LTD Class 1 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the

IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
I. INTRODUCTION unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain
as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
A. History of Land Laws regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
Cruz v. Secretary 347 SCRA 128 G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral
lands;
RESOLUTION
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
PER CURIAM:
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water,
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
are private but community property of the indigenous
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
peoples;
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
to comment.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
merit.
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department
right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples
of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
for the development and utilization of natural resources
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
not more than 25 years; and
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
part.
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
domains and portions thereof which are found to be
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
reforestation.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights
filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR
of private landowners.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it
the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
prays that the petition be dismissed.
the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Constitution.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
These provisions are:
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
ancestral lands;
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that
were granted.
a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties
to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
1
 Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of
the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and
practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples. [if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and
66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease
and desist from implementing Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of
Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions
of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty
of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources. [if !supportFootnotes][7]
[endif]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted
as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an
opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and
Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions
of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should
be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition
solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58,
59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug
also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority
was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate
opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874
by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard
Posner[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] wrote:[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most
backward-looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It
venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom,
seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a
method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of
youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who
wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the
same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms
with history.
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal
system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural
precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources.
The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without
2
considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history.
This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul
shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted
by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of
protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their
ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave
historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal
System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the
private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and
ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the
ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership
and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the
Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources
within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the
natural resources, control and supervision in
their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond
the parameters of Section 7(a) of the
law on ownership of ancestral domains
and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b)
of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph
3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of
the IPRA may be harmonized with
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the
International Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE
PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the
state's power of dominium.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal
theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a
Western legal concept that was first introduced by the
Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion
de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with
respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands,
territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal
crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they
belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for
public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which
are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and
after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage
and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving
them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free
and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents
of pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to them seem
most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of
tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to
the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title
deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper
deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be
protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of
at our will."[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and
conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony
and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took
charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and
concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian. [if !supportFootnotes][5]
[endif]
Private land titles could only be acquired from the government
3
either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the
Crown.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration
of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to
register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The
Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an
amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies,
as already amended by previous orders and decrees. [if !supportFootnotes][8]
[endif]
This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the
Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government,
through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first
Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the
case of Valenton v. Murciano.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis
for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs
had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased
the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower
court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all
rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale.
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year
adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in
the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as
against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not
owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case
on the basis of "those special laws which from earliest time have
regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." [if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif]
The question posed by the Court was: "Did these
special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State
as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically
providing for the disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it
was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a
specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in
the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations
on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine
Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza
of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754. [if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court interpreted it as
follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement
that all those lands belong to the Crown which have not been
granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded
him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be
lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It
excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all
ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the
adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all
the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before
the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their
title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription
were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not
the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time
should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by
them without any action on the part of the authorities." [if !supportFootnotes]
[12][endif]
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been
granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded
him, belonged to the Crown. [if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] For those lands
granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of
assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of
agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land
would be restored to the Crown.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the
Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to
issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's
instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700,
and up to the date of the promulgation and publication of
said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x
x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to
said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which
said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the
same time warn the parties interested that in case of their
failure to present their title deeds within the term
designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will
be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be
granted to others."[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the
adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in
the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations
together with contemporaneous legislative and executive
interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared
no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it,
than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the
Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to
a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet
it has always insisted that he must make that proof before
the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his
4
deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute
owner."[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892
there was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs
could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without
any action by the State." [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Valenton had no rights
other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on
the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue
of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld
the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy
pursued by the Spanish Government from earliest times,
requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds
therefor from the State, has been continued by the
American Government in Act No. 926."[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition
of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government;[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] and that the government's title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] The term "public
land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, [if !
supportFootnotes][21][endif]
and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public
Land Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more
comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No.
141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it
is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two
relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and
corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and
corporations.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the
Torrens system under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903.
Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private
lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost
a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898, [if !
supportFootnotes][25][endif]
which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the
Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned
it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system
requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to
the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein,
subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants
or reserves.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance
of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and
negotiation.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935
Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the
1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. [if !supportFootnotes][28]
[endif]
There was an overwhelming sentiment in the
Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of
natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] State ownership of natural resources
was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the
state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development,
or utilization.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of
land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and
applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as
follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8,
Article XIV on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
5
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in
Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy and Patrimony," to
wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as
all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on public or
private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State
ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the
IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote
the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is
simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the
IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector
in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands,
and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the
same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of
the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from
date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the
ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the
transfer is for an unconscionable consideration. [if !supportFootnotes]
[33][endif]
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the
ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and empowerment,
[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
social justice and human rights,[if !supportFootnotes][35]
[endif]
the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions,
institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to
develop their own sciences and technologies.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif]
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an
independent agency under the Office of the President and is
composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from
each of the ethnographic areas-- Region I and the Cordilleras;
Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro,
Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and
Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] The NCIP took over the functions of
the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities created by former President
Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure. [if !
supportFootnotes][38][endif]
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws
and practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the
NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. [if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] The NCIP's
decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such
as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon
ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with
customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or
fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay
damages.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e.,
the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous
6
Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while
that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 [if !supportFootnotes]
[41][endif]
and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples--
refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies identified by
self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories,
sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions
and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a
group of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously
lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed
and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial.
They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors
and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte,
and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of
110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region-- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc,
Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot,
and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela,
Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of
Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta
of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III-- Aetas.
3. In Region IV-- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora,
Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid,
Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of
Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato
of Palawan.
4. In Region V-- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-
Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon
of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the
Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI-- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz;
the Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII-- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX-- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon
and Yakat.
8. Region X-- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are:
the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the
Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte,
Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon
of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental,
the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of
Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI-- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They
are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan,
Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur;
Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces
and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the
Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao
del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South
Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII-- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug,
Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes
back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was
peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays. [if !supportFootnotes][44][endif]
The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural
features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the
archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or
fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and
socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders.
Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-
colonial society.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water.
Hunting and food gathering became supplementary activities as
reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the
soil.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine
communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous
culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a
primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally
benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna
7
favored similarities, not differences.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] Life was
essentially subsistence but not harsh.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan
in structure and form. They had languages that traced their origin
to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media
of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of
their literary moods.[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] They fashioned concepts
and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they
sensed to be part of their lives. [if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] They had their
own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality
of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs
in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a
host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits.
The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds,
for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to
be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to
their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship
between man and the object of nature.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif]
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that
derived its meaning from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a
boat, which transported them to these shores. [if !supportFootnotes][52][endif]
The barangay was basically a family-based community and
consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was
different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the
chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their
welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised
all the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator
and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war. [if !
supportFootnotes][53][endif]
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed
down orally from generation to generation and constituted the bulk
of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and
in the memory of the elder persons in the community. [if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] The
written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from
time to time as the necessity arose. [if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] The oldest known
written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250
A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code
of Sulu.[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif] Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with
various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime
and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever
disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by
the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising
between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which
a board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters. [if !
supportFootnotes][57][endif]
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of
private property in land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the
name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with
chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual,
therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the
instruments of production as a member of the barangay. [if !supportFootnotes][58][endif]
This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of
mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was
without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or
unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the
development of lands.[if !supportFootnotes][59][endif] Marine resources and fishing
grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their
economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in
land communities.[if !supportFootnotes][60][endif] Recognized leaders, such as the
chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some
economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and
sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from
danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival. [if !
supportFootnotes][61][endif]
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the
archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and
claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu,
Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this
jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon. [if !supportFootnotes][62][endif] The
Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory,
now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.[if !supportFootnotes][63][endif]
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land
was still held in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated
in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of
cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer,
cession or sale of land.[if !supportFootnotes][64][endif]
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi
therefore were primitive economies where most production was
geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship
obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and
profit.[if !supportFootnotes][65][endif] Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to
splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and
separate communities.[if !supportFootnotes][66][endif]
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565,
they found the Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered
along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the
missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos
together in a reduccion.[if !supportFootnotes][67][endif] As early as 1551, the Spanish
government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives. [if !
supportFootnotes][68][endif]
The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of
ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of
community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same
laws."[if !supportFootnotes][69][endif]
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos
where the church and convent would be constructed. All the new
Christian converts were required to construct their houses around
the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same. [if !
supportFootnotes][70][endif]
With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to
"tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using
the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion,
8
to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-
abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make
them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization. [if !supportFootnotes]
[71][endif]
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo
organization as well as all lands not assigned to them and the
pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas,
belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land
grants were made to non-Filipinos.[if !supportFootnotes][72][endif]
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the
introduction of the concept of public domain were the most
immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. [if !
supportFootnotes][73][endif]
The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of
everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the
natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to
land.[if !supportFootnotes][74][endif]
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish
colonialists, civil and religious, classified the Filipinos according to
their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three
types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who
generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the
Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or
the indigenous communities.[if !supportFootnotes][75][endif]
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture.
This class was favored by the Spaniards and was allowed certain
status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were
regarded as the lowest classes.[if !supportFootnotes][76][endif]
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The
Moros were driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the
infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the
deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate
concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were
difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.[if !
supportFootnotes][77][endif]
Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial
administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly
evolved Christian community.[if !supportFootnotes][78][endif] Their own political, economic
and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought
about a generally mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility
between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on
the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise
culturally and historically related populace through a colonial
system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos. [if !
supportFootnotes][79][endif]
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission
of April 7, 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are
now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they
are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however,
be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs." [if !supportFootnotes][80][endif]
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding
them in the path of civilization, the American government chose "to
adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and
with the national conscience."[if !supportFootnotes][81][endif]
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the
Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos. The term
"non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical
area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities."[if !supportFootnotes][82][endif]
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In
1903, they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian
Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary
task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos,
including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the
most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization
and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with
American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in
Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials
about them.[if !supportFootnotes][83][endif]
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian
Filipinos. The raging issue then was the conservation of the national
patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to
effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral
and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural
minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all
said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the
Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law
called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine
mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).[if !supportFootnotes][84][endif] The CNI was given, more or less, the
same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-
independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of
assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward
relationship.[if !supportFootnotes][85][endif]
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the
desired result. Like the Spaniards and Americans, government
attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since
World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of
Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open
spaces in Mindanao.[if !supportFootnotes][86][endif] Knowledge by the
settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system
resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the
settlers' names. With government initiative and
participation, this titling displaced several indigenous
9
peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also
displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the
name of national development.[if !supportFootnotes][87][endif]
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the
following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and
interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and
implementation of State policies."[if !supportFootnotes][88][endif]
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or
the "cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the
Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural communities." More
importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition
and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by
the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies. President
Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential
Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to
integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger
community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to
preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community."[if !supportFootnotes][89]
[endif]
In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree
recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. [if !
supportFootnotes][90][endif]
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as
the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land
occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who
were given up to 1984 to register their claims. [if !supportFootnotes][91][endif] In 1979, the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O.
No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land
problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos. [if !supportFootnotes]
[92][endif]
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the
early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera
region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the
National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw
their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company
(BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company
was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550
hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in
Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan
natives.[if !supportFootnotes][93][endif] Timber concessions, water projects,
plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the
national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous
peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of
their natural environment.[if !supportFootnotes][94][endif]
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of
integration to one of preservation. Invoking her powers under the
Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim
Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.
[if !supportFootnotes][95][endif]
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6)
provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.[if !supportFootnotes][96][endif] This Constitution
goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to
their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively
upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the
Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible,
marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not
dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as
different from those of the rest of the population.[if !supportFootnotes][97][endif] The kind
of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked
well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion
to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had
become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural
perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems
were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of
power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts
of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which
emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of
social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. [if !
supportFootnotes][98][endif]
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence.
There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership.
Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal
right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary
owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to
work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of
the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of
"trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the
present generation but the future ones as well.[if !supportFootnotes][99][endif]
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the
land except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its
mere stewards.[if !supportFootnotes][100][endif] Customary law has a strong
preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by
a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, [if !
supportFootnotes][101][endif]
or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not
be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under
customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly
collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who
are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and
swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards,
pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned. [if !supportFootnotes][102][endif]
For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic base.
Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land
also sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice
10
farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is
limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of
the property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner
as defined under our Civil Code. [if !supportFootnotes][103][endif] Under Kalinga customary
law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in
marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to
sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops. [if !supportFootnotes][104][endif] Moreover,
and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any
village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-
member of the ili.[if !supportFootnotes][105][endif]
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and
social system. The concept of individual land ownership under the
civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national
land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to
ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if
not inexistent.[if !supportFootnotes][106][endif]
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine
indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint
efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills-- Senate
Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,[if !
supportFootnotes][107][endif]
Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and
Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the
comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which
was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.[if !
supportFootnotes][108][endif]
At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth
Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a
background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the
Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro,
have long suffered from the dominance and neglect of government
controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian
brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the
tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the
intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive
exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the
migrant population, they became marginalized. And the
government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It
organized and supported the resettlement of people to their
ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and
early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide
for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the
traditional areas of the ICCs."[if !supportFootnotes][109][endif]
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first
inhabited and cared for the land long before any central
government was established. Their ancestors had territories over
which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These
territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains,
the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their
environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is
manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-
cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and
irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights;
asserting their rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall
cease to exist as distinct peoples."[if !supportFootnotes][110][endif]
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively,
Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the
concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition
subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and
jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the
doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the case of Cario
v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an
indigenous member of the cultural communities as one of
private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native
title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was
affirmed in subsequent cases."[if !supportFootnotes][111][endif]
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A.
No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly
or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title"
or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains.
Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier
continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American
occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it was
more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton
disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth
and the early years of the Philippine Republic when
government organized and supported massive resettlement
of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs
right to own and possess their ancestral land. The bill was prepared
also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme
power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal
tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from
serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position
of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are
11
entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21)
Senators voting in favor and none against, with no abstention. [if !
supportFootnotes][112][endif]
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the
Committee on Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and
subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio
Andolana of North Cotabato.[if !supportFootnotes][113][endif]
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of
similar implications that would promote, recognize the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's
obligation to assure and ascertain that these rights shall be well-
preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws
that remained long before this Republic was established shall be
preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into
these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill
shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of
more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the
mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year
2000." [if !supportFootnotes][114][endif]
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the
policy of preservation as mandated in the Constitution. He also
emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in
Cario v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they
had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and
American regimes.[if !supportFootnotes][115][endif]
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its
corresponding amendments, was approved on Second Reading with
no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE
CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the
Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not
Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same
as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the
Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. -- Subject to Section 56 hereof,
refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water,
mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land
occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans
who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims
of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of
government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not
limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously
until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government
projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private
individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds,
burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access
to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges
of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. [if !supportFootnotes][116][endif]
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands
are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include
but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots.[if !supportFootnotes][117][endif]
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are
similar to the procedures embodied in Department Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel
Alcala.[if !supportFootnotes][118][endif] DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of
ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance
of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of
Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains
and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA on the National
12
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). [if !supportFootnotes][119][endif] The
guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation.
[if !supportFootnotes][120][endif]
This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive
role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the
activities pertinent thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][121][endif]
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA.
The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands
is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure
provided under the law and upon finding by the NCIP that the
application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community
concerned.[if !supportFootnotes][122][endif] The allocation of lands within the
ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate
(family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide
in accordance with customs and traditions. [if !supportFootnotes][123][endif] With
respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the
NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). [if !supportFootnotes]
[124][endif]
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered
by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the place where the
property is situated.[if !supportFootnotes][125][endif]
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How
Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title
over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens
title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration
Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title-- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and
domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held
under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been
public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been
held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." [if !supportFootnotes][126]
[endif]
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held
under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These
lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral
lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. [if !supportFootnotes]
[127][endif]
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be
embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall
recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated.[if !supportFootnotes][128][endif]
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership
of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of private
ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands
and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and
domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore,
indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are
private.
(a) Cario v. Insular Government[if !supportFootnotes][129][endif]
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the
1909 case of Cario v. Insular Government.[if !supportFootnotes][130][endif]
Cario firmly established a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with
the land registration court 146 hectares of land in Baguio
Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been
possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial;
that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding
of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cario
inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to
have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no
document issued from the Spanish Crown. [if !supportFootnotes][131][endif] In
1901, Cario obtained a possessory title to the land under the
Spanish Mortgage Law.[if !supportFootnotes][132][endif] The North American
colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built
a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to
his property in the land registration court. While his petition was
pending, a U.S. military reservation [if !supportFootnotes][133][endif] was
proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military
detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle
and trespassers, including Cario, off the land.[if !supportFootnotes][134][endif]
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's
application for absolute ownership to the land. Both the
Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government
appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land
registration court and dismissed Cario's application. The Philippine
Supreme Court[if !supportFootnotes][135][endif] affirmed the C.F.I. by applying
the Valenton ruling. Cario took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
[if !supportFootnotes][136][endif]
On one hand, the Philippine government
invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cario failed to
comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,
which required registration of land claims within a limited period of
time. Cario, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner
of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the
public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal
feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps
the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not
recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the
same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in
legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign
nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute
13
power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall
insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the
past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to
decide."[if !supportFootnotes][137][endif]
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish
doctrines. The choice was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had
to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American
constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as well as the pronounced policy
"to do justice to the natives."[if !supportFootnotes][138][endif] It was based on the strong
mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law
shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white
race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to
the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America
was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny
that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the
internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902,
chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and
rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude
thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its
own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same
statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution,
and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no
law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have
quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready
to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had
become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what
they, by native custom and by long association,-- of the profoundest factors in
human thought,-- regarded as their own."[if !supportFootnotes][139][endif]
The Court went further:
"[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like
the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a
case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to
give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."[if !supportFootnotes][140][endif]
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far
back as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private
ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public
land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish
decrees upheld in the 1904 decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S.
Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native
title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to
recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant.
The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all
"theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist
beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not
discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us
that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and
laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate
pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some
lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers
or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton
v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it
seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm
those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins
by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin
of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and
discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed
nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their
books." (Emphasis supplied).[if !supportFootnotes][141][endif]
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings
never held sway over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish
laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to
register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such
land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to
establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the
doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility
that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law
because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the
various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of
the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
Constitution, the court validated this kind of title. [if !supportFootnotes][142][endif]
This title was sufficient, even without government administrative action, and
entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law
present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We
have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the
change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental
principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are
14
of the opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice
and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain." [if !supportFootnotes][143][endif]
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of
the 148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.[if !supportFootnotes][144][endif]
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically
refer to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-
General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never
was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish
Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials
would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to
which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and
which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may
have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of
the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the
present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to
amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not
have permitted and had not the power to enforce."[if !supportFootnotes][145][endif]
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in
the entire length of the Cario decision. It is observed that the widespread use
of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a
Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the
Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the
Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal
Land Law.[if !supportFootnotes][146][endif] This article was made after Professor Lynch
visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the
origin and development of Philippine land laws. [if !supportFootnotes][147][endif] He
discussed Cario extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cario's
title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the
concept of "native title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually
similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians. [if !supportFootnotes][148][endif] This is
not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American
regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in
reference to native Americans.[if !supportFootnotes][149][endif] This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.[if !
supportFootnotes][150][endif]
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution
authorizing the provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their
domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake
Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and
some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from
the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under
the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police
power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent
settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans,
introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and
protecting the public forests in which they roamed. [if !supportFootnotes][151][endif]
Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the
policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods
followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the
so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an
investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have
been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.[if !supportFootnotes][152][endif]
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known
to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have
been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and
that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the
government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as
many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro
as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States."[if !supportFootnotes][153][endif]
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the
Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by
proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians. [if !
supportFootnotes][154][endif]
It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by
executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription. [if !
supportFootnotes][155][endif]
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or
reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or
occupancy."[if !supportFootnotes][156][endif] The aboriginal right of possession depends
on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their
ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory
occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation. [if !supportFootnotes][157][endif] It is a
right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental
action, although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with
Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their
occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries. [if !supportFootnotes][158]
[endif]
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans'
rights to land they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of
the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by
the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in
15
1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.[if !supportFootnotes][159][endif]
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2)
grants made by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court
refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The
only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the
government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed that they
had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by
bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the
court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and
consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery
was made, against all other European governments, which title might
be consummated by possession.[if !supportFootnotes][160][endif] The exclusion of all
other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As
regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives
were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive,
no other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants
were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a
considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but
their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the
natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in
themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a
title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy." [if !
supportFootnotes][161][endif]
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the
exclusive right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to
the discoverer-- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland-- did this right
belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of
the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the
discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians
were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her
subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer
purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that
the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians
could not convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to
other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their
right of possession has never been questioned. The claim of
government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this
right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that
right."[if !supportFootnotes][162][endif]
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the
present day, proves the universal recognition of this principle. [if !supportFootnotes][163]
[endif]
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and
their native lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the
government to many U.S. citizens.[if !supportFootnotes][164][endif]
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.[if !
supportFootnotes][165][endif]
In this case, the State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all
white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit
from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high
misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said
license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for
interfering with the treaties established between the United States and the
Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with
them. It characterized the relationship between the United States government
and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some
foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their
protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power
was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the
protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their
neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in its place,
led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were
under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They
assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with
Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character,
and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master."[if !supportFootnotes][166][endif]
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations
with distinct territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over
all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations,
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection
which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is
still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which
their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed
by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
16
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power,
which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate
than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this
was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them,
means "a people distinct from others." x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][167][endif]
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and
with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States
and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States."[if !supportFootnotes][168][endif]
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of
the discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as the
naked fee,[if !supportFootnotes][169][endif] this title was to be consummated by possession
and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged
the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians
being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted
the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land-- either by purchase,
"defensive" conquest, or cession-- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title.
Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted
ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe
respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the
ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.[if !supportFootnotes][170][endif]
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that
although fee title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the
colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign-- first the
discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the
United States-- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was
nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of
respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which
it accorded the protection of complete ownership. [if !supportFootnotes][171][endif] But this
aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to
occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as
ownership by Congress.[if !supportFootnotes][172][endif] It is clear that this right of
occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. [if !
supportFootnotes][173][endif]
It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the
right of occupancy at will.[if !supportFootnotes][174][endif] Thus, aboriginal title is not
the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and
continuous use and occupancy for a long time. [if !supportFootnotes][175][endif] It entails
that land owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its
laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to
any citizen.[if !supportFootnotes][176][endif] Such title as Indians have to possess and
occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of
individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal
membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal
ownership.[if !supportFootnotes][177][endif]
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which
is ordinarily used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other
disposal under general laws. [if !supportFootnotes][178][endif] Indian land which has been
abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain. [if !supportFootnotes][179][endif] On
the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart
for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians. [if !supportFootnotes][180][endif] Once set
apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until
the Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any
preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them. [if !
supportFootnotes][181][endif]
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the
ancestral land claims of indigenous Americans.[if !supportFootnotes][182][endif] And
two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous
property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain
benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
Americans.[if !supportFootnotes][183][endif] Despite the similarities between native title
and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on
whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the
Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their
land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as
successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically
recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress. [if !supportFootnotes][184][endif]
The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by
persons other than the Federal Government. [if !supportFootnotes][185][endif] Although
there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans'
ownership of these lands,[if !supportFootnotes][186][endif] the power of the State to
extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched. [if !supportFootnotes][187][endif]
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting
sovereignty over the ancestral domains and ancestral lands. [if !supportFootnotes][188]
[endif]
The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its
application in the Philippines vis--vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title
will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and
enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to
the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never
public. Cario is the only case that specifically and categorically
recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cario did not
touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains
and lands. Cario was cited by the succeeding cases to support the
concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is
a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be
registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified
in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the
land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the
land.[if !supportFootnotes][189][endif] The land ceases to be part of the public domain, [if !
supportFootnotes][190][endif]
ipso jure,[if !supportFootnotes][191][endif] and is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands [if !supportFootnotes][192]
[endif]
that the court declared that the rule that all lands that were not acquired
from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public
domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest
17
since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. [if !supportFootnotes][193]
[endif]
Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land
Act and Cario was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive
prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify
long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of
public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens [if !
supportFootnotes][194][endif]
and members of the national cultural minorities [if !supportFootnotes]
[195][endif]
that converts the land from public into private and entitles the
registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land
Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in
the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs
over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration
under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA
expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land which
may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that
ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to
public agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496-- Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the
same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are
agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture,
and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent
(18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20)
years from the approval of this Act."[if !supportFootnotes][196][endif]
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands
only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally,
owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial[if !supportFootnotes][197][endif] or for a period of not less than 30 years, which
claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be
registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496,
the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned
ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are
actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes.
These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of
whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in
compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of
the public domain.[if !supportFootnotes][198][endif] Its provisions apply to those lands
"declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which
a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x
x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so." [if !
supportFootnotes][199][endif]
Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only
of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and
lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A.
141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land,
regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent
(18%) or over,[if !supportFootnotes][200][endif] from private to public agricultural
land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be
exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of
approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.
Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987
Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a)
agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks.
Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral
domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To
classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will
render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the
distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses
the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of
vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. [if !supportFootnotes][201][endif]
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that
"Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." [if !
supportFootnotes][202][endif]
It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of
ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life
into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act
recognizes the concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is
based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44
of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect
18
or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior
thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon
while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under
the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such
tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable
or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the
preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he
files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public
Land Law.[if !supportFootnotes][203][endif]
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b)
hereof."[if !supportFootnotes][204][endif]
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was
originally public agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July
4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land
has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is
sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The
possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a
torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the
certificate as entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The
Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429.
This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the
Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may
be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner
to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of
the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, [if !
supportFootnotes][205][endif]
the right to consume the thing by its use, [if !supportFootnotes][206][endif]
the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned, [if !
supportFootnotes][207][endif]
and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing
owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such
thing.[if !supportFootnotes][208][endif]
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the
ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT).
The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership
sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall
serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept
of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private
but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore
cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable
traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept of
ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains
are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply
because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character
ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs
and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas
within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be
communally held.[if !supportFootnotes][209][endif] These communal rights, however,
are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.
[if !supportFootnotes][210][endif]
Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand
partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides
that "[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar
as his share is concerned. [if !supportFootnotes][211][endif] To allow such a right over
ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the
community but of the very community itself.[if !supportFootnotes][212][endif]
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over
real property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation
can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of
another fifty years in any single instance. [if !supportFootnotes][213][endif] Every
stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the corporation. [if !
supportFootnotes][214][endif]
Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily
or involuntarily.[if !supportFootnotes][215][endif]
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present
possessors of the land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs,
past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the
ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain
cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the
19
ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of
ownership. The lands are communal. These lands, however, may be
transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the
same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c)
subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the
land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains,"[if !supportFootnotes][216][endif] the IPRA, by legislative fiat,
introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has
long existed under customary law.[if !supportFootnotes][217][endif]
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized
under the Civil Code as a source of law. [if !supportFootnotes][218][endif] Some articles
of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases
where no codal provision is applicable. [if !supportFootnotes][219][endif] In other words, in
the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly
proven, can define rights and liabilities.[if !supportFootnotes][220][endif]
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA
and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the
absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept
of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and
recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling
and land registration.[if !supportFootnotes][221][endif]
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even
without a paper title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native
title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.-- The rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and
respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be
embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the
title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is
"belongingness" to the land, being people of the land-- by sheer force of
having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture
of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation
to the land-- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage,
and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from man, care for
land; from the land, sustenance for man.[if !supportFootnotes][222][endif]
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian
Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.-- The rights of ownership and possession
of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such
rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made
by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.-- Subject to Section 56
hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands and territories
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the
profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.-- The right to stay in the territory and not to
be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and
prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x
x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.-- In case displacement occurs as a result of
natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced
ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support
systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.-- Right to regulate the entry of
migrant settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.--For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall
have access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters
and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.-- The right to claim parts of the
ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except
those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.-- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with
customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default
thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the
Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.-- The right of ownership and possession of
the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.-- Such right shall include the right to
transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,
subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.-- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of
land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of
the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is
transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP
shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen
(15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting
20
and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights:
(1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the
territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right
to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water;
(f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g)
the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over
the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer
the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members
thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens
title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within
the Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the
Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and
Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of
natural resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution." [if !
supportFootnotes][223][endif]
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources-- waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources-- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the State
exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4)
modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary
power and responsibility in the exploration, development and
utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake
the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by
the private sector through co-production,[if !supportFootnotes][224][endif] joint venture,[if !
supportFootnotes][225][endif]
or production-sharing agreements. [if !supportFootnotes][226][endif] These
agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these
resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State,
through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance
agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e.,
co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-
scale[if !supportFootnotes][227][endif] and small-scale mining.[if !supportFootnotes][228][endif] "Small-
scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor
using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy
mining equipment."[if !supportFootnotes][229][endif]
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes
ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in
Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership-- The right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them
at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention
bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and
21
fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds,
forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources
found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under
Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources"
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as
belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond
the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA [if !supportFootnotes][230][endif] in Section 1, Part
II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands,
waters, and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any
time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not
limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right
to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or
interests over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be
particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent
or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership
over "lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is
not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our
Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim
ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership
over the natural resources found on or under the land. [if !supportFootnotes][231][endif] The
IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources.
Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land
within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law
that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be
discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over
these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules was not specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners.
Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in
general.[if !supportFootnotes][232][endif] Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the
implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of
"natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules
goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of
the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in
Section 7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.-- Subject to Section
56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within
the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit
and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant
to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may
sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment
upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of
the IPRA enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories
and uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights. [if !supportFootnotes]
[233][endif]
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right
to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and
share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate
the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of
"ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation
measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must
be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and
conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the
exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the
form of management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these
resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for
their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that
the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future
generations and that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the
ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws. [if !
supportFootnotes][234][endif]
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be
taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as
22
distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural
resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest
dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who
exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." [if !
supportFootnotes][235][endif]
Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to
manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature,
necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of
the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.-- The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A
non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the
development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25)
years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the
ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-
making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the
NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard
the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the
ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the
ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is
utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive
use that require technology other than manual labor. [if !supportFootnotes][236][endif] The
law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to
participate in the development and utilization of the natural resources and
thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal
written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the
ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage
and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs
"priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means
giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not
necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that
there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the
power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself
chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an
affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the
ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the
Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution [if !supportFootnotes][237][endif] in relation to
Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources,
may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the
natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the
priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the
natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may
likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow
such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If
the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights
of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall
be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the
ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4)
options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development and
exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights
of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development
and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of
the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow
such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically
give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is
within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there
is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the
large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The
ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or
control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over
the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law
simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land
where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for
their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural
resources by the following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.-- All departments and other
governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing,
renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any
production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that
the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such
certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted
by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no
certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed
and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
23
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing
agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally,
That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with
this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation
process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the
exploitation of natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all
departments and government agencies without prior certification from the
NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any
ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-
based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and prior
informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the
consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any
project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the
issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that
a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement
does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP
with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to
grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the
NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the
agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the
certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not
necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within
the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-
imperialism stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a
massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization
of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples
controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was
enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights. [if !supportFootnotes][238][endif] The rise
of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North
American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the
possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,
[if !supportFootnotes][239][endif]
and during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the
international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first
Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the
Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the
building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one
of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world. [if !supportFootnotes][240][endif]
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the
international scene. This came as a result of the increased publicity focused
on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction
of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national
governments' inability to deal with the situation. [if !supportFootnotes][241][endif]
Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental
protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international
agenda.[if !supportFootnotes][242][endif]
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of
applying policies, programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations.
The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the
dismal experience of projects in Latin America. [if !supportFootnotes][243][endif] The World
Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in
Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian
Development Bank.[if !supportFootnotes][244][endif]
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of
ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the
framework of national unity and development. [if !supportFootnotes][245][endif] The IPRA
amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of
IPs,[if !supportFootnotes][246][endif] and is heavily influenced by both the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[if !supportFootnotes][247][endif]
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries" [if !supportFootnotes][248][endif]
and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many
other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination. [if !
supportFootnotes][249][endif]
ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning
the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.
Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new
international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the
aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions,
ways of life and economic development."[if !supportFootnotes][250][endif]
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been
plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These differences were carried
over and magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a
national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. [if !supportFootnotes]
[251][endif]
Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the
alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The
histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of
Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary
problems.[if !supportFootnotes][252][endif] It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made
by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and
biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The
Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization
process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic
society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to
participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, [if !supportFootnotes][253][endif]
it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and
customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws
in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
24
SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you?
Only the race own the land because only the race lives forever. To claim a
piece of land is a birthright of every man. The lowly animals claim their place;
how much more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us
life and placed us in the world to live human lives. And where shall we obtain
life? From the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In
tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is a grace that must be nurtured.
To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu Kabunian to
all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs life.
- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L.
Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos" in Indigenous View of Land and
the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World Bank
Discussion Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever
possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. [if !
supportFootnotes][1][endif]
The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a
valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)
must be construed in view of such presumption of constitutionality. Further,
the interpretation of these provisions should take into account the purpose of
the law, which is to give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of
the indigenous peoples be recognized and protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands
and domains and therefore, their heritage, is not unique. It is one that they
share with the red-skinned Indians of the United States, with the aborigines of
Australia, the Maori of New Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few.
Happily, the nations in which these indigenous peoples live all have enacted
measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive past by the promise of a
progressive future. Thus has the international community realized the
injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This
sentiment among the family of nations is expressed in a number of
documents, the most recent and most comprehensive of which is the Draft
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was
adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among the rights
recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the
resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or
damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous peoples.
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples
The term indigenous traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu,
meaning within. In the sense the term has come to be used, it is nearer in
meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means native.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Indigenous refers to that which originated or has been produced naturally in a
particular land, and has not been introduced from the outside. [if !supportFootnotes][4]
[endif]
In international law, the definition of what constitutes indigenous peoples
attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term indigenous
peoples has been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice
has been guided by a working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special
Rapporteur Martinez Cobo:[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sections of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them.
They form at present non-dominant sections of society and are determined to
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions
and legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended
period reaching into the present, of one or more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion,
living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous
community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as
the habitual means of communication at home or in the
family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal
language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the
world;
(f) Other relevant facts.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In Philippine constitutional law, the term indigenous peoples pertains to
those groups of Filipinos who have retained a high degree of continuity from
pre-Conquest culture.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Philippine legal history, however, has
not been kind to the indigenous peoples, characterized them as uncivilized, [if !
supportFootnotes][8][endif]
backward people,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] with barbarous practices[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
and a low order of intelligence.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international
law, IPRA now employs the politically-correct conjunctive term indigenous
peoples/indigenous cultural communities as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.-- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of
people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by
others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since
time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural
traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads
of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent
from the populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures,
or the establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may
25
have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled
outside their ancestral domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous
peoples were already plowing our soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos
of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original inhabitants of our archipelago,
were, at that time, practicing a native culture. From the time the Spaniards
arrived up to the early part of the American regime,[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] these
native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their
lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro
and Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their
ancestral lands, the lands of their forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the
indigenous peoples, our national culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this
native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial domination have
created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the group
of cultural minorities.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] The extant Philippine national culture
is the culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign
cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant. [if !supportFootnotes]
[14][endif]
While the culture of the majority reoriented itself to Western influence,
the culture of the minorities has retained its essentially native character.
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural
community. Around twelve million Filipinos are members of the one hundred
and ten or so indigenous cultural communities, [if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] accounting
for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated seventy million
Filipinos[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are
one of the poorest sectors of Philippine society. The incidence of poverty and
malnutrition among them is significantly higher than the national average.
The indigenous peoples are also among the most powerless. Perhaps because
of their inability to speak the language of law and power, they have been
relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any, voice in national
politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long
destitution of our less fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity
to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social justice, and to reach
out particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the
indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law several
provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the
indigenous peoples, to wit:
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples
within the framework of national unity and development. [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and
disposition of property and its increments.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization
of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or
concession, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. [if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures,
traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of
national plans and policies.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President
on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the
members of which shall come from such communities. [if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional
provisions. It provides, among others, that the State shall recognize and
promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national
unity and development, protect their rights over the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent
of the ancestral domains.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Moreover, IPRA enumerates the
civil and political rights of the indigenous peoples; [if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] spells
out their social and cultural rights; [if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] acknowledges a general
concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title thereto; [if !supportFootnotes]
[26][endif]
and creates the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the
President.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Preliminary Issues
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. [if !
supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions
or cases.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] The threshold issue, therefore, is whether an
appropriate case exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and
that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, [if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] or that which
seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. [if !supportFootnotes]
[31][endif]
A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an actual
controversy, unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show
that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term controversy is the
presence of opposing views or contentions. [if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] Otherwise, the
Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they
lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed
from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted
situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. [if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
26
The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of
judicial determination.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of
legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government
agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be
successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of
the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial
resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its
face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands
of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State
machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute,
this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent
injury and violation of the constitutional process.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise
the constitutional questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person
who assails the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury
as a result of its enforcement.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] Evidently, the rights asserted
by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the
citizens, the violation of which may result only in a generalized grievance. [if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif]
Yet, in a sense, all citizens and taxpayers suits are efforts to
air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the
allocation of power.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif]
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to
standing.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] The proper party requirement is considered as
merely procedural,[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] and the Court has ample discretion with
regard thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] As early as 1910, the Court in the case of
Severino vs. Governor General [if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] held:
x x x [W]hen the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the
relator must show some personal or special interest in the subject matter,
since he is regarded as the real party in interest and his right must clearly
appear. Upon the other hand, when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
This Court has recognized that a public right, or that which belongs to
the people at large, may also be the subject of an actual case or controversy.
In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may enforce a public right in behalf
of other citizens. We opined therein that:
[T]he right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from
that of any other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true
that the injury which he would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought
would not be greater or different from that of the other electors; but he is
seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a private right.
The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the
town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and would suffer the
same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to
maintaining a petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should
be granted.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
In Taada v. Tuvera,[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] the Court enforced the public
right to due process and to be informed of matters of public concern.
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments, [if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] the Court upheld
the public right to be heard or consulted on matters of national concern.
In Oposa v. Factoran,[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] the Court recognized the public
right of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation-aptly and
fittingly stressed by petitioners-the advancement of which may even be said
to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the public right to ensure that the
national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the
Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national
patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to
ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to
ensure that any grant of concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the
preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a
proper subject of a citizens suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to
enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of
an unconstitutional statute,[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] and by necessity, he may assail
the validity of a statute appropriating public funds. [if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] The
taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus,
may inquire into the manner by which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The
expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose of administering an
invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds. [if !supportFootnotes][51][endif]
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to
Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In the same manner, Section 79
authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing that the amount
necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the
current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities
(the ONCC) and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the OSCC), [if !
supportFootnotes][52][endif]
which were merged as organic offices of the NCIP. [if !
supportFootnotes][53][endif]
Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayers suit.
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
27
or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or
persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] Mandamus, on the other hand, is an
extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to
be done, when said entity or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, or when said entity or person unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif]
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from
implementing the challenged provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same
officials be enjoined from disbursing public funds for the implementation of
the said law and rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be
compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the activities
pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from
implementing the questioned provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds
in connection therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise,
mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of the countrys natural resources. Consequently, the petition for
prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy for the relief sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of
courts, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the petition in view of the
importance of the issues raised therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower
court that should initially pass upon the issues of a case. That way, as a
particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the
important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper
subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of
experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of
courts. Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif]
such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. The resort to this Courts primary jurisdiction to issue said writs
shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
such invocation.[if !supportFootnotes][57][endif] We held in People v. Cuaresma[if !
supportFootnotes][58][endif]
that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket x x x. [if !supportFootnotes][59][endif]
(Emphasis supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous
peoples. Its impact upon the lives not only of the indigenous peoples but also
upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The resolution of this case by
the Court at the earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are to
be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to allow petitioners invocation
of this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance.
