MIKE A. FERMIN, G.R. No.

179695
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA

RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN,
Respondents.
X----------------------X
MIKE A. FERMIN,
Petitioner, G.R. No. 182369

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA
RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN, Promulgated:
Respondents.
December 18, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

These consolidated petitions provide a welcome avenue for the Court to dichotomize, once and for all, two popular remedies to prevent a candidate from running for an elective position which are indiscriminately

interchanged by the Bench and the Bar, adding confusion to the already difficult state of our jurisprudence on election laws.

For the Courts resolution are two petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 179695, which assails the June 29, 2007 Resolution [1] of the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) 2nd Division in SPA No. 07-372, and the September 20, 2007 Resolution [2] of the COMELECEn Banc affirming the said division resolution; and (2) G.R. No. 182369, which challenges the February

14, 2008 Resolution[3] of the COMELEC 1st Division in SPR No. 45-2007, the March 13, 2008 Order [4] of the COMELEC En Banc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, and the March 26, 2008 Entry of

Judgment[5]issued by the Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the Commission in the said case.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan, [6] the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), on November 22, 2006, passed Autonomy Act No. 205 [7] creating the Municipality of Northern

Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new municipality was constituted by separating BarangaysBalong, Damatog, Gayonga, Guiawa, Indatuan, Kapinpilan, P. Labio, Libungan, Montay, Sabaken and Tumaguinting

from the Municipality of Kabuntalan.[8]

Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6

months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay.[9] In the meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006,
[10]
formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan.

Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter to Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan.
[11]
On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.[12]

On April 20, 2007, private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition[13] for Disqualification [the Dilangalen petition] against Fermin, docketed as SPA (PES) No.

A07-003 [re-docketed as SPA No. 07-372 before the COMELEC] with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Shariff Kabunsuan. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of

residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record. The pertinent portions of the petition follow:

1. THE PETITIONER is of legal age, a registered voter, resident and incumbent Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan, holding office at Barangay Paulino Labio in the
Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan where he may be served summons and other legal processes.

2. THE PETITIONER is a candidate for election as Mayor in the same Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan, being a resident of and domiciled in the Municipality since birth. The Respondent is also a
candidate for the same office, Mayor in the same Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan. He is, however, not a resident of the Municipality.

3. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of Candidacy of being a resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in
fact he simply transferred his registration from the Municipality of Kabuntalan on 13 December 2006, wherein he stated that he has relocated to that municipality a year and six months
earlier, or no earlier than June 2005.

4. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of Candidacy of being a resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in
fact he has stayed for at least 33 years in Barangay Payan, Municipality [of] Kabunt[a]lan.

5. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Application for Transfer that he is a resident of Barangay Indatuan on 13 December 2006, wherein he stated
that he has relocated to that municipality a year and six months earlier, or on or about June 2005, when in truth and in fact he has never resided much less domiciled himself in Indatuan
or anywhere else in the Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan earlier than 14 May 2006.

6. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of Candidacy of being a resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in
fact he has never resided in the Municipality, but was simply visiting the area whenever election is [f]ast approaching.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, [in consideration] of the Respondent not possessing the residence required for candidacy, and having perjured
himself in a number of times, the Commission disqualify the Respondent. [14]
 Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor with 1,849 votes over Fermins

1,640.[15] The latter subsequently filed an election protest (Election Case No. 2007-022) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of Cotabato City. [16]

G.R. No. 179695

On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, in SPA No. 07-372, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan.[17] It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident

of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year.[18]

The COMELEC En Banc, on September 20, 2007, affirmed the Division's ruling.[19]

Thus, petitioner instituted G.R. No. 179695 before this Court raising the following issues:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY PETITIONER FROM SEEKING THE MAYORALTY POST OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NORTHERN KABUNTALAN SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN
FILED OUT OF TIME.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ONE (1) YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT AS PROVIDED BY ART. 56, PAR. NO. 3, RULE XIII, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO IS APPLICABLE TO PETITIONER, WHO TRANSFERRED HIS VOTER'S REGISTRATION RECORD DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE FROM BARANGAY PAYAN TO
BARANGAY INDATUAN IN THE SAME MUNICIPALITY OF KABUNTALAN. [20]

Petitioner contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). [21]Following Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, the same must be

filed within 5 days from the last day for the filing of CoC, which, in this case, is March 30, 2007, and considering that the said petition was filed by Dilangalen only on April 20, 2007, the same was filed out of time.

The COMELEC should have then dismissed SPA No. 07-372 outright.[22]

Petitioner further argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters registration

record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length

of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the effective date of its creation. [23]

In his comment, private respondent counters that the petition it filed is one for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the last day for filing of the CoC but not later than the

candidates proclamation should he win in the elections. As he filed the petition on April 20, 2007, long before the proclamation of the eventual winning candidate, the same was filed on time. [24]
Private respondent likewise posits that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement for him to be able to run for an elective office in Northern Kabuntalan. Petitioner applied for the transfer of

his voting record on December 13, 2006, and this was approved only on January 8, 2007.[25]

G.R. No. 182369

During the pendency of G.R. No. 179695 with the Court, Dilangalen filed, on September 27, 2007, with the RTC of Cotabato a motion to dismiss Election Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no legal

standing to file the said protest, the COMELEC En Banc having already affirmed his disqualification as a candidate; and this Court, in the abovementioned case, did not issue an order restraining the implementation

of the assailed COMELEC resolutions.

The RTC, however, denied this motion on September 28, 2007. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court remained steadfast in its stand that the election protest was separate and distinct from the COMELEC

proceedings, and that, unless restrained by the proper authority, it would continue hearing the protest. [26]

Assailing the RTCs denial of his motions, Dilangalen filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition [27] docketed as SPR No. 45-2007 with the COMELEC. On February 14, 2008, the COMELEC 1 st Division set aside the

aforesaid orders of the trial court for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, prohibited the said court from acting on and proceeding with the protest, and ordered it to dismiss the same. [28] The

COMELEC En Banc, on March 13, 2008, denied petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the divisions ruling on account of Fermins failure to pay the required fees. It further directed the issuance of an entry of

judgment in the said case.[29] On March 26, 2008, the ECAD recorded the finality of the ruling in SPR No. 45-2007 in the Book of Entries of Judgments. [30]

These developments prompted Fermin to file another certiorari petition before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 182369. In this petition, Fermin raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

Whether or not public respondent has departed from the accepted and usual course of its rules of procedure, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision by the Honorable Court.

B.

Whether or not public respondent in taking cognizance of the certiorari and prohibition not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in (sic) excess [of jurisdiction].

