Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No.

135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on
the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain
as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated
again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA
law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian
doctrine.

Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (2000)

Petitioners: Isagani Cruz
Respondents: Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Topic: Territory, People, and Government - Territory

SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) or RA 8371 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). However, due to a tie vote (7-7) after due
deliberation and re-deliberation, the petition was dismissed. (Thus, the separate opinions are more important in this
case).

FACTS: See issues.

ISSUE/S:
Most important issue: WoN Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 57, and 58 of RA 8371/IPRA and its IRR are
unconstitutional for unlawfully depriving the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain, minerals, and
other natural resources therein, violating the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO.
Said provisions affirming the ownership by indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by
virtue of native title (definition: lands held in private ownership since time immemorial) do not diminish the States
ownership of lands within the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as private
land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cario v. Insular
Government.
Section 3(a) does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the ICCs/IPs.
Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
Section 57 only grants priority rights to ICCs/IPs in the utilization of natural resources and not absolute
ownership thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under
existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither does the
grant of said rights exclude non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral
domains upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency.
o Justice Puno: NO.
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and
belong to the ICCs/IPs. The classification of lands in the public domain under Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor ancestral domains. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral
lands only. Both modes presume or recognize the land as private and not public.
The right of ownership to ancestral domain under Section 7(a) involves lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains, not waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Ownership therefore of natural resources remain with the
State.
Small-scale utilization of resources in Section 7(b) is also allowed under paragraph 3, section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.
 Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of RA 8371/IPRA is allowed under
paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution since only priority rights (which does not necessarily
mean ownership rights) are given to ICCs/IPs.
However, by including natural resources, Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond
Section 7(a) and therefore unconstitutional.
o Justice Panganiban: YES.
Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain encompasses natural resources found therein], and 3(b)
[defines ancestral lands as those possessed by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial] contravene Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, which declares that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals, and natural resources
none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In addition, mere possession or utilization of land,
however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.
IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to ancestral lands and domains.
IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the States power under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution of full control of
natural resources in ancestral lands and ancestral domains in favor of ICCs/IPs, who may exercise these rights
without any time limit. In addition, they are also given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources under Section 7(b), a right vested by the Constitution only to the State.
o Justice Vitug: YES. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to
an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country and
its patrimony
WoN Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, violate the due process clause of the Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is
incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article
XII of the Constitution.
o Justice Puno: Not discussed.
o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have
been injured by these provisions.
o Justice Vitug: YES, but only on making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows
Congress to provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains. I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law
that would simply express that customary laws shall govern and end it there. No discussion on the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP.
WoN Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that
the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination, infringes upon the Presidents power of
control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under
the Office of the President, and therefore under the Presidents control and supervision with respect to its
administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers
are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC.
o Justice Puno: Not discussed.
o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have
been injured by these provisions.
o Justice Vitug: Not discussed.
NOTES:
Seven Justices voted to dismiss the petitions
o Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago
join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
o Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception
of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
o Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven Justices voted to grant the petition
o Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58,
59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have
been violated by the IPRA.
o Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justice Vitug also mentioned that the petitioners have standing to raise the issue, as it is of
transcendental importance.
o Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
DENR et al VS. YAP et al
NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ
DENR et al VS. YAP et al

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and
others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June
12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on
them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of
private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in
their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest,
which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The
OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced.
Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004,
the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions

ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose
and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto
considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification
modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable
land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.

NOTES:

1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a
time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber,
and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or
were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.

2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value
for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge
that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof
in each particular case

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded
land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of
lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the
other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal
status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by
beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from
public forest to alienable agricultural land.

3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from
the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the
loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack
of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps
to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original
registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to
exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the
House of Representatives.

SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP

Facts

The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibos decision to grant the petition for declaratory relief filed by Boracay
Mayor Jose Yap et al. to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the
land they have been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Later in 2006, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).

Issue

Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.

Ruling

The SC ruled against Yap et al. and Sacay et al.

Yes, because the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay
Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926,
and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable
land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land
possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.

