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B-2:
The Spirit of
Innovation
Rebecca Grant
Rebecca Grant
Rebecca Grant
i
B-2: The Spirit of Innovation
Table of Contents
III
iv
FOREWORD
L
ook skyward, and wonder. Wilbur and Orville Wright
wondered if they could fathom the secrets of birds
in flight. Every aerospace pioneer since and every
individual who has helped them channels that very human
curiosity and wonder into a desire to innovate. The lucky ones
get to do it with brilliant iconoclasts, tough managers, and
skilled teams, and the very most fortunate see their flashes of
insight take flight.
Left and below: Wilbur and
Orville Wright perform early test
For ten years, from 1979 to 1989, flights with two of their
flying machines at Kitty Hawk
the development of the B-2 was circa 1910.
kept secret. Inside that black world,
Opposite: The B-2 Spirit Stealth
thousands of people worked their Bomber soars into the blue.
wonder creating a stealth bomber
unlike anything the aerospace
world had ever seen.
The B-2 evolved from that very
first question, said one engineer.
What can you do in the design of
an airplane when the only priority
was to carry a man and be as small
as possible in all the characteristic
observables?1
Observables . . . through radar,
infrared, and the naked eye, tracking
bombers had gotten easier and
easier since the first integrated Could the return of radar from
use of radar in World War II. a combat aircraft be measured
Surface-to-air missiles and ground- and controlled to let an aircraft
controlled Soviet fighters were close steal through the worlds most
to locking up the borders of the formidable networks ?
Soviet Union. If a bomber could not
penetrate, deterrence weakened.
Engineers wondered: if an under-
standing of the phenomenology of
radar could help improve tracking,
was there a way to turn the tables?
v
CHAPTER ONE
vi
Chapter One: Cones,
Drones, and
Low Observables
E
ngineers had been thinking about how to counter
airborne tracking radar practically since its invention.
During World War II, British engineers theorized about
creating a plasma field around an aircraft to obscure its radar
return. If they could find a material with the right electrical
properties, it could disrupt normal radar return at certain
frequencies.
With the war against Germany That same year, NATO intelligence
raging, the British settled for a much picked up reports of Soviet deploy-
quicker fix called Window, strips ment of the SA-2. Its radar-guided
Opposite: Remnants of a World
of foil dropped from bombers to missile moved at Mach 3.5 to heights War II era radar station.
create a cloud of chaff and white of 60,000 feet and distances out to
Below (top): British bombers drop
out German radar. Window was about 20 miles. Tracking came from clouds of foil chaff to white-out
German radar;
such a secret technology that the gathering information about the (bottom): Soviet SA-2 radar-
RAF kept it under wraps for more timing and angle of reflected radar guided missile.
1
CHAPTER ONE
Right and background: Pyotr How would future aircraft survive? the research
Ufimtsev holding his book that
truly unleashed the stealth Although it was a sideline, research in 1962. His
revolution. in the 1950s and 1960s probed discussion of
Below: The inherently stealthy at low observables for shaping James Clerk
and survivable SR-71.
Minuteman missile warheads and M a x w e l l s
cruise missiles like Snark and equations as a
Hound Dog. basis for pre-
As far as anyone knew, there was dicting how
still no way to apply the low observ- a geometric
able benefits of a sphere to a combat shape would
aircraft. reflect elec-
tromagnetic
Under Kelly Johnsons leadership, waves was
the Mach 3 SR-71 program tried the path to a breakthrough for stealth
out a few of the principles of stealth. aircraft.
Because the SR-71 development
was so highly classified, few knew What Ufimtsev realized was that
how far Lockheed had gone in radar waves, a notch farther down
exploring the potential of stealth. the electromagnetic spectrum,
would behave the same way as
The engineering of the day lacked optical light. Ufimtsevs insight
principles for how was to apply the principle to
to measure and con- calculate the sum of the radar
trol the total sum of cross sections of different geo-
an aircrafts radar metric shapes. Fortunately, it
reflectivity. The best was a snooze for the Soviet Unions
they could do with censors. After all, Maxwell had
radar return was died in 1879.
to soak some of it
up with absorbent The Soviet Union saw no national
material. What they security value in the paper and it
couldnt do, yet, was was cleared for publication.
to control the waves. DRONES
Part of the answer was lying in What first convinced the U.S.
stacks of foreign technical litera- government to push stealth forward
ture, waiting to be translated by the was not research by the Russians
Air Force Institute of Technology. but a strange test result with
The document in question was a a miniature drone on a range
report titled Method of Edge Waves in Florida.
in the Physical Theory of Diffraction. The Defense Advanced Research
The author was Russian physicist Projects Agency (DARPA) ran
Pyotr Ufimtsev. Hed first published several experiments with miniature
2
CONES, DRONES AND LOW OBSERVABLES
3
CHAPTER ONE
4
CONES, DRONES AND LOW OBSERVABLES
6
Chapter Two: Two Horses in
the Race
L
ockheed and Northrop were both selected to work on Opposite (top): Northrop
Grumman B-2 Spirit on the
demonstrators in the fall of 1975. The program was tarmac at Andersen Air Force
Base, Guam; (bottom): Lockheed
Martin F-117 Stealth Fighter.
judiciously named the Experimental Survivable Testbed
Below, left: Early Lockheed XST
(XST). Wedding survivability with aerodynamics was the first conceptual sketches showing
design based on strict geometric
test. No one really knew whether it would be a fighter, bomber shapes.
or reconnaissance vehicle.
Over the next five years, the craft with a surface consisting of
advanced design teams at Lockheed flat plates, the Lockheed team could
and Northrop would transform precisely estimate the radar cross
stealth from a slap-on, modifica- section of its demonstrator.
tion technology to a revolutionary The Northrop approach was dif-
approach to combat aircraft design. ferent from the outset. Its core was
While there were two horses in the built around the deep experience
race, Lockheed had a more mature and insights of a handful of radar
technical stable. Their genius lay cross section experts that for years
in being able to design an aircraft had honed techniques for pre-
whose outer surface was a series dicting RCS of ordinary aircraft.
of strict geometric shapes. Flat However, as 1974 ended, most
planes, triangles and parallelograms of those contracts had lapsed.
defined what would become known Northrop had all but decided
as Have Blue. By designing an air- not to invest any more money in it.
The RCS experts were dispersing
to other jobs in the company. John
Cashen had been hired into the
group as it was getting ready to
pack up. He was told to forget his
electromagnetics background and
concentrate on avionics integration.
Perkos telex rattled in to this sleepy
environment.
7
CHAPTER TWO
Curvature also made good aero- tum and pace of the work. With
dynamic sense. For one thing, we so many part-timers due to the
were trying to make an airplane minimal budget, the data review
that could fly, acknowledged accelerated the pace and gave the
Cashen. The Northrop team elected best results.
not to depend on a fly-by-wire Thats how Northrops airplanes
system because they felt it would were created. Not with some
cost too much. Therefore, the computer code, said Cashen.
design had to be stealthy and
THE STALKING HORSE
aerodynamic. Drag and stability Above: The Norhtrop XST going
on the pole for RCS testing.
problems drove the small team to In August 1975, Perko issued a
try to add curvature. formal request for proposal. Perkos Below: Welko Gasich
The role of RAM was another big That was the theory the proof
distinction. The Northrop design came on the range at Grey Butte.
philosophy for this very first low Radar waves were not vaporized,
observable aircraft competition was but organized. Sometimes they
to use RAM only where needed. popped off the aircraft in unex-
That was just as well, for Northrop pected ways. RCS testing on the
was literally buying RAM commer- range quickly revealed that they
cially from a catalogue. What we would have to work harder to deal
found with the commercial-grade with phenomena such as traveling
stuff was the RAM itself created waves. According to Cashen, the
radar cross section, said Cashen. phenomena of travelling waves had
Below: Various forms of RAM.
In contrast, Lockheed fabricated their been seen on the SRAM missile, but
Lower right: A version of the
symmetric SRAM missile in flight.
own, benefitting again from the SRAM was symmetric. With their
experience of their SR-71 work. XST design, they found that in
However, the most significant dif- flush, edge-dominated designs, the
ference between Lockheed and same phenomenon occurred on the
Northrop centered on the radar edges.
cross section design trades Edge waves occurred when the
chosen by each contender. radar wave encountered an edge and
Perkos criteria for the began a loosely-coupled traveling
XST competition called for along the edge. As the wave went
measuring the radar cross down the edge, controlling RCS
section reduction by quad- depended on catching and directing
rants. its energy.
Northrop put top priority on reduc- Two things will happen, said
ing the nose-on RCS, and second Cashen. Its going to reflect back,
priority on reducing the tail. This or its going to radiate off. When
design, like others to come, sought you have a sharp edge, most of its
to achieve what the Northrop team going to reflect.
called the basic minimum, a XST had a sharp nose. The so-
reduction of radar return all lution was to put RAM on the
around the aircraft. The basic mini-
mum used design to pull the wildly
reflecting radar energy of an
ordinary aircraft into a smaller
signature. It shrank return, then
herded the radar return into very
thin, controlled spikes of energy
that would be reflected at the side
of the aircraft, where they were less
significant to enemy radar.
10
TWO HORSES IN THE RACE
11
CHAPTER TWO
In the simplest terms, the aero- The total signature for the Lockheed
dynamic design features of the XST demonstrator was lower, pure and
constrained signature reduction. simple. When they added all the
A major limitation for Northrop numbers up, Lockheed got an A+,
Above (left): The evolution of
Lockheeds design from the
was their decision not to rely on Cashen said later.
hopeless diamond to Have Blue; fly-by-wire flight controls. Confident But losing the XST did not take
(center): the details of the pure
diamond shape; (right): The Have that nose-on signature mattered Northrop out of the stealth game.
Blue design being tested. Note most, the designers achieved a good
the vertical tails canted inward,
compared to the F-117 outward radar cross section reduction across
canted design. the front from a swept leading edge.
The Northrop XST aerodynamic
design clashed with radar cross
section reduction requirements at
the trailing edge.
With fly-by-wire Lockheed could
control the swept, diamond shape of
its demonstrator. As a result, they
had a great deal more flexibility in
what they did, said Cashen. It paid
off in better signature reduction.