C.

Whether or not public respondent, in ordering Judge Ibrahim to dismiss the election protest case, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
(sic) excess of jurisdiction.

D.

Whether or not public respondent, in not uniformly observing its process in the service of its resolution and/or order, had denied to petitioner the equal protection of the law.

E.
 Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissible in view of the pendency of another action and whereby the result of the first action is determinative of the second action in
any event and regardless of which party is successful.

F.

Whether or not there is forum shopping.

G.

Whether or not the public respondent, acting not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to issue TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction as ancillary remedy of the original action
for certiorari and prohibition.

H.

Whether or not public respondent has jurisdiction to divest the Court of Judge Ibrahim of its jurisdiction on the election protest case. [31]

The Court, on April 29, 2008, initially dismissed the said petition. [32] Fermin subsequently filed in succession his motions for reconsideration and for the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 179695 & 182369. Considering that

the two petitions were interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them.

The Issues

The primordial issues in these consolidated cases may be encapsulated, as follows:

(1) Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 or Section 78 of the OEC;

(2) Whether or not it was filed on time;

(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner as not a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections; and

(4) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered the dismissal of Election Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to file the protest.

Our Ruling

I.

Pivotal in the ascertainment of the timeliness of the Dilangalen petition is its proper characterization.
As aforesaid, petitioner, on the one hand, argues that the Dilangalen petition was filed pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC; while private respondent counters that the same is based on Section 68 of the Code.

After studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 [33] of the OEC. The petition contains the essential

allegations of a Section 78 petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate

(the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or

deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. [34] It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidates eligibility for public office, in this case, his

possession of the one-year residency requirement under the law.

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which

may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,

therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional [35] and statutory[36]provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material

representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate .[37] Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under

Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253[38] of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, [39] with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is

filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the wining candidate.

At this point, we must stress that a Section 78 petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in

different eventualities. Private respondents insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact

captioned a Petition for Disqualification, does not persuade the Court.

The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not established residence in the said locality for at

least one year immediately preceding the election. Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the disqualification of a candidate under Section 68. The provision only

refers to the commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds for disqualification, thus:

SEC. 68. Disqualifications.Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committedacts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Likewise, the other provisions of law referring to disqualification do not include the lack of the one-year residency qualification as a ground therefor, thus:

Sections 12 of the OEC

 SEC. 12. Disqualifications.Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold
any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service or sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC)[40]

SECTION 40. DisqualificationsThe following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Considering that the Dilangalen petition does not state any of these grounds for disqualification, it cannot be categorized as a Section 68 petition.

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only

be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to

continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya,[41] this Court

made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has

been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. [42]

In support of his claim that he actually filed a petition for disqualification and not a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC, Dilangalen takes refuge in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
[43]
specifically Section 1[44] thereof, to the extent that it states, [a]ny candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law x x x may be

disqualified from continuing as a candidate, and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 [45](Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Authority to Hear and Receive Evidence in Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection

with the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections), which states in Section 5(C)(1) and (3)(a)(4) that:

Sec. 5. Procedure in filing petitions.For purposes of the preceding section, the following procedure shall be observed:
 xxxx

C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING
SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION

1) A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for
disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

xxxx

3) The petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualification or possessing some grounds for disqualification, shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies with the concerned office mentioned
in Sec. 3 hereof, personally or through a duly authorized representative by any person of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties on the grounds
that any candidate does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the constitution or by existing law, or who possesses some grounds for disqualification,

3.a. Disqualification under existing election laws:

1. For not being a citizen of the Philippines;

2. For being a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country;
3. For lack of the required age;
4. For lack of residence;
5. For not being a registered voter;
6. For not being able to read and write;
7. In case of a party-list nominee, for not being a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the day of
the election. [Emphasis supplied.]

We disagree. A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the

said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the

denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC. [46] As aptly observed by the eminent constitutionalist, Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, in his separate opinion in Romualdez-

Marcos v. Commission on Elections:[47]

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1
the following:

Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and
citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not
only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for disqualification different from those for a declaration of ineligibility. Disqualification proceedings, as
already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and
the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as
a candidate for a public office and vice-versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of the law does not
imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in 4.
 Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the
detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest," through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the
results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidates qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding
for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in the end he prevails. [48]

Furthermore, the procedure laid down in the said Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cannot be used in Section 78 proceedings, precisely because a different rule, Rule 23, [49] specifically governs petitions to

deny due course to or cancel CoCs.

II.

Having thus determined that the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 78 of the OEC, the Court now declares that the same has to comply with the 25-day statutory period for its filing. Aznar v. Commission on

Elections[50] and Loong v. Commission on Elections[51] give ascendancy to the express mandate of the law that the petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of

the certificate of candidacy. Construed in relation to reglementary periods and the principles of prescription, the dismissal of Section 78 petitions filed beyond the 25-day period must come as a matter of course.

We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 [52] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,[53] contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing Section 78 petitions.

While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates [54] (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in

his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections[55]explains that the procedure hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a

procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x x x.), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day

period for filing Section 78 petitions under the OEC is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of CoCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere

reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so

declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. [56] In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong,[57] which upheld the 25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions, was decided long after the enactment

of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states:

Sec. 2. Period to File Petition.The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.

As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Accordingly, it is necessary to determine when Fermin filed his CoC in order to ascertain whether the Dilangalen petition filed on April 20, 2007 was well within the restrictive 25-day period. If it was not, then the

COMELEC should have, as discussed above, dismissed the petition outright.

The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections on March 29, 2007.[58] It is clear therefore that the petition to deny

due course to or cancel Fermins CoC was filed by Dilangalen well within the 25-day reglementary period. The COMELEC therefore did not abuse its discretion, much more gravely, when it did not dismiss the petition

outright.

III.

However, the Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately declared that Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said

elections.

[59]
In its assailed June 29, 2007 Resolution, the COMELEC ruled as follows:

In the petitioners memorandum, an authenticated copy of the respondents oath of office subscribed and sworn to before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Governor Maguindanao Province, it was stated that
respondents residence is at Barangay Payan, Maguindanao (sic) as of April 27, 2006. Clearly the respondent is not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan earlier than 15 May 2006 as his very own oath
of office would reveal that he is really a resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan less than 365 days immediately preceding the May 14, 2007elections. He is a resident of a barangay not a
component of the local government unit in which he seeks to be elected as of May 15, 2006 and is therefore not qualified or eligible to seek election as mayor in the said municipality. [60]

Obviously, the COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to before

Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalanas of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of evidence does not necessarily support a

finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections.[61] Petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of another locality as

of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he complied with the residency requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have

transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006.