It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with
respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

Republic of the Philippines v Alexander Lao, GR No. 150413, July 1, 2003

Facts:

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She allegedly acquired the
land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa
Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto
Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land
Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She
presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property
and tax declarations in her and her predecessors names. The court approved the application. The petitioner
represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court
decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to
warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts of
possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the qualifications required by law on
the manner of possession (continuous, adverse, notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to
have a bonafide claim of ownership under C.A. 141?

Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable
land of the public domain?

Ruling:

The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the
applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the
respondent did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time
required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest started occupying the
property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous owners was shown and she did not show any
relationship between the parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She further did not present any certification
from appropriate government agency to show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of
the public domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these incontrovertible evidences
to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the
petition was granted and her application was denied.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS Case Digest

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment
and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES,
Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in
the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on
March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be
declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore
and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP
to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon
appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit
the Philippine mineral resources.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign
owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources.
By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no
longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire
over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at
the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely
the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation
in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral
resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or
operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the
nations mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained
60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some
parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or
financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself
is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit,
utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the
same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel
necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership
over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These
stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to
avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine
Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of
our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance
contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and regulations
insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State retains the
power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of
full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance
of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or
given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

LA BUGAL-BLAAN VS RAMOS (GR NO. 127882 DECEMBER 1, 2004)

La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association Inc. vs Ramos
GR No. 127882 December 1, 2004

Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic
Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR
Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995,6 executed by the government with
Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its
Decision granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as
well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are
service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar
to service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal
scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive
management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered;
control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the
products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial
ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII)
effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. In
a Resolution dated March 9, 2004, the Court required petitioners to comment thereon. In the Resolution of June 8,
2004, it set the case for Oral Argument on June 29, 2004.

Issue: Whether or not the FTAA issued were valid.

Held: Yes. The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of those members who spoke out and not the
views of the majority who remained silent should be clarified. We must never forget that those who spoke out were
heard by those who remained silent and did not react. If the latter were silent because they happened not to be
present at the time, they are presumed to have read the minutes and kept abreast of the deliberations. By
remaining silent, they are deemed to have signified their assent to and/or conformity with at least some of the
views propounded or their lack of objections thereto. It was incumbent upon them, as representatives of the entire
Filipino people, to follow the deliberations closely and to speak their minds on the matter if they did not see eye to
eye with the proponents of the draft provisions.

In any event, each and every one of the commissioners had the opportunity to speak out and to vote on the matter.
Moreover, the individual explanations of votes are on record, and they show where each delegate stood on the
issues. In sum, we cannot completely denigrate the value or usefulness of the record of the ConCom, simply
because certain members chose not to speak out.

However, it is of common knowledge, and of judicial notice as well, that the government is and has for many many
years been financially strapped, to the point that even the most essential services have suffered serious
curtailments education and health care, for instance, not to mention judicial services have had to make do
with inadequate budgetary allocations. Thus, government has had to resort to build-operate-transfer and similar
arrangements with the private sector, in order to get vital infrastructure projects built without any governmental
outlay.

The drafters whose ranks included many academicians, economists, businessmen, lawyers, politicians and
government officials were not unfamiliar with the practices of foreign corporations and multinationals.

Neither were they so nave as to believe that these entities would provide assistance without conditionalities or
some quid pro quo. Definitely, as business persons well know and as a matter of judicial notice, this matter is not
just a question of signing a promissory note or executing a technology transfer agreement. Foreign corporations
usually require that they be given a say in the management, for instance, of day-to-day operations of the joint
venture. They would demand the appointment of their own men as, for example, operations managers, technical
experts, quality control heads, internal auditors or comptrollers. Furthermore, they would probably require seats on
the Board of Directors all these to ensure the success of the enterprise and the repayment of the loans and other
financial assistance and to make certain that the funding and the technology they supply would not go to waste.
Ultimately, they would also want to protect their business reputation and bottom lines.

Sotto v Sotto (none)

Legarda vs. Saleeby

FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of
Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on
the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.

Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of
the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the
original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the
defendant also included said wall.

On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to
them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties.