Substantive Issues
Primary Issue
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor
General revolves around the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA,
specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59. These provisions
allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right
of ownership[if !supportFootnotes][60][endif] over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by
virtue of native title.[if !supportFootnotes][61][endif] The term ancestral lands under the
28
statute refers to lands occupied by individuals, families and clans who are
members of indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands
are required to have been occupied, possessed and utilized by them or
through their ancestors since time immemorial, continuously to the present. [if !
supportFootnotes][62][endif]
On the other hand, ancestral domains is defined as areas
generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,
worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous
cultural communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the
home ranges of indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or
shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also include inland waters, coastal
areas and natural resources therein. [if !supportFootnotes][63][endif] Again, the same are
required to have been held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present. [if !supportFootnotes]
[64][endif]
Under Section 56, property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of said law shall be recognized and
respected.
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA
pertaining to ancestral lands, ancestral domains, and natural resources are
unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who, between the State and
the indigenous peoples, are the rightful owners of these properties?
It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with,
and not in violation, of the fundamental law. [if !supportFootnotes][65][endif] The reason is
that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted within its
authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts
should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid,
sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. [if !supportFootnotes][66][endif]
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are part of the public domain and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General
advance the following arguments:
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law
acquired exclusive dominion over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and
conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia,
which was introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521,
acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura
regalia which imputes to the State the ownership of all lands and makes the
State the original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine
State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is the source of any
asserted right of ownership in land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cario doctrine
exists. However, petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title
to lands of the public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor
General, for his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands
of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the
public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over
ancestral lands and ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cario doctrine,
such native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935
Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII
of the Constitution to protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However, they contend that the
mandate is subject to Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia
embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and protection
under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains is far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of
Congress.
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned
by the State, petitioners posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the
public domain and other natural resources.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of
jura regalia is understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our
legal system; it has been regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable
postulate of Philippine land law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental
law and has been recognized by the Court.[if !supportFootnotes][67][endif]
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must
be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its
successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine
Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the
Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some
source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere.[if !supportFootnotes][68][endif]
In its broad sense, the term jura regalia refers to royal rights,[if !
supportFootnotes][69][endif]
or those rights which the King has by virtue of his
prerogatives.[if !supportFootnotes][70][endif] In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the
sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or
propriedad.[if !supportFootnotes][71][endif] These were rights enjoyed during feudal times
by the king as the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally
held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who
were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically
retained the title.[if !supportFootnotes][72][endif] By fiction of law, the King was regarded
as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and
from him all lands were held. [if !supportFootnotes][73][endif] The theory of jura regalia was
therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.[if !supportFootnotes][74][endif]
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held
in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cario vs.
Insular Government[if !supportFootnotes][75][endif] the United States Supreme Court,
reversing the decision[if !supportFootnotes][76][endif]of the pre-war Philippine Supreme
Court, made the following pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a
case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
29
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x.[if !
supportFootnotes][77][endif]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of
native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any
grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
In Cario, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cario applied for registration in
his name of an ancestral land located in Benguet. The applicant established
that he and his ancestors had lived on the land, had cultivated it, and had
used it as far they could remember. He also proved that they had all been
recognized as owners, the land having been passed on by inheritance
according to native custom. However, neither he nor his ancestors had any
document of title from the Spanish Crown. The government opposed the
application for registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held that the applicant was entitled to the
registration of his native title to their ancestral land.
Cario was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when
decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction. [if !
supportFootnotes][78][endif]
We applied the Cario doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs.
Director of Lands,[if !supportFootnotes][79][endif] where we stated that [a]ll lands that
were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. [if !
supportFootnotes][80][endif]
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling in Cario
was premised on the fact that the applicant had complied with the requisites
of acquisitive prescription, having established that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. In
effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for by Cario
was transferred from the State, as original owner, to Cario by virtue of
prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the basis for
decreeing by mere legislative fiatthat ownership of vast tracts of land belongs
to [indigenous peoples] without judicial confirmation. [if !supportFootnotes][81][endif]
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cario doctrine applies
only to alienable lands of the public domain and, as such, cannot be extended
to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cario would show that the doctrine enunciated
therein applies only to lands which have always been considered as
private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or
otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of land under
native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State.
Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by
its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since
time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its
successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government.
There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been
regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast,
ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a
conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to
private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private
person. Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private
land and is deemed never to have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor
Generals thesis that native title under Cario applies only to lands of the public
domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks
under the Constitution[if !supportFootnotes][82][endif] is irrelevant to the application of the
Cario doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State
ownership of lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and
ancestral domains.
Legal history supports the Cario doctrine.
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its
discovery and occupation thereof in the 16th century and the Treaty of
Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with Portugal, [if !supportFootnotes][83][endif] the
continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were considered as terra nullius
although already populated by other peoples. [if !supportFootnotes][84][endif] The discovery
and occupation by the European States, who were then considered as the only
members of the international community of civilized nations, of lands in the
said continents were deemed sufficient to create title under international law. [if
!supportFootnotes][85][endif]
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the
Philippines, this did not mean that it acquired title to all lands in the
archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the Spanish Crown was
considered to have acquired dominion only over the unoccupied and
unclaimed portions of our islands.[if !supportFootnotes][86][endif]
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to
deprive the natives of their property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under
instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the natives and to their
property. In this regard, an authority on the early Spanish colonial period in
the Philippines wrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a
challenging opportunity to avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of
Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who
commanded the expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification of the
archipelago. This extraordinary document could have been lifted almost
verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria,
delivered in the University of Salamanca. The King instructed Legazpi to
inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their persons
or to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and
in friendship and "to explain to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will
be saved." Although the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if
attacked, the royal instructions admonished the commander to commit no
aggressive act which might arouse native hostility.[if !supportFootnotes][87][endif]
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings
including native land occupancy.[if !supportFootnotes][88][endif] Thus, the Recopilacin de
Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands already held by the
30
natives.[if !supportFootnotes][89][endif] The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not
extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree,
dated June 25, 1880, provided that all those in unlawful possession of royal
lands must legalize their possession by means of adjustment proceedings, [if !
supportFootnotes][90][endif]
and within the period specified. The later royal decree, dated
February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law, declared that titles
that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for which
adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the
Maura Law, it was held in the case of Cario that the royal decree of 1894
should not be construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal
of the privilege of registering such title.[if !supportFootnotes][91][endif]
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the
Philippines to the United States, contrary to petitioners assertion that the US
merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the latters rights over lands
of the public domain.[if !supportFootnotes][92][endif] Under the Treaty of Paris of December
10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to property
existing at the time.[if !supportFootnotes][93][endif] During the American colonial regime,
native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902
provided that property and rights acquired by the US through cession from
Spain were to be administered for the benefit of the Filipinos. [if !supportFootnotes][94]
[endif]
In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinleys Instructions, as
well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the
safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an
inviolable rule upon every division and branch of the American colonial
government in the Philippines, [if !supportFootnotes][95][endif] was that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. [if !supportFootnotes][96]
[endif]
These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in
turn expressly protected by the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution.
Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples over their ancestral
lands and ancestral domains were firmly established in law.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights
of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and domains were abated by
the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the 1935
Constitution.[if !supportFootnotes][97][endif] He advances the following arguments:
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the
power to restructure the consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the
State. Through the mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the
State has wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it deems
absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It has been held that
the State may impair vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police
power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only
essential to but determinative of social welfare and existence. To allow
otherwise is to invite havoc in the established social system. x x x
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of
natural resources that have been found from generation to generation to be
critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its agent, the State. [if !supportFootnotes][98]
[endif]
Stated simply, the Solicitor Generals argument is that the State, as the
source of all titles to land, had the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935
Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral lands and ancestral
domains. While the Solicitor General admits that such a theory would
necessarily impair vested rights, he reasons out that even vested rights of
ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not absolute and
may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution
invoked by the Solicitor General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is
too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares that all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. [if !supportFootnotes][99][endif]
Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are absolutely necessary for
social welfare and existence, including those which are not part of the public
domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for
constitutional construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor of the
preservation, rather than impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights.
Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be
construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were
extinguished and that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the
guise of wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural resources [which
the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. On
the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule against the
diminution of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of
lands of the public domain and other natural resources by the State is subject
to any existing right, grant, lease, or concessions. The existing rights that
were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of
ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains.
The words of the law should be given their ordinary or usual meaning, [if !
supportFootnotes][100][endif]
and the term existing rights cannot be assigned an unduly
restrictive definition.
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution [if !supportFootnotes][101][endif]to protect the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and protection under IPRA of
the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional
mandate of the Congress, [if !supportFootnotes][102][endif] since such recognition and
protection amount to the alienation of lands of the public domain, which is
proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent
to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands. In its
general and ordinary sense, the term right refers to any legally enforceable
claim.[if !supportFootnotes][103][endif] It is a power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent
in one person and incident upon another. [if !supportFootnotes][104][endif] When used in
relation to property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an object, or any
just and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it.[if !supportFootnotes][105][endif] Said provision
in the Constitution cannot, by any reasonable construction, be interpreted to
exclude the protection of the right of ownership over such ancestral lands.
For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its constitutional
mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections
7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous peoples
over ancestral lands.
31
 The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the
power to provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains. In light of this provision, does Congress have the power to decide
whether ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the public
domain? Also, does Congress have the power to determine whether the extent
of ancestral domains shall include the natural resources found therein?
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of
the Constitution did not intend Congress to decide whether ancestral domains
shall be public or private property. Rather, they acknowledged that ancestral
domains shall be treated as private property, and that customary laws shall
merely determine whether such private ownership is by the entire indigenous
cultural community, or by individuals, families, or clans within the community.
The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado and Bennagen and Mr. Chief
Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is
instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications
from either Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this
phrase CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY
LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, because ordinarily it is the law
on ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property rights or
relations arising therefrom. On the other hand, in this proposed amendment
the phraseology is that it is the property rights or relations which shall be used
as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain.
I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws and our
regular civil laws on property.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it
to Congress to make the necessary exception to the general law on property
relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an
example of such a customary law wherein it is the property rights and
relations that determine the ownership and the extent of that ownership,
unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is the ownership and the extent of
ownership which determine the property rights and relations arising therefrom
and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may have a different
provision or thrust so that we could make the corresponding suggestions also
by way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership.
There would be ownership based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or
on community. And the thinking expressed in the consultation is that this
should be codified and should be recognized in relation to existing national
laws. That is essentially the concept. [if !supportFootnotes][106][endif] (Emphasis supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also
apparent from the following exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain,
are we thinking in terms of the tribal ownership or community ownership or of
private ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered
as ownership by private individuals, clans and even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that
the State will set aside the ancestral domain and there is a separate law for
that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept more specific ownership in
terms of individuals within the ancestral lands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. [if !
supportFootnotes][107][endif]
(Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the
Constitution never expressly mentioned Cario in their deliberations, they did
not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land, or that they were
unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.[if !
supportFootnotes][108][endif]
The framers of the Constitution, as well as the people
adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines
concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take
these doctrines into consideration in construing the Constitution. [if !supportFootnotes]
[109][endif]
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution
are considered as private property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by
affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its various provisions,
merely abides by the constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of
unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and programs in Section 5,
Article XII of the Constitution to mean as subject to the provision of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, which vests in the State ownership of all lands of
the public domain, mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this
interpretation, petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are the property of the State.
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the
declarations made in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of
conservation and nationalization of lands of the public domain and natural
resources, and is of paramount importance to our national economy and
patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission reveals that the framers of the Constitution inserted the phrase
subject to the provisions of this Constitution mainly to prevent the impairment
of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what constitutes
ancestral lands and ancestral domains, to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting
ancestral lands. How does this affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and
we did say that in cases where due process is clearly established in terms of
prior rights, these two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true
that parts of Baguio City are considered as ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still
recalls, in one of the publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts
could be considered as ancestral domain in relation to the whole population of
Cordillera but not in relation to certain individuals or certain groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is
considered as ancestral land?
32
MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same
manner that Filipinos can speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral
land, but not in terms of the right of a particular person or particular group to
exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. [if !supportFootnotes][110][endif]
Thus, the phrase subject to the provisions of this Constitution was
intended by the framers of the Constitution as a reiteration of the
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without
due process of law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the
protection of rights of the indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands cannot
be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same Article ascribing ownership
of all public lands to the State. The Constitution must be construed as a whole.
It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole Constitution is
examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision. That
construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument. [if
!supportFootnotes][111][endif]
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public
lands, mineral lands and other natural resources should be read together with
the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize the rights of the
indigenous peoples. These, as set forth hereinbefore, [if !supportFootnotes][112][endif]
include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national
unity and development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of
the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being, and for the applicability
of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article XIII, directing
the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural inequities
and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the
principles of agrarian reform or stewardship in the disposition and utilization of
other natural resources, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands;
Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize, respect,
and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article
XVI, authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to advise the
President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national
economy is the more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth.[if !supportFootnotes][113][endif] Equity is given prominence as the first
objective of national economic development.[if !supportFootnotes][114][endif] The framers
of the Constitution did not, by the phrase subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and programs, intend to
establish a hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then
Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., it was not their
objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or to create
absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the
balancing of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davides formulation of the first sentence, he
says: The State, SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights
of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their
economic, social and cultural well-being. There are at least two concepts here
which receive different weights very often. They are the concepts of national
development policies and programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal
communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to ask: When the
Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I
ask this because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely
transgressed in the interest of national development policies and programs.
Hence, I would like to know which is the controlling concept here. Is it the
rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national
development policies and programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is
more paramount. The concept introduced here is really the balancing
of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We have to balance the interests
taking into account the specific needs and the specific interests also of these
cultural communities in like manner that we did so in the autonomous regions.
[if !supportFootnotes][115][endif]
(Emphasis supplied.)
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the States ownership over
the natural resources within the ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over
mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources, [if !supportFootnotes]
[116][endif]
as well as the States full control and supervision over the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources.[if !supportFootnotes][117][endif]
Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a), [if !
supportFootnotes][118][endif]
5,[if !supportFootnotes][119][endif] and 7[if !supportFootnotes][120][endif] of IPRA as
violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that
[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. [if !
supportFootnotes][121][endif]
They would have the Court declare as unconstitutional
Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the
definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State
ownership over these resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and
describes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral domains by setting
forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is
to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words,
Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are
within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of
ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to
our mind, important to ensure that no unnecessary encroachment on private
properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation
process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include
the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character
of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous peoples.
33
Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a source
of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply
because it recognizes ancestral domains as their private but community
property.
The phrase private but community property is merely descriptive of the
indigenous peoples concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided
in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, ownership is the independent and general
power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the
limits established thereby.[if !supportFootnotes][122][endif] The civil law concept of
ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from
the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the
thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform
and even destroy that which is owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude
other persons from the possession the thing owned. [if !supportFootnotes][123][endif] In
contrast, the indigenous peoples concept of ownership emphasizes the
importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal
character of ownership, the property held in common cannot be sold, disposed
or destroyed[if !supportFootnotes][124][endif] because it was meant to benefit the whole
indigenous community and not merely the individual member. [if !supportFootnotes][125]
[endif]
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to
the indigenous peoples is also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral
conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous
peoples over their ancestral domains, to wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8 [if !supportFootnotes][126][endif] rights to ancestral
domain, this is where we transferred the other provision but here itself
---
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short
Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the
provisions on natural resources because we all agree that that
belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those
indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be
exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to
give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any
mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their
areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our
people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers
or the secretariat could just propose a provision for incorporation here
so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be
compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection
both are already considered in subsequent sections which we are now
looking for.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the
indigenous people where they are. Number two, in terms of the mines
there is a need for prior consultation of source which is here already. So,
anyway it is on the record that you want to make sure that the
secretariat takes note of those two issues and my assurance is that it is
already there and I will make sure that they cross check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a
Senate version you do not have and if you agree we will adopt that. [if !
supportFootnotes][127][endif]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the
indigenous peoples over the natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely
recognizes the right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them
at any time within the domains. Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates
certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found
within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis
the natural resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples rights
and welfare in relation to the natural resources found within their ancestral
domains,[if !supportFootnotes][128][endif] including the preservation of the ecological
balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not
be unduly displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural
resources located therein are undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native
title to land, has not been recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et
al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza[if !supportFootnotes][129][endif] in support of their
thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction.
[if !supportFootnotes][130][endif]
They insist that it is possible for rights over natural
resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were
held prior to the 1935 Constitution. [if !supportFootnotes][131][endif] However, a judicious
examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and
Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title to natural resources.
Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim
ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership
by Filipinos of land by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of
an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish
colonization of the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as
regards natural resources. The unique value of natural resources has been
acknowledged by the State and is the underlying reason for its consistent
assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the
Spanish regime up to the present. [if !supportFootnotes][132][endif] Natural resources,
especially minerals, were considered by Spain as an abundant source of
revenue to finance its battles in wars against other nations. Hence, Spain, by
asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these may be found, whether
in public or private lands, recognized the separability of title over lands and
that over minerals which may be found therein. [if !supportFootnotes][133][endif]
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a
source of wealth for its nationals. As the owner of natural resources over the
Philippines after the latters cession from Spain, the United States saw it fit to
allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in
public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. A person who
acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws
then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting
minerals within his property.[if !supportFootnotes][134][endif] Although the United States
made a distinction between minerals found in public lands and those found in
34
private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases sourced from the State.
The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to maintain the States
ownership over natural resources to insure their conservation for future
generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country through
economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would
become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its
internal security and independence.[if !supportFootnotes][135][endif]
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other
natural resources in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973 [if !
supportFootnotes][136][endif]
and 1987 Constitutions.[if !supportFootnotes][137][endif]
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the
ancestral domains belong to the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify
that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under
Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the lands and not to the natural
resources therein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government
Agencies. -- The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is
an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Interior
and Local Government, and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, and any other government agency
claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification
shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed.
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may
still be under the administration of other agencies of the Government, such as
the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to agricultural lands, and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources with respect to timber,
forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral
domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA,
jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands
forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government
agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
terminate by such certification because said agencies are mandated under
existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State, which is the
owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the State, through the
government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established
doctrine that all natural resources are owned by the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are
not unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to
manage and conserve the natural resources found on the ancestral domains,
to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of
these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration
of such natural resources.[if !supportFootnotes][138][endif] The statute also grants them
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains. [if !supportFootnotes][139][endif] Before the
NCIP can issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession,
license or lease, or for the perfection of any production-sharing agreement the
prior informed written consent of the indigenous peoples concerned must be
obtained.[if !supportFootnotes][140][endif] In return, the indigenous peoples are given the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral
domains or portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover, or reforestation.[if !supportFootnotes][141][endif]
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an
active and dominant role in the utilization of our countrys natural resources.
Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the Constitution the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may only be
undertaken by the State, either directly or indirectly through co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. [if !supportFootnotes][142][endif] To
petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise
submit that by vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in
the indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily gives them control over the use and
enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of the State. [if !
supportFootnotes][143][endif]
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof
that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be
under the full control and supervision of the State, which may directly
undertake such activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements. This provision, however, should not be read in
isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of utilization
of natural resources other than the foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution
must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout. [if !supportFootnotes][144][endif] No
constitutional provision is to be separated from all the others, or to be
considered alone, all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
of the fundamental law.[if !supportFootnotes][145][endif]
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of
the countrys natural resources stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII,
the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the same section that
Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by its citizens.[if !supportFootnotes][146][endif] Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the
State, in the disposition and utilization of natural resources, to apply the
principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. [if !supportFootnotes][147][endif] Similarly,
Section 7, Article XIII mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence
fishermen to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources.[if !
supportFootnotes][148][endif]
Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of
the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony
with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered
pronouncement,[if !supportFootnotes][149][endif] cannot be construed as a prohibition
against any and all forms of utilization of natural resources without the States
direct participation.
Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the
exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources under
existing laws,[if !supportFootnotes][150][endif] the State retains full control over such
activities, whether done on small-scale basis[if !supportFootnotes][151][endif] or otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of
natural resources under Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been
granted to them under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076
35
expressly provides that should an ancestral land be declared as a peoples
small-scale mining area, the members of the indigenous peoples living within
said area shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining
contracts.[if !supportFootnotes][152][endif] R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land
shall be opened for mining operations without the prior consent of
the indigenous cultural community concerned[if !supportFootnotes][153][endif] and in
the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community give their
consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be
paid to them by the parties to the mining to the contract.[if !supportFootnotes][154][endif]
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the
rights given to the indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights
are limited only to the following: to manage and conserve natural resources
within territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and share
the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that
will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent
any interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights.
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions
granted under Section 7(b) pertains only to the exploration of natural
resources. The term exploration refers only to the search or prospecting of
mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose of determining the
existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit. [if !supportFootnotes][155][endif] The
exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the
entire process of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
which under the Constitution belong to the State.
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples priority
rights in the utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership
thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is
merely the right of preference or first consideration in the award of privileges
provided by existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs and
welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or
mechanical character in the grant of concessions. Nor does the law negate the
exercise of sound discretion by government entities. Several factors still have
to be considered. For example, the extent and nature of utilization and the
consequent impact on the environment and on the indigenous peoples way of
life are important considerations. Moreover, the indigenous peoples must
show that they live in the area and that they are in the best position to
undertake the required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to
indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and
regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is always subject to
compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws, such as R.A. 7076
and R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns these resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude
the State from undertaking activities, or entering into co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing agreements with private entities, to utilize the
natural resources which may be located within the ancestral domains. There is
no intention, as between the State and the indigenous peoples, to create a
hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance the interests of the State
for national development and those of the indigenous peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples
exclude non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within
the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper governmental
agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership rights of the State over the
natural resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular
sector in the utilization of natural resources is nothing new. As previously
mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the protection
by the State of the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore.
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources within the ancestral domains may disrupt the
natural environment as well as the traditional activities of the indigenous
peoples therein. Hence, the need for the prior informed consent of the
indigenous peoples before any search for or utilization of the natural resources
within their ancestral domains is undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake
such activities, IPRA requires that the prior informed consent of the indigenous
peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter of policy and law, consult
the indigenous peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution that national development policies and programs should involve a
systematic consultation to balance local needs as well as national plans. As
may be gathered from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution on this
point, the national plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the
region after thorough consultation. [if !supportFootnotes][156][endif] To this end, IPRA grants
to the indigenous peoples the right to an informed and intelligent participation
in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private,
and the right not to be removed therefrom without their free and prior
informed consent.[if !supportFootnotes][157][endif] As to non-members, the prior informed
consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the
indigenous peoples and non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case
the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not
peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and regulations such as the Philippine
Environmental Policy,[if !supportFootnotes][158][endif] the Environmental Impact System, [if !
supportFootnotes][159][endif]
the Local Government Code[if !supportFootnotes][160][endif] and the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995[if !supportFootnotes][161][endif]already require increased
consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in
the planning of activities with significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the
indigenous peoples must be procured before the NCIP can issue a certification
for the issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to
the perfection of any production-sharing agreement, must be interpreted, not
as a grant of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization
36
of natural resources, but merely the imposition of an additional requirement
for such concession or agreement. The clear intent of the law is to protect the
rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely
affected by the operation of such entities or licensees.
Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be deprived the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands.
They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains violates the due process clause. [if !supportFootnotes][162][endif]
Petitioners contention is erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral
lands and ancestral domains are subject to Section 56, which reads:
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. Property rights within the
ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act,
shall be recognized and protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the
vested rights of indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of
such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56,
recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same
communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such
interpretation is obviously incorrect.
The property rights referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired
by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision
makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these
property rights. The IPRA thus recognizes and respects vested rights
regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples.
Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. [if !
supportFootnotes][163][endif]
What IPRA only requires is that these property rights already
exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul
any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral
domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the proper
delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against
the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is
member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for
delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands
shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. [if !
supportFootnotes][164][endif]
With regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure
is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu
proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the Ancestral
domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO;
fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon
submission of the final report of the ADO. [if !supportFootnotes][165][endif] With regard to
ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the
statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application;
second, posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the
ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a
report by the ADO.[if !supportFootnotes][166][endif] Hence, we cannot sustain the
arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who
are not indigenous peoples.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP [if !supportFootnotes][167][endif] and the application of
customary law,[if !supportFootnotes][168][endif] violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed
exclusively of members of indigenous peoples, [if !supportFootnotes][169][endif] and that
the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
indigenous peoples,[if !supportFootnotes][170][endif] including even disputes between a
member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over
disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains. [if !supportFootnotes][171][endif]
Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are
incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely contend that the
NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a member of
an indigenous cultural community who must defend his case against [one who
is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but
harbor a suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.[if !supportFootnotes][172][endif]
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws
shall be applied first in disputes involving property, succession and land, [if !
supportFootnotes][173][endif]
and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes
involving indigenous peoples.[if !supportFootnotes][174][endif] They assert that [w]hen the
dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another
who is not], a resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would
clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous
peoples] do not know what these customary laws are.[if !supportFootnotes][175][endif]
Petitioners concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed
of members of the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is
incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-
indigenous peoples. A persons possession of the trait of impartiality desirable
of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the
indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous
peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by
the NCIP of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the
NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The
regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any
party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under
paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states,
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the
ancestral domains. Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not
absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.[if !supportFootnotes][176][endif]
The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these
present a workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of
37
the same indigenous group. This interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule
IX of the Implementing Rules which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains
and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and
boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the
application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral
domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of
the parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved
through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance
with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP
to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent
of the ancestral domains,[if !supportFootnotes][177][endif] where all the parties involved
are members of indigenous peoples, [if !supportFootnotes][178][endif] specifically, of the
same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a
dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous
peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law
is not required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of
customary law in disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all
parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary
laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application
thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel
idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is
sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence,
[if !supportFootnotes][179][endif]
and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. [if !
supportFootnotes][180][endif]
Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the
recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues
involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of
customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in
barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous
peoples.[if !supportFootnotes][181][endif]
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not
infringe upon the Presidents power of control over the Executive Department.
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA
violate Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation
and implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote
and protect the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an
independent agency under the Office of the President. As such, the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President
is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall be
carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day
administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the
discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission, as the Chief Executive
Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power
of control of the President over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of
the NCIP to the Office of the President as lateral but autonomous...for
purposes of policy and program coordination.
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of
the Implementing Rules characterize the NCIP as an independent agency
under the Office of the President, such characterization does not remove said
body from the Presidents control and supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government
agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans
and programs to promote and protect the rights and well being of the
indigenous peoples and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as
their rights thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][182][endif] It has been granted administrative, [if !
supportFootnotes][183][endif]
quasi-legislative[if !supportFootnotes][184][endif] and quasi-judicial
powers [if !supportFootnotes][185][endif]
to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the
NCIPs functions renders it impossible to place said agency entirely under the
control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason
for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An
independent agency is defined as an administrative body independent of the
executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as
distinguished from a subordinate agency or an administrative body whose
action is subject to administrative review or revision. [if !supportFootnotes][186][endif]
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the
President in all instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals, [if !supportFootnotes][187][endif] like those of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain
degree, was placed by Congress under the office of the President and, as
such, is still subject to the Presidents power of control and supervision granted
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution [if !supportFootnotes][188][endif] with
respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as the following:
(1) the NCIP must secure the Presidents approval in obtaining loans to finance
its projects;[if !supportFootnotes][189][endif] (2) it must obtain the Presidents approval for
any negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in
whatever from and from whatever source;[if !supportFootnotes][190][endif] (3) the NCIP
shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to the
President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous
peoples;[if !supportFootnotes][191][endif] and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may
be directed by the President.[if !supportFootnotes][192][endif] The President is also given
the power to appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP [if !supportFootnotes][193][endif] as
well as to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon the
recommendation of any indigenous community. [if !supportFootnotes][194][endif]
To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a)
38
and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8) affirming the ownership by the indigenous peoples of
their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title do not diminish the
States ownership of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands
and domains are considered as private land, and never to have been part of
the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cario vs. Insular
Government;[if !supportFootnotes][195][endif]
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals,
mineral lands and other natural resources in the State is not violated by
Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to the
indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within the ancestral
domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and
utilization of the same, as well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full control over the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with the
grant of said rights to the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of
requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under
existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 [if !supportFootnotes][196]
[endif]
and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. [if !supportFootnotes][197][endif] Moreover, the
rights granted to indigenous peoples for the utilization of natural resources
within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted
to them under the aforesaid laws;
(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with
regard to their ancestral lands and domains, it also protects the vested rights
of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have
acquired rights of ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural
resources within the ancestral lands and domains;[if !supportFootnotes][198][endif]
(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the
provisions (Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among
others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of
customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the
NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is
incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is
sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as
an independent agency under the Office of the President does not infringe
upon the Presidents power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly
places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the
Presidents control and supervision with respect to its administrative functions.
However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of
Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Owen Lynch, Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law; and Introductory
Survey 57 Philippine Law Journal 268 (1982) (Separate)
B. The Torrent System
ALBA v. DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910 J. Trent
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.
Ramon Salinas, for appellants. Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba,
are the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey,
deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on
the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July,
1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as
coowners, sought to have registered the following-described property:
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag,
Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of
light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22
centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the
lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo,
Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut;
on the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the
west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz,
Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane
and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was filed
on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and technical
description of the above-described parcel of land.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February,
1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54
of Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered
in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary
right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.
On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the
Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the
decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of
land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his
allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged
that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of
land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of
land, having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had
a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of section
38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and that the
said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in
said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after
hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the
23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by
excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla
de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed and now
39
insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case and modifying its
decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said decree was
not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in holding
that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not their
property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part
of the land described in the petition and were included in the decree of
February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the remainder of
the land described in the said decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same,
including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a
public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly executed before
Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a
state grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question.
This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the
6th of April of the same year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this
case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is
also admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said
petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the
appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they
did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee
contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under
the estate grant by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include
the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels
of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted
fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial
court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public
document of purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died
prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years
of age when their mother died. So these children were minors when the father
of the appellee obtained the estate grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the
petitioners, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners'
deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of
March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners,
rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz,
father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed in writing. This
land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his
children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose
Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao
R. de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into
this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and his brothers, one of
whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that his father and brother
entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners'
land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not
included in these contracts. In the rental contract between the uncle of the
petitioners and he father of the appellee the land is not described. In the
rental contract between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de
la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are
included, according to the description given therein. This was found to be true
by the court below, but the said court held that as this contract was made by
Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the
appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of
the petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase
and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state
grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was
obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were
minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee
was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented
their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any
fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name
of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was
not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of
their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below commit an error
in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in
February of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by
the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain
an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the
address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants
of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state
what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice given by
statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set
forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the
rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder,
reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together with
their place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the
application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in
the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the
adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the
notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after said
publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk
to every person named in the application whose address is known; to cause a
duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a conspicuous
place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in a conspicuous
place on the chief municipal building of the town in which the land is situated.
The court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given
in such manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of
the clerk that he has served the notice as directed by the court by publication
or mailing shall be conclusive proof of such service. Within the time allowed in
the notices, if no person appears and answers, the court may at once, upon
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general
default. By the description in the published notice "to all whom it may
concern," and by express provisions of law "all the word are made parties
defendant and shall be concluded by the default an order." If the court, after
40
hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in his application, a decree
or registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject
only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern."
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38
referred to above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the
outstanding interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though
denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made parties
defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question
under the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he
was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on
the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons,
including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the
application, notice, or citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on
account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree
had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the
part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee
was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the
petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the original plan
was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land
Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts
to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must
be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes
has been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the
Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning of the word
"fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title,
and its meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona fide
purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the distinction between
"legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. In
none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to the
conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is
there any express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception
of that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p.
834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of
certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there
mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal
fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and
every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right,
and the deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge,
has been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so
obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the same as
knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there absent the
element of intention to deprive another of just rights, which constitutes the
essential characteristics of actual as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p.
835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages
835 and 836.)
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy
Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi,
decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his
work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should be
given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the
meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of
fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this kind of fraud
in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an circumstances in
each particular case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and
have determined, is whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this
case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of
fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without
due process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be
enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition
and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as
he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by
means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section of the
Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note
the history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration
System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens
in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As
we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an
application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the
theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants,
and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a
right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the
proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered
by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The
interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of
private individuals.
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to
registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more
41
and more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without
security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may
evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a
third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against
any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made
by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and
the time occupied from months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the
"three R's" can transact his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and
has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land
Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land
was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia
in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registration takes the place of "title
by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example,
is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued.
The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions,
constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old
system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance, depending for its
validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior
deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system, them, is to do away
with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system.
(Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of
transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under
governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an
absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on
Australian Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in
which the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will
always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of
registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were,
in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2
cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 cents, the
number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in Western
Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the whole
time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been
adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some of the
States of the American Union, and practical experience has demonstrated that
it has been successful as a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens
system has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United
States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575;
People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration
Act," was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of
those States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we
never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.
S., 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary
requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may
be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants
within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter
any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible,
were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the
constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not
known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges,
supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The
Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee
Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular
person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or
to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are
entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand,
the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the
world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true,
show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges,
supra.)
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was
held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons
interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although
the only notice of the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons
interested.
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did
not rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground
that the State has absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's
property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in
rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the
facts and circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the
petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in
any way injure him, constitute due process of law.
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under
the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs.
2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment
appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment
entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower
42
court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
LEGARDA v. SALEEBY G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915 J. Johnson
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in
the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall
between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906,
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration
and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him.
On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title
and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to
them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without
notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they
failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall,
in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of
the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for
the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that
the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and
oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate
they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name.
Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and
the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant
himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their
name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The
plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were
they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in
the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the
same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then
the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must
fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that
once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the
proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an
action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz,
17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175
Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than
does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government.
After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are
no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world
are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes
the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in
the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the
same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered
title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration,
under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he
had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered.
Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact
status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is
the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title
once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would
be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished
in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse
of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for
the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There
is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the
43
present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner
of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the
same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow
that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons
who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights
which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with
certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once
registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious
possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to
the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has
been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by
the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens
System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only
in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;
Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs.
Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R.,
118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the
ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion
of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may
be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases
cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where
two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ...
In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the
prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim
is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do
not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land,
they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p.
237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of
any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration),
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud,
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be
opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding
by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be
deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the
right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides,
among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first
inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in
such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide
that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land
Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the
absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence
in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said
Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and
so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration
Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful
argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al.
were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the
defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land
described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his
right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them,
they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.
They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground
for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles
are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens
system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained
by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the
holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the
present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed
after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their
right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage
done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of
44
the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking
into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent
(granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can
not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants.
He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in
question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to
appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree
adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should
not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the
validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his
failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in
the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity
of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration
Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is
the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive
vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of
the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to
an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no
greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which
his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some
doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only.
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire
rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by
virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an
original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the
present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent
purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been
deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor
of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to
the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to
an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase
"innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these
examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said
sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are
both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the
provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which
we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser,"
in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original
certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights
or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or
vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is
never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons
are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with
the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of
whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown
by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S.,
620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn.,
97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases,
341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable.
He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed
to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.
This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith.
Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted
to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all
persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule
of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds
of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring
mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record
of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that
statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been
recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third
parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded
mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance
have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the
recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he
was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land,
bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the
mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the
public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all
men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact
that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men,
at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is
mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow
the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land
from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser,"
when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of
another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and
45
112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the
phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot
be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the
record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the
purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the
original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent
purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original
certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of
innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent
purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other
than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties
we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the
torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the
record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice
to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in
good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants?
We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered
under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could
his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his
vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of
the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the
appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in
the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record
of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative.
We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose
of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that
the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors,
should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake
like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who
has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and
his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one
who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second
original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and
the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence,
should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who
has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the
effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that
the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that
view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and
recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens
system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the
real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired
equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and
who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court
should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court
now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land
court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may
correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
CAPITAL SUBDIVISION V. PROV. Of Negros Occidental G.R. No. L-16257
Jan 31, 1963
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for plaintiff-appellant.Eduardo P. Arboleda and
Jesus S. Rodriguez for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the
Province of Negros Occidental, the possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral
survey of Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of said lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in
addition to attorney's fees and costs. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal
taken by the defendant, this judgment was, however, set aside by the
Supreme Court (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which,
likewise, ordered the case remanded to the lower court "for further trial", after
which another decision was rendered by said court of first instance dismissing
plaintiff's complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378
to the defendant. The case is, once again, before us, this time on appeal by
the plaintiff, the subject matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda
Mandalagan, consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of
the aforementioned cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of over 502
hectares, originally registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar
Amenabar. Lot 378 has an area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 (Exhibit 4), issued on August
25, 1916, in the name of the Amenabars. On November 30, 1920, the latter
sold the aforementioned hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some
documents as Jose Benares Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000, payable
installments, as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February 8, 1924,
46
said Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares
obtained, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his name.
Meanwhile, or on March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been
mortgaged by Jose Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of
P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2). On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again
mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National
Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
(Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, including said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295, covering
Lot 378.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance
of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated
September 29, 1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired the Hacienda,
including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151 which, owing to its subsequent loss, had
to be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1371 in the name
of the Bank, was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later, or on
November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares,
son of Jose Banares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments,
subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain in
the Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under
this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment
of the installments due to the Bank in 1949. Hence, on September 29, 1949,
the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff
(Exhibit Q) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering 378 was issued,
in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title RT-1371), in plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the
Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the
property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged
right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the
Bank in favor of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation.
When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by the
Bank, on September 29, 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the
Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the
Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately, thereafter, or on
October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to
clarify the status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with the
explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10,
1950.
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired
Lot 378 in the year; 1924-1925, through expropriation proceedings; that
immediately after the commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took
possession of said lot and began the construction thereon of the provincial
hospital, which was completed in 1926; that since then it had occupied said
lot publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner thereof; that,
"for some reason or other and for cause beyond comprehension of the
defendant title thereto was never transferred in the name of said defendant";
that said lot had been placed in defendant's name for assessment purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 16269 (dated December 31, 1937); and that
plaintiff had acted in bad faith in purchasing said lot from the Bank in 1935,
for plaintiff knew then that the provincial hospital was where it is up to the
present, and did not declare said lot in its name for assessment purposes until
1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo Montelibano, the controlling
stockholder, president and general manager of plaintiff corporation, was the
first City Mayor of Bacolod which contributed to the support, operation and
maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer, dated November 8,
1950, defendant alleged, also, that the aforementioned expropriation case
was "amicably settled as between the parties herein, in the sense that the ...
Province of Negros Occidental would pay ... and did in fact pay to Jose Benares
the assessed value of Lot 378 ... and whatever consideration pertaining to
said lot in excess of its assessed value which was paid by the Province would
be donated and was in fact donated by said ... Jose Benares in favor of the
Province purposely for hospital site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant
herein had acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.
This decision appealed from in effect decided this question in the affirmative
and declared that plaintiff merely holds it in trust for the defendant, in view of
which it ordered the former to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is
predicated, substantially, upon the following premises, namely that case No.
