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Negotiation is part of a wider collective bargaining process which gives labour and
management a platform to resolve their differences and agree on issues such as
wages, hours of work and the working conditions of employees. It is against this
backdrop that this discussion seeks to explore the various approaches that may be
used by parties in negotiations. Relevant examples from Zimbabwe and the world at
large will cited as the essay progresses.
There are various approaches to negotiation and this discussion will cover at least
six and give examples of how each approach operates in real world. The first
approach to negation is where negotiations taken as are as a game of strategy.
According to Raiffa, (1982) this approach adopts an approach similar to that which
players of games like chess or poker adopt. Raiffa, (1982) states that, Tit for Tat has
emerged as one of the stronger tactics adopted by negotiators during the negotiation
process. The process is dominated by reciprocity and concessions. For example if a
negotiator is first to make a demand, you are expected to cooperate with what the
other part is going to give as a counter offer. If you are to make a counter offer (move
second) you reciprocate what the other party has offered on the table. Thus for
example, if the other party cooperates, respond cooperatively and if the other
party competes, respond competitively. Reciprocity is referred to by Lewicki et al
(1994) as a kind of exchange in which negotiators make equal concessions, move-
by-move.
The second approach views Negotiations as a power struggle. The IPMZ module
(2010) refers to this as the coercive approach. The coercive approach is based on
the ability of one party to overcome the resistance of its opponent by means of
power, which may stem from the legitimate authority of management or from the
power base of the workforce (Barnhizer 2005). Although negotiators may have
several sources of structural power, the most commonly investigated source of
power is the negotiators best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). A
negotiators BATNA has become the primary indicator of a negotiators relative
power in negotiation. Employers derive their power from the fact that they control the
wages, they can fire and hire employees and own the means of production. On the
other hand employees source of power is derived from their ability to collectively
organise and withdraw their labour (Lewicki et al 1994). Thus in negotiations, factors
such as the ability for an employer to easily replace an employee and the ability of
an employee to withdraw his labour has an impact on either part accepting the other
partys position. for example in a country like Zimbabwe where un employment is
very high and skills are abundant employers hold an upper hand in negotiations for
they can simply threaten to replace employees for much lesser wages than they are
currently earning. The situation was worsened by the labour Act amendment of 2015
which upheld the dismissal of employees on three months notice.
The two track or boundary role model is based on the principle that, the way the
parties negotiate is determined by the interests of the constituents they represent
(IPMZ module 2010). Armstrong (2006) argues that, the negotiator who represents
an organization operates in the boundary between his or her own organization or
constituents and the organization(s) represented by the other negotiator(s). In this
role, the negotiator must balance competing demands made by his or her own
organization with those made by the other representative and his or her constituents.
The argument here is that when Trade union members meet employers
representatives at National Employment councils to bargain or negotiate they do so
based on the fact that they have a mandate from their constituencies. This is the
reason why in most negotiations before agreeing on a position negotiators of ask for
adjournments to consult with their constituencies.
Raiffa, H., 1982. The art and science of negotiation. Harvard University Press.
Barnhizer, D.D., 2005. Inequality of bargaining power. U. Colo. l. Rev., 76, p.139.