In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.

, the Supreme Court explicated this way:

An essential element of these freedom is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
Q What is the rationale behind the right to information? Explain.
ANS: The twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of
the government, as well as to provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the
government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say,
even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are
also essential to hold public officials at all time x x x accountable to the people, for unless citizens have the
proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy. (Chavez v. PEA; Chavez v. NHA, et al., G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007).
Q State the nature of the right of the people to information and exceptions.
ANS: Section 28, Article II compels the State and its agencies to fully disclose all of its transactions involving public
interest. Thus, the government agencies, without need of demand from anyone, must bring into public view
all the steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction and the contents of the
perfected contract. Such information must pertain to definite propositions of the government, meaning official
recommendations or final positions reached on the different matters subject of negotiation. The government
agency, however, need not disclose intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory
stage. The limitation also covers privileged communication like information on military and diplomatic secrets;
information affecting national security; information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies
before the prosecution of the accused; information on foreign relations, intelligence, and other classified
information. (Chavez v. NHA, et al., G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007).
It is unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the 1987 Constitution, there is still
no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the compulsory duty of the government agencies to disclose
information on government transactions. Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see the light of day if
and when Congress decides to approve the proposed Freedom of Access to Information Act. In the
meantime, it would suffice that government agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents incorporating
the information on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and the agreements themselves,
and if finances permit, to upload said information on their respective websites for easy access by interested
parties. Without any law or regulation governing the right to disclose information, the NHA or any of the
respondents cannot be faulted if they were not able to disclose information relative to the SMDRP to the public
in general.
Q What is the other aspect of the peoples right to know? Explain.
ANS: The other aspect of the peoples right to know apart from the duty to disclose is the duty to allow access to
information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution. The gateway to information
opens to the public the following: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions; and (3) government research data used as a basis for policy development. (Chavez
v. NHA, et al., G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007).
Q Distinguish the duty to disclose information from the duty to permit access to information.
ANS: There is no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of information as this is mandatory under
the constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available. On the other hand, the interested party must first
request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents and papers in the particular agency. A
request or demand is required; otherwise, the government office or agency will not know of the desire of the
interested party to gain access to such papers and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which
embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications
and public documents of the government agency. (Chavez v. NHA, et al., G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007).

1
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO
OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL
CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information
and pray that respondent be directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or

(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
(Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:

June 4, 1986

Hon. Feliciano Belmonte

GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila

Sir:

As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We
understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be
furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.

If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?

2
 We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of
the present regime.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on
the matter.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE

[Rollo, p. 7.]

To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:

June 17, 1986

Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City

Dear Compaero:

Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President &
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of
June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve
this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
unless so ordered by the courts.

As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial
institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO

Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for
failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.

3
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct
interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by
the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]

Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The
parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is
that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that
since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.

To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled
to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case
falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he
is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for
reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject
to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106
Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v.
Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the
regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal
question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of
whether or not mandamus hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in
pursuance of their right to information.

We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of
whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional right to
information. In Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's
constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned
to act as prayed for by the petitioners.

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:

4
 The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative
to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government
envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of
power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits
of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the
people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of
public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to
the Constitution.

Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the
accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical,
but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are
not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of
these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government
and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when
the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can
such bear fruit.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to
say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of
the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.

Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the
people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public
interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public
concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra, at p. 542.]

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As
observed in Legazpi:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public. [Ibid. at p. 541]

5
In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was the need
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citezens.
In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang
Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the
February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable
to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines
assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the
necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second
Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to
grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these
funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were above board.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.

Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued
that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.

Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should
be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution
and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the
ambit of the right to information.

There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v.
Mutuc[130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:

... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. UItimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute. state,
6
 In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has
become increasingly important as modem society has developed. All the forces of technological
age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy
and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave
of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-
445.]

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights
need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the
right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like
the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar
College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would
have no such ground for relief.

Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers.
The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA.
219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked only
by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.

It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if
they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more
limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny
[Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx,
211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature
and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which
guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions" only.

It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside
the coverage of the people's right of access to official records.

It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then
its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to
information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

First of all, the "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484
and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people.

Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.

7
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of fun
public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).

Commissioner Suarez is recognized.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?

