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Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook 68
INTRODUCTION Second, this paper will critically examine the Archipelago
Outlook concept, especially with the intention of ascertaining
As the pivotal state1 in Southeast Asia, Indonesia uses maritime the extent to which it applies to Indonesias external maritime
diplomacy as a means of establishing cooperative regional settings. It will argue that while the Archipelago Outlook remains
relationships, thereby achieving two objectives: first, ensuring an identity for Indonesia as a unitary state, it provides little if
its security; and secondby actively resolving its border any guidance for Indonesia to manoeuvre through the current
disputesdemonstrating its leadership credentials to mediate geopolitical landscape characterised by competition between
interstate boundary disputes in the region. Lacking sea power the major maritime powers.
capable of projecting its maritime interests and securing its
borders, the alternative of using maritime diplomacy reduces Third, in light of an increasingly challenging maritime strategic
the causes of insecurity, thus augmenting Indonesias national environment, we then speculate how Indonesia may designate
security. Indonesias management of its border disputes is a its east/west archipelagic sea lanes, particularly in terms of the
classic example of implementing preventive diplomacy in the opportunities and vulnerabilities they pose.
management of regional issues that involve or threaten military
conflict; such an approach significantly bolsters its claim to Fourth, the paper describes Indonesias strategic maritime
regional leadership. environment beyond the scope of the Archipelago Outlook with
reference to the presence and role of major powers in the region
This paper analyses how a rising Indonesia may redefine the and the implications of their maritime projections for the security
security of its maritime domain in light of the increasingly assertive of Indonesias ASLs and choke-points.
presence of major powers in the sea-lanes of East and Southeast
Asia. While much analysis of Indonesias maritime security is Fifth, in the conclusion we explain how Indonesia attempts
viewed through the lens of the Archipelago Outlook (Wawasan to shape, influence, and adapt to the prevailing strategic
Nusantara), which emphasises the importance of national unity environment: specifically, how Indonesia will deal with the
and territorial integrity, the current geopolitical situation in the increasingly intertwined interests of major powers and the
region, characterised by the rise of maritime powers in Asia and implications of that complexity for the security of Indonesias
beyond, has increasingly made Indonesias archipelagic sea- maritime domain.
lanes (ASLs) and its associated maritime choke-points (Malacca,
Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits) critical, and therefore
consequential to its foreign policy strategic planners. Not only ARCHIPELAGO OUTLOOK: THE
are ASLs a crucial factor in global trade, but even more so than EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT
in previous decades they are becoming the flashpoints for the
projection of maritime power. The consequences and therefore Indonesians often refer to their archipelago as the cross-road
the contention of this paper is that Indonesia will take incremental location (posisi silang) between the Indian and Pacific Oceans
steps to re-orient its diplomatic, legal, and security focus and between the Asian and Australian continents,2 emphasising
towards meeting potential external maritime challenges. This is that geographical position should be viewed not only in terms
a fundamental issue to address as it will shape and influence the of physical location, but also in terms of perceptions of status,
evolution of Indonesias ascending power. power and national aspirations. The geopolitics of Indonesia is
informed by its national identity and its aspirations. For example,
The research we embark upon is important for several reasons. considering its archipelagic nature, Indonesia is a maritime
First, while much of the literature has explained Indonesias nation, although much less a seafaring one. The Archipelagic
inward-looking strategic psyche in descriptive terms, little Outlook constitutes the self-identity of Indonesia as based on
attention has been given to the countrys outward-looking territorial integrity stretching from Sabang to Merauke (dari
orientation. With the rise of China and India, compounded Sabang sampai Merauke).3
by the United States pivot to Asia with the aim of reinforcing
its status as the regions principal strategic actor, Indonesias
geopolitical calculus has become more convoluted, especially
in the maritime domain. Our research will be the first attempt
to chart out Indonesias strategic maritime environment in the
post-Suharto era.