3041 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the expropriation
of the hospital site of said province, was actually commenced on January 26,
1924; that, among the lands sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot
377 of the aforementioned cadastral survey, belonging to one Anacleta
Agsam, who sold it, on July 10, 1926, to the defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose
favor the corresponding transfer certificate of title (Exhibit BB-2) was issued
on July 12, 1926; that, according the testimony of Jose Benares, the
expropriation of Lot 378 was settled amicably upon payment to him of the
sum of P12,000; and that defendant's failure to secure the corresponding
transfer certificate of title to Lot 378 was due to "the mistaken notion or belief
that said lot forms part of Lot No. 405-B" in the plan (Exhibit X.).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and
credence, because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the
plaintiff and its president, for the former believes that the latter had
"manipulated" to exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there have been
four (4) litigations between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been
finally decided against the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he
testified to having been paid P12,000 by the Government, although, at the
rate of P1,000 a hectare at which, he would have us believe, he agreed to sell
Lot 378; he should have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq. meters;
(b) he claimed to have received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year 1924 or
1925", about "2 or 3 days" after the Government had taken possession of the
land, and to have sent the money next day to Pilar Amenabar, but the latter
acknowledged to have received the said sum of P12,000 on November 7,
47
1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco,
former deputy clerk of court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose Benares
asserted that there was a written compromise agreement between him and
the Government, whereas Marco averred that agreement was merely oral; and
(b) Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for Lot
378, the assessed value thereof, which was P430, and to donate to the
Government the difference between this sum and the true value of the
property, but Benares affirmed that he was first offered P300 per hectare,
which he rejected, and that he later demanded P1,000 a hectare, which the
Government agreed to pay, although, subsequently, he said that Rafael
Alunan and Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon him to accept P1,000 per
hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso
Coscolluela, the provincial treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the
expropriation, who positively assured the Court that the expropriation case
"was not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the
acquisition of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in
1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no
compromise agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government had
been reached and that the expropriation had not been consummated. For
instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its
filing and the publication in the newspaper of the corresponding notices
(Exhibit 1);.
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the
Government, followed by the cancellation of the certificate of title in her name
and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name of the Province,
when contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment and of a
transfer certificate title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378, strongly
suggest that no such assignment or agreement with respect to Lot 378 had
been made or reached;.
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March
12, 1921, and this mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia, on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose Benares, was not
cancelled until September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have been
expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter was not
made a party in the expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted second mortgage in favor
of the Bank, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not
belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been
expropriated subsequently thereto without the Bank's knowledge and
participation. What is more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November
8, 1935 (Exhibit R), promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos
Benares, it was explicitly stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and 410,
forming part of said Hacienda and designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B and
410-A, had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not
been expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
... It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the
expropriation case and the chances are that the case was dismissed. The
Court had to examine carefully and minutely every single piece of evidence
adduced by both parties in order to arrive at the correct solution of the
mystery. The Court believes that the failure of the government to secure the
corresponding transfer of title to Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or belief
that said lot forms a part of Lot 405-B. This conclusion was arrived at after
examining closely the plan, Exhibit X. The plan shows that while all the
subdivided lots were properly identified by lot numbers, that particular portion
at the lower corner of the plan encircled with red pencil, marked Exhibit X-1, is
not labelled with the corresponding lot number and that portion is precisely lot
No. 378, now in question, where the hospital building was constructed. This
plan was prepared for the government on May 12, 1927 by public land
surveyor, Mr. Formento, embracing lots covering over 22 hectares for the
Capitol and hospital sites. The fact that this particular portion was not labelled
with the corresponding lot number might have misled the authorities to
believe that it formed a part of lot 405-B, which adjoins it, although separated
by the creek. This lack of reasonable explanation why the government failed
to secure the corresponding certificate of title to lot 378, when there is
sufficient proof that Jose Benares was paid and he executed the deed of sale
in favor of the government.
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the
conscientiousness and moral courage that account for the well earned
reputation and prestige of the Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves unable to
concur in the foregoing view. To begin with, there is no evidence, and
defendant has not even tried to prove, that the expropriation case had ever
been dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned. Hence, the lower court merely
speculated about the "chances that the (expropriation) case was dismissed."
By the way, the contrary was intimated by defendant's witness, Ildefonso
Coscolluela, for he testified that the expropriation case was still pending in
1934, when he ceased to be the provincial treasurer, and the record before us
suggests that since the Province took possession of the land in 1924 or 1925
and completed the construction of the hospital in 1926, there were no further
proceedings in said case..
With respect to the plan, Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever
that the authorities had been "misled ... to believe" that the portion at the
lower corner of said plan which was enclosed, during the trial, within a
circle in red pencil, and marked as Exhibit X-1 formed part of Lot 405-B,
which had been expropriated by the Province of Negros Occidental. In fact,
said portion, Exhibit X-1, is not part of the land covered by the plan Exhibit X.
A close examination of the latter shows that the boundaries of said portion are
not delimited on the plan. More important still, on the right hand side of
Exhibit X, the following appears in bold letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation
PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401, 403,405, 406, 407 and 410 Bacolod Cadastre as
surveyed for the Provincial Government of Bacolod, Negros Occidental (Capitol
site)". The absence of Lot 378 from said enumeration and the explicit
statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to the "Capitol Site", negates
the possibility of its being mistaken by any body, much less by government
engineers, as including the hospital site, and, hence, said Lot 378. Lastly, the
very evidence for the defendant herein, specially the assessor's field sheets
and declarations of real property for tax purposes (Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and
48
13) show that the Government had always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405, as
part of the Provincial Hospital Site. In any event, said possibility of mistake, if
any, which would be remote, cannot suffice to warrant in the face of
documentary evidence to the contrary the conclusion that Lot 378 has
already been acquired by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and
applied by him to the payment of his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount
could not possibly be the price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare
allegedly agreed therefor, its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00. In this
connection, it should be noted that, aside from the expropriation proceedings
for the hospital site, another expropriation case for the Capitol site, affecting
another property of Jose Benares, appears to have been instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may have mistaken the
payment for his land included in the Capitol site, as one intended for Lot 378,
which was affected by the hospital site. And this possibility may amount to a
probability when we consider that he erroneously believed that there had
been only one expropriation case, instead of two cases, against him, and that
Lot 378, was not included in the mortgage constituted by him in favor of the
Philippine National Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at least, an accurate
recollection of the events or transactions affecting his properties, and, hence,
his testimony may not be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged
acquisition by the defendant of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to be
the exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of
plaintiff's president to the effect that he did not know until 1949 that the land
on which the Provincial Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it held that
plaintiff was "not a purchaser in good faith for having constructive knowledge
of defendant's possession of the property at the time it was bought by the
plaintiff", because Carlos P. Benares whose right to buy the Hacienda
Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff "is a part owner of the
Capitol Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein"; because the
hospital was already constructed in Lot 378 since 1926 and the lot was
declared in the name of the Government" and "when plaintiff bought the lot in
1935 the purchaser should have inquired as to its location and improvement";
because "it took the plaintiff 14 years to sleep over the supposed rights to
take possession of lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact that
lot No. 378 was erroneously or inadvertently included by the deeds of sale
(Exhibits Q & R) executed by the Philippine National Bank in favor of the
plaintiff subdivision and that same lot was occupied by the defendant
government for the provincial hospital for the last 34 years, as owner thereof".
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president
did not know until 1949 that lot 378 was the very land occupied by the
provincial hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this
fact was known to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge
be deduced from the circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose
Benares, for even the latter appears not to be well-posted on the status of his
properties. Indeed, Jose Benares did not apparently know that there were two
(2) expropriation proceedings effecting said properties: that the P12,000
received by him from the Government was not meant for Lot 378; and that
this lot was one of the properties mortgaged by him to the Bank.
"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid
possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring further, except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Tiburcio
vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940,
March 30, 1960; Manacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13791, February 27,
1961). In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an
established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the land on which the
provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or
before the expropriation case for the hospital site had begun, said lot was
mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly
registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, was
not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or on December 26,
1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which
acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank
agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos P. Benares and the
latter, subsequently conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as well as when the
bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on September 20,
1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that
sugar centrals as well as banks are known to have an array of experienced
and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified in
assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and
were satisfied that the same belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages
were constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale was executed. In
short, we find that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant,
we are of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate
Lot 378 is not contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may
demand what is due by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short,
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the fair and full equivalent to
Lot 378, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the
defendant, plus consequential damages including attorney's fees from
which consequential damages the consequential benefits, if any, should be
deducted, with interests, at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the
plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual taking. The case should be
remanded, therefore, to the lower court for the reception of evidence on the
date of said actual taking and the amount of compensation collectible from
the defendant, and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision
thereon..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated, with
costs against the defendant. It is so ordered..
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.Makalintal, J., took no part.
Separate Opinion of J. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary
II. Constitutional Provisions
A. Regalian Doctrine
49

Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Consti
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Carino v. Insular Gov. (Separate)
Republic v. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 (1983)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO
MARTINEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA
TANALEGA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions
dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan,
Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC No. N-206, respectively, involve a
common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided jointly.
G.R. No. L-35778:
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an
application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land,
situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of
323,093 square meters, more or less.
On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to
the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.
On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an
opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private
appropriation.
On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:
Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez
during the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land, subject matter of this
application, was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that this land was
assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn, August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered
re-opened and the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his
report and/or comment as to whether this lot is covered by the Mariveles
Cadastre within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the
lower court a report stating.
That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is
entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of
Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097.
xxx xxx xxx
Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant
Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied
for, having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares,
more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8
hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees;
that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the
war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the
concept of owner.
Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer
of Luisito Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that
since 1938, applicant has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land
is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia are the
ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between applicant, on one
hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the other; that eighteen (18)
hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.
50
While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked
on the land of the applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less;
that said Luisito Martinez inherited the land from his parents; that he plants
palay only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango trees on the land,
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for
registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two
(2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of Mariveles,
province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or
less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and more
particularly described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles
Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431,
respectively.
On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued
by the Commissioner of Land Registration.
On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a
report within ten (10) days if the land subject of the application has been
issued patents or is the subject of any pending application for the issuance of
patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the Commissioner of Land
Registration to submit within the same period his report if the land applied for
has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree.
On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission
filed a report in the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for
registration "do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the
Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative
Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration
Commission filed in the lower court another report or manifestation stating
"that Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No.
N-41884, when plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the Commission
does not appear to overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496;
that the plan and records of said Land Registration application will be
subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be rendered by
this Honorable Court is received in this Commission to determine whether or
not a patent or title has in the meantime been issued in order to avoid
duplication or overlapping of titles."
At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the
lower court issued an Order of General Default against all persons, with the
exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, represented by
the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo Martinez
represented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file their
respective oppositions,
On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the
Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for
are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent
herein), testified in her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely,
Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as
her documentary evidence in support of her application for registration. On
the other hand,. Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and
submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the
provincial fiscal's office in this case.
At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27
years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely,
notoriously and in the concept of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said
land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land" in the
same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land
for the years 1970-1972.
Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were
the ones working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents,
on their request to owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when
the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these lands were planted
to palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables.
Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood,
he had known Elisa Llamas to be the owner of the land applied for; that she
was the one managing the planting and improving of the land; that he used to
see Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also named Agapito del Rosario
worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas informed him
that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.
At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing
for the government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B.
Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that
the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan containing an
approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and
described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed
for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and
Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of
Forestry as such on February 16, 1972."
The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa
Llamas, to testify on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also
failed to present Guillermo Ramirez, who was hired by her as overseer and her
alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that
the applicant had possessed the land as owners.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions,
dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject
parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez
and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public
land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such
being the case, the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496. Petitioner likewise
stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by
voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory
registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in
order.
It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, 1 the land subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely
inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan,
Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No.
51
626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared
Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the
lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an
answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be
allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the
claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot
numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality,
township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners
of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can
show no express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his
predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the length of time property
was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of
time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession;
(6) If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall
set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its
acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed
value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of
adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful claimants, the
property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their
answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their
claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the
portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them.
The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands,
and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the
subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one
in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded
from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same
must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for
the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area
applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by
the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long
the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed
to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the
concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period required by
law.
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not
approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission.
The Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by
respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are
expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries.
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character
and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 4
WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16, 1972 of the
Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are hereby
reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result.
Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351 (1987)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987
BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES
COMMISSION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set
aside the Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the respondent court
in CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the
then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration Case No. N-506,
G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau of
Forestry, Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries Commission, oppositors. "
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the
bigger portion of Lot No. 1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A
together with the improvements thereon in the name of Filomeno Gallo, of
legal age, widower, Filipino citizen, and resident of 155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo
City, Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-way of 15
meters wide which is presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller
provincial Road and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road they being properties
of the Province of Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said province.
The oppositions of the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the
Philippine Fisheries Commission are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an area of 2.6864
hectares which is enclosed in red pencil and is found inside Lot No. 1 in the
plan Exhibit is hereby declared public land. After the decision has become final
let the corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex "A." p. 25, Rollo)
This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution
dated December 14, 1973 denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the
Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be
changed or varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced before
it. (p. 9, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
52
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo
described in Plan Psu-150727, containing an approximate area of 30.5943
hectares were the subject of an application for registration by Mercedes Diago
who alleged among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land
having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in
his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21,
1934. The Director of Lands opposed said application on the ground that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over
the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems,
and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application. The
Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on
the ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject matter of the
application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square meters are
mangrove swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38,
L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo.
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject
parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be
substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended
Application for Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in
the application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission
also moved on August 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau
of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered,
supervision and control of said portion having been transferred from the
Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration
of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after
excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal
hall of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way
of 15 meters width.
Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
assigning the following errors in their brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT
LAND WHICH CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND AND LAND
BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE UNREGISTERABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE
APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN
PEACEFUL, OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE TO
CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER. (p. 6, Brief for the Petitioners,
p. 105, Rollo)
Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for
reconsideration of the same hence the present petition with two (2) assigned
errors, basically the same issues raised with the respondent court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS
EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), THE SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS PRESUMED
TO BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS
NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST
POSSESSED THE LAND IN QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. (pp. 9 & 20,
Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System,
11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable
portion of the public domain. These are more particularly Identified as parcels
"B," B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exh. "1-A." The rest, consisting of
19.4080 hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same
plan Exh. "1-A," is now the center of controversy of the present appeal.
Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed
facts that 1) the controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project
No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of
February 18, 1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the effect that the area in
question is needed for forest purposes. Respondent court in affirming the
decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that although the controverted portion of
19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland Block
"B," L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered part of the public forest
not susceptible of private ownership since petitioners failed to submit
convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for
agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands.
Respondent court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether or not a
controverted parcel of land is forest land, is a question of fact which should be
settled by competent proofs, and if such a question be an issue in a land
registration proceeding, it is incumbent upon the Director of Forestry to
submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more
valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of
respondent that respondent court did "not hesitate to apply this presumption
with full force particularly where, as in the case at bar, the lands applied for
have been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest for a long number of years without the government taking any
positive step to dislodge the occupants from their holdings which have passed
from one to another by inheritance or by purchase." (p. 9, Brief for private
respondents) Otherwise stated, it is Our impression that private respondents
claim the rule of prescription against the government.
Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the
controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of the
municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956
as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly
therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of
Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not
more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no
question of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said
forest land had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the
Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original
applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961.
In the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49,
cited by private respondents themselves in their brief, We held
Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40
Phil. 10), it is again held, that whether a particular parcel of land is more
valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is
53
a fact which must be established during the trial of the case. Whether the
particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in
each particular case unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside
said land for forestry or mineral resources. (Italics for emphasis)
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that-
... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable
under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all
public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the
taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the
Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber
land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the
category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted
from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of
Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which
cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a
rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET
ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, declaring that:
1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting
of 11.1863 hectares of coconut land and admittedly within the disposable
portion of the public domain are hereby ordered registered in the name of the
applicant Filomeno Gallo and/or his successors-in-interest as provided for by
the Public Land Law; and
2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A,"
consisting of 19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands of the public domain
of the Republic of the Philippines and are therefore inalienable.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 181 SCRA 443
(1990)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods Corporation
(hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach Development Corporation
(hereafter simply CORAL BEACH) bring to our attention the decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals in "Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T.
Santiago, et al.," disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the respondent judge
dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. 4062 is set aside, and
respondent judge is ordered to require private respondents to file their answer
to the complaint in said Civil Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the
trial of the case on the merits and to render judgment thereon.'
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and restated
by the petitioners in their petition are accurate:
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales
Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the
parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly
described and bounded as follows:
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )
Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the
defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate
of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for
the two parcels of land above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1,
Sgs-2409, while Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2,
Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation I
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for
reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062. 2
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds:
1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all administrative
remedies before filing the case in court;
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become indefeasible
and imprescriptible;
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the Solicitor
General and not by the Director of Lands. 3 The then Court of First Instance of
Bataan dismissed the complaint in the Order of October 7, 1977, 4adopting
mainly the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from
the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the
courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.
54
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11, 1977 and
filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 . 5 The Solicitor General then
moved for an extension of thirty days within which to file the Record on
Appeal and to pay the docket fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be
followed by another motion for extension filed by the Solicitor General,
resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another extension of
fifteen days from December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension
lapsed, instead of an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court
of Appeals was filed.
According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and in
a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss, the
correctness of its decision must be decided in the assumed truth and accuracy
of the allegations of the complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands in
question are forest lands; hence, inalienable.
b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite clear and
positive evidence to the contrary.
c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not
initiated by the Director of Lands.
d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for
alleged failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. 6
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set aside
the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No.
4062, and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the
answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action
for reversion.
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefore. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion,
enumerates the premises for granting a review:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court; and
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a
lower court as to call for supervision . 7
We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance with grave
abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for
reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of
action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of
the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the
Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the
lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic's
complaint' was never denied specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners
herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.
If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become
moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 10
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands to the dominion of the State. 11 Thus, before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain. 12
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer
any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of
the public forest. 13
The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land
is by remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues
involved.
Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient
administration of justice is ensured. However, the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14 They
must lead to the proper and just determination of litigation, without tying the
hands of the law or making it indifferent to realities.
Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available
only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of the law. 15 The long line of decisions denying the
petition for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in
instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the instances
when certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions were:
when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when
the broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, 16
or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. 17
We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give
due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of
public concern which is the disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less
than the Constitution protects its policy.
We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the appellate
court, in the absence of a clear showing that the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of substance in a manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that
the respondent Court has departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been committed by the
respondent court. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 (1998)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
55
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN
and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father
JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN
and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father,
JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be
found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made
be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they
pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed
on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of
his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in
Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan
Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa
and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to
Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots
6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had
acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have
received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she
was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella
Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his
predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was
enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67
years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by
Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the
realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961
and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots
1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of
James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and
Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its
annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its
payment of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands
both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to
exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said
islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing
that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed
to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject
to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other
words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet
and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior
right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and
reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two
mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable
and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already
vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly
declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The
June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of
James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the
location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining
Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently
been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had
made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels
prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment.
After World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June
Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench
56
side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had
religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1
to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of
Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral
claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution
of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had
become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration
was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that
time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and
Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area
from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his
location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were
exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The
reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral
perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation
does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as
against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v.
Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate
the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance
with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid
location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public
domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v.
Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right
to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the
minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral
right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after
the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property
right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the
fee remains in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold
Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259,
265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as
held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public
domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this
right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties
of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law.
13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus,
in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy
and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established
under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935,
declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935
within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised
Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to
the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting
locations as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such
act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land
or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private
property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did,
to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was
subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or
abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription.
However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case
at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and
exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support
their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964
and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the
opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his
57
judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of
discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la
Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession
was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as
agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they
were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the
mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace
them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of
the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much
less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest"
between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface
rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of
piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural
on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting
on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The
farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below
and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How
deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the
sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and
completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137,
providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of
government established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does
not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals
which may be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted
are excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private
land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land
in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give
him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of
the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the
rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered
in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such
use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals
therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted
to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the
registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he
is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in
appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly
acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands
of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET
ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Edna Collado v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107764, 390 SCRA 124
(2002)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO,
SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUEZ,
GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G.
TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA
CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M.
LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T.
GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners,
58
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the
Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA,
MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA MOISES,
respondents/intervernors.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition1 seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, 2 dated
June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the
Decision3 dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect
title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The
Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo,
Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application
was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." On March 24,
1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include
additional co-applicants.4 Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively
referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).5
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of
owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the
Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.
According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares
of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to
prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their
predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the
Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of
the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his
name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and "W-1" testimonies of J. Torres on 16
December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the
property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928
(Exhibit "X" and "X-1"; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before
the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He owned and
possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax purposes,
the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February
1957 (Exhibit "I" and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by
virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit "H"). During the
ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson
of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of
Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name
under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No.
8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December
1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October
1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "G").
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale
dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit "P-1" to "P-3").
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO,
VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the
property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985
(Exhibit "Q" to "Q-3").
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO
FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE
TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA
LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA
GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of
Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit "S" to "S-3").
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and
AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R.
SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")." 6
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial
prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors
to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of the
petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to
January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On
this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice.
Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based
on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration
court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions
of the courts decision, as follows:
"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the
witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual,
open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been
testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre,
Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for
Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
59
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes
were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was
planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing
purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to
establish registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed,
the Court can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the
Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to "private
rights."
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734,
1983 "private rights" is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of
acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private
rights" means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that
the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either
by composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory
Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands xxx"
(underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated,
Applicants have acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants
that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated
March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area
excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order
No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June
21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by
Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit "K")."7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6,
1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming
their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the
decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration
court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in
their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a decision
and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the
land registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February
18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order
directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on
the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) under its
Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF" for brevity), filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is
situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They
claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting
purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary
conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed
that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the
public domain.8
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition
and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land
registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1),
1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents
herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
(Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been
segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is
confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a
Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in
private respondent Collados application that "said parcel of land known as
Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application
and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis
supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these
vital documents which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands.
They should have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction
over the case.
"x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of
the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the
60
disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that
petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was
declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it
was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this
action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no
matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. And courts
are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of
Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA
387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA
339)."9
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state. 15
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING
THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR
INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated
July 26, 190410 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation ("MWR" for
brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim
over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private
rights." They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the
reservations are "subject to existing private rights, if any there be." Petitioners
contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when
their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and
ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then
prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was
that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are
agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that
private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33,
thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 11 The Spaniards
first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 12 which laid the foundation that "all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain." 13 Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed
to the Spanish Crown.14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree
of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the
Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated
in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States
colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926,
the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands."16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After
the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141"
for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this
day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
61
legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system.18 The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the
title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are
quieted upon issuance of the certificate. 19 PD 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978, 20 amended and updated Act
496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain.21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 22
explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources
of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption
of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a
necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to
the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in
the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine."
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII 23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and
Utilization of Natural Resources" barred the alienation of all natural resources
except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the
State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in
Section 8, Article XIV24 on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the
Nation". The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of
Article XII25 on "National Economy and Patrimony".
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as
well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong
to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals,
lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need
and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are
essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted
to park and recreational purposes."26
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court
had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of
whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage
of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for
brevity).28 The Court defined watershed as "an area drained by a river and its
tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The
most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most
important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an "intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered
now."
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by
such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed
areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and
Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland
of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig
waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil
and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental
effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit
river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-
an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged
areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no
direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt
care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by
it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road
building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would
not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact
of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive
watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and
implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens."
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and
Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the
parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
62
CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of
natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest
zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities
could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties
of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they
vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of
EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended.
He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of
the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may
have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant,
a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or
adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. 29 Or, that he
has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by
Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA
1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners
application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985. 30 As amended, Section
48 (b) now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act
requires that the applicant must prove the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land,
by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." 31
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO
33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had
acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then,
the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved
as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners
application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer
be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b)
of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded.
It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public
lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela
vs. Court of Appeals,32 the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
"x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both
acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from
the State. "
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals 33 is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not
contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of
the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573
classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that
Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject
land. The Court ruled:
"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that
there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner
Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January,
1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in
June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as
public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation
No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it
suffices if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so many
number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the
63
corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and
[his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and
recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge
that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit
five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the
"private rights" recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes,
we held that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to exclude his
land from a military or forest reservation must show "x x x by clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x
means for the acquisition of public lands."
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with
C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which
prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The
rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an
interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and
notorious possession."
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the
Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of
3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso
Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of
this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are
considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26,
1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF
1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A
CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE
SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI
OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders
Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same,
together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite
purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance
with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of
Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are more
particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the
Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan, being
N-74-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence
N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3;
thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point
5; thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to
point 7; thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00
m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North
1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due
East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence
Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point
18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m.
to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due
South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25;
thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to
point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an
area of three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of
alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked "1"
on sketch plan being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1.
Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due
West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence
Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to
point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62
m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E
458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14
18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence
S. 30 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19;
thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one
thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637
64
issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location
of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners
is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage. 34 Proclamation
No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY
INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED
OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS
RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to
the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974
which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo
and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and
revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to
private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly
described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation
amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan
Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the
portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the
Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-
33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation.
Beginning at a point marked "1" on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of
1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely
within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is
needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.35 Unless and until the land classified as such is released in
an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private
character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. R). The Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and
described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo
Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded
from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283,
promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite
Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known
as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D.
1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as
contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering & Infrastructure Section"
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had
occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by
several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land
registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report 37 dated
March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that
the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus
recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. The Report
states:
"COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San
Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of
title in the case at bar.
65
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that
a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the
subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948
and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia
Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree
dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining
portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
"WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for
its information and guidance with the recommendation that the application in
the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining
supplied)."
Likewise, in a letter38 dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector,
DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter
states:
"That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO
SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-
162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
"x x x
"That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the
Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to
disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social
Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for rejection
(Underlining supplied)." Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex "3"
and made an integral part hereof."
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T.
Collados [as original applicant] application is the technical description 39 of the
Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division
of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the
Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show
clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as
in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.
Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from
the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974,
petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985
would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the
proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two
years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR
Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite
reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may
be applied to this case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply." 40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics
petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of
the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land
registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor
General received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991. 41 Petitioners point
out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for
annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 42 only on August
6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory.
Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed the
petition for annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May
6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that
the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over
the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves
private land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning
the land registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic
participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not
alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not
clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the
public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court
66
involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 43 as follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as
regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the
State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the
Statute of Limitations."
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns
over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, 44 which involved the registration of public
lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res
judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The
Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not
apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental
rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would
involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality."
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the
State of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government,
they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take
steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENRs
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED,
BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED
AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND
PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF
LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,
President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of
Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein
situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and
Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under
the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in
the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point "1" on plan,
being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as
amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force
and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines"
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime
between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona
fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified
recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The
certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR
to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of
twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. 45 The
DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San
Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory of
Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted.46
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the
pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert
their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that
the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30,
1991 confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a
copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for
new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land
registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land
registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor
General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which
allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure47 provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
67
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial
court," as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago
vs. Court of Appeals48 reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the
case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the
movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been
concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is
already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and,
manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of
the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is
simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving
to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the
validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly
possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact,
intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that
the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot
fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the
rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already
claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps
of the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It
also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups
including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the
rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30,
1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A,
LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official
leave.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment 347 SCRA 128 (2000)
(focuses on Separate Opinions discussing Regalian Doctrine)
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority 384 SCRA 152 (2002)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further
seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction
of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed
land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire,
x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." 1 On the same date, then
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" 2 under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum
directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in
MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which
stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works
in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to
progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be
agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and
conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing
required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
68
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to
cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the
MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred
or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of
approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473)
square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and
approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying
elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center
Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy
Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or
157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for
brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in
the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No.
1245, confirmed the JVA.5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. 6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of
all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees
reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560
dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering
the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study
on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, 8 the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel. 10 The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published
reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI
under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these
reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired
Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the
JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial
hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper
court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI
of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to
enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their
Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile,
on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA
to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance
of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral
argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated
May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT
AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE
PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL
AGREEMENT;
69
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED
AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are
moot and academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the
on-going negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the
Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any
new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI
furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA
containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus,
PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the
renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the
Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has
approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue
by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before
the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the
Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended
JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime
PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended
JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such
unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks
to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands
and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It
now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to
safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a
grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA
runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title
and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court
did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public. 17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of
the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, 18 covered agricultural lands
sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The
transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles 19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI
seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and
submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No.
1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by
AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase.
Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because
the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be
reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on
December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in
this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of
title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent
proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The
Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire
reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project. 21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to
observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally
to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court
cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however,
raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. 22 The
Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to
the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under
the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to
disclose publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed
information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule
that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera 23 where the Court
granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not
initially demand from the Office of the President the publication of the
presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the Executive Department
had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code 24 and
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 25 to publish the presidential decrees.
There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial
demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has
70
no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its
renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view
of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing
Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public
bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public
the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA
to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like
the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the
right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved
is a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The principal issue in the instant
case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to
private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings
to enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA
refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution.
PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete
injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus,
there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel
PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth
billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA
from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in
violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional
duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the
public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a
taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He
asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions
questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if
they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the
people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set
aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public
right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is
sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution
of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce
their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with
the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the
petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be
enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared
that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which
possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds
may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the
development, management and operation of the Manila International
Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the
important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution
would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to
information and access to official records, documents and papers a right
guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a
former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the
two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino
citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable
diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to
information on matters of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
71
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public
interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public
concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in
policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If
the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions
to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will
be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also
essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the
people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold
public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry
is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As
explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue
or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in
the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive
to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent
that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently.
Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations
the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government."
PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory
stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-
decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its
contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished
from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer
to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to
the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner
can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their
deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-
making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express
their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure
before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding
requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to
information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of
the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose
to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include
the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being
disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified
to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these
data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process,
long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government
Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure,
any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the
bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or
proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not
immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or
review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions"
on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and
any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to
definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency
or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions
on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on
matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence
and other classified information." (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates
inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise
72
the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be
too late for the public to expose its defects.1wphi1.nt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of
the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow
neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of
its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data
used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is
part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials.
The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third
category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned
by the government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions,
minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to
such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access
to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect
and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject
to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to
minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and
how to conduct the inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers. 36 The right does not
also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts
have long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information
does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange
of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power.39 This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several legislations. 41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer
to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is
rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and
waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed
to the Spanish Crown. 42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of
the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines
except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of
the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article
420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18,
1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for
the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of
the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues
to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and
all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the
public domain for public use. 44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the
reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed
by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the
party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the
73
necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the
State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as
follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general
public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the
national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of
the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public.
In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for
some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public
use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national
wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the
national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property
of public dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use
or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property
of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the
executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer
needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease
or alienate the property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which
regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of
this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in
existing law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or
reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government
without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to
the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or
public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or
otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and
alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to
be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall
give notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or
reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for
commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest
and best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the
Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all
lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the
government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could
lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer
needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the
lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government
reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the
government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available
only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of
the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from
the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the
Public Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands,
were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall
be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or
banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section
fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by
74
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare
that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open
to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be
disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands
of the public domain into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of
the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable
lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall
be classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well
as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These
provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable
lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These
provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such
disposable lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or
marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of
the public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands
to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary
for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and
not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public
domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could
not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to
private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public
service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56
(d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural
purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No.
2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law
allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed
from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the
Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine,
declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except
public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State
could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural
resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease
for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate
foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell
under the classification of public agricultural lands. 50 However, government
reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable
public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties
because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory
prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The
1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were
classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease,
or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and
twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by
purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in
excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in
excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two
thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or
association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not
repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the
contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of
retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act
No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing
75
laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this
day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public
domain into "alienable or disposable" 52 lands of the public domain, which prior
to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the
government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are
"officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as
follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands
of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another,53 for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this
Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed,
or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public
domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There
must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither
timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential
purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes
other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession,
shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not
otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or
banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as
the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to
purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section
fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary
for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The
lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under
the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All
these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such
lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only
lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-
agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however,
became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease
of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive
purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA
No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-
agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, 54
unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55 Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized
succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too
are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means.
Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands
under water remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the
'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also
declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to
be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before
leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the
land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must
have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the
foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by
lease. The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No.
141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first
implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935
76
Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands,
however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution.
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless
reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of government
reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and
not sold to private parties. 56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not
sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141
does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands
classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for
non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional
authority before lands under Section 59 that the government previously
transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably
necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall
not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this
limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes
deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so
granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the
legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141
exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public
lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units and
entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in
violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of
lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be
used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers
could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale
of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private
parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on
these lands.57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under
Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding.
Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not
needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for
authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director
of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in
the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases
or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. 58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still
reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, the
reclaimed land could become private land only if classified as
alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition
under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of
public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the
Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public
dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service, before the same
could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration
of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is
governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of
public dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public
use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national
wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if
not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the
national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise
adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception
of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
77
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
(Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with
the exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution
barred the alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands."
However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution
encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the
public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral
land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public
domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited
the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public
domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935
Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation,
ecological, and development requirements of the natural resources, shall
determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may be
developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual,
corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor
may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or
acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares.
No private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license
or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess
of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by
the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now
acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations
became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of
alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141
applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands
of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA
with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by
dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other
forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for
the efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying
out the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and
functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to
private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for
the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis
supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of
the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the
ebb and flow of the tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under
water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide. 62 Foreshore and submerged
areas indisputably belong to the public domain 63 and are inalienable unless
reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then,
and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban
applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and
associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the
public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations
by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to
lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands
of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to
sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of
CA No.141, which states
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
except when authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
78
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has
adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural
resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2
and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may
be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or
grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which
may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor."
(Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only
through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring,
except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well
understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line
5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this
was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private
corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very
clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases
decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to
prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-
square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it
would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional
ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of
public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size
farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed
the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of
alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not
more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing
the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing
the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent
the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one
generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional
limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of
alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means
would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation
by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is
a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition
by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to
transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public
domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by
the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is
removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the
face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful
adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the
public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit
arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas
clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio
Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a
combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
79
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three
islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more
or less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area." 65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom
Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option
"granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only
157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been
reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged
areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of
P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the
Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all
the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA
will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the
total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total
reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's
share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the
name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of
transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on
the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI,
shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates
of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x;
provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any
given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent
(70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding
proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled."
(Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in
its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-
AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended
JVA states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to
perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the
Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive
right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the
Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated
April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and
own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x
x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas
of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its
Memorandum,67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President
Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded
that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory
authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have
been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey
the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or any
statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding
public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not
apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory
grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the
State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated,"
unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The
mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable
or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open
to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive
Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which
80
was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another location
thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 74 of the Civil
Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until formally
declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being
such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special
land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged
areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares
comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9,
1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos.
7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No.
1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land
patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had
already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were
partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the
necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer
part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor
national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the
classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other
natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the
State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then
a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November
20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed
lands may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said
that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed
by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could
reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private
parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim
from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of
public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold
ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from
which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming
from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of
the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the
sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the
time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No.
141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as
alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands
must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes. 78 Moreover, the
contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could
not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private
corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the
National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A
declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be
limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because
reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the
National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government.
Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the
National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the
National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation
projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity."
Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation
services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind
consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban
81
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land
is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then
declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay.
There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these
submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by
any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these
submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from
the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x
owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged
areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution
are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed
and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer
needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of
man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is
tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of
PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other
kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such
systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and
operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue
"rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private
parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or
any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use."
Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA
would actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions
imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same
section also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the
President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the
PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x
x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA
became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to
reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525
recognized PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare
and interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would
obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration
segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those
still needed for public service.1wphi1.nt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify
inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain
would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not
classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084
or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising
such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of
the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all
aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee,
supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation,
order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of
natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole
agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and
titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies." 80 (Emphasis
supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State,
DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public
lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether
areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be
reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before
PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the
country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of
the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA
should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 81 and 782 of CA No. 141.
Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then
recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the
lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
82
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On
the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or
submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to
PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration
can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83 of CA
No. 141 and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with
CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits
that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government
"shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85
(Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property
of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x
x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property
belonging to the Government. The Court declared that -
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative
authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on
February 4, 1977, provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay
pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November
20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is
hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to
PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the
aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume
the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public
Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates
Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the
corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said
shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public
Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including
appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of
Natural Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without
prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his
assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the
basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue
the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979,
provides that -
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the
PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization
or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use
of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA
to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA."
EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter
of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its
patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of
PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
to private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer
any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does
not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3,
83
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The
legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain
barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could
be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied)
would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate
both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these
lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a
public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is
issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that
the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order
No. 654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of
payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA
from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to
decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not
authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any
cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer
accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if
found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If
found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar
body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized
representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in
the Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in
any newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the property
does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like
period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be
sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be
sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same
committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in
which case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. 90 The
Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code
through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular
emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public
auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of
public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on
December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should
reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of
the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas
in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No one, however, submitted a bid. On
December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could
sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public
bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991. 93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an
option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The
failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares,
almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public
bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the
signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the
country had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
is absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act
No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative
authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the
constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in
the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary
payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of
the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with
respect to the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a
government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and
AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the
contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed
land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and
Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the
repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
84
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a
proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land
ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the
Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor
or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on
portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual,
portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares 96 of non-agricultural
lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative
authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of
the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the
reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public
domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains
that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of
title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and converts
the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI
contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the
corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the
Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory,
PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate
of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically
comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where
the Court ruled -
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he
may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and
continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered
and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public
domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and
free patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private
respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and,
therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical
Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of
a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants
or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons
or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become
registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four
cases uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private
lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically
comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration
under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the
National Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under
the Department of Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-
hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other
facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The
Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of
Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is
an example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the
land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in
the name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public
as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been
issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel
PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is
that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by
these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be
sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the
registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously
conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration
does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to
the registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the
Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically
becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions
of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then
President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the
Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the
aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred
fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the
technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters
not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when
85
authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that
are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141
constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title"
of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104
Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under
Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their
disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the
constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with
Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the
public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands
can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private
or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of
public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are
concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the
National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible
for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be
evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the
Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and
efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas
shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the
National Government which shall ensure a coordinated and
integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates
Authority as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public
welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing
authority to reorganize the national government including the transfer,
abolition, or merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.
All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that,
reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized
under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR
as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of
the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not
private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other
alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the
public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the
lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency
tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of
the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of
the public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both
lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that
alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred
to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not
automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred
to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse
equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands."
This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise
that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in
corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country -
creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent.
This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development
in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire
not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands. 105 The 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the
1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act
No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to
existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be
registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without
losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section
86
103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x
x Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the
Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall
be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in
Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public
corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as
provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens
System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is
expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land
"shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision
refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public
domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered
unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority
prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land
that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the
public domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48,
Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property
of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but
titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion
of a public wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation
regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the
National Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the
name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private
property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school
site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality. 106 All these
properties become properties of the public domain, and if already registered
under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no
requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land
from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of
eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public domain.
Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to
issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of title
covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or
interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National
Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper
Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the
number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A
memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate
of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new
certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government,
province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality
exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the
memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be
for the account of the authority taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis
supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also
be registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of
the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of
Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint
venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by
PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP
under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale
or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to
"cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's
Land Share in the name of AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to
AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by
lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed
lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, 108 the
Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public
domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to
private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their
inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of
the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be
distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such
equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or
seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
87
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public
service. The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural
resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and
further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose
"object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the
commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court
must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore
declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the
issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts,
and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED
from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and
Corona, JJ., concur.
Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr. 393 SCRA 361 (2002)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146030. December 3, 2002]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE
ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA JR.,
MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III, ROQUETA ALEJAGA,
JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA;
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ROXAS CITY, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period
provided in the Public Land Act does not bar the State from asking for the
reversion of property acquired through such means.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the November 15, 2000 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44568. The decretal portion of the
challenged Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, SET ASIDE and
RECALLED.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA thus:
On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. x x x filed with the
District Land Office, Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2) 8442
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Mli-06-000020-D, with an area of .
3899 hectares, more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City (Exh. A; Exh 9). It
appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was executed
under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his
investigation and verification of the land to the District Land Office, Bureau of
Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer of Roxas
City approved the application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the
applicant. On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and
the patent was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for
registration and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter,
Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was issued to
[respondent] by defendant Register of Deeds.
On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-
complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the
District Land Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City,
for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
[respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal
Division, Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his
Report dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management
Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil
proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of
[respondent].
88
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the Cottage
Industry Guarantee and Loan Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank
(hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount of
P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was
annotated at the back of the title.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against
[respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas
City covering Free Patent Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an
area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City.
On November 17, 1990, while the case is pending hearing, [respondent] died.
He was substituted by his wife Roqueta Alejaga and his children, namely:
Everette Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga, Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga.
Roqueta Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe Alejaga III.
xxxxxxxxx
After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval of Free Patent
Application No. 3358 and issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in
the name of Felipe Alejaga is by means of fraud hence, null and void ab initio
and the court orders:
a) the cancellation of the approval of the application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering
Lot No. 1, Mli-06-000020-D with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less,
located at Dumulog, Roxas City;
b) the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15, Free Patent No. (VI-
2) 3358 in the name of Felipe Alejaga;
c) the land covered thereby as above described is reverted to the mass of the
public domain;
d) the defendants, Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr. or defendant, Philippine National
Bank, Roxas City Branch, to surrender the owners duplicate copy of above
described Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 to the Register of Deeds (now
Registries of Land Titles and Deeds), Roxas City;
e) the defendant, Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel Original Certificate
of Title No. P-15 and the owners duplicate copy of said title surrendered by
above stated defendants;
f) defendants, Philippine National Bank, cross-claim is dismissed.
Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe, Alejaga, Sr. [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation
that respondents had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title
through fraud and misrepresentation. [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] The appellate court
likewise held that, assuming there was misrepresentation or fraud as claimed
by petitioner, the action for reversion should have been brought within one (1)
year from the registration of the patent with the Registry of Deeds. [if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that
Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free
patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] The CA added that
petitioner had failed to support its claim that the lot covered by respondents
free patent and title was foreshore land.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Hence, this Petition.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case is already
final and executory as against respondent PNB.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner has proven the
allegations to the Complaint.
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the action for reversion
is unavailing.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the efficacy of the
grant of the free patent and (2) the indefeasibility of the Certificate of Title
issued in consequence thereof.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Efficacy of the Grant
Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of Respondent
Alejagas free patent and Certificate of Title. [if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] It also avers
that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal.
On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a vested
right over the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their proven
open, actual, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land for more than
30 years.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show receipt by
Respondent PNB of a copy of the Decision on October 27, not on October 3,
1993 as alleged by petitioner. [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] Further, the bank filed its
Notice of Appeal on November 9, 1993, within the 15-day reglementary
period.
In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in this Petition --
the presence of fraud -- is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review
factual matters.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] However, the instant case falls under one
of the exceptions, because the findings of the CA conflict with those of the RTC
and with the evidence on record.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party
alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof. [if !
supportFootnotes][15][endif]
The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the
people who perpetrate it in each case. [if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] It may assume
different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways. [if !
supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Thus, the law requires that it be established by clear and
convincing evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a preponderance of
evidence before the trial court, showing manifest fraud in procuring the
patent.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] This Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a
free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to
misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which were [if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] ignored by
the Court of Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with
the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] Under Section 91 thereof, an
89
investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application are true.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient
notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to
give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims. [if !supportFootnotes][24]
[endif]
Note that this notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of
land are to be conducted after an application for free patent has been filed
with the Bureau of Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent [if !
supportFootnotes][25][endif]
was dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other
hand, the Investigation & Verification Report[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] prepared by
Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau of
Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated
that he had conducted the necessary investigation and verification in the
presence of the applicant. Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth,
the violation of the rule cannot be condoned because, obviously, the required
notice to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and
investigation allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the
pale of the Public Land Act.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] As correctly pointed out by the
trial court, investigation and verification should have been done only after the
filing of the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio
to conduct his own investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day
before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent. [if !supportFootnotes][28]
[endif]
It must also be noted that while the Alejagas insist that an investigation
was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the
application.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was
conducted is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself,
which bears no signature. [if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Their reliance on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty [if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
is thus misplaced. Since Recios signature does not appear on the December
27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption that an investigation and
verification of the parcel of land was actually conducted. Strangely,
respondents do not proffer any explanation why the Verification &
Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as will
later on be explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -- assuming it
ever existed -- is overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner.
Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not
been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he
had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the
parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission may be
considered as independently relevant. A witness may testify as to the state of
mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith --
and the formers statements may then be regarded as independently relevant
without violating the hearsay rule.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to
cross-examination, the Investigation Report[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] he had
submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal
knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay. [if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be
considered as independently relevant.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif]
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted
as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made.
Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary,
for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue [if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. [if !supportFootnotes][37][endif]
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the
investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was,
hence, properly admitted by the trial court.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif]
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners
contention that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. [if !
supportFootnotes][39][endif]
Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the
Certificate of Title.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] The invalidity of the patent is sufficient
basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof, since
the latter is merely evidence of the former. [if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] Verily, we must
uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the Alejagas patent and title was
tainted with fraud.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
Second Issue:
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the
reversion of a piece of property belonging to the public domain. [if !supportFootnotes][43]
[endif]
On the other hand, the Alejagas claim that, pursuant to Section 32 of PD
1529[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] -- otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree -- the one-year period for reversion has already lapsed. [if !supportFootnotes][45]
[endif]
Thus, the States Complaint for reversion should be dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title
issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the
patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. [if !
supportFootnotes][46][endif]
However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to
titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] Well-settled
is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens System does
not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrants already existing one.
Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, [if !supportFootnotes][49]
[endif]
the State -- even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for
the reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted
to private individuals.[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] Further, this indefeasibility cannot be
a bar to an investigation by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if
the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact
been committed in securing the title.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif]
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be
invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of fraud.
[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif]
Public policy demands that those who have done so should
not be allowed to benefit from their misdeed. [if !supportFootnotes][53][endif] Thus,
prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its
own property acquired through fraud by private individuals. [if !supportFootnotes][54][endif]
90
This is settled law.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif]
Prohibition Against Alienation
or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is another
basis for the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the
public domain. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 [if !supportFootnotes][56][endif]
proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent
or homestead within five years from its grant. [if !supportFootnotes][57][endif] The
prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a
proviso attached to the approval of every application.[if !supportFootnotes][58][endif]
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title
to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or
any improvements thereon. They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title
or interest, if they have not secured the consent of the grantee and the
approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than
education, charity, or easement of way.[if !supportFootnotes][59][endif]
In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 [if !supportFootnotes][60][endif] was
approved and issued on March 14, 1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. P-15[if !supportFootnotes][61][endif] was issued on the same date. On August 18,
1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr.
obtained from Respondent PNB a loan [if !supportFootnotes][62][endif] in the amount of
P100,000. Despite the statement on the title certificate itself that the land
granted under the free patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from the
grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of
land covered by OCT No. P-15.[if !supportFootnotes][63][endif] In his testimony, Gabriel D.
Aranas Jr., then Cashier III of respondent bank, even admitted that the PNB
was aware of such restriction.
COURT You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected the title also when you
credit investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga and you have personally
examined this?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT Do you conclude that this Original Certificate of Title is a [free] patent?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT And this [free] patent was granted on March 19, 1979.
A Yes, your honor.
COURT And as such [free] patent it cannot be alienated except [to] the
government or within five years from its issuance?
A Yes, your honor.
COURT Why did you recommend the loan?
A Because it is just a mortgage.[if !supportFootnotes][64][endif]
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely
within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land
Act.[if !supportFootnotes][65][endif] A mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate,
and the foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of
the property.[if !supportFootnotes][66][endif]
As early as Pascua v. Talens,[if !supportFootnotes][67][endif] we have explained the
rationale for the prohibition against the encumbrance of a homestead -- its
lease and mortgage included -- an encumbrance which, by analogy, applies to
a free patent. We ruled as follows:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their
home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State
prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent.
Further, an encumbrance on a parcel of land acquired through free patent
constitutes sufficient ground for the nullification of such grant, as provided
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, which we quote:
SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract
made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred
and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall
be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect
of annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion
of the property and its improvements to the State.
Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent grant nullifies
the award and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the
state, as we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals:[if !supportFootnotes][68][endif]
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel
of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the
grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the
cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. [if !
supportFootnotes][69][endif]
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years
from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel
land granted to him. The mortgage he made over the land violated that
condition.[if !supportFootnotes][70][endif] Hence, the property must necessarily revert to
the public domain, pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27,
1993 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official business.
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc., 502 SCRA 587
(2006)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156951 September 22, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASIG, RIZAL, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, intervenor
x-------------------------------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, represented by HON.
SECRETARY ANGELO T. REYES, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE
91
PHILIPPINES, represented by CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, GENERAL
NARCISO L. ABAYA, intervenors
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 173408 September 22, 2006
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, MGEN. MARCIANO ILAGAN (Ret.), MGEN.
PONCIANO MILLENA (Ret.), BGEN. JUANITO MALTO (Ret.), BGEN.
RAYMUNDO JARQUE (Ret.) and COL. DOMINADOR P. AMADOR (Ret.),
petitioners,
vs.
L/T. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., respondent.
x-------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two petitions having, as common denominator, the
issue of ownership of a large tract of land.
In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
docketed as G.R. No. 156951, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision 1 dated January 28, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59454, affirming the dismissal by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, of the Republics complaint
for declaration of nullity and cancellation of a land title against the herein
private respondent, the Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI).
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners Rene Saguisag and
five (5) retired military officers pray that Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr.,
the present Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), be
asked to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for having
announced time and again that the military officers and their families in the
contempt action would be ousted and evicted from the property subject of the
main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally resolved by
the Court.
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment2 to the petition in
G.R. No. 156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA),
followed by the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined
causes with the petitioner Republic and thus sought leave to intervene. The
Court, per its Resolutions dated September 3, 2003, 3 and September 29,
2003,4 respectively, allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding
petitions-for-intervention.
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were
ordered consolidated.
The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the following
backdrop:
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 5
establishing a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley later
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The
proclamation "withdr[ew] from sale or settlement and reserve[d] for military
purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the [AFP] the
[certain] parcels of the public domain [indicated in plan Psu-2031]" situated in
the several towns and a city of what was once the Province of Rizal. On its
face, the proclamation covers three (3) large parcels of land, to wit: Parcel No.
2 (portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3 with an
area of 15,912,684 square meters and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128
square meters are described in the proclamation as situated inside Fort
McKinley, Rizal. Specifically mentioned as excluded from Parcel No. 4 albeit
within its boundaries are the American Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985
sq. m.), the Traffic Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the Diplomatic and Consular area
(100,000 sq.m.).
Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain defined
areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declaring them open for
disposition. These are Proclamation No. 4616 and Proclamation No. 462,7 both
series of 1965, excluding portions of the reservation and declaring them the
AFP Officers Village and the AFP EMs Village, respectively, to be disposed of
under Republic Act (R.A.) 2748 and R.A. 7309 in relation to the Public Land Act
(C.A. 141, as amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172 dated
October 16, 1987 and to be disposed pursuant to the same laws
aforementioned, save those used or earmarked for public/quasi-public
purposes, are portions of the reservation known as Lower and Upper Bicutan,
Western Bicutan and the Signal Village, all in Taguig, Metro Manila.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (R.A.
7227, as amended), investing the BCDA the power to own, hold and
administer portions of Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to
it by the President10 and to dispose, after the lapse of a number of months,
portions of Fort Bonifacio.11
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are
parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as or
are situated in what is referred to as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort
Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the pleadings, military officers, both in
the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been
occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP on the
JUSMAG area.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives
of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 1508412 - in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the property covered thereby as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-
2031) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal.
containing an area of (398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx.
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on subdivision Plan Psd 76057,
being a portion of parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in Jusmang
(sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (1,320)
SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring added.)
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on the basis of a
notarized Deed of Sale13 purportedly executed on the same date by then
Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase price as written in the
conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter.
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the
Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the
aforesaid October 30, 1991 deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the
examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino are
embodied in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR) No. 815-1093. 14 Its
92
highlights:
QUESTIONED SPECIMENS:
1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of the Navy Officers
Village Association (NOVA) containing the signature of "ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR." designated as "Q-961" .
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of SHAI containing the
signature of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." ... designated as "Q-962.
xxx xxx xxx
PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
To determine whether or not the questioned and sample/specimen signatures
"ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were written by one and the same person.
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the specimens, submitted,
under stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lens, with the aid of
photographic enlargement reveals that there exist fundamental, significant
differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the
standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in:
- The questioned signatures show slow, drawn, painstaking laborious manner
in execution of strokes; that of the standard/sample signatures show free,
rapid coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of execution of
letters/elements.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-
961" is a product of TRACING PROCESS by CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD.
CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample
signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were not written by one and the same
person.
The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a
TRACED FORGERY by carbon process.
REMARKS:
The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO
G. PALAD, JR." are still in the process of examination. 15
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum
Order No. 17316 directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute
action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the
Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the
reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed
with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of
title suit against the private respondent SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 63883 and eventually raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the
Republic alleged that fraud attended SHAIs procurement of TCT No. 15084. In
paragraph No. 5 of the complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is
void owing, inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is
spurious as the purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are
no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged
payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable,
being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423. 17
In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material
allegations of the complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as
the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the Republic is
estopped to deny.18 SHAI also alleged paying in full the purchase price
indicated in the deed as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 6030203-C dated
October 29, 1991.
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which
the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence) the
Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084
as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and
"B" as its Exhibits "1" and "2," respectively. As the pre-trial order was
written, it would appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to the due
execution and genuineness of Exhs. "A" and "B."19
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document
Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and
asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit "A" is a forgery. For his part,
Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and
denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding
office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he
could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation
area which, apart from its being outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable
in the first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved around the
absence of bureau records respecting SHAIs application to acquire, payment
of the purchase price and Psd-76057, the plan described in TCT No. 15084. 20
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the
person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought with him PNP QDR
No. 001-96 and testified that Palads signature in Exhibit "A" (same as Exh.
"1") is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified,
saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB
by one Engr. Eugenia Balis,21 followed by the payment in full of the contract
price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds of Rizal, also testified
about his having endorsed to Palad a letter-inquiry he received from SHAI
respecting the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads response-letter dated
January 23, 1992 (Exh. "10"), according to Atty. Garcia, is to the effect that
TCT No. 15084 must be genuine as it emanated from the Registrys office on
the basis of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale. 22
On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit "10" and an LMB official
would disclaim transmitting the same to Atty. Garcia.
Eventually, in a decision23 dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the Republics complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint dated November 15,
1991 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
The counterclaims are also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In not so many words, the trial court considered the parcels covered by the
deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR.
Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA whereat its appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59454.
In the herein assailed Decision24 dated January 28, 2003, the appellate court
affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic on the threshold abstract submission that
the CA "completely ignored, overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts
of substance which, if duly considered, will materially affect the outcome of
this case."
93
In its COMMENT To Petition, private respondent SHAI parlays the "what-can-
be-raised" line. It urges the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
issues raised therein, particularly those bearing on the authenticity of Exhibit
"A"/"1," are mainly questions of fact, adding that the matter of the
inalienability of the area purportedly sold is outside the issue agreed upon
during the pre-trial stage.
The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of the reasons proffered
above.
While the Court, in a petition for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far
from absolute. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,25 citing Floro v. Llenado,26 for one,
suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote:
xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the
Court to review the finding of facts of the [CA], summarized in and
subsequent cases as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension
of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) ; 7) ; 8) ; 9) Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land
when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which if properly considered would justify a different
conclusion; and 10) when the findings of facts are premised on the absence
of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Words in
bracket, added.)
To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least
three of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9.
Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner Republic being barred
from raising the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert the
same at the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general rule,
as articulated in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, 27 is that the
determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of
others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that the rationale for
such preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as far as possible
the trial out of the realm of surprises and back-handed maneuverings. And
lest it be overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure to be observed in
pre-trials is, as Bergano v. Court of Appeals28 teaches, citing Gicano v.
Gegato,29 subject to exceptions. And without meaning to diminish the
importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed with inherent power to
suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the demands of justice so require.30
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally observed in pre-
trial conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to tackling the
question of inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more legal
than factual. As it were, the element of surprise is not really present here. For
the issue of inalienability, which is central to the Republics cause of action,
was raised in its basic complaint, passed upon by the CA and, before it, by the
trial court31 and of which at least one witness (Palad) was examined as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in question at the time of the
land alleged sale was part of the [FBMR]. Now as part of the [FBRM] do
you know whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of disposition?
A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is already part of those
government lands that has been assigned to other government agencies that
is no longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say on that
because the proclamation to the effect was reserving this for particular
purpose under the DND .32 (Words in bracket added.)
At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from private respondent
SHAI. It even cross-examined said witness. 33 The rule obtains that the
introduction of evidence bearing on an issue not otherwise included in the pre-
trial order amounts to implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to
try such issue.34
Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now consider the
clashing assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during the period
material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or
cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable character of
the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the
military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are correct.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its
branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. 35 Such tract or tracts of land
thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other
disposition until again declared alienable.36 Consistent with the foregoing
postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or
a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and,
therefore, not registrable,37 unless it is in the meantime reclassified and
declared as disposable and alienable public land. 38 And until a given parcel of
land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone
and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and
alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains, 39 even if
incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for
defense. So it must be here.
There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned
October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under
Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would categorically
say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that "subject land
is within military reservation,"40 and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area
is the private property of the government and therefore removed from the
concept of public domain per se,41 its own evidence themselves belie its
posture. We start with its Exhibit "2" (petitioners Exh. "B"), a copy of TCT No.
15084, which described the area covered thereby measuring 399,922 square
meters as a "portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic)
area Fort Bonifacio." Complementing its Exhibit "2" is its Exhibit "1" - the deed
of sale - which technically described the property purportedly being conveyed
to private respondent SHAI as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan
Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic) area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx
(Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private
respondents Exhibits "1" and "2," formed part of that wide expanse under
Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land of
94
the public domain as falling within its coverage. These include, inter alia, the
entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu
2031 located inside the now renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a redundant
point, was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation
Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu 2031 42
prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the outlines of
Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there also shown, the
399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT No. 15084,
defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violet-colored
borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No. 423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of
the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel No. 3
of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA,
DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has maintained all along this
thesis. Towards discharging its burden of proving that the disputed property is
part of the reservation, the petitioner Republic need only to demonstrate that
all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 have
been reserved for military purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact of
reservation is the law or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the
contents and issuance of which courts can and should take judicial notice of
under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 43
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked
Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the
proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084,
inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and
hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the appellate court
seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind eye on, certain
admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic being those made
in its answer to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5 (e) and (g) of its
complaint. To the Republics allegations that the property covered by TCT No.
