G.R. No. L-12219
GLENN
March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, v. FRANK SMITH,
JR., defendant- appellee.
FACTS: The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan
Bridge in La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per
hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on
it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man
on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse
without diminution of speed.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard
the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of
the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over
to the other side. The automobile passed in such close proximity
to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse fell
and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI La Union absolved the defendant from liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in
the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as
gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: Yes, he is liable. The control of the situation had then
passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to
bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no
other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of
collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on
until he was almost upon the horse.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances
the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party.
G.R. No. 131588
March 21, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v.
DE LOS SANTOS, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum
Highway in Cagayan de Oro City, a team of PNP members
undergoing a Special Training Course were performing an
Endurance Run. They were jogging at the right side of the lane.
A speeding Isuzu Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and
injuries. The accused surrendered to the Governor, and was
eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated
Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to
death by the Trial Court. Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to kill
the policemen, or a mere reckless imprudence.
HELD: From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined
to believe that the tragic event was more a product of reckless
imprudence than of a malicious intent on Glenns part. First, as
testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the
place of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon.
And according to PAGASAs observed weather report within the
vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50
kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was
overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the thick clouds
covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for
the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts
that illuminated the highway. Second, the jogging trainees and
the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short
pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them
hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards
had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving
hand signals. Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the
road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees
were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as Glenns
vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same
direction as Glenns truck such that their backs were turned
towards the oncoming vehicles from behind. Fourth, no
convincing evidence was presented to rebut Glenns testimony
that he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and
glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction
as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling
from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other
vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one to stop or
swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat
on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and
more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be
inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a
pregnant wife and three very young children who were
dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group
with his truck.
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light
of the number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an
accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note
that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to
grind against the police trainees that would drive him into
deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Glenns offense is in
failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or
to a safe place the movement he heard and felt the first
bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have
been spared.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing
an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position
of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against
its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists
in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his
employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his
physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an
experienced driver, should have known to apply the brakes or
swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first
bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his
own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery
and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of the
incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care
in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man,
such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning
to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane
(there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the
opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at
high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the
speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care
under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious
intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving,
GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries.
G.R. No. 143133
June 5, 2002
BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING N.V. and
JARDINE DAVIES TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC., petitioners, v.
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.
FACTS: CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the MN Anangel
Sky at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of various Prime Cold
Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the
Philippine Steel Trading Corporation. On July 28, 1990, MN
Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the
subsequent days, discharged the subject cargo. Four (4) coils
were found to be in bad order B.O. Tally sheet No. 154974.
Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for
the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine Steel Trading
Corporation declared the same as total loss.
Despite receipt of a formal demand, Phil. First insurance refused
to submit to the consignees claim. Consequently, Belgian
Overseas paid the consignee P506,086.50, and was subrogated
to the latters rights and causes of action against defendants-
appellees. Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant instituted this
complaint for recovery of the amount paid by them, to the
consignee as insured.
Impugning the propriety of the suit against them, defendants-
appellees imputed that the damage and/or loss was due to pre-
shipment damage, to the inherent nature, vice or defect of the
goods, or to perils, danger and accidents of the sea, or to
insufficiency of packing thereof, or to the act or omission of the
shipper of the goods or their representatives. In addition
thereto, defendants-appellees argued that their liability, if there
be any, should not exceed the limitations of liability provided for
in the bill of lading and other pertinent laws. Finally, defendants-
appellees averred that, in any event, they exercised due
diligence and foresight required by law to prevent any
damage/loss to said shipment.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have overcome the
presumption of negligence of a common carrier.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the presumption of fault
imposed on common carriers should not be applied on the basis
of the lone testimony offered by private respondent. The
contention is untenable.
Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the nature of
their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to
the safety of the goods and the passengers they transport.
Thus, common carriers are required to render service with the
greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to
ascertain the nature and characteristics of the goods tendered
for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and
stowage, including such methods as their nature requires. The
extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of and received for
transportation by the carrier until they are delivered, actually or
constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right
to receive them.
Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them,
common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been
at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated
or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they
exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In
order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore,
they have the burden of proving that they observed such
diligence.
However, the presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if
the loss is due to any of the following causes: (1) flood, storm,
earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2)
an act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4)
the character of the goods or defects in the packing or the
container; or (5) an order or act of competent public authority.
This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or
deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then
the carrier is liable therefor.
Corollary to the foregoing, mere proof of delivery of the goods in
good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order
at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or
negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is
given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of
the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.
That petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of
negligence is revealed in the case at bar by a review of the
records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent.