Neither does this evidence support the allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement for the transfer of his voting record from BarangayPayan to Barangay Indatuan. Given that a voter is

required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months immediately preceding the election, [62] petitioners application for transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier

admission that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006. Be that as it may, the issue involved in the Dilangalen petition is whether or not petitioner made a material representation that is false in his

CoC, and not in his application for the transfer of his registration and voting record.

The foregoing considered, the Court finds that the Dilangalen petition does not make out a prima facie case. Its dismissal is therefore warranted. We emphasize that the mere filing of a petition and the convenient

allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation. [63] A

litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient

evidence and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side. [64]
 IV.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, the COMELECs order for the dismissal of Fermins election protest is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, considering that the same is premised on Fermins alleged lack of legal

standing to file the protest, which, in turn, is based on Fermins alleged lack of residency qualification. With our disposition herein that the Dilangalen petition should be dismissed, a disquisition that Fermin has no

standing as a candidate would be reckless and improper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for certiorari are GRANTED. The assailed issuances of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND G.R. No. 184836
FERDINAND N. TALABONG,
Petitioners,
PUNO, C J.,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ABAD, and

ASILO,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Respondents.

Promulgated:

December 23, 2009

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:
 Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of

Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?

The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the

full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

THE ANTECEDENTS

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-

2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence,

he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due

course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render

complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:

1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and

2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4 th term.
 THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

General Considerations

The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective officials term. To

be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections. [2] Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling

ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by succession.

a. The Three-term Limit Rule:

The Constitutional Provision Analyzed

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule

embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a term as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,[3] a Resolution promulgated on November 28,

2007, succinctly discusses what a term connotes, as follows:

The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the
period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease.
In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis
supplied].
 A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,[4] reiterated that [T]he term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several

incumbents shall succeed one another.

The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. This formulation no more than three consecutive

terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the term,

not to the service that a public official may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the term.

The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary

renunciation of office shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first

branch.

A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of service for a full term for

purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase voluntary renunciation, by itself, is not without significance

in determining constitutional intent.

The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that

operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a term in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the

term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word voluntary linked together with renunciation signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to

office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.

The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term voluntary renunciation shed further light on the extent of the term voluntary renunciation:

MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term voluntary renunciation does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article
VI].

MR DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what voluntary renunciation mean? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and resignation?
 MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.[6]

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term voluntary renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-

term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we note further that

Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it suggests.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective
whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this firm
mindset.

b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the

Three-term Limit Rule

Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within the provisions contemplation, particularly on the interruption in the continuity of service for the full term that it
speaks of.

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections[7] presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation
as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:

The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]

Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v. COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases, however,

presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated.

Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of

the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect

of a contrary view that the official (referring to the winner in the election protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling,

when another actually served the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.

In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere de facto officer. The Court obeserved that

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercised the

powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him to stay on indefinitely.

Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to

the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule . Effectively,

these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections[10] dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost in the

regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms. The Court

reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.

Socrates v. Commission on Elections[11] also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he

did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates assumed the

functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his

disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor,

ruling that:

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a
recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether
there would be no immediate reelection after three terms.
 xxxx

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]

Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run ascity mayor in light of the intervening
conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the
municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group
of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years. The Court said:

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office . To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. [14]

Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure
in a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete break
from office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.

Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of

law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-term

limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to

hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and

assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

c. Conclusion Based on Law

and Jurisprudence
 From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective

official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully

served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon.On the other hand, temporary inability or

disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an

effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office

holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to

hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.

To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible

rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full

continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not

speak of the temporary cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:[16]

Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].

Preventive Suspension and

the Three-Term Limit Rule

a. Nature of Preventive Suspension

Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code, [17] the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, [18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who
have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the

respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that
requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves

dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case

filed against him.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to

his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office

holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the

preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to

Asilo.

That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive

suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws [20] themselves that the courts can enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion

is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the extreme situation that it can totally deprive an elective office holder

of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election officials term.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves

protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has

served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any

commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive

suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.

b. Preventive Suspension and

the Intent of the Three-Term

Limit Rule
 Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the

temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal

and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness,

inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without

forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actualservice as the standard to determine effective

interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of

serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.

c. Preventive Suspension and

Voluntary Renunciation

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed

the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the

element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the

exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different

and non-comparable.

But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.

Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of

circumventing the three-term limit rule.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall

disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of
office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive

suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the

COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC

effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken

outside the contemplation of law.[21]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to

serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice
 G.R. No. 104848 January 29, 1993

ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVES, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO NAVARRO, and NOEL NAVARRO, Petitioners, vs. HON.
SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, Respondents.

Villarama & Cruz for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library

Marciano LL. Aparte, Jr. for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners would have Us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch
28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition andmandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order filed as a taxpayer's suit, docketed therein as Special Civil Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the
enforcement of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter acted whimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took
cognizance of the case and issued the said order. It is the petitioners' thesis that the said case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is
exclusively vested in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely baseless, that the private respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public
respondent acted with undue haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of the private respondent in issuing the TRO.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In Our Resolution of 20 April 1992, We required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing and
enforcing the challenged Order of 10 April 1922, and from continuing with the proceedings in Special Civil Action No. 465.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At the time of the filing of both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the 11 May 1992
synchronized elections. Petitioners Antonio Arevalo, Cresencio Echaves, Emmanuel Aranas and Palermo Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial budget officer of
Camiguin, respectively. Their co-petitioners Ronnie Rambuyon, Primo Navarro and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other hand, the private respondent was the incumbent Congressman of
the lone Congressional District of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections and the Regional Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region
X.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The antecedents of this case are not complicated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 10 April 1992, private respondent filed his Petition 1(Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners Gallardo, Arevalo, Echaves, Aranas and Sia to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing
or prosecuting certain public works projects; from releasing, disbursing and/or spending any public funds for such projects; and from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device for the future
delivery of money, goods and other things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with the said projects as (1) said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed
by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated a few days before 27 March 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans,
specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project; hence, they could not have been lawfully and validly undertaken; (2) the hiring of hundreds of
laborers in the different projects continues unabated in flagrant violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code; (3) the projects were undertaken in violation of the provisions
of the Local Government Code 2 governing the use and expenditure of the twenty percent (20%) development fund of the Province of Camiguin; (4) these projects, which are "Locally-Funded", were pursued without
the requisite approval of the provincial budget by the Regional Office of Budget and Management as required by Section 326 of the Local Government Code; (5) some of the projects which are "Foreign-Assisted" and
funded by the Spanish Assistance for Integrated Livelihood Program (SAIL) lack the required building permits and are without any relevance to those livelihood projects envisioned by the SAIL; and (6) more
importantly, as alleged in paragraph VII of his Petition: 3

. . . the illegal prosecution of these public work projects requiring massive outlay of public funds during this election period has been and is being done maliciously and intentionally for the purpose of corrupting the
voters and inducing them to support the candidacy of Respondent Gallardo and his candidates in the coming May 11, 1992 election.