15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs answer thereto reads:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs 5 of the
complaint, the truth of the matter being that in the Deed of Sale , the
Director of Lands Certificate (sic) that he is "authorized under the law to sell"
the subject property and that the "lots were duly awarded by the [LBM] to the
vendee.44 ( Emphasis and word in bracket added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic
alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers denial to such
allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No.
15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules on pleadings, a
specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific because it is
so qualified or termed "specific" by the pleader. 45 The defendant must specify
each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely denies and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which
he will rely to support his denial. 46 Else, the denial will be regarded as general
and will, therefore, be regarded as an admission of a given material fact/s
stated in the complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what,
under the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the Republics averments
that what SHAIs TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In
the process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to admit the reality of such
averment.
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more than
sufficiently established its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of land
covered by TCT No. 15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of proof on
the issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of evidence to
disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had, for
settlement purposes, effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or
excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the
private respondent. This is as it should be for the cogency of SHAIs claim
respecting the validity of both the underlying deed of sale (Exh. "A"/"1") and
its TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") rests on the postulate that what it purportedly
bought from the LMB had ceased to be part of the reserved lands of the public
domain. Elsewise put, SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had been
withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for disposition, failing
which it has no enforceable right over the area as against the State.
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by reason of lack of
evidence. To be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it wanted to,
pointed to any presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed parcels
from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse still, its own Exhibit "5,"47
a letter dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding General, M/Gen
Lisandro Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the SHAI, cannot but be
viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed land has yet to be
excluded from the military reservation. The Abadia letter, with its feature dis-
serving to private respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows:
Dear Mrs. Gabon:
This is in connection with your move to make a petition to President Aquino
regarding the possible exclusion of Southside Housing Area from the military
reservation and for its eventual allotment to the military officers presently
residing thereat. Allow me to state that I interpose no objection . I find it
helpful to our officers to be provided a portion of the Fort Bonifacio military
reservation . (Underscoring added.)
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to understand
how the CA could still have found for SHAI.. The appellate court, apparently
swayed by what SHAI said in its Brief for the Appellees48 that:
Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that , then President
Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation 461 when he excluded from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 an area of 2,455,810 square meters
more or less. Likewise on October 16, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 also located at Fort Bonifacio containing an
area of 4,436, 478 . So if we deduct the 6,892,288 [2,455,810 + 4,436,478
= 6,892,288] square meters covered by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the
areas reserved for military purposes of 7,053,143 square meters, what is only
left is 160,857 square meters or more or less 16 hectares . 49
justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the following
disquisition:
The foregoing admission aside, appellants [now petitioners] reliance on
Proclamation No. 493 [should be 423] in insisting that the land in litigation is
inalienable because it is part of the [FBMR] is too general to merit serous
95
consideration. While it is true that, under the said July 12, 1957 Proclamation,
then President Carlos P. Garcia reserved the area now known as Fort Bonifacio
for military purposes, appellee [now respondent] correctly calls our attention
to the fact, among other matters, that numerous exceptions thereto had
already been declared through the years. The excluded areas under
Proclamation No. 461, dated September 29, 1965 and Proclamation No. 172,
dated October 16, 1987 alone already total 6,892,338 square meters. (Figures
in bracket added.)
The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for concurrence.
For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a springboard to justify
speculative inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423 reserved for military
purposes roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143.
On the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 excluded a combined area
of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump from an acknowledgment of
the disputed parcels of land having been reserved for military purposes to a
rationalization that they must have been excluded from the reservation
because 6,892,338 square meters had already been withdrawn from
Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to stress, factual
speculations do not make for proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and
quite understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any
proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, segregating the property
covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying the same as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we
earlier said, lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation
remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is
released from such classification and declared open to disposition. 50 The
October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for
the nonce its authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying
medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private
respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel
to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is
unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by
the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. 51
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent
are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the
FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of
the JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its
reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still,
such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI. The
reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 352 of the 1987 Constitution forbids
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas had stated
the observation that the reason for the ban is not very clear under existing
jurisprudence,53 the fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are
prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring alienable public lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this
disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however,
without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30,
1991 Deed of Sale which necessarily involves the question of the authenticity
of what appears to be Palads signature thereon.
With the view we take of the case, the interplay of compelling circumstances
and inferences deducible therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the
authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is
spurious. Consider:
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery.
The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent states,
without elaboration, that Palads declaration is aimed at avoiding "criminal
prosecution".54 The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads allegation on
forgery.55 Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes
the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel
each other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB
office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity,
Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before
the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and
there stamped "Received" by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14
p.m. of October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other
words, the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a
day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a
bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized
contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to
purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act. 56 There is also no
record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an
application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property
valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November
24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management
Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court 57 attest to
this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization
and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau
record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.58
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the "deed of
sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29 October
1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price.." An
official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it
kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment, 59 it
failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. A Certification under date
September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division, LMB, states that "OR #
6030203 in the amount of P11,977,000.00 supposedly paid by [SHAI] is not
among the series of [ORs] issued at any time by the National Printing Office to
the Cashier, LMB, Central Office." 60 A copy of the OR receipt is not appended
to any of the pleadings filed before the Court. We can thus validly presume
that no such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to
SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as
paid has, in fact, never been paid.61
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in
cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming
in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses
account taxes credulity to the limit.
96
A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could not have come to
pass without the participation of a cabal of cheats out to make a dishonest
buck at the expense of the government and most likely the members of SHAI.
No less than its former president (Ms. Virginia Santos) testified that a
"facilitator" did, for a fee, the necessary paper and leg work before the LMB
and the Registry of Deeds that led to the execution of the Deed of Sale and
issuance of the certificate of title in question. 62 Ms. Santos identified Eugenia
Balis, a geodetic engineer, as the "facilitator"63 who "facilitated all these
presentation" of documents,64 and most of the time, "directly transacted" with
the LMB and the Register of Deeds leading to acquisition of title. 65 Engr. Balis
was, in the course of Ms. Santos testimony, directly mentioned by name for at
least fifteen (15) times. Not surprisingly, Engr. Balis did not appear in court,
despite SHAIs stated intention to present her as witness. 66
The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this
and the NOVA area litigations is, as described in the Report of the FactFinding
Commission,67 "so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of land
complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and Separation Benefits
System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty shoplifting in
comparison."68 The members of private respondent SHAI may very well have
paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of the
JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the over P11 Million
they paid, if that be the case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside
the commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong hands and did not enter
the government coffers. Else, there must be some memorials of such
payment.
At bottom, this disposition is nothing more than restoring the petitioner
Republic, and eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it in law and
in fact. There is nothing unjust to this approach.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No.
173408 need not detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the
petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area and,
accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in
the housing units each may be occupying is now moot and academic.
However, contempt petitioners expressed revulsion over the efforts of the
military establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from
their respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R. No.
156951 could be resolved, is understandable as it is justified. We thus end this
ponencia with a reminder to all and sundry that might is not always right; that
ours is still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the civilian or
military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat lightly any attempt to
trifle, intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A becoming
respect to the majesty of the law and the prerogatives of the Court is a must
for the orderly administration of justice to triumph.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the
appealed CA Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Deed of
Sale dated October 30, 1991 (Exh. "A"/"1") purportedly executed in favor of
private respondent SHAI and TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such deed are declared VOID. The
Register of Deeds of Pasig or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby ordered to
CANCEL TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby is
DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same
has, in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from such
reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its members, representatives and/or
their assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land immediately upon the
finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7227,
otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act.
Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further
thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur
Buenaventura v. Republic 517 SCRA 271 (2007)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166865 March 2, 2007
ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F. BUENAVENTURA,
Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The case before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72925
entitled, Angelita F. Buenaventura and Preciosa F. Buenaventura vs. Republic
of the Philippines, dated 23 August 2004 and 25 January 2005, respectively,
which granted the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
and declared the parcel of land subject matter of this Petition as public land,
thus, reversing the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City
dated 29 October 2001, which recognized and confirmed the rights of herein
petitioners Angelita F. Buenaventura (Angelita) and Preciosa F. Buenaventura
(Preciosa), over the subject property, and issued a decree of registration of the
same in their favor.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for registration of title
over the subject property. They are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura
and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) from whom they acquired the
subject property.
The facts reveal that the subject property was acquired by the spouses
Buenaventura from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon, namely: Aurelio de Leon and
his sister Rodencia Sta. Agueda even before World War II. However, it was only
on 30 January 1948 that the corresponding Deed of Sale 4 was executed in
favor of the spouses Buenaventura. After the execution of the said Deed of
Sale, the spouses Buenaventura transferred the tax declaration in their name.
Consequently, Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 5492 covering the subject property in
the names of Aurelio and Rodencia was cancelled and T.D. No. 6103 5 was
issued in the name of spouses Buenaventura.
In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of Sale, 6 the
subject property, together with the adjacent property, which they previously
97
acquired from Mariano Pascual, to their children, among whom are herein
petitioners. As a result thereof, a new tax declaration (T.D. No. A-004-05698) 7
was issued in the name of the spouses Buenaventuras children.
Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000
before the RTC of Paraaque City of the subject property, more particularly
described as Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B, Csd-007604-000176-D, Paraaque
Cadastre, located in San Dionisio, Paraaque City, with an area of 3,520.92
square meters, more or less. Petitioners alleged that "they and their
predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru
inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same since time
immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law." 8
As the trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance,
it thereby set the case for hearing, and directed the service and publication of
the notice thereof pursuant to Section 23 9 of the Property Registration Decree
(Presidential Decree No. 1529).
On 27 September 2001, when the case was called for hearing, no interested
party appeared before the trial court other than the petitioners. Consequently,
petitioners proceeded to present several documents in order to establish
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. The same were marked and
offered in evidence before the court a quo.
No formal opposition had been filed and no oppositor appeared in any of the
previously set hearings of the case; hence, petitioners counsel moved for the
declaration of general default except for the Republic. The same was granted
by the court a quo. The case was then referred to a commissioner, who
directly received petitioners evidence in chief.
Petitioners presented five witnesses, namely: Aniceta C. Capiral, Engr. Teofilo
R. La Guardia, Atty. Reginald L. Hernandez, Ricardo H. Lopez, and herein
petitioner Angelita, in order to establish the fact that petitioners and their
predecessors have acquired vested right over the subject property by their
open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by any adverse claim,
meaning, their possession of the subject property was in the manner and for
the period required by law; likewise, to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the subject property.
Other than the respective testimonies of the above-named witnesses, they
also presented and identified several documents 10 offered in evidence, which
tend to establish further the following: (1) petitioners fee simple title over the
subject property; (2) the nature of the possession and occupation of the
property; (3) its classification as part of the alienable and disposable zone of
the government; and (4) the improvements introduced thereon and the taxes
paid on the subject property. Said documents were duly admitted by the trial
court.
On 29 October 2001, based on the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioners, the court a quo issued an Order granting the application for
registration of title of the subject property, the decretal portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the application of registration of title to the subject
parcel of land, known as Lot 5001-B Cad 299, Paraaque Cadastre, and more
particularly described in approved Survey Plan Csd 007604-000176 is hereby
confirmed and ordered registered in the names of [petitioners] Preciosa,
Angelita, [and in the names of their other siblings] Crisostomo, and Alfredo, all
surnamed Buenaventura, free from all liens and encumbrances.
ONCE THIS DECISION has become final, let another one issue directing the
Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree.
Let copies of this [D]ecision be furnished to the adjoining owners, Land
Registration Authority, Land Management Bureau, Office of the Solicitor
General, Sec. of Public Works and Highways, Department of Agrarian Reform,
the Director, Forest Management Bureau, Chairman Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority, DENR [Department of Environment and Natural
Resources], South CENRO, Land Management Sector, City Mayor of Paraaque
and Registry of Deeds, Paraaque City.11
Feeling aggrieved with the aforementioned Order of the trial court, the
Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. According to the Republic,
petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by themselves; hence, the
trial court erred in granting petitioners application for registration of the
subject property. The Republic prayed for the reversal of the Order of the trial
court and for the dismissal of the application for registration filed by
petitioners.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the
Republic, thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads as:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 274, Paraaque City dated October 29, 2001 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the parcel of land subject matter of the application is declared
public land.12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision on 20
September 2004. In a Resolution dated 25 January 2005 rendered by the
appellate court, said Motion for Reconsideration was forthwith denied for lack
of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Decision of the
trial court confirming petitioners title over the subject property for not being
allegedly supported by substantial evidence as required by law.
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject
property as pubic land and ignoring petitioners evidence of over 50 year
possession in the concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any
adverse claim.
In the Memorandum13 of the petitioners, they allege that the appellate court
committed grave error when it nullified the trial courts Order dated 29
October 2001, which confirmed their title to the subject property. Petitioners
claim that contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that the above-
mentioned Order was not supported by evidence, the records of the case
clearly speak of the existence, not absence, of sufficient evidence to sustain
the findings of the court a quo that petitioners have established possession of
the subject property in the manner and for the period required by law, that is
by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an
owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to warrant the registration of their title to
the subject property.
Petitioners likewise argue that the appellate court gravely erred when it
declared as public land the subject property despite the fact that they were
98
able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their possession of the
subject property was indeed in the manner and within the period required by
law. Having been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years,
they have already acquired vested right or title over the subject property by
operation of law based on the period provided for under the prevailing land
registration and property laws; hence, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
inconsistent with the facts and the law.
The Petition is meritorious.
In resolving the issues involved in the present case, there is a need for this
Court to re-examine the facts of the case for the proper determination of the
issues raised herein.
As a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is
not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on the Court.14 However, the rule is not without exceptions. There are
several recognized exceptions15 in which factual issues may be resolved by
this Court and two of these exceptions find application in this present case, to
wit: (1) when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court; and (2) when the findings of fact of the appellate court are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the
evidence on record.
The issues presented by petitioners will be discussed concurrently, since they
are interrelated.
In the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled that petitioners failed
to show possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier as provided for in Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. It further said that the testimonial
evidence presented by petitioners was not sufficient to prove petitioners
possession in the manner and within the period required by the aforesaid law
because petitioners witnesses merely testified on their familiarity with the
subject property.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for
registration of land. The said provision of law refers to an original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings.16 It specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.
From the aforesaid provisions of the Property Registration Decree, we can
deduce that there are three requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under the first category, to wit: (1) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and
(3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945 or earlier.17 The second classification relates to the acquisition of private
lands by prescription.
In the case at bar, the Republic argues, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, that petitioners own evidence tends to show that the subject
property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed and a
fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except for
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Likewise,
under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 18 However, such
presumption is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by the applicants
presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of the
application for registration is alienable and disposable. 19
After a thorough examination of the records of this case, this Court found out
that petitioners offered in evidence a certification 20 from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region dated 29 October
2001, to prove that the subject property was alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. The said certification contains the following statements:
This is to certify that the parcel of land as shown and described on the reverse
side of this plan- Lot 5001-B, Cad-299, Paraaque Cadastre situated at San
Dionisio, Paraaque City, Metro Manila containing an area of 3,520.92 square
meters as prepared by Geodetic Engineer Mariano V. Flotildes for Amado
Buenaventura, et al., was verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable
Land per L.C. Map 2623, Project No. 25 of Paraaque per Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
To our minds, the said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or
character of the subject property. The certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. 22 As it is, the said
certification remains uncontested and even the Republic itself did not present
any evidence to refute the contents of the said certification. Therefore, the
alienable and disposable character of the questioned parcel of land has been
clearly established by the evidence of the petitioners, by 3 January 1968, at
the latest.
Now, going to the requisites of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945 or earlier, Republic alleges that no sufficient evidence was adduced by
petitioners to show that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
exclusive possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier in
the concept of an owner, to which the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court of
Appeals in its decision said that:
Although they were able to show possession by their parents, their
predecessors-in-interest, since 1948, they failed to prove the fact of
possession since [12 June 1945] before the filing of the application. 23
Emphasis should be given to the fact that the Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
did not question petitioners possession of the subject property since 1948.
Verily, it even stated in the said Decision that petitioners possession may be
reckoned from 1948, the year of the execution of the Deed of Sale. The only
reason posited by the appellate court in denying the Order of the trial court
99
which granted the application for registration of title of the petitioners was the
fact that petitioners evidence was not sufficient to prove that their possession
of the subject property was since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence
presented by petitioners was not enough to prove that their possession of the
subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier because the evidence
established that the questioned parcel of land was acquired by petitioners
parents only on 30 January 1948, the date of the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale by its previous owners. They can neither tack their possession
to that of the previous owners because they failed to present any evidence of
possession by those prior owners. Moreover, petitioners possession of the
subject property could only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when the
same became alienable and disposable. "Any period of possession prior to the
date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable
is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period
of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the
land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title shall not apply thereto."24
Be that as it may, this will not be an insurmountable bar to the petitioners to
have the title to the subject property registered in their names.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court closely examined the
land registration laws governing land registration proceedings in the
Philippines. In the aforesaid case, the Court made the following
pronouncements:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. [Republic Act] No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June
12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the
public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted
though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." Clearly the subject lands under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It
did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws."26 (Emphasis supplied.)
It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the
possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12
June 1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by
virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of
prescription.
Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership.27 Article 1106 of the Civil Code provides:
By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the
lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
Also in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
Likewise, Article 1137 of the Civil Code states that:
Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land
may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least 30 years. 28 Such property now falls within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), over which title by
prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable
land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and
exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to
such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only
after 12 June 1945.29
The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case,
while petitioners possession over the subject property can be reckoned only
on 3 January 1968, the date when according to evidence, the subject property
became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject property
registered in their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years, 32 years to be exact, reckoned from the year
1968, when the subject property was finally declared alienable and disposable
by the DENR to the time they filed an application for registration of title over
the subject property on 5 June 2000. Petitioners possession of the subject
property since 1968 has been characterized as open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.
Petitioners presented as evidence their tax declarations covering the years
from 1948 until the third quarter of 2001. They also offered in evidence a
certification30 from the Office of the Treasurer of the City of Paraaque to
prove that realty taxes over the subject property had been duly paid by
petitioners. As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
100
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.31
In the same breath, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have been in actual
possession of the subject property since 1968, at the latest. According to the
testimony of their witnesses, parts of the subject property are planted with
bananas and some vegetables, and a bamboo grove. The other parts of the
subject property were used as a fishpond, as well as devoted to salt making
until 1990.32 However, when the property was no longer suitable for
agricultural purposes, for fishpond, and for salt making because of its
conversion to non-agricultural purposes consistent with the zonal
development of the area, the petitioners backfilled the subject property with
gravel and sand, for which they paid their farm helpers just compensation.
Thereafter, they enclosed the property with perimeter fence, installed guards
and a caretaker to prevent potential squatters from penetrating the area. 33
When tax declarations and receipts are coupled with actual possession, they
constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of
ownership through prescription.34
Conspicuously, the petitioners witnesses are one in pointing out that
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are the sole claimants of the
subject property.
It bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioners are
incontrovertible. No one, not even the Republic, presented any evidence to
contradict the claims of the petitioners that they are in possession of the
subject property and their possession of the same is open, continuous and
exclusive in the concept of an owner for over 30 years. Verily, even the
appellate court mentioned in its Decision that petitioners were able to show
possession of the subject property as early as 1948, the only basis for its
Decision reversing the Order of the trial court being the insufficiency of the
evidence presented by petitioners to establish their possession of the subject
property prior to 12 June 1945.
IN ALL, petitioners were able to prove sufficiently that they have been in
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is
characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of
an owner. By this, the subject alienable and disposable public land had been
effectively converted into private property over which petitioners have
acquired ownership through prescription to which they are entitled to have
title through registration proceedings. Petitioners right to have their title to
the subject property registered cannot be defeated simply because the
possession of petitioners commenced on a date later than 12 June 1945, for
the law and supplementing jurisprudence amply, justly and rightfully provides
the necessary remedy to what would otherwise result in an unjust and
unwarranted situation. It would be the height of injustice if petitioners
registration of title over the said property will de denied solely on that ground.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 23 August 2004
and 25 January 2005, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order of the trial court dated 29 October 2001 which granted petitioners
application for registration of the subject property and directing the issuance
of a decree of registration in petitioners favor once the judgment has become
final and executory is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
101