buddhist logic

difference between vedic and buddhist system of education

what is hetu
what is pramana
foundation of knowledge foundation of human wisdom and science. dharma yoga.self
knowedge. Yama and niyama. Yoga. Meditation samadi,
foundation of dharma Even a little of this dharma saves from a great fear. Dharma is the
cause of happiness . Gita. Upasana.
What is the "logic" in Buddhist logic?
The history of Indian logic is usually divided into three periods, Old Nyaaya (circa 250 B.C. ) ,
Buddhist logic (sixth century A.D.) and New Nyaaya.a andn
The history of Indian logic is usually divided into
three periods, Old Nyaaya (circa 250 B.C. ) ,
Buddhist logic (sixth century A.D.) and New Nyaaya.
The Buddhist logic text, Nyaayaprave`sa
(Introduction to Logical Methods) , had great
influence upon Indian and Chinese Buddhism and also
among the Jains. As a pivotal work, the
Nyaayaprave`sa has received critical attention from
historians of religion, philologists, philosophers,
and logicians. As with all advances in scholarship,
there is controversy over interpretation, but in the
case of Buddhist logic, the controversy cuts to the
very heart of the issue of whether Buddhist logic is
in any recognizable contemporary sense a "logic."
The received view holds that Buddhist logic bears
very close similarities to syllogistic forms and
that it can be represented and analyzed by standard
deductive techniques.(1) A much different and
opposing view has been argued by Professor Douglas
Daye in a series of papers. Daye maintains that "...
the descriptive utility of mathematical logic with
early Nyaaya texts has simply been overrated";(2)
that although the Nyaaya texts contain metalogical
rules for evaluating the "legitimacy or
illegitimacy" of arguments, the distinction between
validity and invalidity does not apply;(3) that
Nyaaya models are not inferences but "formalistic
explanations"; and that "... Buddhist logic is not
deductive, nor can it be formally valid nor is it an
inference."(4)

The cumulative effect of these claims is to

assert that Buddhist logic is not a "logic" at all,
at least not in any sense which is recognized by
Western philosophers. There is a radical
incompatibility between the Nyaaya methods of logic
and those of the Prior Analytics or Principia
Mathematica. Of course, there will be differences,
possibly very great differences, between any two
traditions so diverse as fourth century (B.C.)
Greece and sixth century (A.D.) India, but are we to
go so far as to say that the Nyaaya does not contain
inferences? The radical incompatibility thesis is, I
maintain, a mistake; moreover, it is a mistake which
can readily be uncovered by examining the typical
Nyaaya inference scheme. Of the notion that a Nyaaya
scheme could be a "formalistic explanation"
without being an inference, I shall say very little
because I do not see how anything which functions as
an explanation could not involve inferences of some
kind or other. It is important to know whether the
Nyaaya scheme is deductive or not, and if it is,
whether all of its parts are essential to the
deduction. I will demonstrate that there are two
ways of reading the Nyaaya form: one which is
straightforwardly deductive and a second which is
best understood by what the American pragmatist,
C.S. Peirce, and later Norwood Hanson,
call "retroduction."

To begin with, consider this representative

example from the Nyaaya:(5)

1. pak.sa (thesis) Sound is imprrmanrne

2. hetu (mark or Reason) - Because of its

property of being produced

P.184
 3. d.r.s.taanta (Exemplification)--Whatever is
produced, is impermanent
4. sapak.sa (similar case)- As with a pot, and
so forth
5. vipak.sa (dissimilar case)- As (not with the
case) of space, and so forth

Tachikawa proposes the following scheme for what

he calls the "three-membered Indian syllogism:(6)

6. There is property p in locus L

7. (because) there is property q (in L).
8. Wherever there is property q, there is
property p, as in locus w

Clearly, if this schema is reversed, (8) and (7)

become premises for a valid deductive inference of
(6) as the conclusion. The reverse of our example
becomes an instance of modus ponens.

9. d.r.s.taanta - Whatever is created is

impermanent.
10. hetu - Sound is created.
11. pak.sa - Sound is impermanent.

Why is this instance of modus ponens a matter of

dispute? The incompatibilists point out that the
relationship between the thesis (pak.sa) and the
justification (hetu) is always expressed in the
Sanskrit ablative case and that this relationship
cannot be represented or translated as the English
"therefore" (or ergo). Its best translation is
"because." Thus, for the incompatibilist, the
primary objection to identifying the Nyaaya scheme
as a deductive inference is the familiar one of
ordinary language philosophers who resist the
translation of expressions as `q because p' into `p
) q' on the grounds that the causal or explanatory
meaning of "because" is lost in the
truth-functional conditional.
 This objection has force, but one must
distinguish between the assertion that
truth-functional connectives preserve or capture the
meaning of `q because p' and the claim that
truth-functional connectives can represent a
deductive relationship between propositions within
the Nyaaya scheme. It is the latter which the
received view upholds: it is the former which the
incompatibilist vehemently opposes. The issue is not
joined, because surely one can maintain that there
is a deductive inference in the inversion Nyaaya
scheme without maintaining that it captures the
meaning of or even approaches synonymy with the
original. In sum, the issue between the received
view and the incompatibilist pivots on the former's
willingness to invert the Nyaaya form and read it as
a valid deduction and the latter's insistence that
the form cannot be so reversed without losing the
special relationship of the hetu. Given the merits
of both views and given the fact that both positions
are not explicit contradictories of one another,
there is a way to understand the Nyaaya scheme which
allows both sides to have their cake and eat it too.
I believe that the three-membered Nyaaya is best
understood as a retroductivc inference. A
retroduction, as it has been described by C. S.
Peirce and

P.185

Norwood Hansonl is a pattern of reasoning which

leads from some phenomenon or perception to an
explanatory hypothesis of that phenomenon. Its form
is not truth-functional nor are the relationships of
that premises completely rulegoverned. Peirce said,
"It must be remembered that retroduction, although
hampered very little by logical rules, nevertheless,
is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only
problematically or conjecturally...."(7)
 Retroduction does have a recognizable pattern,
and indeed it is very close to the three-membered
syllogism of Indian logic. Its form, according to
Peirce, is:

12. The surprizing fact Q is observed.

13. But if P were true, Q would be a matter of

course.

14. Hence, there is reason to suspect that P is

true.

As a schema, for retroduction we have:

(12') q
(13') q because p
(14')p

which is isomorphic with that of the Nyaaya (that

is, pak.sa, because hetu and d.r.s.taanta; hence
there is evidence for the pak.sa). The similarity
(sapak.sa) and dissimilarity (vipak.sa) cases serve
as further evidence in support of the explanatory
justification.

The philosopher of science, Norwood Hanson,

argued that retroduction was a "logic of discovery"
which led to deductive-nomological explanations.
Like Peirce, Hanson pointed out that the reversal of
a retroduction was a deductive inference 'q, q
because p', becomes 'p, if p, then q, hence q'. The
notion of reversal" or inverting" a retroduction is
not a technique or rule of formal logic, but rather
a simple psychological description of changing the
order of premises.

If the three-membered syllogism is retroduction

and if a retroduction is part of a
retroductive-deductive pair, one should expect to
find internal evidence for the presence or absence
of a deductive fragment. To return to the Nyaaya and
its commentary on this three-membered syllogism, is
there internal evidence to treat it as a
retroduction-cum-deduction? A crucial point of
philological interpretation is the function of the
ablative "because" and the meaning of "hetu"
itself. The weakness of the standard view is that it
disregards the special features of the ablative
"because" and translates the three-membered
syllogism as if it contained conditionals. Following
Daye, I suggest that that move is too hasty, and
that we must regard the ablative "because" as an
operator connecting the hetu and d.r.s.taanta to the
thesis. Since the Sanskrit ablative expresses a
relation of physical or conceptual removal,
separation, distinction, or origin, it was used to
convey the notion of causal explanation. This fact
gives prima facie evidence for interpreting it in
the sense of "a reason for." Such an understanding
is reinforced by the meaning of "hetu," which is the
name of the explanatory part of the three-

P.186

membered syllogism. According to Tachikawa, "hetu"

primarily means 'reason'.(8) This is solid ground
for reading 'q because p' as: 'p is the reason for
q', 'p is the explanatory hypothesis for q', or even
the Peircean 'if p were true, q would be a matter of
course'.

Beyond points of translation, one of the

strongest reasons for seeing the three-membered
syllogism of the Nyaayaprave`sa as a
retroduction-deduction is the existence of the
five-membered syllogism in the earlier Nyaaya
tradition, particularly the Nyaaya Suutra.(9) The
five-membered syllogism of the Nyaaya Suutra is
perfectly symmetrical between its three initial
retroductive steps and its two culminating deductive
steps:
 15. Thesis(pratij~naa) for example, there is
fire on the mountain.

16. Reason (hetu)- The mountain smokes.

17. Exemplification (d.r.s.taata) - Wherever

there is smoke. there is fire, as (for
example) on the hearth in the kitchen.

18. Recapitulation of the reason (upanaya) - The

mountain smokes.

19. Conclusion (nigamana) There is fire on the

mountain.

If one were to picture this pattern as an isosceles

triangle, one side would represent the retroduction
from [15] the pratij~naa reasoning through the [16]
hetu to [17] the d.r.s.taanta, and the opposing side
of the triangle would represent the deduction
beginning with [17] the d.r.s.taanta to [18] upanaya
and inferring the nigamana.

The French Indologist Rene Guenon pointed out

that after the appearance of the Nyaaya Suutra,
there were two abridged forms of the five-membered
syllogism, (10) in which either the first three
[15-17] or the last three [17-19] parts appeared
alone. Gutnon also pointed out that the latter
abridgment resembles the syllogism of Aristolle; the
former abridgment, of course, is precisely the one
found in the 6th century Nyaayaprave`sa and indeed
the same smoke-fire example occurs there also. Given
the interpretation I have offered, it is not
surprising that there should be two abridgments of
the five-membered syllogism. One abridgment captures
the retroductive move; the second captures the
deductive move. Deduction and retroduction are
inversions of one another, and they can be separated
by positioning the property-locus statement. One
abridgment reasons from the thesis statement to an
explanatory generalization; the other abridgment
deduces the thesis from the generalization. The
Buddhist logicians Mere quite emphatic about which
abridgment they favored. The Nyaaya quite explicitly
says, "We say that these three statements make the
members of the syllogism and no more! "(11)
Tachikwa's gloss on this statement indicates that it
is an assertion that only three statements are
necessary for an inference.

We may conclude that what "inference" primarily

meant to the Buddhist logicians was "reasoning to an
explanatory causal hypothesis"; however, it would be
wrong to further conclude that they had no
appreciation of the

P.187

deductive abridgment. To them logic was a means of

bringing others to a recognition of particular
statements; it was an upaaya, a heuristic teaching
device. The retroductive abridgment of the
five-membered syllogism clearly teaches in the sence
that it brings the hearer to an awareness of a causal
or conceptual connection. The deductive abridgment
does not "teach" in this sense because like all
deductions its conclusion does not contain
information nor already found in the premises, Thus,
from the standpoint of an upaaya the retroductive
inference is enough, or, as the author of the
Nyaayaprave`sa put it, "...these three members make
the [retroductive] syllogism and no more."

A further point in favour of reading the Nyaaya

inference schema as a retroduction is that it makes
the remainder of the manual on logical methods,
especially the detailed sections on kinds of
fallacies, more intelligible and enljghtening. More
than two thirds of the text covers identification
and classification of fallacies, but none bear any
resemblance to the formal fallacies of deduction
such as affirming the consequent or denying the
antecedent, nor does the system resemble Western
notions of an informal fallacy. Fallacies of
irrelevance such as the ad hominem or post hoc
propter hoc call attention to the lack of support
between premises and putative conclusion. In
Buddhist logic the classification of fallacies does
not attempt to circumscribe the ways premises can be
irrelevant; on the contrary it fives criteria for
grading the strength or weakness of the explanatory
hypotheses. This is precisely what is required for
retroductive accuracy. Weak hypotheses emerge in
three circumstances: (1) the hetu is unrecognized by
proponent or opponent, (2) the hetu is inconclusive,
or (3) it is contradicted. Inconclusive hetus are
those which are not supported by further evidence
from the similarity and dissimilarity cases;
contradicted hetus are those which prove the
opposite of the pak.sa. Such a contradiction is
established by deducing the opposite property-locus
assertion. A hetu can fail to be recognized, that
is, it can fail as a teaching device by not making
the auditor (or speaker) aware of the connection
between the assertion statement and its warranting
hetu. Thus, when hypotheses fail to be understood,
they engender fallacies of recognition, but when they
fail in evidential support they engender fallacies
of contradiction or inconclusivity. On the whole,
this classification of fallacies reflects a
sophisticated, but also a commonsensical, means of
evaluating hypotheses. It is open textured as
retroductive reasoning must be, and more importantly
it does not attempt (as the Western notion of fallac
does) to classify fallacious reasoning as a kind of
deductive argument gone awry.

In this paper I have attempted to enlarge the

 dialogue about the nature of Buddhist logic by
arguing that it is essentially retroductive. As
philosophers and psychologists continue to
investigate the conceptual and factual aspects of
hypothesis formation, the study of Buddhist logic
will increase in importance because, unlike other
logical treatises, the Nyaayaprave`sa is an
historyically significant document about ways of
reasoning and misreasoning to an explanatory
hypothesis.
The logic of Buddhist philosophy goes beyond simple truth | Aeon .
Western philosophers have not, on the whole, regarded Buddhist thought with much
enthusiasm. ... Thus we find the great second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna
saying: ... The other rule was the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC): nothing can be both true
and false at the same time
Buddhist logic
5.1 Hetuvidya; 5.2 Pramanavada .... Most pramanavada of Dharmic Traditions
accept 'perception' (Sanskrit: ..... Logic is the standard for the formalization of
mathematics into axioms .... Some Hindus leave their social world and
material possessions, then engage in lifelong Sannyasa to achieve Moksha.
What is the "logic" in Buddhist logic?
The Logic developed under Buddhism is known as 'Buddhist Logic'. Acrya Dinga
and Acrya Dharmakrti were considered as the two shining stars of this ...

xiii
Introduction
Yoga tradition is very ancient. In Pini, the word 'Yoga' is derived from the root
'Yuj', in the sense of samdhi (concentration) and 'Yujir' in sense of joining or
connecting. According to Pini, 'Yogi' means a man who practices religious
austerities. In early 1920's, during excavation of Indus civilization (about 3000BC),
traces of early Yoga were found in Indus cities. There are some Terra-Cotta seals
found during excavation. They are called as "Paupati Seal" which show horned
deities seated in manner of the yogic postures. The Vedas, Upaniads,
Mahbhrata, Smtis, Puras, Yogavsiha describe Yoga. Eighteen chapters of
Bhagavad Gt are named as different Yogas. Vaiavism and aivism also
mention Yoga.
In the Indian Philosophy, there are six daranas or philosophical systems. Most of
these systems accept Yoga as means to attain liberation. Bhagavn Patajali, for
the first time, took great efforts to collect these scattered pearls, and systematized
them in aphoristic style or Yoga stras. He gave' Yoga', a status of darana, a
Philosophical school. Bhya of Vysa, Vcaspati mira and Vijna bhikkhu are
well known.
Along with the Ptajala Yoga, it is necessary to consider the two important
ramaa traditions of India. The two ramana traditions, the Buddhism and
Jainism are avaidic or nstika daranas as they do not accept authority of Vedas.
While remaining four systems accept authority of the Vedas. Thus, they are called
as stika daranas. Both Mahvra and Buddha did not accept the authority of the
Vedas and criticized sacrifice system. They undertook rigorous practice of virtues,
xiv
meditation and tapa to attain emancipation. Thus, in order to understand the 'Yoga'
it is necessary to study these three systems.
Meditation is the core of the Buddhism. Vipassan and amath are the two
dhammas preached by Buddha.1
Buddhaghoa in his classic work 'Viuddhimagga'
has given the gist of Piakas. The formula is 'la, Samdhi and Praj. It is the
noble eight fold path towards nibbna. We can call it 'Yoga', if we compare it with
eight fold Yoga of Ptajala. Yoga in the Mahyna Buddhism includes practice of
Prmitas and is more logical.
In the Jainism, gama directly or indirectly contains some yogic concepts such as
four types of dhynas. In the Jaina darana, doctrine of ratnatraya is accepted as a
means to moka.
2
They are Samyak darana (right inclination), Samyak jna
(right cognition) and Samyak caritra (right conduct). According to .
Haribhadrasri, all means conducive to moka are Yoga.3
Thus Ratnatraya itself is
Yoga, as means to moka. It is cause of kaivalya. . Haribhadraji's contribution to
Yoga is remarkable. He has presented Jaina Yoga and its impartial comparison
with the Ptajala Yoga, Buddhism and other Yoga prevalent at that time. Later on
. Jnabhadragaiji, . ubhacandraji and . Hemacandraji have contributed to
the Jaina Yoga with their works.
Sri Aurobindo has presented a new Yoga, called as 'Integral Yoga'. He was the
great Yogi. His Yoga is new, as he has introduced some new concepts
(transformation of lower nature, ascent and descent and superman), new terms
(Supermind, Overmind and Supramental) with new aim and method. There is no
set method of the Integral Yoga, as he has tried to synthesize different yogic

1
DN 3.11.12
2
Tvs.1.1
3
Ybd 201
xv
systems of India. This study has included Integral Yoga, as it represents Yoga of
modern India.
Significance of the Study
Yoga does not mean practice of sanas or breathing. It is a complete system with
its metaphysics and epistemology. It has its spiritual, psychological and physical
importance. The term 'Yoga', has been often misinterpreted. There are many
definitions of Yoga. In the Buddhist texts, 'Yoga' means bondage. Bhagavad Gt
defines it as 'Yogah karmasu kaualam'. Patajali defines it as, 'restraint of mental
states'. Modern generation considers 'Yoga', as a mean to physical well-being.
There are many misconceptions about Yoga. 'Yoga' is popular all over the world
in innumerable number of forms and names such as Kriy Yoga, Kualin Yoga,
Amt Yoga, Green Yoga, tma Yoga and so on. Every day new schools of Yoga are
emerging. These schools are combinations of old and new yogic methods. If this
continues for longer time, we may forget our precious ancient tradition of Yoga.
As a student of philosophy, it is necessary to understand the concept of 'Yoga' and
to preserve our ancient treasure of Yoga. In order to understand 'Yoga' in the
Buddhism, Jainism and Ptajala Yoga; important works of some scholars who
had done research in this area, are studied.
Literature Review
a) Jaina Yoga k locantmaka Adhayana by Arhadadas Bandoba Dighe (1981):
Present work is part of the thesis which the author did earlier. In the introduction
he states the need of study in the Jaina Yoga. According to him, study of Yoga in
the Vedic tradition and Buddhism is done. He does not mention work done so far
on this subject.
xvi
The first chapter, 'Bhratya Parampar me Yoga', deals with Yoga in the Vedas,
Upaniads, Mahbhrata, Gt, Smti, Puras, Yogavsiha, Ptajala Yoga and
in Advaita Vednta. It describes different types of Yoga like Haha Yoga, Ntha
Yoga and other. The second chapter, ' Jaina Yoga Shitya', lists the literature of the
Jaina Yoga. The third chapter, 'Yoga k Svarp', explains nature of Yoga in the
Jainism. The fourth chapter, 'Yoga ke Sdhana - cra', mentions rules of conduct
in the Vedic tradition and Buddhism briefly. It describes cras in the Jainism in
detail. The fifth chapter, ' Yoga ke Sdhana - Rpa dhyna' mentions meditation in
the Buddhism in short and discusses dhynas in the Jainism in detail. The sixth
chapter, 'dhytmika Viksakrama', deals with theory of Guasthna and Eight
Yoga view points in the Jainism. The Seventh chapter, 'Yoga k Lakya, Labdhiy
evam Moka ' describes miraculous powers of Yogi and concept of moka in the
Jainism.
The author concludes that there are some similarities among the Jaina Yoga and
other Yoga; still the Jainism has its own special characteristic significance.
b)Ptajala Yoga philosophy with reference to Buddhism by Koichi Yamashita
(1994): In the preface, the author states that the present work is part of his Ph.D.
thesis. There is discussion on comparative basis regarding analysis of mind in the
Yoga Stras, its commentary and in the Buddhist text.
The first chapter 'Parima theory in terms of Purua and Evolution of Prakti', is
dedicated to discussion of d, dya and theory of Parima. The second
chapter, ''Parima theory in terms of mental phenomena', mentions Dharma
Parima which includes Citta Parima. Vysa has used Sarvstivda concepts
for elaborating this theory which is criticized by Vasubandhu in Abhidhammakoa.
The third chapter, 'The constitution of mind', is devoted to the study of function of
mind as in Yoga philosophy and in Sarvstivda School. Attempt is made to
xvii
present similarities and differences in both systems. The fourth chapter,
'Epistemology in Yoga philosophy', focuses on theory of perception in Yoga
Philosophy. It describes Pramas and refutation of stand point of the Yogcra
school of Buddhism by Yoga school. The fifth chapter, 'Samdhi theory in the
Yoga philosophy and Buddhism ', discusses and compares Yoga, Samdhi in both
systems.
The author humbly states that both schools have adopted ideas from one another,
thereby, enriching store house of knowledge relating to mind.
c) Jaina Evam Bauddha Yoga - Eka tulantmaka Adhyayana by Sudha Jaina
(1998): In the introduction the author states that Yoga does not belong to a
particular tradition. Method of Yoga may be different but Yoga is Universal. In
modern times practice of Yoga is significant. She adds that, comparison of Jaina
Yoga and Bauddha Yoga is not done previously.
The first chapter 'Bhratya Yoga Parampar: Eka Avalokana' deals with brief
description of Yoga in the Vedas, Upaniads, Mahbhrata, Gt, Smti, Puras,
Yogavsiha, Ptajala Yoga and in the Advaita Vednta. It states brief
comparison among them. The second chapter 'Yoga Ki Avadhra: Jaina Evam
Bauddha', presents nature of Yoga in the Jainism where outline of Samyak
darana, Samyak jnaand Samyak critra is given. la, Samdhi and Praj are
discussed under nature of Yoga in the Buddhism. Comparison between them is
also done. Third chapter 'Jaina Evam Bauddha Yoga Shitya' describes Yoga
literature in two traditions. Fourth chapter 'Jaina Evam Bauddha Yoga k
Tattvamimsya dhra', explains dravya in the Jainism and four noble truths,
dependent origination in Buddhism. It also mentions theory of Karma in both the
systems. Fifth chapter is 'Yoga Sdhan k cra Paka', where rules of conduct
for monks and common people in both the traditions are described with little
xviii
comparison. Sixth chapter 'Dhyna' is about nature of dhyna in the Jainism and
Buddhism. Here, different types of meditations are discussed. Vipassan and
Prekdhyna are also described. Seventh chapter 'dhytmika Viksa ki
Bhmiy', states stages of spiritual development in both systems. It includes
fourteen guasthnas and eight Yoga view points in the Jaina Yoga, four stages of
saints in the Hnayna and ten stages of spiritual development in the Mahyna.
Eighth chapter 'Bandhana Evam Moka ' deals with concepts of bandha and moka
in the Jainism and Buddhism. It explains karma, moka, dependent origination and
nirva with comparison. Ninth chapter 'Upasahra' is conclusion which is short
summary of what is stated earlier. The author has described the facts. She has
mentioned similar concepts in two schools without critical comparison.
d) Ptajal Yoga Evam Jaina Yoga k tulantmaka Adhyayana by Aruna Anand
(2002): In the the introduction, author states that study is about Yoga and the
Jainism. The Jaina Yoga is not popular as the Ptajala Yoga is. In ancient
literature of the Jainism, concepts of Yoga are scattered in seed form. It was in
eighth century, .Haribhadraji, who tried to mould the Jaina Yoga as that of the
Ptajala Yoga. He tried to reconcile various Yogic methods. His works on Yoga
inspired later cryas to follow his footsteps. The author has studied works of .
Haribhadraji, . ubhacandraji, . Hemacandraji and Updhyya Yaovijayji as
basis for her research.
The first chapter 'Ptajala Yoga Evam Jaina Yoga - Sdhan tath Sambandhita
Shitya' is concerned with comparison of two systems in brief. It lists Yoga
literature in these systems. A brief history of some important Jaina cryas is
mentioned. The second chapter 'Yogak svarupa evam bheda' describes brief
comparison of nature of Yoga between two schools. The third chapter 'Yogake
adhikri, prrthamika yogyat evam vayaka nirdea' deals with different types
xix
of Yogi who can practice Yoga in both the systems. It also discusses basic
requisites such as food, anuhna and guru. The fourth chapter 'Yoga aur cra',
presents necessity of virtuous conduct in both traditions. Further, it discusses the
rules of conduct for rvakas, ramaas and theory of Karma in the Jainism. The
fifth chapter 'dhytmika Viksakrama', mentions stages of spiritual development
in two schools. Description of fourteen Guasthnas and theory of eight Yoga
viewpoints in the Jainism is given. The sixth chapter 'Siddhi Vimara', states the
miraculous powers in the Jaina Yoga and the Ptajala Yoga. The seventh chapter
'Ptajala Yoga Evam Jaina Yoga me paraspara smya, vaiamya evam vaiitya',
is the last chapter that mentions similarities, differences and some special
characters in both Yoga.
The author has given very brief discussion of the Ptajala Yoga. Her objective is
to present the Jaina Yoga (as mentioned in the introduction). At places author
argues that Yoga stras do not mention Yoga adhikri of aga Yoga and basic
requisites of a Yogi. Moreover, she states that as Patajali has mentioned the four
parts of Yoga - Pratyhra, Dhra, Dhyna and Samdhi', separately; nature of
'dhyna' in the Ptajala Yoga is not as broad as in the Jaina Yoga; as Jaina Yoga
has included all three parts into 'dhyna '. So concept of dhyna in the Jaina Yoga
is broader than that in the Ptajala Yoga.
e) A Re-appraisal of Ptajala Yoga Stras in the light of Buddha's teaching by
S.N.Tandon (2007): In the Preface the author states that there is influence of the
Buddhism (along with some influence of Skhya) on Yoga Stras. Here, he cites
Prof. A. B. Keith. ("It (Yoga Stras) is a confused text".) The author agrees with
him and adds that the reason for this confusion is the absence of Buddha's original
teachings during the time of the Patajali. As a result there is disagreement
between the commentators. This flaw can be corrected by re-appraisal of Yoga
xx
Stras in the light of Buddha's teaching. It will help to understand real meaning of
Yoga Stras. He mentions names of few Buddhist Monks who attained super
normal powers. He argues that Yoga bhya does not mention any name. Section
One 'Matters consistent with Buddha's teaching', deals with concepts and terms
that are consistent with Buddha's teaching. Concepts such as Vipassan,
Dharmamegha are discussed. Author argues that vivekakhyti is synonym to
vipassan. The similar terms like nirodha, bhvan and others are mentioned.
Section Two 'Matters inconsistent with Buddha's teaching', deals with some the
Yoga Stra concepts that differ from the Buddhism. The author states that the aim
of Yoga Stras is cittavttinirodha (cessation of mental fluctuations); while that of
the Buddhism is Cittanirodha (cessation of mind itself). Section Three mentions
'Super normal powers' in Yoga Stras briefly and describes those of Buddhism in
detail. Section four 'Goal Realization', explains Yoga way and Buddha way to
realization and compares meditation of two systems. Author argues that Yoga
Stras do not use term 'vedana' as that in the Buddhism. He states: "The most
plausible reason for this could be that the author (Patajali) of this work did not
experience the truth of impermanence himself and bereft of such an experience, he
came to hold some different notion of what "truth" implies." He concludes that
those practicing meditation on basis of the Yoga Stras cannot go beyond third
dhyna. Aim of the Buddhist meditation is higher than that of the Yoga Stras.
Section Five is 'The taste of the pudding is in the eating', where author claims that
the Buddhist texts mention names of some persons who attained nibbna , But he
has not come across any practitioner of the Yoga Stras, who claims that he had
attained kaivalya as mentioned in the Yoga Stras.
It seems that Dighe and Sudha Jaina state some similarities in the Jaina Yoga and
Yoga in the Buddhism and other Yogas. Dighe states the special importance of the
Jaina Yoga as it is the main topic of his study. Mr. Koichi also humbly states that
xxi
both the Yoga philosophy and the Buddhism have adopted ideas from one another,
thereby, enriching store house of knowledge relating to mind. Aruna Anand has
described the Jaina Yoga in detail with very little reference to the Ptajala Yoga.
At places she defends Jaina Yoga. e.g. Concept of meditation in the Jainism is
broader than in the Ptajala Yoga. S.N. Tandon clearly defends the Buddhist
Yoga and states superiority of Buddha's teachings and its complete influence on
Yoga stras as if Patajali has explained only Buddhist concepts in his work
without experience.
Research Problem
Such controversial views raise many questions such as
What are the meaning and method of Yoga in the Buddhism, Jainism, Ptajala
Yoga and in the Integral Yoga?
Upaniads existed prior to these systems. So there is need to see the seeds of
Yoga in the Upaniads.
What are similar Yoga concepts among these three systems?
In last century Sri Aurobindo presented 'Integral Yoga' which is recent version
of the Indian Yoga. None of the above authors have mentioned about it. Thus it
becomes essential to find out the facts and fill the gaps.
Hypothesis
After reviewing the literature related to the topic,
It appears that Yoga is practiced in India since ancient time. The Vedas and
Upaniads contain concept of Yoga in the seed form.
Meaning of Yoga changed with time and tradition.
The philosophical schools such as the Jainism, Buddhism and Ptajala Yoga
suggest Yoga as a means (also as an end) to attain Liberation.
xxii
The method of Yoga in each of these systems is unique but with some
similarities.
Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga is a new Yoga which links to ancient tradition
with new aim and method.
Objective of the research
The objective is to understand meaning and method of Yoga in the Vedas,
Upaniads, Jainism, Buddhism, Ptajala Yoga and Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga.
Research Method
Due to Philosophical literary nature of the research, Descriptive method is used to
collect and analyze the data. The primary data includes the original texts and
translations of some of them in English, Marathi, Hindi and Guajarati. The
secondary data involves reference works of some scholars related to the topic. Both
types of sources are used to define Yoga and to describe method of Yoga in the
particular system of Yoga under consideration in each chapter. Comparison of
similar terms and concepts among the Upaniads, Buddhism, Jainism and Ptajala
Yoga is done in the last chapter. Critical analysis of the Yogic concepts is done
wherever is essential.
Scope of research
In case of the study of Yoga in the Vedas, Sri Aurobindo's interpretation of the
Vedas is referred. In case of the Upaniads, scope is limited to the ancient principle
Upaniads and Yoga Upaniads. The Buddhist Yoga includes study of Yoga in the
Hnayna and Mahyna schools. Vinay Piaka, Stta Piaka, Viuddhimagga,
Abhidhamma Koa Bhya and other modern works are referred for the Buddhist
Yoga in Hnayna. For the Mahyna schools, Praj Pramit Stta, Lakvatr
Stta and related works of Narendra Dev, N. Dutta and others are studied. Study of
the Jaina Yoga includes . Haribhadrajis works such as Yogabindu,
xxiii
Yogadisamuccaya, Yogaataka and Yogaviik; Jnrava by .
ubhacandra; Yogastra by . Hemacandrasri; Dhyna atak by .
Jnabhadragaiji, some gama and other works on the Jainism are very important
sources of the Jaina Yoga. The Ptajala Yoga stra with its bhya by Vimala
Karnataki and others are studied. Sri Aurobindo's works on Integral Yoga are
source of constant inspiration. Due to non availabity of some texts and their
translations, complete justice may not have been given in describing certain
concepts.
Research Plan
The First chapter, 'Yoga in the Vedas and Upaniads', describes Yoga in the Vedas
and Upaniads. It studies meaning and method of Yoga in the Vedas and
Upaniads .The word 'Yoga' occurs in the gveda in various senses such as Yoking
or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connections and the like. In the Vedic
hymns the yogic experiences, intuitions and revelations are described with mystic,
symbolic language. The method of Yoga includes the practice of virtues and
meditation. In the Upaniads, important virtues stated are - satya (truthfulness),
tapa, brahmacarya (celibacy) and faith. Other virtues are Svdhyya (study of
scriptures), dna (giving), vidy, ama and dama. Karma Yoga is also stated.
Description of Yogic method is present in veta Up., Kah Up., Maitr Up. Posture,
place of meditation is also mentioned. Comparison of Yoga in the Upaniads and
Ptajala Yoga is done.
The Second chapter, 'Yoga in the Buddhism, Part 1 [Hnayna]', studies meaning
and method of Yoga in the Hnayna. In the Theravada Buddhism, the method of
Yoga includes three principles. They are la, Samdhi and Praj. Buddhaghoa
xxiv
in the Viuddhimagga gives details of it. Detailed discussion of these three
principles is done.
The Third chapter, ' Yoga in the Buddhism [Part 2 -Mahyna]' is devoted to
understand meaning and method of Yoga in the Mahyna. It mentions that the
Mahyna means the great vehicle; Bodhisattva Yna. Here, Yoga means
meditation. Its greatness lies in things such as its compassionate motivation,
directed to the salvation of countless beings, the profundity of the wisdom it
cultivated, the emptiness it taught, taking up of skill in means and its superior goal,
omniscient Buddhahood. Further, it explains some important concepts such as
Vijnvda, nyavda and Stages of spiritual development in the Mahyna.
The Fourth chapter, 'Jaina Yoga', is devoted to the study of the Jaina Yoga in
gams and . Haribhadrasri's Jaina Yoga. The Jaina Yoga in gams presents
Samyak darana (right inclination), Samyak jna (right cognition) and Samyak
caritra (right conduct) in detail. . Haribhadrasri's Yoga includes different types
of yoga, yogi, anuhnas and eight Yoga view Points.
The Fifth chapter, 'The PtajalaYoga', describes meaning and method of Yoga in
the Yoga stras. Critical discussion of Yoga, Citta, Citta vttis, theory of Karma,
theory of Parima and eight fold Yoga is done.
The Sixth chapter, 'Integral Yoga', states detailed description of meaning and
method of Sri Aurobindo's Yoga. It discusses objective, pre requisites of the
Integral Yoga and planes of consciousness. Sdhan through work, knowledge and
love, triple transformation and experiences of Yoga are also mentioned.
The Seventh chapter, 'Comparison and conclusion' deals with comparison of
similar terms and concepts in the three traditions of Yoga. It concludes that Yoga is
practiced since pre-Vedic period. Seeds of Yoga are seen in the Vedas and
xxv
Upaniads. The meaning and method of Yoga in the Veda, Upaniads, Buddhism,
Jainism, Ptajala Yoga and Integral Yoga are different. The Upaniads,
Buddhism, Jainism, Ptajala Yoga (except the Veda) suggest the practice of Yoga
as means (also as an end) to attain liberation. The Integral Yoga suggests the
practice of Yoga in order to unite with the universal and transcendent existence and
to bring down supramental consciousness on the earth. The Integral Yoga is
synthesis of traditional Yoga. It includes the concepts that are present in the
Upaniads and Bhagavad Gt. So it links us to the ancient tradition. The
Buddhism includes some practices such as dhtga that are also mentioned in the
Jainism. It shows influence of Jainism on the Buddhism. There is influence of
Buddhism on the Ptajala Yoga. Influence of the Bhakti cult is seen on the
Mahyna. . Haribhadrasri's Yoga shows influence of the Buddhism and
Ptajala Yoga. Every system of Yoga is unique with some common Yoga parts
among them.
Contribution
Literature review reveals that study of Yoga of either a single or two traditions is
done. But this study gives detailed philosophical description of three traditions
with reference to the Upaniads and Integral Yoga as modern Yoga tradition of
India. It will help to remove misunderstandings about Yoga in minds of common
people.

CHAPTER - I

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF BUDDHIST LOGIC

The Logic developed under Buddhism is known as Buddhist Logic.

Acrya Dinga and Acrya Dharmakrti were considered as the two
shining stars of this system. Before them, teachers like Ngrjuna, Arya
Deva, Maitreya, Asaga, Vasubandhu etc also handled logical topics in a
stray manner in their philosophical works. But Acrya Dinga and
Acrya Dharmakrti have constructed logical topics in a systematic
manner. So Dinga is known as The father of Buddhist Logic.
Dharmakrti made further improvement after Dinga. Buddhist school
has got a remarkable place in the development of the logical thinking in
Indian philosophical systems. We should have reconstructed the origin
and development of Buddhist Logic from the basic principles of
Buddhism at the grass root level to the highest doctrines of logical
thinking. So we have to go through the history of the teachings of
Buddha to logical foundation laid by the great teachers like Ngrjuna
upto Dharmakrti in this Chapter.

15
In the 6th century B.C. the society was clearly divided into four Varas
namely Brhmaas, Katriyas, Vaiyas and Sdras. Then Vara was
divided on the basis ofbirth. Each Vara has well defined with functions.
Brhmaas were given the functionsof priests and teachers. They claimed
the highest status in the society. They were exempted from taxation and
punishments. The Katriyas were ranked as the second in the Vara
hierarchy. They collected taxes from the peasants. The third of Vara
system were Vaiyas. They were engaged in agriculture, cattle rearing
and trade. They were the prominent tax payers. Sdras were the servants
of these three higher Varas. They were kept out from hearing and
studying the Vedas.
Along with this women were banned from learning Vedic texts.
They were considered as domestic slaves2
. The higher Varas were more
privileged. Vaiyas and Sdras were severely punished even for slight
offences. Naturally the Vara divided the human society. This generated
tensions among the Vaiyasand Sdras. They failed to raise their protest
against the misdeeds of the peoples belonging to higher
Varas. Katriyas also suffered the ritualistic supremacy of Brhmaas.
The soil of Gangetic plain became ready to accept a new movement
16
against this attitude. Numerous religious sects arose in middle Gangetic
plains since that time. Among them Buddhism and Jainism were more
attracted by those marginalized people, because of the style of simple
puritan ascetic life .The teachings of Buddha have helped them to be
awakened with the spirit of questioning against evil acts. Thus Buddha
made this age as an Age of Enlightenment
3
.
Gautama Buddha is recorded as the founder of Buddhism.
He was born in Gotama clan in 570 B.C. in the Terai, law lands near the
foot hills of Himalayas4
. His name was Siddhartha, in his early
childhood. Later he became known as Skyamuni, the sage of Skya. The
Skyas were a small Katriya tribe who lived at the border of India and
Nepal. Their capital was at Kapilavastu. His father was a famous
Katriya Skya ruler named Suddhodhana. His mother Maya
Devi was the princess of Kosala Dynasty. There was a story
about the birth of Gautama Buddha. He was born under two Sal trees in
Lumbini grove, the way to his mothers home at Devdaha, which was
the town next in importance to Kapilavastu.
Maya, his mother died seven days after his birth; Siddhartha was
brought up by his stepmother named Prajapati Gautami. In the days of
17
his boyhood he showed interest in meditation. He was married at the age
of sixteen to a beautiful girl named Yaodhara. But married life did not
attract him. The sight of an old man, a sick man and a dead body deeply
touched his heart. He realized the meaningless state of worldly pleasures.
An intense desire for an ascetic life disturbed his mind. When he became
a father of a child, he left his home at the age of twenty-nine to find out a
solution for the miseries of the world. This departure gave birth to Great
Renunciation.
He spent six continuous years as a homeless ascetic. Two religious
teachers named Alra Klma and Uddaka
Rmaputta gave instructions during this period. The technique of
meditation is instructed by Uddaka Rmaputta.
Without gaining much satisfaction, in this instruction he went to
practice severe penances. But he realized that those were also fruitless
efforts to find out the truth. He gave up penances, took a bath in river
namely Nirajana and received a bowl of tasty rice milk from a farmers
daughter named Sujta, in the full moon day of Vaikha. He moved
towards mgadha and sat under a Pipal tree at Gaya there he absorbed
himself in deep meditation. At the age of thirty-five he attained the
18
Supreme Knowledge. Thus he became Buddha which means the
Enlightened and that Pipal tree became famous as Bodhi vka. That
place became popular as Bodh Gaya in later period.
Gautama Buddha started his journey from there. He delivered his
first sermon at the Deerpark at Saranath in Banaras. As a result of this
discourse five disciples joined with him. He used the common language
for communication
before common man. Buddha advised his pupils to adopt a
middle path between the luxuries and the austerities. This can help
one to lead a perfect life. With followers he began to take long journeys
on foot and spread his message far and
wide among common people. He had the habit of travelling long
distances by foot, i.e., about twenty to thirty kilometers per day. He kept
on wandering for forty years, resting only during the rainy seasons.
During this long period of his journey he encountered many staunch
supporters of rival sects including Brhmaas. He defeated them in
debates. His missionary activities did not create any discrimination
between the rich and the poor. He addressed the common people about
19
the worldly problems. He preached his teachings as a means to destruct
the suffering and rebirth. Gautama Buddha attained Nirva at the age
of eighty in 483.B.C. at Kunagara or Kasia near Ghorakpur. His death
happened between two Sal trees. Thus some similarities between his
birth, enlightenment and death are recorded by
some scholars like Damein Keown, C.V. Joshi etc. They pointed out that
all these incidents have occurred in between Sal trees on the full moon
day of Vaiakhamonth.
Sri Buddha, the first rationalist of the world asserted that
he was the savior and master of human kindness without any reference.
Buddhas life itself resembles as an evidence for
his reasoning ability and practical wisdom. He advocated not only a set
of doctrines or dogmas but a rational scheme of spiritual development
also. He rejected the infallibility of the Vedas and condemned the bloody
animal sacrifices in the name of attaining heaven. He raised his protest
against, this complicated meaningless rituals, caste system and
supermacist nature of Brhmaas. He received all people to his Sagha
without considering caste and creed. Buddha says!
20
One does not become a Brahmin by birth,
One does not become an outcastby birth,
One becomes a Brahmin by act,
One becomes an outcast by act 8
Thus Buddhism was liberal and democratic while comparing with
other religions. Women were also admitted in Buddhist Saghas.
Buddha tried to fight with evil by goodness and hatred with love.
Irrespective of caste and sex, the door of the Sagha was always opened
towards mankind.
So Buddhism attracted the ordinary people more than the
people belonging to the higher caste. Buddhas teachings were always
closely connected with life and worldly problems. According to Buddha
mans destiny determines with the result of his actions. In order to
attain salvation one must purify himself through his Karmaleading with
a pure life. He says that the world is full of sorrows and sufferings.
These are caused by our desires. When man win to root out his desire
form his life man will be freed from the circle of birth and death. The
knowledge about Four Noble Truth leads man to this victorious state.
Sothese teachings have an important place in the life of a Buddhist.
21
Four Noble Truths :- They are, Life is suffering (Dukhamasti), Suffering
is caused by desires (Dukha samudayamasti),
Suffering can have an end. (Dukha nirodha masti) and There is a path
which leads to the end of suffering (Dukha nirodhopyamasti)
8
. Among
these truths, the fourth can attain through the practice of the Eight fold
path (Atga mrga).
Atga mrga
They are such as- Right view (Samyag dti), Right
resolve (Samyag samkalpa), Right speech (Samyag vk), Right action
(Samyag karmnta), Right livelihood (Samyag jva), Right efforts
(Samyag vyyma), Right mindfulness (Samyag smti), Right
meditation (Samyag samdhi )
9
.
Right View - The acceptances of Buddhist teachings and practices in
ideal life.
Right resolve - It means that making a serious commitment to develop
right attitude.
Right speech - Telling the truth and speak in a thoughtful and sensitive
way.
22
Right action - It is abstaining from wrongful behaviour like killing,
stealing or behaving wrongfully with respect to sensual pleasures.
Right livelihood - It means that not engaging in an occupation which
causes harm to others.
Right efforts - Gaining control of ones thoughts and cultivate positive
state of mind.
Right mindfulness - It helps to cultivate constant awareness.
Right meditation - It develops deep level of mental calm through various
techniques, which helps concentrate the mind and integrate the
personality.
The above narrated eight fold path can be divided into three
categories, viz., Morality (la), Meditation (samdhi) and Wisdom
(praj). Right view and Right resolve can be included under the
category of wisdom. Right speech, Right action and Right livelihood
come under the category of morality. Right effort,
23
Right mindfulness and Right action includes under meditation. The
virtuous path as suggested by Buddha made a code of practical ethics
which has a rational outlook10
.
Special Features of Buddhism - The teaching of Buddha has attained the
nature of philosophy at this period. The theory of
momentariness is the most important feature of early Buddhism (yat sat
tat Kanika). Buddhism does not believe in God, Soul and Eternity.
The No-soul theory can be considered as the basic principle of
Buddhist philosophy11
.
This can be considered as a kind of revolution in the history of Indian
Religions. Buddhism thus created and developed a new awareness in the
field of intellect and culture. It taught people not to be taken things for
granted but to be argued and judged them on merits. Buddhism
therefore became more social than a religious revolution. It taught the
code of practical ethics and laid down the democratic principles for
social equality.
After the Nirva of Buddha his followers assembled three times at
various places. These assemblies helped them
24
to consolidate and interpret the sayings of their teacher. They codified
some rules of discipline to settle their disputes. But
some direct pupils like Ananda and Puraa held it better to abide by
what they had heard from their teachers mouth, rather than to accept
the conclusions of the first council. L.M. Joshi states that a century after
Buddhas parinirva a
controversy has resulted in schisms within the saghas. He observes that
geographical and local influences seem to have contributed towards the
growth of controversies in doctrinal and disciplinary things12
.
To get a clear picture about the details of these three important
councils, the time and place where it held might be examined.
The first council: It was conducted in 490 B.C. immediately after the
death of Buddha under the leadership of Mahkayapa at Saptapari
cave in Rajagha13
. Five-hundred sages assembled in that council.
Ananda, the cousin and the dearest disciple of Buddha, recited the
Suttas. Upali, who was a barber before his initiation and later he became
the
25
most competent authority in instructing discipline and he recited
Vinayas. Then Abhidhamma was not formed. Men
who assembled in that council became known asTheras. They collected
and canonized the teachings of Buddha on the basis of Theravda.
The second council: This was conducted after one hundred years of first
council, ie, in 390 B.C. under the leadership of
Kloka (Aka the black), it was held at Vaili. This council tried to
settle the monastic discipline. They began to recite the canon once again.
This session was continued for eight months. But more than thousands
of monks violated certain rules of Theravda which settled in the first
council. So they were expelled from the community of Theras. These
expelled priests were called Mahsghikas. They were the first heretical
sect of Buddhism14
. They made certain additions and alternations in
Theravda. They not only acted as the transmitters of tradition but also
the commentators of the sayings of their great teacher.

The third council: - Under the leadership of King Aoka the third council
was held at Paliputra in 253 B.C15
. At that time schisms were raised in
the Buddhist order. A fresh recitation
of texts was necessary and it is conducted by the officials under the
26
Presidency of Tissa Mogaliputta. Abhidhamma was codified in that
council. Thus the Tipiaka is formed. Missionaries were sent to carry the
sayings of Buddha to the extreme limits of the empire and beyond.
Mahinda, the son of Asoka went to Ceylon in 250.B.C. carrying Tipiaka
for preaching the doctrines of Buddhism with great interest. But at this
time the Buddhist order had already split into numerous sects including
the Orthodox believers. Thus within two hundred years from parinirva
of the master, totally eighteen heretical sects arose viz., Theras,
Mahsgikas, Gokulika, Ekabhohrika, Paatti, Bhulika, Cetiya,
Sabbatthi, Dhammaguttika, Kassapya, Sakantika, Sutta, Himavata,
Rjagirya, Siddhatthika, Pubbaselya, Aparaselyaand Vajirya
16
.

Tipiaka- The sacred teaching of Buddha is canonized by his followers

as Tipiaka or Piakattaya (piakatraya) which signifies three
baskets. They are Sermon Basket (Sutta piaka), Discipline Basket
(Vinaya piaka) and Metaphysical
Basket (Abhidhamma piaka)
17
. These teachings were written in Pali
language.
27
Suttapiaka- It means the basket of suttas. The Pali word sutta
correspondes as the Sanskrit word stra. But it lost its original
definition as brief rules and later it became equivalent to the doctrinal
text or doctrinal exposition. Dhamma in place of sutta was rehearsed by
Ananda in 1st
Buddhist council. It consist of five Nikys, viz., Diggha Nikya, Majjima
Nikya, Samyutta Nikya, Agttara Nikya and Khuddaka Nikya
18
.
Dr. S.C. Vidybhaa recorded that some narrations about
ramaas and brhmaas who were also called as takki
(argumentationists) and vimsi (causists) can be seen in these works.
These people were indulged in takka (argumentation) and vimms
(causistry) were found in
Brahmajlasutta, a part of Diggha Nikya of the Suttapiaka. G.C.
Pandey also records that the major part of Nikyas were done in the 4th
century B.C. and these Nikyas were closely related to ancient Buddhism
or the Original Teachings of
Buddha. Majjima Nikya is one among them in the chapters of
Suttapiaka. Anumna Sutta of Majjima Nikya refers the word
Anumna in the sense of Inference and the word Vda in the sense of
28
discussion
19
. Similarly Udana one of the chapter of Khuddaka Nikya
of Suttapitaka states that As long as the perfect Buddha do not appear,
either the Trkkikas (sophists) are not corrected or the Savakas; Owing to
their evil views they are not released from misery. From
this passage we can assume that the word Trkkikas is used in the
sense of sophists during this period.
Vinayapiaka- It is the framed as the rules and regulations of monastic
discipline for the Buddhist monks as well as the nuns. Vinayapiaka
deals with different types of rules with two phases (ubato): one for men
and the other for women20
. They
are totally five in number viz, Ptimokha, Mahvagga, Cullavagga,
Suttavibhaga and Parivra.
(a) Ptimokha - It is intended for pratimoka, in sanskrit which
signifies the days of confession. It is hardly anything
else but a catalogue of sins and the regulations pertaining to them21
.
(b) Mahvagga - It is a detailed code of duties for daily life of nuns or
otherwise it starts with a piece of Biography of Buddha22
.
29
(c) Cullavagga- It is also record of detailed code of duties. It also includes
the history of councils conducted after the death of Buddha23
.
(d) Suttavibhaga - It is a commentary on Ptimokha; it describes the
origin of sins, interpretation of the sins and
discussion of the method and application to relieves from these sins. 24
(e) Parivra - Dr.S.C. Vidybhaa states that Parivra mentions four
types of the cases for settlement
(adhikaras)
25
. They are Vivddhikaraa (a case pertaining to differences
of opinion), Anuvdadhikaraa (a case in which one party accuses
another party of the violation of a rule of good conduct), Apattdhikaraa
(a case in which a monk has
actually transgressed an established rule of good conduct)
and Kiccdhikaraa (a case relating to the formal procedure of an
ecclesiastical ). Seven rules for the settlement of cases also includes in
Vinayapiaka, named as Adhikaraa samath dhamm. They are
Sammukhvinaya (settlement in presence) Sati vinaya (settlement from
recollection), Amtha vinaya (settlement for the insane), Patinanaya
Karetabham (settlement by an under taking) Yebhuyyasik (settlement
by a majority), Tassa papiyyasik (settlement with the prospect of further
30
inquiry) and Tina Vatthraka (covering over the grass).All the
complaints were handled by the Saghas including the members of a
council and the Judge.The
judge should handle the problem of the complaintant and respondent
with impartial approach. The Judge himself should behaves as a true
follower of Buddha
26
.

