Regional Cooperation in Southeast Europe and the European Integration

Process
Searching for Necessary Complementarity1

Introduction
There is no doubt whatsoever that regional cooperation in the Balkans has evolved
considerably over the past decade, that its effects are positive and that it increasingly reflects the
regions interests. Inevitably, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan conflicts of the
1990s have affected the development of regional cooperation. Consequently, it has evolved from
political and financial cooperation based on external post-conflict and stabilisation stimuli to
cooperation which is increasingly accepted as an internal necessity for each country, in which the
region takes an active role. European Union (EU) policy plays a particular part in developing
regional cooperation in Southeast Europe promoting cooperation through a regional approach
within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in those Western Balkan countries aiming
to join the Union. As a result, regional cooperation is also a necessary element in meeting the
prerequisites of each non-member states integration into the EU.
Today, Southeast Europe is involved in a considerable number of multilateral initiatives,
ranging from general political initiatives to specialised theme-based forms of cooperation.
Geographically, the general political initiatives can be divided into two groups: a) organisations
and initiatives primarily or exclusively covering the Balkan region, i.e. primarily focused on
cooperation in the Balkans [the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe including the initiatives like the Southeast European Cooperative
Initiative (SECI) and the Royaumont Process and its successor the Regional Cooperation
Council (RCC), or the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)], and b) initiatives and

1
The authors of this paper are Jasminka Kronja and Dusko Lopandic. The paper was written as the basis for
discussion in a regional expert debate entitled Regional Cooperation and European Integration, co-organised by the
European Movement in Serbia and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Belgrade on 6 June 2012. The views expressed
reflect the authors positions not necessarily the position of the European Movement in Serbia or the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation.

1
organisations geographically close to the Balkans or including the Balkans within a broader
context [the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Central European
Initiative (CEI), the Danube Cooperation Process (DCP) or the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative].
Alongside the umbrella initiatives and organisations above, there are numerous (over 50)
narrower, thematic initiatives and long-term cooperation projects, these are highly versatile in
form and rang from standard international treaties to cooperation networks in a wide variety of
fields, ranging from trade and the power industry to education, science and culture.
Recently, the reasons which have prompted multilateral cooperation in the Balkans/SEE
primarily result from the interests of the region itself: the need to get closer to the EU and other
integration processes and objective interdependence (the limits of national markets, the level of
economic strength, infrastructure development, social and economic issues and common
resources). Pressure to improve cooperation exerted on the Balkan countries by the EU and other
international factors has also played a certain role in the process. Finally, existing models in other
subregions in and beyond Europe (such as the Benelux, Scandinavian, Mediterranean or Baltic
countries) have also had a bearing on cooperation. In addition to its long-term centrifugal effects,
the disintegration of Yugoslavia (i.e. the emergence of six new sovereign states) left a
considerable vacuum, making it necessary to establish new forms of cooperation.
A major feature of regional cooperation and therefore a strong cohesive factor in the
region, is the EU itself: in one way or another, all the countries in the region are affected. While
some of the countries are EU member states, others are either included in the EU enlargement
policy or have special contractual relations with the Union. The European integration process,
therefore, is extremely important to the countries aiming to become EU members (practically all
countries in the region) in terms of components as well as the forms and intensity of regional
cooperation.
Three stages in regional cooperation can be identified since the beginning of the century:
1. The resumption and stabilisation of regional cooperation through the Stability Pact for
SEE (2000-2005);
2. A transition period during which the Pact was dissolved and a new organisation, the
Regional Cooperation Council, was developed (2006-2008);

2
 3. The strengthening of regional ownership and the consolidation of a new regional
architecture, the Southeast European Cooperation Process and the Regional Cooperation Council,
(2008 to the present).
Our paper will focus on initiatives dealing primarily with cooperation in the Balkans, such
as the Southeast European Cooperation Process and the Regional Cooperation Council, i.e. on the
period after 2006, when transformation of the Stability Pact for SEE commenced. We shall
examine how relations between the Process and the Council are regulated and on the novelties
introduced after the Councils establishment. This process has coincided with broader processes
in Europe, notably continued EU enlargement on the one hand (Romania and Bulgaria joined the
EU in 2007, while Croatia concluded its accession talks in 2011), and the intensification of a
complex EU crisis within various different spheres (economic, institutional, political) on the
other. Finally, we shall put forward some suggestions for the promotion of regional cooperation
within the context of the European integration process.