G.R. No. L-65295
March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
CARBONEL, petitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FACTS: On November 15, 1975 (Martial Law period), about
1:30AM, respondent Dionisio, a marketing man, was driving
home from a dinner meeting where he had a shot or two of
liquor. He had just crossed an intersection and while driving
down the street, his headlights were turned off. When he
switched on his headlights to bright, he suddenly saw a Ford
dump truck some 2 meters away from his Volkswagen car. It
was later found out that he did not a curfew pass that night. The
dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked
there by the company driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was
parked on the right hand side of the lane that Dionisio was
driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It was
parked askew so it was sticking out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor
were there any early warning reflector devices set anywhere
near the truck, front or rear.
Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was
scheduled to be used the next morning. Dionisio, upon seeing
the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the left, but it
was too late. His car smashed into the truck. Dionisio suffered
physical injuries, including permanent facial scars, a nervous
breakdown and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
(See resolution of factual issues by the SC, found on HELD part
of this digest.)
At the Court of First Instance, an action for damages was
commenced by Dionisio in the CFI, claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in
which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by
his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisios injuries was his own recklessness
in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on, and without a
curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had
exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump
truck driver. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and
against Phoenix and Carbonel.
Upon appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, that court
affirmed the CFIs decision. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dionisios negligence was an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and
the injuries he sustained.
DECISION: NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent,
his negligence was not an intervening, efficient cause. The legal
and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios injuries
was the negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he
parked the dump truck. Petitioners are liable for damages, but
these damages must be mitigated because of Dionisios
contributory negligence. Decision modified whereby Dionisio
will shoulder 20% of awarded damages.
HELD:
[Resolution of factual issues]
The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a
curfew pass. Since he was without a curfew pass, he was
hurrying home, driving at a fast speed in order to avoid the
police. Worse, he turned off his headlights as he was driving
down that street in order to escape notice from the nearby
police station. However, the Court held that that the one or two
shots of liquor he had did not show that he was so heavily under
the influence of liquor as to constitute an act of reckless
imprudence. Taken all together, however, the Court drew the
conclusion that Dionisio was negligent on the night of the
accident.
[Note: During the period of Martial Law, no person was allowed
to be outside his home during curfew hours, unless he has a
curfew pass.]
Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them
Petitioners urge that the Carbonels negligence was merelt a
passive and static condition and that Dionisios negligence
was an efficient intervening cause, and that consequently
Dionisios negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel.
However, the distinctions between cause and condition have
been almost entirely discredited.
The Court quotes significantly from Prosser and Keeton. The
following parts were quoted with emphasis:
Cause and condition So far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have
played an important part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive
situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter
are the result of other active forces which have gone before
Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
condition remains static will not necessarily affect liability
Cause and condition still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited.
So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have
come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new
force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between cause and condition which is important, but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
Dionisios negligence is not an efficient intervening
cause
Carbonels negligence is far from being a passive and static
condition it was an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision would not have happened had the truck not been
parked askew and without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down the street
and for having so created this risk, Carbonel must be held
responsible. Carbonel owed a duty to Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk that
Carbonel had created. Dionisios negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the
chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the
dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of
liability.
The Court quoted parts of Prosser and Keeton. With emphasis
were the following:
Foresseable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one
which is ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason There is an intervening cause combining with the
defendants conduct to produce result, and the defendants
negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that
very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the
fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk,
to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the
scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendants
negligence.
Thus it has been held that one who leaves an obstruction on
the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a
train will run into it.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention
of the foreseeable negligence of others. Xxx The standard of
reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the
plaintiff against that occasional negligence which is one of the
ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be
anticipated One who parks an automobile on the highway
without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it
Dionisio had contributory negligence
The court held that Dionisios negligence was only
contributory, that the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury remained Carbonels lack of due care and that
consequently Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the court.
Hence, on the award of most of the damages, an allocation of
20-80 ratio should be followed, where 20% shall be borne by
Dionisio, while 80% shall be borne by petitioners.
Last Clear Chance cannot apply
Petitioners ask the application of the last clear chance
doctrine. It cannot apply.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported
into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but is a matter for
debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Its historical function was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule
contributory negligence. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had
also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common
law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where
the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected,
as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Court believes that there is no general concept of last clear
chance that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical
terms, is to determine whose negligence the plaintiffs or the
defendants was the legal or proximate cause of the injury.
That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in
chronology or physics. Chronology of plaintiffs and defendants
negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant factors
that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by
such act or omission for the rest of the community.