In support of his prayer for a restraining order to be issued upon the filing of the petition and a writ of preliminary injunction immediately thereafter, herein private respondent alleges in paragraph XV of his Petition:

That unless the illegal acts of Respondents are enjoined or restrained immediately first by the issuance of the restraining order upon the filing of this Petition and immediately after that a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, great or irreparable loss and injury shall be caused not only to Petitioner himself, as a candidate and as a taxpayer, but also to the entire LDP slate of candidates, whose supporters are being corrupted
and illegally induced to vote for Respondent Antonio A. Gallardo and his candidates in consideration of their employment in these projects, but (sic) most of all the greatest and most irreparable loss, damage and
injury, in terms of wanton, irresponsible, excessive, abusive and flagrant waste of public money, is now being caused and shall continue to be caused, primarily and principally to the sixty-thousand or more
taxpayers of the Province of Camiguin, whom Petitioner represents as Congressman and whose interests Petitioner is sworn to uphold, promote and protect. 4chanrobles virtual law library

The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a ) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of twenty-nine (29) different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation
of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of the Human Resource
Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the
rehabilitation of office and equipment. 5chanrobles virtual law library

On the same day that the private respondent filed his petition, public respondent Judge issued the questioned TRO, 6 the pertinent portion of which reads:

It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great and irreparable damage and/or injury shall be caused to the petitioner as candidate and taxpayer, such damage and injury taking the form and shape
occasioned by the alleged wanton, excessive, abusive and flagrant waste of public money, before the matter can be heard on notice, the respondents are hereby Temporarily Restrained from pursuing or prosecuting
the projects itemized in Annexes "A" and "A-1" of the petition; from releasing, disbursing and/or spending any public funds for such projects; from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with said projects. (Emphasis supplied).

In the same order, the public respondent directed the petitioners to file their Answer within ten (10) days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction for 24 April 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, alleging as grounds therefor the following:

Ichanrobles virtual law library

PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465, BEING (sic) A SUIT INTENDED TO ENJOIN AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.

IIchanrobles virtual law library

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION IS LIMITED TO CRIMINAL ACTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.

IIIchanrobles virtual law library

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF COMPLAINTS/PETITION BASED ON ELECTION OFFENSES PRIOR TO THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BY THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS; FURTHER, PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT TO FILE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465 SINCE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE ELECTION OFFENSES BELONGS TO THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

IVchanrobles virtual law library

PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Vchanrobles virtual law library

THE PETITION DATED 09 APRIL 1992 FILED WITH PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS COMPLETELY BASELESS SINCE:

A. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY PETITIONERS ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE PUBLIC WORKS BAN ENFORCED BY THE COMELEC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

B. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE COMMENCED ONLY AFTER APPROVAL OF THE DETAILED ENGINEERING PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS AND PROGRAM OF WORK.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

C. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY A BUDGET DULY PASSED AND APPROVED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

D. THE DEVELOPMENT FUND MAY VALIDLY BE USED TO FINANCE THE MAINTENANCE OF PROVINCIAL ROADS.

VI

THE TAXPAYER'S SUIT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IMPROPER SINCE HE IS NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

VIIchanrobles virtual law library

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH UNDUE HASTE, MANIFEST PARTIALITY AND EVIDENT BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST PETITIONERS IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER. 7chanrobles virtual law library

As adverted to earlier, We issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 20 April 1992.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the Petition, the Comment thereto and the Reply to the Comment, We gave due course 8 to this Petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda which they complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The main issue in this case is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465. The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the
private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis on the last two (2)
paragraphs which read:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:chanrobles virtual law library

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. -

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. -

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. - During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and
thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury
warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.

Private respondent likewise focuses on Resolution No. 2332 (not 2322 as erroneously stated in page 10 of his Petition) of the COMELEC, promulgated on 2 January 1992, implementing the aforesaid paragraphs (v)
and (w) of Section 261 and fixing the duration of the 45-day ban for purposes of the synchronized elections from 27 March 1992 to 11 May 1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial court is for the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of elections; corollarily, the issue that is logically provoked is whether or not the trial court has
jurisdiction over the same. If the respondent Judge had only hearkened to this Court's teaching about a quarter of a century earlier, this case would not have reached Us and taken away from more deserving cases
so much precious time.

Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, 9 decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue above posed. Speaking through then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice), this Court
explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the
assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the hospitable
scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions." 10chanrobles virtual law library

Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180, otherwise known as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947. The present Constitution and extant election laws
have further strengthened the foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no doubt that the present COMELEC has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law" 11 and had the power to deputize all law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, 12 and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power (a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections" 13 (b) "[D]eputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," 14 and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law," 15 it was not expressly vested with the power to promulgate
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the necessary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the
Commission to "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law."chanrobles virtual law library

The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the Commission's power under the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, . . . . 16
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it
further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, 17 and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage - the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a
peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers:

l) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government
required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its
orders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its
instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or
employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure. 18

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. 19chanrobles virtual law library

Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. As a matter of fact, the specific
allegations in the petition therein of violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code provide a stronger basis and reason for the application of the Zaldivar doctrine. At most,
the facts in the latter case do not illustrate as clearly the announced doctrine as the facts in this case do. In Zaldivar, no specific provision of the Revised Election Code then in force was alleged to have been
violated. What was sought to be enjoined was the alleged wielding by Zaldivar, then a municipal mayor, of the power, by virtue of his office, to appoint special policemen or agents to terrorize voters into supporting
the congressional candidate of his choice. In holding that the then Court of First Instance did not have jurisdiction over the case, this Court considered the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and to exercise all other functions which may be conferred by law. We likewise relied on the provisions of
the Revised Election Code vesting upon the COMELEC (a) direct and immediate supervision over municipal, city and provincial officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and (b)
authority to suspend them from the performance of such duties for failure to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings and recommend to the President their removal if found guilty of non-feasance,
malfeasance or misfeasance in connection with the performance of their duties relative to the conduct of elections. 20chanrobles virtual law library