2. From the Pact to the Council from the region's stabilisation to active cooperation and
taking responsibility
The Stability Pact for SEE has played a major role in the stabilisation of the region, the
resumption and promotion of political dialogue and the development of economic, social,
security and other areas of cooperation. It has achieved its basic goal, connecting the countries in
the region, helping them define their common priorities in the implementation of reforms, and
recruiting and permanently engaging international donors to assist the regions development and
European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Among the major projects inspired,
encouraged or coordinated by the Pact are bilateral free trade agreements and the multilateral
agreement CEFTA 2006, the Energy Community Treaty between the EU and SEE, the
Investment Compact (and subsequently the Investment Committee) for SEE, the Multilateral
Agreement on the Establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, and proposals for the
development of basic transport infrastructure in the region, linked to the main Pan-European
corridors.

3
 From the outset, the Stability Pact for SEE was transitional, set up with specific goals,
consequently, a process of identifying new priorities and establishing new forms of regional
cooperation was launched in 2005. As the situation in SEE had improved considerably, seen also
in the headway made by all countries on their road to the EU, it was necessary to move on to a
new stage of regional cooperation in which countries should take the initiative and responsibility
for the programme- and personnel-related, financial and other aspects of regional cooperation
(regional ownership). International donors would continue assisting the region, on condition that
the countries took a more active attitude. The entire process of defining the new concept of
regional cooperation took place within the Pact and the Southeast European Cooperation Process
and, consequently, with the active involvement of the countries in the region as well as the
European Commission and a number of donors concerned.
The two-year process that transformed the Stability Pact for SEE into the Regional
Cooperation Council was completed on 27 February 2008 when the Council held its inaugural
meeting in Sofia. Prior to this, at the 10th summit of the SEECP, Zagreb 11 May 2007, Sarajevo
was chosen as the host city for the Councils Secretariat and the then state secretary of the
Croatian Foreign Ministry, Hidajet Biscevic, was appointed the Councils first secretary-general.
Moreover, the fundamental SEECP document, the Charter on Good-Neighbourly Relations,
Stability, Security and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe, was amended.
The Regional Cooperation Council is a new regional cooperation structure in SEE.
Within the process of its establishment the SEECP has remained the main political forum; the
RCC is functionally linked to the Process as its institutional and logistics support.
Unlike the majority of initiatives involving the Balkans, from the outset, the Southeast
European Cooperation Process was an autochthonous attempt by the SEE countries to organise
their relations at multilateral level. As its main activity was to provide political guidelines for
promoting regional cooperation, the SEECP had no organisational or technical structure, the
country presiding over the Process was in charge of the guidance process alone. Quality in the
Process can be seen in the regularity of high-level meetings: annual meetings involving heads of
state or governments, regular encounters of foreign ministers as well as occasional meetings
between various ministers. Though this may not seem to be a truly great achievement in overall

4
multilateral diplomacy, nevertheless, given the regions specific features, the historical
background of (non-)cooperation, the political developments and the heterogeneous interests of
the states in the region, it can be defined as a major upgrade in quality and a positive step
forward. On the whole, while the Process has not yielded remarkable results in terms of progress
in major bilateral political issues and other relations in the region, it has, however, certainly
contributed to creating a better political atmosphere and the easing of the existing tensions.
Furthermore, over the past decade or so, the Process has evolved more concrete activities (the
introduction of the Troika, coordination with the EU and the Pact, currently the RCC, sectoral
ministerial meetings etc.). Institutionalizing the Process and establishing a Secretariat had always
been an issue, yet no such initiative had been possible because of differences between some
countries. In part, these problems have been solved through setting up the Regional Cooperation
Council, among other things, its role is to transform political agreement within the Process into
concrete reality. Recently, proposals to consider the appropriateness of institutionalising the
Process and even the possibility of merging the Process and the Council have once again been put
forward.
The Southeast European Cooperation Process and the Stability Pact were almost wholly
separate cooperation processes, albeit with specific forms of coordination and information
sharing. Setting up the Regional Cooperation Council has strengthened the new bodys ties with
the Southeast European Cooperation Process: the SEECP countries are the RCC member states;
the annual RCC meeting and the SEECP summit are now linked; the RCC secretary-general
reports to the SEECP on the Councils work and programme and attends SEECP meetings at all
levels; the SEECP member states appoint the secretary-general etc.
Furthermore, regular coordination meetings are held between EU representatives, the
SEECP and RCC chairmen (there were four such meetings in 2011).
Summits and ministerial meetings are organised and the cooperation agenda and priorities
are defined under the auspices of the SEECP. The RCC is a governing body which, in addition to
the countries in the region/countries involved in the Process2, brings together the EU and

2
Greece, Turkey, Serbia, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Montenegro, Moldova, Slovenia 12 states all in all.