Abhidhammapiaka - The third basket is called as Abhidhammapiaka.

It explains the character and motives of dharma and moka (Nirva). It
can be considered as
equal to two baskets. It consists of seven books of metaphysics viz.,
Dhammasamangani, Vibhnga, Kathvattu, Puggalapannatti,
Dhtukatha, Yamaka and Patthana27
.
Mahavibha was the commentary of Abhidhammapiaka which
considered as a prama
by Vaibhikas
28
. This was composed by the learned
and venerated monk named Tissa Moggaliputta. Kathvatuppakaraa
a work of Abhidhammapiaka mentions some technical
terms of logic viz., anuyoga (enquiry), aharaa (illustration), patinna
31
(proposition), upanaya (application of reason), niggaha (humiliation or
defeat) etc29
.
Main Sects of Buddhism
Gradually Buddhist community was scattered by schisms. The
literary productions of them fell into two
divisions. Each of them had a sacred tongue of its own. These important
sects were called as new school such as Hnaynaand Mahyna
30
.

Hnayna- This word stands for Inferior vehicle. It is usually employed

for ancient Buddhism31
. They give importance to
Tipiakas. They were also known as Theravdins because of their
orthodox mindfulness. They considered Buddha as a super personality
and Nirva is the supreme goal, which is to be acquired only through
ascetic life.
Mahyna- The word Mahyna signifies Great vehicle
32
. It is also
known as Bodisattvayna, means the vehicle of the future Buddha. This
school claims to have been founded by the Buddha himself, through the
first confined to selected group of hearers. The earliest literature of
Mahynais known as the Mahyna Stras. These stra are regarded as
traditional and proclaimed by Buddha. It starts with the remarks that
eva may uta, (Thus have I heard). King Kanika was a great
32
patron of this school. He introduced Sanskrit as a medium of language
for communicating Buddhist principles in society. A large collection of
works
were translated by the direction of King Kanika this collection is
preserved under Navadharmas. Navadharmas is a series
of books which have been composed at different persuations and it was
translated and collected by these monks.
They are Ata Sahasrika, Praja paramita, Gandaka vyha, Daa
bhumvara, Samdhi rja, Lakvatrastra, Sa dharma pudarka,
Tatgatha guhyaka, Lalitavistara and Suvara prabhasa. In these works
we can see many logical references 33
.
Four schools of Buddhism - Gradually there were four main divisions
arose among Buddhists according to their varied approaches and
interpretations of Buddhist teaching. They are Vaibhika, Sautrntika,
Yogcra and Mdhyamika. Vaibhika and Sautrntika come under the
school of Hnayna, Yogcra and Mdhyamika are the two divisions
under the school of Mahyna
33.
Vaibhikas - This name is derived from the word Vibhsa which
signifies commentary. They give importance to commentaries rather
33
than the original teachings of Buddha. They are also called
Sarvstivadins. Their philosophy is called
as Anaikntika Yathrthyavda and Hetuvda. They accept the
commentary of Mahavibhsaas prama
34
.
Sautrntika- The word Sautrntika is derived from
Strnta. Which means theOriginal teachings of Buddha. Huentsang
states that the efficient teacher named Kumralabdha of Taxila was
the founder of this school35
.
Yogcra - The word Yoga means meditation and Acra means
practice. As the name indicates, this school emphasizes the practice of
meditation. They believe that this is the way to get perfection. This school
holds citta or vijna (the pure consciousness) as the ultimate reality.
So this school is also known as Vijnavda. They says that it is an ever
changing stream of consciousness like flowing water, when one can stop
this flow then the Buddhahood can be attained. Maitreyantha is
considered as the founder of this school. Major works of this system are
Lankvatrastra, Mahasamaya-stra, Bodhisattva-cary-nirdea, Saptada-bhmi-
vibha-astr-yogcra-bhmi
etc.
34

Mdhyamika- The word Mdhyamika is derived from the word

Madhyama, which means the middle
37
. Ngrjuna was the founder
of this school. This system advocates neither the theory of reality, nor the
unreality of the world. But they accept mere relativity. They uphold the
nyta to be the
central idea of their philosophy38
. So they are also known as Snyavdins.
This school is divided as two viz., Prasagika and Svantatra. The
Mdhyamika krika by Ngrjuna, Mlamdhyamavtti by
Buddhapalita, Hastbala prakaraa by Arya Deva, Madhyama-hdayakrikby
Ka, Mdhyamakavatra-kby Jayanta are principal works
of Mdhyamikaschool.
EARLY BUDDHIST WRITERS
Ngrjuna
Ngrjuna had laid the foundation to logical topics in his
philosophical works39
. He developed the philosophy of Voidness or
Snyavda. Through the deep influence of his doctrines on Buddhism he
had been called the founder of Eight Sects among the Japanese40
.
Winternitz records in his
35
History of Indian Literature that he was lived as a contemporary of
Andra King named Gautamiputra Yajasree, who lived around 166-
196.A.D. Rahul Samktyyana also admits this that the date above
mentioned is exactly correct as the period of Ngrjuna. So he fixes the
time of Ngrjuna is around 175.A.D41
. Lma Trntha opines that
Ngrjuna
was a contemporary of King Nemi Candra in Aparntaka. His biography
was translated into Chinese by Kumrajva in 405.A.D
42
. Dr S.C.
Vidybhaa states that Ngrjuna lived round 250-320.A.D
43
. H.
Nakamura states that Ngrjunas time can be fixed around 150-250
A.D. Considering all these observations we can fix his time as around to
the first half of 3rd century A.D.
Ngrjuna was born in a Brahmin family of South India at
Vidarbha. He was the pupil of Saraha in Kalacakra. He studied all the
sciences Vedas and Vedagas. But he was not satisfied with the mere
knowledge of these Sastrs. He was also attracted by Buddhist doctrines,
he began to study and became an expert in that philosophy. It is said
that within
36
ninety days he studied all the three Piaksand mastered their meaning,
but he was not satisfied with the same and continued to search for other
sources to fulfill his ambition. Finally he could accept the Mahyna
stra from a venerable hermit who lived in the Himalayas. He went there
to receive the studentship directly from him. Thus he became an expert
in all philosophies. He energetically propagated Buddhism in Southern
India. He succeeded to convert a powerful King named Bhoja Deva to
Buddhism44
. He promoted the doctrine, viz, nyata and which can be
established through the assumption of two truths, viz, Samvti satya
(conventional truth) and Pramartha satya (supreme truth). This state of
nyata is called Nirva. He became famous as the one among the
founders of the University of Nland
45
. He became known as the
founder of eight sects in Japan. Many works were ascribed to him.
Many scholars have of different opinions about his authorship. They
opine that several Ngrjunas might have been flourished at various
periods.

Works - Th.Stcherbatsky remarks that Ngrjuna had the authorship of

37
more than one hundred works46
. Unfortunately original of these
Sanskrit works were not available. But Tibetan translations exist. Rahul
Saktyyana writes in the journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research
Society, Patna records that Ngrjuna had the authorship of five texts
which includes Yuktiatika47
. K. Venkata Raman opines that
Ngrjuna has written six books, viz.,1)Mdhyamika stra or
Mdhyamika krik, 2) Vigrahavyvartan 3) Mah Praja paramita
tra, 4) Daabhmi Vibha tra, 5) Suhllekha and Ratnvali. Dr.
S.C. Vidybhaa states that Ngrjuna had the authorship of only four
works such as 1) Mdhyamika krik, 2) Vigraha vyvartan krik 3)
Pramavihtana and 4) Upya kaualya hdaya stra
48
.
Mdhyamika Krik- The name Mdhyamika is derived from Madhyama
which means the middle. One who follows the middle path is called
Mdhyamika because they avoid the
two extremes and adopts the middle path. The text Mdhyamikakrik is
written in verses. Rhul Samktyyana
observes that Ngrjuna was the first man who used kriks in textual
writings
49
. Mdhyamika krik is the
first regular work on Mdhyamika philosophy. Snyata is remarked as
38
the ultimate reality in this work. Creating a new philosophy in this work,
Ngrjuna created a revolution in Buddhist teachings. According to
Ngrjuna Mla mdhyamika krika is the comprehended form of four
aspects. They are in contradistinction to onesideness, as the abnegation
of onesideness, as unity in plurality and in
the sense of absolute truth. In this text, he defines some logical terms are
given by him such as Punarukta (repetation), Siddhasdhana
(demonstration of what has already established) and Sdhyasama
(petetio principi) and Parihra(avoidance)50
.
Eight commentaries on this Mla mdhyamika krik were
written. Unfortunately except Chanadrakrtis Prasannapda all other
works were seemed to be lost from its original language. In Chinese and
Tibetan language translation of all these texts are available now.

Vigrahavyvartani Krik - Dr.S.C.Vidybhaa states that the Sanskrit

original of this text was not available to him. Tibetan and Chinese
versions were available. This work in Tibetan is called Rt-sod-pa-bzlogpahi-tshig-
lehur-byas-pa
signifying Memorial verses on quelling
disputes. In this work he defines nyata, as prattyasamutpda and
he criticizes the Nyya theory of Prama given by Akapada as Like a
39
lamp illumines itself and other objects, so does a prama establish itself
and other objects. Ngrjuna puts forward his opinion to criticize that
a lamp cannot illuminate itself as there is no darkness in it. If a lamp
could remove darknes even coming in conduct with it, why could it not
standing here, remove the darkness of the entire universe
51
.
PramaViheana or Prama Vidvasana Prama vihetana literally
signifies the quelling of prama. Dr.S.C. Vidybhaa opines that
the original Sanskrit of this work is not seen by him. Tibetan version of a
commentary
on this work named prama-vihetana-teppitaka-vtti or prama -
vidhvasana- sambhaita-vtti exists even now. It
extends over folios 415 -418 of the Bstan- hgyur, mdo- ha. This is called in
Tibetan Tshad- ma-rnam-pa-hjoms-pa mdor-bsad-pahi-hgrel, which
literally means that a magic stick commentary on prama vihetana or
pramavidvasana
52
.
The name of the commentator is not mentioned this work. He pays
obedience to Manju-ri-kumara bhuta and introduces this work as
follows;To please the learned people,I give san exposition of the
Vihetanaor Vidhvasana.
40
He also observes that the instructions on Nyya delivered by
Ngrjuna are put together to constitute Prama-viheana. A legend
also about Ngrjuna also narrated in it is as follows. Ngrjuna was a
man of greatness and proceeded once for the dissemination of culture to
the region of the Ngs. They exhibited their magical powers which could
not overcome him. Beholding his super human greatnessd Upendra,
King of the Ngs, offered, him his daughter, while the other Nagas
worshipped him in a befitting manner. They
took orders and coming to the region of men practiced the austerities of
monks.
The commentator also reproduced Ngrjunas definition of
categories as follows: (1) tshad - ma (prama) (2) gshal-bya (prameya),
(3) the-tshom (saaya) (4) dgos -pa (prayojana) (5)dpe (danta),
(6) grub-pahi-mthah (siddhnta) (7) Chasas (avayava) (8) rtog-ge
(tarka), (9) gtan-la-phab-pa (niraya) (10) smra-wahi-mthah (vda) (11)
rtsod-pahi-mthah (jalpa), (12) rnam-par-rtstod-pahi-mthah (vitada) (13)
gtan-tshigs-tar-snan-wa (hetvbhsa) (14) tshig-dor (chala), ltas-gcod
(jti) and (16) tshar-gcod-pa nigrahasthna.
41
A syllogism (avayava) is shown to consist of three members, viz., a
proposition, a reason and an example. It may be put in the affirmative or
negative way.
The reasons (hetu) may appear in one of the following relations viz.,
(1) An effect (krya) (2) An identity (svabhva) and (3) Non-perception
(anupalabdhi ).
An example (dtnta) is defined as the place in which
is decisively shown the connection between the reason
(middle term) and its universal companion the predicate (major term).
Upya kaualya hdaya tra- This work is stated to be a work on art
of debate. The name of the work implement the meaning that The
Essence of skill in the accomplishment of action. Dr. S.C. Vidybhaa
records, that the original work in Sanskrit was not available to him. This
work is in Chinese known as Fan-pien-sin-lun. This was translated in
472 A.D. by Ci-cia-ye and Than-Yao. It has four chapter viz., an
elucidation of debate (Vda viadkaraa), an explanation of the point of
defeat (Nigrahasthna) an explanation of the truths (Tattva-vykhyna),
the analogue or farfetched analogy (Jti). This work is available now
through its English translation.
42
I. The first chapter consists of eight sections which treat respectively of
(1) An example (udharaa), (2) A tenet, truth or conclusion (siddhnta)
(3) Excellence of speech (vkya praas ) (4) The defect of speech
(vkya-da) (5) The knowledge of inference (anumna or hetu-jna),
(6) The
appropriate or opportune speech (samayocita-vkya) (7) the fallacy
(hetvbhsa), and (8) the adoption of a fallacious reason (duavkynusaraa).
(1) The example is of two kinds (1) the affirmative or homogenous
example (anvayi udharaa) and (2) the negative or heterogenous
example (vyatireki udharaa).
(2) The conclusion is of four kinds, viz., (1) That accepted by all the
schools (sarvatantra siddhnta), (2) that accepted by a particular school
(pratitantra siddhnta) (3) that accepted hypothetically (adhikaraa
siddhnta) and (4) that which is implied or accepted on assumption
(abhyupagama siddhnta).
43
Conclusions are established through the Prams (the source of valid
knowledge). They are of four kinds, viz., perception (pratyaka)
inference (anumna), comparison (upamna) and scripture (gama).
(3) A speech is said to be excellent if its words are neither inadequate
nor redutant, and its reason and example well expressed.
(4) A speech is said to be defective if its words are inadequate, or
redundant, or if it employs the same word to convey different meanings
or different words to convey the same meaning.
(5) The inference is of three kinds, viz., (1) a priori (prvavat), (2) a
posteior (eavat), and 3) commonly, seen (smnyato dta). The
respective examples are on seeing a cloud one infers that there will be
rain; on seeing a swollen river one infers that there was a rain; on
seeing a man move from one place to another, one infers that the sun,
which rises in the east and sets in the west, must have moved.
(6) The appropriate or opportune speech consists in its being pertinent
to the subject and occasion, e.g. in the discussion as to whether there
will be rain tomorrow, one may appropriately speak of the condition of
the sky of the previous day.
(7) The fallacies signify reasons which are derived from an imperfect
perception, inference, or comparison, or which
44
derivate from the scripture. They are respectively as follows.
(a) The quibble in respect of a term (vak-chala), e.g. a man possess
navakambala while uses the term nava-kambala in the sense of nine
blankets while hereally means a new blanket.
(b) The erratic reason or undistributed middle term (savyabhicara),
e.g. to say that all external things are non- eternal is to employ an
erratic reason, because the sky is an external thing which is eternal.
(c) Balancing the doubt or false assumption (samaya-sama), e.g.
there is doubt as to a certain tall object being
a post or a man, and yet if we proceed to act on the assumption that it
is a man, we commit the fallacy of false assumption.
(d) The mistimed (kltita), e.g. we attempt to prove the eternity of
Veda on the ground that the sound is eternal, when no proof has been
given for the eternity of sound.
45
(e) Balancing the point in dispute or begging the question
(prakaraasama), e.g., the soul is eternal, because it is distinct form
the body. (It is a matter of dispute if a thing which is distinct form the
body is eternal or not.)
(f) Balancing the predicate (sdhyasama), e.g. the sky is eternal,
because it is intangible.
(g) Showing obserdity (vyghta pradarana), e.g. the five objects are
not eternal, because they are apprehended by the senses; the four
elements being also so apprehended are non-eternal. It we say so it
will follow that a tortoise possesses hair and salt possesses smell,
because they areapprehended by the mind: this is absurd.
(h) The contradictory (viruddha) - either in respect of the example or
in respect of the conclusion.
8. The adoption of a fallacious reason - If in the course of ones
argument one commits fallacies, one will be thrown into difficulties
and disgrace.

46
II The points of defeat are the following: (1) The unintelligible
(avijtrtha) (2) non-igenuity (apratibh), (3) silence (ananubhaa),
(4) saying too little (nyna) (5) saying too much (adhika), (6) the
meaningless (nirarthaka), (7) the inopportune (aprptakla), (8) the
incoherent (aprthaka), (9) hurting the proposition (pratij hni).
III. An explanation of the truths deals mainly with the admission of
an opinion (matnuj)
IV. The anlogue or farfetched analogy is of various kinds as follows:
(1) balancing an excess (utkarasam) (2) balacning a deficit (apakarasam),
(3) balancing an unquestionable (avaryasam), (4) balancing a
non - reason (ahetu-sama), (5) balancing the co-presence (prapti-sam),
(6) balacning the mutual absence (aprapti sam), (7) balancing the
doubt (samaya sam), and (8) balacning the counter example
(pratidtnta sam).
Suhllekha - It means the Friendly epistle or friendly letter.
Ngrjuna had a friendship with Satavhana King
named Yajasri Gautamiputra. This text is in the form of a letter which
is written to this King is named as Suhllekha. It exists in Tibetan
47
language. U.K. Nariman states that one hundred and twenty three
verses contains in it. Content of this work is the basic principles of
Buddhism. He addresses the King and advises him to follow the life of a
true Buddhist. How a King should behave himself, how he should rule
his kingdom, how solve the problems of his subject aims at social welfare
and how show kindness towards human beings and animals in the
kingdom of a Buddhist follower. It is recorded that three Chinese
versions of this text are available54
.
Arya Deva
Deva or Arya Deva was another writer on Mdhyamika
philosophy. He was born in South India in the first half of the
4
th century (about 320.A.D.). He was a famous disciple of Ngrjuna. He
is also known as Kararipa, Kaa Deva, Nla Netra, Pigala Netra etc55
.
Along with the biographies of Asvaghosa and Ngrjuna which
translated into Chinese about 401 A.D Kumrajva mentions the life of
Arya Deva as a
great master of the Mahyna. Dr.S.C. Vidybhaa quotes from the
Travalougue of Huent-sang that Arya Deva as a great master of the
Mahyna. Arya Deva was an eminent teacher who preached the original
48
teachings of Buddha. He was very good defender of Buddhism who
always engaged in debates with the Trthas or Scholars from other
countries like Mahakoala Srugha, Prayga, Cola and Vaili
56
. Lama
Taranatha records that Arya Deva was a Pandita who resided for a long
time in Nland. L.M. Joshi states that Mdhyamika School was founded
by Ngrjuna and further developed by his pupil Arya Deva57
. But later
he was hatred and assassinated by a heretic, during the time of Chandra
Gupta (about 320.A.D.).
Works - According to Stcherbatsky three works viz Catuh ataka,
Hastbala prakaraa and Cittauddhi-prakaraa
were attributed to Arya Deva. Dr. S.C. Vidybhaa states that he wrote
many works on Mdhyamika-tra viz., Sataka-tra, Brahmapramtana-yukthi-
hetu-siddhi
etc. H.Nakamura states that the above
works ascribed to Arya
Deva including Akara-ataka also. Tibetan and Chinese translations of
Akaraataka are also available. But the authenticity of this work is not
to be established. Based on the various opinions of scholars important
works of Deva are as follows; Sataka tra, Brahma-pramtana-yuktihetu-siddhi,
Catuh-ataka and Akara-ataka.
49
Sataka tra-This work is published by G.Tucci. This short treatise exists
in Chinese. Kumarajva did this Chinese translation in 401.A.D. This
text is also an example for his logical thinking.
Brahma-pramtana yukti hetu siddhi- Dr. S. C. Vidybhaa records
that this work is written by Arya Deva. But there isnt any relevant
evidence for proving the authenticity of this text59
.
Catuh-ataka- According to H. Nakamura this is the most important
work of Deva. As the name indicates it includes four hundred kriks in
sixteen chapters of twenty five verses in each chapter. It has also two
commentaries done by Chandrakirti and Dharmapla
60
.

Akara-ataka: This work is available in Chinese and Tibetan. But

authenticity of this workto Deva did not proved even now
61
.
Maitreya
Maitreya or Maitreya-natha was an eminent teacher of Yogcra
School
62
. Dr S.C. Vidybhaa records that he had lived 900years after
the Nirva of Buddha ie about 400A.D63. He was known in mirok in
China, Byams-pahi-mgon-pa in Tibetan. He was also known
Maitreya Bodhisattva or future Buddha. He was a strong supporter
of the doctrines of voidness and momentariness64
.
50
Dr. S. C. Vidybhaa recorded that Maitreya was
the author of many works. He has quoted that some of
them are Bodhisattva-carya-nirdea, Saptadaa-bhumi-stra yogcrya
and Abhisamaylakra krik.
Abhisamaylakra krik- Both of the original work in Sanskrit and
translation in Tibetan language are available. The Tibetan translation
was prepared during 1059-1109A.D
65
. The text is an evidence of his
strong position about the doctrine of
momentariness and voidness. It is a sort of synopsis which contains
Aasahasrika Prajpramita. Through the composition of the text he
succeeded to establish the momentariness of all objects in this world.
When we attain perfect wisdom, our thought becomes static, it neither
proceeds nor succeeds. Just as a lamp, it remove the darkness neither
proceeds nor follows the same. By his words the knowledge of things
their connection separation etc all are momentary. Thus he also
established Snyata through his words, that the knowable, knowledge,
action, means and expedients are all profound. In as much as the object
share the character of a dream. There is no reality underlying our
existence and its emancipation.
51
Saptadaa-bhmi-stra-yogcrya- This text consists of seven chapters.
There is a treatise on the art of debate in the 15th volume of this text. The
order of the chapters are the subject of debate, the place of debate, the
means of debate, the qualifications of a debater, points of defeat,
attending a place of debate and confidence of a debater. All these titles
reveal the fact that Maitreya handled the practical questions of Logic.
He also accepted three types of prams viz, pratyaka, anumna
and gama. The form of reasoning is as follows:- 1) Sound is non-eternal,
2) Because it is a product, 3) Like a pot, but not like ether (ka). 4) A
product like a pot is non-eternal. 5) Where as, an eternal thing like ether
is not a product. Pratija is always supported by a hetu and dtnta.
From these descriptions about Maitreya, we can conclude that he
handled the topic about the Pure Logic
67
.
Arya Asaga
Arya Asaga he was born in a Brahmin family at Puruapura in
Gndhra (Modern Peshwar)
68
. His father was Kauika. He was the
younger brother of Vasubandhu. He was well versed in logic and also
known as the founder of idealistic school. At first he followed the
52
Mahisaka sect and the Vaibhika sect of Hnayna. Later he became
the disciple of Maitreya and adopted Yogcra philisophy of Mahyna.
Hsuan-tsang the Chinese Pilgrim in the 7th
Century A.D. states that Asaga lived in Nalanda for some years. Dr. S.C.
Vidybhaa remarked that Arya Asaga have flourished in the first
half of the 5th century A.D.
Works - According to Rahul Saktyyana, there are five works ascribed
to him. They are Mahynottara tantra, Strlakra, Yogcra bhmi,
Vastu sagrahai and Bodhi sattva piaka vda
69
. Among these works
Mahynottara tantra and Strlakra were translated into Tibetan and
Chinese. Vastu samgrahini and Bodhi sattva piaka vda were included
in his great work Yogcra bhmi
70
.
Yogcra bhumi - This is an extra large work which includes seventeen
chapters or bhmikas. They are as follows; Vijna bhmi, Mano bhmi,
Savitarka vicra bhmi, Avitarka vicra bhmi, Samhita bhmi,
Avitarka avicra bhmi, Asamhita bhmi, Sacittak bhmi, Acittak
bhmi, Sutamay bhmi, Cintmay bhmi, Bhvanmayi bhmi,
Srvaka bhumi, Pratyeka Buddha bhmi, Bodhi sattva bhmi,
Spadhika bhmi and Nirupadhika bhmi
71
.
53
In this work he says that Prattyasamutpda is equal to the
theory of momentariness. He also describes the topic of logic in his
Tarkastra into six as Vda, Vdadhikaraa, Vdadhitana, Vdlakra,
Vdanigraha and Vdopayukta krys. He was a follower of Maitreya
except in respect of the theory of proof (sadaka) which helps in
establishing a thesis as follows. A proposition (pratij ), a reason (hetu),
an example (udharaa), an application (upanaya),a conclusion
(nigamana),perception (pratyaka), comparison (upamna) and
scripture (gama). Among these the first five constitute inference.
Vasubandhu
Dr. S.C.Vidybhaa states that he lived about 410-490 A.D. He
was a Contemporary of a Vaibhika teacher named Sanghabhadra in
489 A.D
72
. He was born in a family of Pan in Gandhara (Modern
Peshwar) He was the younger brother of Arya Asaga. He was called in
Chinese Seish and Tibetan Dwyig-gnen. His father was Kauika. He
was well known as the Second Buddha
73
. At first he was a follower
54
of Vaibhika of Sarvstivda sect; but later he was converted by his
eldest brother Asaga, to the Yogcra school of Mahyna. He spent many
years in Sakala, Kausambi and Ayodhya. He was the teacher of Dinga,
but he was very old man when Dinga came to attend his lessons. He
died at the age of eighty at Ayodhya
Works - He was the author of many works. Some of the original works
are available in Sanskrit, and other exists in Chinese and Tibetan
translations. Dr. S. C. Vidhybhaa states that Hsuan-tsang saw three
works of Vasubandhu which deals with the art of debate. These works
were styled in Chinese as Ronki (vdavidhi), Ronshiki (vda mrga) and
Roshin (vdaKauala)
74
. These works discuss the basic principles of the
art of debate. Another work named Tarka stra is also attributed to
Vasubandhu. But there isnt any evidence to support this.
Vdavidhi- This is the only work which extent in survived form and it is
the earliest of the treatise which deals with logical topics. It denotes the
mark of the down of Indian formal logic.
This work is meant for the people who wish to mould the flawless
arguments while engaging in philosophical debates.
55
Tarka stra - This is a logical treatise which consists of three chapters,
viz. 1) five parts of syllogism (pacvayava) 2) The analogues (jti) 3) The
point of defeat (nigrahasthna).
In the first chapter author discuss about a proposition (pratij), a
reason (hetu) an example (udharaa) and a conclusion (nigamana).
In the second chapter, he discuss about analogues, which is
subdivided into three groups viz. 1) Viparyaya Khaana (a rejoinder on
the basis of reversion) 2) Nirarthaka Khaana (a rejoinder on the ground
of meaningless), 3) Viparta Khaana (a contrary rejoinder). In the last
chapter of this work, he describes twenty two kinds of Nigrahasthanas.
Acrya Dinga
According to Dr .S. C. Vidhybhaa, his time is fixed around
450-520 A.D. His two works were translated into Chinese that is in 500
A.D. L.M. Joshi opines that modern
writers placed Dinga in the fifth century A.D., based on
the ground that he was a Pupil of Vasubandhu. His direct person was
Ivarasena, (C. 600.A.D.) who was the teacher of Dharmakrti, who lived
56
in the first half of the seventh century A.D. So we can rightly placed
Dingain the first half of the sixth century A.D75
.
Dinga the master and father of medieval logic, is considered
as the earliest systematic writer on Buddhist logic. He was born in a
Brahmin family Simhavaktra near Kci in South India76
. He was a man
of vast learning and wisdom. In his younger days he was attracted by
the Buddhist teachings and he joined in Vtsiputriya Bauddha sect. He
studied all the doctrines of Trthikas under the teacher named
Ngadatta of Vatsiputriya sect, who was an expert in all the doctrines of
Trthikas. Dingareceived pravarjya under this teacher and became a
scholar of the Srvaka Tripiaks. Later he became the student of
Vasubhandhu and studied all the piaks of Hnayna and Mahyna.
Thus he became proficient in five hundred dhrai-s. He would become
an
expert in debates. Hsuan-tsang, an authority of the historian of ancient
times states that he was originally the follower of Hnayna and later
became a Mahynist and devoted to the study of Science of Logic and
propagation of the Yogcra. Relaying the records of Yuan Chwang, L.M.
Joshi opines that Dinga was believed in Hnaynabefore his conversion
57
to the Mahyna. It is also said that Dinaga having heard the Yogcra
bhmistra, he gave up Hnaynism and received the Mahynism
with a view to propagate the Yogcra . This shows that he was a
Yogcrin and especially Vijnavdin. This can be confirms from his
work Alabanaparka, which displays him as the champion of
Vijnavda. Stcherbatsky also point out that Dinga
quotes from the Abhidharma of Sarvstivdins in support
of the formulas of the definition of two prams. Considering valuable
records of Hsuan-tsang, Dinga travelled through Orissa and
Maharastra to the South, and engaged in debates with the Trtha
controversialists and defeated them. So he was nicknamed Fighting
Bull or
Bull in Discussion (Tarka pugava). In Orissa he converted Bhadra
Palita, the Treasury Minister of the King of the country, to Buddhism.
Dinga was a man of vast learning and extra ordinary intellect who
practised twelve tested virtues during his life time. His whole life was
passed in giving blows and receiving counterblows. He lived in a
considerable part at Telingana in Madras Presidency. He died in a
solitary wood in Orissa77
.
58
Even after his death his opponents continued to fall up on him
with force. Uddyotakara calls him a quibbler (kutrkika),
Vacaspatimira described him as an erring one (bhrnta) and
Mallinatha compares him with rock (adrikalpa) exemplify their
attitude towards Dinga. Considering all these comments Dr.
S.C.Vidyabha remarks that He must have been a strong man, both
physically and mentally, other wise he could hardly lived for a single day
under the assaults from many sides. However we can consider that he
gave a path to the system of realistic logic.

Works -Many works were ascribed to Dinga. But most

of them have lost its original. Dr. S. C. Vidhybhaa records that his
main works are Prama-samuccaya,
Nyya-pravea, Hetu-cakra- hamaru, Prama-samuccaya-vtti, Prama-
stra, Nyya-pravea, Alambana-parika, Alambana-parik- vtti and
Trikla-parika
78
.
Prama-samuccaya - This work is considered as a Masterpiece of
Dinga. It is said that Dinga composed this work while he was residing
on a solitary hill near Vengi in Andra of Madras Presidency. It was
59
written in anuubh metre. Dr. S. C. Vidhybhaa records that
its original text in Sanskrit is not seen him. But the Tibetan translation
exists even now. It was done by an Indian Sage named Hema Varma or
Kanaka and Tibetan interpreter named Dad-Pahi-ses- rab. It is called
in Tibetan as Tshad-mahi-Mdo-kun-las- btus-pa (Prama stra
samuccaya), signifying a compilation of aphorisms on prama
79
.
Prama samuccaya became the most authoritative stra of Buddhist
doctrines in the 7th
and 8th Centuries A.D. This text can be divided into six Chapters viz.,
Pratyaka, Svrthnumna, Parrthnumna, Hetu- dnta, Apoha
and Jti respectively.
He begins this text with the words that his purpose of the
composition was to resolve several controversies to other philosophers
which had generated the misconceptions regarding the means of
acquiring knowledge. He put forward two methods for this. The first
method is securing new knowledge which is described as pure sensation,
in the form of cognition when it is free from all judgement. The subject
60
matter of this type of cognition is devoid of particular instances such as
colour, sound and other sensible properties. The second method is
described as inferential reasoning. The subject matter of this type of
cognition represents the knowledge of universals.
Buddhists are concerned with two Prams viz., in the Pratyaka
(perception) and Anumna (inference). According to Dinga
perception is that which being freed from pre
conception is unconnected with name, genus etc (pratykam
kalpanpoda nmajtydyasayuta). This definition shows that in
Dingas opinion perceptual knowledge is pure and should be
unqualified, and stripped of characters. Thus he made a clear distinction
between sensation and imagination. His verse on perception can be seen
in Bhamakas Kavylakra in the form of quotation about the
conception the means of valid knowledge.
The second type of right knowledge is Anumna. This can be
divided into two viz., Svrthnumna and Parrthnumna. Dinga has
been rightly credited
with stabling the distinction of Anumna. Svrthnumna can be
61
defined as the knowledge of an object obtained through its hetu of three
characters viz., effects (krya), identity (svabhva) and non-perception
(anupalabdhi). Parrthnumna takes place when a person demonstrates
to others the conclusion drawn by him, through an inference for oneself.
The invariable relation between hetu and sdhya
gives in the Inference. Hetu or reason is of two kinds affirmative
(anavayi) and negative (vyatireki) .For affirmative instance: - The hill is
fiery, because it is smoky. For the negative instance: The hill is not
smoky, because it is not fiery. Example or dnta is of two kinds; viz
affirmative or homogeneous (anvayi or sdharmya) and negative or
heterogeneous (vyatireki or vaidharmya). For instance: - The hill is
fiery, because it is smoky. That which is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen.
Which is not fiery not smoky as a lake
80
.
This logician made a sharp differentiation between direct and
indirect knowledge. Our ordinary experience admits that some type of
relation must connect between a word and an object. The Buddhist holds
that the word does not represent the actual objects but it negates what
the object is not. This concept led to the origin of a striking theory called
Apoha (Doctrine of meaning). It was Dinaga, who for the first time
62
evaluated the doctrine of Apoha in Buddhist thought. It is an entity
which defined as being the negation of its opposite. Apoha stood for
pure negation. For instance; A cow is that which is not a not cow
81
.
Analogues or farfetched analogy (jti) according to him are of
fourteen types. They are prpti sam, aprpti sam, varya sam,avarya
sam, anutpatti sam, krya sam, sdharmya sam, vaidharmya sam,
vikalpa sam, upalabdhi sam, samaya sam, arthpathi sam, sdhya
sam and prasaga sam.
Prama-samuccaya-vtti - He himself made this
commentary on his own work called Pramasamuccaya.
Dr. S.C. Vidhybhaa opines that the Sanskrit original of this work is
not seen by him. But the Tibetan translation was prepared at the
command of the King Rigs -ldan-rgyal-po by the famous Indian sage
Vasudhara Raksita and Tibetan interpreter Sha-ma-dga-bsnen-sin-rgyal
.It is called Tshad- ma-kun-las-btus-pahi-hgrel-wa
82
.
Prama-stra-nyya-pravea - This is another excellent work written by
him. Chinese version of this work is called Gyen-min-gshihi-cin-lihilun
and Tibetan version is called Tshad-mahi-bstan-bcos-rig-pa-lahjug-pa
signifying An Entrance to the science of Logic is exists. The
Chinese version was translated into Tibetan by the Chinese scholar
63
Dge-ses-sin-gya and Tibetan monk ston-gshon in the kya monastery
of Western Tibet83
. This work is published by
Dr. R.C. Pandey and Manju as a joint venture.
Hetu-cakra-hamaru- This is a small treatise on Logic by Dinga. Dr. S.C.
Vidhybhaa opines that the Sanskrit original of this work is not seen
by him. The Tibetan work is called Gtan-tshigs-kyi-hkhor-lo-gtan-ladwab-pa
signifying the wheel of Reasons put in order. It was
prepared by the sage Bodhisattva of Za-hor and a Biku named
Dharmka. It starts thus Bowing down to the Omniscient One
(Buddha) who was destroyed the net of errors, I explain the system of
three characteristics of the Reason. He analysed all nine possible
relations between the middle and major terms and as found that there
are among them two relations which confirm to the three characteristics
of the middle term already laid down, and the remaining seven relations
are at variance with those characteristics. He also concluded that only
these two relations are valid.
Alabana park - Dr. S. C. Vidhybhaa records, that the original
Sanskrit of this work is not available to him. The
64
work written in Tibetan is called Dmigs-pa-brtag- pa signifying An
examination of objects of Thought. It starts with a prayer to Buddha
and all the Bodhisattvas. It has a commentary named Alabanaparik-vtti
85
.
Alabana-park-vtti- Dinga himself did this commentary. Dr. S.C.
Vidhybhaa records, that the Sanskrit original of this work was not
available. This is also not recovered yet now. The Tibetan version of this
work exists and it is called Dmigs-pa-brtag-pahis-hgrel
86
.
Trikla Park- Dr. S. C. Vidhybhaa records that; the original
Sanskrit of this text is not available to him. But the Tibetan translation
exists even now. This work called Dus-busum-brtag-pa signifying An
examination of Three Times. This was done by a great scholar named
Santakara Gupta and Tibetan interpreter named Tshul-hkhrims-rgyalmtshan87
.
Paramrtha
According to Dr. S.C. Vidhybhaa he lived during 498-
569A.D). He was a Buddhist ascetic, who born in 498 A.D. at Ujjaini in
Western India. He was an eminent scholar
65
and translated many works in to Chinese. He was placed by Jivitagupta-I
or Kumara Gupta, as an interpreter at the disposal of a Chinese mission
sent to Magadha by Liang Emperor Wu-ti in 539 A.D. He died at China
in 569 A.D
88
. It is also said that he translated Vasubandhus Tarkastra
into Chinese and also Nyya Stra too. He wrote a work called Nyyabhya
or an explanation of the Nyya-strain five volumes.
Sankarasvamin
According to Dr. S.C. Vidhybhaa Sankarasvamin lived
around 550 A.D. He was a native of Southern India. He was a direct
pupil of Dinga.
Based on the records of Hsuan-tsang Dr. S.C. Vidhybhaa
opines that Sankaraswami is the author of Nyya- pravea-stra or
Nyya pravea-tarka-stra. It is also recorded that Husan-tsang has
translated this work into Chinese in 647 A.D89
.

Dharmapla
Dr.S.C.Vidybhaa records he was lived about 600-635 A.D.
Dharmapla was a Buddhist logician and a native of Kacpura in
66
Drvida (Modern Conjeeveram) in Madras. He was the eldest son of a
great Minister of this Country. He was very intelligent in his early child
hood. There was a story about him as follows. In his younger days the
King and Queen of the country invited him to a feast. In that evening his
heart was depressed with sorrow assuming the robes of a Buddhist
monk. He left home and began to learn about Buddhism. Later he joined
in the University of Nland. He passed with great distinction and
became the head of Nland University
90
. He was a follower Yogcra
school. He is also said to have been the most famous propagator of the
Vijnavda tenents as expounded in Vasubandhus Vijapti-matrartasiddhi.
He was the author of several works
viz., Alabana-pratyaya-dhyana-stra-vykhy, Vidyamatra-siddhi-
stra-vykhy and Sata-stra-vaipulya-vykhy etc.
It was translated into Chinese in 650 A.D. as a join-venture
with Bharthari he composed a text called Beda- vtti on Painis
grammar. Dr. S.C. Vidhybhaa quotes that Hsuan-tsang has
narrated about the life of Dharmapla in his travalogues91
.
Acarya Silabhadra
67
Dr.S.C.Vidybhaa records that he lived around the first half of
the seventh century A.D. He was a great logician and master of stras,
belonged the family of Samataa Brhmaa caste in Bengal. He was a
student of Dharmapla and later he became the head of Nland
University. The Chinese Pilgrim Hsuan-tsang has studied under his
mastership92
.
Next logician is Dharmakrti. His life and works will be dealt with
in the next chapter in detailed way.

difference between vedic and buddhist system of

education

What is the difference between Vedic teachings and Buddhist teaching

Many other apparent differences are the result of Buddha's wrong interpretations of
Vedas, similar to the then Srautins. ... The ideas of Karma, rebirth, dhyana, deities
(like Brahma) are there in both Hinduism and Buddhism. Both agree that life is
suffering. Both agree that suffering is caused by desire.
There is one principal difference, and namely that the Vedic heritage was not
originally a teaching but a reflection of the reality of life of humankind. Buddhism
was a teaching / religion, one of many different teachings and religions of its time.

Vedic reality was neither theistic nor atheistic. It worked on the life and experiences
of humankind making the practical spirituality a natural constituent of all other
aspects of life (economics, politics, arts...). Buddhism, although it is interpreted as
atheistic teaching, is a typical religion today. As such, it is detached from the reality
of life as a spiritual part of the life.

Vedic reality was not one of many approaches to life - because it was not a religion
but a reflection of reality as it is. Buddhism founded another approach to spirituality,
another practices, another ways of meditations etc...

Although, it is possible to say that all post-Vedic teachings, religions, and

movements in India have their roots in vedic tradition or better to say, they are a
part o Indian spiritual continuity from the time immemorial. However, all post
Vedic traditions were contaminated with philosophizing for the sake of
philosophizing, conceptualizing for the sake of conceptualizing, theorizing for the
sake of theorizing, as also with superstition and superficiality, spiritual elitism, and
religiousness as contra-pole to mundane life...

Most people here would quote Hinduism and compare with Buddhism, which,
unfortunately, is not what the question demands.
The Vedic teachings are different from post Buddhist Hindu ideas.
I shall subscribe to the question only, and thus compare Buddhism with only Vedas,
and not post Buddha scriptures of Hindus.

Coming to the answer.

Vedas are much older and obscure at the time of Buddha itself.
The fact is that Rig Veda was intended for spiritual purposes, but was misinterpreted
later, as the ritualists gained popularity over the spiritualists.
The contention is easily recognisable in Rig Veda itself, where a hymn mocks the
sheer mutterers of mantras with the frogs who croak in the rainy season. At any
rate, the Vedic sages preached spirituality, and created symbols for the rituals,
making rituals only symbolic in nature.
But unfortunately, the masses couldn't grasp the simple Vedic ideas, they were
more interested in rituals. Thus, Brahmanas emerged, which created pathetic myths
for each highly symbolic Vedic words. The subsequent years showed the emergence
of purely ritualist and materialistic Srautins, who believed that sheer utterance of
the spiritual poems could gain them much. The meaning was ignored.
The literal interpretations gained popularity. Sacrifices involving animals gained
popularity, in spite of the fact that Vedas tried their maximum to symbolize those,
and prohibit them.
Thus, the new people were not real followers of Vedas. They were attached to literal
interpretation lacking in spirit, of the poetic Vedas.
And the spiritual followers seemed to be extinct, in spite of some Upanishadic
sages.
Buddha came. He took the Srautin belief for granted, and said that Vedas were
ritualistic mucks (as ultimately what Srautins also believed), and Vedas should be
renounced.
Thus, he became a "pAkhaNDi", an opposer of Vedas.
The Jains too followed. The ignorant Srautins couldn't still realise their folly, and
revert to spirituality, instead they tried to defend their religion by assimilating more
people, by drawing in different beliefs of local people. This resulted in Epic
Hinduism, which followed by the new followers along with Buddhists and Jains
rejecting many Vedic concepts and Vedic Gods, and popularizing their local gods.
Srautins still remained in their "ortho"doxy.

That is history. Now, we can see the core difference between actual Vedic teachings
and Buddhism.
1. Vedas are theistic, and believe in God, while actual Buddhism is anti theistic, and
obviously non theistic.
2. Vedas believe that life is something to live, not to waste. So, every Vedic follower
prays for at least a "hundred autumns" life span. (sharadaH shatam)
Vedas believe in action. Therefore, Veda supports Rishis, the sage philosophers, who
actively participate in the wordly matters.
Buddhism, on the other hand, believes in passiveness. It thinks that life is a trap of
action and relations. So, it renounces actions, and relationships, instead chooses
sannyasa (asceticism) as the path.
In Vedas, asceticism is frowned upon. Passiveness is not tolerated. Yajur Veda 40
says :
"One, doing actions, should wish to live a hundred years".
Vedas believe that each single second is valuable for us, to enjoy in this world, and
therefore enjoy to our desires. But Veda also sets the limit : "All this is encompassed
by the God, with this renunciation in mind, enjoy... And do not desire other's
materials"
This "enjoyment" with moral limits is a great idea to modern world.
But Buddhists believe that desire is the cause of all sufferings. Man is not destined
to enjoy in this world... and is pessimistic.
3. Veda does not believe in Karma theory, or rebirths, or any sort of superstitions.
But Buddhists do. And also the post Buddha Hindus do.
4. Vedas are panentheistic basically. A sort of pantheism may also be imposed,
though the former is the correct one.
But Buddhists are non theistic, but unnecessarily believe in existence of non theistic
devas and other cosmic souls, who, but can't help you in any way. (Remember the
famous quote : "No Buddha can save a Buddha")
This is a superstition, but Buddha claimed his religion to be more rational. (Though
it was actually rational than ritualist religion of Srautins)
The Buddhist scriptures usually mock devas, and become more of anti theistic than
non theistic.
Many other apparent differences are the result of Buddha's wrong interpretations of
Vedas, similar to the then Srautins.
5. Vedic philosophy does not involve unexplainable things like afterlife or other
things. It is seemingly simple. But Buddhists have a complex philosophy rooted on
various unprovable ideas, like the later Hinduism.
Many later Hindu texts resemble Buddha's teachings in core, and are in fact,
opposed to the actual Vedic teachings. (Like, say, Ashtavakra Gita)

The ideas of Karma, rebirth, dhyana, deities (like Brahma) are there in both
Hinduism and Buddhism. Both agree that life is suffering. Both agree that suffering
is caused by desire. The main area of difference is the idea of an eternal Self. Hindus
accept an eternal Self while Buddhists do not. Hence Buddhism accepts pratitiya-
samutpada while Hindus do not.

How does Vedanta look at the Buddhist doctrine of pratitya-samutpada? This

doctrine states that all finite things are established in others. The answer to the
question is given in Chandogya Upanishad mantras 7.24.1 and 7.24.2:

When one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is
the infinite. But where one sees something else, hears something else, understands
something else, that is the small (finite). Verily, the infinite is the same as the
immortal, the finite is the same as the mortal. 'Venerable Sir, on what is the infinite
established?' 'On its own greatness or not even on greatness.' (Chandogya
Upanishad 7.24.1)
 Here on earth people call cows and horses, elephants and gold, slaves and wives,
fields and houses 'greatness'. 'I do not speak thus, I do not speak thus,' said he, 'for
in that case one thing is established in another.' (Chandogya Upanishad 7.24.2)

The first mantra says that the empirical dualities are absent in the experience of
the infinite. The infinite is not dependent on anything finite. It is dependent on itself.
The second mantra states the doctrine of pratitya-samutpada but rejects it on the
ground that the Infinite, the Ultimate Reality, can not be dependent on the finite.

The reason why Buddhists stress pratitya-samutpada is precisely because they do

not accept the idea of the eternal self.

Yes, there has been strong debates between Hindu and Buddhist leaders. Adi
Sankara debated with the famous Buddhist leaders of his time.

Difference is only in way of expression and not in the core principle i.e truth. One
who sincerely follow any one path will the same destination. Although in between
experience s may be different. This variation is due to different nature of individual
mind.

Well, up to the upanishadic time that was juct developing around that time there
was a lot of difference.

Buddhism was part of the sramana tradition that was non-vedic.

Vedas are focused on social life, rituals (fire sacrifice) and have a very archaic feel,
speaking more in cryptic impressions than clear language.

Sramanas were atheist philosophers, prone to asceticism (even to the most extreme
levels), renouncing the society, disapproving the castes etc.

Many authors believe that ideas and practices of acetic and contemplative nature,
monasticism, ideas like karma, reincarnation, vegetarianism etc actually originated
in Sramana circles.

They were opposed forces in their times and both defined themselves often in
comparison and debate with the other.

Later Hinduism assimilated a lot of Buddhist and sramanic in general ideas and
practices, though it is sometimes difficult do separate sources as there were
similarities and inter-influences in developments in both traditions and things are
sometimes reinterpreted in much later sources to fit certain narratives.

By Vedic teachings I assume you mean the Hindu Vedas -- however, Hindus
generally dont know there are several Vedas and the Hindu Vedas is considered a
lesser Vedas by Buddhists. Lord Buddha NEVER rejected Hindu Vedas, only showed
a higher one and he shows the true inner meaning of the 3 fires that Vedic people
were supposed to keep.
Buddhist texts are known as The Tipitika but also as The Dharma Veda and Jata
Vedas (thus Jatakas)-- Vedas which Hindu India lost since they did not understand
that Buddhism had the higher Vedas. Buddhism begins with The Dharma Chakra
with a proof by induction using recursion to define fractals. Fractals are what is
beyond time and eternal, and always whole even when broken -- it is Nirvana Dhatu.

So Buddhism literally leaves Hindu Vedas behind through this one magnificent proof.

Hindu Vedas:

1) requires chanting of Gayatri 3 times a day and initiation by adolescence --

requires declaration of caste -- gotra, parivar.

2) requires external fire rituals and animal sacrifice. Hindus can't deny the
ritualized killing of animals -- their texts are full of this. Lord Buddha stopped this
ritual slaughter -- Buddha did not say not to kill for food (MAghAta is Buddhist
kosher)-- but stopped ritual slaughter to gods and ancestors.

3) limited to land -- cannot cross oceans due to the constant shift in electromagnetic
energy -- known as Kala Pani -- you lose caste by crossing bodies of water.

4) all based on ritual instead of good works. Buddha said that Meditating on loving
kindness (metta) creates more merit than the Aswamedha Yagna.

Buddhists instead of chanting Gayatri 3 times, do good deeds by body, speech and
mind throughout the day And night.

by mastering fractals Buddhists could cross oceans without losing caste.

Buddhists observe Uposaths on new and full moon could eat meat everyday as long
as they did not kill anything on the Uposaths.

all Buddhist had to do was take refuge in Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha everyday,
be full of good works and observe the holy days and we were gold.

