Evidence Case Digests 13, 14 and 15 (January 28, 2017)

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

Facts:
David A. Noveras and Leticia T. Noveras were married on 1988 the Philippines, both migrated to California
and eventually acquired American citizenship. The spouses have different properties in the Philippine and
in the United States. David left the USA and returned to the Philippines while, Leticia executed a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with in Aurora province.
Leticia claimed that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of Davids
father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, in 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia P750,000,
which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that
David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines. David was able to collect P1,790,000 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an
unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair; Leticia filed a petition for divorce in California which
the California Superior Court granted 2005.
In 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC. She relied on the
2003 Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: The
power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; that David and his partner to cease and
desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; that the declaration that all conjugal properties be
forfeited in favor of her children; that David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the
sale of the Sampaloc property; and that the payment of P50,000 and P100,000 litigation expenses.
The RTC dissolved the absolute community properties of both parties; the properties in the Philippines
were awarded to David, while those situated in the U.S. are awarded to Leticia.
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personal status are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of
the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California. Thus, the trial court
considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime
with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for
judicial separation of conjugal property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision by directing the equal division of only
the Philippine properties between the spouses as the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties. Moreover with respect to the common childrens presumptive legitime, the appellate
court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of P520,000.

Issue:
Was the lower court correct in taking judicial notice of a foreign divorce judgement thus treating this case
as a liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes?
Held:
The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the
parties.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. The foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the
trial courts decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute
community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more
than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. while actual abandonment had not been proven, it
is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to
the Philippines to set up his own business.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Liquidation under Article 102 of the Family Code, for the dissolution of the absolute community regime
should apply.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well
as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be
limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their childrens presumptive
legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both
claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where
their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus,
Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit
of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000. incurred in going
to and from the United States may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of P300,000.00
when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement
of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the
Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is
not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in
the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000. or in the respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 182622 September 8, 2010

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY [PLDT], Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO R. PINGOL, Respondent.

Facts:
Respondent Roberto R. Pingol was a maintenance technician hired by PLDT.
On 1999, while still under the employ of PLDT, Pingol was admitted at The Medical City, Mandaluyong City,
for "paranoid personality disorder" due to financial and marital problems.
From September 16, 1999 to December 31, 1999, Pingol was absent from work without official leave.
According to PLDT, notices were sent to him with a stern warning that he would be dismissed from
employment if he continued to be absent without official leave." Despite the warning, he failed to show up
for work. On January 1, 2000, PLDT terminated his services on the grounds of unauthorized absences and
abandonment of office.
In 2004, four years later, Pingol filed a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal and Monetary Claims 6against
PLDT. In his complaint, he alleged that he was hastily dismissed from his employment on January 1, 2000.
In response, PLDT filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that respondents cause of action had
already prescribed as the complaint was filed four (4) years and three (3) months after his dismissal.
Pingol, however, countered that in computing the prescriptive period, the years 2001 to 2003 must not be
taken into account. He explained that from 2001 to 2003, he was inquiring from PLDT about the financial
benefits due him as an employee who was no longer allowed to do his work, but he merely got empty
promises. It could not, therefore, result in abandonment of his claim.
The NLRC in its November 15, 2006 Resolution reversed the LAs resolution and favored Pingol arguing that
the prescriptive period has not yet lapsed.
The CA later on affirmed the NLRC decision.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent Pingol filed his complaint for constructive dismissal and money claims within
the prescriptive period of four (4) years as provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code and three (3) years as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code, respectively.

Held:

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Respondent Pingol posits that the continuous follow-up of his claim with petitioner PLDT from 2001 to 2003
should be considered in the reckoning of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner PLDT, on the other hand, contends that respondent Pingol was dismissed from the service on
January 1, 2000 and such fact was even alleged in the complaint he filed before the LA. He never
contradicted his previous admission that he was dismissed on January 1, 2000. Such admitted fact does
not require proof.

The Court agrees with petitioner PLDT. Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings or in the
course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and these does not require further
evidence to prove them.

Respondent Pingol never made any written extrajudicial demand. Neither did petitioner make any written
acknowledgment of its alleged obligation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. CA and NLRC decisions were reversed.

G.R. No. 182705 July 18, 2014

VICENTE JOSEFA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.

Facts:

On April, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular accident along Ortigas Avenue,
Pasig City.4 As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, three transformers, and other
electrical line attachments were damaged. Upon investigation, respondent Manila Electric Company
discovered that it was the truck with plate number PAK-874 and registered in Josefas name that hit the
electricity post.

Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement cost of the electricity post and its
attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. On September, 1993, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the
truck driver, for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
In defense, Josefa denied that Manoco was his employee when the accident occurred. He also maintained
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of all his
employees.