Under the present law, however, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or hiring of new employees or the creation or filling up of new positions in any government office, agency or instrumentality, whether
national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, is banned during the period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before a special election if made without the
prior authority of the Commission on Elections. A violation thereof constitutes an election offense. 21 Then too, no less than the present Constitution - and not just the Election Law as was the case at the time
of Zaldivar - expressly provides that the Commission may "[R]ecommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision." 22chanrobles virtual law library

Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices." 23chanrobles virtual law library

It may thus be said without fear of contradiction that this vast array of powers and functions now enjoyed by the Commission under the present Constitution provides a stronger foundation for, and adds vigor and
vitality to, the Zaldivar doctrine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The rationale of the said doctrine needs to be stressed here so that henceforth, no judge will lose his bearings when confronted with the same issue. Otherwise, he should be held to account for either the sheer
ignorance of the law or the callous disregard of pronouncements by this Court to accommodate partisan political feelings. We declared in the said case:

The question may be asked: Why should not the judiciary be a

co-participant in this particular instance of enforcing the Election Code as its authority was invoked? The obvious answer is the literal language of the Constitution which empowers the Commission on Elections to
"have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of the elections." Moreover, as was so aptly observed by the then Justice Frankfurter, although the situation
confronting the United States Supreme Court was of a different character: "Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that brings courts into immediate and active relations with party contests.
From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial
intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law." 24 Then, too, reference by analogy may be made to the principle that sustains Albano v. Arranz. For even without the
express constitutional prescription that only this Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand why no inference whatsoever with the performance of the
Commission on Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz, 25 while not precisely in point, indicates the
proper approach. Thus: "It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order
of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."chanrobles virtual law library

This conclusion finds' support from a consideration of weight and influence. What happened in this case could be repeated elsewhere. It is not improbable that courts of first instance would be resorted to by leaders
of candidates or political factions entertaining the belief whether rightly or wrongly that local officials would employ all the power at their command to assure the victory of their candidates. Even if greater care and
circumspection, than did exist in this case, would be employed by judges thus appealed to, it is not unlikely that the shadow of suspicion as to alleged partisanship would fall on their actuations, whichever way the
matter before them is decided. It is imperative that the faith in the impartiality of the judiciary be preserved unimpaired. Whenever, therefore, the fear may be plausibly entertained that an assumption of jurisdiction
would lead to a lessening of the undiminished trust that should be reposed in the courts and the absence of authority discernible the from the wording of applicable statutory provisions and the trend of judicial
decisions, even if no constitutional mandate as that present in this case could be relied upon, there should be no hesitancy in declining to act. 26chanrobles virtual law library

The foregoing disquisitions should have rendered unnecessary the resolution of the remaining collateral issues raised in this petition. In view, however, of their importance, they will be dealt with in a general
way.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself
grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. 27 Neither can We agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the court below involves the
prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses
which, by their alleged nature, are continuing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to
prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for
election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the
accredited citizens arms of the Commission. 28 However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election
Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." 29 As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged
grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right
thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We have, therefore, no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis Our resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465, We are not to be understood as approving of the acts complained of by the private respondent. If his charges for the violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and
(w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code are true, then no one should be spared from the full force of the law. No government official should flout laws designed to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections or make a mockery of our electoral processes. The bitter lessons of the past have shown that only elections of that nature or character can guarantee a peaceful and orderly change.
It is then his duty to respect, preserve and enhance an institution which is vital in any democratic society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged order of respondent Judge of 10 April 1992 in Special Civil Action No. 465 is SET ASIDE and said Civil Case is hereby ordered DISMISSED, without
prejudice on the part of the private respondent to file, if he is so minded, the appropriate complaint for an election offense pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Costs against the private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997]

EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.

FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
 First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8, 1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private respondent Eduardo A.
Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038 votes.[1] Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.

On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He alleged:

xxxxxxxxx

4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own `private army' at his aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police assigned with the Intelligence Command at
Camp Crame, applied for and was granted search warrant no. 95-147 by Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May 1995. A copy of the said search warrant is attached as Annex "A" hereof.

5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the PNP Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command, backed up by the Philippine
National Police Special Action Force, accompanied by mediamen who witnessed and recorded the search by video and still cameras, raided the house of respondent Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.

6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.

7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino Blanco where they conducted a search of the subject firearms and ammunition.

8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various high powered firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long arms. These persons composing respondent's
`private army,' and the unlicensed firearms are as follows:

A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama -

1. PYTHOM (sic) Cal. 347 SN 26946 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.

2. INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with Suppressor SN: 45457 with two (2) Mags and 54 Rounds of Ammo.

B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon -

1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2) Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo.

C.Roberto Santos y Sacris -

1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn: 522218 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.

D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil -

1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3) Rounds of Ammo.

E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion -

1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.

F. Francisco Libari y Calimag -

1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869

Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.
9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass window, respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject premises.

10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the composite police-military team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant (Annex "B-6") so that they could enter the said
room to seize the said firearm.

11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife and respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of respondent in the Nationalist People's Coalition
Party, asked permission to enter the locked room so they could withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay their watchers, and the teachers of Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.

12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.

13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained 200 pay envelopes, and each
pay envelope when opened contained the amount of P1,000.00. When questioned, respondent's brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife, admitted to the raiding team that the total amount of money in the
ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.

14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as respondent's bribe money to the teachers of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is the cover of one of the shoe boxes containing the
inscription that it is intended to the teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying activity ever in the history of Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the envelope where this P10,000,000.00 was
placed in 100 peso denominations totalling one thousand pesos per envelope with the inscription `VOTE!!! TINOY.'

This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his organization called `MTB' or `MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS.' The chairman of this movement is respondent's brother,
Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted to the police during the raid that these money were for the teachers and watchers of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy. Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The purpose is for the voter
to tear the office copy and return it to respondent's headquarters to receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money after voting for respondent during the elections.The voter will initially be given a down-
payment of P500.00.

16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use of flying voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995 showing that six (6) flying voters
were caught in different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after being caught and arrested that they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent and his followers, to vote for other voters in the
voter's list.

17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another scheme as follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his target from the list of voter and will impersonate said voter in the
list and falsify his signature.

Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct No. 26, Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes Cruz stating that
when she went to her precinct to vote, her name was already voted upon by another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T. Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, - Poll Clerk; and Nelson John Nito - Poll Member.

18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the good graces of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the petition of the people of
Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an article in the 3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled `1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar.'

19. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to terrorize the population and make the people
afraid to complain against respondent's massive vote buying and cheating in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the teachers ensured the implementation of his vote-buying ballot box switching,
impersonations, and other cheating schemes.

Attached as Annexes `I-1' to I-2' are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and ammunitions seized from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a Certification to the same effect.

20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Election Code. There are only 97,000
registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent's expenses of at least P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
 On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there was a "probable commission of election offenses
which are grounds for disqualification pursuant to the provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support of disqualification is strong." It directed the Municipal Board of
Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election returns of the municipality of Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he obtain the winning number of votes for the
position of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan until such time when the petitions for disqualification against him shall have been resolved."

On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.

On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco. The parties thereafter submitted their position papers. [2] Blanco even replied to the position paper of Alarilla on June 9,
1995.

On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-buying, viz.: [3]

xxxxxxxxx

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995
elections for having violated Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein Respondent is now made PERMANENT.The Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately
proclaimed.

SO ORDERED."

Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. [4] He moved for reconsideration of that part of the resolution directing the
Municipal Board of Canvassers to "immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor he should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were heard on September 7, 1995. The parties were allowed to file their
memoranda with right of reply. On October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration.

In this petition for certiorari,[5] Blanco contends:

xxxxxxxxx

18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as its own the majority decision of the First
Division in that:

18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of Petitioner Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice or hearing in gross and
palpable violation of Blanco's constitutional right to due process of law.

18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which Resolution this Honorable Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC) violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other
respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case were referred by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their proclamation -- an act which evidently
discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein.

18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in violation of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-BUYING, terrorism and similar such acts
should be resolve in a formal election protest where the issue of vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing of the issue in a summary proceeding;

18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in VOTE-BUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a disputable presumption of vote-buying in gross
and palpable violation of the provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;

18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down by this Honorable Supreme Court in the case
of LABO vs. COMELEC which was reiterated only recently in the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.

On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari [6] that he should be declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in Labo vs. COMELEC. [7]

We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.

 Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. It ought to be
emphasized that the suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so warrants. It is akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte under exigent
circumstances.

In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his position paper and reply to Alarilla's position paper. The
COMELEC considered the evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity to be
heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to be heard. Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings. [8]

Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in COMELEC Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution pertinently provides:

xxxxxxxxx

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be
referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate
trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the
proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong."

It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our laws.

We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all encompassing
power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel proclamations. [9] Our laws are no less
explicit on the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides:

"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs
d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the elections laws."

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong."

Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot always be straitjacketed by this
procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that the resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as
partial solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to resolve the disqualification case of
Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The action of the COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz:

"x x x.

"SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-selling. - The presentation of a complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining
witness attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter's acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be
immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legal officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (emphasis supplied)

"x x x."

Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings to the view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the Commission of its duty to resolve disqualification cases under the
clear provision of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646." [10] Clearly too, Blanco's contention that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-line.He was not the object of any invidious discrimination. COMELEC assumed
direct jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to favor anybody but to discharge its constitutional duty of disposing the case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.
 Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its Rules of Procedure which expressly
provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot
be the subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in
character.

The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying activities of Blanco. The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows: [11]

"x x x

"Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the affidavits and sworn statements admitted as evidence against him are products of hearsay; inadmissible because of the illegal
searches; they violate the Rule of Res Inter Alios Acta and the offense of vote-buying requires consummation.

We are not impressed.

A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the Reply of the Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3] would reveal that they are in the nature of
general denials emanating from individuals closely associated or related to respondent Blanco.

The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper [Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's political leaders and private secretary.

On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to how the alleged vote-buying was conducted.

Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for Tinoy Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and allegedly used as a means to facilitate the vote-
buying scheme.

There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for Respondent [Annexes "E-2", "E-3", "E-4", "E-5", "E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].

On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote for Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal complaint for violation of section 261
[2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred S. Corpus on May 9, 1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan. The same was docketed as Criminal Case 95-16996 [Exhibit F-2].

Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of the suspected flying voters.

The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same [Exhibit "F-1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two suspected flying voters when the latter
attempted to vote despite failing to locate their names in the voter's list.

From this rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered by Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA 684, the Supreme Court noted
that "Denial is the weakest defense' [page 692].

In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso, et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court observed that,

`We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence." [page 754].'

However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included herein, may be given in evidence against him [affiants who executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against Respondent.

There is no merit in this contention.

The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature of witnesses who have assumed the risk of being subsequently charged with violating Section 261 [1] of BP 881. In fact, their
affidavits were sought by the Petitioner and not by any law enforcement agency. Even Respondent admits this finding when he filed his Reply to Petitioner's Position Paper and Motion to Refer for Preliminary
Investigation and Filing of Information in Court against the Persons Who Executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election Offense. If they were the accused, why file the motion? Would not
this be redundant if not irrelevant?

xxx

Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a huge amount? Why should the Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to his own admission, be giving money to
teachers a day before the elections? What were the peso bills doing in pay envelopes with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY", and kept in shoe boxes with the word "Teachers" written on the covers thereof?

There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB cards when one considers the testimony of Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these cards, which is equivalent to more or less 52% of
the 97,000 registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in Meycauayan; that under the law, a candidate is allowed only one watcher per polling place and
canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no explanation at all by the respondent as to what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00 each.

xxx

Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be consummated.

Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money x x x." Section 28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient and conspirator
referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: x x x.

While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising something in consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying.

In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the votes of said affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of vote-buying."

These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of Commissioner Maambong.

There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not
be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings especially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. More importantly, we cannot depart from the settled norm of reviewing decisions of
the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the factual findings of the COMELEC absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its decision, order or resolution." [12]

We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the event Blanco is finally disqualified. [13] We sustain the plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:

"x x x

"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.- (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
voters in each distribution the immediately preceding election."

In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

"x x x.

"ART. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials.- (a) What constitutes permanent vacancy - A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor -

(1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined in this
Article."

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v. COMELEC, [14] viz:

"x x x x x x x x x

"We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

"That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings
has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

"Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated as
stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him."

Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC. [15]

A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which
our people express their sovereign judgment. Its free exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we succinctly held in People v. San Juan, [16] "each time the enfranchised
citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every
assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of
suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated October 23, 1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as Mayor of Meycauyan,
Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he
says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.

It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is,
curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there
is no question that this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.

The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was
paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when
the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
 SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election.

The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.

and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect,
specificallyManchester v. Court of Appeals. 1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was fliedahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate
Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected
although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988.
He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was
deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15,
1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent
COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and
did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its
publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by
the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that
the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3,
1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.