MR. OPLE. Very gladly.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions"

referring to the transactions of the State and when we say the "State" which I
suppose would include all of the various agencies, departments, ministries and
instrumentalities of the government....

MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.

MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished

from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to
the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the
contract itself?

MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it
can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the

consummation of the transaction.

MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.]

(Emphasis supplied.)

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the
8
end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may
be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.]
The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the
list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able
to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos."

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi
v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August
27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the
part of respondent to prepare the list requested.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government
Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans
granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable
regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem
necessary.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:
Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the
list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a
clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished
with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection
herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General
Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS,
Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between
the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach
this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e
are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue
our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte,
Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo
Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil
action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents

9
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for
the subject information.

Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by
Imelda Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa.

Held: The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 states that "The right
of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." An informed citizenry with access
to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the
free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government
envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and
institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a
public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information
of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation
adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is
merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking
abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public
concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the
State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear
that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Herein, the information sought by Valmonte,
et. al. is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the 7 February
1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. In sum, the
public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. However, a second
requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. On this
matter, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of the petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power. Although it may be true that when the information requested
from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights
to information and to privacy may arise. Such competing interests of these rights need not be
resolved in the present case. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity,
and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked
by juridical entities like the GSIS. Thus, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager,
Belmonte, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and

10
hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be
observed, however, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to
invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate
and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. In fine, Valmonte, et. al. are entitled to access to the
documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter
may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or
loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may
be insured.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]

GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS ARE LIKEWISE SUBJECT TO THE

PRINCIPLE OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. - Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further
that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and
third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT THE
RIGHT TO DEMAND COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE INSPECTED. - However, the same
cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list
of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information or matters of public concern.

11
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

CORTES, J.:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil
action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed
by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information,
petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to
disclose said information.

This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to information. The
same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April
24,1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section
6) was invoked in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory
right to information provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by
a newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register
of Deeds for the purpose of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80
Phil. 383 [1948]).

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights,
Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the
1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development." The new provision reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

12
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it
cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty
under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter.
Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He challenges
the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be
informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged
failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that
there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner
in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be
enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is
asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service
eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in
whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been
held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24,
1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and
therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those
who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll
records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No.
496, as amended). In the words of the Court:

* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every

person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character
in the particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted
distinction. *** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).

13
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction
of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.

2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional
regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield
individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5).
Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold
individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the
citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly
mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in
addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy
of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28
thereof, to wit:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).

In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an
imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We granted mandamus in
said case, and in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:

* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters
of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should
be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada
v. Tuvera, supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied).

The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of public records,
specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records.
It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted
before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the
Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy
records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are
confined to:

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books
14
 and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled
to make inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the
manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for
his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the
Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We
absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon
the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate the
manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made
between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority
to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of
access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The
second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate
access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the
same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner
is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition
of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of
general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving
them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open
every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject
to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt
certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90,
September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It
follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the
nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not
being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore,
whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information.
However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access.
In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is

15
not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of
the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the
government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard
Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ
of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public.

The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate notice to the
public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta,
supra, the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate
transactions which some believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees
that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly
declares as a State policy that:

Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).

Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case,
the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under
the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of
sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said
position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

16
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin
and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Legaspi Vs. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987Cortes, J.

Facts: Valentin L. Legaspi invoked his fundamental right to information against the Civil Service
Commission for denying his request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
They allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles for sanitarians. Hence, petitioner
prayed for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information. However, the Solicitor General interposed. He challenged
the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal
righto be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He
calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this
particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be furnished a copy of the civil service eligibles.

Held: Yes. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law (III, Sec. 7 of the
1987Constitution). The court further ruled that it becomes apparent that when a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied
by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which
possesses the right.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]

AGENCIES CAN ONLY REGULATE THE MANNER OF INSPECTION, BUT MAY NOT PROHIBIT ACCESS. -
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without
discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the
Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which
persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands.
However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

. . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to
make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to
regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza
vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was
filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal
17
docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had
allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In
effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of
examining the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority
to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A
distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to
a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be
afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which
only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the
government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is
to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the
exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta,
supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by
the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical
exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.