5
UNMIK/Kosovo under Resolution 1244, as well as countries and institutions actively backing
regional cooperation processes in SEE through donations and other forms of support (47
members).
The fact that the SEECP has been permanently expanding over the past decade shows just
how important it is. Consequently, even the countries which, after the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, were highly hostile to any form of Balkan cooperation (Croatia, Slovenia) have
gradually accepted reality and the need for more intense regional involvement. On the other hand,
Moldova has also been accepted as an initiative member; the scope and political significance of
cooperation have certainly expanded: Nevertheless, the SEECP has become even more
heterogeneous; along with a large number of EU member states, it now includes countries which
are not even potential candidates and countries whose potential future membership is highly
uncertain. Moreover, a higher number of member states means additional bilateral, international
or internal problems on which this form of multilateral cooperation can have little or no
influence.

3. Results attained by the Regional Cooperation Council - four years of more active and more
responsible multilateral cooperation in the region

Establishing the Regional Cooperation Council, regional cooperation has entered a new,
improved stage: the epicentre of cooperation has been moved to the region; the countries in the
region play a more active role in deciding on and programming activities and projects; the new
organisations Secretariat is based in Sarajevo; the secretary-general and the working team
(Secretariat) are from the region; the majority of meetings regarding the region are held in the
region, (e.g. Of 300 meetings held in 2011, almost 80% took place in the SEECP countries and
Pristina, and 1/5 (58) were organised by the Regional Cooperation Council).3
Over a four-year period, the Regional Cooperation Council has positioned itself as the
regions major representative on the broader European and international scene, achieving much in
programme-related, functional and thematic consolidation of regional cooperation in SEE. It
should be pointed out that this was no easy task given the complex political and economic

3
Data quoted in the RCC draft document RCC Strategy and Work Programme 2011-2013, Self-Assessment
Report on the First Year of Implementation due to be adopted at the annual meeting scheduled for mid-June 2012.

6
scenario of the global economic crisis, the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and
the deterioration of bilateral relations among several states, further compounded by internal
problems in the EU and its member states.
Some new qualities in regional cooperation, which are the result of the Regional
Cooperation Councils work, are worthy of note:
A speedier response to developments in the EU and coordination with its strategic
priorities. In March 2010, for example, the EU adopted its new development strategy Europe
2020, while the Regional Cooperation Council simultaneously launched a framework project
Western Balkans 2020.
A strategic approach is increasingly present in the Councils work and cooperation in
specific fields. In 2010, the Council adopted a document entitled Strategy and Work Programme
2011-2013, also endorsed by the Southeast European Cooperation Process. The idea to define the
strategy and work plan once every three years and the actual process of drawing up this document
through intense consultations and dialogue with RCC members, the European Commission and
other donors are something new in regional cooperation. Regional strategies have been or are
being mapped out in the spheres of justice, internal affairs, research, innovation and development,
regional investment promotion and in the Social Agenda for the Western Balkans 2020, an
energy strategy has also been initiated. Thus, thematic initiatives and working groups are
integrated and grouped in a well-pondered manner, while duplication and incoherent action,
formerly a common obstacle, are avoided.
In an organised manner, the Regional Cooperation Council is increasingly involving the
civil sector in regional cooperation. Room has been created for a greater involvement of civil
society organisations as partners in all cooperation areas as well as in the independent evaluation
and monitoring of regional initiatives and working groups.
Furthermore, the RCC has developed considerable analytical capacity and knowledge, which
the Southeast European Cooperation Process ought to avail of more (i.e. its presiding country and
other actors in regional cooperation).
The RCCs future work will depend primarily on the level of engagement and support it
receives from its members in the region, but also on broader political and economic

7
circumstances, such as further effects of the global economic crisis, a potential slowdown of the
European integration process, the state of bilateral political relations in the region and the
sustainability of the established regional structures. What is important is how cooperation within
the SEECP will develop, whether its member states agree that it should be in the form of a more
efficient, strategic dialogue with specific guidelines for the Regional Cooperation Council or
whether the SEECP-RCC relationship will remain within its current framework, without fully
exploiting the RCC's potential and capacity.