By the time the Northrop team
realized their design was running a
risk given the DARPA preference,
it was too late. Northrop would
have had to scrap the XST model
and retrace their steps to include
fly-by-wire in order to bring down
the rear-aspect RCS. However, their
design was already being built to go
on the pole. There was no time to
start over.
12
TWO HORSES IN THE RACE
13
CHAPTER THREE
14
Chapter Three: Cruise Missiles
and Tacit Blue
T
om Jones got a mysterious telephone call not long after Opposite: Northrops Tacit Blue
experimental airborne command
Northrops advanced design team lost the XST duel. platform.
Dr. William Perry was serving as Director, Defense Below: Advanced design work
flowed into the Air Forces
Research and Engineering, at the Pentagon. Perry called development of the AGM-129A
Advanced cruise missile.
15
CHAPTER THREE
16
CRUISE MISSILES AND TACIT BLUE
U.S. technology to What Tacit Blue be- Left: The Tacit Blue performed
beyond many peoples
defeat the over- came, however, was expectations and flew 132 test
whelming superior- the crucial conceptual flights.
ity of Warsaw Pact bridge from rolling Below: Drawing a crowd outside
its hangar at the Air Force
armor by using the dice on XST to Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB.
p re c i s i o n - g u i d e d preparing the con-
weapons. Missiles cepts for the B-2
launched from the bomber.
air or ground would The unique require-
be controlled by ments ensured that
command guidance Tacit Blue would start
from the radar making key contri-
aircraft in the mid-course of their butions to the B-2 well before the
flight, then switch to terminal guid- Whale itself ever flew. Four stood
ance to strike individual vehicles out radar, spikes, curves, and
(the radar concept was developed low frequency.
under the Pave Mover program and
eventually became J-STARS). Radar was a major threshold.
Incorporating a powerful radar
BSAX Tacit Blue was supposed and its antennae into a stealth
to be that airborne command aircraft was a new frontier.
platform. As a command ship, it had Tacit Blue would be the first stealth
to be as close to the forward edge aircraft to carry a massive low-
of the battle as possible without probability of intercept radar,
getting shot down. That, of course, which was the core of its mission
put it smack in range for everything system.
from the SA-6 to the ZSU-23.
Northrop paired up with Hughes.
Stealth was the only way to make We convinced ourselves, and there-
the concept work. This time, there fore DARPA, that a low probability
would be no butterfly shapes as
with XST. The platform had to be
low observable from all aspects
360 degrees around.
At first, the new program really
meant a chance for Cashen and
other XST alumni to keep building
their skills on the advanced design
team. The Pentagon was placing
another bet on nurturing the stealth
design base. It was pioneering
work. Every day was a discovery,
said Cashen.5
17
CHAPTER THREE
18
CRUISE MISSILES AND TACIT BLUE
edge.
He came up with this shape with a
wide angle radius, just like the front
of a Winnebago, quipped Cashen.
Oshiro came into work the next
morning, put the clay on the bench
and told the shop foreman to build
the model. That was Fred and his
genius, said Cashen. He just came
up with it.
The body of Tacit Blue produced the
needed RCS. Head on it was like a
prototype for the B-2 center body.
19
CHAPTER THREE
referring to Air Force Chief of Staff flight tests ended in 1985, and the
General Lew Allen. demonstrator then spent a decade
Cruise missiles played a role again. hidden in a guarded hangar. What
They were doing tests of cruise worried those involved was the
missiles out in the desert. All of fact that the aircraft could be
a sudden they noticed you could picked up visually. The Air Force
follow the thing straight in if you finally decided to retire it. They
used a low frequency radar. The declassified just enough about the
wingspan of the cruise missile innovative airship to allow it to find
matched the wavelength of the low a home in a museum and in the
frequency radar and it just lit up, annals of stealth.
Above: Tejon desert test site. said Waaland. All that was in the future. At
Making Tacit Blue work at low Northrop, the work on Tacit Blue
Below: The cockpit of the Tacit
Blue has been compared to the frequencies would turn out to be drew together a number of inno-
cab of a Volkswagen microbus.
an enormous breakthrough for the vations that paved the way for the
B-2. Tacit Blue went on to successful B-2. Tacit Blue had a flush topside
flight tests although it was one of inlet, the first in the business. Its
the least stable aircraft ever flown. broad curvature dominated Tacit
Northrop had of course come Blues one of a kind design. Stare
around to the necessity of fly-by- at the front cockpit and Tacit Blues
wire for the exotic missile control shape is pure B-2.
platform. You cant talk about the B-2 without
In the end it achieved a tremen- talking about Tacit Blue, summed
dously low signature. Tacit Blues up Cashen.
20
CRUISE MISSILES AND TACIT BLUE
21
CHAPTER FOUR
22
Chapter Four: A Bomber?
B
eyond the exotic Tacit Blue, could there be other
applications for stealth? Northrop quietly started
investing some its own money into research on a
stealthy fighter in 1978. The Air Force had other ideas. On a
visit to Hawthorne in the spring of 1979, government officials
led the team into Waalands office and asked what ideas they
might have for future applications of stealth.
Did you ever think about a strategic Then there was Tom Joness com- Opposite: The YB-49 Bomber,
forerunner to the modern B-2
bomber?, asked one of the Air Force mitment. True to his promise to Spirit.
officers, Major Dave Englund. work on stealth projects, no matter
Left: John Patierno.
Waaland and Cashen immediately if they came out of the blue, Jones
Below: U.S. Air Force Lt. General
thought the same thing. Accord- backed the concept of a bomber Tom Stafford, NASA astronaut
ing to the grapevine, Lockheed from the beginning. and veteran of four missions
Gemini 6 and 9, Apollo 10, and
was working on a low-observable Id been asked by Perry would the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.
bomber. Surely the nonchalant ques- you please, you, Northrop, respond.
tion from the governments team Well, I had to say yes. I knew we
proved it. Were they once again knew enough to configure that
looking for a stalking horse? And did bomber, Jones said.
Northrop want to play that role? The formal request came from
Their boss John Patierno puffed on Air Force General Tom Stafford.
his pipe. Ive got to tell you Dave, By spring 1979, the
Northrop doesnt do big bombers. team was looking at
Thats not our business. the problem. Step
The Air Force did not rest easy with one was to review
that answer. Jack Twigg reminded the threat models
the design team that they were in and synthesize the
business in no small part because problem.
the Air Force Jones told them to
had fed them give it six weeks. Tell them that on
Tacit Blue, and that date we will be in the Pentagon
wanted them to to brief on our studies of a manned,
keep working. penetrating bomber, he said to
23
CHAPTER FOUR
Top right: The B-1 Bomber had Welko Gasich. Jones wanted the
the supersonic capabilities but
lacked the desired stealth. first B-2 concept briefing to com-
municate the possibilities to the
Below: Jim Kinnu.
top leadership of the Air Force, just
to show them it was theoretically
possible to make a stealth bomber
out of a flying wing and that
Northrop believed in it.
I picked the date because I knew
that our guys Waaland and Cashen
and Patierno they briefed me all
the time and they could deliver, extract from Waaland, Cashen and
Jones recalled. others on the advanced design team
The possibility was there. We a way forward for Tacit Blue. By the
didnt know how to do it in detail. A end of it, Kinnu had a risk closure
lot of things had to be discovered to plan for how to narrow the tech-
be able to do it. We saw that there nical gaps. It taught him all over
was an opportunity here. Maybe again that it was critical to lay out a
we can make it work. It was like a risk closure plan before cementing
prize, summed up Jones. a program schedule.
Bringing home the prize fell in Now, in the early summer of 1979,
large part to Jim Kinnu, a veteran Kinnu joined a meeting where the
whod joined Northrop in time to advanced design leaders considered
help straighten out Tacit Blue. This how to apply Northrops approach
taciturn engineer with extensive to a bomber.
experience outside Northrop soon On a blackboard he drew four
became the long-time program quadrants for combinations of high
manager for the B-2, leading the and low altitude and subsonic or
program from 1980 to 1987. supersonic speed. The B-1 already
Yet it was with Tacit Blue that he had low supersonic.
learned one big management lesson. All agreed the technology was not
The first step was to get Waaland there yet for supersonic stealth.
and Cashen to work together, he We were already starting to work
recalled. Like prodigies, they were on a fighter application for stealth
brilliant separately, but they worked technology, said Kinnu. It was
together about like oil and water, a supersonic problem, of course,
said Kinnu. and those familiar with the project
It had taken Kinnu three intense realized there was a long way to
weeks of meetings in the big con- go to match low observables with
ference room in Building 3-60 to speeds beyond Mach 1.
24
A BOMBER?
To Kinnu, the sweet spot for a the picture they painted was of
bomber was high and subsonic. a dense Soviet air threat where
You gain a lot more range, and there survivability would have to be
are less things coming at you, and if 360 degrees around the airplane,
you are stealthy, they arent going I looked at the results, Cashen
to see you, he later explained. recalled, and to me it said flying wing.
Waaland and Cashen got the XST was a wedge, Tacit Blue a clever
assignment to work on a bomber radar box, but the bomber would
application of our technology, be something different altogether.
continued Kinnu. Northrop still had
substantial advanced design work in
the white world. Kinnu kept feeding
designers, configuration experts,
and others to the black world design.
Whenever subsystems could be
designed in the white world, Kinnu
kept them there. Already, the
momentum for the bomber and the
pull on manpower made it prudent
to slim down the shotgun-style
approach to other advanced design
and leave only a few projects in the
white world, plus the black world
bomber.
Disciplined as they were they
began with the fundamentals. Both remembered their experience Above: Early flying wing sketch.
This airplane demanded all-aspect with reviewing a flying wing during
signature reduction. A strategic the tough times on Tacit Blue.
bomber was not going to melt away Waaland had looked at the results
in a plasma fuzz anymore than the too and he thought the same thing,
F-117 or Tacit Blue demonstrators. said Cashen.