18
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of
Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court, committed
an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he
would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the
Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or registration
of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No.
141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems
unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor in
interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and
19
that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of
registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such
benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession
at least since July 26, 1894. This, the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not
have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit between
vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of
the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the application
filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

OH CHO, applicant and appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor andappellant.[No.
48321. August 31, 1946]

FACTS:

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on
his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain. The applicant, who is an
alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the lot from 1880 to the filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that maybe confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the
lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrees
promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under
the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the applicant is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the provisions of
the Public Land Act (C. A. No, 141)?

RULING:

No. Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
(sections 48, 49, C. A. No. 141).The sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null
and void. Judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

20
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.

Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in
toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for
confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the applicants
Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan
AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq.
m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The
applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes
thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed
the application on the grounds that:

1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire
ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by any
of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal
grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or
adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion
possessoria' or possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any
other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.

2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application.

3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15,
Rollo.)

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and
included the following allegation:

21
 Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the
benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16,
Rollo.)

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein
private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public,
continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership
for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced
improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land
into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as
timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more
valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural

land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government
and not of the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA
141, as amended.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the
courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but
the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave
error and/or abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1)
the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of
Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as
forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas,
56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41
Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the
22
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA
210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest
lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because
of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding
the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in LRC Cad.
Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR,
respondents. G.R. No. 83609; October 26, 1989

Facts: On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the
registration of two parcels of land, located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They
claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau
of Forest Development opposed the application on the ground that said parcels of land were part
of a timberland, a public dominion, so it cannot be the subject of the registration
proceedings. After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names
of the applicants, herein private respondents after finding that the applicants and their
predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than 80
years. The CA affirmed the CFIs decision, holding that the classification of the lots as
timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are
indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10).

Issue/s: Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can ripen to
private ownership.

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. It emphasized that a positive act of the government, particularly the Executive
Department is needed to declassify land, which is classified as forest, and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes before registration of which may
proceed. The Court, citing various cases, stated that a parcel of forestland is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, an office under the Executive Department, and beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. In the present
case, the two parcels of land were not declared by the Executive Department to be alienable and
disposable, thus it cannot be registered under private ownership.

23
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ,
LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the
then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as Lot
2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and
has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents have converted
it into a fishpond.

In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed
that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by
purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is
assessed for taxation purposes in their names.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the
application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan,
per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as
forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed
on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject
parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application"
and are, therefore, entitled to registration. It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely devoted to
fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands. "

Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public
land; and (2) whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.

The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region of Obando,
Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March 1, 1927. 1 No evidence has been submitted that the
land has been released or subsequently classified despite an Indorsement, dated November 17, 1976, of the
District Forester, to the Director of Forest Development, containing the following recommendation:

24
 Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be within the Unclassified Region of
Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot
inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, it disclosed that the same was devoid of
any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. Two
houses of light materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.

In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the investment introduced therein this
Office believes that the release is in order,

Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance with the Public Land Law. 2

The Government's case is meritorious.

In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category,
which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative
of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the
land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be
so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 5

The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not
the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject
property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State
considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped
by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact.

While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that an
lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding
merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon
claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it
would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 7

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it,
does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of
the property from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands
around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification
of the land in question.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the application for registration in Land Registration Case
No. N299-V-76 of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed, without
prejudice to the availment by the applicants of the proper administrative remedy. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part

25
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ,
LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA, respondents. G.R. No. L-58867;
June 22, 1984

Facts: In May 10, 1976, Antonio Valeriano et al., hereinafter referred to as the respondents, filed
their application for the registration of a parcel of land, connected to a river and which they have
converted into fishponds, in the CFI of Bulacan. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that
the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan and that areas within the
unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and
alienable portion of the public domain. After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the
subject land in favor of the applicants (respondents), which the CA affirmed basing from the
evidence that the applicants predecessors-in- interest have been in open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse possession of the parcel of land for more than 30 years. The CA further
opined that since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot
not be categorized as part of forestlands, thus this case.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Courts can reclassify public lands.

Ruling: No. In its decision, the SC commented that the CFI and CAs approval for the registration
of the subject land in effect released such property from the unclassified category, which is
beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Court further emphasized the rule
stating that classification or reclassification of public lands is an exclusive right vested to the
Executive Department of the Government and not to the Judiciary and in the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition.

26