1 The qualities of the Republic of Indonesia, the worlds fourth most populous
country, the largest democracy in the Muslim world, and geo-strategically,
Southeast Asias most significant state give it the attributes of a pivotal state.
According to the authors of an influential study, a pivotal state is geo-strategically
important state to the United States and its allies, and its importance is attributed
to its ability not only to determine the success or failure of its region but also 2 Evan Laksmana, The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesias Geopolitical
significantly affect international stability, See Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Architecture, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region Vol.1, No.1, (2011), p. 96.
Kennedy eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. policy in the 3 Sabang and Merauke are respectively Indonesias westernmost and
Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc 1999), pp: 6 and 9. easternmost cities located in the Provinces of Aceh and Papua.
4 Leonard C. Sebastian, Domestic Security Priorities, Balance of Interests 6 See Michael Leifer, Indonesias Foreign Policy, cited in Leonard C.
and Indonesias Management of Regional Order, in Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf Sebastian, Domestic Security Priorities, Balance of Interests and Indonesias
Emmers, eds., Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Management of Regional Orderop.cit, p. 54.
Leifer, (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 178. 7 Ibid.
5 Hasyim Djalal, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, (Jakarta: Center for 8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
Strategic and International Studies, 1995). U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook 70
ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES, MARITIME Organization (IMO)12 in 1996 during the 67th meeting of the
Maritime Safety Commission (MSC67). Three related institutions
BOUNDARIES, AND CHOKE-POINTS and 22 states provided their responses, with a majority of states
Archipelagic waters fall within the sovereignty of a state commenting on the lack of eastwest ASLs. The proposal was
reconsidered in order to address these concerns, but Indonesia
regardless of the breadth of distance between its islands.9 In
subsequently failed to implement a plan that included eastwest
Indonesias case, for example, there are no longer high seas
ASLs. In its London proposal to MSC69 Indonesia maintained
between Java and Kalimantan; maritime areas previously
its original position, designating only three northsouth ASLs,
regarded as part of the high seas and which were used for
which were approved by the IMO on 19 May 1998. However,
international navigation now belong exclusively to Indonesia. To
even though Indonesias original ASL submission did not opt for
avoid situations in which such an interpretation would hinder
a partial designation, its proposition was deemed only partially
previous freedom of navigation in archipelagic waters, it was
designated since it did not include all normal passage routes
necessary for Indonesia to designate archipelagic sea lanes. used for international navigation, and in particular because it
ASLs are the trade-off recognised by a state in return for being excluded eastwest ASLs.13 During consultations with other user
granted archipelagic state status and for being able to exercise States namely, the Maritime states prior to the submission,
sovereignty over archipelagic waters. Such an arrangement Australia and the United States specifically proposed possible
allows for compromise between coastal states with growing eastwest ASLs that Indonesia should include in its submission
jurisdiction over maritime areas adjacent to them and other to the IMO, but which it omitted. In making their own proposals
maritime states insisting on retaining their historical right to concerning eastwest ASLs, Australia and the United States
freedom of the seas.10 were motivated by their concern regarding the application of
innocent passage rules to eastwest routes.14
Indonesia determined that the concept of archipelagic sea
lanes would be appropriate to its maritime domain because
the archipelago is located on the major shipping routes
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, although
HOW TO DESIGNATE EASTWEST
designating archipelagic sea lanes in Indonesian waters would SEA-LANES
permit the government to concentrate its efforts on providing In order for detailed rules to be applied regarding the ASLs,
navigational safety and security in relation to foreign vessels, the
Indonesia, Australia and the United States first informally agreed
promulgation of UNCLOS would not permit the government to
on several points called the 19 rules. The 19 rules specifically
prevent foreign vessels transiting through the routes they used
govern the rights and obligations of transiting vessels in
to navigate. From Indonesias perspective, the fact that vessels
Indonesias designated ASLs.15 An important point to deduce
could continue arbitrary transit meant that the security benefits of
from the 19 rules is that in areas where ASLs have yet to be
archipelagic status were not sufficient. Foreign vessels, civilian or
designated, the right of ASLP may be exercised in the relevant
military, remained able to sail through Indonesia waters regarded
archipelagic waters in accordance with the Law of the Sea
sensitive to national security and safety, such as the Java Sea,
located in close proximity to the vast majority of Indonesias Convention, 1982. This stipulates that where ASLs have yet to
population and key economic centres. be designated Indonesia agrees to permit transiting vessels to
navigate through its archipelagic waters along any routes normally
Indonesias effort to implement Archipelagic Sea-lane Passage used for navigation, as specified by Article 53 (12) of UNCLOS.