Buddhism and Hinduism

Hinduism and Buddhism have common origins in the Ganges culture of northern
India during .... and Jainism as well as other faiths of Indian origin such as
Sikhism. ... Despite the similarities in terminology there exist differences between
the ..... an aspect of the practice of the yogis in the centuries preceding the Buddha.
Hinduism and Buddhism have common origins in the Ganges culture of northern
India during the so-called "second urbanisation" around 500 BCE.[1] They have
shared parallel beliefs that have existed side by side, but also pronounced
differences.[2]

Buddhism attained prominence in the Indian subcontinent as it was supported by

royal courts, but started to decline after the Gupta era, and virtually disappeared
from India in the 11th century CE, except in some pockets of India. It has continued
to exist outside of India and is the major religion in several Asian countries.
Contents [hide]
1 Early history
1.1 Upanishads
1.2 Royal support
2 Similarities
2.1 Basic Vocabulary
2.1.1 Karma
2.1.2 Dharma
2.1.3 Buddha
2.2 Similar Symbolism
2.3 Similar practices
2.3.1 Mantra
2.3.2 Yoga
2.3.3 Meditation
3 Differences
3.1 God
3.2 Rites and rituals
3.3 Caste
3.4 Cosmology and worldview
3.5 Practices
3.6 Meditation
3.7 Vedas
3.8 Conversion
3.9 Soteriology
3.9.1 Nonduality
3.9.2 Nirvana
4 Early Buddhism and early Vedanta
4.1 Brahman
4.2 tman
4.3 Cosmic Self declared non-existent
4.4 Brahman
5 Buddha in Hindu scriptures
6 Buddha in Buddhist scriptures
7 Notable views
7.1 Neo-Vedanta
7.2 Reformation
7.3 Dalit-movement
8 See also
9 References
10 Sources
11 Further reading
12 External links
Early history[edit]
Upanishads[edit]
Certain Buddhist teachings appear to have been formulated in response to ideas
presented in the early Upanishads in some cases concurring with them, and in
other cases criticizing or re-interpreting them.[3][4][5]
The influence of Upanishads, the earliest philosophical texts of Hindus, on Buddhism
has been a subject of debate among scholars. While Radhakrishnan, Oldenberg and
Neumann were convinced of Upanishadic influence on the Buddhist canon, Eliot and
Thomas highlighted the points where Buddhism was opposed to Upanishads.[6]

Buddhism may have been influenced by some Upanishadic ideas, it however

discarded their orthodox tendencies.[7] In Buddhist texts he is presented as
rejecting avenues of salvation as "pernicious views".[8] Later Indian religious
thoughts were influenced by this interpretation and novel ideas of the Buddhist
tradition of beliefs.[9]

Royal support[edit]
In later years, there is significant evidence that both Buddhism and Hinduism were
supported by Indian rulers, regardless of the rulers' own religious identities.
Buddhist kings continued to revere Hindu deities and teachers, and many Buddhist
temples were built under the patronage of Hindu rulers.[10] This was because never
has Buddhism been considered an alien religion to that of Hinduism in India, but as
only one of the many strains of Hinduism. Kalidas' work shows the ascension of
Hinduism at the expense of Buddhism.[11] By the eighth century, Shiva and Vishnu
had replaced Buddha in pujas of royalty.[12][13][14]

Similarities[edit]
Basic Vocabulary[edit]
The Buddha approved many of the terms already used in philosophical discussions
of his era; however, many of these terms carry a different meaning in the Buddhist
tradition. For example, in the Samaaphala Sutta, the Buddha is depicted
presenting a notion of the "three knowledges" (tevijja) a term also used in the
Vedic tradition to describe knowledge of the Vedas as being not texts, but things
that he had experienced (these are not noble truths[clarification needed]).[15] The
true "three knowledges" are said to be constituted by the process of achieving
enlightenment, which is what the Buddha is said to have achieved in the three
watches of the night of his enlightenment.[16]

Karma[edit]
Karma (Sanskrit: from the root k, "to do") is a word meaning action or activity
and often implies its subsequent results (also called karma-phala, "the fruits of
action"). It is commonly understood as a term to denote the entire cycle of cause
and effect as described in the philosophies of a number of cosmologies, including
those of Buddhism and Hinduism.

Karma is a central part of Buddhist teachings. In Buddha's teaching, karma is a

direct intentional[17] result of a person's word, thought and/or action in life. In pre-
Buddhist Vedic culture, karma has to do with whether or not the ritualistic actions
are correctly performed. Little emphasis is placed on moral conduct in the early
Vedic conception.[neutrality is disputed] In Buddhism, by contrast, a person's words,
thoughts and/or actions form the basis for good and bad karma, sila (moral conduct)
goes hand in hand with the development of meditation and wisdom. Buddhist
teachings carry a markedly different meaning from pre-Buddhist conceptions of
karma.[18]
Dharma[edit]
Dharma (Sanskrit, Devanagari: or Pli Dhamma, Devanagari: ) means Natural
Law, Reality or Duty, and with respect to its significance for spirituality and religion
might be considered the Way of the Higher Truths. A Hindu appellation for Hinduism
itself is Santana Dharma, which translates as "the eternal dharma." Similarly,
Buddhadharma is an appellation for Buddhism. The general concept of dharma
forms a basis for philosophies, beliefs and practices originating in India. The four
main ones are Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism (Jaina Dharma), and Sikhism (Sikha
Dharma), all of whom retain the centrality of dharma in their teachings. In these
traditions, beings that live in harmony with dharma proceed more quickly toward,
according to the tradition, Dharma Yukam, Moksha, or Nirvana (personal liberation).
Dharma can refer generally to religious duty, and also mean social order, right
conduct, or simply virtue.

Buddha[edit]
The term "Buddha" too has appeared in Hindu scriptures before the birth of
Gautama Buddha. In the Vayu Purana, sage Daksha calls Lord Shiva as Buddha.[19]

Similar Symbolism[edit]
Mudra: This is a symbolic hand-gesture expressing an emotion. Depictions of the
Buddha are almost always depicted performing a mudra.
Dharma Chakra: The Dharma Chakra, which appears on the national flag of India
and the flag of the Thai royal family, is a Buddhist symbol that is used by members
of both religions.
Rudraksha: These are beads that devotees, usually monks, use for praying.
Tilak: Many Hindu devotees mark their heads with a tilak, which is interpreted as a
third eye. A similar mark is one of the characteristic physical characteristics of the
Buddha.
Swastika and Sauwastika: both are sacred symbols. It can be either clockwise or
counter-clockwise and both are seen in Hinduism and Buddhism. The Buddha is
sometimes depicted with a sauwastika on his chest or the palms of his hands.[20]
Similar practices[edit]
Mantra[edit]

In Tibet, many Buddhists carve mantras into rocks as a form of devotion.

A mantra () is a religious syllable or poem, typically from the Sanskrit language.
Their use varies according to the school and philosophy associated with the mantra.
They are primarily used as spiritual conduits, words or vibrations that instill one-
pointed concentration in the devotee. Other purposes have included religious
ceremonies to accumulate wealth, avoid danger, or eliminate enemies. Mantras
existed in the historical Vedic religion, Zoroastrianism[21] and the Shramanic
traditions, and thus they remain important in Buddhism and Jainism as well as other
faiths of Indian origin such as Sikhism.

Yoga[edit]
The practice of Yoga is intimately connected to the religious beliefs and practices of
both Hinduism and Buddhism.[22] However, there are distinct variations in the
usage of yoga terminology in the two religions.
In Hinduism, the term "Yoga" commonly refers to the eight limbs of yoga as defined
in the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, written some time after 100 BCE, and means "yoke",
with the idea that one's individual atman, or soul, would yoke or bind with the
monistic entity that underlies everything (brahman). Yoga in Hinduism also known
as being 'complex', based on yoking (integrating). Yoga defines a specific process, it
has an emphasis on knowledge and practice, as well as being known to be 'mature'
and difficult.[23] The most basic meaning of this Sanskrit term is with technique.
The technique of the different forms of yoga is what makes the practice meaningful.
Yoga is not an easy or simple practice, viyoga is what is described as simple. Yoga is
difficult in the fact of displaying the faith and meaning of Hinduism. Many Hindus
tend to pick and choose between the five forms of yoga because of the way they
live their life and how they want to practice it in the form they are most connected
to.[24]

In the Vajrayana Buddhism of Tibet, however, the term "Yoga" is simply used to refer
to any type of spiritual practice; from the various types of tantra (like Kriyayoga or
Charyayoga) to 'Deity yoga' and 'guru yoga'. In the early translation phase of the
Sutrayana and Tantrayana from India, China and other regions to Tibet, along with
the practice lineages of sadhana, codified in the Nyingmapa canon, the most subtle
'conveyance' (Sanskrit: yana) is Adi Yoga (Sanskrit). A contemporary scholar with a
focus on Tibetan Buddhism, Robert Thurman writes that Patanjali was influenced by
the success of the Buddhist monastic system to formulate his own matrix for the
version of thought he considered orthodox.[25]

Meditation[edit]
There is a range of common terminology and common descriptions of the
meditative states that are seen as the foundation of meditation practice in both
Hindu Yoga and Buddhism. Many scholars have noted that the concepts of dhyana
and samdhi - technical terms describing stages of meditative absorption are
common to meditative practices in both Hinduism and Buddhism. Most notable in
this context is the relationship between the system of four Buddhist dhyana states
(Pali: jhana) and the samprajnata samadhi states of Classical Yoga.[26] Also, many
(Tibetan) Vajrayana practices of the generation stage and completion stage work
with the chakras, inner energy channels (nadis) and kundalini, called tummo in
Tibetan.

Differences[edit]
Despite the similarities in terminology there exist differences between the two
religions. There is no evidence to show that Buddhism ever subscribed to vedic
sacrifices, vedic deities or caste.[27]

The major differences are mentioned below.

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God[edit]
Gautama Buddha was very ambiguous about the existence of a Creator Deity
Brahman and Eternal Self Atman and rejected them both. Various sources from the
Pali Cannon and others suggest that the Buddha taught that belief in a Creator deity
was not essential to attaining liberation from suffering, and perhaps chose to ignore
theological questions because they were "fascinating to discuss," and frequently
brought about more conflict and anger than peace. The Buddha did not deny the
existence of the popular gods of the Vedic pantheon, but rather argued that these
devas, who may be in a more exalted state than humans, are still nevertheless
trapped in the same samsaric cycle of suffering as other beings and are not
necessarily worthy of veneration and worship. The focus of the Noble Eightfold Path,
while inheriting many practices and ideologies from the previous Hindu yogic
tradition, deviates from the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita and earlier works of the
Dharmic Religions in that liberation (Nirvana or Moksha) is not attained via unity
with Brahman (the Godhead), Self-realization or worship. Rather, the Buddha's
teaching centers around what Eknath Easwaran described as a "psychology of
desire," that is attaining liberation from suffering by extermination of self-will,
selfish desire and passions. This is not to say however, that such teachings are
absent from the previous Hindu tradition, rather they are singled out and separated
from Vedic Theology.

The Buddha (as portrayed in the Pali scriptures, the agamas) set an important trend
in nontheism in Buddhism by establishing a somewhat non-theistic view on the
notion of an omnipotent God, generally ignoring the issue as being irrelevant to his
teachings.[28] Nevertheless, in many passages in the Tripitaka gods (devas in
Sanskrit) are mentioned and specific examples are given of individuals who were
reborn as a god, or gods who were reborn as humans. Buddhist cosmology
recognizes various levels and types of gods, but none of these gods is considered
the creator of the world or of the human race.[28]

Buddha preaches that attachment with people was the cause of sorrow when
'death' happens and therefore proposes detachment from people. Hinduism though
proposes detachment from fruits of action[29] and stresses on performance of duty
or dharma, it is not solely focused on it. In Hinduism, Lord Shiva explains 'death' to
be journey of the immortal soul in pursuit of 'Moksha' and therefore a fact of life.
While Buddhism says retirement into forest for meditation is to take place starting
from childhood, this is viewed as escapism by Hinduism, Hinduism allows for this to
happen only after performing all dharmas or duties of one's life, starting from
studying scriptures, working to support children and family and taking care of aged
parents and lastly after all the dharma done retire to the forest and slowly meditate
and fast until physical disintegration & to reach the ultimate truth or Brahman.
Buddhism explained that attachment is the cause of sorrow in society. Therefore,
Buddhism's cure for sorrow was detachment and non-involvement (non-action or
negative action). Hinduism on the other hand explained that both sorrow or
happiness is due to 'Karma' or past actions and bad karma can be overcome and
good karma can be obtained by following dharma or righteous duty (pro-action or
positive action) which will ultimately provide 'Moksha' i.e. overcoming the cycle of
life and joining Brahman.
Buddhist canonical views about God and the priests are:

13. Well then, Vasettha, those ancient sages versed in ancient scriptures, the
authors of the verses, the utterers of the verses, whose, ancient form of words so
chanted, uttered, or composed, the priests of today chant over again or repeat;
intoning or reciting exactly as has been intoned or recited-to wit, Atthaka, Vamaka,
Vamadeva, Vessamitta, Yamataggi, Angirasa, Bharadvaja, Vasettha, Kassapa, and
Bhagu [11] did even they speak thus, saying: "We know it, we have seen it",
where the creator is whence the creator is?

Scholar-monk Walpola Rahula writes that man depends on God "for his own
protection, safety, and security, just as a child depends on his parent." He describes
this as a product of "ignorance, weakness, fear, and desire," and writes that this
"deeply and fanatically held belief" for man's consolation is "false and empty" from
the perspective of Buddhism. He writes that man does not wish to hear or
understand teachings against this belief, and that the Buddha described his
teachings as "against the current" for this reason.[30] He also wrote that for self-
protection man created God and for self-preservation man created "soul".[31]

In later Mahayana literature, however, the idea of an eternal, all-pervading, all-

knowing, immaculate, uncreated and deathless Ground of Being (the dharmadhatu,
inherently linked to the sattvadhatu, the realm of beings), which is the Awakened
Mind (bodhicitta) or Dharmakaya ("body of Truth") of the Buddha himself, is
attributed to the Buddha in a number of Mahayana sutras, and is found in various
tantras as well. In some Mahayana texts, such a principle is occasionally presented
as manifesting in a more personalised form as a primordial buddha, such as
Samantabhadra, Vajradhara, Vairochana, Amitabha and Adi-Buddha, among others.

Rites and rituals[edit]

In later tradition such as Mahayana Buddhism in Japan, the Shingon Fire Ritual
(Homa /Yagna) and Urabon (Sanskrit: Ullambana) derives from Hindu traditions.[32]
Similar rituals are common in Tibetan Buddhism. Both Mahayana Buddhism and
Hinduism share common rites, such as the purification rite of Homa (Havan, Yagna
in Sanskrit), prayers for the ancestors and deceased (Ullambana in Sanskrit, Urabon
in Japanese).

Caste[edit]
The Buddha repudiated the caste distinctions of the Brahmanical religion,[33] by
offering ordination to all regardless of caste.[34]

While the caste system constitutes an assumed background to the stories told in
Buddhist scriptures, the sutras do not attempt to justify or explain the system.[35]
In Aggaa Sutta, Buddha elaborates that if any of the caste does the following
deeds: killing, taking anything which is not given, take part in sexual misconduct,
lying, slandering, speaking rough words or nonsense, greedy, cruel, and practice
wrong beliefs; people would still see that they do negative deeds and therefore are
not worthy or deserving respect. They will even get into trouble from their own
deeds, whatever their caste (Brahmin, Khattiya, Vessa, and Sudda) might be.[36]

Cosmology and worldview[edit]

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Main article: Buddhist Cosmology
In Buddhist cosmology, there are 31 planes of existence within samsara.[37] Beings
in these realms are subject to rebirth after some period of time, except for realms of
the Non-Returners. Therefore, most of these places are not the goal of the holy life
in the Buddha's dispensation. Buddhas are beyond all these 31 planes of existence
after parinibbana. Hindu texts mostly mentions the devas in Kamma Loka. Only the
Hindu god Brahma can be found in the Rupa loka. There are many realms above the
brahma realm that are accessible through meditation. Those in Brahma realms are
also subject to rebirth according to the Buddha.

Practices[edit]
To have an idea of the differences between Buddhism and pre-existing beliefs and
practices during this time, we can look into the Samaaphala Sutta in the Digha
Nikaya of the Pali Canon. In this sutra, a king of Magadha listed the teachings from
many prominent and famous spiritual teachers around during that time. He also
asked the Buddha about his teaching when visiting him. The Buddha told the king
about the practices of his spiritual path. The list of various practices he taught
disciples as well as practices he doesn't encourage are listed. The text, rather than
stating what the new faith was, emphasized what the new faith was not.
Contemporaneous religious traditions were caricatured and then negated. Though
critical of prevailing religious practices and social institutions on philosophical
grounds, early Buddhist texts exhibit a reactionary anxiety at having to compete in
religiously plural societies. Below are a few examples found in the sutra:

Whereas some priests and contemplatives... are addicted to high and luxurious
furnishings such as these over-sized couches, couches adorned with carved
animals, long-haired coverlets, multi-colored patchwork coverlets, white woolen
coverlets, woolen coverlets embroidered with flowers or animal figures, stuffed
quilts, coverlets with fringe, silk coverlets embroidered with gems; large woolen
carpets; elephant, horse, and chariot rugs, antelope-hide rugs, deer-hide rugs;
couches with awnings, couches with red cushions for the head and feet he (a
bhikkhu disciple of the Buddha) abstains from using high and luxurious furnishings
such as these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives... are addicted to scents, cosmetics, and
means of beautification such as these rubbing powders into the body, massaging
with oils, bathing in perfumed water, kneading the limbs, using mirrors, ointments,
garlands, scents, ... bracelets, head-bands, decorated walking sticks... fancy
sunshades, decorated sandals, turbans, gems, yak-tail whisks, long-fringed white
robes he abstains from ... means of beautification such as these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives... are addicted to talking about lowly
topics such as these talking about kings, robbers, ministers of state; armies,
alarms, and battles; food and drink; clothing, furniture, garlands, and scents;
relatives; vehicles; villages, towns, cities, the countryside; women and heroes; the
gossip of the street and the well; tales of the dead; tales of diversity [philosophical
discussions of the past and future], the creation of the world and of the sea, and
talk of whether things exist or not he abstains from talking about lowly topics
such as these...
Whereas some priests and contemplatives...are addicted to running messages and
errands for people such as these kings, ministers of state, noble warriors, priests,
householders, or youths [who say], 'Go here, go there, take this there, fetch that
here' he abstains from running messages and errands for people such as these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives...engage in scheming, persuading,

hinting, belittling, and pursuing gain with gain, he abstains from forms of scheming
and persuading [improper ways of trying to gain material support from donors] such
as these. "Whereas some priests and contemplatives...maintain themselves by
wrong livelihood, by such lowly arts as: reading marks on the limbs [e.g., palmistry];
reading omens and signs; interpreting celestial events [falling stars, comets];
interpreting dreams; reading marks on the body [e.g., phrenology]; reading marks
on cloth gnawed by mice; offering fire oblations, oblations from a ladle, oblations of
husks, rice powder, rice grains, ghee, and oil; offering oblations from the mouth;
offering blood-sacrifices; making predictions based on the fingertips; geomancy;
laying demons in a cemetery; placing spells on spirits; reciting house-protection
charms; snake charming, poison-lore, scorpion-lore, rat-lore, bird-lore, crow-lore;
fortune-telling based on visions; giving protective charms; interpreting the calls of
birds and animals he abstains from wrong livelihood, from lowly arts such as
these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives...maintain themselves by wrong

livelihood, by such lowly arts as: determining lucky and unlucky gems, garments,
staffs, swords, spears, arrows, bows, and other weapons; women, boys, girls, male
slaves, female slaves; elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, cows, goats, rams, fowl,
quails, lizards, long-eared rodents, tortoises, and other animals he abstains from
wrong livelihood, from lowly arts such as these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives... maintain themselves by wrong

livelihood, by such lowly arts as forecasting: the rulers will march forth; the rulers
will march forth and return; our rulers will attack, and their rulers will retreat; their
rulers will attack, and our rulers will retreat; there will be triumph for our rulers and
defeat for their rulers; there will be triumph for their rulers and defeat for our rulers;
thus there will be triumph, thus there will be defeat he abstains from wrong
livelihood, from lowly arts such as these. Whereas some priests and
contemplatives...maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such lowly arts as
forecasting: there will be a lunar eclipse; there will be a solar eclipse; there will be
an occultation of an asterism; the sun and moon will go their normal courses; the
sun and moon will go astray; the asterisms will go their normal courses; the
asterisms will go astray; there will be a meteor shower; there will be a darkening of
the sky; there will be an earthquake; there will be thunder coming from a clear sky;
there will be a rising, a setting, a darkening, a brightening of the sun, moon, and
asterisms; such will be the result of the lunar eclipse... the rising, setting, darkening,
brightening of the sun, moon, and asterisms he abstains from wrong livelihood,
from lowly arts such as these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives...maintain themselves by wrong

livelihood, by such lowly arts as forecasting: there will be abundant rain; there will
be a drought; there will be plenty; there will be famine; there will be rest and
security; there will be danger; there will be disease; there will be freedom from
disease; or they earn their living by counting, accounting, calculation, composing
poetry, or teaching hedonistic arts and doctrines he abstains from wrong
livelihood, from lowly arts such as these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives...maintain themselves by wrong

livelihood, by such lowly arts as: calculating auspicious dates for marriages,
betrothals, divorces; for collecting debts or making investments and loans; for being
attractive or unattractive; curing women who have undergone miscarriages or
abortions; reciting spells to bind a man's tongue, to paralyze his jaws, to make him
lose control over his hands, or to bring on deafness; getting oracular answers to
questions addressed to a mirror, to a young girl, or to a spirit medium; worshipping
the sun, worshipping the Great Bref>Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, pp.
5152.rahma, bringing forth flames from the mouth, invoking the goddess of luck
he abstains from wrong livelihood, from lowly arts such as these.

Whereas some priests and contemplatives...maintain themselves by wrong

livelihood, by such lowly arts as: promising gifts to devas in return for favors;
fulfilling such promises; demonology; teaching house-protection spells; inducing
virility and impotence; consecrating sites for construction; giving ceremonial
mouthwashes and ceremonial bathing; offering sacrificial fires; administering
emetics, purges, purges from above, purges from below, head-purges;
administering ear-oil, eye-drops, treatments through the nose, ointments, and
counter-ointments; practicing eye-surgery (or: extractive surgery), general surgery,
pediatrics; administering root-medicines binding medicinal herbs he abstains
from wrong livelihood, from lowly arts such as these.[38]

Meditation[edit]
Main article: Dhyana in Buddhism
See also: Jhna Historical development
According to the Maha-Saccaka Sutta, the Buddha recalled a meditative state he
entered by chance as a child and abandoned the ascetic practices he has been
doing:

I thought, "I recall once, when my father the Sakyan was working, and I was sitting
in the cool shade of a rose-apple tree, then quite secluded from sensuality,
secluded from unskillful mental qualities I entered & remained in the first jhana:
rapture & pleasure born from seclusion, accompanied by directed thought &
evaluation. Could that be the path to Awakening?" Then following on that memory
came the realization: "That is the path to Awakening."

[39]
According to the Upakkilesa Sutta, after figuring out the cause of the various
obstacles and overcoming them, the Buddha was able to penetrate the sign and
enters 1st- 4th Jhana.

I also saw both the light and the vision of forms. Shortly after the vision of light and
shapes disappear. I thought, "What is the cause and condition in which light and
vision of the forms disappear?
Then consider the following: "The question arose in me and because of doubt my
concentration fell, when my concentration fell, the light disappeared and the vision
of forms. I act so that the question does not arise in me again.

I remained diligent, ardent, perceived both the light and the vision of forms. Shortly
after the vision of light and shapes disappear. I thought, "What is the cause and
condition in which light and vision of the forms disappear?

Then consider the following: Inattention arose in me because of inattention and my

concentration has decreased, when my concentration fell, the light disappeared and
the vision of forms. I must act in such a way that neither doubt nor disregard arise
in me again.

In the same way as above, the Buddha encountered many more obstacles that
caused the light to disappear and found his way out of them. These include sloth
and torpor, fear, elation, inertia, excessive energy, energy deficient, desire,
perception of diversity, and excessive meditation on the ways. Finally, he was able
to penetrate the light and entered jhana.

The following descriptions in the Upakkilesa Sutta further show how he find his way
into the first four Jhanas, which he later considered samma samadhi.

When Anuruddha, I realized that doubt is an imperfection of the mind, I dropped out
of doubt, an imperfection of the mind. When I realized that inattention ... sloth and
torpor ... fear ... elation ... inertia ... excessive energy ... deficient energy ... desire ...
perception of diversity ... excessive meditation on the ways, I abandoned excessive
meditation on the ways, an imperfection of the mind. When Anuruddha, I realized
that doubt is an imperfection of the mind, I dropped out of doubt, an imperfection of
the mind. When I realized that inattention ... sloth and torpor ... fear ... elation ...
inertia ... excessive energy ... deficient energy... desire ... perception of diversity ...
excessive meditation on the ways, I abandoned excessive meditation on the ways,
an imperfection of the mind, so I thought, I abandoned these imperfections of the
mind. Now the concentration will develop in three ways. ..And so, Anuruddha,
develop concentration with directed thought and sustained thought; developed
concentration without directed thought, but only with the sustained thought;
developed concentration without directed thought and without thought sustained,
developed with the concentration ecstasy; developed concentration without
ecstasy; develop concentration accompanied by happiness, developing
concentration accompanied by equanimity...When Anuruddha, I developed
concentration with directed thought and sustained thought to the development ...
when the concentration accompanied by fairness, knowledge and vision arose in
me: My release is unshakable, this is my last birth, now there are no more likely to
be any condition.

[39]
According to the early scriptures, the Buddha learned the two formless attainments
from two teachers, Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta respectively, prior to his
enlightenment.[40] It is most likely that they belonged to the Brahmanical tradition.
[41] However, he realized that neither "Dimension of Nothingness" nor "Dimension
of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception" lead to Nirvana and left. The Buddha said
in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta:

But the thought occurred to me, "This Dhamma leads not to disenchantment, to
dispassion, to cessation, to stilling, to direct knowledge, to Awakening, nor to
Unbinding, but only to reappearance in the dimension of neither perception nor non-
perception." So, dissatisfied with that Dhamma, I left.

[39]
Cessation of feelings and perceptions

The Buddha himself discovered an attainment beyond the dimension of neither

perception nor non-perception, the "cessation of feelings and perceptions". This is
sometimes called the "ninth jhna" in commentarial and scholarly literature.[40][42]
Although the "Dimension of Nothingness" and the "Dimension of Neither Perception
nor Non-Perception" are included in the list of nine Jhanas taught by the Buddha,
they are not included in the Noble Eightfold Path. Noble Path number eight is
"Samma Samadhi" (Right Concentration), and only the first four Jhanas are
considered "Right Concentration". If he takes a disciple through all the Jhanas, the
emphasis is on the "Cessation of Feelings and Perceptions" rather than stopping
short at the "Dimension of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception".

In the Magga-vibhanga Sutta, the Buddha defines Right Concentration that belongs
to the concentration (samadhi) division of the path as the first four Jhanas:

And what is right concentration? There is the case where a monk quite withdrawn
from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful (mental) qualities enters & remains in
the first Jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed
thought & evaluation. With the stilling of directed thoughts & evaluations, he enters
& remains in the Second Jhana: rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of
awareness free from directed thought & evaluation internal assurance. With the
fading of rapture, he remains equanimous, mindful, & alert, and senses pleasure
with the body. He enters & remains in the Third Jhana, of which the Noble Ones
declare, 'Equanimous & mindful, he has a pleasant abiding.' With the abandoning of
pleasure & pain as with the earlier disappearance of elation & distress he
enters & remains in the Fourth Jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither
pleasure nor pain. This is called right concentration.

[43]
The Buddha did not reject the formless attainments in and of themselves, but
instead the doctrines of his teachers as a whole, as they did not lead to nibbana. He
then underwent harsh ascetic practices that he eventually also became disillusioned
with. He subsequently remembered entering jhna as a child, and realized that,
"That indeed is the path to enlightenment."

In the suttas, the immaterial attainments are never referred to as jhnas. The
immaterial attainments have more to do with expanding, while the Jhanas (1-4)
focus on concentration. A common translation for the term "samadhi" is
concentration. Rhys Davids and Maurice Walshe agreed that the term samadhi is
not found in any pre-buddhist text. Hindu texts later used that term to indicate the
state of enlightenment. This is not in conformity with Buddhist usage. In The Long
Discourse of the Buddha: A Translation of the Digha Nikaya (pg. 1700) Maurice
Walshe wrote,

Rhys Davids also states that the term samadhi is not found in any pre-Buddhist text.
To his remarks on the subject should be added that its subsequent use in Hindu
texts to denote the state of enlightenment is not in conformity with Buddhist usage,
where the basic meaning of concentration is expanded to cover "meditation" in
general.

[38]
Meditation was an aspect of the practice of the yogis in the centuries preceding the
Buddha. The Buddha built upon the yogis' concern with introspection and developed
their meditative techniques, but rejected their theories of liberation.[44] In
Buddhism, sati and sampajanna are to be developed at all times, in pre-Buddhist
yogic practices there is no such injunction. A yogi in the Brahmanical tradition is not
to practice while defecating, for example, while a Buddhist monastic should do so.
[45]

Another new teaching of the Buddha was that meditative absorption must be
combined with a liberating cognition.[46]

Religious knowledge or "vision" was indicated as a result of practice both within and
outside of the Buddhist fold. According to the Samaaphala Sutta this sort of vision
arose for the Buddhist adept as a result of the perfection of 'meditation' (Sanskrit:
dhyna) coupled with the perfection of 'ethics' (Sanskrit: la). Some of the Buddha's
meditative techniques were shared with other traditions of his day, but the idea that
ethics are causally related to the attainment of "religious insight" (Sanskrit: praj)
was original.[47]

The Buddhist texts are probably the earliest describing meditation techniques.[48]
They describe meditative practices and states that existed before the Buddha, as
well as those first developed within Buddhism.[49] Two Upanishads written after the
rise of Buddhism do contain full-fledged descriptions of yoga as a means to
liberation.[50]

While there is no convincing evidence for meditation in pre-Buddhist early

Brahminic texts, Wynne argues that formless meditation originated in the Brahminic
or Shramanic tradition, based on strong parallels between Upanishadic cosmological
statements and the meditative goals of the two teachers of the Buddha as recorded
in the early Buddhist texts.[51] He mentions less likely possibilities as well.[52]
Having argued that the cosmological statements in the Upanishads also reflect a
contemplative tradition, he argues that the Nasadiya Sukta contains evidence for a
contemplative tradition, even as early as the late Rg Vedic period.[51]

Vedas[edit]
Buddhism does not deny that the Vedas in their true origin were sacred although it
maintains that the Vedas have been amended repeatedly by certain Brahmins to
secure their positions in society. The Buddha declared that the Veda in its true form
was declared by Kashyapa to certain rishis, who by severe penances had acquired
the power to see by divine eyes.[53] In the Buddhist Vinaya Pitaka of the
Mahavagga (I.245)[54] section the Buddha names these rishis. The names of the
Vedic rishis were "Atthako, Vmako, Vmadevo, Vessmitto, Yamataggi, Angiraso,
Bhradvjo, Vsettho, Kassapo, and Bhagu"[55] but that it was altered by a few
Brahmins who introduced animal sacrifices. The Vinaya Pitaka's section Anguttara
Nikaya: Panchaka Nipata says that it was on this alteration of the true Veda that the
Buddha refused to pay respect to the Vedas of his time.[56]

The Buddha is recorded in the Canki Sutta (Majjhima Nikaya 95) as saying to a
group of Brahmins:

O Vasettha, those priests who know the scriptures are just like a line of blind men
tied together where the first sees nothing, the middle man nothing, and the last
sees nothing.

In the same discourse, he says:

It is not proper for a wise man who maintains truth to come to the conclusion: This
alone is Truth, and everything else is false.

He is also recorded as saying:

To be attached to one thing (to a certain view) and to look down upon other things
(views) as inferior this the wise men call a fetter.

Walpola Rahula writes, "It is always a question of knowing and seeing, and not that
of believing. The teaching of the Buddha is qualified as ehi-passika, inviting you to
'come and see,' but not to come and believe... It is always seeing through
knowledge or wisdom, and not believing through faith."[57]

In Hinduism, philosophies are classified either as Astika or Nastika, that is,

philosophies that either affirm or reject the authorities of the Vedas. According to
this tradition, Buddhism is a Nastika school since it rejects the authority of the
Vedas.[58] Buddhists on the whole called those who did not believe in Buddhism the
"outer path-farers" (tiirthika).[59]

Conversion[edit]
Since the Hindu scriptures are essentially silent on the issue of religious conversion,
the issue of whether Hindus evangelize is open to interpretations.[60] Those who
view Hinduism as an ethnicity more than as a religion tend to believe that to be a
Hindu, one must be born a Hindu. However, those who see Hinduism primarily as a
philosophy, a set of beliefs, or a way of life generally believe that one can convert to
Hinduism by incorporating Hindu beliefs into one's life and by considering oneself a
Hindu.[60] The Supreme Court of India has taken the latter view, holding that the
question of whether a person is a Hindu should be determined by the person's belief
system, not by their ethnic or racial heritage.[61]

Buddhism spread throughout Asia via evangelism and conversion.[62] Buddhist

scriptures depict such conversions in the form of lay followers declaring their
support for the Buddha and his teachings, or via ordination as a Buddhist monk.
Buddhist identity has been broadly defined as one who "takes refuge" in the
Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, echoing a formula seen in Buddhist texts. In some
communities, formal conversion rituals are observed. No specific ethnicity has
typically been associated with Buddhism, and as it spread beyond its origin in India
immigrant monastics were replaced with newly ordained members of the local
ethnic or tribal group.[63]

Soteriology[edit]
Upanishadic soteriology is focused on the static Self, while the Buddha's is focused
on dynamic agency. In the former paradigm, change and movement are an illusion;
to realize the Self as the only reality is to realize something that has always been
the case. In the Buddha's system by contrast, one has to make things happen.[64]

The fire metaphor used in the Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta (which is also used
elsewhere) is a radical way of making the point that the liberated sage is beyond
phenomenal experience. It also makes the additional point that this indefinable,
transcendent state is the sage's state even during life. This idea goes against the
early Brahminic notion of liberation at death.[65]

Liberation for the Brahminic yogin was thought to be the permanent realization at
death of a nondual meditative state anticipated in life. In fact, old Brahminic
metaphors for the liberation at death of the yogic adept ("becoming cool", "going
out") were given a new meaning by the Buddha; their point of reference became the
sage who is liberated in life.[66] The Buddha taught that these meditative states
alone do not offer a decisive and permanent end to suffering either during life or
after death.[67]

He stated that achieving a formless attainment with no further practice would only
lead to temporary rebirth in a formless realm after death.[68] Moreover, he gave a
pragmatic refutation of early Brahminical theories according to which the meditator,
the meditative state, and the proposed uncaused, unborn, unanalyzable Self, are
identical.[69] These theories are undergirded by the Upanishadic correspondence
between macrocosm and microcosm, from which perspective it is not surprising that
meditative states of consciousness were thought to be identical to the subtle strata
of the cosmos.[70] The Buddha, in contrast, argued that states of consciousness
come about caused and conditioned by the yogi's training and techniques, and
therefore no state of consciousness could be this eternal Self.[69]

Nonduality[edit]
Both the Buddha's conception of the liberated person and the goal of early
Brahminic yoga can be characterized as nondual, but in different ways. The nondual
goal in early Brahminism was conceived in ontological terms; the goal was that into
which one merges after death. According to Wynne, liberation for the Buddha "... is
nondual in another, more radical, sense. This is made clear in the dialogue with
Upasiva, where the liberated sage is defined as someone who has passed beyond
conceptual dualities. Concepts that might have some meaning in ordinary
discourse, such as consciousness or the lack of it, existence and non-existence, etc.,
do not apply to the sage. For the Buddha, propositions are not applicable to the
liberated person, because language and concepts (Sn 1076: vaadapathaa,
dhammaa), as well as any sort of intellectual reckoning (sankhaa) do not apply to
the liberated sage.[71]

Nirvana[edit]
The word nirvana (Pali: Nibbana) was first used in its technical sense in Buddhism,
and cannot be found in any of the pre-Buddhist Upanishads (It can be found in Jain
texts). The use of the term in the Bhagavad Gita may be a sign of the strong
Buddhist influence upon Hindu thought.[33] Although the word nirvana is absent
from the Upanishads, the word itself existed prior to the Buddha.[72] It must be
kept in mind that nirvana is one of many terms for salvation that occur in the
orthodox Buddhist scriptures. Other terms that appear are 'Vimokha', or 'Vimutti',
implying 'salvation' and 'deliverance' respectively.[73] Some more words
synonymously used for nirvana in Buddhist scriptures are 'mokkha/moksha',
meaning 'liberation' and 'kevala/kaivalya', meaning 'wholeness'; these words were
given a new Buddhist meaning.[74]

Early Buddhism and early Vedanta[edit]

Early Buddhist scriptures do not mention schools of learning directly connected with
the Upanishads. Though the earliest Upanishads had been completed by the
Buddha's time, they are not cited in the early Buddhist texts as Upanishads or
Vedanta. For the early Buddhists they were likely not thought of as having any
outstanding significance in and of themselves, and as simply one section of the
Vedas.[75]

The Buddhist texts do describe wandering, mendicant Brahmins who appear to have
valued the early Upanishads' promotion of this lifestyle as opposed to living the life
of the householder and accruing wealth from nobles in exchange for performing
Vedic sacrifices.[76] Furthermore, the early Buddhist texts mention ideas similar to
those expounded in the early Upanishads, before controverting them.[77]

Brahman[edit]
The old Upanishads largely consider Brahman (masculine gender, Brahm in the
nominative case, henceforth "Brahm") to be a personal god, and Brahman (neuter
gender, Brahma in the nominative case, henceforth "Brahman") to be the
impersonal world principle.[78] They do not strictly distinguish between the two,
however.[79] The old Upanishads ascribe these characteristics to Brahm: first, he
has light and luster as his marks; second, he is invisible; third, he is unknowable,
and it is impossible to know his nature; fourth, he is omniscient. The old Upanishads
ascribe these characteristics to Brahman as well.[78]

In the Buddhist texts, there are many Brahms. There they form a class of
superhuman beings, and rebirth into the realm of Brahms is possible by pursuing
Buddhist practices.[80] In the early texts, the Buddha gives arguments to refute the
existence of a creator.[81]

In the Pli scriptures, the neuter Brahman does not appear (though the word
brahma is standardly used in compound words to mean "best", or "supreme"[82]
[83]), however ideas are mentioned as held by various Brahmins in connection with
Brahm that match exactly with the concept of Brahman in the Upanishads.
Brahmins who appear in the Tevijja-suttanta of the Digha Nikaya regard "union with
Brahm" as liberation, and earnestly seek it. In that text, Brahmins of the time are
reported to assert: "Truly every Brahmin versed in the three Vedas has said thus:
'We shall expound the path for the sake of union with that which we do not know
and do not see. This is the correct path. This path is the truth, and leads to
liberation. If one practices it, he shall be able to enter into association with
Brahm." The early Upanishads frequently expound "association with Brahm", and
"that which we do not know and do not see" matches exactly with the early
Upanishadic Brahman.[84]

In the earliest Upanishad, the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, the Absolute, which came
to be referred to as Brahman, is referred to as "the imperishable".[85] The Pli
scriptures present a "pernicious view" that is set up as an absolute principle
corresponding to Brahman: "O Bhikkhus! At that time Baka, the Brahm, produced
the following pernicious view: 'It is permanent. It is eternal. It is always existent. It is
independent existence. It has the dharma of non-perishing. Truly it is not born, does
not become old, does not die, does not disappear, and is not born again.
Furthermore, no liberation superior to it exists elsewhere." The principle expounded
here corresponds to the concept of Brahman laid out in the Upanishads. According
to this text the Buddha criticized this notion: "Truly the Baka Brahm is covered with
unwisdom."[86]

The Buddha confined himself to what is empirically given.[87][88][89] This

empiricism is based broadly on both ordinary sense experience and extrasensory
perception enabled by high degrees of mental concentration.[90]

tman[edit]
tman is a Sanskrit word that means 'self'. A major departure from Hindu and Jain
philosophy is the Buddhist rejection of a permanent, self-existent soul (tman) in
favour of anicca or impermanence.

In Hindu philosophy, especially in the Vedanta school of Hinduism, tman is the first
principle,[91] the true self of an individual beyond identification with phenomena,
the essence of an individual. Yajnavalkya (c. 9th century BCE), in the
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, uses the word to indicate that in which everything
exists, which is of the highest value, which permeates everything, which is the
essence of all, bliss and beyond description.[92] While, older Upanishads such as
the Brihadaranyaka, mention several times that the Self is described as Neti neti or
not this not this,[93] Upanishads post Buddhism, like the Maitri Upanishad, define
tman as only the defiled individual self, rather than the universal self.[94] Taittiriya
Upanishad defines tman or the Self as consisting of five sheaths (kosha): the bodily
self consisting of the essence of food (annamaya kosha), the vital breath
(pranamaya kosha), the mind or will (manomaya kosha), the intellect or capacity to
know (vijnanamaya kosha) and bliss (anandamaya kosha).[95] Knowledge or
realization of the tman is seen as essential to attain salvation (liberation):

If atman is brahman in a pot (the body), then one need merely break the pot to fully
realize the primordial unity of the individual soul with the plenitude of Being that
was the Absolute.[96]
Schools of Indian philosophy, such as Advaita (non-dualism) see tman within each
living entity as being fully identical with Brahman the Principle, whereas other
schools such as Dvaita (dualism) differentiate between the individual atma in living
beings, and the Supreme atma (Paramatma) as being at least partially separate
beings.[97] Unlike Advaita, Samkhya holds blissfullness of tman as merely
figurative. However, both Samkhya and Advaita consider the ego (asmita,
ahamkara) rather than the tman to be the cause of pleasure and pain.[98] Later
Advaitic text Pacada classifies the degrees of tman under three headings:
Gauna or secondary (anything other than the personality that an individual
identifies with), Mithya or false (bodily personality) and Mukhya or primary (the real
Self).[99]

The concept of tman was rejected by the Buddha. Terms like anatman (not-self)
and shunyata (voidness) are at the core of all Buddhist traditions. The permanent
transcendence of the belief in the separate existence of the self is integral to the
enlightenment of an Arhat. The Buddha criticized conceiving theories even of a
unitary soul or identity immanent in all things as unskillful.[100] In fact, according to
the Buddha's statement in Khandha Samyutta 47, all thoughts about self are
necessarily, whether the thinker is aware of it or not, thoughts about the five
aggregates or one of them.[101]

Despite the rejection of tman by Buddhists there were similarities between certain
concepts in Buddhism and tman. The Upanishadic "Self" shares certain
characteristics with nibbana; both are permanent, beyond suffering, and
unconditioned.[94] Buddhist mysticism is also of a different sort from that found in
systems revolving around the concept of a "God" or "Self":

If one would characterize the forms of mysticism found in the Pali discourses, it is
none of the nature-, God-, or soul-mysticism of F.C. Happold. Though nearest to the
latter, it goes beyond any ideas of 'soul' in the sense of immortal 'self' and is better
styled 'consciousness-mysticism'.[102]

However, the Buddha shunned any attempt to see the spiritual goal in terms of
"Self" because in his framework, the craving for a permanent self is the very thing
that keeps a person in the round of uncontrollable rebirth, preventing him or her
from attaining nibbana.[94] At the time of the Buddha some philosophers and
meditators posited a root: an abstract principle all things emanated from and that
was immanent in all things. When asked about this, instead of following this pattern
of thinking, the Buddha attacks it at its very root: the notion of a principle in the
abstract, superimposed on experience. In contrast, a person in training should look
for a different kind of "root" the root of dukkha experienced in the present.
According to one Buddhist scholar, theories of this sort have most often originated
among meditators who label a particular meditative experience as the ultimate
goal, and identify with it in a subtle way.[103]

Adi Shankara in his works refuted the Buddhist arguments against tman. He
suggested that a self-evident conscious agent would avoid infinite regress, since
there would be no necessity to posit another agent who would know this. He further
argued that a cognizer beyond cognition could be easily demonstrated from the
diversity in self existence of the witness and the notion.[104] Furthermore,
Shankara thought that no doubts could be raised about the Self, for the act of
doubting implies at the very least the existence of the doubter. Vidyaranya, another
Advaita Vedantic philosopher, expresses this argument as:

No one can doubt the fact of his own existence. Were one to do so, who would the
doubter be?[105]

Cosmic Self declared non-existent[edit]

The Buddha denies the existence of the cosmic Self, as conceived in the
Upanishadic tradition, in the Alagaddupama Sutta (M I 135-136). Possibly the most
famous Upanishadic dictum is tat tvam asi, "thou art that." Transposed into first
person, the Pali version is eso ham asmi, "I am this." This is said in several suttas to
be false. The full statement declared to be incorrect is "This is mine, I am this, this is
my self/essence." This is often rejected as a wrong view.[106] The Alagaduppama
Sutta rejects this and other obvious echoes of surviving Upanishadic statements as
well (these are not mentioned as such in the commentaries, and seem not to have
been noticed until modern times). Moreover, the passage denies that ones self is
the same as the world and that one will become the world self at death.[107] The
Buddha tells the monks that people worry about something that is non-existent
externally (bahiddhaa asati) and non-existent internally (ajjhattam asati); he is
referring respectively to the soul/essence of the world and of the individual.[107] A
similar rejection of "internal" Self and "external" Self occurs at AN II 212. Both are
referring to the Upanishads.[107] The most basic presupposition of early Brahminic
cosmology is the identification of man and the cosmos (instances of this occur at TU
II.1 and Mbh XII.195), and liberation for the yogin was thought to only occur at
death, with the adept's union with brahman (as at Mbh XII.192.22).[108] The
Buddha's rejection of these theories is therefore one instance of the Buddha's attack
on the whole enterprise of Upanishadic ontology.[109][110]

Brahman[edit]
The Buddha redefined the word "brahman" so as to become a synonym for arahant,
replacing a distinction based on birth with one based on spiritual attainment.[111]
[112] The early Buddhist scriptures furthermore defined purity as determined by
one's state of mind, and refer to anyone who behaves unethically, of whatever
caste, as "rotting within", or "a rubbish heap of impurity".[113]

The Buddha explains his use of the word brahman in many places. At Sutta Nipata
1.7 Vasala Sutta, verse 12, he states: "Not by birth is one an outcast; not by birth is
one a brahmin. By deed one becomes an outcast, by deed one becomes a
brahman."[114] An entire chapter of the Dhammapada is devoted to showing how a
true brahman in the Buddha's use of the word is one who is of totally pure mind,
namely, an arahant.[115] However, it is very noteworthy that the Bhagavad Gita
also defines Brahmin, and other varnas, as qualities and resulting from actions, and
does not mention birth as a factor in determining these. In that regard, the chapter
on Brahmins in the Dhammapada may be regarded as being entirely in tune with
the definition of a Brahmin in Chapter 18 of the Bhagavad Gita. Both say that a
Brahmin is a person having certain qualities.

A defining of feature of the Buddha's teachings is self-sufficiency, so much so as to

render the Brahminical priesthood entirely redundant.[116]
Buddha in Hindu scriptures[edit]
Main article: Buddha as an Avatar of Vishnu

Hinduism regards Buddha (bottom right) as one of the 10 avatars of Vishnu.

In one Purana, the Buddha is described as an incarnation of Vishnu who incarnated
in order to delude demons away from the Vedic dharma. The Bhavishya Purana
posits:

At this time, reminded of the Kali Age, the god Vishnu became born as Gautama,
the Shakyamuni, and taught the Buddhist dharma for ten years. Then Shuddodana
ruled for twenty years, and Shakyasimha for twenty. At the first stage of the Kali
Age, the path of the Vedas was destroyed and all men became Buddhists. Those
who sought refuge with Vishnu were deluded.

[117]
Consequently, the word Buddha is mentioned in several of the Puranas that are
believed to have been composed after his birth.[118][119]

Buddha in Buddhist scriptures[edit]

Main article: Buddha as an Avatar of Vishnu
According to the biography of the Buddha, he was a Mahapurusha (great being)
named Shvetaketu. Tushita Heaven (Home of the Contented gods) was the name of
the realm he dwells before taking his last birth on earth as Gautama Buddha. There
is no more rebirth for a Buddha. Before leaving the Tushita realm to take birth on
earth, he designated Maitreya to take his place there. Maitreya will come to earth as
the next Buddha, instead of him coming back again. Krishna was a past life of
Sariputra, a chief disciple of the Buddha. He has not attained enlightenment during
that life as Krishna. Therefore, he came back to be reborn during the life of the
Buddha and reached the first stage of Enlightenment after encountering an
enlightened disciple of the Buddha. He reached full Arahantship or full Awakening
after became ordained in the Buddha's sangha.

Notable views[edit]
Neo-Vedanta[edit]
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan has claimed that the Buddha did not look upon himself as
an innovator, but only a restorer of the way of the Upanishads,[120] despite the fact
that the Buddha did not accept the Upanishads, viewing them as comprising a
pretentious tradition, foreign to his paradigm.[121]

Vivekananda wrote in glowing terms about Buddha, and visited Bodh Gaya several
times.[122]

Steven Collins sees such Hindu claims regarding Buddhism as part of an effort
itself a reaction to Christian proselytizing efforts in India to show that "all religions
are one", and that Hinduism is uniquely valuable because it alone recognizes this
fact.[123]

Reformation[edit]
Some scholars have written that Buddhism should be regarded as "reformed
Brahmanism",[124] and many Hindus consider Buddhism a sect of Hinduism.
[citation needed]

Dalit-movement[edit]
B. R. Ambedkar, the founder of the Dalit Buddhist movement, declared that
Buddhism offered an opportunity for low-caste and untouchable Hindus to achieve
greater respect and dignity because of its non-caste doctrines. Among the 22 vows
he prescribed to his followers is an injunction against having faith in Brahma, Vishnu
and Mahesh. He also regarded the belief that the Buddha was an incarnation of
Vishnu as "false propaganda".[125]
Comparison of Sikhism with Vaisnavism, Vedanta, and Nathism
Comparison discussing how Gurmat is unique from Hindu philosophies of
Vaisnavism, ... The bedrock of every religion is the spiritual experience of its
founder. .... In fact, Guru Nanak was clearly laying down the new ideology for
high ..... Nath Yogis are Saivites and Saivism has the longest religious history, being
pre-Vedic.
Sikhism, Vaisnavism, Vedanta and Nathism

Daljeet Singh

Introduction

The subject of this paper is to understand the uniqueness of the Sikh Religion and
why and how Guru Nanak in laying down the principles of his religion and pursuing
his mission completely departed from the earlier Indian traditions. In this attempt
we shall describe the essentials of Sikhism and briefly compare them with three of
his contemporary religious systems.