Phoenix is presumed negligent for failing to supervise its
employees properly and adequately
Carbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its
employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was not able to
overcome this presumption of negligence. It failed to show any
effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which
the dump truck if parked when away from company premises. It
is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of
Phoenix.
Decision modified as to the allocation of award of damages.
G.R. No. L-7664
August 29, 1958
MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-appellants, v.
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his
two brothers went to the swimming pool operated by
Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After paying the entrance
fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.
The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy
roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine
kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to
insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place
within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use
of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards who are all trained as
they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule
prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have
two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the
bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a
clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security
guards who are available always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that hell just be going to the
locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned.
Later, the elder Ong noticed someone at the bottom of the big
pool and notified the lifeguard in attendant (Manuel Abao), who
immediately dove into the water. The body was later identified
as Dominadors. He was attempted to be revived multiple times
but of no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent
in selecting its employees. During trial, the elder brother of Ong
and one other testified that Abao was reading a magazine and
was chatting with a security guard when the incident happened
and that he was called a third time before he responded. Plaintiff
further alleged that even assuming that there was no
negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable under the
doctrine of Last Clear Chance for having the last opportunity
to save the Dominador, its employees failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of
Dominador Ong.
HELD: No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent
in selecting its employees as all of them were duly certified.
MWD was not negligent in managing the pools as there were
proper safety measures and precautions/regulations that were
placed all over the pools. Hence, due diligence is appreciated as
a complete and proper defense in this case. Further, the
testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other witness was
belied by the statements they have given to the investigators
when they said that the lifeguard immediately dove into the
water when he was called about the boy at the bottom of the
pool.
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is of no application here. It
was not established as to how Dominador was able to go to the
big pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no one saw him
returned not until his body was retrieved from the bottom of the
big pool. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously (how can
the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from
going to the big pool if he did not see him go there), and if the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in
cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged
cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
G.R. No. L-51806
November 8, 1988
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, v. COURT
OF APPEALS and ERNEST E. SIMKE, respondents.
FACTS: Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was
Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He went to
Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. As the
plane was landing, he and his companions went to the viewing
deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke
slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back,
breaking his thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3-hour
operation and after recovery he filed a claim for damages
against the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was
the government entity in charge of the airport.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAA was negligent.
HELD: CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a
legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was never
intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no
other purpose but to drain water on the floor area of the
terrace."
But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that
the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is
charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing,
equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila
International Airport.
Responsibility of CAA
The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence
of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place."
Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck,
a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety
of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where
the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look
down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA
should have thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or
elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue
harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a
negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which
although not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to
his own damage. The Court found no contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, considering the following test formulated
in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence
in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct
of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of the negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations
cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably
said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct by the circumstances
which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are
not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them
to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case
under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist.... [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before
the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm
that would befall him, considering the attendant factual
circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking
where he was going, the step in question could not easily be
noticed because of its construction.
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."
G.R. No. 130150
October 1, 1998
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.
FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned
Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'
Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and
stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel,
Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the
vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm
and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel
reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about
2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the
bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped.
However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed
of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the
crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not
take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching
the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not
take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before
the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the
bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory
pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to
the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the
damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of
the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the
time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his
orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her
navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should
give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing
anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty
to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to
act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does
not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the
adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the
navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is
quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory
pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels
approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on
board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these
laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with
the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus
protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon
assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held
to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence
required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and
knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over
which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted
than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible
degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the
ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and
usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under
extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary
care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such
strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the
performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure
that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but
Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. The
master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the
presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony
makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his
duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking
procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful
vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are
not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot,
but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory
pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor
in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the
pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid,
and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no
exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if
his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the
owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not
release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence.
The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect
to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except
insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the
vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of
the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession
and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural
and proximate damages caused to persons or property by
reason of her negligent management or navigation.
G.R. No. L-4977
March 22, 1910
DAVID TATLOR, plaintiff-appellee, v. THE MANILA ELECTRIC
RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a
cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of
mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads
office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all
said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises
of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting
caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said
caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the
caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the
explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion
and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company
left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages
due to the companys negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as
follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was
guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence
and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been
negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the
power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor.
However, the causal connection between the companys
negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in
fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the
caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple
attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led
to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15,
more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy
of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The
series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to
discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a
match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that
he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous.
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which
comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand
reparation therefor from another.
G.R. No. L-10563
March 2, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, v. ANTONIO
BONIFACIO, defendant-appellant.