During trial, Meralco offered the testimonies of six witnesses as well as documentary evidence to
substantiate its claim for damages against Josefa:
Juan Fernandez, Meralcos senior legal investigator, testified that he arrived at the scene of the accident at
around 2:30 p.m. on that fateful day and saw Meralco employees installing a new electricity post. He
interviewed the people in the vicinity who told him that it was the truck that rammed the electricity post.
He thus went to the police station at Caruncho Complex, Pasig City and talked toSPO2 Alexander Galang
who informed him that the owner of the offending vehicle was Josefa. Fernandez also identified and
authenticated the investigation report dated April 21, 1991 summarizing the result of his investigation.
Elmer Albio identified himself as the driver of the jeepney that was involved in the accident. He testified
that a truck suddenly hit the rear of his jeepney while he was driving along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City; he
thus lost control of the jeepney and hit a Nissan car on the other lane of the road. Thereafter, the truck hit
the electricity post.
SPO2 Manuel Valiente testified that he immediately went to the scene of the accident after a concerned
citizen went to the police station and informed him about the accident. However, he could no longer
recall the trucks exact position with reference to the electricity post at the time of his arrival at the scene
of the accident.
Carlos Zapanta, Meralcos supervising accountant, affirmed that Meralco incurred actual damages
totaling P384,846.00. To support his finding, he identified and authenticated two pieces of evidence, the
memorandum dated October 7, 1992 (Exhibit "C") and the document dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit "D").
Exhibit "C" is a letter from Meralcos legal department requesting the accounting department for a
computation of actual damages. On the other hand, Exhibit "D" provides a detailed computation of actual
damages that Meralco allegedly suffered. On cross-examination, Zapanta stated that the computation was
based on "supplementary time sheets," "trip tickets," and other documents provided by Meralcos
distribution office; however, Meralco did not present these documents during trial.
In a decision dated April 10, 2006,the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC
held that Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The RTC ruled that
SPO2 Galangs account of the accident was merely hearsay since he did not personally witness the
incident. It alsodid not give probative value to the police blotter entry dated January 7, 1994 since the
accident had long occurred in 1991. The RTC likewise denied Meralcos claim for actual damages for lack of
evidentiary support.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in disregarding the parties stipulation at the
pre-trial that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that Bautista was Josefas
employee when the accident occurred since Josefa did not specifically deny this material allegation in the
amended complaint. It likewise noted that the sheriffs return stated that Bautista was under Josefas
employ until 1993.

Issue:
Whether it was proven through evidence that truck with plate number PAK-874 hit the electricity post;

Held:
We partially affirm the CAs ruling.
We are aware that the issues before us involve factual questions which require us to review the presented
pieces of evidence before the trial court. While a petition for review on certiorari precludes this Court from
entertaining factual issues, we can review the pieces of evidence, by way of exception, when a conflict
exists in the findings of the RTC and the CA. We see this exceptional situation here and thus examine the
relevant pieces of evidence presented before the trial court.
Contrary to the CAs finding, the parties did not stipulate that the truck hit the electricity post. The pre-trial
order shows that the parties merely agreed that the truck "was involved in an accident on April, 1991 at
along Ortigas Avenue, Rosario, Pasig City." The parties in fact posed the issue of whether the truck rammed
the electricity post as one of the factual questions to be resolved by the trial court during the pre-trial
conference.
We also agree with Josefa that Fernandez and SPO2 Galangs testimonies regarding the truck hitting the
electricity post are hearsay and should not be given credence. Fernandez and SPO2 Galang merely
testified and conveyed to the court matters only narrated to them by other people who were not presented
in court. Hearsay evidence has no probative value because it is merely the witness recitation of what
someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. A witness can testify only to those facts which are
derived from his own perception.
Nonetheless, Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the
electricity post through Abios testimony. Abio categorically stated during trial that he saw the truck hit the
electricity post. We find his first-hand account of the incident during the direct examination frank and
straightforward. More importantly, Josefa failed to impeach the veracity of Abios testimony during the
cross-examination. Abio even reiterated that it was Josefas truck that rammed the electricity post. 40 We
thus give full faith and credence to his positive, unrebutted, and categorical declaration on the witness
stand, made under solemn oath, that it was the truck that caused damage to Meralcos property.
Even without Abios testimony, it does not escape this Courts attention that Josefa judicially admitted in
his motions and pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. In a motion to dismiss dated March 17,
1997, Josefa stated:
"1. This action was commenced by plaintiff to recover from defendant the sum of P384,846.00 as actual
damages resulting from the vehicular mishap which occurred on April 21, 1991 along Ortigas Avenue,
Rosario, Pasig City, Metro Manila, whereby defendants dump truck with plate No. PAK 874 hit and bumped
plaintiffs 45-foot wooden pole; "
Josefa further pleaded in his petition before this Court:
Nowhere in the records was it shown how and why the accident occurred on April, 1991.
In the absence of any description on such important aspect, fault or negligence cannot be properly
imputed to petitioner, simply because his truck bumped into Meralcos electricity post. The causal
connection between the petitioners supposed negligence and the damage was not shown. Neither was it
proved tobe the proximate cause of the damage.
These statements constitute deliberate, clear and unequivocal admissions of the causation in fact between
the truck and the electricity post. Judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course
of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to
prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 44 A party who judicially admits a fact
cannot later challenge this fact for the reason that judicial admissions remove an admitted fact from the
field of controversy.
In turn, the employees negligence established to be the proximate cause of the damage would give rise to
the disputable presumption that the employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of the erring employee.
Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of his employment relations with Bautista in the
absence of proof that his truck was used without authorization or that it was stolen when the accident
occurred.
Since the documents that support actual damages presented by Meralco were not authenticated in court
during trial, we cannot give weight to the amount of actual damages for being hearsay. The constitutes
hearsay evidence. Meralco however, is entitled to temperate damages because there is no doubt that it
suffered pecuniary loss as a result of Bautista and Josefas negligence.
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Vicente Josefa is ordered to pay respondent Manila Electric
Company the amount of P200,000.00 as temperate damages with legal interest at 6% per annum from the
promulgation of this decision until full payment has been effected.