Sikhism

The bedrock of every religion is the spiritual experience of its founder. Let us see
what is the spiritual experience of the Sikh Gurus and how they define God.
Obviously, it is this experience that forms the driving force of the mission of a
prophet and determines his goal. Guru Nanak says, "O, Lalo, I speak what the Lord
commands me to convey."1 This means two things. First, that God is both
Transcendent and Immanent, and, thus, operates in history. Second, that the Guru
had a mission to perform. Guru Nanak calls God: "The Sole One, Self-existent and
Immanent, Creator Person, Without Fear and Without Enmity, Timeless Person,2 Un-
incarnated, Self-Created and Gracious Enlightener", "Benevolent", and "Ocean of
Virtues". As to the character of spiritual experience, it is recorded, "Friends ask me
what is the mark of the Lord, He is All Love. Rest He is Ineffable."3 It is this definition
of God as "Love" and "Ocean of attributes" that governs the entire structure of
Sikhism and the growth of its history. It is in this background that Guru Nanak gave
for his mission the call, "If you want to play the game of love, Come with your head
on your palm."4 and Guru Gobind Singh declared, "Let all listen to the Truth I
proclaim, He who loves, attains to God."5 We have, thus, to see what are the
doctrinal implications of the spiritual experience of the Gurus and their definition of
God regarding the various issues we seek to understand. The metaphysical position
of Sikhism being a monotheism is clear enough, but much more significant is the
inference that the world is not only real but also meaningful. For, the Guru says,
"True is He, true is His creation."6 "God created the world and permeated it with His
Light."7 "God created the world of life and planted Naam in it, making it the place
for righteous activity."8 Further, apart from the world being meaningful and a place
for virtuous living, God has a deep interest in life and man. "God is eyes to the blind,
milk to the child, and riches to the poor."9 "It is the innermost nature of God to help
the erring.10 "This religious experience of the Gurus emphatically lays down the
direction in which God wants man's spiritual activity to move. Altruism is, therefore,
a direction and the methodology prescribed by the Guru both for the super-man and
the seeker. For, "with God it is only the deeds in this world that count."11 "Good,
righteousness, virtues, and the giving up of vice are the way to realize the essence
of God."12 "Love, contentment, truth, humility and virtues enable the seed of Naam
(God) to sprout."13 God showers His Grace where the lowly are cared for."14 "It is
by our deeds that we become near or away from God."15 And finally, the Guru
clinches the issue when he says, "Everything is lower than Truth, but higher still is
truthful living."16 "The spiritual path can be trodden not by mere words and talk but
by treating all alike, and as one's equal. Yoga does not lie in living in cremation
grounds, doing one-point meditation or roaming all over places, or visiting places of
pilgrimage, but by remaining God-centred while doing the affairs of the world."17
"By despising the world one gets not to God."18 In the Japuji the Guru pointedly
asks a question as to what is the godly way and himself replies to it saying that by
carrying out the Will of God one becomes a Sachiaara or God-man. And, God's Will is
attributive, God being "All Love" and the "Ocean of Virtues".

The logic of the above approach of life-affirmation leads to a number of other

inferences. Since love can be expressed and virtues practised only in life or social
life, the Gurus clearly lived and recommended a householder's life. Except Guru
Harkrishan who died at an early age, all the Gurus were married householders. This
inference from the thesis of the Gurus was not just incidental, it was clear and
categoric. Because Guru Nanak not only bypassed his son Siri Chand, a pious Udasi,
in choosing his successor, but the second and the third Gurus clearly excluded the
recluses, ascetics or Sanyasis from the Sikh fold. In short, monasticism, asceticism
and other-worldliness were clearly rejected. Instead, the worldly life was accepted
as the arena for the practice of virtues for spiritual growth. Similarly, life-affirmation
and the rejection of celibacy led to the second inference, namely, that the status of
woman should be equal to that of man. The Guru says, "Why call woman impure
when without woman there would be none,"19 and when it was she who gave birth
to kings among men. This was the logic of Guru Nanak's path, against the one of
celibacy and women being considered sin-born and therefore an impediment in the
spiritual path. In Hinduism women were classed with Sudras, being generally
regarded as unfit for the spiritual path.

Guru Nanak's system leads to a third inference as well, namely, the importance of
work and production. He says, "The person incapable of earning his living gets his
ears split and becomes a mendicant. He calls himself a Guru or a saint. Look not up
to him and touch not his feet. He knows the way who earns his living and shares his
earnings with others."20 It is significant that after his long tours Guru Nanak worked
as a peasant and started a Langar (free food for all and service at one platform) till
the end of his days. This practice of earning one's own living continued till, after the
Fifth Guru, organizational work of the Panth and confrontation with the Empire made
the carrying out of a private profession impossible. It is important that all these
doctrines of their religion were not only scripturally sanctioned but were also
actually practised by the Sikh Gurus. This was very essential because, these
doctrines being so radically different from, or even opposed to, the earlier religious
traditions and trends, their import and importance would have been completely
missed or misunderstood if these had not been visibly lived and demonstrated in
practice. For example, it is significant that in order to establish the equality of man,
and demolish the ugly caste discrimination, Guru Nanak's first act after his
enlightenment was to take a low caste Muslim as his sole companion, emphasizing
thereby that anyone who wanted to join his path had completely to shed all caste
prejudices. That is also why while organizing local Sangats he wanted them to meet
together and run langars so as to eat together and share their food with the poor.
For him this was the path to establish the brotherhood of man. The Guru not only
recommended work and sharing of incomes but also deprecated the amassing of
wealth. He says, "Riches cannot be gathered without sin but these do not keep
company after death."21 "God's bounty belongs to all but men grab it for
themselves."22 Just as in the Indian religious systems of his times monasticism,
asceticism, celibacy and ahimsa went together with the acceptance of the caste
ideology in the social field, similarly, in Guru Nanak's system all such ideas and
institutions were rejected and instead a concerted effort was made to establish the
brotherhood of man and give religious sanction to the life of the householder, the
need of work, production and sharing, and the acceptance of all kinds of social
responsibility. We have seen that the Gurus' experience of God being "Love" and
their description of God being "Protector" (Raakbaa), "Just" (Adli), "Benevolent",
"Helper of the weak", "Shelter of the Shelterless", "Destroyer of the Tyrant" enjoins
a clear responsibility on the god-men to toe that line, namely, to live a religious life
while accepting full social participation and responsibility. It is in line with this wholly
radical religious thesis that the Gurus changed the entire methodology and the
direction of the spiritual life. "The God-centred' lives truthfully while a
householder."23 The God-man has to be the instrument or the soldier of God in this
world.

The acceptance of full social responsibility has other implications too. Everything
that militates against an honest and righteous discharge of a householder's life has
to be tackled. It is in this context that Gurus recommended the rejection of
asceticism, monasticism and celibacy and the acceptance of a householder's life of
work and sharing of wealth, and the elimination of caste distinctions. But, there is
one thing more which most of us have failed to understand. In the life of man there
are not only social pressures but there are also what modem life calls political
pressures. Evidently, both are problems of living in a society. These societal
problems the modem man has artificially divided into three sections, economic,
social and political. In actual life these three kinds do not occur separately, nor can
these be segregated to be dealt with separately. The religious man is confronted
with all of them and it becomes his religious duty and responsibility to tackle them
and to resist and react against injustice and evil forces whatever be the quarters
from which those should emanate. It is obvious that socio-political problems cannot
be solved individually or by mere preaching; these can be dealt with only by a
properly and religiously motivated society. It is equally plain that in order to counter
and resist evil political pressures it may at some time become necessary to use
force in aid of a righteous cause. Here it is important to note that Guru Nanak as the
prophet of this new religious thesis did three things. He laid the foundations of a
society that was to be trained and motivated to react against injustice. Wherever he
went, he organized local societies with faith in his system. He chose and appointed
a successor to carry on the mission he had started. His was not a religion where the
object was just personal salvation as an end in itself, or the salvation of a few. His
was not a Math or Khankah for a few seeking only spiritual attainments. Guru Nanak
taught, as was exemplified by his own life, that the spiritual man has a social
mission as well. For that very reason it was he who clarified another principle of his
religion, namely, his stand regarding Ahimsa. He says, "Men discriminate not and
quarrel over meat eating. They do not know what is flesh or non-flesh and what is
sin or non-sin."24 In this and other hymns he exposes the cant of non-meat eating,
which was based on the principle of Ahimsa. He adds that there is life in every grain
of corn or food we eat. In the context of Indian religions, this explanation was
extremely necessary for a society for which he contemplated the course of action as
indicated in his hymns. For, resistance to aggression or oppression cannot at times
be done without the use of force. Therefore, for the execution of the religious
mission of Guru Nanak it was essential to create a society, appoint a successor, and
clearly eliminate the religious sanction to the curb of Ahimsa in the socio-political
field. Thirdly, Guru Nanak clearly identified the socio-political problems of his times.
The greatest problems were the tyrannical barbarity of the invaders, rapidly of the
rulers, the corruption and misrule of the officials," and the hypocrisy and greed of
the Mullahs and priests. On the-issue of cruelty, loot and murder by the invaders, he
even criticizes the local rulers for their unpreparedness. Nay, he even complains to
God for allowing the weak to be tyrannized by the strong. Very often the logic of this
criticism has been missed. Guru's criticism was not an empty rhetoric. In fact, Guru
Nanak was clearly laying down the new ideology for high society and identifying the
tasks to be accomplished by it. It is in this light that we have to understand the
institutions of succession, its continuing even after the doctrinal base had been
finalized and the scripture compiled by the Fifth Guru, and its closure by the Tenth
Guru only after the creation of the Khalsa. The Sikh does not pray to God for
Moksha, but he prays for millions of hands to serve Him. This religious thesis of the
Gurus, as well shall see, is entirely different from the earlier Indian religious systems
like Vaisnavism, Nathism and Vedantism in vogue in those times. Therefore, the
Gurus by their personal examples and martyrdoms established the validity and the
practicality of their religious system. In the absence of it, Sikhism could hardly have
been understood, much less followed. In fact, Gurus' spiritual experience of God
being all Love involves logically and correspondingly total responsibility towards all
beings. In the Gurus' system it is simply impossible for the religious person and his
society to avoid responsible reaction against injustice wherever it may occur.
Sikhism accepts the "idea that specifically designated organized bands of men
should play a creative part in the political world destroying the established order
and reconstructing society according to Word of God."25 Guru Nanak, thus, laid the
foundations of the doctrines of Miri and Piri that later fructified in the form of the
Harmandir Sahib and Akal Takhat. This doctrine of Miri-Piri or Saint-Soldier is so
radical in the Indian context that Sant Ram Dass of Maharashtra had to be explained
by the Sixth Guru himself that he was pursuing the religion of Guru Nanak and that
his sword was for the protection of the weak and the destruction of the tyrant.
Similarly, the anti-asceticism and the householder's life of Guru Nanak looked so
odd to the Naths that they questioned his very claim to be following the religious
path. But, the Guru's reply to them is very revealing of his new thesis because he
asserted that it is the Naths who did not know even the elementaries of the spiritual
path.

What we wish to emphasize is that it is not just incidental, but it is the very logic of
Guru Nanak's system that involved on the one hand the rejection of monasticism,
asceticism, celibacy and Ahimsa and on the other hand led to the creation of an
organized and disciplined society that accepted total social responsibility. It is in this
context that we should understand and interpret the history of the Guru period. We
shall revert to this point at the close of our discussion. At present, let us give a brief
outline of the three religious systems, namely, Vaisnavism, Vedantism; and Nathism,
that were prevalent in the time of Guru Nanak. These systems, the Guru clearly
found incongruous with his spiritual experience and he clearly rejected them and
simultaneously started his own Panth in pursuance of his mission.

Vaisnavism

It is a generally accepted view that Bhagvatism arose as a non-Vedic cult which was
for the first time included in the Hindu Complex as an alternative mode of Moksha in
the Bhagvad Gita which is admittedly an eclectic compilation. The system is
ritualistic and involves (i) visit to the temple, (ii) selection of material for worship,
(iii) worship of the deity, (iv) muttering of the Mantras, and (v) Yogic meditation.
Similarly, the worship of Hari involves (i) remembering and repeating the name of
Hari, (ii) constant worship with devotion, (iii) salutation and resorting to the feet of
Hari, and (iv) surrender of the soul with devotion. Two things are significant about
this Bhakti; it is entirely ritualistic without any reference to socio-moral conduct.
Secondly, it was accepted as only an alternative mode of Moksha which was given a
low priority. In fact, the Bhagvad Gita does not prescribe a unified system. Apart
from its different modes of Moksha being unintegrated into one unified whole, the
metaphysical position is also quite incongruous because the dualism of Yoga and
the pantheism of Upanisads exist side by side with the concepts of Vedic ritualism
and mysticism. It is, thus, believed that the Gita was more concerned in bringing
variant systems within the Hindu fold than with their integration into a systematic
whole; and that the permission of Shudras and women to the path of devotion was
allowed because the Buddhist had admitted them to their monasteries without
discrimination. This is supported by the fact that the Gita gives full sanction to the
discriminatory rigidity of the caste system. It says that the Lord created the four
Varnas with their separate specified duties and that it was more meritorious to do,
even though inefficiently, the duties of one's own caste than to do, even though
efficiently, the duties of another caste. "The Gita brought about a compromise
between the worldly life of allotted duties and the hermit's life of absolute
renouncement." "On the one hand we purify our minds by non-attachment and yet,
on the other hand, we continue to perform all the ritualistic and other duties
belonging to our particular caste or state of life, i.e., the prescribed stages of four
ashramas."26 Both in the Bhagvad Gita and the system of Ramanuja, Bhakti meant
only Upasana or 'just meditation with a contemplative union with God as the goal.
This Bhakti does not involve a devotional or personal love as later in the time of
Sandiliya or the Bhagvat Purana.

Later arose the theory of Avtarhood, namely, that God incarnates Himself in order to
save man. This is a Vaisnava contribution to the complex of Hindu systems. It is
believed, as in the eclectic character of Bhagvad Gita, that the doctrine of
Avtarhood is only a way of absorbing heterodox and variant cults by declaring their
gods to be the incarnations of Vishnu. Accordingly, founders of even dualistic
systems like Sankhya and Jainism were also declared avtaras. In the long run
twenty-three avtaras were declared, including Lord Rama, dwarf, man-lion, tortoise,
Rsabha, Kapila, and others. While this doctrine enabled the absorption of heterodox
creeds, and made the new entrants to accept the authority of the Vedas and the
Brahmanical ideology of caste, it could evidently never make for the development of
a coherent or unified religious or metaphysical system prescribing a uniform or
integrated methodology or goals.

The next development in the course of Vaisnavism is the period of Sandilya and
Bhagvat Purana. Alvar Saints appeared in the South and Saints like Tuka Ram,
Ramanand, Chaitanya, Mirabai and others arose in the north, west and the east of
India. Dr. Tara Chand believes that this new development which took place, quite
often in the lower sections of the Hindu society, followed the influence and impact
of Islam which was I non-hierarchical.

Though there are other exponents of Vaisnavism like Nimbarka, or Madhva who is a
dualist, Ramanuja is considered to be the best of them. His system is pantheistic,
Brahman being both manifest and unmanifest. The individual souls and the material
world are the body or the attributes of Brahman. He accepts the presence of
ahankara and explains human activity virtually on the basis of Sankhya. For him
Ishwara exists in five forms, (i) As Narayana or Paravasudeva, wearing jewels and
ornaments, he lives in Vakuntha on a throne surrounded by Sesa (serpent), Garuda
and other delivered souls, (ii) As in four forms including that of Vasudeva to enable
men to worship him, (iii) As in the Avtaras, fish, tortoise, swan and others, (iv) As
the soul of each being even when it goes to heaven or hell, (v) As in the idols kept in
the houses. Souls are of three kinds, (i) eternal souls like that of Garuda, (ii) the
delivered souls, and (iii) the bound ones.

In his system Bhakti is integrated both with ritualism and Jnana Yoga which are also
its essential components, It is significant the Ramanuja considers both Vedic
ritualism and Brahm Vidya of Upanisads as of equal importance and validity, so
much so that ritualistic acts have to be practised even by a Jnani. It is important to
note that his Bhakti is open only to the three higher castes. To Sudras only the
system of surrender or Prapatti is open. The caste ideology and the ideas of
pollution are clearly accepted and practised. Brahmans only can be priests for the
purpose of idol worship. The concept of pollution is so important that if while
cooking or eating one's food another person casts his glance on it, the entire food
has to be thrown away. Celibacy is recommended and women are considered sin-
born. They are, therefore, not admitted as Vaisnavas.

In the Bhagvad Purana, nine modes of worship are suggested. These are all formal
and ritualistic like listening to the praise of God, repeating the name of God, image
worship, etc., without any insistence on socio-moral activity. Padma Purana
prescribes seven modes of worship: (i) imprinting of marks on the body and
forehead, (ii) repeating mantras, (iii) drinking water used for the feet of the idol, (iv)
eating food offered to the idol, (v) service of the devotees, (vi) fasting on designated
days of the lunar month, (vii) laying Tulsi leaves at the feet of the idol.
Both Vallabha and Chaitanya accept Bhakti as the sole method of Moksha. In the
former system the modes of worship are all formal like singing the praises of God,
Arti, image Worship, etc. Householder's life is allowed but the devotee visits the
temple of the Guru for worship of the idol at fixed intervals. In the case of
Chaitanya, Bhakti is an extremely emotional affair, involving ecstatic dancing and
singing. While Chaitanya's devotees were from all castes, even Muslims, his
followers, except for Bairagis, observed the caste system regarding cooking and
other matters. It needs to be clarified that Karam Yoga meant only ritualistic acts
and not socio-moral deeds. In fact, because of the general insistence on celibacy,
socio-moral activity is virtually excluded. Maitra, who had made a detailed study of
the ethics of all Hindu systems writes that a common feature of the doctrine of the
ideal life is "the conception of the ideal as a negation or at least as a transcendence
of the empirical life proper and that this state is thus a super moral spiritual ideal
rather than a strictly moral idea." It is transcendental state of deliverance from all
struggles of life. It is generally and essentially a state of quiescence."27

In sum, Vaisnavism has seven fundamentals. Its scriptures, as of all other Hindu
systems, are the Vedas and Upanisads. It lays down the doctrine of avtarhood which
is a Vaisnava contribution to the Hindu religion. The ideology of caste is accepted
fully as also the idea of pollution. Its methodology of worship or devotion is clearly
formal, ritualistic, contemplative, or intensely emotional without any reference to so
do-moral life. Hooper, who has made a detailed study of Alvar Saints says that
moral character is hardly a strong feature of their Bhakti. The reason for it is
obvious. The entire approach is otherworldly and for liberation from the tangles of
life. Consequently, this is also the reason that except in the case of Vallabhacharya,
celibacy is the rule and the position of women is distinctly downgraded. Ramanuja
denies Vedic studies to women. They were not allowed to mix with men for devotion
nor allowed to become nuns. Shankradeva, a liberal saint, says, "Of all the terrible
aspirations of the world, woman's is the ugliest. A slight side glance of her
captivates even the hearts of celebrated sages. Her sight destroys prayer, penance
and meditation. Knowing this the wise keep away from the company of women."28
He did not allow women to join even the religious functions of men. For she was
deemed to be a temptress. Murti writes about Shankradeva that he was interested
only "In establishing religious freedom and fellowship rather than social overhaul. To
trouble about the improvement of social conditions, perhaps, deemed to him as
little profitable."29 Sixthly, Ahimsa is prescribed as a cardinal rule for all Vaisnavas.
Seventhly, the goal is union with or merger in God or Brahman, though ritualistic
duties are prescribed till the end of one's days. There is one more point for mention.
In Hinduism the sexual or tantric method is accepted as an alternative system of
Moksha and a saint like Rama Krishna also accepts its validity.

Vedanta

Vedantism is a very mixed concept. Basically, Upanisadic thought is the Vedantic

thought. This system which is mainly opposed to the earlier Vedic ritualism (Purva
Mimansa) is in itself very variant. It can form the basis of materialism, antheism,
monoism, i.e., of the world being the emanation of Brahman or of the world being
just illusory and Brahman alone being real. That is why later philosophers like.
Shankra, Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbarka and others have all given divergent
interpretations of the Upanisads. Because of the short space available, it will not be
possible to indicate all the diverse views on the subject. We have already stated the
views of Ramanuja, Vasisht Advaita. We shall here describe briefly the Upanisadic
thought and the Vedanta of Shankra which is the most popular Vedanisc system.

It is necessary to note that the Upanisadic thoughts were not meant to be a

religious system. These comprise teachings meant only for a small section or an
elite most of whom had withdrawn themselves to the seclusion of the forest. The
search was for an intuitional, blessed and ineffable mystic experience of unity or
identity with Brahman. With the knowledge of it, they say, everything becomes
known. Similies of a river merging into the sea, of a seed growing into an oak tree
and of a whole of which everything is a part are given. This fundamental reality is
not personal like God of theists to whom we pray with devotion and love. It is this
that has led to the concepts of "That thou art", "I am Brahman", and of Katha
Upanisad saying, "He who perceives diversity in this world suffers the death of all
deaths", and of Brahman alone being real the rest being all false and illusory.
Upanisads, thus, contain divergent and contradictory thoughts without any attempt
to reconcile them into a coherent system. As to methodology, it is primarily
meditational with the ideal of four ashramas. The last two ashramas of Vanprastha
and Sanyasa are basically other-worldly and ascetic, involving disconnection with
the delusive secular life. The final achievement is the result of one's own effort and
not the gift of God or his grace. The Jivan Mukta has no role to play and is indifferent
to all actions whether good or evil. The distinction of good and evil is transcended
and it is a liberation from the conditions of worldly existence.

Later the authors of the Upanisads also accepted the validity of Vedic ritualism and
its social commands regarding caste. As such, they became a component of the
overall Vedic system and gained scriptural sanctity as a limb of the Vedas.
Therefore, for any serious consideration of Vedanta, the abovenoted factual position
about the Upanisads, on which the various types of Vedanta are based, has to be
kept in view. Hiriyana writes, "The diversity of teaching noticed in connection with
the theoretical teaching of the Upanisads has its reflex in their practical teachings,
both in regard to the ideal to be achieved and the means of achieving it."30 For
example, "one Upanisad alone mentioning three such different means of attaining
immortality devotion to truth, penance and vedic study and ascribing them to three
specific teachers."31 Secondly, it is also clear that the Upanisads and the
sanctioned social system of the period give clear approval to the caste system. The
Chhandogya writes that "the wicked are born again as outcasts, dogs or swine."
"The Brihadaraniyaka (VI. 2, 15-16) gives a similar account. The rules of punishment
in Grih sutras and Dharamasutras are grossly discriminatory."32 It must be noted
that "the rules of punishment are largely based on caste consideration, so that for
having committed the same offence, a Brahman may pass unscathed, but a Shudra
may even receive capital punishment."33 "The period of Sutras witnessed the
gradual hardening of the caste system in general and the deterioration of the
position of Vaishyas and Shudras in particular." "The Shudra was denied the
privilege of Sanyasa (renunciation)."34 "We see in the Dharam Sutras the beginning
of the formal theory of defilement resulting in the taboo of all contact on the part of
a pure man of the upper castes with an impure man, namely, a member of the
lowest caste."35 "The Dharam Sutras show that the caste distinction has
outstripped its proper limits and has even invaded the field of civil and criminal
law."36 Evidently, the Upanisadic mystic system, though other-worldly and
meditational in its approach, accepts the ritualism and the caste ideology of the
Vedas.

Shankara's View

Gaudapada and Shankra pursue that line of thought in the Upanisads which
considers world to be just an illusion and Brahman alone to be real. Gaudapada
writes, "The manifold universe does not exist as a form of reality nor does it exist of
itself." "Having attained to non-duality one should behave in the world like an
insensible object."37 All diversity according to Shankra is false (Mithya). Therefore,
to work while accepting the phenomenal existence of the world is sheer Avidya. The
goal is to realize the truth of Brahman alone being real and to deny the world.
Ishvara and individual souls are parts of Brahman. Man is ignorant since he does not
realize that all change in the world is without any meaning or validity, thereby
denying the very basis of all socio-moral life. Shankra says, "I am not born how can
there be either birth or death for me? I am neither male nor female, nor am I
sexless. I am the Blessed peaceful one, who is the only cause of the origin and
dissolution of the world."38 All changes in the world are due to Maya which is
neither real nor unreal nor related to Brahman. All methods of devotion and worship
are fruitless, the goal being the Absolute and not Saguna, or qualified Brahman, God
or Ishvara which is a lower stage to be transcended by the Jnani. In fact, the path of
devotion; he says, is for persons of narrow or poor intellect. Since he cannot deny
the scriptural character of the Vedas, he says that the path of ritualism or sacrifices
is prescribed out of compassion for persons of low and average intellect and it can
gain for them only heaven. As in Sankhya Yoga, withdrawal from the illusory
adjuncts of Maya is suggested. Starting with Vairagya and dissociation with the
world, the mystic achievement can be made only as a Sanyasin or renouncer of the
world, giving up all works good or bad and as one who is unwilling to accept even
the grace of God. The method prescribed, as in the Upanisads, is of Vedic study,
reflection and meditation. The aim is to realize, "I am Brahman (Abam Brabm
asm;)." It is an intellectual realization accompanied by Anubhava. But the Jivan
Mukta has no role to play in life. Swami Sivananda writing about the two modern
Jnanis, Kalkot Swami and Mowni Swami, says that they were unconscious of the
movement of their bowels and the Sevadar (attendant) had to wash their
bottoms."39 "Such a Videha Mukta who is absolutely merged in Brahman cannot
have the awareness of the world which is non-existent to him. If his body is to be
maintained, it has to be fed and cared for by others. The Vidheha Mukta is thus not
in a position to engage himself for the good of the' world. "40 For them, self-
realization breaks the chain of causation and the world of experience appears false.
Even the idea of God being a lower stage has to be transcended finally, for "God" is
only the most subtle, most magnificent, most flattering false impression of all in this
general spectacle of erroneous self-deception."41 No wonder Zimmer says that
"Such holy megalomania goes past the bounds of sense. With Sankara, the
grandeur of the Supreme human experience becomes intellectualized and reveals
its inhuman sterility."42 Such is Shankra's monoism for which world is Mithya.

Nathism
Nathism was one of the prevalent religious cults in North India in the time of Guru
Nanak. He criticized it quite severely. Nath Yogis are Saivites and Saivism has the
longest religious history, being pre-Vedic. Pasupata is the oldest Saiva system. Nath
Yogis are a part of the Lakula group that developed from the Pasupata. Gorakh Nath
is the chief historical organizer of the Nath Yogis. He appears between 11th and
12th centuries A.D. The system involves asceticism, renunciation, Yogic
methodology with emphasis on Hath and Mantra Yogas, and the worship of male
and female deities. The goal is liberation from the misery of the world through
Kundalani Yoga and final union with Lord Siva. Though Nathism is a theistic system,
its entire approach and methodology are of Yoga where the aim is primarily to gain
power. Both before and after the union the Nath has no interest in the world.
Nathism is a monastic system. Each Nath is linked to a monastery headed by a
Guru, or a Pir if he is a Muslim. Naths are also called Kanpathas. They are initiated
into the group in a rigid ritualistic manner. Their ear lobes are split for the wearing
of Mundras. The Nath takes three vows: to remain celibate, not to accept any
employment or earn his living, and to sustain himself by begging, and to observe
Ahimsa. The Nath goes barefooted on pilgrimage to sacred Hindu places and to
Nath monasteries where images and pictures of Hindu gods and Siva in the form of
Bhairon are worshipped.

The Naths do observe some caste distinctions. In theory, only twice born are
initiated but in practice all except a few low castes are accepted. Hindu Naths do
not eat with Muslim Naths nor do they go to the houses of Muslims or of lower
castes for begging. The worshipping of the deities, the cooking at monasteries is
done by Brahmins generally. At Dhinodhar monastery higher castes are given
uncooked food. Other castes are fed at the monastry hall except low castes and
Muslims who are given food outside in the open. Women, except widows, are not
admitted and Naths do not sit or eat with them, even if they were Naths.

The Nath Yogi is a typical ascetic who rubs ashes on his body as a symbol of death
to the world from the misery of which he seeks liberation. Secondly, Naths have
faith in ritualism. Certain months are auspicious, Mantras are used at the time of
initiation and for daily and other use, because these are considered to have mystic
potency for spiritual advancement. Fasting is also considered efficacious. May be
because of the black colour of Bhairon, black buck, snakes' and black dogs are
venerated. Animal sacrifices at the temple of Bhairon are practised. At the annual
fair of Devi Pattan on one day 20 buffaloes, 250 goats and 250 pigs were sacrificed.
Blood mark is applied to devotees. At places Linga and Yoni are worshipped. Naths
have belief in Hindu gods and goddesses, good and bad spirits, auspicious and
inauspicious days, etc. Nath Yogis mainly use Mantra Yoga and Hathyoga or
Kundalini Yoga along with Pranayama. Their cheif religious texts are Gorakh Sataka,
Gorakhsa Paddhati and Hath Yoga pradipika. These prescribe yogic and meditational
practices, asanas, repetition of mantras, stages of progress in raising Kundalani
through the Nadis, chakras, etc. By the repetition of mantras 21,600 times a day a
Yogi could gain liberation in year or so. The goal is to reach through Kundalani Yoga
the top of the head as Sahashara achieving thereby blissful union with Siva and
eternal release from the world. The Naths also believe in the combination of male
and female energies (Nadi and Bindu) to achieve liberation. For this, sex practices
called Vajroli, Sahjoli, or Amroli, conducted in the company of a woman are
suggested. About Naths, Briggs concludes in his book, "'The essence of Nath Yoga is
physical exercise and manipulation, quite mechanical. If it is charged against the
exposition found in the earlier pages that it is overburdened with interpretations on
too Iowa plane, it must be said in reply that both the practices and the outlook of
the Yogis confirm this point of view The high religious value to man-woman
relations was insisted upon. The first Chaitanya Sahajya movement confirms this
point."43 Even otherwise it is necessary to indicate that the use of the sexual
method has been clearly indicated in the ancient Indian literature and materials.
Datterya, who is a Hindu deity, is one of the chief deities worshipped by the Naths.
He is considered an avatara of Visnu, a Jnani and Paramhansaj "Puranic accounts
depict him as always in ecstasy, surrounded by women, drinking wine and indulging
in sex."44 Hindu Tantras are supposed to be a fifth Veda for Kalyuga. Ghurye
believes, "Fundamentally the Yogis represent the oldest school of Indian
asceticism."45 "The Yogis are the residual of the ancient Saivite sects."46 The Nath
cult, we conclude, is in direct lineage from the oldest pre-Vedic and Vedic traditions
through the Saiva system of Pasupata and Kapilkas, with both of which all its
essentials are common. It is noteworthy that everywhere asceticism or
monasticism, whether Hindu, Saiva, Vaisnava or Buddhist, at some point leads to
male and female symbolism and consequent erotic practices which are accepted as
a means of salvation. Quite often these degenerate into licentious practices. Where
a religious system does not harness creative energies to life-affirming and virtuous
deeds and processes the danger of degeneration is obvious.

Nathism is, thus, a life negating and ascetic system which calculatedly avoids social
responsibility and prescribes renunciation and withdrawal from the world which is
considered a place of misery.

Comparison and Conclusion

We have given an outline of Sikhism and of three Hindu systems prevalent in India
in the times of Guru Nanak. We have selected the three Hindu systems because
scholars ignorant of the Bani and the thesis of Gum Granth Sahib have confused
Sikh doctrines with those of these systems. We shall now make a brief comparison
of the essentials of Sikhism with the essentials of the three Hindu systems. For the
purpose, we regret, some recapitulation will become unavoidable.

The religious experience of the Gurus is that God is Love. He is the Ocean of Virtues
and is deeply interested in the world. The world, thus, becomes not only real but
also the arena of spiritual expression and development. Fourth, the system is a
monotheism. Fifth, virtuous deeds in the world are the sole measure of man's
religious growth and assessment, for, higher than truth is truthful living. Sixth, the
householder's life, in all its social aspects, thus, becomes the forum of religious
activity involving full social responsibility. Seventh, the idea of the brotherhood of
man is alone compatible with the idea of the fatherhood of God, logically involving
equality between man and man, man and woman, and a fair distribution of God's
wealth among His children. Consequently, the need of work, social participation,
and reaction and resistance against wrongs, both as an individual and as a society
become part of one's religious duties. Therefore, the goal is neither Moksha, nor
merger in, or blissful union with God as an end in itself, but to be the instrument of
His Attributive Will directed toward the creation of the kingdom of God on earth
(Haleemi Raj). Since there could be occasions when the use of force in pursuit of a
righteous cause becomes inevitable, the doctrine of ahimsa as an invariable rule of
religious conduct has been rejected. The conclusion is that there can be no socio-
moral progress without the spiritual growth of man and there can be no spiritual
growth in isolation without its simultaneous expression in life. As a model, the role
and life of a Jivan Mukta, are epitomized in the lives, deeds, struggles and
martyrdoms of the Sikh Gurus. Guru Nanak, we find, was the first man of God in the
East to proclaim and found a religion with an inalienable combination between the
spiritual life and the empirical life of man. Hence his radical thesis and its logic
involved a clear rejection of asceticism, monasticism, renunciation or withdrawal
from life or any segment of it. In pursuit of his mission he also rejected the idea of
avatarhood, ritualism, the caste and Ahimsa, both in theory and in practice. And, he
positively created and guided a society that should as a religious duty attempt to
combat the evils and to solve the social problems of life.

In contrast, Vaisnavism recommends asceticism, renunciation, withdrawal from life

and celibacy. It accepts ritualism, Ahimsa, the caste ideology and the idea of a
woman or married life being a hurdle in man's spiritual growth. Socio-moral
participation and responsibility are recommended neither for the seeker nor for the
Jivan Mukta, neither as a methodology nor as a goal. Formal and ritualistic image
worship, meditation or emotional singing and dancing are the means of attaining
Moksha, involving union with or merger in Brahman. The doctrine of avtarhood is
fundamental and, may be on this account, the metaphysical or ideological concepts
are quite variant and even conflicting. The Vasisht Advaita of Ramanuja is
pantheistic. In sum, we find, that the fundamentals of Vaisnavism are opposed to
those of Sikhism.

As in Vaisnavism, the ideological concepts in Vendantism are quite variant, this

being the position in Upanisads too. The essentials of Shankara's Vedanta, which is
the dominant view, are also in contrast with those of Sikhism. Sankara calls
Brahman

"Sat-Chit-Anand", a quietist concept, against God being love, a dynamic concept, in

Sikhism. Against monotheism, Shankara's monism implies the world being an
illusion (Mithya) and worldly activity of no spiritual value. The system being life-
negating, it recommends celibacy and Sanyasa. Woman has been called the
gateway to hell. The final realization of ''aham brahm asmi" is the result of a
contemplative effort and not of any grace of God. These ideas are considered
heretical and egoistic in Sikhism. Therefore, Guru Arjan rejected the hymns of
Bhagat Kanha who proclaimed, "I am the same, Oh, I am the same". Sankara
accepts both the caste ideology and the value of Vedic ritualism because he
concedes that the latter can gain heaven for the seeker. Sikhism calls ritualism
useless and caste immoral. In Vedanta there is a clear dichotomy between the
spiritual life and the empirical life; in Sikhism such dichotomy is considered a
negation of both. The Vedantic Jnani is wholly inactive, but in Sikhism he is the
active instrument of God's Will. The contrast between the two systems is
conspicuously evident.

The Gurus have criticized no system more severely than Nathism and its ways. This
ascetic cult withdraws completely from the world which the Naths call a place of
misery. Nath discipline is purely ritualistic, ascetic, Yogic and formal. They make
caste distinctions both in the matter of admission to the cult and in the service of
food, etc. Some of the Nath practices are quite abhorrent. Their goal, by the raising
of Kundalani is a blissful union with Siva. The meanings of "Sahaj" and" Anhand
sound" are very different in Nathism, from that in Sikhism. Both Nathism and
Vaisnavism accept the validity of the sexual method for the achievement of
liberation. In Sikhism there is not the faintest suggestion of the kind. Guru Nanak's
observation that the Naths did not know even the elementaries of the spiritual path,
clarifies categorically both the glaring contrast between the two systems and the
completely radical nature of his thesis and mission.

Having given a brief outline of the four systems, let us now record the views of
some Western and Indian scholars about Sikhism. They write: "the term founder is
misleading for it suggests that the Guru (Nanak) originated not merely a group of
followers but also a school of thought, or a set of teachings." "It was the influence of
Nath doctrines and practice on Vaisnava Bhakti which was primarily responsible for
the emergence of Sant synthesis". "This is precisely the doctrine which we find in
the works of Guru Nanak."47 ''The indigenous elements in Sikhism are largely those
customs of the tribes of Jats, who made Sikhism their own and the marginal
elements are there of the Nath Yogi tradition, which with Vaisnavism Bhakti was
primarily responsible for the Sant synthesis."48 "The teachings of Nanak do not
have a direct causal connection with the later growth which should be understood,
largely in terms of historical events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."49
"The Sikh Gurus who compiled the Guru Granth were marked by the genuinely noble
and emancipated trait of appreciating and assimilating all that is valuable in other
religions. In this sense, Guru Granth Sahib is not a religious text like a holy Bible or
Quran but a treatise on human life and righteous living. Guru Nanak did not seek to
build a new religion, etc:" "Even Sikh scholars see the Miri and Pin concept as an
inseparable whole in the religious order. Non-Sikhs have come to see a basic
religion-politics linkage in Sikhism and deduct the root cause of the current crisis in
Punjab to this."50 "To the extent Hinduism has been influenced by Vedanta, either
traditionally or in the modern version of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, it has a
tendency to subsume all religions as different aspect of one Large Religionof
which Hinduism is a subconscious if not an overt model. And, of course, in this
Religion the closer a person or a doctrine is to the Advaita Vedanta closer to Truth is
he or is assumed to be." "But where it comes to the Indians belonging to religions
which originated within India, such as Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs, many a Hindu
regard these as downright unpatriotic or unspiritual, or both, if they wish to
maintain their distinct identity from the Hindus. Distinctions are just not considered
a mark of high enough vision and are mere appearances."51 "When dealing with the
beliefs, rituals practices of the Sikhs-be they religious or political-it is always worth-
while to constantly remind ourselves that we are fundamentally dealing with the
peasantry and the world-view of this social class has historically always been very
different from the other social classes."52

Seen in the light of our discussion and analysis of Sikhism and the three other
systems, we find that the above-noted observations of some scholars display a
singular lack of understanding of the essentials of Sikhism and of the other three
religious systems. This ignorance, we believe, is primarily due to their failure to
understand the fundamental thesis of Guru Granth Sahib, namely, an inalienable
combination between the spiritual life and the empirical life of man. Guru Nanak
was the first prophet who broke the dichotomy that existed between the two lives in
all the Indian religious systems. It has been asserted and accepted that the
institutions of asceticism and monasticism are the specific contribution of Indian
religions and culture to the world culture. This dichotomy was not only broken
ideologically and a contrary ideology embodied in the Sikh scripture, but it was
consistently practised and clearly proclaimed. Further, this doctrine was externally
symbolized and institutionalized in the close and common location of Harmandir
Sahib and the Akal Takhat, the installation of two flags at the common compound
between Harmandir Sahib and Akal Takhat, and the two swords worn by the Sixth
Guru. The chief fundamentals of Sikhism were not only opposed to those of the
earlier Indian traditions but there was really no trace of them in those systems. It is,
therefore, evident that this sudden and radical change in the essentials of the Indian
religious doctrines as emphatically brought about by Guru Nanak and the other
Gurus could only be spiritually revealed. For, there was nothing new in the
environment to cause such a revolutionary response. Such being the thesis of the
Gurus, it is sheer naivety to apply evolutionary, materialistic or sociological
methodologies in trying to interpret the Sikh religion. Such studies could only
suggest self-contradictory inferences. Hence our stress that the study of a religion
requires a discipline of its own. Sikhism believes that there is a higher level of
Reality which not only reveals itself to man but also operates in history. Without the
acceptance of this concept, no revelatory religion or its history can be studied much
less understood and correctly interpreted. The study of Sikhism and the three other
contemporary systems clearly leads to the above conclusion.
Who is the Guru?
Guru is not a teacher because teacher is a professional who earns living out of
teaching.
Guru is not a mother because the mother gives birth to a mortal human being.
Guru is not the father because the father works for his own family and suffers for
them.
Guru is not a friend since friends are made in a lifetime who leave you after death.
Guru is not the God of knowledge, since the God has knowledge as a function.
Guru is not a mentor since they show you how to progress in the material world.
Guru is not the God that you pray to since that God is still dependent on the Guru.
So who is the Guru?
He is the One who is the doorway to God, divine knowledge, creator to destroyer of
material domains, fount of knowledge, parent to all the parents and child to all the
children. He is neither the body nor the mind. He is full of love, compassion,
kindness, goodness, benevolence and magnanimity. He cannot be appeased by
money or any offering. He is not corruptible. He is detached and always lost in the
Self or divine. His physical manifestation makes us believe Him to be involved in the
world of Maya. Its impossible to fathom His depth of knowledge or His love for the
devotees.
The foolish assume Him to be the body and attribute all human qualities to Him. His
human nature is on full display for the unbelieving. He appears weak and faulty. Its
only a facade to disturb the minds of the disbelievers.
Dattatreya who is the highest of the Sadgurus once to dissuade the Gods from
disturbing Him, walked out of the lake with two beautiful buxom women and a bottle
of liquor and continued to consume both. The Gods didnt flinch. They prayed to
Him to stop His bewitching maya creating that illusion. He promptly destroyed that
illusion and told the Gods to ask for a boon. The Gods asked for the destruction of
Sahasrahar Arjun. He promised the Gods that Dattatreya Himself will be born to
destroy Arjuna. That was accomplished by Parshurams birth.
So have complete faith in the Guru. Surrender to Him and have love and devotion
towards Him. Then you will attain the highest weal.

Disciple of the true Guru

There is no perfect rest

Even in a deep forest,
There is no perfect rest
Even on the peaks of Mt. Everest
If the mind is at unrest.
All is the same palace or forest
If the mind you arrest
Then He is your nearest
And you are His dearest
Causing mutual interest.
*** Salutations to the shoes of my Eternal Father Guru Siddha Nath ***

uru's WordDisciple of the true GuruThere is no perfect restEven in a deep

forest,There is no perfect restEven on the peaks of Mt. EverestIf the mind is at
unrest.All is the same palace or forestIf the mind you arrestThen He is your
nearestAnd you are His dearestCausing mutual interest.*** Salutations to the shoes
of my Eternal Father Guru Siddha Nath ***If you have any spiritual questions do not
hesitate to ask : To send the question/request/suggestion/Mailing list click
hereNote:This website is made to spread the teachings of our Guru and is purely
spiritual.Eternal values like Mercy, Unselfishness, Truth, Devotion, Righteousness,
Compassion, Renunciation, Mind control, Sense-control, Duty, Character,
Contentment, etc. are the guiding forces behind this website.This website welcomes
all irrespective of religion, nation, birth, creed, colour, race, region, education,
gender, caste, place, position, power, faith, samaj, language, etc. etc.This website
has nothing to do with any social community, political community, any government
or private organizations, any samaj (community) of social, cultural, political or any
that is not mentioned here.This website is universal and cannot be limited by a
samaj, community, organization, caste, creed, religion, nation, language, region,
etc.Who visited the website thinking that it belongs to some samaj, community or
organization may leave the website. Those who have the narrow mindedness of
belonging to the same caste, religion, community, nation, region, race, language,
colour, creed, samaj, birth, power, position, political organization, etc. may leave
this website. Truth cannot be limited by narrow-mindedness of belonging to the
same group, caste, religion, colour, ethnic, race, region, etc.The thoughts, ideas,
views, comments, suggestions, feelings, etc. expressed in this website are at the
discretion of visitors or viewers.Our Guru's ABCD = Avoid Begging, Charity,
Donations. Our Guru's EFGH = Earn For God Honestly. So we don't seek any
donations or charities from anyone. True and unselfish love is only our begging.The
truth is Atma or Soul and is only One and is the same for all beings irrespective of
differences. He is known among followers of Buddha as Sunya or subtler than the
subtlest state. Atma is the real true Guru and God seated in the hearts of all beings
and is our sole goal.Hari Om

The Logic of Four Alternatives

By K. N. Jayatilleke

Philosophy East and West

I AM WRITING ON the Buddhist logic of the four alternatives (catu.sko.ti), as it

appears for the first time in the Pali Nikaayas, for three reasons. First, it appears to
be a typical "East-West problem" in philosophy. Secondly, it is evident that if the
thesis adduced in this article is correct, the problem has baffled both Indian as well
as Western scholars, and among these Indian scholars we have to reckon classical
scholars held in great esteem, such as Naagaarjuna. Finally, this system of logic
should be of some interest to modern students of logic, not only because it provides
a novel method of classifying propositions into logical alternatives, but also because
it does so in such a manner that the alternatives are not dependent on the number
of truth-values assumed in the system of logic.

The nature and significance of these reasons would become evident if we give an
exact exposition of this logic of four alternatives, which was known in the later
Buddhist tradition as the catu.sko.ti (tetralemma). But it must be borne in mind that
to call this the "logic of four alternatives" is already to adduce a theory which needs
to be proved in the light of all the available evidence. I have previously given some
account of this system of logic,[1] but it stands in need of further clarification and
exact definition, which I propose to attempt in this article, avoiding as far as
possible any repetition of what I have already said on the subject.

In the Pali Nikaayas the four alternatives are referred to as "these four positions"
(imesu catusu .thaanesu)[2] and it is said that religious teachers at the time were
trying to state the nature of the existence of the perfect person after death without
going "outside these four positions" (a~n~natra imehi catuhi .thaanehi).[3] These
references seem to suggest that they were regarded as four logical alternatives and
it was believed that the truth with regard to any matter lay, perhaps, in one of these
alternatives.

Some of the examples given in the texts strongly suggest that the four alternatives
present possibilities which are mutually exclusive and together exhaustive, viz.:

(1) A person is wholly happy

(2) A person is wholly unhappy
(3) A person is both happy and unhappy
(4) A person is neither happy nor unhappy[4]

(1) X is a person who torments himself

(2) X is a person who torments others
(3) X is a person who both torments himself as well as others
(4) X is a person who neither torments himself nor others[5]
(1) The universe is finite
(2) The universe is infinite
(3) The universe is both finite and infinite
(4) The universe is neither finite nor infinite[6]

One example given in the Nikaayas confirms the fact that if one of the four
alternatives stated is true, then the others are false.[7] There are, in fact, in the
Nikaayas certain examples in which all four alternatives are rejected but these, in
my opinion, are not to be explained as violating the exposition we have given below.

Professor Robinson has also proposed taking the propositions as logical

alternatives:

A typical piece of Buddhist dialectical apparatus is the tetralemma (catu.sko.ti). It

consists of four members in a relation of exclusive disjunction ("one of, but not more
than one of, 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' is true"). Buddhist dialecticians, from Gautama onward,
have negated each of the alternatives, and thus have negated the entire
proposition. As these alternatives were supposedly exhaustive, their exhaustive
negation has been termed "pure negation" and has been taken as evidence for the
claim that Maadhyamika is negativism. There is thus an extra-logical interest in
analyzing the form of the catu.sko.ti.[8]

We agree with this statement of Robinson only insofar as he says that the

Who understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist texts?

A Wayman The two topics of causation and existence relate to Buddhist teachings that are ... I.
THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES AND LOGIC Jayatilleke says, "there is little .

INTRODUCTION

The Buddhist four alternatives are often referred to

by their Sanskrit name catu.sko.ti, and given in the
form that something is, is not, both is and is not,
neither is nor is not, with observation that each of
these terms may be denied. As we proceed we shall
see that this is not the only manner of presenting a
catu.sko.ti. Since so many authorities and scholars
of ancient and modern times have discussed this
cardinal matter. sometimes heatedly, it is not
possible to deal with all the previous studies.
Certain discussions will be considered herein within
the scope of my five sections: I. The four
alternatives and logic, II. The four alternatives in
a disjunctive system, III. The four alternatives
applied to causation, each denied, IV. The four
alternatives applied to existence, each denied, V.
The three kinds of catu.sko.ti, various
considerations.

My findings differ from the Western treatments

that have come to my notice, and the differences
stem from my current preparations for publication of
a translation of a Tibetan work that deals in
several places with the formula.(1) In fact,
Tso^n-kha-pa's separation of the causation and
existence aspects of four alternatives, each denied,
goes back to Atii`sa (11th century), who in his
Bodhimaarga-pradiipa-pa~njikaa-naama presents four
ways of realizing insight (praj~naa), as follows:(2)

1) the principle that denies existence by four

alternatives discussed in section IV herein).

2) the principle called 'diamond grain'

(vajraka.na). He illustrates this in his text by
Naagaarjuna's Madhyamaka-kaarikaa (M.K.), I. 1, with
alternatives applied to causation (discussed in
section III herein).

3) the principle free from singleness and

multiplicity. He appeals to such an author as
`Saantideva (especially his Bodhicaryaavataara,
Chap. IX).

4) the principle of Dependent Origination (pratiit-

yasamutpaada). Here he means, for example, that the
dharmas arise dependently and are void of self-
existence.

Atii`sa's classification is revealing of the

meditative use put to the denial of four
alternatives when applied to causation or to
existence. The fact, then, that his listing does not
allude to the disjunctive system of the four
alternatives that I discuss in section II, may be
simply because this system was not put to meditative
use.