(ASLP) in its archipelagic waters commenced immediately
subsequent to its ratification of UNCLOS, which culminated in a
National Working Group meeting in Cisarua in early 1995. The
meeting managed to establish consensus on a proposal of three
northsouth ASLs that had been proposed during the Indonesian
Navy Strategic Forum in 1991.11 Puspitawati (2005) has noted
that the proposal was submitted to the International Maritime
Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook 72
OPERATIONALISING ASL DESIGNATION safeguard such a large maritime boundary area, Indonesia would
require substantial resources, but present levels of inventory
To better manage its maritime zones, Indonesias boundary and skilled staff remain woefully inadequate to this task.19 In
administration has to contend with three main issues: addition to this, coordination is also an essential challenge.
1. illegal activities occurring at boundary areas;
2. geospatial/technical issues; and
3. information dissemination.
19 Defence Minister, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, admitted the need to improve
The challenge regarding illegal activities revolves around the need facilities for the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). See: Jurnal Nasional, 22 August
to provide an adequate number of maritime patrol vessels and 2011, Menhan akan Modernisasi Alutsista, [Defence Minister will modernise main
sufficient staff resources. Established maritime boundaries have weaponry system (Alutsista). available at: http://www.jurnas.com/news/37982/
to be monitored by both military and civilian officials possessing Menhan_akan_Modernisasi_Alutsista/1/Nasional/Keamanan. See also Buku Putih
Pertahanan Indonesia 2008, [Indonesias Defence White Paper 2008] (Jakarta:
adequate knowledge and the necessary equipment. To Indonesias Ministry of Defence, 2008).
Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook 74
We contend that in the coming decades Indonesias strategic Fifth, the evolving nature of non-traditional security challenges
planners of national and foreign policy will seek to address this will also affect the future of Indonesias maritime environment.
anomaly by proactively managing their maritime environment. While major power competition is certainly a defining feature in
This is primarily because the future of Indonesias maritime the current strategic landscape, new security challenges warrant
environment will be characterised by several trends. First, attention. The threats of piracy and sea robbery, terrorism,
the rise of Asian maritime powers will affect regional stability. smuggling, and pollution remain increasingly problematic
The rapid economic growth of Asia has meant that the region throughout the region. Multinational and cooperative efforts
has increased its political and military might. For the first time have sought to address such challenges, but due to their
in history, Asia has surpassed Europe in terms of defence dynamic and evolving nature, new measures and initiatives
expenditure.26 In Southeast Asia, the majority of defence must constantly be developed and implemented. For Indonesia,
expenditure will be incurred building a more capable and farther efforts to address non-traditional maritime security threats have
reaching maritime force.27 This will create new opportunities and often led to previously unforeseen types of regional engagement.