The designers would have to We took one look at the flying wing
capture and manage RCS to create and said thats the shape that gives
a minimum signature instead you more efficient structures and
of a radiating blob like the B-52 more efficient aerodynamics lift to
and all other bombers. Flying drag ratio, added Jones.
an ideal profile, the bomber crew
FROM FLAT PLATE TO FLYING WING
would have to maneuver away
from the worst radar threats. The reason the flying wing was
Northrop survivability analysts perfect was that it most closely
worked for advanced design and resembled that infinite flat plate
25
CHAPTER FOUR
26
A BOMBER?
out its easier to deal with the spikes half a degree to assist trim. In
than the basic minimum. The reason the B-2, you couldnt just cant Below: Understanding the
is because basic minimum dwells the engines, because the engines RCS allowed planners to find
survivable routes through
as it flies by radars. Spikes, if they were buried, said Haub. Inlets, sophisticated enemy defenses.
are narrow, appear as glimpses, exhaust, engines: all were affected.
Cashen said. The normal rules changed quite a
That was the whole idea of stealth. bit, noted Haub.
It was inherently tactical, and it Control was another issue. For
was always about tilting the odds. a time, for yaw control, they had
With all-aspect reduction, the odds thrusters. Waalands first concept
soared in favor of the attacker. briefs depicted a B-2 shape with
ENTER THE B-2
two small, canted tails.
27
CHAPTER FOUR
Above: Copy of the original rudders, recalled Cashen. Split Waaland and team believed they
artist concept rendering of the
advanced bomber. rudders became the one major could bring the baseline RCS
inheritance passed from the YB-49 of the bomber well below Tacit
to the B-2. Blues signature. At the lower
On August 7, 1979, Waaland briefed frequencies, we could do better
General Stafford on the Low than Tacit Blue, Waaland said. The
Observables Bomber Study. The Northrop team was excited about
time elapsed was not much more the prospects, especially given the
than the six weeks mandated need for the bomber to elude low
by Jones. True to their word, the frequency early warning radars
briefing concentrated on range, and penetrate deep into the Soviet
payload, and the concept of low Union.
observables. Waaland and the At high altitude, the bomber
team decided the range would would survive by defeating both
need to be at least 6,000 nm. Their detection systems and kill systems.
primary threat concern was the Discrete, narrow side spikes with a
SA-2, the one that shot down specified (and still classified) RCS
Gary Francis Powers, in the U-2. as measured in decibels per square
One chart featured a low altitude meter would help it get past the Tall
concept, but the real beauty was the King radars and foil the Soviet-style
sketched B-2 presented as the high AWACS. Shielding the exhaust and
altitude penetrator. In the first minimizing skin temperature would
configuration, we had fins on it, dampen the infrared signature and
recalled Waaland. Wingtip spoilers, help prevent Soviet satellites from
elevons, split flaps and differential picking it up. Full RCS reduction and
engine thrust were also needed for a high subsonic speed were critical
control.
28
A BOMBER?
the Soviet Union, said Waaland. Below (left): Early B-2 models
The F-117 was thriving. They were with small vertical tails or small
wingtip stabilizers direct
still nervous about whether you descendants of the YB-49;
could do it at high altitude, said (right): Photo clearly shows the
left hand split rudder.
Waaland.
Lieutenant General Tom Staf-
ford had seen a lot by the time
the Northrop team arrived with
Waalands charts. He was a fighter
pilot and astronaut who flew Apollo
X. Now, as three-star head of the Air
Force Research, Development and
Acquisition on the Air Staff, he was
nearing retirement. But he knew a
good thing when he saw it.
29
CHAPTER FOUR
30
A BOMBER?
31
CHAPTER FIVE
32
Chapter Five: Another
Horse Race
B
y January 1980, then program manager Waaland Opposite: The B-2 s unique
combination of flat planar shapes
had a formal study contract to turn the ideas theyd and precise curves make it the
ideal low observable bomber.
briefed to General Stafford into a full proposal. It was
going to be the bomber, Waaland recalled. The B-1 was history
cancelled, back in 1977 and the new bomber was going to
take over a conventional and a nuclear role for Strategic Air
Command. It was the prize, just as Jones had foreseen.
33
CHAPTER FIVE
Below (top): Albert Myers; the time Northrop had no one with flying wings, which had been cut up
(bottom): T. Wilson
bomber experience. Boeing was for scrap when the Air Force gave
Bottom: Chart representing the the maker of the B-17, the B-29, the up on the program 30 years earlier.
vast supplier team that ultimately
came together on the B-2. B-47 and the B-52, literally tens of But Northrop had stealth. Boeing
thousands of bombers. Drawing agreed to join the team.
from their expertise was critical.
While Northrop held its cards with
LTV was another rapid choice,
confidence, behind the scenes
a good producer with a strong
concerns were growing. Work
technical staff. For radar, they
on Tacit Blue was still proceeding
would let superstars Westinghouse
at full speed. There simply were
and Hughes compete.
not enough RCS specialists to fuel
Flight controls presented even more two programs. Cashen, Locus and
challenges, so the approach was to others were helping out on B-2 but
hire a smart specialist to help. The still trying to meet requirements for
first name that came to mind was the Whale.
Albert F. Myers at NASA Dryden.
The design wasnt moving fast
They hired him in 1981 to manage
enough for the competition schedule.
flight control engineering, and it
was a prescient move. Weve got a date to be on a pole
with a 6,000-lb. 4/10ths scale model
Jones handled the Boeing nego-
of this bomber, Cashen said at one
tiation himself. On the other side
tense meeting that summer of 1980,
of the table was T. Wilson, CEO
and if we dont close the design
of Boeing. It was a turnabout for
within the next two months, we are
giant Boeing, to be taking a briefing
not going to make the date.
from little Northrop. Boeing had
built literally tens of thousands of Cashen dropped everything and
bombers. Northrop had to its cred- worked on the problem, with Don
it only a handful of B-35 and B-49 Heinz, Hal Markarian, Dick Scher-
rer, who had been instrumental on
Have Blue at Lockheed, and others.
Scherrer produced the hawk bill
shape of the leading edge. It gave
them the needed aero performance
for the high subsonic airframe.
On every stealth aircraft theyd
done, propulsion integration was
the obstacle and the inlet the last
element to close. The key to the
closure of the design was to
34
ANOTHER HORSE RACE
Were just not making it, Patierno Left: Details of the complex inlet
structures for the engines a
told him. Its just not happening. compromise between air flow
Wed like you to take it over, become and RCS.
the proposal manager and then the Below: Nuclear bomb testing.
program manager, Patierno told
Kinnu.
Kinnus immediate response was:
I cant make that kind of decision
now. I have to go home and talk to
my wife.
You cant talk to your wife about
this! Patierno exclaimed.
NATIONAL TREASURE
35
CHAPTER FIVE
Below: Sputnik. and in 1957, the Soviet Union ability opening when the U.S.
Bottom, right: The governments orbited Sputnik, the first man-made bomber force could not get through.
program manager, a young one- earth satellite. Nuclear arsenals
star Dick Scofield evaluating early We had shortfalls in our ability
cockpit designs. numbered thousands of warheads to match the Soviets and we were
by the 1970s. Treaties had outlawed losing our ability to deter them, or
most ballistic missile protection at least the perception was we were
systems, but the bombers still had to losing our ability to provide proper
contend with Soviet air defenses. deterrence. The Soviet IADS had
After dtente in the mid-1970s, become sophisticated enough that
America and the Soviet Union were it would be very difficult to call it
entering a second Cold War. The a viable deterrent force without
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan something like the B-2, said
in 1979. The U.S. and western allies Scofield.
boycotted the 1980 Moscow Summer A stealth technology bomber was
Olympics in protest. Irans govern- the revolutionary solution that
ment fell and U.S. diplomats spent could close the window of vulner-
444 days as hostages in Tehran. ability and keep deterrence alive.
The technology coming along in the With this as background, Northrops
late 1970s provided the leadership team did not lack for motivation.
with a new way to approach the They took over a red brick building
task of dealing with the Soviets on Chadron Street in Hawthorne
and the sophisticated defenses and made it into a classified facil-
they had at that time, summed up ity. Eighty and 90 hour weeks were
Air Force Lieutenant General Dick common. Engineers in those days
Scofield, who at the time was a wore white shirts and neckties,
young officer working for the Air except for Kinnu, and except on
Forces Systems Command.
Perry, in the Carter administration,
had called it the Offset Strategy.
Its central idea was that syner-
gistic application of improved
technologies command and con-
trol, stealth, embedded computers,
and precision guidance would
allow the U.S. to overcome Soviet
defenses and destroy Soviet tanks,
noted a history of the period.8
The Offset Strategy was to be the Saturdays, when they might skip the
intellectual cradle for high-level tie. Kinnu instigated another crash
government support for stealth. effort to sort out the major develop-
Analysts saw a window of vulner- ment risks and tasks and align them
36
ANOTHER HORSE RACE
into a work breakdown structure. scale models for the bomber would
The structure helped them carve again be the deciding factor in the
out major hunks of the program to competition.
delegate to subcontractors. We had reached a point through
One bright spot came when the XST and so on where this head-to-
advanced design team was allowed head, winner take all on the pole
to show a small model of the bomber was the norm. Which was kind of
to Jack Northrop himself. By neat, said Cashen. Technical solu-
coincidence, the B-2 would have a tions determined the contractor.
wingspan just six inches shorter Winning on the pole was tanta-
than that of his YB-49 flying wing. mount to winning the program
The man who had founded the and by all indications Lockheed
company was 85 years old and appeared to be ahead. For one thing,
suffering from Parkinsons disease, Ben Richs team had started work
which would claim his life just a on the range earlier as Northrop
few months later in February 1981. struggled to finalize their model.
Mr. Northrops delight in the B-2 With supreme effort, Northrop
model was plain to see. Now I got its flying wing model ready for
know why God has kept me alive all range work in October 1980. The
these years, they heard him say. tests didnt go well.
POLE OFF We came home with results that we
The proof of stealth is always on the were less than happy with. Frankly,
range. For Northrop and Lockheed, we were wondering if we had a shot
the data from pole tests of their at this thing, said Cashen.
37
CHAPTER FIVE
38
ANOTHER HORSE RACE
Northrop was convinced they had The model would flex and the paint
the right airplane. At full size, their would crack. So we had to stiffen
B-2 would have range and payload the model, as Kinnu put it.
near that of the B-52. They believed When you had micro-cracking
Lockheed was offering something youd get a radar return off that.
considerably smaller and shorter- You didnt want that to happen. It
legged, more in the category of the was significant, said Kinnu.
F-111 fighter bomber.
On the night of November 30, 1980,
But without good scores for the all- typists, secretaries and engineers
aspect signature reduction results, worked through the night, then set
Northrops design would not stand up the 15-volume proposal on tables
a chance. for every member of the Air Force
The team plunged in to figure out evaluation team.
what was wrong. The model of the It was one of the best proposal
bomber used in range testing was efforts Id been on, and we ended
constructed of wood and painted up feeling pretty buoyant, Waaland
silver to simulate metal. On the later said.
range, the model was elevated 50
The team arrived on December 1.
feet in the air. It baked in the desert
They stayed several days, issuing
heat by day and contracted in the
requests for information, then left
cooler air when pole and model
to do the same thing at Lockheed.
were elevated for night-time radar
cross section testing. The model The crisis came when the Air Force
was hauled on and off the pole. alerted them to a protest from none
Mechanics and engineers leaned other than Ben Rich. Lockheed Below: Workers doing final checks
out of a cherry-picker to work on it. claimed that the Northrop model before nighttime RCS testing.
39
CHAPTER FIVE
Below: Ronald Reagan, 40th from both. The only way to clear larger control surfaces and needed
president of the United States.
the air was to send Northrop back no tail at all, Rich said.9
to the range facility in the middle of The real celebration came back in
winter to test additional details on Hawthorne later at a routine lunch-
the model. hour data review.
The protest gave Northrop another Welko set a heavy book bag down
chance to run the RCS tests with on the light table, Cashen recalled.
a clean model, this time coated in He opened it and started pulling
fiberglass. out wineglasses and champagne.
At the end of January, we went on Six months remained until the
the range again, on our own bid announcement. But we all knew,
and proposal money, said Kinnu. just from the RCS standpoint,
It was a good investment. The said Cashen. Northrop was going
results were better. Substantially to win this horse race. If there was
better, added Kinnu. The new data going to be a program, we would
on the clean model was submit- be the winner, Kinnu felt. The doubt
ted with final cost proposals in the hinged on whether funding of the
winter of 1981. B-1 would pre-empt the B-2.
40
ANOTHER HORSE RACE
liberal Republican, Weinberger stealthy B-2 with Northrop being Above (left): T.V. Jones at the B-2
contract award announcement
was a Harvard-trained lawyer who selected as the Prime contractor ceremony; (center): Irv Waaland;
had enlisted in the Army and ended and winner of the Advanced (right): Jim Kinnu.
41
CHAPTER SIX
42
Chapter Six: Risk Closure
T
he story of the B-2 engineering development is rich Opposite: Every square inch of
the B-2 wing surface about a
million and a half must conform
with the trials and tribulations of a very complex to the strictest low observable
requirements to achieve optimum
aeronautical system. So wrote Kinnu and John Griffin, a stealth.
senior Air Force engineer, in a study two decades later. Bottom: Early government/
contractor team meeting.
Technology risk was an essential part of the B-2 program. Note the tools on the wall for
managing the program.
Nothing like it had ever been done before. As designed, the
wing surface would add up to over 10,000 square feet, and all of
it had to conform to the strictest low observable requirements.
43
CHAPTER SIX
44
RISK CLOSURE
Composites were one of the first the parts were made they were
major risk areas identified. The torn down again for full analysis
B-2 was going to be enormous. of their ability to carry the design
As a flying wing with a 172-foot structural loads. For a time, the Air
wingspan, the surface area was Force insisted that Northrop keep
immense. Conventional metals like subcontractor Boeing at work on
steel, titanium and aluminum would an alternate aluminum wing, just in
weigh down the big bomber too case. However, the Northrop team
much to be of any practical use. was able to prove they could de-
Composites were not new in the sign, manufacture and quality-test
aerospace industry but no one had composites for the 172-foot wing-
used them on the scale contemplated span bomber. Above: Close-up of composite
for the B-2. According to Kinnu In those days the size and capacity
material.
and Griffin, composites were for composite facilities was a Below, left: Learning to precisely
insert thousands of fasteners in
considered a major risk. source of bragging rights. Later, composites.
Kinnus plan called for the compos- as the program grew, Northrops
Bottom: One of the huge
ite structures risk to close by late autoclave capacity went beyond autoclaves required for composite
curing.
1983. It illustrated just one of the anything seen in the aerospace
many processes by which Northrop industry. It caused one visitor to
brought the B-2 from theory to the Pico plant to exclaim: you
reality. could do the composite work of the
free world in there!
First, Northrop worked with the
Air Force to fund research on In this area, the learning curve for
MANTECH short for manufac- the B-2 drove the learning curve
turing tech- for Americas entire aerospace in-
nology. LTV dustry. Composite work on the B-2
got a con- eventually paved the way for com-
tract to learn posites and integrated digital de-
how to insert sign on programs like Boeings 777
fasteners in and 787.
composites
and improve
techniques such as composite
water jet cutting. Boeing set to
work on pultrusion, autoclave
improvements and methods for
using ultrasound to inspect the
composite structures. Central to
the strategy was fabricating several
large, composite parts, including
major sections of the wing. Once
45
CHAPTER SIX
Below: The stealthy force F-117s Two new areas were added into the er or more, said Scofield. He knew,
with the B-2.
requirements, and both reopened because he was the Air Forces
risk. One was to study a defensive F-117 program manager when
electronics system for a stealth he got a call to take over the B-2
aircraft. The second was a major program from Colonel Keith Glenn.
trade study on a three-man crew, Sorry as he was to leave the F-117
versus the original plan for a two- just as production was ramping up,
man crew. the B-2 was irresistible. Little did
All the brilliant innovations from Scofield know that new job would
XST on would not matter if the turn into an unheard of eight-year
company could not finalize the assignment. Scofield would stay in
technical design and manufactur- place as the Air Force B-2 program
ing plan to build the first B-2s, manager from 1983 until 1991,
and scale up again into an efficient rising from colonel to two-star
production line. Although the general in the process.
schedule now contained an extra With the F-117, the Air Force
year, the task ahead was daunting. controlled its first big bet on stealth
ORDER OF MAGNITUDE by limiting the mission to specific
tasks and planning to buy only a
Risk closure was vital, because the squadrons worth of aircraft. The
B-2 was without question the most B-2 was different. Everything about
complex, ambitious stealth program it was bigger and more ambitious.
yet conceived. The mission systems from radar to
The bomber was a much more defensive electronics to nuclear
complex airplane than the F-117. hardening were complete depar-
The degree of complexity from tures from the F-117 experience.
F-117 to B-2 was 5 or 6 times great- Over time, the bomber would
become part of the force struc-
ture, conducting routine operations
from nuclear alert to conventional
missions.
That was never in the cards for the
F-117. Their mission was to carry
two laser-guided bombs to strike
missile sites in Eastern Europe and
leave. That was it, said Scofield.
Later it grew beyond the silver
bullet role, but in the 1980s, it was a
much simpler mission with a much
more focused capability. The F-117
46
RISK CLOSURE
had also lifted many of its subsys- People wonder why we designed
tems directly from other aircraft. the avionics architecture to the
Then again, the B-2 was big. Dave complexity that we did in the B-2.
Mazur had come from the Air If you think back to the early 1980s,
Force F-117 program where hed a fast processor was 512 kilobytes,
been an engineer. The B-2 had so Scofield said. Processing at 512
many more square feet, so many kilobytes was not a problem, as long
more fasteners, to deal with, said as there were plenty of processors.
Mazur. We had many more processors to
handle parallel processing of the
Unlike the F-117, Strategic Air data on the airplane than we would
Command wanted its B-2 to have have today, he said.
a full suite of defensive system
avionics. The imaging radar was To top it off, the B-2 program
part of it. So was a concept for planned full capabilities on the
a system to detect enemy threat first airplane, said Scofield. There
emissions. would be no prototype. The first air
vehicle had to incorporate all the Top: Dave Mazur.
All this required integrated cockpit low observable requirements right Above: Wiring electronic
displays. These mission avionics from the beginning. components.
were over and above the on-board
computer systems required for As design risk closed, the next Below: Early cockpit design
cut and paste. Note, the side
the quadruple-redundant flight major hurdle would be the transi- stick was eventually replaced by
47
CHAPTER SIX
48
RISK CLOSURE
face of Northrop and its facilities, far. The Lockheed Skunk Works had
although that all seemed hazy to the its own way of doing business and
leaders trying to close risk and look a deeper company bench to draw
ahead to production. on thanks to Lockheeds work on
Surrounding the technical issues other programs. Northrop had the
was the challenge of expanding brains but lacked the organizational
the number of people working on sophistication.
the B-2 program and acquiring the The euphoria at beating Ben Rich
facilities to house them. and that team from over the hill
Kinnu saw it as a shock to the at the Lockheed Skunk Works in
system of the brilliant, but small, Burbank carried them only so far.
advanced design team in the Chad- Ahead lay the mammoth task of
ron building that had taken them so building up a huge bomber program
49
CHAPTER SIX
Below (top to bottom): Doug and racing to field the technology to be where the structure crossed into
Wood, Valerie Lewis-Corder,
Mark Tucker. close the window of vulnerability. the radar absorbing materials.
One of the biggest struggles Then there was the high pressure
was manning up, and getting the culture of the advanced design
right people, said Kinnu. Top team. Cashen, Waaland, Kinnu and
talent came from programs like the Patierno stood out as largerthan-
space shuttle and from around the life figures to the young engineers
pool of southern Californias aero- joining the team.
space industry. However, theyd all Kinnu was in charge, Waaland
have a lot to learn about working did technical matters, Cashen
on stealth. Before that, they had to worked the spooky stuff, recalled
be cleared for the most top secret, one. Together they were known as
special access data. John Patiernos junkyard dogs.
Those who came over were often The younger staff had to admire
amazed at what they found after their absolute dedication. By
endless waits for security clearance. todays standards, they were
First glimpses of the plans for the firmer and harder as managers
B-2 made for memorable moments. than would be allowed now, Haub
I was shocked it wasnt a fighter, said. But nothing was personal.
commented Doug Wood , an engineer The junkyard dogs drove their
who joined the team in July 1980. teams hard. It was not an exagger-
Valerie Lewis-Corder was a New ation to say we were working 80-90
York attorney with other experi- hours per week, said Haub. As the
ence in the aerospace field when team expanded it was not unusual
she joined Northrops four-person to come in and find another person
contract shop in 1982. Her shock sharing the desk you thought was
was in seeing the dollar figures yours.
already committed to the contract. When they did attract people
One document listed a figure of willing to make the commitment,
$9 billion. Is that really nine they got stand-outs. Lewis-Corders
billion? she recalled asking in office started staffing up in 1983.
amazement. Before long, there were over 100
Mark Tucker joined the program in people working on contracts alone.
1983, specializing first in manufac- Lewis-Corder stayed with the
turing. When he saw the B-2 mock- B-2 and Northrop for the next 25
up, that was eye-watering, he years. Thats the kind of company
said. He was surprised at the aero- Northrop was, she said.
dynamic design and stealthiness Back in Ohio, Dick Scofield faced
and immediately aware of how a similar problem ramping up the
stringent the requirements would B-2 program office. The Air Force
50
RISK CLOSURE
encouraged him to hand-pick the Kinnu had the same problems and
team, but even then it was not easy. successes at Northrop. He had his
Not all the best people can work in core people like Cashen, Waaland
that environment where you cant and others but some of the other
tell anyone what you are doing, senior people he wanted got to
Scofield realized. You have to take say no because they just didnt
on the decision-making responsi- want to come over to a black world
bility yourself because you cant go program.
ask your boss for help. Scofields One key engineer who joined in
solution? We had to go hire intel- 1985 was Ed Smith. Ed had just
ligent people who were also very come off the Orbiter program and
smart, he commented. saw the B-2 as a very similar chal-
Scofield also learned there were lenge one of a kind system, fly-by-
some top picks in the Air Force who wire, no tails and stealthy. As Vice
Top: Inside the cockpit as it takes
refused to dedicate themselves to a President of Engineering, Ed was shape.
top priority, black world program. the programs Chief Engineer and
Above: Ed Smith
For the dedicated ones, Daytons saw they needed to distribute work
black world management arena was a across a thousand suppliers while
breeding ground for general officers. moving to a new facility, lock the
51
CHAPTER SIX
Right: Scott Seymour confers doors and pull the team together
with BG Tom Goslin, 509 Bomb
Wing Commander under their rigorous security um-
brella. His key observation was that
Below: The Century Boulevard
corporate office tower. most of the team had not worked
together before, and building the
team became one of his most im-
portant activities. This was evident
with one of his first challenges
the airplane had a weight problem, and major programs. Names like
very similar to Orbiter. He attacked Scott Seymour and of course Kent
it with an iterative design and fed Kresa went on to take the top jobs
work out to suppliers, put in sub- in company management. B-2 was
systems, and modified the structure a school for talent. Couples met and
to account for the new low altitude married, sons joined fathers on the
requirement. The solution was a work force, and the B-2 team, as big
team solution, and in solving it he as it was, kept a family feeling that
significantly improved overall team went well beyond the average as-
effectiveness. sembly line esprit de corps.
Many of the young engineers join- But that bright cultivation of talent
ing the B-2 program at Northrop was just beginning as Kinnu in
later rose to lead manufacturing California and Scofield in Dayton
divisions, advanced design work, wrestled with the reality of the
aggressive schedule theyd adopted.
Where would they put everyone?
Kinnus team quickly outgrew the
Chadron building. They moved in-
to a leased glass office tower on
Century Boulevard in West Los
Angeles and soon had nearly 1,000
people employed on the bomber.
Finally they had to go big. We got
the Ford plant at Pico Rivera in
California. We acquired it, stripped
it totally bare, Kinnu said. We built
the facilities we needed. In place of
the automobile assembly lines grew
a secure facility equipped for all but
final assembly of the B-2.
But there was a major shock ahead.
52
RISK CLOSURE
53
CHAPTER SEVEN
54
Chapter Seven: My Airplane
Blew Up On Me
P
eople and dollars were pouring in, the composite Opposite: Banking over the
Pacific Ocean the B-2, originally
analysis was going strong, but at this point, the B-2 designed as a high-altitude
penetrator, had to perform at low
altitudes as well.
was still a series of drawings on computer screens,
with engineers toiling to bring all the pieces together for a
preliminary design review. One lurking risk closure issue was
about to hit with gale force. Back in April 1981, before contract
award, the Air Force had inquired about a mission modification.
Could the bomber fly low, too?
The B-2 was designed as a high- that looked afresh at the flying
altitude penetrator. The Air Force wing plus a range of other designs,
had picked it almost two years such as the delta-shape low altitude
earlier from Waalands conceptual penetrator briefed to the Air Force
briefing to General Stafford. As in August 1979. All the pole work
it turned out, the high altitude and their success of three months
bomber had what Kinnu termed a earlier did not matter if the basic
fallback capability. Waaland had shape of the airplane was wrong
designed it to cruise at low level for the Air Forces mission.
using a terrain-avoidance system. The studies showed that the flying
Still, Northrop felt the first thing wing concept was still the right
they had to do was reassess the shape. Theres no contest, its
whole concept. It wasnt just a mat- the right way to go, Waaland
ter of finding a fix. Was this really concluded. However these new Air
the right aircraft design for both Force requirements would require
the high and low altitude missions? design changes to the flying wing.
They asked us to do a clean sheet of Northrop put the low altitude modi-
paper analysis. Would we have the fications high on the risk closure
same airplane? recalled Waaland. task list. The plan was to stiffen the
Irv, John and I agreed that the wings, and add fuel. Fortunately,
thing to do was to go back to our we were a flying wing, said Kinnu,
starting point and re-examine and there was already plenty of
everything we had done, Kinnu room to add more fuel without hav-
said. The team launched a study ing to build on more structure.
55
CHAPTER SEVEN
56
MY AIRPLANE BLEW UP ON ME
where you are, and with stealth the most pessimistic projections.
and the clutter of earth, theyd The Northrop team understood
have a heck of a hard time finding the magnitude of the problem and
you. They light their afterburner the pain it would cause to the B-2
to go up there and catch you then design and schedule. They set out
they have to come down and search to complete risk closure analysis.
for you and still keep their speed
Then came the bad news. In early
up and they are going to hit bingo
1983, the data was in. The B-2 was
fuel quickly and theyll have to
going to need a major redesign.
break off contact, even if they have
a contact. Of course, the whole Everything was going along fine
stealth plan was to elude contact in until we got to the aeroelastic anal-
the first place. Low altitude was just ysis, Kinnu said. The idea behind
another complication to throw at aeroelastic analysis was to test
the defenders. loads and structures in wind tunnel
models, derive the results, and use
This changed the flight envelope,
the data to design actuators swift
recognized Al Myers, the flight
enough for the hydraulic controls. Left: Soviet fighters, such as the
When the data was in, it showed MiG-25, posed a serious threat to
the B-2 unless low altitude flight
that the controls worked fine in the could be perfected.
smooth air at high altitude. But at
low altitude, the controls would
become saturated in a strong gust
environment. It turned out to be
a much tougher environment than
they thought, said Scofield. The
B-2 had been optimized for high
altitude but now it would be
subject to stresses similar to that of
a supersonic fighter. Now we were
controls specialist. In the most
going to go at a high Q on the deck,
dense threat environment, you might
explained Kinnu.
need a low altitude route, he said.
Both pitch and roll were handled
The second problem was speed.
by trailing edge controls so the
SAC wanted the B-2 to fly near
problem was severe. To fix the
Mach 1 on the deck. Introducing
problem, the control surfaces had
the low altitude requirement was
to come inboard of the wings first
logical if you agreed with this
bending node line, all the way in to
projected capability noted Kinnu.
the trailing edge notch.
Since the B-2 was all about offset-
ting Soviet advantages down the My airplane blew up on me,
road, it had to be able to cope with Kinnu told Patierno.
57
CHAPTER SEVEN
Air Force requirements changed THE GUST LOAD GENIUS Just building the models to use
along with the rapid technological
advances during the Cold War. What Kinnus team eventually con- for the redesign was beyond the
cluded was that the flight controls current state of the art. The analysis
for pitch in particular were tools and techniques simply didnt
malpositioned on the wings. They exist, said Myers. Immediately
could not respond strongly or that became one of our priority
swiftly enough to gusts and buf- activities to pull together the
feting at low altitudes. Pressure right collection of people capable
loads and bending would hit at the of developing such a model. This
wrong places, and all sorts of things was a joint effort between the
were bound to go wrong. The flight controls organization and the
pilots would not have enough pow- structural dynamics organization.
er to counteract severe gusts. Load Myers later described the magni-
transfers from the outboard wing tude of the computer modeling
to the inboard wing were poor. task they faced. In the early 1980s
Around the engine inlet ducts, the complexity of flight control
there were several places for single models was described in terms of
point failure and excessive fatigue the number of states in the
on the structure. Added to that, the model. Flight control design was
bomber would get into trouble at normally done on models that had
high angles of attack because there on the order of 10th and some
wouldnt be enough airflow to make really ambitious models had 12th
the ailerons effective. order systems, Myers said. Not so
To meet the new Air Force require- the B-2. Once we had the models
ments, the B-2 would have to be re- put together, it took a lot of work
designed, moving control surfaces to residualize them down to the
and compensating for the stresses size where they were 110th order
of high-speed, low altitude flight. systems, Myers explained.