The two topics of causation and existence relate

to Buddhist teachings that are essentially distinct.
Thus, in Buddhism the problem of how a Tathaagata or
Buddha arises by reason of merit and knowledge, that
is, the problem of cause, is distinct from the
problem of the existence, for example, of the
Tathaagata after death. Naturally, the causal topic
is first, since a Tathaagata has to have arisen
before there is a point to inquiring whether he
exists after death. Historically, the first topic
represents what the Buddha preferred to talk about,
and

P.4

the second topic includes matters which the Buddha

sometimes refused to talk about.

As suggested earlier, my main sources are from

Asian languages. I am also indebted to certain
Western writers, namely, Hermann Weyl for the
limitations of symbolic systems, Bernard Bosanquet
for treatment of disjunctive statements, and Willard
Van Orman Quine for his use of the word "logic"
(bibliography herein).

I. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES AND LOGIC

Jayatilleke says, "there is little evidence that

Naagaarjuna understood the logic of the four
alternatives as formulated and utilized in early
Buddhism."(3) This scholar was not content with
putting down Naagaarjuna, founder of the Maadhyamika
school, for he concludes that scarcely any Western
scholars, classical Indian scholars, or modern
Indian and Japanese writers have comprehended this
logic either. Richard H. Robinson, one of the
Western scholars whose theories on the matter were
rejected for the most part by Jayatilleke,
subsequently replied to him,(4) among other things
questioning the use of the word "logic" to refer to
the four alternatives, although himself having
written an article entitled, "Some Logical Aspects
of Naagaarjuna's System, "(5) which included a
discussion of the four alternatives, and himself
having a section entitled "Naagaarjuna's Logic" in
his book (Early Maadhyamika...).(6) Chatalian, in
turn, asserts that Robinson did not justify his use
of the word' logic" in his book.(7) While agreeing
with Chatalian thus far, I still am puzzled by a
seeming overattention by Robinson and Chatalian to
other persons' uae of the word "logic." Quine points
out that while writers have used the term "logic"
with varying scope, a common part of their usage is
called "the science of necessary inference,"
although he admits that this is a vague
description.(8) He then states that it is less vague
to call logical certain locutions, including `if',
`then', `and', `or', `not', `unless', `some', `all',
`every', `any', `it', etc. Further more, he
mentions that a set pattern of employing these
locutions allows us to speak of the logical
structure. This is tantamount to saying that every
grammatical English sentence in the indicative mood
has a logical structure. Then, when Naagaarjuna
writes (Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, XVIII, 8) , in an
English translation, "all is genuine or is not
genuine..." this has a logical structure. Indeed,
every statement with the pattern, "Every X is an a
or a b," has the same logical structure. Quine
further qualifies a statement as logically true if
its logical structure alone yields truth; and thus
his use of the term "logic" involves truth and
falsehood in this sense. Other writers have used
such terms as "formally valid, " "analytic
proposition," or "tautology" as closely related to
this usage of "logic."(9) Accordingly, the
application of symbolic logic to Naagaarjuna's
statements, to prove them logically true or false,
goes along with such a title as "the logic of the
four alternatives"; and this application of symbolic
logic has been engaged in by H. Nakamura, Robinson,
Jayatilleke, R. S. Y. Chi,

P.5

among others, including Shohei Ichimura in his

recent dissertation. "A Study on Naagaarjuna's
Method of Refutation." It does seem that both
Jayatilleke and Robinson were justified in using the
term "logic" in a study of these matters when they
employed symbolic logic.

This still leaves the important problem of

whether Naagaarjuna's statements are indeed
logically ture, and thus have truth or falseness
according to their logical structure regardless of
content, regardless of what is given. By "given,"
what is meant here is the usual 'granted, assumed'.
This involves a problem of translation, because when
Naagaarjuna's statements are assumed to be at hand,
the mere fact that there are marks on a page in the
English language purported to be his statements does
not prove that they faithfully relay Naagaarjuna's
intention by marks on a page in the original
Sanskrit language. Here there are two points: If the
statements do not have an easily isolated logical
structure, it is hazardous and probably
contraindicated to apply symbolic logic. Even if
they do have an easily isolated logical structure,
one asks if they are also so complicated that one
requires a symbolic representation to sift or show
truth and falsehood.

We may start to solve this problem with its two

points, by recourse to Weyl's remarks regarding
"constructive cognition":(10) "By the introduction
of symbols the assertions are split so that one part
of the [mental] operations is shifted to the symbols
and thereby made independent of the given and its
continued existence. Thereby the free manipulation
of concepts is contrasted with their application,
ideas become detached from reality and acquire a
relative independence." Thus Weyl, an eminent
mathematician, is frank to admit that the pure
operations of mathematics are independent of the
existence of the given. In the case of the
catu.sko.ti, the given is a rather considerable
corpus of material in the Paali scriptures and then
in Naagaarjuna's works, not to speak of
contributions by later Asian authors. And there is
the assumption that this corpus is at hand in a
translated form of English sentences that are
susceptible, in whole or part, of being converted
from their natural form to the artificial language
of a symbolic system.

Now to the first point. Let us assume that the

catu.sko.ti statements do not have an isolatable
logical structure, and yet symbolic logic is
utilized. If one would grant the applicability of
Weyl's remarks, even if there were a valid
utilization of symbolic logic, it could not account
for the full corpus of the given, as the "given" has
been explicated earlier. So it may be merely a
section or subset of the given whose logical
structure is not isolatable. But then the
application of symbolic logic is a matter of
mastering the art of the symbols. And so one may
presume that it is an arrogated comprehension of the
given--although in fact the symbols are independent,
partially or wholly, of the given --whereby an
undeniably brilliant writer as Jayatilleke takes the
stance that he virtually alone understands "the
logic of the four alternatives," while claiming
that such a renowned author as Naagaarjuna cannot
understand it! Or

P.6
claiming that a modern writer like Robinson cannot
understand, because he does not apply the formal
symbolic system right, that is, has not mastered the
art. Thus the symbolic system becomes a vested
interest, the users jealous of its misuse, while
they champion its misapplication to the given, and
even to what may not be at hand, for example, a
correct translation of a passage from an ancient
text.

Then to the second point. I do not propose to

denigrate, in general, the employment of symbolic
systems for representing propositions of Indian
philosophy. But are the catu.sko.ti statements so
complicated that a symbolic restatement is
necessary, with the implication of an understanding
already at hand to certify the necessity? Perhaps
there is working a psychological factor which could
be called "wonder." What mathematics student getting
the "right answer" with calculus has not at times
felt a wonder at the ability of the
mathematics--beyond his native capacities--say, to
determine the intercepted volume of the cone. As
Buytendijk has been cited: "Wonder is characterized
by a halting of the thing observed. This halting,
which men call attention, is at the same time
permeated by a premonition that light may be shed on
this thing."(11) But this premonition of light
through the symbolic system is a will-o'-the-wisp, a
subtle infatuation. Because light can only be shed
on the given, and the symbolic system is
independent, in whole or part, of the given as it
has been described earlier. It is like a person
fascinated by a brilliant lamp and therefore is not
seeing anything illumined by the lamp. The master of
the art is himself mastered and uses the symbolism
willy-nilly: even for the simplest computation, he
needs the computer. For centuries the Buddhists
believed that the given of the four alternatives,
including the traditional exegesis, provides
sufficient material for understanding--if a person
can understand. Some of the modern writers have
rendered the discussions into an artificial
language, and then have dwelt on false issues of
whether this or that scholar's formulation is a
"logic."

II. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES IN A DISJUNCTIVE SYSTEM

Here by a "disjunctive system" is meant a system of

statements subject to the judgment "A is either B or
C." Either B or C is left and one of these two is
excluded. Such a judgment appears to be involved in
the Indian syllogism, whose 'reason' (hetu) is
relevant to the, thesis' (saadhya) when the case
referred to in the thesis is agreed to be present in
similar cases and absent in dissimilar cases.(12)
Anyway, the disjunctive judgment is a form of
inference (anumaana), and for a particular system
it is necessary to state the rule of the disjunction.
Jayatilleke has shown that various systems of four
alternatives found in the early Buddhist texts are
in a disjunctive system whose rule seems to be that
when one of the alternatives is taken as "true" the
rest are certainly false. He points to such systems
as, "A person is wholly happy;.... unhappy;...both
happy and unhappy;...neither happy nor unhappy." "X
is a person who

P.7

torments himself;... torments others;... both

torments himself as well as others,...who neither
torments himself nor others."(13) Bosanquet has an
apt illustration:(14) "I suppose that the essence of
such a system lies in arrangements for necessarily
closing every track to all but one at a time of any
tracts which cross it or converge into it. The track
X receives trains from A, B, C, D; if the entrance
for those from A is open, B, C, and D are ipso facto
closed; if A, B, and C are closed, D is open, and so
on."
 But the matter is not without complications. The
Paali work Kathaavatthu records a dispute between
the two Buddhist sects Theravaada and Andhaka about
the nature of the meditative state which is called
in Paali nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana (the base of
neither the sa~n~naa nor non-sa~n~naa) , where
sa~n~naa means something like "idea, " and the
disagreement was over the presence or absence of
sa~n~naa in that state. The section concludes with
an appeal to the case of the "neutral feeling" (the
neither-pleasure-nor-pain), thus consistent with the
traditional Indian syllogism which uses, as example,
something well known to society (lokaprasiddha).
Just as it would not be cogent to ask if that
neutral feeling were either pleasure or pain, so is
it not proper to assert there either is or is not
sa~n~naa on the basis of neither the sa~n~naa nor
non-sa~n~naa.(15) This conclusion agrees with the
previous observation that only one of the four
alternatives is the case at a particular time.
Besides, we learn that the "neither... nor"
alternative points to a neutrality with
indeterminate content.

Jayatilleke quite properly explains the third

alternative: "S is partly P and partly non-P."(16)
Thus for the content of the third alternative,
stated as "the universe is both finite and
infinite." the Brahma-jaala Sutta explains this as
when one has the idea (sa~n~naa) that the world is
finite in the upward and downward directions, and
has the idea that the world is infinite across. In
agreement, Naagaarjuna states in his
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, XXVII, 17-18:

If the same place (ekade`sa) that is divine were the

same place that is human, it would be (both)
permanent and impermanent. That is not feasible. If
`both the permanent and the impermanent' were
proven, one must also grant that the pair 'neither
the permanent nor the impermanent' is proven.

One should note about this passage (Jayatilleke

mistranslates and misunderstands it) , (17) that
Naagaajuna does not here deny an alternative of
"both the permanent and the impermanent'' per se; he
denies this for one and the same place. This can be
illustrated by his own verse (MK XXV, 14, cited
later), implying that nirvaa.na is present in the
Buddha and absent in ordinary persons, but not
present and absent in the same place. Naagaarjuna,
in the present verses (XXVII, 17-18), also makes
explicit his position that the fourth alternative
(neither the permanent nor the impermanent) is
derived from the third one, and that the third one
(both the permanent and the impermanent) combines
the presumed first one (the permanent) and the
second one (the impermanent).

This brings up Naagaarjuna's remarkable verse

(MK XVIII, 8):

P.8

All (sarva) is genuine (tathyam),(18) or is not

genuine, or is both genuine and not genuine, or is
neither genuine nor not-genuine. That is the ranked
instruction (anu`saasana) of the Buddha.

According to Candrakiirti's commentary "all" means

the personality aggregates (skandha), the realms
(dhaatu), and the sense bases (aayatana).(19) See,
along the same lines, Kalupahana's discussion(20)
about the "Discourse on 'Everything'" (Sabbasutta),
available both in the Paali canon and in the AAgama
version in Chinese translation. Therefore the word
"all" in Naagaarjuna's verse amounts to "anything,"
where the "anything" is any entity chosen from the
set of 'all' entities according to the Buddhist
meaning, as just expounded. This agrees with
Bosanquet's observation that the content of the
disjunctive judgment "A is either B or C" "is
naturally taken as tin individual, being necessarily
concrete."(21)

Next, the interpretation of the word anu`saasana

as 'ranked instruction' comes from observing it
among the three 'marvels' (praatihaarya) of the
Buddha's teaching, of which the first one is
`magical performance' (.rddhi), the second is `mind
reading' (aade`sanaa) , and the third. 'ranked
instruction' (anu`saasana), apparently made possible
by the preceding 'mind reading'.(22) This
interpretation is confirmed in Vasubandhu's
Buddhaanusm.rti-.tiikaa, saying in part, "... with
the three kinds of marvels observing the streams of
consciousness of the noble `Saariputra, and so on,
and of other fortunate sentient beings, teaches the
true nature of the `Sraavakayaana exactly according
to their expectations and their potentialities."(23)
This only clarifies why Candrakiirti's commentary on
the verse interprets it as a ranking, and not why
his commentary interprets the ranking as follows:

(a) The Buddha taught to worldly beings the

personality aggregates, the realms, and sense bases,
with their various enumerations, in a manner that
'all is genuine' in order to lead them onto the path
by having them admire his omniscience about all
these elements. (b) After these beings had come to
trust the Lord, it was safe to inform them about all
those divisions of the world that 'all is not
genuine', i.e. `all is spurious', because they
momentarily perish and change. (c) Certain select
disciples could be told `all is both genuine and
not-genuine'. That is, that the same element which is
genuine to the ordinary person is not-genuine or
spurious to the noble person who is the Buddha's
disciple. He tells them this, so they may become
detached, i.e, not see it in just one way. (d) To
certain advanced disciples, far progressed in
viewing reality and scarcely obscured, he taught
that 'all is neither genuine nor not-genuine', just
as in the case of the son of a barren woman, one
asserts that the son is neither white nor black (=
non-white).(24)

However, he seems to be following, in his own way,

the four 'allegories' or 'veiled intentions'
(abhisa.mdhi) which are listed and then defined in
the Mahaayaana-Suutraala.mkaara, XII,16-17.(25) The
first one is avataara.na-abhi (the veiled intention
so they will enter), explained as teaching that
form, and so forth, is existent, so as not to scare
the `sraavakas from entering the Teaching. The
second one is lak.sa.na-abhi (the veiled intention
about the character, namely, of

P.9

dharmas), explained as teaching that all dharmas are

without self-existence, without origination, etc.
The third one is pratipak.sa-abhi (the veiled
intention about opponents, namely, to faults) ,
explained as teaching by taking into account the
taming of faults. So far these terms agree quite
well with Candrakiirti's exposition. For example, in
the case of the third one, the application to
Naagaarjuna's line "all is both genuine and
not-genuine" is the opposition (pratipak.sa) to the
fault of one-sidedness. It is the fourth one whose
relevance is obscure: this is the pari.naamana-abhi
(the veiled intention about changeover, namely, to
reality) . In illustration, the Suutraala.mkaara
cites a verse: "Those who take the pithless as
having a pith abide in waywardness. Those who are
mortified with the pains [of austere endeavor]
[abide] in the best enlightenment." Candrakiirti is
at least partially consistent by saying "to certain
advanced disciples, far progressed in viewing
reality," because these ones would take the pithless
as pithless.
 Jayatilleke(26) refers to the same passage of
Candrakiirti's and to a different commentary on
Naagaarjuna's verse in the
Praj~naapaaramitaa`saastra, both as presented in
Robinson's book,(27) to deny that in the verse cited
above, the four alternatives are in a "relation of
exclusive disjunction" and to claim that they amount
to the non-Buddhist relativistic logic of the Jains.
However, Candrakiirti's commentary is consistent
with Naagaarjuna's MK XXVII, 17-18 (translated
earlier, herein) concerning the dependence of the
subsequent alternative on the previous one or ones.

Jayatilleke's hostility to Candrakiirti's

commentary on the verse may stem from the modern
Theravaadin's reluctance to attribute a ranked
instruction to the Buddha. Ordinarily the canonical
passage cited in this connection is, as Thomas
renders it: "Buddha replied, 'What does the Order
expect of me? I have taught the Doctrine without
making any inner and outer, and herein the
Tathaagata has not the closed fist of a teacher with
regard to doctrines.'"(28) From the modern
Theravaadin standpoint, Candrakiirti's explanation
attributes to the Buddha precisely such an inner and
outer, because it portrays the Buddha teaching
worldly beings (= the outer) in the realistic
manner, and then teaching those beings once they had
become disciples (= the inner) in the illusional
manner. And going on with a still different teaching
to certain advanced disciples. But that same
scriptural passage from the traditional, last sermon
of the Buddha could be taken differently than it
usually is, and perhaps consistently with
Naagaarjuna's verse as Candrakiirti understood it.
That is because the original Paali (Diigha-Nikaaya,
ii, 100) reads: mayaa dhammo anantara.m abaahira.m
karitvaa (By me was the Dhamma preached without
inner, without outer). The phrase "without inner,
without outer" can be restated as "with neither an
inner nor an outer." And then just as the "neutral
feeling" (neither pleasure nor pain) is not either
pleasure or pain, so also one could not determine if
the Buddha's doctrine was either inner or outer, and
one homogeneous character, wearisome by repetition
of the same doctrine over and over again.
Naagaarjuna's

P.10

verse, by use of the word anu`saasana, seems to mean

that the Tathaagata, without the closed fist, would
gladly communicate in a graduated manner so that
disciples in different stages of progress could have
a teaching suited to their particular level. While
this position may not be agreeable to some modern
exponents of the Theravaada tradition, it is not a
'Mahaayaana' quarrel with the earlier 'Hiinayaana'
school, because also Buddhaghosa of the Theravaada
tradition in his Atthasaalinii insists that the
Buddha's teaching was fittingly modified in
accordance with the varying inclinations of both men
and gods.(29)

III. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO CAUSATION,

EACH DENIED

Starting with the Buddha's first sermon, the four

Noble Truths have been a basic ingredient of
Buddhist thinking and attitudes. Of these Truths,
the first is the Noble Truth of Suffering; and of
the fourth Truth, the Noble Truth of Path explained
with eight members, the first member is called
'right views' (samyag-d.r.s.ti). Sometimes 'right
views' were established by determining and
eliminating the wrong views. So in the Paali
Sa.myutta-Nikaaya (II, 19-21) , (30) the Buddha,
replying to questions by Kassapa (Kaa`syapa), denied
that suffering is caused by oneself, by another, by
both oneself and another, or neither by oneself nor
by another. Then, in answer to further questions,
the Buddha stated that he knows suffering and sees
it. Then Kassapa asked the Buddha to explain
suffering to him, and was told that claiming the
suffering was done by oneself amounts to believing
that one is the same person as before, which is the
eternalistic view; while claiming that the
experiencer of the suffering is different from the
one who caused it, amounts to the nihilistic view.
Thereupon the Buddha taught the Dharma by a mean,
namely, the series of twelve members which begin
with the statement `having nescience as condition
the motivations arise' and continue with similar
statements through the rest of dependent origination
(pratiitya-samutpaada) . The Buddha proceeded to
teach that by the cessation of nescience, the
motivations cease, and so on, with the cessation of
this entire mass of suffering. In agreement,
Naagaarjuna's Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, I, 1 states:

There is no entity anywhere that arises from itself,

from another, from both (itself and another), or by
chance.

In this case the given element is called the

'entity' (bhaava). The first two of the denied
alternatives have the given element of 'cessation'
(nirodha) in MK VII, 32. The element is 'suffering'
(du.hkha) or 'external entity' (baahya-bhaava) in MK
XII. The meaning of the denial here is aptly stated
by Bosanquet: "Negation of a disjunction would mean
throwing aside the whole of some definite group of
thoughts as fallacious, and going back to begin
again with a judgment of the simplest kind. It
amounts to saying, 'None of your distinctions touch
the point; you must begin afresh.'"(31) In the
discourse to Kassapa, to begin afresh amounts to
accepting "dependent origination." This is also
Naagaarjuna's

P.11

position, following the ancient discourse to

Katyaayana, as mentioned later in the
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, and as stated in Candrakiirti's
Madhyamakaavataara, VI, 114:

Since entities do not arise by chance, (i.e.) from a

lord, and so on (primal matter, time, atoms,
svabhaava, Puru.sa, Naaraayana, etc.) , or from
themselves, others, or both (themselves and others),
then they arise in dependence (on causes and
conditions).(32)

Besides, to begin afresh amounts to the

establishment of voidness (`suunyataa), for so the
Anavatapta (naagaraaja) parip.rcchaa is cited: "Any
(thing) that is born (in dependence) on conditions,
is not born (to wit): The birth of this (thing) does
not occur by self-existence (svabhaava). Any (thing)
that is dependent on conditions, is declared void.
Any person who understands voidness, is
heedful."(33) Since Naagaarjuna begins his
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa with this theory of causation,
it is reasonable to assume that it is essential for
the rest of his work. Also, since voidness
(`suunyataa) is established in the course of the
causal denials, it is taken for granted in the
denial in terms of existence, and so the attempt to
establish voidness by way of existence becomes a
faulty point of view (d.r.s.ti), as in MK XXII, 11:

One should not say "It's void." nor "It's non-void,"

nor "It's both (void and non-void), " nor "It's
neither." But it may be said in the meaning of
designation.

One should not say, "It's void," because the four

alternatives applied to existence cannot establish
voidness. But in the meaning of designation
(praj~naptiartham), as in the celebrated verses (MK
XXIV, 18-19), there is the act of calling dependent
origination 'voidness' and the dharmas so arising
'void'; and here Naagaarjuna adds that the act of
calling, when there is the dependency, is the middle
path.(34)

Besides, the denial of the four alternatives in

the scope of causation (confer, MK I, 1, earlier)
was aimed at four philosophical positions, as
follows:(35)

1. The denial of arising from itself is the

rejection of the Saa.mkhya position, which is the
satkaaryavaada (causation of the effect already
existent) . Murti is certainly right on this
point.(36)

2. The denial of arising from another rejects

the creator being (ii`svara) , and Kalupahana
increases the list from a Jaina source for 'caused
by another': destiny (niyati), time (kaala), God
(ii`svara), nature (svabhaava), and action (karma).
The later Buddhist logicians held a theory of
'efficiency' that belongs here.(37) Murti
incorrectly puts this kind of denial under the
heading of asatkaaryavaada (the nonexistence of an
effect before its production).(38)

3. The denial of arising from both itself and

another is the rejection of the Vai`se.sika, who say
the clay pot arises from itself (clay) and from the
potter, wheel, sticks, etc. In fact, this theory is
in both the Nyaaya and Vai`sesika philosophy, which
Dasgupta,(39) in agreement with Shastri,(40) calls
the asatkaaryavaada, the opposite of the Saa.mkhya's
satkaaryavaada. Here, the clay is the material
cause; the stick, wheel, etc., the instrumental
cause.

4. The denial of arising without a cause (or by

chance), is the rejection of the Lokaayata (the
ancient materialistic school), which espouses the
arising
 P.12

from self-nature.(41) That school held that

consciousness is just a mode of the four elements
(fire, air, water, earth): consciousness is not the
effect of another consciousness.(42)

Hence, there is no denial of arising per se, but

the alternatives are meant to deny the arising
falsely ascribed to certain agencies, to wit,
itself, another, both itself and another, or by
chance. This, then, is one of the 'right views'.

V. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO EXISTENCE, EACH

DENIED

The Buddha rejected each of the four alternatives

regarding the existence after death of the
Tathaagata, because none of the four are relevant
(na upeti), or defined (avyaakata).(43) Naagaarjuna
devotes Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, chap. XXV to the same
topic, saying generally (XXV, 22): "Since all given
things (*vastu)(44) are void, what is endless, what
with end, what both endless and with end, what
neither endless or with end?" This refers to the
celebrated fourteen 'undefined given things'
(avyaak.rta-vastuuni) .(45) So in the chapter,
nirvaa.na is treated in verses 5, 8, 13, 16; and the
Lord before and after cessation, in verses 17, 18.
For example, this is verse 17; "One should not
infer(40) that the Lord exists after cessation (i.e.
in Nirvaa.na). One should not infer that he does not
exist, or both (exists and does not exist), or
neither." Hence the rejections, again, are aimed
against all philosophical positions that resort to
inference or to ordinary human reason in such
matters.(47) The failure of reasoning is clearly
expressed in the Mahaayaana work Ratnagotravibhaaga
(chap. I, verse 9) when denying the four
alternatives about the Dharma-sun as the ultimate
nature:
I bow to that Dharma-sun which is not existence and
not non-existence, not both existence and
non-existence, neither different from existence nor
from non-existence; which cannot be reasoned
(a`sakyas tarkayitum) , is free from definition
(nirukty-apagata.h), revealed by introspection, and
quiescent; and which, pervasively shining with
immaculate vision, removes the attachment,
antipathy, and (eye-) cauls toward all objects.(48)

The question arises whether it is proper to

interpret this to involve denial in Bosanquet's
meaning, what he calls "contrary negation";(49) "As
we always speak and think within a general subject
or universe of discourse, it follows that every
denial substitutes some affirmation for the judgment
which it denies." One could argue that simply to
deny one judgment and thereby affirm another
judgment would be a process of thinking that is
negated by the goal alluded to in the preceding
passage, since the Dharma-sun "cannot be reasoned."
However, if Bosanquet's statement were altered to
read "every denial substitutes some affirmation for
the denial," it then appears to suit the state of
affairs alluded to in the passage above. In short,
the whole system of four alternatives would be
denied in this contrary negation, thus to suggest
the retirement of convention (sa.mv.rti) in favor of
absolute truth (paramaartha-satya).

In the preceding illustrations, it is the

Tathaagata or the Dharma or Nirvaa.na which is
affirmed as the affirmation of absolute truth in the
process of the

P.13

denials, because these denials are a meditative

act--and acts succeed where theories fail--which
downgrades the role of inference and human reason
generally, and upholds the role of vision, so--as
Ati`sa indicated--to promote insight (praj~naa).

Therefore, it is now possible to evaluate two

interpretations which seem to be starkly contrasted:
(1) Murti's "The Maadhyamika denies metaphysics not
because there is no real for him; but because it is
inaccessible to Reason. He is convinced of a higher
faculty. Intuition (praj~naa)...."(50) (2) Streng's.
"In Naagaarjuna's negative dialectic the power of
reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate
Truth."(51) One could argue that the disagreement is
deceptive, since if reason is to be taken as the
mental process of making the denials which
substitute an affirmation of the Real or Ultimate
Truth, then indeed while the Real is inaccessible to
reason, it cannot be denied that reason brought
about that higher faculty, the supernal insight
(praj~naa), to which the Real is accessible. This
very point is made in the Kaa`syapa-parivarta:

"Kaa`syapa, it is this way: for example, when two

trees are rubbed together by the wind, and fire
arises (form the friction), (that fire) having
arisen, burns the two trees. In the same way,
Kaa`syapa, (when given things are analysed) by the
most pure discrimination (pratyavek.sa.naa), the
faculty of noble insight is born; and (that Fire)
having been born, (it) burns up that most pure
discrimination itself."(52)

Hence, the very discrimination which is the kind of

reasoning that denies the alternatives is described
metaphorically as a friction which arouses the fire
of insight that in turn destroys this kind of
reasoning.

Turning to Tso^n-kha-pa's section,(53) defending

the denial of the four alternatives, this concerns
the presence and absence of entities. Tso^n-kha-pa
states that there are only two possibilities for an
entity, that is, accomplished by own-nature, and
efficient. Then, if the first alternative is stated
in the form, "An entity exists." this is denied; the
denial meaning to the Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika that,
in the case of both truths (sa.mv.rti and
paramaartha), one denies that an entity exists
accomplished by own-nature. while; the efficient
entity is denied in the paramaartha or absolute
sense but not conventionally.

Likewise, the Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika rejects

the nonexistence of an entity, should someone affirm
the nonexistence of an entity accomplished by
own-nature among the unconstructed (asa.msk.rta)
natures (dharma).

Likewise, this Maadhyamika rejects the

simultaneity of existence of that sort of entity
with the nonexistence of the other sort of entity.
And he rejects that there are neither, even one
accomplished by own-nature.

While I have insisted that the ultimate nature

is affirmed by the four denials, it should be
granted that the acceptance of this absolute in
Naagaarjuna's Maadhyamika is a matter much disputed
by Western scholars; de Jong's thoughtful
article(54) on the topic deserves consultation. In
any case, Candrakiirti's position is clear, as he
states in his own commentary on the
Madhyamakaavataara:

P.14

Regarding this sort of svabhaava (self-existence) as

written in particular (Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, XV,
1-2), received from the mouth of the aacaarya (=
Naagaarjuna), does it exist? (In answer:) As to its
authorization, the Bhagavat proclaimed that whether
Tathaagatas arise or do not arise, this true nature
of dharmas abides, and so on, extensively. The "true
nature" (dharmataa) (of that text, = svabhaava)
(necessarily) exists. Which (elements) have this
"true nature"? These, the eye, etc. have this
svabhaava. And what is their svabhaava? Their
uncreate nature and their non-dependence on another;
the self-nature which is to be understood by
knowledge (in aaryasamaapatti) free from the caul of
nescience (and its associated habit-energy). When it
is asked. "Does that sort of thing exist?" who would
answer, "No."? If it does not exist, for which goal
do the Bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the
perfections? For what reason do the Bodhisattvas, in
order to comprehend the true-nature, assume myriads
of difficulties that way?(55)

In short, Candrakiirti explains the svabhaava of MK

XV, 1-2, as the "true nature" of the scriptures, and
in a manner equivalent to the dharma-sun of the
Ratnagotravibhaaga passage.(56)

Finally, the denials concerning existence are

also referred to as the rejection of four 'views'
(d.r.s.ti). So MK,XXVII, 13:

Thus whatever the view concerning the past, whether

'I existed', `I did not exist', `I both (existed and
did not exist)', `I neither (existed, nor did not
exist)', it is not valid.

Such passages undoubtedly support the frequent claim

that the Maadhyamika rejects all 'views'. But note
that the views here are of existence, not of
causation; and that Naagaarjuna elsewhere adheres to
the view of Dependent Origination, which in Buddhism
would be counted as a 'right view'
(samyag-d.r.s.ti).

V. THE THREE KINDS OF CATU.SKO.TI, VARIOUS

CONSIDERATIONS
It might be argued that there are not really three
'kinds' of catu.sko.ti but simply different
applications of the catu.sko.ti. Perhaps an
exaggeration of contrast is involved in using the
word `kinds'. Still I feel the word is necessary to
counter the frequent discussion of the catu.sko.ti
as though the catu.sko.ti is at hand and the only
difficulty is in how to explain it. Hence we may
observe that the first kind of catu.sko.ti, in a
disjunctive system, is explanatory of the individual
propositions, and thus serves as an introduction to
the next two kinds or uses of the catu.sko.ti, to
wit, to apply to the problem of causation or to the
problem of existence. There were disputes concerning
each of the three kinds, but it is especially the
causation and existence applications of the four
alternatives that occasioned spirited disagreements
between the two main schools of the Maadhyamika--the
Praasa^ngika and the Svaatantrika-disagreements
which would require too many technical explanations
to be treated in this article.

Moreover, all three kinds of catu.sko.ti are

found in early Buddhism and later in the Maadhyamika
school. The first case where the four alternatives
constitute a disjunctive system, with the individual
terms not necessarily

P.15

denied, was well represented in passages of

early Buddhism. as preserved in the Paali canon; and
then was included in Naagaarjuna's
Madhyamaka-kaarikaa in the verse about the ranked
instruction of the Buddha. The second case, denial
of alternatives regarding causation, starting with
the discourses to Kassapa and to Kaccaayana, is made
much of by Naagaarjuna as the basis of the
Maadhyamika, but does not seem to have been stressed
as much in other schools of Buddhism. The third
case, denial of four alternatives, has important
examples in both early and later Buddhism, and, of
course, is generously treated in the Maadhyamika.
Therefore, when Jayatilleke says, "It is evident
that Naagaarjuna and some of his commentators,
ancient and modern, refer to this logic with little
understanding of its real nature and
significance, "(57) these remarks define the
limitations of Jayatilleke's own views of these
problems, outside of which is his own "little
understanding." Robinson answered Jayatilleke in a
different way: "And since the catu.sko.ti is not a
doctrine but just a form, later writers were at
liberty to use it in new ways, doing which does not
itself prove that they misunderstood the early
forms."(58) This is well stated and is meant not
only to reject Jayatilleke's criticism of
Naagaarjuna and others, but apparently also to
justify the application of symbolic logic. However,
I have brought up sufficient evidence to show that
Naagaarjuna, in the matter of the catu.sko.ti, is
heir to and the continuator of teachings in the
early Buddhist canon (in Paali, the four Nikaayas;
in Sanskrit, the four AAgamas). Furthermore, I
cannot concede that the catu.sko.ti is just a form.
Indeed, if Naagaarjuna had used it in new ways,
Jayatilleke would have been more justified in his
attribution of misunderstanding to Naagaarjuna.

Next, we observe by the foregoing materials that

the first kind of catu.sko.ti is a disjunctive
system that was used to explain the Buddha's
teaching. The second, applied to causation, each of
the alternatives denied, is a meditative exercise,
and besides serves to classify some of the
philosophical positions rejected by the Maadhyamika.
The third kind, applied to existence, each of the
alternatives denied, is another meditative exercise,
and besides serves to establish the absolute by
negating the notional activity of the mind
(sa.mj~naaskandha) and its net of imputed
qualifications.(59)

The priority of the causality to existence

treatments--as I have already insisted upon--is
consistent with Naagaarjuna's Madhyamaka-kaarikaa,
which devotes chapter I to conditional causes
(pratyaya) , beginning with the denial of four
alternatives concerning origination of entities, but
in the same chapter begins to treat alternatives of
existence, nonexistence, etc. So MK I,6: "Neither an
existent nor a non-existent entity has a valid
condition (pratyaya) . What non-existent has a
condition? What is the use of a condition for an
existent?" The next verse (I,7) shifts to the word
dharma: "Whenever a feature (dharma) neither
existent nor non-existent, or both existent and
non-existent, operates, in that case how could an
operator-cause be valid?" (and it is not valid.) MK
chapters III, IV, and V, deal with the products
causes, namely, the sense

P.16

bases, personality aggregates, and elements, that

amount to "all entities" (sarva-bhaava, IV, 7). Here
again, "all entities" presuppose their arising as
products, so the causality. The establishment of
causality in conventional terms and of existence in
absolute terms is therefore implied in MK XXIV, 10:
"Without reliance on convention, the supreme
(paramaartha) is not pointed to."

I propose that it was by not distinguishing

these uses of the catu.sko.ti that there has been in
the past various improper or misleading attributions
to this formula. For example, there is the problem
of which kind of two negations is involved: the
prasajya-prati.sedha (negation by denial) or
paryudaasa-prati.sedha (negation by implication).
Matilal concludes that the catu.sko.ti is of the
prasajya type and that so understood the catu.sko.ti
is free from contradiction.(60) Staal after
admirably explaining the two kinds of negation (the
paryudaasa type negates a term; the prasajya type
negates the predicate) agrees with Matilal that the
catu.sko.ti exhibits the prasajya type, but
disagrees that this frees the formula of
contradiction.(61) However, when one considers this
along with my preceding materials, one can promptly
agree with Matilal and then with Staal that it is
the prasajya negation which is involved with the
catu.sko.ti, nota bene, the four alternatives in
their explicit form applied to existence, because
the proposition "I bow to that Dharma-sun which is
not existence" is of the prasajya type (confer,
Staal: `x is not F'). But when one examines the
propositions of the four alternatives in their
explicit form applied to causation, one can promptly
disagree with Matilal and then with Staal, because
the proposition "There is no entity anywhere that
arises form itself," is of the paryudaasa type
(confer, Staal: 'not-x is F'). And this paryudaasa
type is of the variety implying action, for which
there is the stock example, "Fat Devadatta does not
eat food in the daytime." But 'fat Devadatta' must
eat sometime, so when? The world responds, "at
night!"(62) Also, the entities that do not arise
from self, another, both, or by chance, must arise
somehow, so how? Buddhism responds. "in the manner
of Dependent Origination (pratiityasamutpaada)." In
illustration, the first two members of Dependent
Origination are: (1) `nescience' (avidyaa), and (2)
`motivations' (sa.mskaara). `Motivations' do not
arise from self (motivations) or from another
(nescience) , or from both self and another
(motivations and nescience), or without a cause
(that is, by chance); 'motivations' do arise with
'nescience' as condition (pratyaya) ; and since
'motivations' are a karma member, have a cause
(hetu) which is karma, hence the other karma-member,
which is (10) `gestation' (bhava) `re-existence'
(punarbhava).(63)
 But then what of Staal's position that even so
(that is, allowing the prasajya interpretation for
the catu.sko.ti of existence), this does not save
the prasajya propositions from mutual contradiction?
Saying, "In rejecting the third clause, the denial
of the principle of non-contradiction is rejected,
not the principle of non-contradiction itself,"(64)
he interprets the third proposition in its literal
form, denial that something both exists and does not
exist. However, at least

P.17

in the Tso^n-kha-pa Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika

explanation that I gave earlier, it is not possible
to understand the four denials in terms of existence
just by their literal form, because one must bring
in the theory of two truths (sa.mv.rti and
paramaartha) to understand Naagaarjuna's position.
In such a case, the denial of the third proposition
amounts in commentarial expansion to: This
Maadhyamika rejects, in the absolute sense
(paramaarthatas), the simultaneity of existence by
own-nature of that efficient entity with the
nonexistence by own-nature of the unconstructed
entity. In short, it is here claimed that
`existence' and 'non-existence' refer to contrasting
entities. Along the same lines, Naagaarjuna says (MK
XXV, 14):

How could Nirvaa.na be both a presence and an

absence? Like light and darkness, there is no
existence of the two in the same place,

Thus the third alternative of this type of

catu.sko.ti can be resolved in various ways, for
example, one may deny both a presence and an absence
of nirvaa.na, adding "that is, in the same place";
or, with a different subject, adding perhaps, "that
is, at the same time"; or, with still other
subjects, perhaps drawing upon the two truths, "that
is, with the same truth." All these additions are
consistent with Naagaarjuna's verses in the MK Thus,
in such interpretations it is not the intention of
the denial, as Staal claims, to save a principle of
human reason from default; but rather it is held
that such is really the meaning of the third
proposition, to wit, that a qualification of place,
time, or truth must be added. However, it follows
that the denials of alternatives applied to
existence, while in their explicit form constituting
the prasajya type of denial, turn out, by reason of
the qualifications added in the Maadhyamika school,
to be paryudaasa negations. Indeed, study of the two
main traditions of the Maadhyamika, Candrakiirti's
Praasa^ngika and Bhaavaviveka's Svaatantrika, will
show that both of them insist on adding
qualifications, especially in terms of the two
truths (sa.mv.rti and paramaartha) , their
disagreement stemming from how such qualifications
are made. But that a qualification should be added
is consistent with most of the attempts of
Westerners to explain the catu.sko.ti, because they
usually added something, to wit, their theory of the
catu.sko.ti. So the Maadhyamika commentators and the
Western writers share this solicitude to
rationalize, even in the case of the absolute, which
was supposed to cut off the net of qualifications.
Even so, as was indicated previously, the
Maadhyamika is not against reason as the faculty
which denies a self, denies the alternatives, and so
on, because this reason leads to the insight which
realizes the absolute.

CONCLUSION

Now we must revert to the initial question: Who

understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist
texts? It is easier to define the persons who do not
understand: as was shown, they are the ones who do
not want to understand, or are not confident of
their own ability to understand. Besides, no one
under-

P.18

stands the four alternatives, but perchance one does

understand the four alternatives in a disjunctive
system, or the four alternatives applied to
causetion, or the four alternatives applied to
existence. The four alternatives, disjunctively
considered, constitute a preliminary orientation.
The alternatives of causation, each denied, are a
meditation with upholding of human reason with its
inferences, definitions, and the like. The
alternatives of existence, each denied, are a
meditation with ultimate downgrading of human
reason, Then to answer more along the lines of the
way Candrakiirti writes: --Whether one who
understands arises or does not arise, "this true
nature of dharmas abides,"--the svabhaava of that
sort. So Candrakiirti says in his Prasannapadaa
commentary on Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, chapter XV:

By svabhaava ons understands this innate nature,

uncreate, which has not deviated in the fire in the
past, present, and future; which did not arise
earlier and will not arise later; which is not
dependent on causes and conditions as are the heat
of water, (one or another) of this side and the
other side, long and short. Well, then, does this
own-nature of fire that is of such manner (i.e.
uncreate, not dependent) exist? (In reply: ) This
(svabhaava of such sort) neither exists nor does not
exist by reason of own-nature. While that is the
case, still in order to avoid frightening the
hearers, we conventionally make affirmations (such
as `It is svabhaava' and 'It is dharmataa') and say
it exists.(65)

NOTES
 1. Tso^n-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo, the sections
'Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real'. The
four-alternatives discussion occurs in the
'Discerning the Real' section.

2. The passage is in the Tibetan Tanjur, photo

edition, vol. 103, pp. 39-4-8 to 40-2-2.

3. K. N. Jayatilleke, "The Logic of Four

Alternatives," Philosophy East and West, 17: 1967):
82; hereafter cited as Jayatilleke, "Logic."

4. Richard H. Robinson, book review of

Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory. Philosophy East
and West 19, no. 1 (Jan., 1969): 72-81., see
especially 75-76; hereafter cited as Robinson,
book-review.

5. Richard H. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of

Naagaarjuna's System," Philosophy East and West 6,
no. 4 (Jan., 1957): 291-308.

6. Richard H. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika in

India and China (Madison, Wise.: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1967) , pp. 50-58, hereafter
Robinson, Early Maadhyamika.

7. G. Chataliasn, "A Study of R. H. Robinson's

Early Maadhyamika in India and China, "Journal of
Indian Philosophy 1 (1972), section II, Logic and
Argument, pp. 315-325.

8. Willard Van Orman Quine, Elementary Logic

(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 1-3.

9. Confer, Hermann Weyl, Philosophy of

Mathematics and Natural Science (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 13; hereafter
cited as Weyl, Philosophy.

10. Weyl, Philosophy, pp. 37-38.

 11. Cornelis Verhoeven, The Philosophy of Wonder,
trans. Mary Foran (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1967), p. 38.

12. Confer, Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic

(New York: Dover Publication, 1962), vol. 1, pp.
242-245.

13. Jayatilleke, "Logic," pp. 70-71.

14. Bernard Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic

(London: Macmillan and Co., 19-48) , p. 125;
hereafter Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic.

P.19

15. Confer in translation of the Kathaavatthu.

Points of Controversy, by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs.
Rhys Davids (London: Pali Text Society. 1915), pp.
155-156. where the term sa~n~naa is rendered
'consciousness'.

16. Jayatilleke. "Logic," p. 79.

17. Ibid., p.82.

18. My rendition 'genuine' is close to the

dictionary. Confer, the negative forms atathya
('untrue, unreal') and avitatha ('not untrue, not
futile').

19. In translation, see J. W. de Jong, Cinq

chapitres dela Prasannapadaa (Paris: Paul Geuthner,
1949). p.27: "il a enseigne que ces agregats,
elements et bases... sent vrais." Hereafter cited as
de Jong Cinq chapitres.

20. D. J. Kalupahana, "A Buddhist Tract on

Empiricism." Philosophy East and West 19, no. 1
(Jan., 1969): 65-67.
 21. The Essentials of Logic, pp. 123-124.

22. See Franklin Edgerton. Buddhist Hybrid

Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 392, under praatihaarya.
Here the form anu`saasanii is used.

23. Tibetan Tanjur, photo edition, vol. 104, pp.

33-5-8 to 34-1-1:...' phags pa `Saa-ri'i bu la sogs
pa da^n de las gzan pa skal pa da^n ldan pa.rnams
kyi sems can gyi rgyud la gzigs nas cho 'phrul gsum
bstan pas bsam pa ji lta ba da^n/skal pa ji lta ba
bzin du ~nan thos kyi theg pa'i chos ~nd ston ci~n.../

24. I have summarized. In full translation, see

de Jong, Cinq chapitres, pp. 27-28.

25. Asanga: Mahaayaana-Suutraala.mkaara, edite

par Sylvain Levi (Paris, 1907), p. 52.

26. Jayatilleke, "Logic," p. 82.

27. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika, pp. 56-57.

28. Edward J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha (New

York: Barnes & Noble, 1952), p. 146.

29. The Expositor (Atthasaalinii), trans. Pe

Maung Tin, edited and revised by Mrs. Rhys Davids,
vol. 1 and 2 (London: Luzac & Company, 1958
reprint), 1:246; 2:318-319.

30. As cited by I. B. Horner, Buddhist Texts

Through the Ages, ed. by Edward Conze (Oxford: Bruno
Cassirer, 1954), pp. 68-69, and my summary.

31. Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, p. 125.

32. Here translated from the Tibetan in the

context of Tso^n-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo,
`Discerning the Real' section.
 33. For the various occurrences of the important
verse, see Louis de la Vallee Poussin,
Muulmadhyamakakaarikaas de Naagaarjuna avec la
Prasannapadaa Commentaire de Candrakiirti,
Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4 (St-Petersbourg,
1903-1913), p. 239.

34. Here I accept Matilal's correction of my

earlier stated position; confer, Bimal Krishna
Matilal, Epistemology. Logic, and Grammar in Indian
Philosophical Analysis (The Hague: Mouton, 1971),
p.. 148-149; hereafter cited as Matilal,
Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar. But now my
understanding only partially agrees with his, to
wit, "Dependent origination = Emptiness Dependent
designation = The Middle Way." Because I would say
that as far as Naagaarjuna is concerned, dependent
origination is the way things happen and that it is
voidness, while the dharmas so arising are void,
whether one recognizes this to be the case. But
while his school designates dependent origination
voidness, this is not what every other Buddhist sect
does; and Naagaarjuna goes on to add that the act of
so designating, when there is the dependence, is
indeed the middle path. So it is not voidness that
is designation.

35. Here I have taken suggestions from the

context of the Lam rim chen mo when MK I, 1 is
cited, and from the annotational comments of the
Tibetan work called Mchan bzi.

36. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of

Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp.
168-169.

37. Confer, David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The

Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The
University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 5, 46. For
the theory of the Buddhist logicans as later
expressed by Ratnakiirti, see Surendranath Dasgupta,
A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1932), 1:158-159. This
is a theory that 'efficiency' (arthakriyaakaaritva)
can produce anything, and so a momentary, efficient
entity is the 'other' from which something may
arise. The stream of consciousness is held to be of
this nature, with one 'moment' of consciousness
giving rise to the next one. Hereafter cited as
Kalupahana, Causality.

P.20

38. Murti: The Central Philosophy, p. 170.

misused the term asatkaaryavaada (for the correct
usage, see below).

39. A History of Indian Philosophy, 1:320.

40. Dharmendra Nath Shastri, Critique of Indian

Realism (Agra: Agra University, 1964). p. 236.

41. See now Kalupahana. Causality, pp. 25ff. for

a valuable discussion of the svabhaavavaada in
connection with the ancient Materialists, and on p.
31 he admits for them the appelation
`non-causationists' (ahetuvaada).

42. The Tattvasa^ngraha of `Saantarak.sita with

Commentary of Kamala`siila, trans. by Ganganatha
Jha, vol. 2 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1939), pp.
887-888.

43. Cf. Jayatilleke, "Logic," p. 81; and K. N.

Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp.473--474.

44. While the verse in Sanskrit has the locative

plural dharme.su rather than vastu.su,
Candrakiirti's commentary makes it clear that the
latter word is intended, because he promptly talks
of the fourteen avyaak.rta-vastuuni and does not
mention any dharma-s; while in the Tibetan
translation of the verse, instead of the standard
translation for dharma (T. chos), one finds the term
d^nos po, which is frequently used to translate
vastu; confer, Takashi Hirano, An Index to the
Bodhicaryaavataara Pa~njikaa, Chapter IX (Tokyo:
Suzuki Research Foundation. 1966), pp.273-276.

45. Edward J. Thomas. The History of Buddhist

Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963
reprint), p. 124, states that they are actually
four, but become fourteen by stating them in
different ways.

46. My translation 'should not infer' is for the

Sanskrit nohyate. The verb uub- has a number of
meanings, including 'to infer': and the latter
meaning is more associated with the verb root when
there is the prefix abhi, with such a form as
abhyuuhya `having infrred'.

47. This conclusion, however, goes against

various speculative solutions that have been
advanced to determine particular schools to go with
the various denials applied to existence, namely,
those of Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge, pp. 243ff.; Murti, The Central
Philosophy, pp. 130-131; K. V. Ramanan,
Naagaarjuna's Philosophy (Vanarasi: Bharatiya Vidya
Prakashan, 1971), pp. 155-158. It is noteworthy that
there is little agreement between these authors'
solutions, and their arbitrariness itself stems
from human reason, while to counter such positions
Naagaarjuna would also have had to use ordinary
human reason.

48. The Ratnagotravibhaaga

Mahaayaanottaratantra`saastra, ed. E. H, Johnston
(Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950). pp. 10-11;
Confer, also Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the
Ratnagotravibhaaga (Uttaratantra) (Roma: Istituto
Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966), pp.
163-166.

49. Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, p. 129.

50. Murti, The Central Philosophy, p. 126.

51. Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in

Religion Meaning (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press,
1967), p. 149.

52. The passage is translated in the context of

its citation in Tso^n-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo. It
is number 69 in A. Stael-Holstein, ed.,
Kaa`syapaparivarta, (Commercial Press, 1926), but
original Sanskrit is not extant for this passage.

53. Referred to in note 1, herein. There were

many Tibetan controversies on this issue.

54. J. W. de Jong, "The Problem of the Absolute

in the Madhyamaka school, " Journal of Indian
Philosophy 2 (1972): 1-6.

55. The passage occurs in the Tibetan Tanjur,

photo edition. vol. 98, pp. 151-2-3 to 151-2-7,
immediately preceded by Candrakiirti's citation of
MK XV, 1-2. I have translated it in Lam rim chen mo
context.

56. While it is not possible to deal here with

the many misconceptions in Ives Waldo, "Naagaarjuna
and Analytic Philosophy," Philosophy East and West
25, no. 3 (July, 1975), one may observe that
Candrakiirti's passage directly contradicts his
remarks (p. 283) that the acceptance of `relational
conditions' (pratyaya) entails a denial both of
svabhaava and of nonrelational 'significant events'.
Because Candrakiirti accepts, as does Buddhism
generally. the pratyaya in the causal chain of
Dependent Origination, and yet he also insists here
upon the svabhaava as well as on a significance (the
bodhisattva's goal) that is perhaps nonrelational.

57. Jayatilleke, "Logic," p. 82.

58. Robinson, book review, p. 76.

P.21

59. This is well stated in the Tibetan language

by Red-mda'-ba's Commentary to AAryadeva's `Four
Hundred Verses', ed. Jetsun Rendawa Shonnu Lodo
(Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, 1974), p. 170. "The
form and variety of natures (dharma) are posited as
different by dint of sa.mj~naa (notions, ideas), but
not by reason of the own-form (svaruupa) of given
things (vastu)--because all of them being illusory,
it is not possible to distinguish their own-forms."

60. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar,

pp. 162-167.

61. Frits Staal, Exploring Mysticism (London:

Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 45-47; hereafter cited as
Staal, Exploring Mysticism.

62. Confer, Dhirendra Sharma, The Negative

Dialectics of India (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), p.
94; note where the example illustrates the Vedaanta
authority (pramaa.na) caalled 'presumption'
(arthaapatti).

63. For Naagaarjuna's classification of the two

members, nos. 2 and 10, as karma, see, for example,
A. Wayman, "Buddhist Dependent Origination," History
of Religions 10, no. 3 (Feb., 1971):188. I have gone
much more into the cause and effect (hetu-phala)
 side of the formula in my forthcoming "Dependent
Origination--the Indo-Tibetan Tradition," (special
issue of Journal of Chinese Philosophy).

64. Staal, Exploring Mysticism, p.47.

65. La Vallee Poussin, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas,

pp. 263.5 to 264.4.

A Short History of Buddhist Logic in Tibet

regarding the practice and culture of the Buddhist logic. India where it rst .... his great work on
Buddhist logic, Tattvasamgraha before he reached Tibet.

Development of Buddhist epistemology and logic

In the non-Buddhist traditions of Indian philosophical thought, and perhaps
also in early Buddhist thought, there appears to be a tacit acceptance of the
possibility of acquiring knowledge of reality. However, Ngrjuna (about AD
250), a later Buddhist dialectical thinker, raised serious doubts about the
possibility of acquiring knowledge by pointing out the self-contradictory
character of all means of acquiring knowledge, Ngrjunas objections
stimulated and compelled all subsequent philosophers to provide a solid
foundation to epistemology and logic before proceeding with the formulations
of their philosophical positions.
In Buddhist circles Asanga (about AD 405) and Vasubandhu (about AD 410)
made pioneering attempts to construct epistemology and logic on the
Buddhist pattern. However it was Dignga (about AD 450) who put Buddhist
epistemology and logic on a solid footing and gave them a distinctive
character. He is, therefore, rightly regarded as the father of Buddhist
epistemology and logic, and also of medieval Indian epistemology and logic in
general, for he not only gave a precise formulation to Buddhist epistemology
and logic but also imparted a new direction to Indian epistemology and logic
by way of composing independent treatises on these two interspersing the
treatment of metaphysical problems within them, a style which was later on
followed by Gangesa (about the twelfth century AD), the founder of the school
of Navya-Nyaya. Buddhist literature prior to Dignaga deals with the problem of
knowledge and the means of knowing either very casually or not at all. There
seems to be no work devoted to the problem. But Dignaga felt the necessity
for a distinct treatise on epistemology and logic to establish the Buddhist
doctrines in a logical manner. He explicitly mentions in the Pramna-
samuccaya that its composition was led by the need to establish the means of
valid cognition.
The task initiated by Dignaga was brilliantly continued by Dharmakirti (about
635), a doyen of Buddhist epistemology and logic. His Pramna-vrtika,
Pramnaviniscaya and Nyaya-bindu are masterpieces of Buddhist
epistemology and logic. When Dignaga undertook an examination of the
logical tenets of other philosophical schools in his treatise there were
reactions from the latter. For instance, Uddyotakara and Kumarila (about AD
500) tried to controvert the views of Dignaga. Dharmakirti therefore defended
and modified the views of Dignaga, thereby strengthening the foundations of
Buddhist epistemology and logic. However, his exposition, which was ended
to explain and defend the views of Dignaga, superseded and eclipsed the
original by its superior merit. This tradition of Dharmakirti was carried forward
by Darmottara (about AD 847) and subsequently by, amongst others,
Jnanasrimitra about AD 1040.
From: S. R. Bhatt Logic and language in Buddhism in: Brian Carr, Indira
Mahalingam (eds.) Companion Encyclopedia of Asian philosophy London,
Routledge, 1997, pp. 414-415.

Differences; Hinduism is about understanding Brahma, existence, from within

the Atman, which roughly means "self" or "soul," whereas Buddhism is about
finding the Anatman "not soul" or "not self." In Hinduism, attaining the
highest life is a process of removing the bodily distractions from life, allowing
one to eventually understand the Brahma nature within. In Buddhism, one
follows a disciplined life to move through and understand that nothing in
oneself is "me," such that one dispels the very illusion of existence. In so
doing, one realizes Nirvana.

In Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's words,"Buddhism, in its origin at least, is an

offshoot of Hinduism."
Buddhism Hinduism

Place of worship Buddhist monasteries, temples, shrines. Temple (Mandir)

Place of origin Indian subcontinent Indian Subcontinent

Practices Meditation, the Eightfold Path; right view, Meditation, yoga,

right aspiration, right speech, right action, contemplation, yagna
right livelihood, right effort, right (communal worship),
mindfulness, right concentration offerings in the temple.

Use of statues Common. Statues are used as meditation Common

and pictures objects, and revered as they reflect the
qualities of the Buddha.

Goal of religion To attain enlightenment and be released To break the cycle of

from the cycle of rebirth and death, thus birth, death and
attaining Nirvana. reincarnation, and attain
salvation.

Founder The Buddha (born as Prince Siddhartha) Not credited to a

particular founder.

Means of Reaching Enlightenment or Nirvana, Reaching enlightenment

salvation following the Noble Eightfold Path. by the Path of
Knowledge, the Path of
devotion, or the Path of
Good Deeds.

Belief of God The idea of an omniscient, omnipotent, Many gods, but realize
omnipresent creator is rejected by that they all come from
Buddhism Hinduism
Buddhists. The Buddha himself refuted Atman.
the theistic argument that the universe
was created by a self-conscious, personal
God.

Human Nature Ignorance, as all sentient beings. In the Depends on sects.

Buddhist texts, it is seen that when
Gautama, after his awakening, was asked
whether he was a normal human being,
he replied, "No".

Religious Law The Dharma. Dharma shastras

Clergy The Buddhist Sangha, composed of No official clergy. Gurus,

bhikkhus (male monks) and bhikkhunis Yogis, Rishis, Brahmins,
(female nuns). The sangha is supported Pundits, priests,
by lay Buddhists. priestesses, monks, and
nuns.

Literal Meaning Buddhists are those who follow the The followers of Vedas
teachings of the Buddha. are called as Arya, noble
person. Arya is not a
dynasty, ethnicity or race.
Anyone who follows the
teachings of Vedas is
considered Arya.

Life after death Rebirth is one of the central beliefs of A constant cycle of
Buddhism. We are in an endless cycle of reincarnation until
birth, death and re-birth, which can only enlightenment is
be broken by attaining nirvana. Attaining reached.
nirvana is the only way to escape
suffering permanently.

Confessing sins Sin is not a Buddhist concept. Repentance for

unintentional sins are
prescribed, but
intentional sins have to
be repaid through karmic
consequences.

Marriage It is not a religious duty to marry. Monks Man may marry one
and nuns do not marry and are celibate. woman. However, kings
Buddhism Hinduism
Advice in the Discourses on how to in mythology often
maintain a happy and harmonious married more than one
marriage. woman.

Followers Buddhists Hindus.

Authority of Dalai Dalai Lamas are tulkus of the Gelug N/A.

Lama school of Tibetan Buddhism. They are
cultural figures and are independent of
the doctrinal basis of Buddhism.

View of the The highest teacher and the founder of Some Hindu sects claim
Buddha Buddhism, the all-transcending sage. Buddha was an avatar of
Vishnu. Others believe
he was a holy man.

Population 500-600 million 1 Billion.

Scriptures Tripitaka - a vast canon composed of 3 Vedas, Upanishad,

sections: the Discourses, the Discipline Puranas, Gita. Smrti and
and the Commentaries, and some early Sruti are oral scriptures.
scriptures, such as the Gandhara texts.

Original Pali(Theravada tradition) and Sanskrit

Language(s) Sanskrit(Mahayana and Vajrayana
tradition)

View of other Since the word Dharma means doctrine, They believe that
Dharmic religions law, way, teaching, or discipline, other Buddhists, Jains, & Sikhs
Dharmas are rejected. should reunite with
Hinduism(which is the
original Dharmic
religion).

Goal of To eliminate mental suffering. Salvation, freedom from

Philosophy the cycle of birth and
reincarnation.

Religion which Yes. Charvakas and Sankyas

atheists may still are atheistic groups in
be adherents of Hinduism.

Geographical (Majority or strong influence) Mainly in Mainly in India and

 Buddhism Hinduism
distribution and Thailand, Cambodia, Sri lanka, India, Nepal.
predominance Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, Japan, Myanmar
(Burma), Laos, Vietnam, China, Mongolia,
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and
Taiwan. Other small minorities exist in
other countries.

Status of Vedas The Buddha rejected the 5 Vedas, Vedas are generally
according to the dialogues seen in the regarded as sacred in
nikayas. Hinduism. Post-Vedic
texts like the Gita are
also revered.

Place and Time of The origin of Buddhism points to one Indian Subcontinent,
origin man, Siddhartha Gautama, the historical beginning with the Vedic
Buddha, who was born in Lumbini (in civilization circa 3000 BC
present-day Nepal). He became
enlightened at Bodhgaya, India and
delivered his first set of teachings at a
deer park in Sarnath, India.

Holy days/Official Vesak day in which the birth, the Diwali, Holi,
Holidays awakening, and the parinirvana of the Janmashtami, Ganesh
Buddha is celebrated. Chaturthi, etc.

Symbols The conch, endless knot, fish, lotus, Om, Swastika, etc.
parasol, vase, dharmachakra (Wheel of
Dharma), and victory banner.

Time of origin 2,500 years ago, circa 563 B.C.E. (Before circa 3000 B.C.E
Common Era)

Status of women No distinctions between men and women. Women can become
Women are equal to men, and men are priestesses or nuns.
equal to women in the Sangha. The
Buddha gave Men and Women equal
rights and a major part in the Sangha.

Principle This life is suffering, and the only way to To follow dharma, i.e.
escape from this suffering is to dispel eternal laws
one's cravings and ignorance by realizing
the Four Noble Truths and practicing the
Eightfold Path.
 Buddhism Hinduism
Views on Other Being a practical philosophy, Buddhism is Some scriptures say the
Religions neutral against other religions. path they describe is the
only path to God and
salvation. Other
scriptures are more
philosophical than
religious. Beliefs vary.
Some believe that all
spiritual paths lead to the
same God.

Can atheists Yes. Yes.

partake in this
religion's
practices?
Hetuvidya - Chinese Buddhist
Hetuvidya is one of the three original systems of logic in the world. ... Hetuvidya is not only a
crystal of Buddhist wisdom, but also a treasure of
Pacavidy (Sanskrit), five classes of knowledge (Vidy) of ancient India. The five sciences are:
science of language (abda vidy), science of logic (hetu vidy), science of medicine (cikits
vidy), science of fine arts and crafts (ilpa-karma-sthna vidy), and science of spirituality
(adhytma vidy).[1]

The first four are common for all schools and the latter is the theory of each school of thought,
for example it is the Tripitaka for Buddhists, and the four Vedas for Brahmins. In the Buddhist
context, a recognized master of all five sciences was afforded the title pand ita.

Buddhism is centered upon the life and teachings of Gautama Buddha,

whereas Jainism is centered on the life and teachings of Mahavira.
Buddhism is a polytheistic religion and it's main goal is to gain
enlightenment. Jainism is also a polytheistic religion and it's goals are
based on non-violence and liberation the soul.
 Buddhism versus Jainism comparison chart
Buddhism
Place of Buddhist monasteries, temples,
worship shrines.
Place of Indian subcontinent
origin
Practices Meditation, the Eightfold Path; right
view, right aspiration, right speech,
right action, right livelihood, right
effort, right mindfulness, right
concentration
Use of Common. Statues are used as
statues and meditation objects, and revered as
pictures they reflect the qualities of the
Buddha.
Goal of To attain enlightenment and be
religion released from the cycle of rebirth
and death, thus attaining Nirvana.
Founder The Buddha (born as Prince
Siddhartha)
Belief of God The idea of an omniscient,
omnipotent, omnipresent creator is
Jainism
Temple
India.
Five vows of Truth, Non-violence,
Non-stealing, Non-attachment,
control over desires and senses.
Greater emphasis on non-violence
and truth. Also follow 3 jewels of
Right Perception, Right Knowledge
and Right Conduct
Common.
To gain liberation and be released
from cycle of rebirths, adopt a path
of non-violence towards all living
beings.
Rishabhdev- 1st Tirthankar in this
era, Further revived by Vardhaman
Mahavir- 24th and final Tirthankar
of this era
Jainism does not believe in a
Creator God.
 Buddhism versus Jainism comparison chart
Buddhism
rejected by Buddhists. The Buddha
himself refuted the theistic
argument that the universe was
created by a self-conscious,
personal God.
Clergy The Buddhist Sangha, composed
of bhikkhus (male monks) and
bhikkhunis (female nuns). The
sangha is supported by lay
Buddhists.
Means of Reaching Enlightenment or
salvation Nirvana, following the Noble
Eightfold Path.
Life after Rebirth is one of the central beliefs
death of Buddhism. We are in an endless
cycle of birth, death and re-birth,
which can only be broken by
attaining nirvana. Attaining nirvana
is the only way to escape suffering
permanently.
Literal Buddhists are those who follow the
Meaning teachings of the Buddha.
Human Ignorance, as all sentient beings. In
Nature the Buddhist texts, it is seen that
when Gautama, after his
awakening, was asked whether he
was a normal human being, he
replied, "No".
Followers Buddhists
Jainism
Monks, nuns.
Goal is to unshackle the soul from
bondages of karma which results in
misery due to many rebirths and
deaths. Once soul is freed from
these bondages, it achieves
Nirvana and becomes perfect soul
free from all attachments, in an
eternal blissful state
Until liberation is achieved, circle of
rebirths and deaths continue due to
Karma via incarnations in any life
form on earth, as also heavenly
and hellish life forms.
To become a Jina (liberated soul)
by following the teachings of 24
Tirthankars (ford-makers/teachers)
Human suffering is due to negative
effects of bad karma and excessive
attachment to material aspects of
world.
Jains.
 Buddhism versus Jainism comparison chart
Buddhism
View of the The highest teacher and the
Buddha founder of Buddhism, the all-
transcending sage.
Scriptures Tripitaka - a vast canon composed
of 3 sections: the Discourses, the
Discipline and the Commentaries,
and some early scriptures, such as
the Gandhara texts.
Authority of Dalai Lamas are tulkus of the
Dalai Lama Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism.
They are cultural figures and are
independent of the doctrinal basis
of Buddhism.
Marriage It is not a religious duty to marry.
Monks and nuns do not marry and
are celibate. Advice in the
Discourses on how to maintain a
happy and harmonious marriage.
Original Pali(Theravada tradition) and
Language(s) Sanskrit(Mahayana and Vajrayana
tradition)
Goal of To eliminate mental suffering.
Philosophy
Population 500-600 million
View of other Since the word Dharma means
Dharmic doctrine, law, way, teaching, or
religions discipline, other Dharmas are
rejected.
Status of No distinctions between men and
Jainism
Buddha is considered as
contemporary of Mahavir
Religious scriptures called Agamas.
Many other canonical texts.
N/A.
Marriage is a social convention and
not linked to religion. But followers
must strictly follow monogamy.
Monks, though have renounced
material world, hence strictly follow
celibacy.
Ancient texts were written in
various languages, predominantly
in Magadhi, language prevalent at
time of Mahavir and Buddha.
Jainism is a way of life, adhere to
teachings of Tirthankars, respect all
life forms and end goal is to
achieve Nirvana.
50-60 million
Comradeship with other Dharmic
religions.
Women can become nuns.
 Buddhism versus Jainism comparison chart
Buddhism
women women. Women are equal to men,
and men are equal to women in the
Sangha. The Buddha gave Men
and Women equal rights and a
major part in the Sangha.
Holy Vesak day in which the birth, the
days/Official awakening, and the parinirvana of
Holidays the Buddha is celebrated.
Principle This life is suffering, and the only
way to escape from this suffering is
to dispel one's cravings and
ignorance by realizing the Four
Noble Truths and practicing the
Eightfold Path.
Time of origin 2,500 years ago, circa 563 B.C.E.
(Before Common Era)
Religion Yes.
which
atheists may
still be
adherents of
Symbols The conch, endless knot, fish,
lotus, parasol, vase, dharmachakra
(Wheel of Dharma), and victory
banner.
Concept of n/a. According to some
Deity interpretations, there are beings in
heaven realms but they are also
bound by "samsara". They may
have less suffering but have not yet
achieved salvation (nibbana)
Jainism
Paryushan festival
Respect all living things. Attain
liberation by avoiding and shedding
of bad karma which is the cause of
rebirths and all sufferings. Five
vows and three jewels.
Very ancient. One of the oldest
religions as origin of 1st Tirthankar
is too ancient and obscure. Mahavir
(24th Tirthankar) born in 599 B.C.E.
Yes. Jains do not believe in the
idea of a Creator God. The laws
revolve around Karma. Good
Karma lead to spiritual elevation
and bad Karma and bad deeds to
decline.
Swastika(used it long before it
became a symbol for antisemitism).
Numerous deities known as
Tirthenkaras. But Jains do not
worship them in literal sense of idol
worship to ask favors. Rather,
these Tirthankars are venerated as
ideal Men and teachers whose
teachings should be followed.
 Buddhism versus Jainism comparison chart

Buddhism Jainism

Views on Being a practical philosophy, Belief in pluralism and respect

Other Buddhism is neutral against other other religious view points and try
Religions religions. to accomodate them.

Can atheists Yes. Yes

partake in
this religion's
practices?

Place and The origin of Buddhism points to Very ancient, origin obscure dating
Time of origin one man, Siddhartha Gautama, the many millenia
historical Buddha, who was born in
Lumbini (in present-day Nepal). He
became enlightened at Bodhgaya,
India and delivered his first set of
teachings at a deer park in Sarnath,
India.

Yoga and Buddhism: Similarities and Differences

(By David Frawley, Note: This article in various forms has been published by
different magazines in the past like Yoga International and Hinduism Today,
and been put on various websites.)

Yoga and Buddhism are sister traditions which evolved in the same spiritual
culture of ancient India. They use many of the same terms and follow many of
the same principles and practices. For this reason it is not surprising that
many of us born in the West, particularly after an initial exposure, are apt to
regard Yoga and Buddhist teachings as almost identical.

We may want to combine their teachings or practices accordingly, as if there

were no real differences between them. The differences that have existed
between the two systems historically, which have kept them apart as separate
traditions, are less obvious to us in the West than are their commonalities. Or
those who study one of these traditions may be inclined to see the other as a
borrowing from it. Those who study Buddhism may find so much similarity in
Yoga that they suspect a strong Buddhist influence on Yoga. Those who study
Yoga may find so much similarity in Buddhism that they see a strong yogic
influence on Buddhism.

However, the tendency to find commonality between these two great spiritual
traditions is not limited to the West. Swami Vivekananda, the first great figure
to bring Yoga to the West, examined the Buddhist Mahayana scriptures
(Sutras) and found their key teachings and those of Vedanta that he followed
to be ultimately in harmony. In recent years with the influx of Tibetan refugees
into India, including the Dalai Lama, there has been a new dialogue between
the two traditions that is bringing about greater respect between them. Tibetan
Buddhists often appear at Hindu religious gatherings and partake in all
manner of discussions.

Nor is the attempt to connect the two traditions limited to modern times.
Various synthetic Hindu-Buddhist teachings have existed through history.
Buddha himself was born a Hindu and some scholars have argued that
Buddhism as a religion apart from Hinduism did not arise until long after the
Buddha had passed away. A Shiva-Buddha teaching existed in Indonesia in
medieval times, and for many Tantric Yogis it is difficult to tell whether they
were Hindus or Buddhists. Buddha became accepted as an avatar of Vishnu
for the Hindus during the medieval period, and most Hindus still consider that
we live in the age of the Buddha-avatar. Most Hindus accept Buddha as a
great teacher, even if they do not accept all Buddhist teachings.

Yet, similarities and connections aside, the two traditions have had their
differences, which have not always been minor. Such synthetic trends did not
exclude disagreements and debates between the two traditions. Nor did they
ever succeed in fully uniting them. Their traditions and lineages remain
separate to the present day. Generally the Hindu Yoga tradition sought to
absorb Buddhism into itself by reinterpreting Buddha in a Vedantic light.
Buddhism however strove to maintain its separate identity by stressing its
disagreements with Vedic theism or the Vedic recognition of a higher Self.
Most Hindu and Buddhist teachers, including those of the different Yoga
schools of Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhists, have found it necessary to
discriminate their doctrines, particularly on subtle levels of practice and
insight. Refutations of Buddhist teachings are common in yogic texts and
refutations of yogic and Vedantic teachings are common in Buddhist texts. So
while we can honor the connections between these two systems, we cannot
overlook their differences either.
The Yoga Tradition

By Yoga in the context of this examination we mean primarily the classical

Yoga system as set forth by Patanjali in the Yoga Sutras, but as part of the
greater Vedic tradition that Patanjali was part of. Patanjali has never been
regarded in India as the founder of the Yoga tradition but simply the compiler
of yogic teachings that long predated him. Patanjali, reflecting the older
tradition, taught an eightfold (ashtanga) system of Yoga emphasizing an
integral spiritual development including ethical disciplines (Yama and Niyama),
postures (Asana), breathing exercises (Pranayama), control of the senses
(Pratyahara), concentration (Dharana), meditation (Dhyana) and absorption
(Samadhi).

This integral or eightfold approach to Yoga is common to most schools of

Vedic and Hindu thought and practice. They occur in pre-Patanjali literature of
the Puranas, Mahabharata and Upanishads, where the name Patanjali has
yet to occur. The originator of the Yoga system is said to be Hiranyagarbha,
who symbolizes the creative and evolutionary force in the universe, and is a
form of the Vedic Sun God.

Yoga can be traced back to the Rig Veda itself, the oldest Hindu text which
speaks about yoking our mind and insight to the Sun of Truth. Great teachers
of early Yoga include the names of many famous Vedic sages like Vasishta,
Yajnavalkya, and Jaigishavya. The greatest of the Yogis is always said to be
Lord Krishna himself, whose Bhagavad Gita itself is called a Yoga Shastra or
authoritative work on Yoga. Among Hindu deities it is Shiva who is the
greatest of the Yogis or lord of Yoga, Yogeshvara. Therefore, a comparison of
classical Yoga and Buddhism brings the greater issue of a comparison
between Buddhist and Hindu teachings generally, particularly relative to the
Yoga and Vedanta side of Hindu dharma.

Some people, particularly in the West, have claimed that Yoga is not Hindu or
Vedic but an independent or more universal tradition. They point out that the
term Hindu does not appear in the Yoga Sutras, nor does the Yoga Sutra deal
with the basic practices of Hinduism. Such readings are superficial. The Yoga
Sutras abounds with technical terms of Hindu and Vedic philosophy, which its
traditional commentaries and related literature explain in great detail.

The Yoga Sutras have always been regarded as one of the six systems of
Vedic philosophy accepting the authority of the Vedas, Bhagavad Gita and
Upanishads, which traditional commentators on the text have always brought
in. Another great early Yogic text, the Brihatyogi Yajnavalkya Smriti, describes
Vedic mantras and practices along with Yogic practices of asana and
pranayama. The same is true of the Yoga Upanishads, of which there are
several dozen. Those who study Yoga Sutras in isolation from this greater
tradition are bound to make mistakes. The Yoga Sutras, after all, is a Sutra
work. Sutras are short statements, often incomplete sentences that without
any commentary often do not make sense or can be taken in a number of
ways. So to approach the Yoga Sutras and the Yoga tradition, one must look
at the entire context of the teachings, commentaries and authoritative texts,
not just modern opinions on the matter.

Other people in the West, including many Yoga teachers, state that Yoga is
not a religion. This can also be misleading, though it does have its point. Yoga
is not part of any religious dogma proclaiming that there is only one God,
church or savior as the only path. Yoga teachers from India have not insisted
that their students formally become Hindus either. But Yoga is still a system
deriving from the Hindu religion and is closely connected with all aspects of
Hindu Dharma and much of Indian culture. Yoga does deal with the nature of
the soul, God and immortality, which are the main topics of religion throughout
the world. Its main concern is religious and certainly not merely exercise or
health, though it is more concerned with the spiritual and mystical side of
religion, not the mere belief or institutionalized aspect.

Though Yoga is one of the six schools of Vedic philosophy (sad darsanas), it
is also used by all the rest of the six systems in various ways. Yoga is coupled
with another of these six schools, the Samkhya system, which sets forth the
cosmic principles (tattvas) that the Yogi seeks to realized. Nyaya and
Vaisheshika, two of the other systems, provide the rational and philosophical
training that Yoga teachers in India also followed. Purva Mimamsa or the
ritualistic school was the basis of much of the Karma Yoga of the yogic
system.

Uttara Mimamsa (also called Vedanta) is closely connected to Yogic traditions

of Bhakti and Jnana Yoga, and their teachers have always used the eight
limbs of Yoga. Most of the great teachers who brought Yoga to the modern
world, like Swami Vivekananda, Paramahansa Yogananda, Sri Aurobindo, and
Swami Shivananda, were Vedantins and emphasized Yoga-Vedanta.

These six Vedic systems were generally studied together. All adapted to some
degree the methods and practices of Yoga. While we can find philosophical
arguments and disputes between them, they all aim at unfolding the truth of
the Vedas and differ mainly in details or levels of approach. All quote from
Vedic texts, including the Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita and Puranas for
deriving their authority.

Some Western scholars call these the six schools of Indian philosophy. This
is a mistake. These schools only represent Vedic systems, not the non-Vedic
of which they are several. In addition they only represent Vedic based
philosophies of the classical era. There were many other Vedic and Hindu
philosophical systems of later times. Yet even these later systems like
Kashmiri Shaivism, the Hatha Yoga, Siddha Yoga and Nath Yoga traditions,
frequently quote from and accept not on the teachings of the Yoga Sutras, but
those of the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita as well.

Buddhism and Its Philosophy

The Buddhist schools, of which there are four in classical Indian philosophy,
though they shared many ideas and with Vedic spirituality, like karma and
rebirth, did not accept the authority of the Vedas and rejected a number of key
Vedic principles. All Buddhist schools employ meditation but some add more
specific yogic practices, like Pranayama and Mantra. Such systems may be
called Buddhist Yoga by modern writers. However, Yoga as a term in lacking
in early Buddhist texts, particularly of the Theravadin type, and becomes
prominent mainly in the Buddhist Tantric tradition that developed later,
particularly as practiced in Tibet. Some Buddhists regard that Buddha was a
great Yogi, particularly relative to the occult and psychic powers he was
supposed to possess.

Buddhism has basically two varieties, as well as many subvarieties. The

northern, Mahayana or great vehicle tradition prevails in Tibet, China and
Japan and adjacent countries. This is the type of Buddhism that is most
known and followed by the largest number of people in the world. It includes
Chan, Zen, Buddhist Tantra, Vajrayana, and Dzog Chen. The southern,
Theravadin, prevails in the south of Asia, Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand.
Vipassana is the most commonly known practice of Theravada Buddhism.
Generally the Theravadin form is considered to be the older of the two forms
of Buddhism. However, most Indian Buddhism, including the Sanskrit
Buddhist Sutras, is of the Mahayana branch and has probably been best
preserved in Tibet, where it has undergone a further development into
Vajrayana.
There are some disagreements between these two main Buddhist lines. The
Mahayana tradition calls the Theravadin tradition, the Hinayana, or lesser
vehicle. Many Theravadins consider that types of Mahayana Buddhism,
particularly the Tibetan, are not truly Buddhist because they have mixed
Buddhism with indigenous religious practices.

The Mahayana tradition, particularly in its Tantric forms, uses breathing

exercises, mantras, visualizations and deities much like the Yoga tradition.
The Theravadin tradition has less in common with Yoga, though it does use
similar meditation and concentration methods. It generally rejects devotional
worship and the use of deities such as occurs in Yogic paths. For example,
Vipassana teachers have often criticized the use of mantra, which is common
not only in Hindu Yogic traditions but in the Mahayana Buddhist teachings. In
fact, it could be argued that Tibetan Buddhism, with its mantras, deities and
yogic teachings, is closer to Hinduism in its teachings than to such Buddhist
schools.

Buddhism grew up in a cultural base of Hinduism. For this reason Indian and
Tibetan Buddhism have included Ayurvedic medicine, Hindu astrology,
Sanskrit, the same rules of iconography and the same forms of temple
worship, and other common factors as the Hindu tradition. A number of Hindu
Gods and Goddesses, like Ganesh and Sarasvati, appear in the Buddhist
tradition. Some figures like the Goddess Tara appear in both. Yet as Buddhism
moved to other countries outside of India many of these connections were
either lost or their basis forgotten.

Nepal has remained as one region of the Indian subcontinent in which both
these religions have continued, though Nepal has a Hindu majority, a Hindu
king and is officially a Hindu state. Yet in Nepal Hindu Yoga and Buddhists
traditions have never been simply equated. Nepalese Hindus and Buddhist
respect one another but seldom combine the teachings of these two different
religions by way of their actual practices. They tend to follow one tradition or
the other but seldom both.

Yoga and Meditation

Today Yoga is most known for its asana tradition or yogic postures, which are
the most popular, visible and outward form of the system. Buddhism is known
as a tradition of meditation, as in the more popular forms of Buddhist
meditation like Zen and Vipassana. This is rather strange because Yoga
traditionally defines itself as meditation, or calming the disturbances of the
mind, not as asana, which is taught merely as an aid to meditation. In the
Yoga Sutras, the classical text on Yoga, of which there are two hundred Sutras
only three deal with asana, while the great majority deal with meditation, its
theory and results. In the West we hear people talk of Yoga and meditation,
yoga meaning asana or some other outer practice like pranayama. If one
states this in India, one hears Yoga and meditation, are they two?

Unfortunately, many people who have studied Yoga in the West have learned
only the asana or posture side of the teaching, not the meditation side. Some
of them may therefore look to Buddhist teachings, like Zen or Vipassana, for
meditation practices, not realizing that there are yogic and Vedantic forms of
meditation which are traditionally not only part of the yogic system, but its core
teaching! The cause for this often resides with Yoga teachers who have not
studied the meditation side of their own tradition. Some have not been taught
it as purely asana-oriented teachers have become more popular, no doubt
owing to their appeal to the physically oriented Western mind.

There is nothing necessarily wrong with doing Yogic asanas and Buddhist
meditation but one who is claiming to be a Yoga teacher and yet does not
know the Yogic meditation tradition cannot claim to be a real Yoga teacher.
We could compare them with someone who practices a Buddhist physical
exercise system, like Buddhist martial arts, but on top of this does a non-
Buddhist meditation system, and still claims to be a teacher of Buddhism! The
real Yoga tradition has aimed at producing meditation masters, not merely
beautifully flexible bodies. Most of the Yoga System of Patanjali is concerned
with the science of meditation as concentration, meditation and Samadhi
(Dharana, Dhyana, Samadhi). In fact in the beginning of the Yoga Sutras Yoga
is defined as Samadhi or spiritual absorption.

Yoga and its related Vedantic systems include numerous types of meditation
both with form and without. These include pranayama techniques like Soham
Pranayama or the various types of Kriya Yoga (like those taught by
Yogananda), meditation on deities of all types and various devotional
approaches, every sort of mantra from simple bija mantras like Om to long
extended mantras like Gayatri, the use of yantras and other geometrical
devises, diverse concentration methods, passive meditation approaches and
active approaches like the Self-inquiry taught by Ramana Maharshi. It is a rich
meditation tradition of which the rich asana tradition is merely an aspect.
Philosophical Differences Between Hindu Yoga-Vedanta Traditions and
Buddhism

There are Buddhist refutations of the different schools of Hindu philosophy,

including Yoga and Vedanta, and a rejection of Hindu deities like Shiva and
Krishna. There are similar Yoga-Vedantic refutations of the different schools of
Buddhist philosophy, including the rejection of the omniscience of Buddha,
criticism of the Buddhist view of the mind, and so on.

Buddhist scriptures themselves, both Mahayana and Theravadin, contain

refutations of the Atman, Brahman, Ishvara, and the key tenets of Yoga and
Vedanta, which are regarded as false doctrines. Note the Lankavatara Sutra,
which is very typical in this regard. Refutation of Buddhist teachings does not
occur in Hindu scriptures, which are largely pre-Buddhist but are common in
the later literature. Many Vedantic, Sankhya and Yoga texts contain refutations
of Buddhist doctrines, particularly those of the four classical schools of
Buddhist philosophy, which are similarly regarded as untrue. Such criticism of
Buddhist teachings occur in the main commentaries on the Yoga Sutras, that
of Vyasa, and are common in Advaita or non-dualistic Vedanta.

Such critiques can be found among the works of the greatest Hindu and
Buddhist sages like Shankara of the Hindus, and Nagarjuna and Aryadeva of
the Buddhists. Relative to Yoga and Buddhism one of the most interesting
interactions was between Ishvara Krishna (not Krishna of the Bhagavad Gita)
and the Buddhist guru of Vasubandhu, the founder of the Vijnanavada school.
The debate was won by Ishvara Krishna and the record of his arguments, the
Sankhya Karika was produced, which has become the main text on Samkhya.
Vijnanavada, also called Yogachara, is the closest Buddhist school to classical
Yoga, but curiously was the Buddhist system most in conflict with it in
philosophical debates.

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have been similar, but more limited debates within each tradition, with Advaita
Vedanta critiques of other Hindu traditions like Sankhya-Yoga, or Buddhist
Madhyamika critiques of Buddhist Vijnanavada and other Buddhist traditions.
The Indian tradition cherished debate as a means of finding truth and did not
simply aim at superficial intellectual agreements. This tradition of free and
open debate is alive not only in India but in Tibet. The Indian tradition never
required intellectual uniformity but honored diversity, something we should
also remember today. While we should be open and tolerant, we need not
give up discrimination or clarity in thinking.

How Yoga and Buddhist Teachings Compare

Yoga and Buddhism are both meditation traditions devised to help us

transcend karma and rebirth and realize the truth of consciousness. They see
the suffering and impermanence inherent in all birth, whether it is animal,
human or god, and seek to alleviate it through developing a higher
awareness. Both emphasize the need to dissolve the ego, the sense of the
me and the mine, and return to the original reality that is not limited by the
separate self. Both traditions emphasize enlightenment or inner illumination to
be realized through meditation.

Both systems recognize dharma, the principle of truth or natural law, as the
basic law of the universe we must come to understand. Such dharmas are the
law of karma and the unity of all sentient beings. Buddhism defines itself as
Buddha dharma or the dharma of the enlightened ones, which is seen as a
tradition transcending time or place. Yoga defines itself as part of the Hindu
tradition called Sanatana Dharma, the universal or eternal dharma, which is
not defined according to any particular teacher or tradition. Both traditions
have called themselves Arya Dharma or the Dharma of noble men.

The main differences between the two systems are over their cosmic view and
way of practice. Vedic systems are built upon fundamental principles like the
Self (Atman), the Creator (Ishvara), and Godhead (Brahman). Buddhism
rejects all such ontological principles as mere creations of the mind itself. In
this regard Vedic systems are more idealistic and Buddhism systems more
phenomenological.

Apart from such philosophical differences both systems share the same basic
ethical values like non-violence, truthfulness, non-attachment and non-
stealing. The vows that Buddhist monks take and those that monks and
sadhus take in the Yoga tradition are the same, so are those of Jain monks.

The Absolute

Vedanta defines the absolute as a metaphysical principle Being-

Consciousness-Bliss, or Brahman in which there is perfect peace and
liberation. Buddhism does recognize an Absolute, which is non-dual and
beyond all birth and death. However, Buddhism generally does not allow it any
definition and regards it as void. It is sometimes called the Dharmakaya or
body of dharma, though Sanskrit Buddhist texts never call it Brahman.

Self and not-Self

Buddhism generally rejects the Self (Atma or Purusha) of Yoga-Vedanta and

emphasizes the non-Self (anatman). It says that there is no Self in anything
and therefore that the Self is merely a fiction of the mind. Whatever we point
out as the Self, the Buddhists state, is merely some impression, thought or
feeling, but no such homogenous entity like a Self can be found anywhere.
Buddhism has tended to lump the Self of Vedanta as another form of the ego
or the misconception that there is a Self.

The Yoga-Vedanta tradition emphasizes Self-realization or the realization of

our true nature. It states that the Self does not exist in anything external. If we
cannot find a self in anything it is no wonder, because if we did find a self in
something it would not be the self but that particular thing. We cannot point
out anything as the Self because the Self is the one who points all things out.
The Self transcends the mind-body complex, but this is not to say that it does
not exist. Without the Self we would not exist. We would not even be able to
ask questions.

Yoga-Vedanta discriminates between the Self (Atman), which is our true

nature as consciousness, and the ego (generally called Ahamkara), which is
the false identification of our true nature with the mind-body complex. The
Atman of Vedanta is not the ego but is the enlightened awareness which
transcends time and space.

However a number of Buddhist traditions, particularly traditions outside of

India, like the Chan and Zen traditions of China, have used terms like Self-
mind, ones original nature, the original nature of consciousness or ones
original face, which are similar to the Self of Vedanta.

Mind and Self

Buddhism defines reality in terms of mind and often refers to ultimate truth as
the One Mind or original nature of the mind. In Yoga, mind (manas) is
regarded as an instrument of consciousness which is the Self. It speaks of the
One Self and the many minds which are its vehicles. For it mind is not an
ultimate principle but an aspect of creation.
If we examine the terms mind and Self in the two traditions it appears that
what Yoga criticizes as attachment to the mind and ego is much like the
Buddhist criticism of the attachment to the self, while what Vedanta calls the
Supreme Self is similar to the Buddhist idea of the original nature of the Mind
or One Mind. The Self is the unborn, uncreate reality similar to what Buddhism
refers to as the transcendent aspect of Mind. The enlightened mind which
dwells within the heart of the Buddhists (Bodhicitta) resembles the Supreme
Self (Paramatman) which also dwells within the heart. Yet these similarities
aside, the formulations and methodologies of the two systems in this regard
can be quite different. Classical Indian Buddhist texts do not make such
correlations either, but insist that the Vedantic Self is different than the One
Mind of Buddhism.

God or the Creator

The yogic tradition is based upon a recognition of, respect for and devotion to
God or the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe. One of its main
principles is that of surrender to God (Ishvara-Pranidhana), which is said to be
the most direct method to Self-realization. Some degree of theism exists in the
various Yoga-Vedanta teachings, though in Advatic systems Ishvara is
subordinated to the Self-Absolute, which transcend even the Creator. This is
perhaps the main point of difference between Yoga and Buddhism. Buddhism
rejects God (Ishvara) or a cosmic lord and creator. It sees no need for any
creator and considers that living beings arise through karma alone. The Dalai
Lama recently noted that Buddha is similar to God in omniscience but is not a
creator of the universe.

Yet some modern Buddhist teachers use the term God and make it equivalent
to the Buddha-nature. There is also the figure of the Adi-Buddha or primordial
Buddha in some Buddhist traditions who resembles God. The Buddha
appears as God not in the sense of a theological entity but as the Divine
potential inherent in living beings, but is similarly looked upon as a great being
who is prayed to for forgiveness of misdeeds.

Karma and Rebirth

Both systems see karma as the main causative factor behind rebirth in the
world. However, in Buddhism karma is said to be a self-existent principle.
Buddhism states that the world exists owing to the beginningless karma of
living beings. In the Yoga tradition, however, karma is not a self-existent
principle. The world is created by God (Ishvara), the creative aspect of
consciousness. Karma as a mere force of inertia and attachment cannot
explain the creation of the world but only our attachment to it. Karma is
regarded as a force dispensed by God, which cannot exist by itself, just as a
law code cannot exist without a judge. However some other Vedic systems,
also, like Purva Mimamsa put more emphasis upon karma than upon God.

Yoga recognizes the existence of a Jiva or individual soul who is reborn.

Buddhism denies the existence of such a soul and says that rebirth is just the
continuance of a stream of karma, not any real entity.

The Figure of the Buddha

All Buddhist traditions go back to the Buddha and most emphasize studying
the life of the historical Buddha, Shakyamuni. The Vedic tradition, on the other
hand, recognizes many teachers and there is no one teacher that everyone
must follow or look back to. There is no single historical figure like the Buddha
that dominates the tradition or whom all must follow, honor or worship.
Hinduism has accepted Buddha as a great teacher but it has included him
among its stream of many other teachers, gurus and avatars.

The term Buddha itself is common in Vedic teachings, as it is a common

Sanskrit term meaning wise, awake, aware or enlightened. When Buddhism is
referred to in Hindu literature it is called Bauddha Dharma or Saugata
Dharma, as there is nothing in the term Buddha in Sanskrit that refers to a
particular person or religion. While Hindus make Buddha into an avatar, in
Buddhism Buddha cannot be an avatar because Buddhism has no God that
Buddha could manifest. If Buddha is an avatar in Buddhism it is of the
enlightened mind, not of the Creator.

Nirvana

Both systems regard Nirvana or mergence in the Absolute as a primary goal

of practice. However in the Buddhist tradition, particularly the Theravadin,
Nirvana is generally described only negatively as cessation. It is given no
positive appellations. In the Vedic tradition Nirvana is described in a positive
way as mergence into Brahman or Sacchidananda, Being-Consciousness-
Bliss, the realization of the infinite and eternal Self, called Brahma Nirvana.
Yet both systems agree that this truth transcends all concepts. Vedanta
describes Nirvana as freedom or liberation (Moksha). This term does not
occur in Buddhism which does not accept the existence of any soul that can
be liberated.
Devotion and Compassion

Yoga with its recognition of God emphasizes devotion and surrender to God
(Ishvara-pranidhana) as one of the main spiritual paths. It contains an entire
Yogic approach based on devotion, Bhakti Yoga, through which we open our
hearts to God and surrender to the Divine Will. As Buddhism does not
recognize God, devotion to God does not appear as a Buddhist path. That is
why we dont find any significant tradition of great devotees and singers of
Divine Love in Buddhism like Chaitanya, Ramakrishna, Tulsidas or Mirabai in
the Hindu tradition.

Buddhism does recognize devotion to the Buddha or faith in the Buddha-mind.

However devotion to great teachers or to functions of the enlightened mind
does not quite strike the human heart with the same significance as devotion
to the Divine Father and Mother of the Universe, the creator, preserver and
destroyer of all, which requires a recognition of God.

Buddhism has developed the role of the Bodhisattva, the enlightened one who
stays on after enlightenment to teach and guide living beings. As according to
Yoga God and all the sages merged in him are ever present to help all beings,
so there is no need for such a special Bodhisattva vow. Yoga values
compassion as an ethical principle, however, and says that we cannot realize
our true Self as long as we think that we are separate from other creatures.

Gods and Goddesses/ Buddhas and Bodhisattvas

Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, technically speaking, are not deities or Gods and
Goddesses. They are not forms of the Divine Father and Mother and have no
role in creating, preserving and destroying the universe. They are not the
parents of all creatures but merely wise guides and teachers. They are often
described as great beings who once lived and attained enlightenment at some
point in time and took various vows to stay in the world to help save living
beings.

For example perhaps the greatest Buddhist Goddess, Tara is such a

Bodhisattva, an enlightened person not the Divine Mother like Durga or Kali
of Hinduism but a great enlightened sage who has continued to exist in the
world to help living beings. She is not the Goddess or a form of God as the
universal creator but a personal expression of the enlightened mind and its
power of compassion. There are also meditation Buddhas (Dhyani Buddhas),
who represent archetypes of enlightenment.

Yet though the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are not forms of God, they can be
prayed toto provide grace and protection. For example, the Bodhisattva Tara
was thought to save those in calamities. Worship of various Bodhisattvas is
called Deity Yoga in the Tibetan tradition.

Summary

If we can equate the One Mind of the Buddhists with the One Self of Vedanta,
make Buddha and God the same and give the Buddha the power of creation
of the universe, and make other such correlations, both traditions could be
synthesized at least at a philosophical level, even though differences of
lineages and practices could continue.

I have found that many people in the West who consider themselves to be
Buddhists are really Vedantic in their view. While they accept karma and
rebirth, they also accept the existence of God as the Creator, the higher Self
and an Absolute of Pure Being. These are the Ishvara, Atman and Brahman of
Vedantic thought, which classical Buddhism does not directly accept.

Choosing a Path

There are a number of people in the West today, and even in India, who are
combining Yoga and Buddhism, as well as less related traditions. Some
people may try to follow gurus in both traditions (sometimes without the
approval of the teachers). Of course, teachings which are common to both
traditions like non-violence are obviously easy to correlate.

It is also quite easy for Buddhists to use Yoga asanas or pranayama, the outer
aspects of Yoga teachings into their practice. It may be difficult to meditate
upon the Supreme Self of Vedanta, while meditating upon the non-Self of
Buddhism. The Buddhist approach requires doubting that there is any self at
all. The Vedantic approach requires complete faith in the Self and merging
everything into it. Above all it is hard to maintain certain devotional
approaches in a Buddhist context where there is no real God or Creator.

Generally, gurus either within Vedic or Buddhist traditions require that their
disciples emphasize their particular teachings. In this regard, they may not
accept their followers combining teachings and practices from other gurus and
traditions, particularly those of different orientations. In this eclectic age, many
people do some synthetic experimentation combining different spiritual paths
and teachings according to their inclinations or inspirations. This is bound to
continue and may prove fruitful in some instances, particularly when one is
still searching out ones path. Yet it frequently gets people lost or confused,
trying to mix teachings together they do not really understand.

Jumping back and forth between teachers and traditions may prevent us from
getting anywhere with any of them. Superficial synthesis, which is largely a
mental exercise, is no substitute for deep practice that requires dedicated
concentration. The goal is not to combine the paths but to reach to the goal,
which requires taking a true path out to the end. While there maybe many
paths up to the top of a mountain, one will not climb far cross-crossing
between paths. Above all it is not for students on the path to try to combine
paths. It is for the masters, the great lineage bearers in the traditions, to do so,
if this is necessary.

Honoring All Paths: Following Our True Path

Today we are entering into a global age that requires the development of a
global spirituality. This requires honoring all forms of the inner quest
regardless of where and when they come from, even if our own inclinations
are different. The unity of truth cuts across all boundaries and breaks down all
divisions between human beings. It is crucial that such meditation traditions as
Yoga and Buddhism form a common front in light of the needs of the global
era. All such true spiritual traditions face many common enemies in this
materialistic age. Their common values of protecting the earth, non-violence,
recognition of the law of karma, and the practice of meditation are perhaps the
crucial voice to deliver us out of our present crisis.

But in coming together the diversity of teachings should be preserved, which

means not only recognizing their unity but respecting their differences. This is
the same issue as that of different cultures. While we should recognize the
unity of humanity, we should allow various cultures to preserve their unique
forms, and not simply throw them all into one big melting pot, in which all their
distinctions are lost.

True unity is universality that fosters a creative multiplicity, not a uniformity

that reduces everything to a stereotype. Truth is not only One but Infinite and
cannot be reduced to any final forms. Pluralism is also true as each individual
is unique and we should have a broad enough view to allow others to have
contrary opinions. As the Vedic Rishis stated, That which is the One Truth the
seers teach in diverse ways. This is to accommodate all the different types
and levels of souls.

While we should honor all paths, we do need to follow a single path to the
goal. Hopefully, that path will be broad, but every path must have some
guidelines and not every path will work for everyone.

What is the difference between Dvaita, Advaita and Visishtadvaita ...

Very simply stated, the difference lies in the definition and nature of Reality as understood by ...
Advaita: Reality - Any entity which is finite, temporal or can be defined using .... According to
Vishishtadvaita the individual souls are different from ..
Very simply stated, the difference lies in the definition and nature of Reality as understood by each of
these schools.

Ever since the Vedas and Puranas, self-realization has been a fundamental concept in Hindu
scriptures. The differences in the interpretation and understanding of Reality, 'I' and the means to
Real-I-zation are central to the distinction between these schools of philosophy, that formed around
the concepts purported by these scriptures. Without going into the history of how these schools came
into being (which is quite interesting in itself), here's a summary of differences:
Advaita:
Reality - Any entity which is finite, temporal or can be defined using attributes is treated as unreal
and the spirit (aatman) is supposed to be the only real entity. The spirit is attribute-less and infinite
by definition. Any entity outside the realm of the spirit is Maya (unreal, finite, temporal and illusory).

I - Consists of the spirit together with a finite material triad of body, mind and intellect. And since
the triad is finite and unreal, one must identify the 'I' with the spirit and not with the body/mind or
intellect.

The means to realization - Is to understand this real nature of the spirit and the unreal nature of
the material-world. With practice (yoga) and consciousness, the goal of life should be to become one
with this reality of Brahman/Aatman. Such a person is supposed to be jivanmukta or liberated from
the cycles of birth and death.

As you can see, this is a very binary view of reality. Things are either real or unreal. If you can
experience reality and be one with it, you are liberated, else you are under bondage. While the school
does believe in worship of God, the conceptualization of God is primarily an abstraction created to
act as a North Star to help imagine and understand the otherwise inconceivable, attribute-less,
infinite spirit. Hence, ritualistic worship and discussions on the superiority of one God over another
are generally considered redundant.
As mentioned on the cover of this book, the swan (hansa in Sanskrit) is one of the most perfect
metaphors used to describe the Advaita view of life:
The greatest masters in the advaita tradition are called paramahamsas - the great swans. The
word hamsa is a variation of so'ham: I am He, which constitutes the highest realization. There are
other equivalences between the swan and the advaitin, that make the swan a particularly apt
symbol for advaita vedAnta. The swan stays in water, but its feathers remain dry. Similarly, the
advaitin lives in the world, yet strives to remain unaffected by life's ups and downs. In India, the
swan is also mythically credited with the ability to separate milk from water. Similarly, the
advaitin discriminates the eternal Atman from the non-eternal world. The Atman that is brahman
is immanent in the world, just like milk is seemingly inseparably mixed with water, but It can
never be truly realized without the nitya-anitya-vastu viveka - right discrimination between the
eternal and ephemeral - that is essential for the advaitin. The swan is thus a symbol for the
jIvanmukta, who is liberated while still alive in this world, by virtue of having realized Brahman.
[1]

Dvaita:
Reality - The dvaita philosophy classifies reality into three parts, each different from the other.
These are - sentient entities, insentient entities and God or the Supreme entity. Each of these is
considered to be real. While some may be temporary and others eternal, they are each still very real.
Each sentient entity is supposed to be different from another and so is each insentient entity from
another insentient entity. The five types of differences are shown below:
I - is supposed to be the insentient body containing a sentient soul, which is different from the ever-
powerful Supreme God, from other insentient objects and from other souls. There is a gradation of
souls in the world. A soul's grade or level is determined by the free-will and actions of the sentient
being that the soul resides in. The process of action and reaction that results in an increase or
decrease in grade is karma.

The means to realization - is to understand and experience this reality in its fullness and analyze
and understand these five types of differences between real entities. Realization is attained and
liberation is achieved, when by yoga and actions the soul is able to purify itself and be one with God
and God accepts the soul in It's abode. Liberation achieves freedom from birth and death but even in
the heavenly abode the gradation of souls still persists.

Since the Dvaita school believes in purification of the soul by actions and treats God as a distinct real
entity, the means to attain realization are more akin to Karma Yoga (the path of action) or Bhakti
Yoga (the path of devotional service) as opposed to Jnana yoga (the path of knowledge / meditation)
which is more in tune with the Advaita school. While Dvaita emphasizes the differences and plurality
among entities and lays downs a gradation and heiarchy, Advaita emphasizes the unity in all reality.

Visishtadvaita:
The school recognizes the distinction of entities as proposed by the Dvaita school. However, it also
believes that these entities (including the sentient and insentient ones) are nothing but different
modes of Brahman (the one true reality). This is explained by the following metaphor:

The notion of unity may be illustrated by the example, A purple robe. Here purpleness is quite
different from robe. The latter is a substance while the former is an attribute. This integral and
 essential relation is not found in the case of a man wearing a wrist-watch. If the former relation is
inseparable (apthaksiddhi), the latter is separable and external. A word signifying attribute does
not stop after denoting the usual meaning, but extends till it reaches the substantive. This is the
true significance of an attribute. The individual selves and the world constitute the body of
Brahman who is their inner self. Brahman is the integral principle without whom neither the self
nor the world can exist. Hence all names finally denote him.[2]

The school therefore upholds both unity and plurality at the same time:

We uphold unity because Brahman alone exists with all other entities as his modes. We uphold both
unity and plurality, as the one Brahman himself has all the physical and spiritual entities as his
modes and thus exists qualified by a plurality. We uphold plurality as the three entities the
individual selves, the world and the supreme Lord are mutually distinct in their substantive
nature and attributes and there is no mutual transposition of their characteristics [2]

[1] - The Advaita Vednta Home Page

[2] - Vedarthasangraha of Sri Ramanujacharya
34.2k Views View Upvotes
Related QuestionsMore Answers Below

Among Advaita, Dvaaita and Visishtadvaita school of thoughts of Hinduisim which is

more relevant and suitable to our current time?

How is Vishitadvaita different from pure Advaita?

What are the differences between Advaita and Achintya Bheda Abheda?

How has Hinduism stayed alive?

Doesn't the concept of Maya makes Advaita, Dvaita? If not then why? If it is then
Advaita is doomed from it's own Base?

Vamsi Emani, thinker.

Updated Oct 22, 2014
"I am a weakling. I have no will of my own. All actions are His'. God is my guardian and protector.
I worship him with love and devotion. for, I am his humble servant." ~Dwaita

"There are no two. There is only One. I am not the body. I am not the mind. I am the Self. Aham
Brahmasmi. I am that transcendental consciousness (nirguna parabrahman - without
attributes) that stands as the basis for all creation (maya) yet beyond everything that is
created." ~Adwaita

"God is the indweller of my heart. I worship the Saguna Brahman (God with attributes) that
pervades everything as the spirit. Brahman although independent and absolute, is everything
(creation included). I am the spirit/soul/self whose existence is dependent on the universal spirit
(Vishnu)." ~Vishistadwaita
In Dwaita, one sees oneself as a separate entity from God. In this school of philosophy, one is
exclusively devoted to a personal God.

In Adwaita, emphasis is laid on transcendental God as pure consciousness. It has more to do with the
subjective nature of God. All that is objective i.e the creation is discarded as Maya or as an illusion, in
spite of the fact that Maya also owes its existence to brahman.

Vishistadwaita, emphasis on the fact that individual soul is part and parcel of the super soul. Being a
part of the super soul does not mean that the supersoul and the individual soul are exactly the same.

Though these three schools are exclusively classified into categories, they lead to the same end goal
of "Self" realization.
18.4k Views View Upvotes

Karthik Rao,
Written Dec 27, 2013
Tattvavada (dvaita): The term dvaita is not technically the right word for the philosophy though it
popularly applied to the philosophy that is called Tattvavada which Madhvacharya himself prefers to
use. Summarily Tattvavada can be considered as the realist-theist school of thought which begins
with the acceptance that the world we perceive and experience is real and diverse, each individual
soul is unique, and Bhagavan/brahman is the only self-dependent sat(existence)-
chit(consciousness)-aananda(bliss) being. Since bhagavan is inherently omnipotent He does not
have to resort to trickery/illusion to misguide souls instead creation ensues in order for the souls to
realize their inherent uniqueness and because the creation is real so are the sadhana (spiritual
practices) real nevertheless dependent on bhagavan in every way. Tattvavada emphasizes that the
entire corpus of vedas are coherent and each and every verse is equally important in learning about
the self and bhagavan with no contradictions and therefore no verse superseding any other verse.
Each & any verse of veda therefore provide authentic, bonafide, and accurate knowledge about
ultimate truth. Bhakti based on the authentic knowledge with complete vairagya (equanimity) is the
path to moksha (liberation) which again is unique to each individual. Even after attaining liberation
individual souls continue bhakti and continue to be unique because that is a natural state and
therefore bhakti for liberation is not a trade agreement but bhakti refers to being in a natural state of
the soul where moksha is but one of the fruits which some bhaktas even regard with contempt.
Advaita: Advaita begins with the negation of creation's existence as an illusion or maya and
therefore mithya (unreal) and hence advaita is also referred to as mayavada. Advaita considers
individual souls are actually brahman (ultimate truth of sat-chit-aananda state) without any qualities
or attributes but being under the influence of maya, which is not real, the soul considers itself to be
with all the attributes generally perceived and experienced in the world. Since the brahman is
indescribable and without attributes, all forms and names for brahman are contrived truths which
subside upon kaivalya (moksha sans any attributes). Only those veda verses that appear to describe
such qualities are paramarthika (superseding & essential) verses and the remaining are vyavaharika
(transactional & subservient) verses and therefore vedas cannot be fully relied upon. Eventually, only
four verses known as mahavakyas are considered and are usually quoted out of context excluding the
preceding and subsequent portion of the verse. Moksha is attaining the realization that the world is
unreal. However it can be argued that the concept of moksha is untenable in this philosophical
approach as that from which moksha is to be attained does not exist - mithya - in the first place.
Vishishtadvaita: Vishishtadvaita rejects the theory of advaita that world is not real. According to
Vishishtadvaita the individual souls are different from bhagavan/brahman with the relationship of
amsha(dependent portions)-amshi (independent whole). Vedas are coherent and need only be
interpreted accurately so as to understand the import of apparently contradictory verses. Moksha is
attainment of brahman through bhakti and prapatti. Upon attainment of moksha individual souls
attain all auspicious attributes and all mukta (liberated) souls attain oneness.

In practice these differences have huge implications both in terms of sadhana and attainment of
ultimate goal. For instance, if atma is brahman how did maya overpower or if the atma chose to enter
maya why could atma not discern before doing so. Even if considering maya as anaadi (beginning
less) the fact that atman is under the influence of maya suffices that even after moksha there can be a
possibility of such subjugation. If there is no difference between individual souls and they are all
equally brahman then attainment of moksha by only one atman necessitates that all atmans attain
moksha or as a corollary no soul has hitherto attained moksha as defined by Advaita. Considering the
world unreal also by implication means any sadhana toward attainment of moksha is unreal. If all
souls are considered to become equal after moksha (Vishishtadvaita) what is the significance of
various types of sadhana that are recommended in the vedas.

These differences are primarily from a philosophical point of view, with deeper analysis you will find
that the entire outlook changes with respect to each and every aspect of spiritual practice and
everyday perspective of life.

9.3k Views View Upvotes

Rama Pokkunuri, I've read a good amount of Advaitic Literature.

Written Apr 20, 2016

All of the world's knowledge usually surrounds three things:

1. World (including non-living entities; referred to as Jagat in the whole; Jada in part)
2. Living entities (Jiva)
3. God (Iswara)
Every religion tries to answer the relationship between them. Most religions simply assume or
explicitly state as an axiom that these three are different. Vedanta and Bouddha (Buddhism) argue a
great deal about these.

Advaita comes across as obvious to some. It says that - essentially Jagat, Jiva and Iswara are the
same. Due to an illusion (Maya), they appear to be different. Once you get over the illusion, you will
realize all that exists is - consciousness (Brahman). Ultimately, God does not have a form - because
form is perceived due to one's ignorance (avidyaa). But, in the process of realizing God, one can
worship in whatever form inspires. Here, world is in the beholder's mind. When mind dissolves, the
world ceases to exist for the (once) beholder.
Visishtadvaita also says that Jiva, Jagat and Iswara are one - but in a different way: Jagat and Jiva
are parts of Iswara i.e. Iswara is bigger entity that subsumes everything else. There are
some technicalities in using the words Iswara and Brahman. By devotion, one realizes God and
constantly stays in union with Him.

Dvaita is the most obvious to non-Indian religions. It says that these three are completely different
and real things. In fact, it explicitly states that there is difference between each of: Jiva-Iswara;
Jagat-Iswara; 2 Jivas; Jiva-Jada; 2 Jadas. Brahman is identified with Iswara. Atman is identified
with Jiva. See this for more details. Here, God is of infinite attributes. All the worlds (heaven, hell
etc.) are real and souls travel through them. Like Visishtadvaita, by devotion, one could realize God.

Of course, these are just the superficial differences. If you go deeper, there will be a lot more
differences. There are books running into hundreds of pages about them.

Vedic tradition has 6 major theistic darshanas (views). Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Purva
Mimamsa and Uttara Mimamsa (aka Vedanta). Advaita, Visishtadvaita and Dvaita are approaches
within Vedanta. Note that there are several other lesser known approaches within Vedanta (Achintya
Bhedabheda, Dvaitadvaita, Suddhadvaita etc.)

In the spectrum of spirituality, Buddhism and Advaita are to the left-most i.e. all differences are an
illusion - we are all one; Visishtadvaita is centrist i.e. some major differences exist - we are all part of
one environment; Dvaita is right-most i.e. all differences are real and important - we belong to
various levels.
3.3k Views View Upvotes

Jirka Hrbek
Written Aug 4, 2015
Ramana Maharshi about this topic...

Dvaita>>
...Dvaita can subsist only when you identify the Self with the not-Self. Advaita is non-identification.

Vaishnavism>>
...They hold that they must exist and God must exist, but how is that possible? It seems that they
must all remain for ever doing service in Vaikunta, but how many of them are to do service and
where would there be room for all these Vaishnavites?
Bhagavan said this laughing, and then, after a pause, he added, On the other hand, Advaita does not
mean that a man must always sit in samadhi and never engage in action. Many things are necessary
to keep up the life of the body, and action can never be avoided. Nor is bhakti ruled out in Advaita.
Shankara is rightly regarded as the foremost exponent of Advaita, and yet look at the number of
shrines he visited (action), and the devotional songs he wrote.
...
Absolute truth>>
It is as it is. Dvaita and advaita are relative terms. They are based on a sense of duality. There is
actually neither dvaita nor advaita.
4.1k Views View Upvotes

Stefan Pecho, Hinduism is not my intellectual hobby but a part of my life experience.
Written Oct 27, 2014
Any answer in a form of a definition quoted from the scriptures is not an answer but a quotation.
Lets try to use plain everyday language to answer the question.

The issue is about different treating of the relation / interaction between human being and
phenomenon called god.

Dvaita: I know that there is a phenomenon of god. I can think about him and worship him.

Visishtadvaita: I know that I could be in direct live interaction with god. I do somethin which I
presuppose could help me interacting with god.

Advaita: I know that I am god. I was never departed form him.

That is the substance behind the question.

5.8k Views View Upvotes

Pradip Gangopadhyay, lives in India

Written Apr 26, 2015
Advaita says, 'Atman or Jiva=Brahman=one without a second'.
Universe is mithya, i.e., true as a phenomena but not real from the point of view of Brahman.

Visishtadvaita says, 'Jivas+Universe+Narayana=1'.

Universe is not mithya but real.

Dvaita says, 'Jivas+Vishnu=2'.

Universe is not mithya but real.
3.6k Views View Upvotes Answer requested by Suresh Sukumaran

Ambarish, Student of the Vedanta...

Written May 27, 2016
My answer will be mainly focusing on difference between Dvaita and Advaita philosophies. For
Dvaita reference, I will use Bhagavad Gita as it is by Prabhupada and Bhagavad Gita by A.
Parthasarathy as Advaita reference.

Bhagavad Gita Chapter 02 verse 12 onwards, there is a part about Atman in advaita and Jiva (soul) in
Dvaita and if we compare the 2 interpretations, many things get clear about both these schools of
thought.

Chapter 2, Verse 12 :

Dvaita says: The Lord says clearly that He Himself, Arjuna and all the kings who are
assembled on the battlefield are eternally individual beings and that the
Lord is eternally the maintainer of the individual living entities.
Advaita interprets it as the same Brahman is all pervading and exist at all periods of
time
Chapter 2, Verse 13

Dvaita says: As the embodied soul continuously passes, in this body, from boyhood to
youth to old age, the soul similarly passes into another body at death. A sober
person is not bewildered by such a change.
Advaita says: The Atman or self is all pervading but the embodied (not soul) subtle
body constituting mind and intellect moves into another body. As Atman is pervading
all universe, it acts as a medium for the subtle body transfer.
Chapter 2, Verse 17

Dvaita says: That which pervades the entire body you should know to be
indestructible. No one is able to destroy that imperishable soul. The consciousness
pervade all body as every part of the body is Chetan.
Advaita says the Brahman pervades entire universe. The Sarvam here is everything in
the universe as well as everything in our waking, dream and deep sleep states.
Chapter 2, Verse 24

Dvaita opinion is very interesting here: All these qualifications (everlasting, present
everywhere, unchangeable, immovable and eternally same) of the atomic
soul definitely prove that the individual soul is eternally the atomic particle of the spirit
whole, and he remains the same atom eternally, without change. They (atomic souls)
live on the land, in the water, in the air, within the earth and even within fire. The belief
that they are sterilized in fire is not acceptable, because it is clearly stated here that the
soul cannot be burned by fire. Therefore, there is no doubt that there are living entities
also in the sun planet with suitable bodies to live there.
Advaita says, the Brahman or the substratum on which this universe is built is all
pervading. Like space pervades entire universe, Brahman also pervades entire universe
and it is subtler than space.
I personally find Advaita opinion more correct. And wherever there is this conflict, Dvaita becomes
so sure and emphatically exclaims its opinions. (see the italic words)

Practically, Dvaita is for devotional people who cannot imagine themselves to be same as the God.
They see odds in the Advaita opinion. But Advaita also accommodates the Dvaita opinion by saying
they are eventually worshiping that same Brahman as nothing is beyond it.
1.9k Views

Chandra Ravikumar
Written Sep 30, 2015
The following are the explanations of Adhvaitha, Visishtadhvaitha, and Dvaitha, from Swami
Sivananda's "Lives of Saints"

1. Shankarachaarya and Advaita.

Sankaras supreme Brahman is Nirguna (without the Gunas), Nirakara (formless), Nirvisesha
(without attributes) and Akarta (non-agent). He is above all needs and desires. Sankara says, "This
Atman is self-evident. This Atman or Self is not established by proofs of the existence of the Self. It is
not possible to deny this Atman, for it is the very essence of he who denies it. The Atman is the basis
of all kinds of knowledge. The Self is within, the Self is without, the Self is before and the Self is
behind. The Self is on the right hand, the Self is on the left, the Self is above and the Self is below".

Satyam-Jnanam-Anantam-Anandam are not separate attributes. They form the very essence of
Brahman. Brahman cannot be described, because description implies distinction. Brahman cannot
be distinguished from any other than He.

The objective world-the world of names and forms-has no independent existence. The Atman alone
has real existence. The world is only Vyavaharika or phenomenal.

Sankara was the exponent of the Kevala Advaita philosophy. His teachings can be summed up in the
following words:

Brahma Satyam Jagat Mithya,

Jeevo Brahmaiva Na Aparah

Brahman alone is real, this world is unreal; the Jiva is identical with Brahman.

Sankara preached Vivarta Vada. Just as the snake is superimposed on the rope, this world and this
body are superimposed on Brahman or the Supreme Self. If you get a knowledge of the rope, the
illusion of the snake will vanish. Even so, if you get a knowledge of Brahman, the illusion of the body
and the world will vanish.

2. Ramanujacharya and Visishtadvaita

Ramanuja was the exponent of the Visishtadvaita philosophy or qualified non-dualism. Ramanuja's
Brahman is Sa-visesha Brahman, i.e., Brahman with attributes. According to Ramanuja's teachings,
Lord Narayana or Bhagavan is the Supreme Being; the individual soul is Chit; matter is Achit.
Ramanuja regards the attributes as real and permanent, but subject to the control of Brahman. The
attributes are called Prakaras or modes. Lord Narayana is the Ruler and Lord of the universe. The
Jiva is His servant and worshipper. The Jiva should completely surrender himself to the Lord. The
oneness of God is quite consistent with the existence of attributes, as the attributes or Shaktis
depend upon God for their existence.

3. Madhvaacharya and Dvaita

Madhvacharya is the great exponent of the Dvaita school of philosophy. His Vaishnavism is called
Sad-Vaishnavism in order to distinguish it from the Sri-Vaishnavism of Ramanujacharya. According
to his philosophy, the Supreme Being is Vishnu or Narayana. Every follower of the Madhva school
should have a firm belief in the Pancha-bhedafive real and eternal distinctionsviz., the distinction
between the Supreme Being and the individual soul, between spirit and matter, between one Jiva
and another Jiva, between the Jiva and matter, between one piece of matter and another. The
phenomenal world is real and eternal. The worship of Vishnu consists in (i) Ankana, marking the
body with His symbols, (ii) Namakarana, giving the names of the Lord to children and (iii) Bhajana,
singing His glories. Madhva laid much stress on constant practice of the remembrance of God
(Smarana). He says, "Form a strong habit of remembering God. Then only it will be easy for you to
remember Him at the moment of death". Madhva pointed out that when the Lord incarnated, no
Prakrita Deha or material body was put on by Him. He prescribed a rigorous kind of fasting to his
followers.

Renunciation, devotion and direct cognition of the Lord through meditation lead to the attainment of
salvation. The aspirant should equip himself with the study of the Vedas, control of the senses,
dispassion and perfect self-surrender, if he wants to have the vision of the Lord. These are some of
the important teachings of Madhvacharya, the renowned exponent of the dualistic school of
philosophy.
2.5k Views View Upvotes
Sriharish Padmanabhan, studied at Guru Nanak College, Velachery, Chennai
Written Jan 17, 2015
Any abrahamic religion (in a sense) will loosely fit into vishistadvaitham. Primarily because it
acknowledges the need for a guru to help you reach your ultimate destination : Vaikundam (as
believed by the vaishnavites.) Although some advaitis also believe in Narayana,the rest may reject
the notion.

The azhagusinger of Ahobila madam plays a similar role in the life of vadakalai iyengars
(community,Iyengar,Brahmin) as say the Christ plays in the life of christians or Mohammad in the
case of muslims. Except that he is not believed to be a prophet, but a well educated individual in
Vaishnavism.

It is such a diverse,democratic religion that virtually any world philosophy can be easily
accommodated under hinduism. This is believed to be the real reason why India has completely
embraced any religion thrown at her and shall continue to do so.

Jai Hindh.
4k Views View Upvotes

Duraiswamy Vaidyanathan Chandrasekar, lives in India

Written Oct 22, 2014
Simply put Advaita says that you and the world (and the cosmos) are not separate but only appears
to be so. Visishtadvaita says that you are part and parcel of this world but you are different from it.
Dvaita says you and the world are different ( for which one does not need a philosophy as you already
experience it!). Equate the word world mentioned above to God.
3.3k Views View Upvotes

Anonymous
Written May 6, 2015
Hi Vamsi,

There are not much difference in all these so called philosophies... These are truths to be experienced
than mere understanding which leads to lots of confusion... Mere Intellectual Understanding does
not help in any way.
In Yoga Sadhana these are experienced during the stages of Samadhi as posted...
In Savikalpa Samadhi - One Experiences Dvaita (Duality)
In Nirvikalpa Samadhi - One Experiences Advaita (Unity)
In Paripoorna Samashi - One Experiences Visishtadvaita (Unity in Diversity)
Beyond these known stages of Samadhi one experiences "Datta Samanvaya Advaita" (Unity in One
divergent looking manifested Consciousness)
2.5k Views View Upvotes
Ayhtin Evoli
Written Sep 21, 2015
Guess all those who think there are only 3 schools of thought are , I guess have been reading Tinkle.
There are 21 different schools of thought ,some based on AmNayas and some aren't (I.e boudha
matha). One has to apply oneself and go deep into the thoughts/ works before making statement...
surface level comparison wouldn't help. It's definitely not poetry like what westerners think it to be.
When you dispassionately go through all of them and use your" bhuddi", you clearly understand and
appreciate that "Tatvavaada" has answered all your questions and beyond.Just try it once and you
will never be disappointed.As the saying goes"Na MaDhava samO Devo... NaCha MaDhva samO
Guruhu..NaThad vAkyam samam sHastram..NaCha tasya Samah PumAn".

"Advaita" literally means "not two", and is often called a monistic or ... Theydiffer passionately
with Advaita, and believe that his nirguna Brahman is not ... will show that it is in some ways
metaphysically similar as Brahman.
Advaita, Dvaita and Vishishtadvaita

"Advaita" literally means "not two", and is often called amonistic or non-dualistic
system which essentially refers to the indivisibility of the Self (Atman) from the
Whole (Brahman). The key texts from which all Vedanta (literally, "end or the goal of
the Vedas") texts draw are theUpanishads (twelve or thirteen in particular), which
are usually at the end of the Vedas, and the Brahma Sutras (also known as Vedanta
Sutras), which in turn discuss the essence of theUpanishads.
Adi Shankara's thoughts in a summary
Adi Shankara's treatises on the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita and the Brahma
Sutras are his principal and almost undeniably his own works. Although he mostly
adhered to traditional means of commenting on the Brahma Sutra, there are a
number of original ideas and arguments. He taught that it was only through
knowledge and wisdom of nonduality that one could be enlightened.
Shankara's opponents accused him of teaching Buddhism in the garb of Hinduism,
because his non-dualistic ideals were a bit radical to contemporary Hindu
philosophy. However, it may be noted that while the Later Buddhists arrived at a
changeless, deathless, absolute truth after their insightful understanding of the
unreality of samsara, historically Vedantins never liked this idea. Although Advaita
also proposes the theory of Maya, explaining the universe as a "trick of a magician",
Shankara and his followers see this as a consequence of their basic premise
thatBrahman is real. Their idea of Maya emerges from their belief in the reality of
Brahman, rather than the other way around.
Shankara was a peripatetic orthodox Hindu monk who traveled the length and
breadth of India. The more enthusiastic followers of the Advaita tradition claim that
he was chiefly responsible for "driving the Buddhists away". Historically the decline
of Buddhism in India is known to have taken place long after Shankara or
evenKumarila Bhatta (who according to a legend had "driven the Buddhists away"
by defeating them in debates), sometime before the Muslim invasion
into Afghanistan(earlier Gandhara).
Although today's most enthusiastic followers of Advaita believe Shankara argued
against Buddhists in person, a historical source, the Madhaviya Shankara Vijayam,
indicates that Shankara sought debates
with Mimamsa, Samkhya, Nyaya,Vaisheshika and Yoga scholars as keenly as with
any Buddhists. In fact his arguments against the Buddhists are quite mild in
the Upanishad Bhashyas, while they border on the acrimonious in the Brahma Sutra
Bhashya.
The Vishistadvaita and Dvaita schools believed in an ultimately saguna Brahman.
They differ passionately with Advaita, and believe that his nirguna Brahman is not
different from the Buddhist Sunyata (wholeness or zeroness) much to the dismay
of the Advaita school. A careful study of the Buddhist Sunyata will show that it is in
some ways metaphysically similar as Brahman. Whether Shankara agrees with the
Buddhists is not very clear from his commentaries on the Upanishads. His
arguments against Buddhism in the Brahma Sutra Bhashyas are more a
representation of Vedantic traditional debate with Buddhists than a true
representation of his own individual belief. (See link: Shankara's arguments against
Buddhism)
Dvaita, a school ofVedanta (the most widespread Hinduphilosophy) founded by Shri
Madhvacharya, stresses a strict distinction between God and souls. According to
Madhva, souls are not created by God but depend on Him to evolve or
transform.Satguru Sivaya Subramuniyaswami explainsdualism in his book, Dancing
with Siva, by stating that in dualism, God is seen as the efficient cause of
theuniverse and not as the material cause. He is the potter causing the clay to
emerge, rather than serving as the source of the clay itself.
Dvaita philosophy
Like Ramanuja Shri Madhvacharya espoused a Vaishnava theology that understands Brahman to be endowed with
attributes and a personal God, Vishnu. ByBrahman, he referred to Vishnu, as per his statement (brahmashabdashcha
vishhnaveva) that Brahman can only refer to Vishnu. Madhva states that Vishnu is not just any other deity, but is rather the
singular, all-important and supreme one.Vishnu is always the primary object of worship, and all others are regarded as
subordinate to Him. The deities and other sentient beings are graded among themselves, with Vayu, the god of life, being
the highest, and Vishnu is eternally above them.
Dvaita, or Dualistic philosophy, also known as Bheda-vda, Tattva-vda, and Bimba-pratibimba-vda, is the doctrine
propounded by Ananda Trtha (also known as Madhvacharya) that asserts that the difference between the individual soul or
jva, and God,(shvara or Vishnu), is eternal and real. Actually, this is just one of the five differences that are so stated -- all
five differences that constitute the universe are eternal.
The Dvaita doctrine was summarized by Vyasa Tirtha as comprising nine tenets or prameyas.
Vishisthadvaita is a qualified monismin which God alone exists but admits plurality.
By holding such beliefs, Vishisthadvaita is midway between Advaita and Dvaita. The
book, "All about Hinduism" bySwami Sivananda discusses aspects of
Vishisthadvaita, a theological school whose most important proponent
was Ramanuja.
The Philosophy
In more specific terms Vishishtadvaita conclusions may be briefly summarised as
below.
The Absolute Supreme Reality referred to as Brahman, is a Transcendent Personality
with infinite superlative qualities. He is Lord Vishnu, also known as Narayana. He
creates the other two members of the Trimurti, namely, Creator Brahma and Shiva,
the Lord of Deluge.
Narayana is the Absolute God. The Soul and the Universe are only parts of this
Absolute and hence, Vishishtadvaita is panentheistic. The relationship of God to the
Soul and the Universe is like the relationship of the Soul of Man to the body of Man.
Individual souls are only parts of Brahman. God, Soul and Universe together form an
inseparable unity which is one and has no second. This is the non-duality part.
Matter and Souls inhere in that Ultimate Reality as attributes to a substance. This is
the qualification part of the non-duality.
Souls and Matter are only the body of God. Creation is a real act of God. It is the
expansion of intelligence. Matter is fundamentally real and undergoes real
revelation. The Soul is a higher mode than Matter, because it is conscious. It is also
eternally real and eternally distinct. Final release, that comes, by the Lord's Grace,
after the death of the body is a Communion with God. This philosophy believes in
liberation through one's Karmas (actions) in accordiance with the Vedas,
the Varna (caste or class) system and the four Ashramas (stages of life), along with
intense devotion to Vishnu. Individual Souls retain their separate identities even
after moksha. They live in Fellowship with God either serving Him or meditating on
Him. The philosophy of this school is SriVaishnavism, a branch of Vaishnavism.
The succession of great Master-Expositors and spiritual giants of Vishishtadvaita
school starts with the twelve Alwars, who left behind an imperishable legacy
of Tamildevotional poetry in the form of 4000 songs, now called the
Teachings of the Samaya Srividya Tradition and the Himalayan .
The 3 Streams of the Himalayan Lineage: Yoga, Advaita, Samaya Srividya ... The
Himalayan Lineage is one in a family of lineages that share similar qualities and ...
The lineage of the Himalayan masters, emphasizes this higher Tantra Yoga. ....
playlist has many clips on different topics, such as Samaya Srividya, Chakras, .
Teachings of the Samaya Srividya Tradition and the Himalayan Lineage

The 3 Streams of the Himalayan Lineage: Yoga, Advaita, Samaya Srividya

The teachings of the Samaya Srividya Tradition and Himalayan Lineage as taught by
Swami Rama are explained.

The teachings are handed down from Master to student, who then in turn becomes
a teacher. Our lineage is known as the Himalayan lineage and is said to be older
than 6000 years. The Himalayan Lineage is an unbroken lineage dating back to
legendary teachers such as the great sages Dattatreya and Vasishtha and historical
masters such as Adi Shankara and Swami Rama.

The Himalayan Lineage is one in a family of lineages that share similar qualities and
whose lineages also trace back to these legendary sages. This family of lineages
together is called Sampradaya. Sampradaya translates as tradition. Since our
tradition is the custodian of the teachings of Samaya Srividya, it is the Samaya
Srividya Tradition.

Samaya means "One with the Divine Mother". Srividya means auspicious wisdom.
Samaya Srividya is a privileged option for those who have reached an advanced
stage in the cycle of death and rebirth and seek to end this cycle and attain
enlightenment in this lifetime.

There are three stages of initiation given according to the Himalayan Lineage of the
Samaya Srividya Tradition.

Mantra, breath awareness and meditation

Inner worship of Srividya and Bindu vedhan or piercing the pearl of wisdom
Shaktipata and leading the force of kundalini to the thousand petalled lotus called
Sahasrara chakra.
The Teachings of the Himalayan Lineage

The teachings of our lineage are based on the 3 streams of:

Yoga
Advaita
Samaya Srividya Tantra

Yoga
In the Himalayan Lineage of Samaya Srividya, Yoga as explained by Patanjali, is a
preliminary step. Samkhya philosophy forms the basis of the first stream of our
lineage and tradition.

Yoga focuses on discriminating between consciousness and matter at all levels. This
stage of practice is dualistic.

In our tradition and lineage, theory and practice must never be divorced from one
another. Yoga provides a step by step approach to the highest goal of spiritual
liberation. Yoga, in its pure and pristine form, is a method of unlearning behavioural
and thinking patterns. It presupposes spiritual insights or mystical experiences.

The emphasis is not on mere information or knowledge but wisdom. The focus in not
on intellectual gymnastics but intuition. Yoga, practiced the traditional way, has
nothing in common with the modern schools of yoga that are merely forms of
gymnastics and acrobatics. It also has little to do with institutes of therapy or new
age esotericism.

Advaita

The second stream of Advaita is expressed in the Upanishads. The Upanishads are
estimated to have been written in the period from the fifth to tenth centuries BCE,
although the principles had been taught orally for a very long period prior to that;
some say since around 6000 BCE.

The prefix "A" means "non", the word "dvaita" means "two". Thus the word Advaita
means "not two". Advaita is a non-dualistic philosophy of life. This non-dualistic
approach to life, goes beyond all dualities such as joy and sorrow, birth and death,
young and old, embracing all of life as the One Divinity. It removes all separation
between Knower and Known, between God and Devotee, between the Beloved and
the Lover.

This mystical approach is far from intellectual and seeks to know the Atman, the
center of individual consciousness, which is ultimately found to be qualitatively the
same essence as Brahman, the universal consciousness or the Absolute One all
pervading Reality.

Samaya Srividya Tantra

There are three forms of Tantra, of which Samaya is a purely internal form, whose
sole goal is spiritual liberation or enlightenment. It deals with the higher energy
centres, up to the energy centre at the top of the head, the crown chakra. The
lineage of the Himalayan masters, emphasizes this higher Tantra Yoga.

The third stream of Samaya Srividya Tantra deals with the energy systems of our
being, going directly to the heart of consciousness. It emphasises the creative
aspect of consciousness called shakti and following that creative aspect back to it's
source.
Shakti is the Mother principle and Shiva the Father principle. Shiva the Father
principle is the centre of consciousness and Shakti, the Mother principle is the
creative aspect or the world that manifests out of the centre of consciousness and
returns eventually to its source.

The Paths of the Himalayan Lineage

Yoga

Raja Yoga, or the Royal path of Yoga, encompasses the other paths. It is also known
as Ashtanga Yoga, referring to the Eight Limbs of Yoga described in the Yoga Sutras
of Patanjali. Ashta means eight; Anga means limbs. It is important to note that the
phrase Ashtanga Yoga has recently become known in the west as a system of
physical postures, this is not consistent with the original meaning of the term.

In Yoga the aspirant must:

Develop a healthy lifestyle

Gain insights in to the essential yogic concepts of non-harming, truthfulness, non-
stealing, purity, contentment, self-study and surrender
Learn to cultivate a regular time for meditation
Develop a steady meditation posture
Develop a serene breath
Cultivate Sankalpa shakti or the power of the determination
Learn to let go of distracting thoughts
Learn how to reduce the colorings (kleshas) of ignorance, ego, attachment,
aversions and fear.
Develop the quality of introspection
Cultivate a razor-sharp discrimination
Systematically move inward in a process of attention, meditation and deep
absorption
Seek to know mind and matter as separate from Pure Consciousness.
Advaita

While the modern approach to Advaita is increasingly intellectual, the Himalayan

Lineage of the Samaya Srividya Tradition emphasizes the need for a practical
approach. It does so by providing contemplative means of self enquiry and
exploration. This contemplative meditation suggested by the Himalayan sages
complements the meditation of the Yoga Sutras.

Vedantic Meditation or the practical approach to Advaita is generally called Self

Enquiry or Atma Vichara. These practices are contemplative and generally
complement the dualistic practices of Yoga.

In Advaita the aspirant must:

Learn to witness the four functions of mind: manas, the coordinator of actions and
sensation; chitta, the powerhouse of memories, emotions and desires; ahamkara,
the false identities; buddhi, which is the higher faculty of knowing, deciding,
judging, and discriminating.
Explore in contemplative meditation the three levels of reality: waking, dreaming,
deep sleep; conscious, unconscious, subconscious; gross, subtle, causal.
Contemplate on the center of consciousness, seeking to experientially go into the
heart of the question, "Who am I?" using the traditional practice called Atma Vichara
Contemplate step by step on the Mahavakyas, the great sayings of the Upanishads
Samaya Srividya Tantra

Samaya Srividya is the path of mastery. The aspirant is no ordinary seeker but one
who has "adhikar". Adhikar literally means "having the right". The seeker must have
the necessary qualifications or prerequisites to be initiated in to the subtle and
sublime secrets of Samaya Srividya. The three qualities are necessary for this path:

Power of Discrimination
Ethical standards and values
Desire to end the cycle of life and death
The seeker who possesses the above qualities is called an adhikari. In our Lineage
we initiate all adhikaris irrespective of their gender, religious background, race and
socio-economic status.

Under the guidance of and with the support of the Guru, Lineage and Tradition, the
adhikari will learn:

To master the internal energies of the chakras

To balance the two sides of the subtle body, ida and pingala, sun and moon, or the
Ha and Tha as these dual aspects are known
To open the central stream of energy, sushumna, the subtle counterpart of the
physical spine, allowing the latent energy to awaken, flowing upward in this
channel, so as to reach the point from which it originally emerged.
Use mantra to dive in to the deepest levels of the unconscious mind and invite the
hidden to come forward
To master the process of raising the kundalini and bringing it back to its resting
place
Deep reflection and meditation on Tripura, the one who lives in the three cities
(tri=three; pura=city) of conscious, unconscious, subconscious and waking,
dreaming and sleeping
To "see" that mind and matter are grosser form of manifestation that emerge from
the pure consciousness.
To know the pre-existing union of Shiva and Shakti, which are the latent and active
aspects of manifestation, sometimes called masculine principle and feminine
principle.
Texts of the Himalayan Lineage

Yoga Sutras of Patanjali

Yoga, as described by the great sage Patanjali, is a foundational practice, and is

codified (arranged or systematized) in the Yoga Sutras. The word codified is
commonly used because the Yoga science was recorded by Patanjali over 2000
years ago, although the science itself was not new, having been known for
thousands of years before that time. Patanjali codified Yoga into 196 sutras (literally
threads) outlining the path of Yoga.

Mandukya Upanishad

Of particular importance is the introspection of the waking, dreaming, and deep

sleep levels of consciousness, which have as their counterparts the gross, subtle,
and causal planes of reality. It means examining not only the conscious, but also the
unconscious and subconscious levels of mind, so that these can ultimately be
transcended. These levels are summarized in the Mandukya Upanishad, a practical
Vedantic text, which deals with the 4 layers of the Om mantra.

Yoga Vasishtha

The Yoga Vasishtha is a part of the great epic Ramayana. It is a dialogue between
the Sage Vasishtha and Prince Rama. The Prince, who is an adhikari asks the sage
about the nature of the world, the meaning of life and the most fundamental
question, "Who am I?" The Yoga Vasishtha is a truly monistic text, uncompromising
in its approach to Advaita.

Tripura Rahasya

This is a unique tantric text. While most spiritual texts exalt the Divine in its
masculine form, this text refers to the Divine as Her. It is unconventional for its
teachers are a princess, a woman hermit and the goddess Sri Tripura Sundari.

It is unrelenting in its approach and reveals the Highest as nothing other than Pure
Consciousness.

Saundarya Lahari

Saundarya Lahari means "Waves of Bliss and Beauty". Those looking for esoteric
explanations on chakras and kundalini will be disappointed. Saundarya Lahiri is a
collection of mystical verses in praise of the Divine Mother, She who represents all
levels of reality.

Srividya Sadhana Questions Answered by Sadguru Sri ...