The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendants land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

HELD: The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the
defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not
appear and oppose it

Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying
that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same
registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by
simply including it in a petition for registration?
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of titles under the
Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like
the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered
in the name of two different persons.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest
certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original
certificate to an innocent purchaser. The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or
interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to
hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be
protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The
record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land
court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in
including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in
all other duplicate certificates issued.

October 2, 1915 G.R. No. L-8936 CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. D.R. Williams for appellee. JOHNSON,
J.:

FACTS: Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila . Between their lots is a
stone wall which is located on the lot of the plaintif fs. On March 2, 1906, Consuelo and her husband presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration to register their lot. The registration was allowed on Oct ober 25, 1906.
They were then issued an original certificate and the title was r egistered. Both included the wall. On March 25,
1912, the predecessor of N.M. Saleeby presented a petition in the C ourt of Land Registration for registration. The
court decreed the registration o f the land which also included the wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, her
husband, discovered that the wall has also been registered to N.M. Saleeby. They presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for adjustment and c orrection of the error where the wall was indicated in both registrations.
Howev er, the lower court contended that during the pendency of the petition for the r egistration of the
defendant s land, they failed to make any objection to the regist ration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the defendant.

ISSUE: WON the defendant is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

RULING: NO. The lower court s decision would call for the plaintiffs to be always al ert and see to it that no other
parties will register the wall and its land. Els e, if they spotted someone registering such wall in their own name,
plaintiff mu st immediately oppose. Such would become defeat the real purpose of the Torrens system of land
registration. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at th e time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent theret o. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registe red the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals o f the court, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. So who owns the land? According to Torrens system, the
plaintiffs. Under our law, once a party registers the land, final and in good faith, no thir d parties may claim interest
on the same land. The rights of all the worlda re fore closed by the decree of registration. The registration, under
the Torrens system, d oes not give the owner any better title than he had. The registration of a parti cular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the sam e parties. It is a notice to the world and no one can
plead ignorance of the reg istration. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes an d the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree tha t in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name o f two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
The presumption is t hat the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. T his
presumption is IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or g ood faith. Otherwise the very
purpose and object of the law requiring a record w ould be destroyed. The rule is that all persons must take notice
of the facts wh ich the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation.

DECISION: Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The wall and the land where it sits is awarded to the plaintiffs.
Capitol Subdivisions vs. Province of Negros Oriental
7 SCRA 60 (1963)

FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name
of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of
the aforementioned in 1916.

Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of
P300,000, payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then
later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to
the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.

These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot
378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000,
payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full payment.

Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which
completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title
covering Lot 378 was issued.

It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take
possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease.

For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat
emptor stipulation.

When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda
and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations
with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given by
said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through
expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began the construction of the provincial
hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title was never
transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there
and that he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned expropriation
proceedings.

HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title over
Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been consummated.

First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication
in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of
the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not
have been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the
expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which would not
have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been
expropriated without the Banks knowledge and participation.
Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it
was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.

Director of Lands vs. Santiago

MARCH 25, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
Director of Lands vs. Santiago

G.R. No. L-41278

April 15, 1988

FACTS: this is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of the respondent Judge, and
mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioners Motion for New Trial. The petitioner
also prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporations application for registration.

On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of
the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed
an opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the
Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant
from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application.
Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago.

A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that a party who
failed to appear would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and
posted by the sheriff as required by law.

On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general
default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the applicant
before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor
of the respondent corporation.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to appear at the
initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however
denied.

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions:

1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent
corporation,

2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

3. Denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial.;

HELD: The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and the Order denying the
Motion for New Trial, the Decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant
thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporations subject application for land
registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent corporations application for
registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is
registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the
respondent corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.

First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation purchased the subject
lots, have pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria
Garcia herself. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the
same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the applications were submitted.
Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private respondents were
conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital fact)

More than anything else, however, registration in this instance can not be granted on the basis of Section 48,
paragraph b, of the Public Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain.
It appears from Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject landswere forest
lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The respondent Garcia
and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over
the subject lands. An examination of the dates will show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on
October 24, 1971, was done after the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.

