DE LA LLANA VS ALBA (Copied)

GR No. L-57883
12 March 1982

FACTS

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was
assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of
the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can
remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE

Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute
(BP 129)

HELD

Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence
to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation
of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that
its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is
sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from
any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice
of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is
to be preferred.