The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still
necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.

In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we
required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special
circumstances of that case, declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee
within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid, theCommission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack
of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less
important consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.

This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of thequo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding,
and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same action.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be deemedpro forma. But going over the extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately
impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the
parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope
of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural
steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6

xxx

While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the
case to the proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del
Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:

... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to
this Court. (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:

... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court
of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that
the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98
SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lwph1.t Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that
where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34
Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality. 7

xxx

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions,
the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where
the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence
of the parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.

We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:

 In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing,
has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent still pending before it? 9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.

Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the
petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines. 11

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the
petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until
representations shall have been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.

The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in
the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred
from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.

On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian
citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as
such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9
April 1984 in regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.

STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal
requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.

B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ...,
renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former country.

C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.

D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.

E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material
nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.

F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian citizenship:

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or

(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the
Act.
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul

13
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows:

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the
following information:

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.

2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other
allegiance.

Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as follows:

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 14

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:

AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs
and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he
declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a
returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily
made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We
reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts.

The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.

There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has
ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the
private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a
Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen.
As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear
provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he
voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims,
does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim,
that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he
shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by
Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for
recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his
alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:

Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English,
Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be
accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the
Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for
the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified
to serve as such.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who
was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with
three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote.25 One was on official leave. 26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case ofGeronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others
were on leave. 32 There the Court held:

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having
been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right
to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his
adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has
abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.

G.R. No. 136351. July 28, 1999]

JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc dated December 8, 1998
in SPA Case No. 98-288 which disposed:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered to:

1. AMEND and RECTIFY the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Commission (First Division) in SPA No. 98-019 promulgated on May 5, 1998, to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE PEMPE MIRANDAs certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998
national and local elections is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

2. ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election and CANCEL the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued
therefor;

3. DIRECT THE City board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE, PREPARE a new certificate of canvass & proclamation and PROCLAIM the winning candidate among those voted upon as the duly elected
mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election; and

4. DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines; the Department of Interior and Local Government; the Department of Finance, and
the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Santiago City.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 90-91, Rollo.)

The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the First Division of the Comelec dated May 16, 1998, dismissing private respondents petition to declare
the substitution of Jose Pempe Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiagos mayoralty post void.

Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:

On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition
was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose Pempe Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose
Pempe Miranda.

During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20, 336 votes.

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as
SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioners certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute,
had already been cancelled and denied due course.

On May 16, 1998, Comelecs First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo). Private respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En
Banc rendered the assailed decision aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of
Santiago City.

On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Courts intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.On December 11,
1998, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition. On December 14, 1998, private respondent filed his Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-
234, Rollo) and on February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its counsel, the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within 10 days from
notice, but petitioner twice asked for an extension of the period. Without granting the motions for extension of time to file consolidated reply, the Court decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.
 Tersely, the issues in the present case may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner.

On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Comelec. As early as in Herrera vs. Baretto (25 Phil. 245 [1913]), this Court had
occasion to apply the following principles:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a causethe right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

(p. 251)

On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Comelecs action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City,
Isabela is proper and legally sound.

Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

SEC. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose Pempe Miranda in the May 5, 1998 resolution and he heavily relies upon the above-quoted provision allowing substitution of a
candidate who has been disqualified for any cause.

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not
include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose
certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party may be substituted. InBautista vs.
Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy (p.13).

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
 The law clearly provides:

SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a
candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the
person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is
cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the
candidates among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly
registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another
office in the same election. (Monsale vs. Nico, 83 Phil. 758 [1949])

It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains why the
law provides for grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.

After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all.Applying this principle
to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any
possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.

Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as disqualification for any cause in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as the
words dies and withdraws in the instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned (see: Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 [1979]). A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy, otherwise his political party
would not be allowed to field a substitute candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of
candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable
requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the two previous instances.

Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut eviatur inconveniens et absurdum, meaning, where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in
all cases be adopted. To include those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a candidate in the first placea person who did not have a valid certificate of candidacy
prior to substitution. Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no one can give what he does not have.

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of
somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election code, the existence of a valid certificate of
candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called substitute to file a new and original
certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the controversy at hand is not a simple case of hair-splitting. A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid certificate of
candidacy. Another candidate may likewise be not qualified and at the same time not have a valid certificate of candidacy, for which reason, said certificate of candidacy is also cancelled and/or denied due
course. Or, a third candidate may be qualified but, his certificate of candidacy may be denied due course and/or cancelled. This is possible because the grounds for disqualification (see: Omnibus Election Code,
Section 68 Disqualifications) are totally separate and distinct from the grounds for cancellation and/or denying due course to a certificate of candidacy (Ibid., Section 69 nuisance candidates; and Section 78 material
misrepresentation). Only the candidate who had a valid certificate of candidacy may be substituted.
 The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel Pempe Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and
cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE Pempe MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED,
there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy. It may be stressed at this instance that the legal consequences of this May 5, 1998 resolution are independent of the issue of whether or not the Comelec was correct in reviving SPA No. 98-019 by
consolidating it with SPA No. 98-288 in its December 8, 1998 resolution.

As regards the procedural matter in the present petition for certiorari, the following considerations are also in point:

It may be relevantly stressed that the review powers of the Supreme Court over decisions of the Constitutional Commissions, in general, and the Commission on Elections, in particular, were rather particularly
defined and limited by the 1987 Constitution, as they were also circumscribed in the 1973 Constitution, to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65. In Dario vs. Mison(176 SCRA 84 [1989]), the Court held:

. . . We affirm the teaching of Aratuc vs. Commission of Elections, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]) as regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commissionwhich is that judgments of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In Aratuc, we declared:

It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body
charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings
of the Commission subject to review by the Supreme Court. And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commissions actuations be instead brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari,
We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.

xxx
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, which, asAratuc tells us,
technically connotes something less than saying that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court, which in turn suggests an appeal by review by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our
jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that
justify certiorari under Rule 65.

(pp. 111-112)

To emphasize this procedural point, then Commissioner, later to become a distinguished Member of this Court, Mr. Justice Florenz Regalado responded to Commissioner Bernas query during the deliberations of
the 1987 Constitution thusly:

FR. BERNAS. So, for purposes of the record, now, what is the intention of the Committee? What are the grounds for certiorari?

MR. REGALADO. The Committee refers specifically to a technical term of review by certiorari would be relying on the provision of Rule XLV [Should be LXV] of the Rules of Court that laid down the three grounds.