The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on substantial grounds, having been
formally filed prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking
cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the
day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against the petitioner was patently invalid because when
the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer.
The pertinent provision of law which states: If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court
may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be
recorded , cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long
been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust

Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to
be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicants evidence and set another date for the
reception of the oppositors evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been
accorded ample opportunity to establish the governments claim.

3. The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial, ignored the established rule that courts
should be liberal in setting aside a default judgment. The Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could have
restored their standing in court and given them an even chance to face their opponents.

Tthe Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case which would only prolong the
litigation unnecessarily, for as it said in a recent case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither reception
of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before on
the records before it.

In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the State, courts must scrutinize
with care applications to private ownership of real estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed; the
tax declarations and plans submitted by the private respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the allegations in
the petitioners opposition to the application were so casually ignored.

NOTES:

1. The respondent corporation maintains that the appropriate remedy in this instance is appeal, which is expressly
provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and not certiorari. In Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation
vs. Vallejos the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine that appeal is not an adequate remedy where a party is
illegally declared in default. Thus, it stated:

The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule (i.e. Sec. 2, Rule 41) is properly, though not exclusively, available
to a defendant who has been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a defendant who has been illegally
declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the
judgment by default set aside as a nullity.

2. Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

Vda de Barroga vs. Albano, 157 SCRA 131

FACTS: CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the oppositors was
Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the decree of registration did not
issue except until after the lapse of 14 years or so (October 14, 1955). It was only after 24 years
(November 17, 1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquino's name.

1970 - after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor,
the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit
against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino appellees Angel Albano,
et al.
Barroga et.al.: had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; they prayed that
Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled and that a new title be made out in their names.

Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion of an adjoining Lot 9822, belonging to
Cesar Castro. Castro filed complaint in intervention for the recovery thereof.

CFI: DISMISSED Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-
meter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino's title.

The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's
suit for recovery of Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral
proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the former's
predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The
judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the title to
the thing.

On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ
of possession as regards Lot No. 9821. Writ of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga and
Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano,
et al.

They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued.

Their argument: as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion
for writ of possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not they can be ejected.

HELD: Yes. The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that
had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe
pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot, It also declared that
the segregation of the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had no
effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which was the appropriate process for the
enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Conformably with the established axioms set out in
the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled
to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the
title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced
against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a party
in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the
land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many
years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to the
cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the
controversy long enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so.

MALABANAN v REPUBLIC

FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-
Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather and upon his death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. Part of
this property was later sold to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification. The RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA reversed the RTC
ruling and dismissed the application.

ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the
filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the
Civil Code?

HELD: The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b)
merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must
also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe
Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive
clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529)

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified
as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters.

Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than
thirty (30) years.

Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sonsthe fourth
being Aristedess grandfather.

Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.

Malabanan presented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the CENRO-DENR, which
stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan The Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan.

CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) any period of possession prior
to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession.

CA noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. (Interpretation of CA of Section 14(1) was based on the Courts ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto)

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the CA; it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court

Petitioners rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit (handed down just 4 months prior to Herbieto) - with respect to
agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted
in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree
.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct
interpretation of the provision.

The OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable as of 12 June 1945.

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
o According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been
converted into private property through prescription.

The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State
refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands.

The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

DISCUSSION: Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further
classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for
public and quasi-public uses.

Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants
that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

o The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.

Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class
than only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the
Public Land Act has remained in effect.

Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree
warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed , may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

It is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been
in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act (amended by
Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002) limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under
Section 48.

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter : Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting
under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.

The substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020. The OSG has
adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have
been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended.

Discussed in Naguit. adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed .

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the
land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the
notice of initial hearing. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence
submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein
had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2)

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential
rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With such conversion, such property may
now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original
registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It
reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible
to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership
of timber or mineral lands Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to
or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession
period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30)
years. The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification what c onsists of
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421.

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the
object of prescription Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of
public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted
law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial
be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative. As the
application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil
Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property
can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Section 14(1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.

Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public
Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the
Civil Code. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on
thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription.
But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal
next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of
property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.

SYNTHESIS OF DOCTRINES APPLIED: (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51] (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying
with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a)
Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property
by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at
least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES: Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.

While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is
no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article
422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it
is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED.