SECTION 66A, IT ACT AND FREE SPEECH: WHERE TO DRAW THE

LINE?

ABSTRACT

Freedom of speech and expression has been rightfully regarded as the

mother of liberties. It is the very life of a healthy democracy. India is one
nation whose history has been a witness to how the state has time and
again snapped the whip at its critics. Lately, the politics around free
speech has shifted online. Section 66A, which was added to the
Information Technology Act in 2008, passed without a single debate in
the lower house of the Parliament. The paper analyses the
constitutionality of the impugned anarchic Section 66A of the
Information Technology Act, 2002(amended in 2008) which accounted for
a series of politically motivated arrests. It goes on to explore how the
wide phraseology adopted by Section 66A which restricts free speech
and is not saved by any of the subject matters mentioned under Article
19(2). Other aspects relating to chilling effect, over-breadth and
severability have also been examined. It is the task of penal laws to
define the criminal offence with sufficient definiteness. Laws should
always stand in their proper place when it comes to the sanctity of the
Fundamental Rights.

The paper further argues that the decision of Supreme Court in Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India, declaring the provision as unconstitutional, has
led to the creation of a vacuum in the legal framework where the
provision was originally intended to stand. In this regard, it concludes by
proposing certain measures to save the free voice of the citizens from the
Draconian might of the state.

INTRODUCTION

Cyber power is now a fundamental fact of global life. In political,

economic, and military affairs, information and technology provide and
support crucial elements of operational activities. 1 The ease with which
information can be transmitted over social media has given rise to the
need to regulate the content of such information. Free speech on internet
in India is again at the centre of the academic debate following the
Supreme Courts decision to strike down Section 66A of the Information
Technology Act in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.2 Section 66A of the
amended Indian Information Technology Act, 2000 is one provision which
has lately been in controversy because of its wide scope which has been
often used for politically motivated arrests.

Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution guarantees to all Indian

citizens, freedom of speech and expression. But it is inevitable that
freedom of speech would be always limited. The existence of such a
society is not possible which is free of limitations on the exercise of this
freedom. This is because speech always takes place within a milieu of
competing values. And hence, the idea is not to vouch for an unlimited
domain of free speech; such an argument cannot be defended. The ability
to disseminate information seamlessly over social media has resulted in a
rising need to regulate the content of such information. Section 66A of
the IT Act makes it a punishable offence to send messages that are
offensive or false or created for the purpose of causing annoyance or
inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation,
enmity, hatred or ill-will, through a computer device. Since no guidelines
have been laid down for identification of offensive information, the wide
amplitude of the provision has often been used for politically motivated
arrests.3

The paper examines the wide phraseology adopted by Section 66A of the
Information Technology Act (amended in 2008) in the light of the effects

1F.D. Kramer, Cyber Power and National Security, 3 (1st ed., 2009).

2Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.

3Law Commission of India, Consultation Paper on Media Law, May 2014, para
12.1.
it has had on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Further, it analyses how the
provision is not saved by any of the subjects provided under Article 19(2).
The concept of due process as a touchstone to determine the
reasonableness of legislative measures has also been reflected upon.
Various other aspects dealing with the constitutionality of the provision
have been dealt with. Thereafter, the paper discusses the need of a
substitute law to fill the vacuum created by striking down of Section 66A.
In this regard, certain measures have been proposed for the new legal
framework which might take place of Section 66A in future.

ANALYSIS OF SECTION 66A, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT

Section 66A, which was added to the Information Technology Act in

2008, passed without a single debate in the lower house of the
Parliament.4 The section infringes the sacrosanct fundamental right to
free speech and expression and is not saved by any of the subjects listed

4O. Banerji, Section 66A and free speech in India: The debate continues, The
London School of Economics and Political Science, available at
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/indiaatlse/2013/01/30/section-66a-and-free-speech-in-
india/, last seen on 29/07/2015.
in Article 19(2). The provision in fact arbitrarily invades the right of free
speech, thereby upsetting the balance between such right and the
reasonable restrictions that may be imposed on such right. Furthermore,
the provision is inherently vague which makes it incapable of being
judged on objective standards and hence, susceptible to arbitrary
application. Such an application of the law leads to its misuse and
consequently, affects free speech. The Court in Shreya Singhals case5
clearly pointed out that a penal law would be void on the grounds of
vagueness if it failed to define the criminal offence with sufficient
definiteness. Ordinary people should be able to understand what
conduct is prohibited and what is permitted. Also, those who administer
the law must know what offence has been committed so that arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the law does not take place, the
court said. In fact, the provision has had a chilling effect on free speech
and expression of the people of the country. The judgement declaring
Section 66A unconstitutional is quite elaborate and well-reasoned.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS: DUE PROCESS AS THE YARDSTICK TO

DETERMINE THE REASONABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE MEASURES

The first important point to be discussed in this regard is the void-for-

vagueness doctrine. Criminal statutes which lack sufficient definiteness
or specificity are commonly held void for vagueness. 6 This doctrine,
derived from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, advocates for clarity in language of
the penal statutes so much so that an ordinary individual is able to
comprehend that what conduct is punishable and what is not. One can
have a four-fold view of the doctrine. Firstly, it paves way for the
government to clearly distinguish lawful conduct from that which is not.
Despite its deliberate omission by the makers of the Indian Constitution

5Supra 2, at 153.

6Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,308 (1940, Supreme Court of the United
States).
and its conspicuous absence in the Indian Constitution, the Supreme
Court of India by a process of interpretation of two Articles of the
Constitution, namely Articles 14(Right to Equality) and 21(Protection of
Life and Personal Liberty) has for all practical purposes introduced the
concept of due process of law in the constitutional law of India. 7 A
provision like Section 66A runs afoul of the Due Process because it fails
to convey to the individuals their legal obligations so that they may
accordingly govern their behaviour. Individuals possessing ordinary
intelligence cannot be expected to interpret for themselves the meaning
of an enactment.

Secondly, the doctrine checks the indiscriminate and arbitrary

application of penal legislations. The enforcers of the law must also be
very clear on this point. Thirdly, it makes the task of the Judiciary
comparatively easier because it is ultimately the Judiciary who has to
apply the laws and decide. Such sloppily worded laws create problems in
judicial interpretation. A fourth aspect of the doctrine is that it provides
protection to Fundamental Rights like right to free speech, expression,
religion etc. Vagueness leads to uncertainty. And individuals are
inevitably deterred from practising or propagating their religion or freely
expressing their views for the fear of what might land them in jail. The
wide phraseology adopted by Section 66A makes it incapable of being
judged on objective standards and hence, susceptible to arbitrary
application. Such an application of the law leads to its misuse and
consequently, affects free speech. Terms used in the provision like
offensive, menacing, annoyance, inconvenience, danger,
obstruction and insult which the provision uses have not been defined
in the IT Act, General Clauses Act, or in any other legislation, for that
matter.

7T. R. Andhyarujina, The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme

Court, 193, 193 in Supreme but not Infallible (B.N. Kirpal, A.H. Desai, G.
Subramaniam, R. Dhavan & R. Ramachandran, 4 th ed., 2008).
In A. K. Roy v. Union of India 8, the Honble Supreme Court observed
that:The impossibility of framing a definition with mathematical
precision cannot either justify the use of vague expressions or the total
failure to frame any definition at all which can furnish, by its
inclusiveness at least, a safe guideline for understanding the meaning of
the expressions used by the legislature. (Para 61) In the said case, a
provision of the National Security Act was held to be violative (due to
being capable of wanton abuse) of the Fundamental Right to Life and
Personal Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Moreover, on a comparison drawn between Section 66A and other

provisions of the Act, we find that all other provisions, unlike 66A, are
narrowly worded and use terms which are well defined. All computer-
related offences provided in Section 66 have the ingredient of mens rea.
Also, the terms dishonestly and fraudulently are given specific
meaning with reference given to the Indian Penal Code. Section 66A
contains no such reference and neither does the definition clause of the
act provides for the interpretation of the expressions used in the act to
mean the same as defined in the IPC. Sections 66B to 67B also provide
for punishments for offences which are narrowly defined and thus,
clearly made out.

While making a comparison with IPC provisions, it can be seen that the
expression annoyance has also been used in Sections 268, 294 and 510
of IPC. But Section 294 requires the annoyance to be caused by
obscene utterances or acts. Similarly, Section 510, annoyance must only
be caused to a person by another person who is in a state of intoxication.
Moreover, such annoyance has to be caused in a public place or in a
place for which it is a trespass for him to enter. In Section 268, a further
ingredient is that the injury, danger or annoyance must be to the public
or to the people in general who occupy property in vicinity. In striking
contrast to all these is Section 66A which is so open-ended and vague.
None of the expressions used therein has been defined which makes the

8A K Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271, 317.

task of interpretation excessively subjective. Something which may be
annoying or offensive to one may not be so to another. Persistently is
again another indefinite term which leaves it open to decide what exactly
would be contained in it. How many times should a message be sent so
that it can be called to have been sent persistently?

CHILLING EFFECT ON FREE SPEECH AND OVERBREADTH

With the vague phraseology that Section 66A adopts, it inevitably takes
within its ambit protected speech as well. Someone may discuss
unpopular views or advocate some cause using internet as the medium.
But the way Section 66A stood, anyone posting such views over the
internet could be roped in. In fact, any unfavourable dissenting opinion
can be easily brought within its fold which is why it was having a serious
chilling effect on free speech and expression. The pervading fear of
frivolous prosecution among the citizenry of the country continuously
hindered them from exercising their fundamental right to free speech
and expression.

Therefore, it is clearly evident that the Section is unconstitutional in that

it covers in its ambit protected as well as innocent speech and thus, can
be used in a way to have a chilling effect on free speech. The provision is
liable to be struck down on grounds of overbreadth.

PROVISION NOT SAVED BY REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS UNDER

ARTICLE 19(2)

Freedom of speech is the bulwark of the democratic government. This

freedom is essential for the proper functioning of the democratic process.
The freedom of speech and expression is regarded as the first condition
of liberty. It occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of liberties
giving succour and protection to all other liberties. It has been truly said
that it is the mother of all other liberties. 9 (Report of the Second Press
Commission, Vol. I, p. 34-35)

9M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law: Vol. 1, 49 (5th ed., 2003).

In December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Every country was asked to
embrace the terms of the declaration in the hope that future generations
would benefit from the foresight of their elders. Sadly, there have been
many examples over the years of breaches of many of the Articles. 10
However nations have consistently reaffirmed the commitment of
freedom of expression enshrined in Article 19 which states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless
of frontiers.11
The fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression is
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India to its citizens.
The fact that it is enshrined in Part III of the Constitution makes it all the
more sacrosanct. The underlying idea in entrenching certain basic and
Fundamental Rights is to take them out of the reach of transient political
majorities. It has, therefore, come to be regarded as essential that these
rights be entrenched in such a way that they may not be violated,
tampered or interfered with by an oppressive government. 12 Even the
Preamble of the Indian Constitution ensures to all its citizens the liberty
of expression.
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression has
gone through judicial scrutiny of the Apex Court of India on numerous
occasions and Judges have time and again reiterated that any restriction
on the freedom of speech and expression should be considered in the
narrowest of compass and must be strictly pass the test under article
19(2) of the Constitution of India. The permissible restrictions on any

10D. Bloy, S. Hadwin, Law and the Media, 41 (2nd ed., 2011).

11The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations Official Website,

available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19, last seen
on 27/07/2015.

12Supra 9, at 967, 968.

fundamental right have to be imposed by a duly enacted law and must
not be excessive. In other words, they must not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve the objects of the law under which they are sought
to be imposed.13
Sovereignty and integrity of India, Security of state, Contempt of
court & Friendly relations with foreign states:
Section 66A has no proximate relation with these grounds and therefore,
they would be kept out of the purview of discussion on how the provision
is not saved by the grounds mentioned under Article 19(2).

Public order:
This ground was added by the First Amendment in 1951 and was to
overcome the Supreme Courts ruling in Romesh Thapars14 case which
had held that restrictions could not be imposed on grounds of public
order.15 In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., 16 public
order was said to have more bearing to community than law and order.
The even tempo of the life of the community constitutes public order,
whether community is country as a whole or a particular locality.
Disturbance of public order cannot encompass acts directed against
individual or certain class of individuals, which do not affect public
tranquillity. The degree of disturbance and its impact upon community
life is the test to distinguish a breach of law and order from disturbance
of public order. Public order is jeopardized when the act embraces large
sections of the community and incites them to make further breaches of
the law and order thereby subverting public order.

13L. Bhasin, Media World & The Law, 18 (1st ed., 2010).

14Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.

15A.P. Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India: Vol. 1, 310 (2nd ed.,
2007).

16Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1966) 1 SCR 709.
As far as Section 66A is concerned, the recipient of the information sent
has not been taken into consideration, except under sub-clause (c) where
the recipient is misled about the origin of certain message. The provision
does not draw the line between mass dissemination and dissemination to
one person. There is no requirement as to the potentiality of the message
to affect public tranquillity and thereby disrupt public order. It does not
provide for any ingredient which would require the message to be a
threat to public order. Public order may be jeopardized when the
repercussions of any act encompass large sections of the community and
incite them to make further breaches of law and order.
The provision in question has no requirement of such tendency to disrupt
public order. Merely offensive, menacing or annoying information
may not be sufficient to do so. The offence under Section 66A gets
complete even without affecting public order in any way. The Court in
Shreya Singhals case17 also took resort to the clear and present danger
test according to which a State cannot forbid or proscribe advocacy of
use of force or of law violation in presence of constitutional guarantees of
free speech and expression, except where such advocacy is directed to
incite or produce imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. Section 66A does not stand good as per this test too
because it allows the State to restrict free speech even when there is no
such tendency in the information to incite or produce imminent lawless
action.

Decency or morality:
In Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand
Patwardhan,18 the Supreme Court took note of the law in the United
States and said that a material may be regarded as obscene if the
average person applying contemporary community standards would find

17Supra 2, at 144.

18Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan,

2006 (8) SCC 433, 446.
that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest
and that taken as a whole it otherwise lacks serious literary artistic,
political, educational or scientific value. The community standards test
was approved and applied by the Apex Court in a recent judgement given
in the case of Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal. 19 Again in, the
offence under Section 66A is made out without affecting decency or
morality in any way. Something which may be grossly offensive,
menacing, annoying etc. may not be obscene at all.
Defamation:
The basic ingredient which constitutes the offence of defamation is the
injury of right to reputation.20 It is clearly evident that Section 66A has
nothing to do with the right to reputation of individuals. Any message
may be annoying, menacing, offensive or inconvenient to
someone without having effect in any manner to his/her reputation.
Section 66A, therefore, is also not saved by this ground mentioned under
Article 19(2).
Incitement of offence:
As the provision does not require any tendency to disrupt public order,
same is the case for incitement to an offence. The terminology used by
Section 66A does not provide for any requirement as to the information
being one that incites anyone to do anything at all. The phraseology
that the provision employs is nebulous on this point. Something which
may be offensive, menacing, annoying, etc. may or may not involve a
tendency to incite to commit an offence. Written words sent over the
internet may involve merely discussion or advocacy of some viewpoint.
But the fact that such is a range of unpopular views that does not toe the
line of majority does not make such advocacy or discussion illegal in
itself. Therefore, it is argued that Section 66A does not fall even in this
category of reasonable restrictions for free speech and expression.

19Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2014 (4) SCC 257.

20P.S.A. Pillais Criminal Law, 1212, (Dr. K.I. Vibhute, 10th ed., Third Reprint,
2009).
Now, since Section 66A unreasonably restricted information that may be
sent on internet because of the vague terminology which it adopted. Also,
such terminology did not have a nexus with any of the eight subject
matters provided under Article 19(2). Therefore, the provision was liable
to be struck down, it being violate of the fundamental right to free
speech and expression. Another noticeable thing pointed out by the
Supreme Court in Shreya Singhals case is that as the possibility of abuse
of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to it any element of invalidity,
a statute which is otherwise invalid as being unreasonable cannot be
saved by its being administered in a reasonable manner. (Para 95)
Whether a particular statute is constitutionally valid or not must depend
upon its provisions and not on its operationalism. How a law is being
administered is no ground to decide such an issue. If after being properly
construed, it does not pass the test under Part III of the Constitution,
then a law cannot be pronounced valid merely because it is administered
in a manner which would not go against the constitutional mandate. And
hence, the constitutionality of Section 66A also must be decided upon its
merits without taking into consideration how well it may be
administered.
SEVERABILITY
The language of Section 66A imposes restrictions on fundamental right
to free speech and expression, which are in the nature of both within and
beyond constitutionally permissible limits as provided under Article
19(2). Therefore, it is impossible to uphold it even so far as it may be
applied within the constitutional limits which makes the provision not
severable. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,21 Section 9(1-A) of the
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 23 of 1949 was declared
unconstitutional. The provision covered purposes having wider scope
than restrictions provided under article 19(2) and it was impossible to
separate Section 9(1-A) into what was within and what was outside the
ambit of Article 19(2). The impugned provision was adjudged to be not
21Supra 14.
severable because of the phraseology it adopted. The judgement in
Romesh Thappar applies in the present case in that Section 66A does not
fall within any of the subject matters covered under Article 19(2). It has
already been discussed how there is possibility of Section 66A being
misused and applied for unconstitutional purposes which is why it must
be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.

SUBSTITUTE FOR SECTION 66A: WHERE LIES THE NEED?

The Supreme Court striking down Section 66A has led to the creation of
a vacuum in the legal framework where the provision was originally
intended to stand. The Supreme Court has very rightly noted in Shreya
Singhals case that there is an intelligible differentia between speech on
the internet and other mediums of communication for which separate
offences can certainly be created by legislation.(Para 102)
The palpable grounds on which this difference can be easily made out
include the speed, expanse, cost and ease of transfer of information,
among others. Information can be transferred to millions of people over
the internet in a matter of few seconds by a single click of mouse.
Rumours having a serious potential of disrupting public order can be
very conveniently spread online to the whole world without any check.
Moreover, any such information can speedily be circulated among so
many people with very little payment or in some cases, without any
payment at all. For all these reasons, the gravity of online offences
increases automatically as compared to offline ones.
In 1860, the framers of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) would not have even
imagined that information and ideas could be transferred with such
speed and to such a large number of people. In the modern era, social
media has become one of the biggest platforms for the individuals to
voice their opinion. At the same time, its susceptibility to abuse has also
increased to a large extent, which is why there arises a need of laws to
regulate the same. The provisions under IPC are insufficient to deal with
various offences committed over internet because they were never
drafted for the same in the first place. And also, it is clear enough that
there is an intelligible differentia between online and offline offences.
The situation at hand, thus, demands a greater regulation and vigilance
of social media subject to the framework of Article 19(2) of the
Constitution.

PROPOSAL FOR THE NEW FRAMEWORK:

The scope of the provision needs to be cut short and be reasonably well
defined. The new law should be drafted carefully to make it fall in line
with the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It should
also be made to have the element of mens rea because it attracts
criminal liability. The application of the provision must be restricted to
communication between two persons rather than mass dissemination as
was the case under Section 66A. Proper categorisation of offences should
be done within the new provision and each such offence must be
precisely defined.

The government had modified rules under the controversial Section 66A
of the Information Technology Act in the wake of its alleged misuse. No
less than a police officer of a rank of DCP was to be allowed to permit
registration of a case under Section 66A of the Information Technology
Act, 2000.22

22Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (Record of Proceedings), (2013) 12 SCC 73,

75.
What could have led to the formation of such a vague provision in the IT
Act could be the fact that it was passed without a single debate in the
lower house of the Parliament.23 It was only after a series of politically
motivated arrests that the government realised it and then, in order to
extricate itself from the troublesome situation came up with the above
order. The government actually, in order to correct one wrong, committed
another. The impugned section had enabled the police to act
expeditiously and responsibly in face of any grave situation demanding
immediate attention of the authorities. But with such an order in force, it
would have been too Utopian to believe that the IG or DCP rank officer
shall be prompt enough to enable the police to act swiftly. What must be
understood here is that the law on point has the task of balancing two
conflicting interests, namely the interest of the accused in terms of his
fundamental rights and the other, of the aggrieved party.

In S. Khushboo vs Kanniammal & Anr, 24 it has been observed that: It is

not the task of the criminal law to punish individuals merely for
expressing unpopular views. The threshold for placing reasonable
restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression is indeed a very
high one and there should be a presumption in favour of the accused in
such cases. Therefore, the new law on the matter must be drafted
keeping in mind that it has to fall within the four corners of Article 19(2)
if it is to legally restrict free speech and expression of the citizenry of the
country.

23Supra 4.

24S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 600, 619.

 CONCLUSION

George Orwell has rightly put it, If liberty means anything at all, it
means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear. It is the
same reason why free speech is regarded as the very life of a healthy
democracy. With changing times, internet has emerged to be one of the
biggest platforms of sharing of information and ideas. Simultaneously,
the vulnerability to its misuse has also turned out to be so much greater
than it was anytime before because of which we need laws to monitor the
same. But Section 66A of the Information Technology Act was indeed not
what we mean by laws to monitor free speech on internet.

With the particular provision struck down, there arises a need for laws to
regulate free online speech. The existing legal framework is clearly
insufficient to deal with various problems which may arise upon the
matter in the future. The ease with information and views can be shared
over the internet to millions of people is indicative of the fact that
offences relating to online speech are of a far more serious concern than
those related to offline speech and expression.

It must always be kept in mind that the freedom of speech and

expression in India can be restricted only on grounds mentioned under
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. It is more of a right than a liberty which
cannot be curbed by the State for its own ends. Therefore, laws should
always stand in their proper place when it comes to the sanctity of the
Fundamental Rights. Proper balance has to be struck so that the civil
rights of the individuals do not get violated.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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