Jones reviewed the data with them. To work the problem, I brought
in everybody I knew in the country
It was no small matter. The rede-
that I felt could contribute to [solv-
sign would be the largest single
ing] the problem, said Myers.
internal event that occurred during
development of the B-2, Kinnu and The team Myers pulled together
Griffin concluded later.12 to work the modeling and analysis
capability included outside experts
Fortunately, the man to tackle the
from Honeywell and NASA Langley
problem was already on the B-2
assisting the in-house Northrop ex-
team. Al Myers led the effort to
perts.
build the model for the redesign
of the B-2 for its demanding low The specific problem of low altitude
altitude mission. ride was solved by invention of
58
MY AIRPLANE BLEW UP ON ME
59
CHAPTER SEVEN
60
MY AIRPLANE BLEW UP ON ME
McMullin, who was commander of the capability that the technology Below: Details of the redesigned
planform.
the massive Aeronautical Systems could give us as quickly as we can,
Center at Dayton, and Scofields he said. First flight stayed on the
boss. schedule for 1987. Kinnu hoped there
The CEOs said no. If they relaxed would be some understanding
the schedule, the momentum of the from the Air Force when milestones
program might slack off. Losing like first flight approached.
momentum might lead to an even Slowing down work on the structures
bigger slip to the schedule than was and the major subsystems was the
already projected. Would that open price to be paid. But as General
a window to simply scrap the B-2 Gabriel had said, if it made for a
and extend B-1 production? better airplane, it had to be done.
In the end, as Scofield put it, national
security priorities won the day. We
really needed to continue because of
the priority of the program within the
department, and the desire to field
61
CHAPTER EIGHT
62
Chapter Eight: A Miracle a Day
F
rom 1984 through 1989, the B-2 program entered into Opposite: B-2 production in the
purpose-built facility in Palmdale
a period of invention, discovery, and innovation on a an incredible government
investment that will pay dividends
well into the future.
scale rarely seen in the American aerospace industry.
It would change Northrop forever, and help vault Americas
air dominance far ahead of what potential adversaries
could offer. Not that it was all smooth sailing. At times, the
technical challenges threatened to overwhelm even the
savviest engineers. We thought for a while they were just
letting us go to see how far we could, Scofield felt at times as
the technical challenges deepened.
Complex and ambitious as the aircraft To complete CDR, the plan called
was, there was simply a lot to invent. for a team numbering literally
A miracle a day, was the phrase thousands of engineers and pro-
they lived by. duction specialists to draw the plans
for every piece of the bomber.
All new aircraft aim toward a goal Good systems engineering practice
known as Critical Design Review grouped subsystems into major
(CDR) the moment when the pro- categories such as propulsion and
gram manager, with the advice of worked to refine the details for each,
numerous other lead engineers always keeping track of how the
and teams, will certify that every elements of one subsystem impacted
detail and subsystem of the design another. Done right, the interfaces
is complete. The schedule for the would all be diagrammed well before
B-2 still called for the process to building of the first B-2 bomber
culminate with a Critical Design began. Many major elements
Review in December 1985. such as the composites for the
Preliminary reviews would target wings would have been tested in
subsystems, but the idea behind prototype or mock-up. Of course,
CDR was that the airplane should to trim schedule time, there would
be close to completion, ready for a be no full system prototype, which
final scrub of plans before lay-up for made the critical design review
the first air vehicle began in earnest. process that much more critical.
63
CHAPTER EIGHT
Background: Rendering showing Meeting the CDR by the end of able to operate out of different
color-coded groupings of B-2
subsystems. 1985 was essential to achieve B-2 bases during wartime in fact, they
first flight in late 1987. wanted the B-2 to be able to land
Given the risk closure objectives, and take-off from any airfield that
and the stance of the CEOs, the could accommodate a 737. The
push toward CDR for the B-2 original, low observable design
would be more dramatic than most. called for a sharp leading edge all
For example, the B-2 was still in part of creating an airplane as close
the midst of design trade-offs that as possible to an infinite flat plate.
would affect major items like radar, Now the issue was getting enough
navigation, and even the number of airflow over the wing for a safe
crew-members after Strategic Air take-off at high angle of attack on
Command asked them to look at some hot day at an unusual wartime
adding a third crew station in the airfield.
cockpit. With a sharp edge, as you start to
Although the advanced design pull angle of attack at a low speed,
team had a good grip on the the airflow starts to go span-wise,
low observables and aerodynamic said Cashen. Without enough air
requirements, major questions for rushing back, the trailing edge con-
the stealth bomber lurked in all the trol surfaces lose power. The num-
unknowns likely to appear during bers were conclusive. With a full
the final design and manufacturing bomb load on a hot day, we could
process. stall the airplane, said Cashen.
64
A MIRACLE A DAY
65
CHAPTER EIGHT
Above: Working skin composites its part in electrical conductivity Still, nearly every major manufac-
was a laborious process.
to manage the radar cross section. turing step on the B-2 was a matter
Right: Complex parts like this Previously, airplanes were tooled of breaking new ground.
inlet duct proved challenging, to
say the least. from the inside out. When toler- Take, for example, the engine inlet
ances built up, the outside surface duct. Cashen was confident a flush-
could vary. Nearly all fighters and mounted duct would work for the
bombers were built with some B-2 as it had for Tacit Blue. Actu-
degree of shims to nudge it all ally manufacturing the duct was an-
into place. Most aircraft could other matter. This
tolerate a fractional bulge here or was almost a flush
there to help make the guts of the inlet, which we had
aircraft fit. a lot of trouble mak-
With stealth that wouldnt work. ing work, Waaland
The tolerances had to be exact or said later. The tech-
the low observables would suffer. nology was beyond
That led to a complete reversal of difficult. LTV had to
the usual aircraft manufacturing build a mold, form it
philosophy. and pull the tool out
of it. Learning how
On the B-2, everything had to be
to do that to exact specifications
solved without penetrating the outer
took time.
mold line, recalled Scott Seymour,
who was then an engineer new to A blessing came in the form of in-
the program. formation technology beginning to
blossom in the early 1980s, such as
The process of actually building
computer aided design. However,
the B-2 brought to mind Jones
the process wasnt easy.
caution from earlier years about
laying in a program to discover the The decision to shift all design and
knowledge we dont have. engineering work to computer-
aided design was revolutionary at
Work on everything from compos-
the time. Kinnu invested Northrop
ites to electronics had considerably
money in a process called NCAD
added to the body of knowledge.
Northrop Computer Aided Design.
66
A MIRACLE A DAY
Northrop personnel wrote the pro- to get them all on a common CAD,
gram for this proprietary design. classified system, Kresa remarked
This was Northrops approach to later.
taking an older 2-D computer aided Eventually, it resulted in a first
design and a 3-D system called total design integration within one
Nor-Loft and making it into a new computer database, accessible to
3-D design system. the prime contractor and subcon-
Of course, Kinnu had to justify tractors alike.
spending dollars on infrastructure. Al Myers later found that in a poll
Youve got to design these stealthy taken among aerospace engineers
airplanes and the way its going in the 1990s, two-thirds said they
with Cashen and Waaland in terms had first trained on computer-aided
of designing and controlling a design with NCAD. We trained the
country to do digital design, Myers Left: An early NCAD rendering of
said. the cockpit stick lower assembly.
67
CHAPTER EIGHT
68
A MIRACLE A DAY
69
CHAPTER EIGHT
70
A MIRACLE A DAY
to the select few on the Air Staff he the flight test program as potential U.S. Secretary of Defense under
President Ronald Reagan.
briefed the Chief of Staff. Then Id problems. The senior RAND execu-
go straight to Weinberger, said tive who took the briefing to Wein-
Scofield. Hed have five or six of berger, and later to Congress, was
his direct reports. He always took Michael Rich Ben Richs son.14
the meetings. We always had good
dialogue, good interchange. I didnt
always have the best of news, but
he was always appreciative of the
fact he was getting straight infor-
mation, said Scofield.
Through his steady personal super-
vision, Weinberger gave the B-2 the
support needed on a complex, vital
program. To Weinberger, it was im-
portant for the Air Force to succeed
with its ambitious and vital B-2
program. He was always willing
to give us whatever resources we
needed to solve the problems we
had to deal with. It was important
to him, Scofield concluded.
Not that he took it all on faith. In late
1987, Weinberger heard a highly
classified briefing from analysts at
the RAND Corporation. This south-
ern California think-tank had been
set up by the Air Force after World
War II, and earned its reputation
in part as an expert watchdog of
aerospace programs. Now operat-
ing independently, one of the vice
71
CHAPTER NINE
72
Chapter Nine: Slip and
Recovery
T
he B-2 program had its share of disappointments and Left: The shared workspace of the
B-2 cockpit pilot, left; mission
one of the biggest was the failure, after much effort, to commander, right.
73
CHAPTER NINE
Below: Iron Bird for component expected as the B-2 moved toward of engineers and physicists to figure
and system test.
full production. A crisis in confi- out how to design antennas that
dence was brewing. worked in an LO system, Myers
From CDR onwards, it was all added. Northrop was not about to
about timing to complete manufac- get into the antenna business so
turing and test. They had to com- we taught manufacturers how to
plete not only the technical aspect design and build [LO] antennae,
of design, but the manufacturing said Myers.15
design which would allow the air- Change began to pop up every-
plane to be actually manufactured, where. These were not, for the most
explained Scofield. part, new requirements. Rather,
As the prime contractor, they were identifications of prob-
Northrop was respon- lems that had to be solved in order
sible for manufacturing to proceed with assembly of the
critical pieces of the B-2 very first B-2.
such as wing leading More changes caused more churn.
edges, but the company Each time there would be a change
was also responsible for it would ripple the whole system,
integrating the work of observed Scofield.
its suppliers including The effort from CDR to first flight
big ones, like Boeing. In is centered on manufacturing the
many cases, Northrop parts, assembling the aircraft,
engineers had to lead an qualifying the components, and
education process to get the suppli- checking out the assembled system.
ers accustomed to the demands of This is simply hard work, Kinnu
stealth manufacturing. and Griffin noted.
Antennae were a case in point. The At the working level, there was
B-2 needed antennae that did not constant pressure to make changes
radiate in a way that added to the as assembly took shape. But too
radar cross section. Putting two many changes could unravel the
dozen big radiating antennae even work plan for good. Kinnu and his
on an infinite flat plate would give engineering leadership team real-
it the radar cross section of Jupiter. ized there was always a better
But when Al Myers asked suppliers way to implement design features
about manufacturing non-radiating or make enhancements. They kept
antennae, they would give us a change orders on a tight leash, with
blank stare, as if to say, Isnt that Scofields help.16
an oxymoron? Myers recounted.
Because there was no alternative, Pressure continued as projected
we had to develop an in-house group dates for roll-out and first flight
74
SLIP AND RECOVERY
approached. Soon all realized that The core of the expanding work Below: Chris Hernandez.
the December 1987 first flight wasnt force came from other Northrop Bottom: The first B-2 taking shape
going to happen. Major contribu- programs like the T-38, F-5, and in Palmdale Hangar 401.
75
CHAPTER NINE
The design tools for wiring were to, and known radars to avoid,
almost non-existent, Hernandez weather, and so on, as Moore
recalled. It took a methodical described it.
approach to sort that out. It was all a big software exercise,
The B-2 incorporated the most and too often there was tension
advanced mission systems ever between the avionics and the soft-
attempted for a stealth aircraft, ware. Problems were booted up
Above: Dave Moore.
and probably any aircraft up to to managers and integration was
Below: Just some of the circuits that time. Dave Moore joined the done on the 3rd shift, until the 8 AM
Chris Hernandez had to deal with
before they could be installed in
program in 1983 to work on the turnover meeting.
the aircraft. defensive systems, then spent time John Mall was still working with
on mission planning the onboard the team on nuclear hardening. He,
systems calculating targets to go like others, found the environment
intense but productive. This was
not a politically correct environ-
ment, he said later. You could yell
at people. In his opinion, that was
part of what made the B-2 work.
Due to its complexity, the B-2
required innovative thinking on
nearly everything. As expected,
validating the composites held its
challenges. While not a pacing item,
the composite work generated its
share of unknowns. Ultrasound
tests sometimes revealed voids
in the composite molding or dis-
bonding. That meant cutting the
skin, patching, and repairing and
then of course, reestablishing the
low observables.
Here again the investment in
CAD paid off. The manufacturing
approach for the B-2 was able to
eliminate most prototyping. The
plan to go from design to produc-
tion was based on the use of 3-D
modeling as made possible by
computer-aided design. With CAD,
the team could skip prototype
76
SLIP AND RECOVERY
tooling and prototype manufactur- cialized structural test. AV-3 was Left: Building up electrical panels.
ing of aircraft. The first B-2 built the avionics integration bird while Right: Wiring complexity in
would also be the first to fly. This cut AV-4 would test weapons and AV-5 the weapons bay. Note the air
deflectors, and the round attach
significant time off the engineering would validate further integration. point for the rotary launcher.
and manufacturing development Segmentation allowed for test to
schedules. move forward, and the early air
The flip side of streamlining was vehicles would simply be retrofitted
that the B-2 was a highly concur- after they finished up flight test.
rent program. The idea behind Still, the concurrency of engineer-
concurrency was precisely to cut ing development and production
engineering and manufacturing de- was creating havoc, Chris Hernandez
velopment time by doing the final said of the frenetic period before
aspects of design, build, and test all first flight. In other words, it was
at the same time. Overlap could be crunch time.
highly efficient but it also called for Scott Seymour had been working
superstar performance from all in- at the Navy test facility at Patuxent
volved. However, if a change had to River in Maryland prior to joining
be made, it could slow down other the B-2 program. He worked first
parts of AV-1 and the next low-rate on flight test plans and landing gear,
production bombers. then moved into management. He
The only relief was that each of the became head of test site operations
first six B-2s had a special role to in 1988.
play in the flight test program. AV-1 By then, the first B-2, AV-1, was
would test the low observables, coming together in completed form.
while AV-2 would go through spe- But everything demanded a huge
77
CHAPTER NINE
78
SLIP AND RECOVERY
but significant low observable The pioneers Irv, John, Jim, they
features, too. Both groups were did a fantastic job, Diaz recalled.
scrambling to complete their tasks, The B-2 was sound it just needed
and changes from one group firm nudges in the right direction.
often impeded progress by the other. The bar was set especially high for
One of the biggest challenges lead- the first B-2, for two reasons. First,
ing up to first flight was the series of AV-1 was not a simplified demon-
compromises that had to be made strator but a bomber with full low
between the aero guys and the LO observable functionality. As test
guys, said Mazur. articles went, the B-2 was setting
Once again, it was a matter of very high expectations.
finding the right people to infuse Second, the low rate production
technical leadership into a complex was still highly concurrent. Con-
program. currency made it very hard for Left: Jorge Diaz, Chief Engineer
79
CHAPTER NINE
Background: The B-2 Spirit takes a hand-built aircraft. Diazs fix was promoted to other jobs but they
off from the desert floor for its
inaugural flight. to reorganize the engineering gathered, too. Family members
progression so that those working flocked to Palmdale for the event.
on the airplane got a chance to Diaz watched the control panels
proceed. Everything that couldnt closely. Suddenly, I saw that the
be fixed ended in my office, Diaz fuel was getting hot and the pres-
said. sure dropping, Diaz said. He was
JULY 1989 worried. Someone told him, you
The main driver was the series of have ten seconds to decide. I dont
flight justification tests. Theyd been need ten seconds, Diaz thought.
coded red for four years, said Were not flying today. Were
Wood, but in the late spring of 1989 aborting the flight, he said.
it all came together. It turned out to be a decision that
High speed taxi tests gave them a saved the aircraft. The hangar at
jolt of excitement. The test was done Palmdale had an air filtration system
at night. I could hear the throttles to keep the environment as clean as
come up, recalled Wood. The possible. Workers used cheesecloth
feeling was pretty indescribable, rags to clean the fuel cells. Over
he said. time, miniscule particles of lint
Saturday, July 15, 1989 was the date wore off, circulated through the air,
officially planned for the first flight and into the fuel filters. Fueling the
of the B-2. Workers drove up from
Pico Rivera to witness it. Cashen,
Waaland, and Kinnu had all been
80
SLIP AND RECOVER
B-2 loosened the lint and created a team diagnosed and fixed the Below: The initial flight test
crew of Bruce Hinds, Northrop
block in all four AMADS. It was just problem. The press to get the B-2 Grumman Chief Test Pilot,
like having four clogged fuel filters. into the air was feverish. Even and Colonel Richard Crouch,
Commander of the B-2 Combined
What was the chance of that all today its a blur to me, said Chris Test Force at Edwards AFB being
congratulated (top) and at the
four? Seymour wondered. On Hernandez of that final weekend. post-flight interview (left).
take-off the fuel flow could have A much smaller, more somber group
stopped and the B-2 might well gathered two days later when the
have crashed. B-2 tried again.
I felt really bad cancelling the On Monday , July 17, 1989 , the B-2
B-2 first flight, but I was doing took flight. I cried, said Kinnu.
my job, said Diaz. Actually, this
was familiar territory to Diaz.
Id already cancelled three space
shuttle flights, he demurred.
The disappointed crowds dispersed
and over the weekend the Northrop
81
CHAPTER TEN
82
Chapter Ten: Success
W
hen the triumph of first flight receded, there was Opposite: B-2 production in full
swing at Palmdale.
still much work left to be done on the B-2. For Below: Ollie Boileau brought
the right approach at the right
starters, when the first B-2 flew across the range, time he remains a management
legend at Northrop Grumman.
it bobbled its low observable signature tests. As usual, the
Bottom: Tony Imondi was
problems lay in the process, not in the design. Engineers went instrumental in getting the B-2
operational.
back to the basics to diagnose each small piece of the surface
area to determine where there were low observable problems.
Small fixes added up to a big improvement.
It would take more than three years general manager for the B-2 pro-
for Northrop to deliver the first B-2 gram.
to the Air Force. How will we know Ollie came in with a sledge-
the B-2 is a success? those working hammer, recalled Kresa. Diaz, his
on the plane often wondered. Chief Engineer through 1992, saw
It wasnt just about the range results the impact right away. He really
or the maintenance or the avionics made a cohesive team, Diaz said.
integration or even the remarkable, B-2 owes him a lot.
unprecedented, and total absence After first flight the goals were to
of fuel leaks. To Hernandez, there get production underway and to
was a simple answer: when the prepare for the Air Force test pilots
pilots come back from war. to give the B-2 a workout.
Almost ten years would pass from Major Tony Imondi was the first
that July day when the B-2 flew Strategic Air Command pilot to
until the bomber made its debut fly the B-2. Hed come to Edwards
in combat in the dark skies over with a group of six hand-picked
Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. pilots, and spent time learning the
THE SLEDGEHAMMER B-2 systems and flying T-38s until
In December 1989, Northrop added the B-2 itself was ready. It handled
fire to the mix in the person of like an F-111 with four fuel tanks,
Ollie Boileau. A long-time aero- he said. The engineers drew on
space executive, Boileau had briefly the pilots assessments of the sim-
retired from General Dynamics in ulators and test-bird avionics to
St. Louis when he took over as make several changes.
83
CHAPTER TEN
Above: Taking ownership of the Waiting was not easy. Resolv- 20 aircraft, although money to
operational aircraft.
ing the inevitably complex prob- retrofit AV-1 into a 21st plane was
Below: The B-2 flying above lems that arose with the massive added at the end of the decade.
Whiteman AFB.
stealth aircraft strained the patience Nevertheless, the B-2 was destined
Bottom: Margaret Calomino of government and manufacturer to make a big impact as a combat
alike. Over time, manufacturing bomber.
smoothed, and Northrop had the
Officially, the B-2 achieved ini-
right aircraft, AV-6, to deliver to
tial operational capability in April
the Air Force as its first operational
1997. The B-2 owed its speedy
stealth bomber.
IOC in part to a specially-designed
At last, on December 17, 1993, the Northrop precision weapon called
first B-2 touched down at White- GATS/GAM.
man AFB, Missouri. Everything
GATS/GAM was an acronym on an
changed when we delivered an air-
plane, Imondi said. When we got acronym. It stood for GPS-aided
Targeting System/GPS-aided muni-
a flyable, combat airplane, every-
tion, with GPS, of course, being the
thing changed.