4. Mutual dynamics of the EU enlargement process and regional cooperation in the Balkans
We have already noted that specific mutual dynamics exist between the process of EU
integration and regional cooperation. While EU accession underlines the significance of regional
cooperation it also makes it relative. EU enlargement and the prospect of Western Balkan
countries accession to the Union have gone through different stages since the beginning of the
century; the parallel process of deepening EU integration, the onset of an increasingly intense
economic crisis and the eurozone crisis at the end of the first decade and the beginning of this
second decade have had a bearing on this process.
The most concrete encouragement to the entire Western Balkan regions accession to the
EU was already given at the EU-Western Balkans summit of June 2003. On that occasion, the
heads of state or governments of the EU stated the future of the Western Balkans is within the
European Union, confirming that the ex-Yugoslav countries and Albania were potential EU
candidates. Meanwhile, a series of concrete measures were adopted aimed at improving political
dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkan countries (announcements of summits, regular
meetings of ministers, parliamentary cooperation, meetings of the Troika etc.): the European
partnership programme was announced; internal EU programmes for the Western Balkan
countries were introduced; the pre-accession mechanisms applied up to that point to Central and
East European countries were expanded so as to include the Western Balkan countries; financial
support programmes were intensified and new ones introduced (CARDS and later IPA) etc. To
promote bilateral relations, the EU also intensified the programmes under the Stabilisation and

8
 Association Process, gradually concluding bilateral Stabilisation and Association Agreements4.
Though the EU strategy and official goal of enlargement in the Western Balkans were officially
reiterated at a later stage, the process was nonetheless eclipsed by open issues and internal
problems which increasingly affected the EU from the middle of the last decade onward, issues
ranging from the Constitutional Treaty adoption fiasco (2004) and the need to adapt EU
structures to its fifth enlargement (Central and East European countries), to the severe public debt
crisis and threats to the very survival of the Monetary Union (2008 to present day). Under such
circumstances, some major EU member states (Germany, the Netherlands etc.) have been struck
by enlargement fatigue and, as a result, proposals have been put forward to freeze any further
EU enlargement for the time being and to regulate relations with the remaining candidate
countries on the basis of some sort of reinforced strategic partnership. Such a stand has
coincided with increasingly vehement rejection (in Germany, France etc.) of the possibility of
Turkey ever becoming an EU member state, despite the fact that the Union had opened
membership talks with that country a long time ago.
Despite an evident lag in EU enthusiasm about further enlargement (seen also in the the
fact that no EU-Western Balkan summit has been held since 2003,), the enlargement policy is
still being pursued. In December 2011, after six years of negotiations, Croatia signed its EU
accession treaty (due to take effect on 1 July 2013). In addition to the official candidate countries
(Turkey, Macedonia and Iceland), Montenegro was also accepted as an EU candidate (December
2011) as was Serbia (March 2012). In the not-so-distant future, the European Council can be
expected to consider granting candidate status to Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while
membership talks with Montenegro and possibly Serbia could open in 2012. Nevertheless, there
are some obvious differences in the present EU enlargement process when compared to the
Unions fifth enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe:
the enlargement process is proceeding in a far less favourable context, characterised by a
European and world crisis;

4
The EU concluded Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Western Balkan countries in the
following order: Macedonia (2001), Croatia (2001), Albania (2006), Montenegro (2007), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2008)
and Serbia (2008).

9
 enlargement to the Western Balkans is not considered to be some sort of global geo-strategic
priority which should secure Europes unity, as was the case with the fifth enlargement;
this enlargement is based on the regatta principle (i.e. one country at a time) rather than the
group principle, as in previous cases;
the membership terms set before candidate countries are becoming ever more rigid and
difficult to adhere to, due to the partially negative experiences already encountered with some of
its Balkan member states and Cyprus. The negotiation methodology can also be expected to
become increasingly complex in the coming period, thus slowing down the entire process;
accession negotiations are likely to take more and more time, as has been seen in the case of
Croatia (six years), or might even be suspended or slowed down for various reasons (Turkey);
the priority given to national interests, rather than to common Community interests,
noticeable in the conduct of many EU member states, can further complicate the enlargement
process, which could become increasingly burdened with various bilateral issues and problems5;
financial resources from EU funds for candidate countries could dwindle more and more, EU
structural or cohesion funds for new member states can be expected to continue to decrease
compared to earlier periods;
the negative attitude towards further EU enlargement which is manifest in part of the
population in the EU.
Once Croatia joins the EU, it cannot be objectively expected that the Union will accept
any other new member in the next few years6. Negotiations with other Western Balkan countries
might last from half a decade (in a highly optimistic scenario) to an entire decade, or even longer.
Practically all the Western Balkan countries outside the EU still face institutional and structural
difficulties, for example poorly functioning democratic institutions in Albania, dysfunctional
political structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia's border issues arising from the unilaterally
declared independence of Kosovo, Macedonia's relations with neighbouring countries and