(I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 539, as cited in Bernas, S.J, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 903.)

Thus, we have to be guided by jurisprudence relating to review by certiorari under Rule 65. Generally, certiorari lies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Without jurisdiction refers to an absolute want of jurisdiction; excess of jurisdiction refers to the case where the court has jurisdiction, but it transcended the same or acted without any statutory authority;
grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Comelec committed an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present case, such is not within the province of certiorari, as a remedial measure, to
correct. The only issue that may be taken cognizance of in the present case is whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility (Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 170 SCRA 246
[1989]; Litton Mills vs. Galleon Traders, 163 SCRA 489 [1988]; Butuan Bay Export Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297 [1980]). An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the
same as grave abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was
exercised arbitrarily and despotically (Soriano vs. Atienza, 171 SCRA 284 [1989]).

Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, was allowed to
substitute for disqualified the candidate Jose Pempe Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an act of grave abuse of discretion for the Comelec to direct the proclamation of private respondent as the winning
candidate in the May 11, 1998 election.

Petitioner further faults the Comelec for amending the dispositive portion of its resolution in SPA No. 98-019, which was not elevated to it on review, the same having already attained finality by then.

While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it motu proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in which was by then already final, it
does not necessarily follow that the Comelec also committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to grant private respondents motion for reconsideration by nullifying the substitution of petitioner Joel G.
Miranda. Evidently, what is under review before us in this certiorari proceedings is SPA No. 98-288, and not SPA No. 98-019.

The question to answer is: will the Comelecs act which may constitute an excess of jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-019 be tantamount to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its judgment in the separate and
distinct case of SPA No. 98-288 as well? Clearly, non sequitur. SPA No. 98-288 should be judged on its own accord, and not under the shadow of SPA No. 98-019.
 Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. As earlier pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998 resolution
pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed error
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari.

As earlier elucidated too, the crux of the Comelecs disposition in SPA No. 98-288 is the fact that former candidate Jose Pempe Mirandas certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled. There is
no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda ( Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise
no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the
candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. In fact, it was not even necessary
for the Comelec to reiterate this in its December 8, 1998 resolution. At best, the Comelecs motu proprio act of resurrecting SPA No. 98-019 should be treated as a mere surplusage. The fact that the certificate of
candidacy of Joel Pempe Miranda was denied due course and cancelled did not depend on the en bancresolution dated December 8, 1998 of the Comelec. It stems from the fact that the May 5, 1998 resolution
GRANTED private respondents Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.

Verily, there is clear basis to find that there indeed was a blatant misrepresentation in the instant case and that it was a valid ground for the granting of the petition in SPA No. 98-019. Also, there appears to be
sound basis to rule that a certificate of candidacy which has been denied due course on account of misrepresentation is, in every legal contemplation, no certificate at all. Ergo, there is nothing to substitute. If this
judgment, rendered in the Comelecs rightful exercise of its jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-288 may, at all, be considered flawed, this blemish would only constitute an error of judgment and definitely not grave abuse of
discretion. And, of course, errors of judgment may not be corrected by certiorari.

It may be noted that Commissioner Flores raised this supposed error in her dissenting opinion (pp. 93-99, Rollo). However, her legal opinion failed to convince the majority of the collegiate body and was not
adopted by the Commission en banc. This Court in the present certiorari proceedings cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Comelec without violating the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the
matter. The Comelecs decision is not subject to appeal to this Court. We may only strike out a Comelec decision if it was rendered without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and submit to the sovereign will of the electorate, as expressed by their votes. We should always be reminded that ours is a
government of laws not of men. If this Court should fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every clamor of the majority of the supposed constituency, where shall order and justice lie? Without the least
intention to degrade, where shall people power end, and where shall law and justice begin? Would the apparent results of the canvassing of votes justify this Court in refusing to apply the law instead? The answers
to the foregoing are obvious. The Court cannot choose otherwise but to exercise its sacred duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the Republic for and under which it exists. Besides, only history will discern
whether Jose Pempe Mirandas filing of a certificate of candidacy for a 4th term and the intended substitution by his son was a ploy to perpetrate the Mirandas in power by way of a political dynasty disdained and
abhorred by our Constitution which declared:

SEC. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

(Article II, 1987 Constitution)

The invalidation of petitioners supposed substitution of Jose Pempe Miranda brings about the disqualification of petitioner in the mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said in Nolasco vs. Commission on
Elections (275 SCRA 763 [1997]) may be recalled:

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]), viz.:

xxxxxxxxx

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in denying petitioner Julius O. Garcias petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings
has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

Garcias plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can be treated as stray,
void and meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]).

(pp. 782-783)

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled ruling consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1
[1989]), Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]).

Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results pointing to petitioner as the electors choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our eyes to the pertinent
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the matter, nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said election results point to the fact that private respondent was not then the choice of the people of Santiago
City, Isabela. This Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago City to accept private respondent as their mayor. The law on succession under section 44 of Republic Act
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. Said provision relevantly states:

SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member, or, in case of his
permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election and proclamation of petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is, however, hereby GRANTED so as to
MODIFY the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the
May 11, 1998 elections. The law on succession should be enforced. Accordingly, the restraining order issued in this case is forthwith LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
 reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter,
from an elective office to serve that community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate of
Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

8
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. On the same day, the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March
20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her
original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her
intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion
of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking
the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of
Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity
of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First
Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she
always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she
has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always
been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was
quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what
was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy
speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of
elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before
this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that
she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her
residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
(Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of
Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in
1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that
prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a
resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case
 of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later
on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This
may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her
residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15

16
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution
granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number
of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the
canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to
this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of
the said Code.
 b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in
agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the
purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court
took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction
between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu
vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is
the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it
actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive
residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in
the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
 xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted
by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

31
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding
it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the
questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The
said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for
a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing
the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which
was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when
herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of
Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look
at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal
residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration
as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District
if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the
time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to
a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without
having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

34
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing
to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile
or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC
was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

36
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to
1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in
Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,
petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she
"abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

37
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be
inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in
domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically
loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual
residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision
which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to
refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more
consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different
domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the
husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and
not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino
further explains:

Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must
be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial
residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of
her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a
residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence
or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of
origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that
the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or
wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with
the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other;
and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann.,
70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the
State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
 In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property,
all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of
the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear
that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him.
The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his
family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New
Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69)
distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to
the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in
our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her
letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her
arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her
husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on
the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court inMarcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing
 that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our
courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

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In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case.
Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we
condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.