challenges for regional security and stability. Coordinated patrols organised with neighbouring countries
have multiplied regional naval diplomatic initiatives and serve
Second, simmering regional tensions emerging out of historical as another avenue in confidence-building measures as regional
grievances and territorial disputes are increasingly compounded navies increase in size and strength. As a consequence, the
by rising nationalism and regional interstate trust deficits. Indonesian Navy has participated in out-of-area deployments to
While the region has undergone rapid economic growth and counter piracy and illegal activities at sea in the Gulf of Aden and
interdependence, these trends have not reshaped the way the Mediterranean Sea.28
regional states view sovereignty. On the contrary, regional states
possess increasing military capability to entrench their hold The last concern is that of Indonesias growing overseas
on sovereignty, which make sensitive issues such as historical interests. According to a recent McKinsey report, Indonesia is
grievances and maritime disputes extremely complicated and projected to be the seventh largest economy in the world in
difficult to resolve and to manage. 2030.29 It is currently the sixteenth largest economy in the world,
and a member of the G20. Indonesia is also one of the worlds
Third, the rise of China and the role of the United States have largest exporters of natural resources including coal, palm
added to the complexity of factors affecting regional stability. The oil, and natural gas. For example, India and China have now
rise of China has been welcomed in the region, as it has brought become Indonesias largest coal and gas export destinations.30
with it new diplomatic and economic alternatives, providing Indonesia also consumes more energy than in the past. It
options for regional states previously dependent on the West. became a net oil importer in 2004, shipping the bulk of its oil
This is particularly so in the case of Indonesia, whose free and from the Middle East. This is a clear indication that Indonesias
active foreign policy discourages tendentious alignments with economy is becoming increasingly intertwined with seaborne
any major powers. However, regional states are equally wary routes, and that disruptions to seaborne trade would deliver a
about growing Chinese power and intentions, as China also severe blow to economic growth.
displays ambitions for leadership and hegemony, while being
perceived as aggressive whenever it comes to protecting its
interests. Meanwhile, the United States, which has officially
declared China a peer competitor, gives the impression of
exploiting the situation as an opportunity renew its strategic
military presence in Asia after a decade of being distracted
and absorbed in conflicts in the Middle East. The rise of Asian
maritime powers and simmering regional tensions will decide the
future role of the United States in the region.
28 The Indonesian Navy sent a naval task force to the Gulf of Aden in April
2011 to rescue 20 Indonesian sailors held hostage by Somali pirates, while a
permanent naval contingent is deployed in the Mediterranean Sea to support
the UNIFIL-Maritime Task Force (UNIFIL-MTF) along the Lebanese maritime
border. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/somali-pirates-release-
indonesian-ship----121086654/158016.html and http://www.antaranews.com/en/
news/82154/kri-hasanuddin-366-on-peace-mission-to-lebanon
29 http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/asia/the_archipelago_
26 See, http://www.voanews.com/content/asia-defense-spending/1527336.html. economy
27 See, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/07/us-defence-southeastasia- 30 http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/bisindonesia/indonesia-to-lead-coal-
idUSBRE8960JY20121007 export-growth-through-2020/444341
Chase. R., Hill. E., and Kennedy. P., eds., (1999) The Pivotal Sebastian, Leonard C., (2006) Domestic Security Priorities,
States: A New Framework for U.S. policy in the Developing Balance of Interests and Indonesias Management of Regional
World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Order in Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf Emmers, eds., Order
and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael
Dishidros, Official website, http://www.dishidros.go.id Leifer, London/New York: Routledge, p. 178.
Djalal, H., (1995) Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, Jakarta: Sindonews, (2012) Alutsista TNI AL minim, negara rugi Rp40 T,
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Navys Alutsista inadequate, Indonesia suffers IDR 40 trillion of
loss, available at:
Ello, N.P., (1982) Hasil Sidang IMO dan Konsultasi IHO tentang http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/2012/12/27/14/701229/
ALKI dalam rangka implementasi UNCLOS 1982, [Results of alutsista-tni-al-minim-negara-rugi-rp40-t.
IMO Assembly and IHO Consultation on Indonesias Archipelagic
Sea Lanes in relation to the Implementation of UNCLOS 1982]. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
Forward, Chris, (2009) Archipelagic Sea-Lanes in Indonesia
Their Legality in International Law, Australian & New Zealand Vision, Mission, Tasks and Functions of Bakorkamla, available at:
Maritime Law Journal. http://www.bakorkamla.go.id.
Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook 76