5
Examples are the name-related dispute between Greece and Macedonia, which has burdened Macedonias
integration process in the long term, problems in relations between Slovenia and Croatia and their effect on the pace
of Croatias EU membership talks, and Romania's stalling when the European Council was considering Serbias
candidate status, justified by the inadequate treatment of the Vlach community in eastern Serbia.
6
Iceland might be an exception, but there is no clear commitment showing this country really intends to join
the Union.

10
internal ethnic divisions etc. The EU's influence will be crucial to the resolution of these and
similar issues in the future as well and specifically within the enlargement context. The lack of a
European prospect, i.e. of an active EU presence and integration process, could probably
trigger new upheavals in the region where national and ethnic divisions are not yet a thing of the
past, where nationalist ambitions are still strong and socio-economic problems are graver than
anywhere else in Europe.
The main geopolitical effect of this fragmentary and decelerated EU enlargement, i.e. of
an imbalanced relationship with the EU (member states, candidate countries, potential candidate
countries etc.), could be an additional lack of economic cohesion in the Balkans, thus potentially
higher political instability in the region (among countries and within some countries). In the
medium or long term a slowdown or suspension of enlargement can hold back the development
of some countries, specifically in infrastructure and the reform processes of modernisation and
Europeanisation of administration and legislation. Consequently, regional cooperation should
provide some sort of compensation, i.e. it should smooth out the unevenness caused by this
staggered process of enlargement. The best example of this kind of regional balancing is the
CEFTA 2006 agreement, which, at least in part, has expanded the southeastern European
countries' markets i.e. alleviated the potential fragmenting effects of the EU bilateral
arrangements in the region by creating a free trade zone. Agreements on the creation of an
Energy Community of Southeast Europe and the setting up of a Common Aviation Area (Open
Sky policy) between the EU and the Western Balkan countries have similar objectives. Yet, such
agreements have limited impact and cannot replace the political and other effects of a
comprehensive enlargement process.

5. Some new official ideas for the promotion of regional cooperation and the regions
integration into the EU
Alongside integration into the EU, several official proposals have been made lately to
promote regional cooperation and reform regional institutions. To illustrate further potential lines
of cooperation, we can refer to the proposals put forward by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu, the Visegrad Groups proposal to set up a Balkan Fund modelled after the Visegrad

11
Fund and Greeces proposal to organise an EU-Western Balkans summit, Thessaloniki II, during
its EU presidency in the first half of 2014.
5.1. In late 2011, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu presented a programme
containing his views and ideas on the promotion of cooperation in the Balkans and, in particular,
on strengthening the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Turkey has officially
submitted some of these proposals through the official mechanisms of the SEECP and other
SEECP members are expected to make their position clear at meetings in June 2012. The
proposal was to set up an independent group (a wise-men group) to assess the results of regional
cooperation to date, especially the achievements of the SEECP, and to draw up guidelines for the
structure and form of future cooperation; it was also suggested that a stronger institutional form
be considered for this initiative, a structure that would be more than just a forum or a process.
Davutoglu proposed a new approach to regional cooperation in the future, based on the
following ideas: restoration of cultural, economic and political ties; overcoming the legacy of the
past; building relations which respond to the challenges of the future; and, developing a new
spirit of joint action. This vision of future cooperation would be structured on the following four
policy principles:
- regional ownership and inclusiveness to strengthen cooperation and solve problems through
bilateral, trilateral and multilateral processes, as many regional initiatives as possible are needed
in future;
- regional reintegration cherishing top-level political dialogue. A mechanism similar to that of
the EU: instead of one annual summit, 2-3 summits are proposed. Reintegrating and connecting
the region in the sphere of economy (airline connections, motorways, high-speed trains), culture,
education and science;
- the importance of the European integration process a two-way process, where the Balkan
region can also help the EU become multicultural and economically competitive, a relevant
political and strategical actor on the international scene. The region should use its centuries-old
multiculturalism to its advantage, and regional politicians should make the Balkans a centre of
attraction for the EU, an area of mutually-beneficial economic interaction;

12
- a common stance and coordination of positions in regional and global organisations
intra-Balkan dialogue on specific, broader issues should be promoted and joint positions taken.
Solidarity, consultation and the development of joint projects within global forums (UN, NATO,
G-20 Turkey being the only G-20 member in the region) can have positive influence on
regional cooperation in the Balkans and vice versa. Minister Davutoglu also proposed that 2012
be commemorated as the year of peace in the Balkans, i.e. remembering the 100th anniversary of
the Balkan Wars.
5.2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, the country currently
presiding over the Visegrad Group, has official published an elaborated proposal7 for the
establishment of a Western Balkans Fund for regional cooperation, modelled on the Visegrad
Fund. The main goal is to provide financial stimulation to multilateral cooperation among
Western Balkan civil society organisations in the spheres of culture, science, education, cross-
border cooperation and experience sharing. The Fund would be set up by the states and should
help strengthen cooperation as well as ties among the public and civil sectors in the Western
Balkan countries. Initially, the Fund, which would last at least 10 years, could include those
countries that wish to join it and remain open to the possibility of other countries joining later.
The initial contribution could even be modest, sufficient to set the entire mechanism in motion. It
is estimated that the Fund could amount to between 300,000 and 700,000 in the first few years
i.e. between 30 and 80 grants ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 each. Contributors could be from a
wider circle of stakeholders and a part of the funds could be drawn from the national components
of IPA programmes.
5.3. In November 2010, Greek Foreign Minister Dimitri Droutsas proposed a new EU-
Western Balkans summit, Thessaloniki II, to be held during Greeces EU presidency in the first
half of 2014 (Agenda 2014). Greece reiterated the proposal at an informal meeting of SEECP
foreign ministers in Belgrade in January 2012. Agenda 2014 includes the following three main
objectives:

7
The proposal was drawn up by the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) as a result of a
project entitled Sharing the Experiences of Visegrad Cooperation in the Western Balkans and the Eastern
Neighbourhood, 2010-11

13
- the setting up of Group 2014, where EU member states would form preparatory alliances with
candidate countries;
- establishing stronger cooperation among the candidate countries in the region, within the
existing cooperation platforms, and strengthening their coordination (e.g. SEECP, RCC and other
general and sectoral initiatives); and
- agreeing on the date of EU accession for those Western Balkan countries that are ready. While
being a new catalyst of changes and progress the move would also stimulate reform and help
define the criteria to assess the work of regional governments. Such a commitment on the part of
the EU would be vital to speedier accession in the Western Balkans.
5.4. Finally, numerous international conferences on the regions EU integration and on
enlargement policy have been held and renowned European analysts and researchers have
published many papers on the subject. These analyses are almost unanimous in expressing the
opinion that the EU ought to be even more energetic and specific in its enlargement policy for the
region and that this would be mutually useful and vital to sustainable stability (a good example is
the efficiency with which the visa regime was lifted). Furthermore, these analyses and proposals
back Greeces Thessaloniki II summit (which will depend, however, on developments in Greece
and its status in the EU political dialogue), and the idea that EU candidate status should be
granted to all the countries in the region and dates set for membership negotiations (J. Rupnik). It
has also been suggested that the EU integrate the Western Balkans and Turkey in some areas;
they would the receive treatment equal to EU member states, on condition that they commit to
implementing all the relevant regulations (as was done in setting up the Energy Community -
Despot/ Reljic /Seufert).

6. Conclusions and proposals: the EU and regional cooperation towards strengthening

complementarity
Regional cooperation in the Balkans has progressed over the past decade or so; numerous
initiatives and projects have been developed, ranging from umbrella political initiatives to
specialised thematic initiatives in many different spheres. The Regional Cooperation Council
marked the regions transition to a more mature stage of multilateral cooperation implying the

14
active involvement of the countries in the region in programming, funding, monitoring and
implementation projects. The Council provided the Southeast European Cooperation Process
with an operational instrument, its main political forum where the gap between agreements
reached and decisions taken at the highest political level and their implementation was bridged to
some extent, albeit insufficiently.

6.1. Possible scenarios for the development of regional cooperation under the circumstances of
the EU crisis
The EU has a special role in the development of regional cooperation in SEE. On the one
hand, EU policy in the region defines regional cooperation as a prerequisite for integration, while
on the other, all the countries in the region are somehow linked to the EU, either as member
states, as countries which have set EU membership as a priority or as countries with a special
contractual relationship with the EU. A specific mutual dynamics exists between the EU
integration process and regional cooperation. How will these two processes correlate in the
future?
This will depend on developments within the EU and, among other things, the status of its
enlargement policy, as well as the pace of the integration process, the interest in regional
cooperation shown by the countries in the region, support to the Southeast European Cooperation
Process and the Regional Cooperation Council and readiness to address the bilateral issues
encountered.
The EU is currently facing a crisis which could evolve in different ways. This crisis affects
the enlargement policy and, consequently, the process of regional cooperation. Different
scenarios of future evolution in the correlation between enlargement and regional cooperation in
the Balkans can be envisage.
(1) The best-case scenario: the EU finds the way out of the crisis soon, resulting in a
strengthening of the Union, as in previous crises, and a positive influence on enlargement policy8.
All Western Balkan countries would begin membership talks, and the Thessaloniki II summit
would be held in 2014, during Greeces EU presidency, to decide on the further strengthening of

8
We can call this the win-win option.

15
instruments to support the integration of the Western Balkans and enlargement. The countries in
the region would be interested and even more active in regional cooperation, strengthening the
Regional Cooperation Council and the Southeast European Cooperation Process, which would
become the voice of the region in the true sense of the word. Bilateral relations would be
improved and many outstanding issues solved etc. Although perhaps it is difficult to bring about,
this would be a win-win scenario, the positive effects would multiply in the EU, the region and
each individual state.
(2) The most negative scenario9 would be a further deterioration of the situation in the EU,
failure to find the right solutions to the crisis (partial disintegration of the eurozone, a further fall
in the growth rate in some countries, increased indebtedness in member states, an upsurge of
nationalism and disputes among the member states, unwillingness to make more profound
institutional changes in the EU towards the federalisation of economic policies etc.). Under such
conditions, interest in enlargement would weaken or temporarily disappear. The process of
accession would slow down or even be suspended. This could also weaken interest in regional
cooperation and the internal situation in the region's countries would deteriorate. Unsolved
bilateral issues would lead to a worsening of bilateral relations. Bilateral disputes and problems
in potential crisis areas (Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Metohija) would
intensify. The RCC would become inactive and would be reduced to the mere service for IPA
MB of the European Commission. The SEECP would hold protocolar meetings without a specific
content, demonstrating no real wish for regional action.
(3) The third scenario10 would be the middle scenario with both negative and positive
effects of the situation in succession. With respect to enlargement and regional cooperation, the
general picture would not be as bleak. The EU would manage to bring the current crisis under
control, however without managing to solve it in a permanent, sustainable manner. While the
enlargement policy would still be officially pursued it would be considerably slower (akin to EU
relations with Turkey or Macedonia at this point). For example, candidate status would be
granted, but the initiation of negotiations would be postponed or would make very slow progress

9
The lose-lose scenario.
10
The lose-win-lose scenario.

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with intermittent opening of specific negotiation chapters, each time with numerous technical or
political conditions being set. Instead of comprehensive enlargement to the region, the EU would
introduce sectoral integration, which, despite its positive effects, would not substitute the
accession process in the long term. Instead of a new EU-Western Balkans summit, ten years after
the Thessaloniki summit, another formal ministerial meeting would be staged. Regional
cooperation would decelerate somewhat.While ongoing processes and projects might be
completed, motivation for new projects would abate and consequently there would be no
substantial support to strengthen the role of the RCC and the SEECP. Though bilateral issues
would be addressed, no significant headway would be made, solutions would be found mainly
thanks to pressure exerted through the integration process.

6.2. Regional cooperation a few proposals to promote cooperation and complementarity

The SEE countries can have no bearing on the course and resolution of the broader crisis
in the EU, their impact on the pace of the Unions enlargement is limited, nevertheless they can
play the key role in promoting and developing regional cooperation. In the medium term, this
could, in turn, facilitate the very process of integration and alleviate problems related to the
region's economic and social situation. The SEE countries must re-assess the results of their
cooperation, try to define a common vision for the region and define the role the SEECP and
RCC will play in forthcoming period.
Within the SEECP or the RCC, the SEE countries could form a separate panel of experts
on regional cooperation and high representatives of the SEECP member states (a wise-men
group) to map out the options in further developing cooperation. This could also be achieved
through broader coordination between the EU, the SEECP and the RCC, assessing the results
achieved in regional cooperation to date, in particular the work of the SEECP. Parallel to the
diplomatic corps, a broader teams of independent experts could be set up, to analyse
achievements in specific fields and make suggestions for the promotion of cooperation. At the
same time, we would also suggest holding several meetings of think tanks and non-governmental
organisations to review the issues involved in promoting regional cooperation.