Global Positioning System satellite
By the mid-1990s, there were sever- constellation developed by the Air
al B-2s at Whiteman. The fleet was Force.
now grouped as Block 10, Block 20,
One person involved was Margaret
or Block 30 aircraft, according to
Calomino, who joined the Arma-
the sophistication of the avionics.
ment Division in 1984, integrating
The newest B-2s were coming off
all weapons onto the airplane.
the production line as Block 30 air-
She remembers being briefed on a
craft ready for war and sailing
through customer acceptance. program to combine accurate posi-
tioning with a synthetic-aperture
Unfortunately, the B-2 would never radar picture on board the B-2.
achieve full production. A 1992 Starting many miles out, the
decision capped the fleet at a mere synthetic aperture radar could
84
SUCCESS
and show its versatility. Kent Kresa B-2 and JDAM. The B-2 became
wrote the government to say that the first Air Force jet to be certified
Northrop would not compete for to employ JDAM, and the wing
the upcoming JDAM competition if liked the new weapons with its all-
we could upgrade all the B-2s. We weather precision.
had to sign a non-compete agree-
Most of all, the pilots at Whiteman
ment with the Air Force, Moore
grew to love the B-2 as they moved
and Calomino said. Calomino notes
together from training to combat
that while there were those in gov-
rehearsal. In October 1996, a B-2
ernment initially against the invest-
destroyed 16 separate targets using
ment, ultimately, it was the GATS/
GATS/GAM. That opened a lot of
GAM that allowed the B-2 to take
eyes, said one pilot.
its place as a conventional bomber
in the years before JDAM was fully THE QUIET WARBIRD
tested, ultimately demonstrating its The B-2 made its combat debut
capability in the skies over Serbia. on the first night of Operation Al-
Thanks in part to Imondi, the B-2 lied Force on March 24, 1999. The
was at the front of the line for B-2s primary weapon was the
Joint Direct Attack Mission (JDAM) 2000-lb. JDAM, also making its
integration. combat debut. Stealth, precision,
range and mass united for the first
One day in 1995 he had the honor of
time.
flying Secretary of Defense William
Perry in the B-2. In deference to his Of all the remarkable achievements
instrumental work on his first tour in of the B-2 at war, four stood out:
the Pentagon in the 1970s Perry was opening the air campaign, flying
often called the father of stealth. alone, destroying an SA-3, and
Imondi took the opportunity with taking down the Novi Sad bridge.
85
CHAPTER TEN
Imondi was the Operations Group the target runs, you are doing a lot
Commander, the man in charge of of aiming, a lot of radar scope inter-
the B-2 squadrons going to war. pretation, so you are very busy. You
Whiteman launched two B-2s on dont have time to think about any-
night one. There had been false thing but getting the weapons out,
starts to this air war, so those he said. The weapons releases were
gathered in the command post good. Time to turn for the border.
half expected the bombers to be Then it seemed like it took about
Above: A Soviet MiG-29.
recalled. three days to get out of country,
Below: Night refueling enroute to as Single remembered it.17
the combat zone on an extended Theyre not coming back, Imondi
mission from CONUS.
told them. Not tonight. The B-2 soon proved it could do
what no other asset could do: fly
Leading the mission was Lieuten- alone and arrive in a hostile envi-
ant Colonel Eric Single. Ahead lay ronment. Fighters and jamming air-
Serbian integrated air defenses and craft were routinely in the air, but
fighters, including the formidable on this night, the weather was too
MiG-29. bad to launch all the tankers and
As they entered Serbian airspace other assets needed. The air war
NATO and Serbian fighters were stood down but not the B-2.
mixing it up below them. The other
Two B-2s entered hostile airspace
B-2 saw the white trail of an air-to-
by themselves. It was eerily quiet,
air missile.
said Major Tom Bussiere of the tar-
Single saw no dog- get run. One B-2 kept pre-planned
fights below his B-2 targets, but Bussieres retargeted
but he did see flash- all 16 weapons in flight for new
es from the TLAMs coordinates.
and CALCMs going No other aircraft flew in-country
off about the time
that night. For their solo effort, the
we started ingress-
B-2 pilots were awarded the Distin-
ing in country. guished Flying Cross.
Other than that,
the sky was quiet. Another deeply satisfying mission
Do they know Im was rapid re-targeting to destroy an
here, do they not SA-3. The B-2 had been designed
know Im here?, to elude air defenses. Now, with
he wondered. precision, it could destroy them,
too. A B-2 crew was refueling
He didnt have much
before crossing the Yugoslav
time to think about
border when they got a SATCOM
it. Once you get message to plug in a new target.
into the target areas, They released JDAMs on the new
86
SUCCESS
target, and a few days later, an Imondi flew a mission near the end
intelligence officer said to them, of the campaign, after all his young
hey, you guys blew up an SA-3.18 crews had their turns. Twelve years
Perhaps the most famous target had passed since he first laid eyes
destroyed by the B-2 was the on the B-2 tucked away in its not-
Novi Sad Bridge. By May 1999, quite-lint-free hangar in Palmdale.
that bridge had been attacked by On that May night the target area
conventional fighters and by F-117s was dark, cloudy, and quiet. I was
but it was still standing. Mission almost overcome with emotion,
planners at Whiteman decided to Imondi recalled. The target run was
take no chances and employ a full over almost as fast as it started and
round of 8 weapons on the Novi Sad the B-2 slipped away unscathed yet
bridge. In one quick pass, a single again
B-2 targeted six JDAMs on the FUTURE IMPACT
center span with another 2 JDAMs From 1999 to 2003, the B-2 flew
at one end. The bridge collapsed combat missions in three very
into the water. different campaigns in distinct
Over the 78-day campaign the regions of the world with varied air
B-2 pilots flew 51 sorties, all from threats.
Missouri to the European theater For Afghanistan, the B-2 opened
and back. Their epic intercontinental the campaign soon dubbed Oper-
flights proved a level of reliability ation Enduring Freedom. It flew
for the B-2 which no other combat several missions, then pulled back
aircraft ever attempted. to let other bombers and fight-
87
CHAPTER TEN
ers continue the work, since the develop and build a new bomber
airspace held no threats. as early as mid-2020, but there are
At the beginning of Operation no plans to retire the B-2 from its
Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the B-2 conventional or nuclear deterrence
again took on the most dangerous missions.
targets in areas where the rem- The B-2 is very much a front line
nants of Iraqs air defenses were asset. Innovation on the B-2 has
most active. The B-2s logged 22 not stopped, and its lineage within
sorties from a forward base Northrop Grumman and the aero-
and 27 from Whiteman AFB, space industry is still producing
primarily during the first 10 payoffs.
days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Fifteen years of operational history
The B-2 targeted equipment in in the Air Force did not cut the ties
Republican Guard strongholds and between Northrops B-2 team and
struck fixed targets. These precision the bomber they created. No mat-
missions with up to the minute ter what, Im still in awe to see it
target updates were well beyond fly, said Mall.
anything the first SAC planners
The B-2 itself is a different creature
had dreamed of in 1979.
in many ways after a decade and a
The combination of precision, half in the fleet. Through constant
retargeting flexibility, stealth, and innovation, the Northrop and Air
payload made the B-2 perfect for Force team have improved on many
the job. of the most vexing compromises
With a fleet of only 20 aircraft, made for the sake of the break-
the B-2 remains the nations only through design.
bomber for heavily defended tar- For example, the tape is gone. We
gets. Where the B-2 will fly combat eliminated 2800 feet of tape off
next is impossible to predict. Whats the airplane, explained Mazur,
certain is that even today there are who was promoted to B-2 program
regions of the world with dense air manager.
Above and background: The defenses where only the B-2 has the
Shield of the Air Combat Tape once covered the seams
Command ability to survive and complete the
around access panels and other gap
mission. The Air Force intends to
Right: Details of the original
surface material stack, and the
simplified version with updated
fasteners that greatly enhanced
LO reliability and maintainability.
88
SUCCESS
points. When it came off for panels blood ties came from the people. Left: Top view of the original
tape and butter materials over
to open it had to be resealed and The people who are here come gaps. Bottom view of updated
cured to reestablish the smooth from that B-2 culture, said Chris technique that eliminated
hundreds of feet of tape.
conducting surface for stealth. Hernandez, who had risen to the
Bottom: X-47A on the ramp
A new crew at Northrop Grumman head of advanced design. a complex LO tailless air vehicle.
proposed a radical fix with new, The short story of how Pegasus
simpler materials and fasteners. evolved echoed the Northrop spirit
of discovery. We lost the Air Force
UCAV competition to Boeing in
1999 and took it back from Boeing
by winning UCAS-D in 2007, said
Hernandez. How did they do it? In
a way very reminiscent of Cashen,
Waaland, Kinnu and the pioneering
advanced designers who invented
the B-2.
After their first loss, Bill Haub
and I scratched our heads and said
we could come back and win this
program in SDD, because this is
just an ACTD, but weve got to fly
something. We cobbled together
89
CHAPTER TEN
this thing based on work wed the benefit for the joint force. That
done over the years on different advanced design team remains in
airplanes and ideas and thought, place and continues to work on
this could probably work. They developing future capabilities for
focused on the Navy as their cus- the warfighter, leveraging the
tomer. successes and lessons learned
From an aeroelastic standpoint of the past with maturing and
theres a lot of learning that we proven technologies. The B-2 was
take from B-2 to UCAS, Hernan- and is unique a success born out
dez added. of necessity and facilitated by a
dedicated, capable government-
Scott Seymour had moved from contractor team a stepping
the B-2 program to leadership stone to a next generation of air
of the entire Integrated Systems dominance.
sector. Just like Jones had done,
he told his enterprising advanced And of course, Northrop Grumman
design team thats a great idea, is always up for a race on stealth.
go do it. It was a significant
amount of money to invest, and
an uncertain outcome, but they all
saw the technical possibilities and
90
SUCCESS
91
92
ENDNOTES
Endnotes
By Chapter
Foreword
1. Rebecca Grant Interview with John Cashen, May 2008. ............. pg. v
93
ENDNOTES
Endnotes
By Chapter
94
THE AUTHOR