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 For the present, merging the SEECP and the RCC into one single, stronger organisation
which would actually weaken the current level of regional cooperation seems unrealistic, as it is
highly unlikely that all SEECP member states would back such a move and, as a result, the
present format of multilateral cooperation would peter out and weaken. The merging of the two
organisations might be realistic once all the countries in the region become EU member states or
are well on the road to EU membership, so that the creation of such an organisation would not be
perceived as a substitute for or competition to EU integration. Nevertheless, it is possible for the
SEECP to take joint action on a more active scale even in its current format, to strengthen a
regional sense of belonging and solidarity among member states aimed at creating the
foundations of mutual support on some issues within broader international organisations, the
support of the EU member states in the SEECP to the regions common interests within EU
structures (e.g. regarding future funds for pre-accession activities etc.) and support to the non-EU
member states in the integration process.
Below, we present a number of possible ideas for the promotion of cooperation:
(1) Increasing the pace of the SEECP's work:
- to increase the number of meetings on a ministerial level and among the political directors of
foreign ministries, introducing special ad hoc meetings to exchange views on specific topics
(international issues, economic matters etc.);
- in addition to the usual political issues, each summit should review one aspect in greater
detail (Agenda 2020, economic development, infrastructure, the fight against organised
crime, culture etc.);
- to map out a common work-plan for several chairmanships in major areas (meetings of
defence, interior and transport ministers) to ensure meetings are held regularly; meetings
prepared by specialised working groups under the chairpersons supervision and in
partnership with the RCC Secretariat.
(2) Strengthening SEECP-RCC ties:
- to coordinate the next RCC strategy with the SEECP programme for the same period (a three-
year chairmanship programme as in the case of the EU);
- to improve the RCC's integration as a working secretariat assisting the SEECP's chairperson;

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- to organise separate working meetings of the SEECP countries shortly before RCC
conferences;
- to reinforce EU-SEECP-RCC coordination through concrete components and to use the RCC
Secretariats analytical capacity to prepare thematic summits and ministerial meetings;
- to promote functional cooperation on priority regional issues (e.g. transport infrastructure,
energy, the environment, the investment and business environment).
(3) Greater complementarity between the EU and SEECP/RCC processes:
to coordinate the RCC programme with the pace of the enlargement programme, so that RCC
activities would function as stimulation;
to strengthen the coordination mechanisms between the European Commission and the
SEECP and RCC.
(4) Other suggestions:
- common activities supported by the SEECP and RCC to represent the region across the EU
(visual arts, music, tourism etc.);
- to back the setting up of the Western Balkans Fund within the RCC, modelled after the
Visegrad Fund;
- the SEECP and RCC should actively support the involvement of civil society organisations in
all fields of cooperation.

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND DATA

1. Dimitar Bechev, Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast
Europe, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 8, Number 1, April 2006, pp. 27-
43
2. Dimitar Bechev, Constructing South East Europe: the Politics of Balkan Regional
Cooperation, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 224
3. Ahmet Davutoglu, A Forward Looking Vision for the Balkans, 2011
http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/vision_paper_en1.pdf
4. Milica Delevic, Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans, Paris ISS, Chaillot Paper, No.
104, 2007
5. Andrea Despot / Dusan Reljic / Guenter Seufert, Ten Years of Solitude, German Institute for
International and Security Affairs
http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C16SerbKroat_despot_rlc_srt.pdf
6. Thanos Dokos, Who Lost Greece? The Geopolitical Consequences of the Greek Crisis,
ELIAMEP, February 2012
7. Dimitri Droutsas, speech given at the Centre for European Politics in November 2010
http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/periferiaki_politiki/agenda_2014_en.pdf
8. Dusko Lopandic, Jasminka Kronja, Regional Initiatives and Multilateral Cooperation in the
Balkans, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2010
9. Vassilis Monastiriotis, Quo Vadis Southeast Europe? EU Accession, Regional Cooperation
and the Need for a Balkan Development Strategy, LSE, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece
and Southeast Europe, January 2008, p. 42
10. Regional Cooperation Council, Strategy and Work Programme of the Regional Cooperation
Council for 2011 2013, 2010
http://www.rcc.int/pubs/0/14/strategy-and-work-programme-of-the-regional-cooperation-council-
for-2011-2013
11. Jacques Rupnik (Ed), The Western Balkans and the EU: The Hour of Europe, ISS, Chaillot
Papers No. 126, Paris, 2011
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp126-The_Western_Balkans_and_the_EU.pdf

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