Srividya Level 2 Thirumoolar Navakkari Chakra Sadhana. Eligibility: level 1 .....
What is the difference between srividya and other paths like dhyana yoga, .... subtle
bodies and other doshas using basic tantric mula mantra of srimatha and.
Srividya Sadhana Questions Answered by Sadguru Sri Sivapremanandaji
http://www.srividyasadhana.com Om Mulanji 2 www.srividyasadhana.com
Copyright 2016 Mulavarg Self-Realization Centre The author and publisher
respectfully acknowledge that this book is copyrighted. No part of this publication
may be reproduced in any form by Photostat, microfilm, xerography, or any other
means which are known or to be invented or incorporated into any information
retrieval system, electronic or manual without the written permission of the
copyright holder. Mulavarg Self-Realization Centre Email:
prem999ananda@gmail.com Mobile: 09742118385 (Mr.Soham)
http://www.srividyasadhana.com Om Mulanji 3 www.srividyasadhana.com
Dedication In humility we offer this dedication to Mahasiddhar Sadguru Sri
Thirumoolaji, Who initiated Sri Sivapremanandaji into the secrets of srividya
sadhana Om Mulanji 4 www.srividyasadhana.com Contents 1. Srividya Sadhana 5 2.
Das Mahavidya 13 3. Deeksha 18 4. Mantra 23 5. Guru & Disciple 33 6. Kundalini 41
7. Srichakra & Navavarana puja 45 8. Mudra 55 9. Darshan of Divine Mother 60 10.
Recommended books 64 Author 67 Om Mulanji 5 www.srividyasadhana.com
Srividya Sadhana She is the Beginning, She is the Beginningless, She is the Cause,
She is the Causeless She is the Light, She is the Not-light She is the Bliss that is
Beauty Divine, She is the Mother Supreme, She is Samadhi, the transcendental End
She is Manonmani, the Jewel of the Inmost Mind She in my sentience entered, And
in my heart abided. Tirumantiram 1114 Om Mulanji 6 www.srividyasadhana.com
What is Srividya? Who isthe deity of Srividya? What is the ultimate realization of
Srividya? Srividya is the experimental knowledge of the goddess Sri LalithaTripura
Sundari that leads to divine or absolute truth. Srividya is meant for the
selfrealization which leads to absolute bliss. The Ultimate realization of Srividya is
that your own SELF is Tripura Sundari. This knowledge happens to you through
Self-Realization by practicing srividya meditation. What are the different Schools of
Srividya? There are three different schools of Srividya Sadhana called Samaya Mat,
Kaula Mat and Mishra Mat. Samaya Mat is the ancient form of worship. Vedic in
origin, it believes in sacrifice and penance. Kaula Mat is the path of heroes who can
face challenges and remain balanced while enjoying yoga and bhoga(sensual
enjoyment). Kaula is an evolved being who dwells in non-dual consciousness and a
constant state of awareness. His Madya (liquor) is Amrita (some) dripping from
soma chakra. To him Mansa (meat) is his anger, greed, and attachment. Matsya
(fish) is taste, egoity, pride, avarice. Mudra (money) is hope, seeking, anxiety, fear,
jealousy, shyness, envy. Maithuna(sexual communion) is the union of kundalini with
Shiva. This is the real Panch Makar Sadhana of a Kaul. Mishra mat, mixed path,
combines yoga, tapa and mantra. According to this school the intoxication that
comes by knowledge is liquor, the inner silence that comes by sadhana is meat, the
stopping of the constant floating in the Ganga and Yamuna (Ida and Pingala) is
eating the fish and selfknowledge is mudra (money) and the union of Siva and
Shakti is Maithuna(sexual communion). Which school of srividya is taught by you?
The teachings presented by us belongs to the Mishra Mat. What are the benefits of
Srividya Sadhana ? A healthy body that is in a constant rejuvenative mode Om
Mulanji 7 www.srividyasadhana.com A mind that is inspired, guided and powerful
Attract Wealth, fame, respect, power, and prosperity Supercharge your energy
level Manifest your sacred purpose as human and evolve Manifest your dreams
into reality Learn to detach and free yourself from negative feelings and emotions
Draw and feel divine that is divine love near to you Cultivate inner silence and
bliss Find out just what true satisfaction is Learn to trust yourself Access
answers from your higher self Clear away karma by clearing chakra system Take
control of your life Awaken psychic abilities How many Srividya Levels are taught
in your program? What should be the gap in-between each level of srividya
sadhana? The core practices of Srividya Sadhana are taught in 7 graduated
steps/levels. All the practices are meditative in nature and are not outward Puja
rituals. Each level should be practiced regularly for minimum 6 -8 weeks before
going to the next level. Following are the different srividya levels with required
eligibility: Srividya Level 1 Kundalini Chakra Sadhana Eligibility: Willingness and
open mind Srividya Level 2 Thirumoolar Navakkari Chakra Sadhana Eligibility: level
1 Srividya Level 3 Thirumoolar Navakkari Chakra Pranayama Eligibility: level 2 Om
Mulanji 8 www.srividyasadhana.com Srividya Level 4 Bala Tripura Sundari Sadhana
Eligibility:level 3 Srividya Level 5 Panchadasi Sadhana Eligibility:level 4 Srividya
Level 6 Shodasi Sadhana Eligibility:level 5 Srividya Level 7 - Siva-Soubhagya
Shodasi Sadhana Eligibility: level 6 Can you please explain why srividya sadhana is
offered in 7 levels and how each level of srividya sadhana is helpful to sadhaka? Ill
explain in brief about inner mechanism of each level and their importance in the
spiritual progress of a student: Srividya level-1: helps student to balance his chakras
and make them function with maximum capacity so that he can receive divine
mothers energy and transform his life. Srividya level-2 & 3: invokes Navakkari
Shakthi into the student's soul which are nine powers that control this universe in
different aspects and dimensions (these are the same powers that we worship as
dasmahavidya shaktis) to overcome any negative effects of planets, Horoscope,
Past life curses, Ancestor problems etc. Srividya level-4: first 3 levels cleanses and
prepares student energy body, astral body, mental body, and causal body to receive
srividya mantra in seed form called Bala Tripura Sundari mantra. This level-4 Om
Mulanji 9 www.srividyasadhana.com sadhana is like sowing a divine mother
vibration, i.e. seed in the students soul so that he can grow into divine mother
consciousness with regular sadhana. Srividya level-5: Panchadaai is expanded form
of bala tripur sundari mantra. This mantra balances ida, pingala and sushmna and
removes all 3 granthis, cleanses all karmic impressions by raising kundalini upto
sahasrara chakra. This level-5 sadhana prepares sadhaka to become one with
Divine mother. Regular practice of level-5 awakens selfawareness or Witness
consciousness in sadhaka i.e. stage of self Realization. Srividya level-6: Shodasi
Mantra further raises kundalini above sahasrara chakra about half to one feet and
merges completely with Universal divine Self/Soul. Regular practice of level-6 leads
to God realization i.e. experience of ultimate truth. Srividya level-7: This sadhana
helps to balance ground and bring universal Divine Soul consciousness into mind,
body and waking state of awareness. It prepares a normal sadhaka to siddhahood.
Why you decided srividya sadhana to be taught Online/Distant? It is not my wish,
but the divine mothers intention to reach her children in this way. I started
experiencing OM Samadhi after Savikalp and Nirvikalp Samadhi by the grace of
Divine Mother. After that, Divine mother as Om Naad started entering my right ear
and giving messages that teach my children. I was surprised about this
experience because Divine mother asked in the same way to my Master Sivakami
Omanandi to teach Sivayoga. But already I was teachings sivayoga so I didnt
understand why divine mother asking again. Then I started getting a Om Mulanji 10
www.srividyasadhana.com dream of wearing sriyantra in my finger and giving
lecture on panchadasi mantra. Next day morning, I realized that the divine mother
wanted me to teach srividya Sadhana that I learned directly from Sadguru
Thirumoolarji during my astral travel. So I understood the divine mother's intention
and started offering it online because I was working and not in a position to devote
my whole time for offline teachings. I started getting srividya deeksha request from
army officers who are working at borders & navy, also from different countries like
USA,Canada, Germany, Finland, Japan, Nepal, & other western countries within a
week after creating a website on srividya sadhana. This made me very clear that, It
is the prayer of many devotees who want to learn srividya sadhana but dont have
time to attend a lengthy retreat. This is how Online srividya sadhana started by
divine mothers grace. Is srividya sadhana learned online/distance is effective? We
have a record of students who have got self-realized through online/distance
srividya sadhana. Also, there are students who received instructions from divine
mother in their dream to visit our website for srividya sadhana and deeksha. It is
divine mother who is working behind these teachings and nothing is impossible by
the grace of the divine mother. Can you please explain what is Samadhi? Savikalp
Samadhi, Nirvikalp Samadhi and Om Samadhi ? Samadhi is the experience of
ONEness with Cosmic consciousness. In savikalp Samadhi you experience your true
identity as a SOUL and not body & mind, etc. but still it is a relative state. In
Nirvikalp Samadhi, Om Mulanji 11 www.srividyasadhana.com you experience all that
is existed is only ONE soul, energy and consciousness. It is totally subjective state in
which there is only experience but no experiencer. There is no separation between
god, guru and you in this state, but only experience of all is ONE. In Om samdhi, you
experience you are Om naad which is Sound form of parabrahma. But here it is a
very important factor to consider that savikalp and nirvikalp samadhis are blissful
and peaceful, but om Samadhi is very joyful, pleasurable then all other Samadhis.
So my Master made a criteria that until disciple dont experience Om Samadhi he is
not eligible to become a master in our Siddha Mulavarga lineage. This is because he
is so content in himself that no pleasure of this world is equal to it. If you compare
the experience of peak of sexual intercourse to Om Samadhi then Om Samadhi is
million times more pleasurable to sexual pleasure. Many yogis and siddhas always
in Om Samadhi. Om Samadhi is called as Kama Sutra of Higher consciousness that
only few experience it all the time. This makes them to detach from the world and
be in their blissful & pleasurable state of consciousness. Why is srividya sadhana
considered supreme amongst all the sadhanas? Srividya sadhana removes the
ignorance of the disciple by helping him realize his true identity and experience
oneness with Paramataman. Other sadhanas will yield many material benefits, but
not the ultimate knowledge or truth. Hence, srividya is considered as the supreme
and called Brahma Vidya. Also, it is mentioned in the Lalitha shasranama stotra that
carame Janmani srividyaopasako bhavet means one will succeed in attaining
srividya only in his final birth.Also Srividya Om Mulanji 12
www.srividyasadhana.com sadhana is only sadhana that yields all the four goals of
human life i.e. dharma, Arth, Kama, & moksha. Where is srividya referred to in Vedic
texts? Sri Sukta from Rg veda, Aruna Upanisad in Yajurveda, Bhavanopanisad &
Atharve shika in Atharva veda.Sundari Tapini Pancjakam, Ratrisukta
Bhavanopanishad, Devisukta, Devyupanishad,Tripuropanishad, Saubhagya Lakshmi
Upanishad, Bahvrchopanishad, Kaulopanishad, Guhyopanishad,Mahopanishad,
Saraswati Rahasyopanishad, Srichakropanishad Om Mulanji 13
www.srividyasadhana.com Das Mahavidya With all created objects, their associated
living things, the Parai with ten faces looking in ten directions, and paraparai
activizing the mind and the functions of other organs, Sakti is the Mistress of
wisdom. Tirumantiram 1059 Om Mulanji 14 www.srividyasadhana.com What are Das
Mahavidyas? Das Mahavidya means the 10 Mahavidyas. Maha-Vidya means great
knowledge. The Mahavidyas are thus ten insights covered by ten mysteries about
10 essential energies, that are also 10 goddesses. Their worship is a main path in
Tantra Yoga. For example, the first and foremost Mahavidya is Kali, which is the
energy of Time. The related avidya or mystery is that Time, which is life, seems
temporary. The truth or vidya is that time and life are neverending. Death, the
apparent end of life and time, is an illusion. To conquer the fear of death, worship of
Kali is very effective, using the Kali mantra, yantra and an image of the goddess.
However, one should never worship a Mahavidya lightly. Worship of Kali should only
happen if one is ready to give up attachment to the body. Following is an overview
of these 10 wisdom goddesses, their attainment and what it means to worship
them: Name KALI (Time) Mahavidya Eternity of time Worship means To die daily,
detach from body consciousness and the impermanence of all things, transforming
into the eternal unborn being. Attainment Kumbaka, self-knowledge, samadhi. Name
TARA (Star) Mahavidya The power of silence Om Mulanji 15
www.srividyasadhana.com Worship means To move across the pond of mind &
emotion, guided by the savior star that is silence, the void, nada, the primordial
sound. Attainment Hearing the silence of nada (or Aum) behind all sound, inner
peace. Name TRIPUR SUNDARI (the beauty of the 3 worlds) Mahavidya(Srividya) The
beauty of pure perception Worship means To move beyond the perception of form
into the delightful union of seen and seer, the divine beauty in everything.
Attainment Witness consciousness Name BHUVANESHWARI (queen of the universe)
Mahavidya The love of infinite space Worship means To let the fullness of inner
space merge with the cosmic womb of outer space, with the divine mother, and join
the play of loving union with everything. Attainment Universal love Name TRIPUR
BHAIRAVI (terror of the 3 worlds) Mahavidya The fire of truth Worship means To let
the awesome power of truth destroy all impediments to spiritual growth by burning
them in the fire of tapas (ascetism). Attainment Inner light, removal of the 9
impediments of mind Name CHINNAMASTA (chopped off head) Om Mulanji 16
www.srividyasadhana.com Mahavidya To stop mind is liberation Worship means To
liberate yourself from the desire for sensory input, cutting off the source of the
movements of mind and reaching deep meditation (samadhi). Attainment
Willpower, vision, meditation, sexual abstinence, kundalini yoga, Samadhi Name
DHUMAVATI (beholder of smoke) Mahavidya The blessing of suffering Worship
means To let the unreal become obscured by the smoke of suffering, revealing the
hidden potential behind pain, ugliness and old age, grasping the opportunity for
learning, embracing the wisdom of forgetting the past. Attainment Enjoyment of
sorrow, spiritual insight, compassion, mental health Name BAGLA MUKHI (power to
stop speech) Mahavidya All opposites are one Worship means To apply the stunning
power of the truth of complimentary upon all negativity, silencing confusion and
doubt. Attainment Inner silence, stillness of asana, kumbhaka, willpower Name
MATANGI (power of intellect) Mahavidya Speaking truth purifies Om Mulanji 17
www.srividyasadhana.com Worship means To speak truth, teach truth, sing of truth,
paint truth, even if it makes us outcasts, even if we feel unsuited, and thus invoke
its purifying power. Attainment Creativity, harmony, mantra meditation, teaching
Name KAMLA (lotus, clad in water) Mahavidya Sharing brings wealth Worship means
To share wealth, beauty and enjoyment in order to obey the magical law of karma,
thus providing a peaceful background for spiritual growth. Attainment Wealth,
sharing, peace, devotion Om Mulanji 18 www.srividyasadhana.com Deeksha
Gathering the strands of my fetters, he knotted them together and then wrenched
them off. Thus freeing me from my fond body, straight to mukti he led me. Behold,
of such holy potency is the presence of my guru divine! Tirumantiram 1574 Om
Mulanji 19 www.srividyasadhana.com What is srividya deeksha or initiation?
Deeksha is a process wherein the Spiritual power or charge or Truth consciousness
in the form of mantra is infused in the soul of the disciple. The guru adds the
spiritual power to the mantra and gives the same to the disciple so that disciple
gets the mantra with much power to awaken his kundalini and break the karmic
barrier, overcome the obstacles and start his spiritual journey. If the mantra is got
by upadesham then disciple will have to create that power in oneself by strenuous
japa, homa, tarpana, marjana and dhyana. Parashuram in his kalpa sutra suggest
that one should get srividya deeksha without fail. What is the difference between
deeksha and upadesam? Upadesham is merely teaching the mantra to the disciple,
but deeksha is infusing mantra power with spiritual charge of the divine in disciple
soul and guiding him with spiritual practice to experience truth and liberation. What
are the different types of deekshas? Scriptures mention 32 kinds of deekshas but
three types of deekshas are given generally. They are Sakthi, Sambhavi and Mantra
deeksha. Whether srividya Deeksha can be given to someone who is
widow/widower/bramachari? All persons irrespective of caste, creed, gender and
position of ashram can take up the srividya deeksha. Divine mother is unconditional
love and an ocean of mercy and she will bless all equally. Om Mulanji 20
www.srividyasadhana.com Why it is customary to give deeksha to couples in
srividya? To bring harmony between the couple so that they can follow the same
path, principles and practices under one guru instead of different path and approach
which create lots of confusion in the family life. But if one partner not interested in
this path, then alone can be initiated. Does receiving Deeksha result in the
activation of Kundalini Shakti and opening of the Chakras of the Sadhak? When a
Sadhak receives Deeksha, his Kundalini Shakti (the Universal Life Energy) gets
activated and awakened. Signs of awakening are innumerable and can be unique to
each Sadhak based on his Samskaras and his needs for further spiritual progress.
However, these signs cannot and should not be categorized as indicative of specific
milestones or the opening of specific Chakras. Does one need to receive Deeksha
only once? Does it result in the continual purification of the Sadhak once he has
received it? How long does it take to reach enlightenment after Deeksha? Deeksha
needs to be received only once from a Guru who is capable of transfering of Awaken
Soul Consciousness to sadhak. Once Deeksha is given, the Sadhaks Kundalini
Shakti and consciousness get awakened. Under favorable conditions the internal
purification of a Sadhak takes place through diligent Sadhana and disciplined
external behavior (Karma). Even if a Sadhak has bad habits and poor Karma to
begin with, the awakened Kundalini Shakti will move him away from his bad habits
and towards good Karma as long as he sits for Sadhana regularly and surrenders
himself to the Divine Mother. In that sense it is a continuous process of purification
and the Kundalini Shakti will continuously purify the Sadhak until he experientially
achieves enlightenment. Om Mulanji 21 www.srividyasadhana.com What are the
pre-qualifications necessary to become as srividya sadhaka? Burning Desire for
liberation, willingness, sincerity, determination, selfdiscipline and open-mind are
necessary qualities to become a srividya sadhaka. How do I know that SriVidya
sadhana is right for me? There are many different approaches to Yoga and
meditation, so you can try any or all of them. You can also try SriVidya Sadhana and
if you think it works for you, go ahead and keep following it. What is the difference
between srividya and other paths like dhyana yoga, karma yoga etc? Srividya is the
primordial (highest) Mulavidya or brahmavidya. Other paths are derivatives of
srividya. How can a common man get benefitted from this path? Common man can
attain both spiritual and materialistic goals by following this path. Is it possible for
the common man to make this a part of his busy lifestyle? Sure, Supreme mother
can be worshipped at any time, in any place without any pre-conditions Can women
practice these srividya techniques? Yes, Lopamudra who was women practiced
srividya sadhana and started teaching the well known lopamudra srividya. Is it
always necessary to have srichakra or any idol to follow this path? Om Mulanji 22
www.srividyasadhana.com There is no restriction as such. It is recommended to
worship sriyantra or idol, but not mandatory and you can keep the photo of the
divine mother. Can householders follow this path? Yes, they are the most eligible.
Every day I recite Lalitha sahasranama, trishathi and saundaryalahari. Is it enough
or is there something to be added on to this sadhana? Please continue your
sadhana. Shortly divine mother will show you the guru to learn more about srividya
sadhana. We are very happy with our lives and we are also very young. Why should
we bother with meditation, Sadhan and Srividya? What benefit does it have for us?
The urge to sit for Sadhan (meditation) has to come from within. No one should tell
you that you should sit for Sadhan and follow Srividya, because without the internal
urge Sadhan just wont happen. Having said that, Sadhan can be of benefit to
everyone, regardless of whether you are presently successful and happy with your
success, or are encountering obstacles in your day-to-day life. When you are
successful and happy you will have a tendency to think that your current state will
continue for ever. But as most of us are aware, our lives go through ups and downs.
Even with material success most of us will encounter periods of unhappiness and
stress at various points in their lives. But it is important to remember that it is our
mind that becomes happy or sad, not our true self which is the Pure Consciousness.
If we can become aware of the Consciousness within us, and experientially identify
ourselves with it, our ability to deal with the ups and downs of life will be greatly
improved. Srividya sadhana will help you experientially become aware of, and
identify with, your true inner self. The sense of calm you will derive from this can
help you maintain an even keel through the ups and downs in your life. In other
words, Srividya sadhana can take you beyond the successes and failures of our day-
to-day lives. Om Mulanji 23 www.srividyasadhana.com Mantra The five letters
beginning with "Ka" are golden hued to behold The six letters beginning with "Ha"
are red-hued The four letters beginning with "Sa" are pure white The mantras thus
grouped leads to bliss below And to liberation above. Tirumantiram 1307 Om
Mulanji 24 www.srividyasadhana.com What is the Mantra? What are srividya
mantras? Why srividya mantras are considered very powerful? Mantra is a
combination of divine syllables or sounds which when chanted with devotion, faith
and emotion gravitate the concerned God or Goddess or deity and secure their
divine blessings. For divine help one must link with divine forces, but majority of
humans are unaware of these forces and have no link whatsoever. But when an
individual starts chanting Mantra related to a particular deity regularly the gap
between him and the concerned divine force steadily decreases. By regular use of
Mantra a subtle link is formed and through this one could then obtain any desired
boon within the power of the deity. Srividya Mantras have proved to be a wonderful
key to success in the lives of hundreds of great Rishis and Yogis. According to
ancient texts these Mantras were never created by anyone, rather it was obtained
directly from Lord Shiva. It is these mysterious srividya Mantras that hides within it
the power to link a human to his inner bodies. Most people and scholars today
associate Srividya Mantras with mental upliftment only. If used properly srividya
mantra can activate all the inner bodies and also all the Chakras of the Kundalini,
thus bestowing psychic and soul powers like telepathy, hypnotism, astral travelling
and omniscience on an individual. What is the Panchadasi Mantra? Please explain it?
Srividya mantra of Divine Mother Tripurasundari is known as the famous
Panchadashi or fifteen syllable mantra. It has three sections (kutas), each ending
with the mantra Hrim which is a mantra by itself can be used to worship Tripura
Sundari or Lalita. KA E I LA HRIM HA SA KA HA LA HRIM SA KA LA HRIM The above
Pachadasi Mantra is derived from the following verse, KAMOYONIH KAMLA
VAJRAPANIR GUHA HASA MATRISHVABHRAMINDRA Om Mulanji 25
www.srividyasadhana.com PUNAR GUHA SAKALA MAYEYA CHA PURUCHCHAIVA
VISHVAMATADI VIDDYOM KAMA (KA), YONI(AYE), KAMLA (EEE), VAJRAPANI INDRA
(LA), GUHA (HRING), HASA VARNAS MATRISHVA-VAYU (KA), ABHRA (HA) INDRA (LA),
PUNAH GUHA HRING, SAKALA VARNAS AND MAYA HRING There are many ways to
explain this srividya mantra. Whole books have been written on it. Below is a short
examination of its syllables Relative to the first of the three sections of the mantra:
Ka is desire or the creator. E is Maya or the power of illusion. I is Vishnu or the
Divine ruling power. La is the power of bliss. Relative to the second section: Ha is
space or breathSa is time. Ka again is creation. Ha is breath or spirit renewed in
energy. La again is bliss. Relative to the third section: Sa is time as eternity or
totality Ka is origin and also the unknown. La again is bliss. Hrim repeated three
times brings about a triple transformation of our nature. The first set of srividya
mantras is the head of the Goddess, the second from her neck to her hips, and the
third the region below the hips. The first set relates to Vak, the power of speech the
second to Kamaraja, the king of love, and the third to the original Shakti or power of
transformation. These three sections also relate to Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, the
three Vedas (Rig, Yajur, and Sama). Om Mulanji 26 www.srividyasadhana.com What
is Kadi Vidya, Hadi Vidya and Sadi vidya? The version of srividya mantra that begins
with Ka is known as kadi vidya. There is another version called Hadi Vidya that
starts with Ha, which omits some letters and gives letters in a slightly different
order HA SA KA LA HRIM HA SA KA HA LA HRIM SA KA LA HRIM Kadi Vidya is
ascribed to a line of teachers: Parama-Siva, Durvasa, Hayagriva and Agastya and it
is more popular all over the country than the other one. Tantraraja-tantra and
Vamakesvara-tantra are its chief authorities. The Hadi vidya tradition goes back to
Lopamudra, wife of Agastya, and was prevalent in Kerala. The main text on which
this tradition relies is Tripuropanisat. There is another version of the srividya mantra
that starts with Sa is called Sadi vidya. What are other deities associated with
srividya sadhana? There are many derivative deities from the Srividya. The first of
them is called Bala-Tripura sundari. She is imagined as a young maiden or as a girl
of Nine, Om Mulanji 27 www.srividyasadhana.com the mother goddess in her
juvenile condition. Mantra of Bala-Tripura Sundari is, AIM KLIM SAU Or AIM KLIM SAU
SAU KLIM AIM The second divinity is Mantrini (counselor to the mother-goddess).
She is also called Shyamala (dark in complexion), and Mathangi (or RajaMathangi, in
her capacity to function like the gateway to Srividya). Goddess Raja shymala or Raja
Matangi mantra takes the following form, AIM KLIM SAU AIM HRIM SHRIM OM OR
alternatively, HRIM SHRIM KLIM AIM OR again Om Mulanji 28
www.srividyasadhana.com AIM HRIM SHRIM AIM KLIM SAU OM NAMO BHAGAVATI
RAJAMATANGESWARI AIM She symbolizes the second unit of panchadasi mantra and
therefore she has this formula form, HESTRAIM HA SA KA HA LA HRIM HESTRAUH
The third divinity is Danda-natha(lady commander of the forces of the mother
goddess, symbolizing might of srividya). She is also called Varahi (the hog-faced one
or the great consumer) who destroys the evil forces that obstruct the devotees
progress and leads ultimately to Srividya. Goddess Varahi mantra is, AIM GLOUM
AIM OM NAMO BHAGAVATI VARTALI VARAHI VARAHAMUKHI As she represents the
third unit of the panchadasi mantra , her formula form is, HASAIM SA KA LA HRIM
HASTRAUM Another divinity associated with srividya is Pratyangira, whose
involvement is mainly with magic and sorcery. She is considered as a powerful
repellent of the Om Mulanji 29 www.srividyasadhana.com influences generated by
witchcraft. In srividya sadhana, she protects the devotee against all odds, and
guides him along the path. The goddess Pratyangira mantra is, HRIM KSHAM
PRATYNGIRE KLIM HRIM KSHAM HUM PHAT SWAHA She is represented by many
forms. But has significance is uniformly to drive away the hordes of enemies, sins
and evil designs. NOTE All Srividya mantras mentioned above should be practiced
under the guidance of Guru. What is the first mantra initiated in srividya? According
to Lalita krama and Parasurama kalpa sutra, Bala mantra should be given as first
mantra. But in our Siddha Mulavarga Sampradaya we give Bala mantra at fourth
level because we prepare students to cleanse their chakras, subtle bodies and other
doshas using basic tantric mula mantra of srimatha and Navakkai mantra &
pramayama. This prepares them to receive bala mantra which is the seed mantra of
Panchdasi. Om Mulanji 30 www.srividyasadhana.com What does Mantra siddhi
mean? Mantra siddhi means the sound waves of the mantra have become a part of
your inner body. We have 5 bodies the physical body, energy body, Astral body,
Mental body and Causal body.The mantra has to influence the five bodies and when
it awakens the causal body then it is called Mantra Siddhi. What are indications of
Mantra Siddhi? Mantra siddhi activates psychic powers and soul qualities. Soul
qualities like Calmness and balanced attitude without getting angry or having any
hatred are some of indications of mantra siddhi. Mantra siddhi also activates
psychic powers like hearing inner astral sounds i.e veena, flute, mrdanga and om.
Dreams of Guru or divine mother offering flowers & fruits, etc. Experiencing
fragrances, high dimensional light like gold, violet, white in agna chakra. What is
suddha vidya, Soubagya vidya and Para vidya? Panchadasi mantra sadhana is
Suddha Vidya. When Bala bija mantras are added to the panchadasi in the
respective kutas at the beginning, it is called Soubagya Vidya. As the name
suggests this mantra will bestow the sadhaka with all the riches needed throughout
the life. It is given at the level-7 in our srividya Sadhana as Siva-soubhagya
Sadhana. The Para Vidya is a single lettered mantra wherein all the forms of divine
mother vanish. It is the shakti or power or heart of divine mother. It is not asked by
student but given by the guru only by the command of the divine mother. What is
Shodasi and Maha shodasi? Explain greatness of Mahashodasi mantra? A Secret
single bija mantra is added to the panchadasi mantra called Shodasi mantra.
Whereas Mahashodasi is a mantra wherein eight bijas are added at the beginning
and five bijas at the end and panchadasi is placed in-between. This is very powerful
mantra.This should not be uttered outside and has to be given only Om Mulanji 31
www.srividyasadhana.com to the qualified. Scripture says if one sincerely repeats
the mahasodasi mantra then it Is equivalent to performing one thousand Vajapeya
yagas, doing pradaksina of the whole earth, taking bath in all the holy rivers and
receiving powers of the universe, planets and galaxies. This is so powerful and so it
shouldnt be given even if one is prepared to give his kingdom or ones own head.
Only qualified and by the order of divine mother given to the right disciple. What are
the various malas that are used in the mantra sadhana? Malas made of sphatika
(crystals), rudraksha, tulasi, lotus stalk, bilva can be used for japa. Each mala has
particular vibrations & effect and you should learn from guru and sastras about
which mala should be used for what sadhana. Can ladies practice mantra or srividya
sadhana during menstruation? There is nothing unhealthy or impure about the
menstrual period. Rather, if you understand it correctly and scientifically, then you
will realize that it is the most important time for a woman when she can experience
psychic awakening. During the menstrual period, the hormones that flow in the
womans body, stimulate her emotional personality, and this can be used very
easily and effectively for psychic development. So women should particularly
practice mantra or srividy sadhana during menstrual period. But if this goes against
her belief or creates conflict, then she shouldnt do Sadhana. If the concept of
impurity has embedded itself so deeply in her mind, it will be difficult to extricate it.
Can you please explain about the importance of lalitha shasranama chanting?
Lalitha sahasranama is very powerful spiritual practice. It is of divine origin in the
praise of divine mother by Vagdevatas. It gives an idea of the divine mother and her
qualities and powers. Also, it gives glimpses of divine mother manifestation and her
purpose. In yogic point of you it is the sadhana of sahasrara chakra. Each name is
the vibration of 1000 petaled Om Mulanji 32 www.srividyasadhana.com lotus of
crown chakra, which is the true abode of divine mother lalithambika in the human
body. Can you please explain about lalitha trisathi? Lalitha trisathi is expansion of
panchadasi mantra. Panchadasi mantra is coded form and to understand the power
of each letter you need to understand the meaning of Lalitha thrisathi. Once you
understand lalitha thrisathi then you will have a realization about a subtle form of
divine mother that is hidden in the panchadasi mantra. Can you please explain
about kadgamala strotra? Khadgamala strotra is an invocation of divine mother in
her full manifestion with all srichakra khadgamala yoginis & devatas. It is a short
form of srichakra nava avaran puja. it is tantric worship of the divine mother and
yoginis in srichakra. It is very complete tantra sadhana and very few can get it by
the grace of divine mother. Can you explain about durga sapthashati? Durga
Sapthashati is very sacred shakti sadhana. By chanting durga sapthasathi under the
guidance of a guru, students ida, pingala and sushmana nadis and kundalini gets
activated. It is complete sadhana of invoking divine mother grace at all levels your
existence and awakening soul consciousness. Om Mulanji 33
www.srividyasadhana.com Guru & Disciple He taught me the meekness of Spirit,
Infused in me the light of devotion, Granted me the Grace of His Feet; And after
interrogation holy, testing me entire, Revealed to me the Real, the Unreal and Real-
Unreal; Of a certain is Siva-Guru Lord Himself. Tirumantiram 1573 Om Mulanji 34
www.srividyasadhana.com Who is a guru? Guru is a tattva(principle or concept)
appearing in the human form. Guru appearing in the human form plays an
important in the spiritual growth of the sadhaka. Guru empowers students with right
spiritual practice, principles and even protects sincere sadhak until he discovers his
truth i.e Self-Realization. What are the qualities of a srividya Guru? Clarity on the
subject, Compassion towards other & purity of the soul are the main qualities of the
GURU. What is Guru parampara? Guru Parampara is an unbroken tradition starting
from Lord siva/Divine Mother to the devotees immeditate guru. Can you please
explain about your guru paramapara? Our guru parampara is called Siddha
Mulavarga Sampradaya. Mulavarg[ Mula=Mulanji(Thirumoolars name) &
Varg=group] means a group of students following the teachings of Sadguru
Thirumoolar. Our Siddha Mulavarg Parampara Lineage is as follows: Lord Siva
Nandhi devar Siddha Thirumoolar Sivakami Om Nanandhi Sivapremananda Can
you please tell me more about Siddha Thirumoolarji? Siddha Thirumoolarji is
considered as Grand father of Siddhas and known by the name of Sundarar from the
Mt. Kailas area of the Himalayas. He decided to undertake a journey to see a friend
and fellow Siddha. This friend resided in the Potheya Mountains of south India. He
was known as Siddha Agastyar. Nearing the end of his journey, near the village
called Sathanur, he saw a Om Mulanji 35 www.srividyasadhana.com sight that
deeply moved him. He noticed a herd of cows lowing miserably around the dead
body of their cow herd, Mulan. This yogi who knew wellAnbe Sivam (God is
Love), felt he should do something to alleviate the suffering of these poor creatures.
Through the use of his yogic powers, he put his body in a hollow log for safe keeping
and then left it to enter the body of the dead Mulan. The cows were overjoyed to
see their master returning to them. He then led them back to the village. After
leaving them safely at home, he returned to the old log where he had left his body.
He was shocked to find that his body had disappeared. This yogi remained in the
cowherds body and became famous for the verses he uttered when he occasionally
would come out of Samadhi (contemplative absorption). In this fashion, 3000 verses
were recorded, and these are now known as THIRUMANDIRAM. Now Thirumandiram
is available in nine volumes which took five years for a team of scholars to translate
each of its more than 3,000 verses and to write extensive commentaries about
them, in nine chapters, known as tandirams. For more details please visit:
http://srividyasadhana.com/buy-tirumandiram-books/ Can you explain me more
about Sri Sadguru Sivakami OmAnandi? I wouldlike to share an article written by Sri
Roger which gives more details about Sivakami Om Anandi: Sivakami Om Anandi
was born October 31, 1947 in the state of Colorado in the USA. She grew up and
lived most of her life in the Pacific Northwest of the US. The last 9 years of her life
were spent in relative seclusion on the island of Hawaii in the Pacific ocean. She was
a strong swimmer, gifted equestrian, and accomplished dog breeder; but above all,
a skilled and well read metaphysician. Brought up in a Christian home, she was
disillusioned with many aspects of the religion; among others, the lack of any
special happenings or feelings when she took her 1st communion. One beautiful
spring morning, as she was driving into town from her home in the countryside, she
looked across the new fields of dark green wheat and acres of golden mustard
flowers in bloom, and said to herself; If there is a God, Im looking at it! This
seemed Om Mulanji 36 www.srividyasadhana.com to be a magic formula, as within
a week, she was introduced to metaphysical teachings, which she hungrily
devoured. She soon realized that what she was truly passionate about was the
search for truth. Eventually, she came across the writings of Paramahansa
Yogananda and once she had read The Autobiography, there was no stopping her.
She was euphoric at the realization that there was actually a way out of this mess
we call life, and she set out to find it, at all costs. Her family had a fit. Even friends
that should have known better, tried to tell her it wasnt for westerners. What
nonsense, she said. Truth is truth, wherever one finds it! By this time, she was on
a mission. She joined Self-Realization Fellowship (YogodaSatsanga in India) and it
changed her life forever. Her first SRF weekend retreat, in 1977, was led by a Swami
of the order, Brother Bhaktananda. As she knelt in front of Yoganandas photo and
offered a rose, a great flash of light passed between the Swami and herself. They
didnt talk about it, but both knew it had happened. She never forgot what
happened that evening. In her bedroom, she suddenly awoke and was aware the
master Yoganandaji was standing there, all aglow, even as the room was dark. He
was dressed in white with a white wool shawl around his shoulders. His hair was
pulled back in a knot at the back of his head, and covered in a scarlet-red ribbon.
She sat up on the bed in total disbelief. He knelt in front of her, lifted his hands in
front of her stomach, and drew negative karma out of her. Then he pronammed to
her and was gone. This act of charity on his behalf instantly and permanently
changed her. Suddenly she found she could concentrate like never before. This
made meditation easy. Therefore, she meditated all the time, everywhere. She also
realized he had imparted ways of doing it not given to most students. This, along
with her total surrender, led her to Samadhi in just 6 weeks time. The Samadhis she
was experiencing became progressively longer and more intense, to the point she
feared she might die, and this brought her to begin the struggle to take back self-
control. It took a full year of effort to get back to semi-normal consciousness. When
she did, she was totally grief-stricken over the loss of the intense love she had been
experiencing. It was at this time that Divine Mother began asking her to teach My
children; but she Om Mulanji 37 www.srividyasadhana.com did not know what to
teach, as SRF makes it clear that you are not to pass on what they give and at that
time she didnt know any other techniques. About 4 years later, while meditating,
she received Babaji Nagarajs darshan, which she described as being so incredibly
strong that when a friend walked in during the process, the friend almost fainted
just from being near her. In 1989, Divine Mother took her astrally to hidden caves
and passages under the Himalayas where she began receiving lost meditation
techniques. Some of these, she taught locally. It was in 1991 that a fellow SRF
student introduced her to the book, Babaji and the 18 SiddhaKriya Yoga Tradition.
She read a few pages each night before sleeping. She had just read about doing the
mantra, Sivayanama, with the breath, so decided to try it as she lay down to sleep.
She hadnt made it through the 1st round when a Master (in living color and fully
animated) dropped into her Spiritual eye, calling her by name, telling her how
happy he was to see her again, and other personal information. Then he held up his
index and middle fingers, sent a brilliant light through her, and was gone. At the
time, her husband came running down from the upstairs to tell her the house was
full of a holy vibration. She was too drunk on bliss to react. This blissful drunken
state lasted for 3 days. As she became outwardly conscious again, she began to go
through the book to find out which one of the 18 Siddhas had come to her. The
minute she looked upon the eyes in his picture, she knew it was Thirumoolar, her
first and Sat Guru. It was Sivas mantra that had brought him and this prompted her
to research book after book about Siva, and to wear the Shiva Lingam which she
later passed to Sivapremananda. Because of her devotion to Siva, he eventually
came to her in a vision, and told her that her name was Sivakami Om Anandi. In
the years following, Thirumoolar came to her many times, transposing the
instructions for the 3DQs/sivayoga onto her mind and imploring her to put it on the
internet for todays upwardly mobile, electronics savvy population. Sivakami had
never learned to use a computer, and never did, but around this time, she fell in
love with and married her soul mate, and he was to Om Mulanji 38
www.srividyasadhana.com become her secretary and helper in this most important
endeavor. Towards the end of her life on this earth, she made sure to set things up
so that this important work could continue. On November 14th, 2011, her work on
this earth came to a close as she left the body permanently.Throughout her life,
Sivakami did not seek out miracles. She sought only for truth; for answers to why
miraculous things happened to her spontaneously. Those answers, for the most
part, came through meditation and surrender to Spirit. Sometimes they were
communicated to her directly in visions or by clairaudience. Other times, she was
guided to answers or clues hidden in the writings of others. She was not bound by
any one religion or path, but believed truth could be found where 2 or more paths
crossed How you came in contact with siddha Thirumoolarji and Sivakami
OmAnandi? Please share your experiences. I came in contact with Sivakami
OmAnandi during my higher studies in Germany. I read Autobiography of a yogi and
wanted to learn Kriya yoga so I searched in the internet for kriya yoga teacher in
Germany and somehow I found sivayoga website (www.sivayoga.com). I chanted
Thirumoolars 51 letter Siva mantra mentioned in the sivayoga website and found
so much bliss & joy that I completely forget the world for a few minutes. Then I felt
magnetically attracted to sivayoga teachings taught by Sivakami Omanandi. So I
applied for sivayoga course and started sivayoga practices under her guidance. This
is how I came in contact with my spiritual master and mother Sivakami Omanandhi.
As I started meditating under her guidance, my life started changing and I started
experiencing great transformation in my thoughts, energy, emotional states and
behavior. In the beginning, Sadguru Thirumoolar started guiding me in my dreams.
After 3 months of Sivyoga initiation, I got a dream where Siddha Thirumoolar was
writing some coded symbols around my head and those symbols started shining as
a divine Siva mantra. This is my first initiation in Sivamantra by Sadguru
Thirumoolarji infusing five letters of Siva mantra around my head as if they are five
faces (panchamukhi) of Lord Siva. After this initiation, I started experiencing
kundalini activation and deeper state of meditations for 5-10hrs daily. Then he
started manifesting as golden light Om Mulanji 39 www.srividyasadhana.com form
in my third eye and once he completely came out of my third eye and gave a
darshan which made me go blank and drunk in bliss for 3days. Other times he
manifested in three different bodies like young, middle and old age person. I prayed
him to give darshan in the old age(father form), so that my mind can surrender to
him completely and sadguru Thirumoolarji accepted my request. How to find and
select a guru? The disciple with his limited knowledge and perception cant find a
guru who will be able to remove all his miseries and help him directly in the
advancement of his spiritual sadhana. Actually, It is the guru who chooses disciple.
Sastras say that for getting a proper Guru, one should meditate with utmost faith
and devotion on his ista devata.Then by the grace of ista devata, Sri Guru will be
known to him. Remember, the connection with the proper guru is really the result of
good deeds done in the earlier births by the disciple. What is the place of a guru in
the life of a Disciple? While guru may appear as an ordinary person, he must be
perceived as the embodiment of Shiva-Shakti and not as an individual. Sastras
vouchsafe that there is no difference between the Sri Guru and Parashakti. The guru
is always in the heart of the disciple and clearing all the doubts arising then and
there. This can be an experience of the disciple. The disciple will experience that the
guru is the living personification of the divine mother. How should the guru be
honored and respected? One should have the utmost respect and devotion towards
his guru. Guru is living deity who has come to elevate the disciple up from the
ocean of samsara. Gurus words should be taken as the words of divine
sivashakti.Guru bhakti should be something the disciple must feel from within. Mere
external expression not necessarily an indicator of ones respect for his guru. Om
Mulanji 40 www.srividyasadhana.com Who is a disciple? Disciple is one who
sincerely and faithfully follows the discipline given by the guru. Can a disciple or
seeker give upadesam or deeksha(initiation) to another? Normally when the Guru is
alive, the disciple should not give upadesam or deeksha to another person.
However, when guru is unable to do so due to old age etc then one can with the
prior permission of the Guru do the same. Om Mulanji 41 www.srividyasadhana.com
Kundalini In the nine centers within, That Flower walked, As nine Saktis were they
there; Kundalini Light through Central passage arose, And into the Lotus in
Sahasrara spread. Tirumantiram 1143 Om Mulanji 42 www.srividyasadhana.com
What is the Kundalini? How Kundalini activation and srividya Sadhana are
connected? Kundalini is the power of Siva which is dormant in the muladhar chakra.
Srividya mantras called panchadasi and Sodasi are the mantras of kundalini
activation. Various kutas of Shodasi mantra are matched with the kundalini in the
tantras: Lower Kundalini Vagbhava kuta- Agni mandala Central Kundalini Kama
Kuta-Surya Mandala Upper Kundalini -Shakit Kuta -Soma Mandala Triya Kundalini-
Turiya Kuta-Para Mandala Bhaskararaya in his setubandha refers to five forms of
kundalini: 1.Shakti Kundalini: it is in the form of serpent and dormant. 2.Prana
Kundalini:In the form of life force in the form of hissing snake 3. Para Kundalini: It is
a subtle or light form of Prana kundalini 4. Urdhva Kundalini: It lies upper portion of
the Sushma Nadi. 5.Adhah (lower) Kundalini: It is in the compressed form of
kundalini stored in the lower chakras. Can you please share your kundalini
awakening experience? I started experiencing kundalini energy flow as a tingling
sensation around my spine as soon as I chanted the Guru mantra for the first time.
But after initiation of Sivamantra in a dream by Sadguru Thirumoolar, I felt the
kundlini energy as a river that is flowing at high speed within me and it broke the
water-dam that is holding it as a reservoir. I realized the water dam is nothing but all
the inner blocks like granthis/knots, chakras and other barriers opened and the river
flowing beyond my head or crown chakra as Om Mulanji 43
www.srividyasadhana.com river Ganga flows from Lord Shivas head. The whole
experience was involuntary & uncontrolled at the same time blissful and peaceful.
After Kundalini awakening, I could able to experience great changes in my body,
meditative states, peoples behavior & treatment towards me. Is kundalini
awakening brings Siddhis to the sadhaka? Siddhis are yogic powers, which manifest
as a byproduct of intensive meditation due to kundalini awakening. But all students
dont get siddhis. It is depending upon the lesson needed for a student to learn that
divine decides and blesses siddhis. Is it safe to activate Kundalini? Does it create
any problem if it happens at distance/online? Can you explain the process you
follow to activate it? In our Siddha parampara, activation of kundalini is smooth &
Safe. I have learned to activate kundalini in a safer way as taught by divine mother
and Sadguru Thirumoolarji. First, I ground students Muladhar chakra to mother
earth, then I bring Shiva consciousness to muladhar chakra of a student. Siva
consciousness magnetically attracts and activates dormant kundalini. Siva
consciousness doesnt stay at muladhar and it starts moving upward so kundalini
follows Siva consciousness slowly by cleansing and piercing all chakras, granthis
and goes beyond sahasrara and experiences oneness with Siva. Kundalini activation
happens very natural that is a precious gift of divine to all students who follow this
path. It is my realization that Divine Siva-Shakti are the doer here and I am just an
instrument and witnessing all the miracles of divine in student life. I have initiated
and activated kundalini of 14yrs old childrens and their consciousness is blossoming
like a flower under the grace of the divine. It is very safe and not to be afraid of it. Is
there any difference between Kundalini Yoga and Srividya Sadhana? Any Sadhana
which leads to the awakening of the kundalini is a part of Kundalini yoga. Therefore,
we can say that srividya Sadhana is Kundalini yoga. Srividya mantras facilitate
arousal of Kundalini energy, remove the Om Mulanji 44 www.srividyasadhana.com
Brahma, Vishnu & Rudra granthis and upward movement of kundalini from
muladhar to sahasrara chakra which leads to self-realization. Srividya sadhana is
very safe, scientific way and mulavidya of practicing Kundalini yoga. Om Mulanji 45
www.srividyasadhana.com Sri Yantra Meditate on the Double Triangular
Chakra(Sriyantra) This the truth if you but see,This the true God, none other there
is; Listen, one thing I say This double triangle is great unto the ocean Center your
thoughts on it, Bliss and Mukti shall yours be; Tirumantiram 1308 Om Mulanji 46
www.srividyasadhana.com What is sriyantra or srichakra? Sriyantra is a sacred
geometry of a universal soul drawn on a paper or bhojpatra or etched on a metal. It
is employed in the worship of goddess Lalitha Maha Tripura Sundari as per ritual.
Srividya tradition believes that worship of the divine mother in the Sri
chakra/Sriyantra has more power than in an idol.It is abode of divine mother and all
her powers. What is 2-Dimensional sriyantra, Ardha-Meru and Maha-Meru sriyantra?
Sriyantra drawn on a paper or bhojpatra or etched on a metal is called 2- dimension
sriyantra. Sometimes only some part is made like a pyramid and rest in a flat plate
itself, then it is called Ardha-Meru Sri chakra. When complete sriyantra is made in
pyramid structure, then it is called Mahameru Sri chakra. Can you explain more
about Sri Yantra, its worship & construction etc.? The worship of the Sri Yantra, the
method of constructing it, and its complete explanation are given is Saundariya
Lahiri. Shri Yantra is constructed with an intersection of nine triangles. Four of these
triangles are pointing upward and five downwards. The four upward-pointing
triangles are Shiva triangles, and the five downward pointing triangles are Shakti
triangles. A combination of these nine triangles makes Sri Yantra the most dynamic
of all Yantras. If we construct a similar figure by intersecting eight triangles- four
pointing upward and four pointing downward it becomes balanced and static. The
imbalance created by the addition of one more triangle makes the yantra dynamic
and more powerful. Sri Yantra is asymmetrical diagram, and the beauty of it is that
when you look at it, it appears symmetrical. The five downward-pointing triangles,
or Shakti triangles, are manifested as five tanmatras(sound, touch, sight, taste &
smell), five mahabhutas (Akash, air, fire, water & earth), five sense
organs(ear,skin,eyes,tongue, & nose), and five organs of action(hands,
feet,mouth,genitals,&anus). In human body these five elements are skin, nerves,
flesh, fat, and bones. The four upward pointing triangles, which are Shiva triangles,
represent the male energy and exist as chitta(being), buddi(intellect), Om Mulanji
47 www.srividyasadhana.com ahamkar(ego), and manas (mind). As the five
downward-pointing and four upward-pointing triangles intersecting and overlapping
one another, producing forty-three visible triangles, similarly the male and female
forces intersect in the cosmos, producing various objects of the phenomenal world.
As the Bindu in the center represents the Divine mother, so there is Bindu in the
sahasrar Chakra representing the individual consciousness, which is the self (Jiva),
soul, spirit, or atman For the purpose of worship, a Sri Yantra is engraved on copper,
silver, and gold plates as a flat line drawing, or sculpted from stone and precious
gems (quartz, crystals, etc.). This form of Sri Yantra looks like a pyramid, and there
are many such yantras available from ancient times. Sri Yantra usually represents
the body of the goddess Tripurasundari. Also, it is known as tantra of the cosmos. In
the Bhairavayamal tantra it is clearly said that the Yantra of Tripurasundari is of the
shape of the cosmos. In Kamakalavilas it is said that Sri Yantra is constructed on the
same principles on which the human organism is constructed. Just as the body has
nine chakras (psychic centers), so a Sri Yantra has nine chakras (groups), as follows,
1. Bindu 2. Trikon central triangle which contains the bindu 3. Astar a group of
eight triangles outside the trikon 4. Antar Dashar a group of ten inner triangles 5.
Bahir Dashar a group of ten outer triangles 6. Chatur Dashar a group of fourteen
triangles 7. Ashta Dal a ring of eight lotus petals 8.Shodashi Dal a ring of sixteen
lotus petals 9.Bhupar the square form with four gates Om Mulanji 48
www.srividyasadhana.com The word chakra in the Sri Yantra means a group, not a
psychic center of Kundalini Yoga, but there is a definite relationship between the
nine figures of the Sri Yantra and the nine psychic centers. The Kamakalavilas
Agama states that it is very necessary to understand the true form of the goddess
Tripur Sundari, and the only way to understand it is to understand Sri Yantra, which
is symbolic form. Thus it becomes clear that Sri Yantra is The cosmic form (the
diagram of evolution and development of the cosmos) The form of the human
organism(the diagram of inner circuit of the body) The form of goddess Tripur
Sundari(because the goddess energy, which pervades the entire phenomenal world)
How sriyantra worship help in spiritual sadhana or on the path to selfrealization?
Sriyantra is the soul diagram and contains all dimensions of being. By worshipping
sriyantra you are worshiping your complete being at all levels of your existence, i.e.
physical, mental, energy, astral, and spiritual. So it awakens your chakras, kundalini
and erases your karmic impressions and attracts divine near to you. How sriyantra
is correlated with the energy centers/chakras in the human body? Srichakra in the
form of Meru is thought to be identical with the body of a worshipper. Following are
the various avarnas(energy circuits/enclosures) of srichakra find equivalent in
different chakras in the body: Kula chakra- bhupar (three concentric squares) Visu
chakra-Sodas dala chakra (16 petaled lotus) Muladhara-Asta dalal chakra (8 petaled
lotus) Om Mulanji 49 www.srividyasadhana.com Swadisthan-Chaurdasaram or
Manvasra chakra (14 petaled lotus) Manipura-Bahir dasara chakra(outer 10
traingles) Anahata-Antardasara chakra(inner 10 traingles) Visuddhi-Asta dala chakra
or Asta Cona (8 triangles)) Lambikagra-trikona chakra(one traingle) In-between Ajna
and Sahaarara-Bindu(dot) Kula chakra is 2 inches below muladhara. Visu chakra is 1
inch below muladhar chakra. Why sriyantra puja is called Navaavarna puja?
Sriyantra contains nava avarna i.e nine chakras. Various deities worshipped in these
chakras and divine mother is worshipped in the center at the bindu. Srichakr puja
involves worshipping these nine-avarnas so it is called nava avarna puja. What are
the deities, yoginis, mudra residing in the various Avaranas of the sri chakra and
what are their aspects and attainment by worshipping them? Folllowing is an
overview of each Avarna, Mudra, diety, Yogini and attainment etc Om Mulanji 50
www.srividyasadhana.com Om Mulanji 51 www.srividyasadhana.com Om Mulanji 52
www.srividyasadhana.com How sriyantra should be drawn? The detailed method of
drawing is given in various tantric texts like Nitya, Sodasikarnavam, Paramananda
tantra, Tantra raja etc. What is inner worship and outer worship of srichakra puja?
There are two methods of performing the Sri Chakra Puja. One is the
Bahiryagam(outer worship) and the other is the Antaryagam(inner worship) way of
doing the puja. In the Bahirayagam method, Sri chakra puja is done to the nine
different sthanam, tatvam, roopam etc. of the goddess as depicted in the Srichakra.
The puja is done Om Mulanji 53 www.srividyasadhana.com stage after stage, till the
Bindu sthanam is reached. [To learn Bahirayagam visit:
http://srividyasadhana.com/sri-chakra-puja/ In the Antaryagam method of the Sri
Chakra puja, the same is done, only it is done inwards. The nine points of the Sri
Chakra are marked inside the body and the puja is done crossing each place till the
Bindu spot is reached. In the former method, the Kundalini Shakthi is tapped and
coursing through the body, it reaches the Sahasrar, where Shiva-Shakthi unite. Sri
Chakra worship is considered the highest worship of Devi, and because it contains
all deities and all divine potencies within it, it brings every kind of blessing for
physical and emotional health, wealth, harmony in ones relationships, and true
spiritual progress. Srividya antaryagam or Srividya sadhana meditation is taught in
7 graduated levels. [To learn Antaryagam visit: http://srividyasadhana.com] What is
the Nyas & Its purpose in srividya mantra sadhana? Nyasa is storing the power of
the divine in ones body. This is done by a special mudra and repeating a particular
mantra. This nyasa is for the purification for gross body and subtle body and
attaining mantra siddhi. What are the Different types of Nyasas done in srichakra
upasana? The following are the main Nyasas that are performed under the guidance
of Guru: 1. Matrika Nyasa (Antarmatrika and Bahirmatrika Nyasa). 2. Karashuddhi
Nyasa 3. Atmaraksha and Balashadanga Nyasa 4. Chaturasana (or Shadasana)
Nyasa 5. Antashchakra and Bahishchakra Nyasas 6. Mahakameshwaryadi Nyasa 7.
Moola Vidya Varna Nyasa Om Mulanji 54 www.srividyasadhana.com 8. Laghu Shoda
Nyasa (which involves Ganesha, Graha, Nakshatra, Yogini, Rashi and Pitha Nyasas)
9. Maha Shodha Nyasa (which involves Prapancha, Bhuvana, Murti, Mantra, Daivata
and Matrika Bhairava Nyasas) 10. Srichakra Nyasa (again of three types: Srishti,
Sthiti and Samhara) Om Mulanji 55 www.srividyasadhana.com Mudra By Muladhara
Way,With Grace of Guru Vision Sakti,Seated fragrant and lovely; Practise Sambhavi
and Kechari mudras You shall attain Siddhis Eight, That to mighty Siva's goal leads.
Thirumantiram 642 Om Mulanji 56 www.srividyasadhana.com What is Mudra? What
is the significance of Dasmudras in srichkara puja or Nava avarna puja? Mudras are
a non-verbal mode of communication with Divine consisting of hand gestures and
finger postures. The Gherand Sanhita and the Vamakeswara Tantra advises that the
Mudras are capable of bestowing great powers and psychic abilities called
"Siddhies" on their practitioners, hence, their knowledge should not be conveyed to
those steeped in sin, to those that are not true to their word, to the skeptics and
non believers, to heretics and insincere persons and those who do not observe the
precepts. Srividya mudras should be learned from the guru and should be shown to
the devi daily at the appropriate stage in the nava avarna puja and japa. How the
mudras have to be shown, what is the meaning of each mudra is learned from the
guru and it is available in the texts like Vamakeswara tantra. Images of Srividya
Dasamudras are given below for your comprehension but they should be learned
from the Guru only. MMuuddrraa11SSaarrvvaaSSaammkksshhoobbaanni i
MMuuddrraa Mudra 2 Sarva Viidhravanii Mudra Om Mulanji 57
www.srividyasadhana.com MMuuddrraa33SSaarrvvaaaakkaarrsshhi inni i
MMuuddrraa MMuuddrraa44SSaarrvvaavvaassaannkkaarri i MMuuddrraa
MMuuddrraa55SSaarrvvoonnmmaaddi inni i MMuuddrraa Om Mulanji 58
www.srividyasadhana.com MMuuddrraa66
SSaarrvvaammaahhaannkkuussaaMMuuddrraa MMuuddrraa77
SSaarrvvaaKKhheecchhaarri i MMuuddrraa MMuuddrraa88SSaarrvvaaBBhheeeej
jaaMMuuddrraa Om Mulanji 59 www.srividyasadhana.com MMuuddrraa99
SSaarrvvaaYYoonni i MMuuddrraa MMuuddrraa1100SSaarrvvaaTTrri
ikkhhaannddaaMMuuddrraa Om Mulanji 60 www.srividyasadhana.com Darshan of
Divine Mother She wears red silk dress and anklets on Her sacred Feet. Her breasts
are in corset; Her hands hold flower-arrows, Sugarcane bow, goad, and noose; Gem-
studded crown adorns Her head; dark-blue Kundalams (Earrings) grace Her ears.
Tirumantiram 2683 Om Mulanji 61 www.srividyasadhana.com Can you explain the
manifestation of divine mother in different forms? Divine Mother manifest in
following forms in srividya Sadhana: Physical Form: as Bala Tripura Sundari (3-9 yrs
old), Tripura Sundari (Panchadasi-15yrs old, Shodasi-16 yrs old, Mahashodasi-28yrs
old) Subtle Form: as Divine energy in the form of Light, Sound and Vibrations. and
also as astral form of divine mother. Formless Form: i.e Pure awareness or
Consciousness Is it possible to have a darshan of divine mother in all forms? Yes. It
is easier to have darshan of mother in subtle form than the physical and formless
form. To have darshan of Physical and formless form student has to raise his soul
vibrations and also it is divine mother who chooses to give darshan. Can you share
your experiences with Physical form? Divine mother blessed darshan in the physical
form of Lalithambika Maha Tripurasundari. Can you share your experience about
having physical darshan of mother? Divine mother blessed a physical darshan to me
after my self-realization experience. In my case mother blessed me darshan of
formless form(nirakaar) first than Physical form. After self-realization I made a
persistent request to divine mother for a Darshan in a physical form. It took more
than 6 years that I was doing sadhana for darshan but mother didnt bless my
request. I started crying and longing to see her in physical form with all my heart
and soul. Day by day, I started getting pain in my heart and not happy with
anything I do in my life. Then mother blessed her presence. I was sleeping alone at
home and heard the sound of anklets around 3 am. I opened my eyes & found
whole home was filled with golden light & Om naad and I saw divine mother
standing next to me. I was in a Om Mulanji 62 www.srividyasadhana.com state of
great joy and gratitude that I wont be able
speak or move any part of my body and felt completely frozen myself. Then divine
mother kept her right feet on my heart and pressed it with her toe and I became
unconscious for 3 days. Now I can feel her feet on my heart whenever I experience
Bhava Samadhi. Can you please share more about having darshan of divine mother
in a subtle form? I see a divine mother through my third eye as entering my soul in
the form of golden light Whenever I invoke her by chanting Mahalakshmi and
bagalamukhi mantras. When I invoke with Pratyangira and Varahi mantra then I see
her with shades of platinum mixed with violet colour. When I invoke Divine mother
with Kali mantra I see her in the form of Golden red mixed with platinum shades.
Can you share more about having Nirakar darshan of divine mother? It is a
thoughtless state of pure awareness, bliss and infinite expansion, which is difficult
to explain in words. Guruji, I have been on this spiritual path for more than 28 yrs as
a sanyasi and met many masters and explored many paths but still my desire for
Samadhi experience and darshan of divine mother is not fulfilled. I am quite jealous
that you are younger than me, householder and experienced all. Why divine mother
is not answering my genuine prayers and giving me darshan? Why divine mother
favored you but not me? I have seen many students judging me with my outward
appearance like age, householder lifestyle & cloths, etc. Only few students who are
clairvoyant and intuitional can see my true self. Never judge a master with his outer
image because wearing rudraksha, sanyasi robes, beard and long hair dont help to
know true inner self, wisdom, power and attainment of a Master. Divine mother has
shown my past lives where I was a house holder & trader in countries like India,
Greece, spain, etc. Also she has shown my yogic life in Om Mulanji 63
www.srividyasadhana.com Himalayas and as a sanyasi in Mahabalipuram
(Tamilanadu). Also shown, how I was meditating & seeking divine mother grace from
different past lives and only in this life divine mother blessed her darshan. It is not
that I meditated only for few years in this life and I got all. It took many past life
tapas to experience divine mother grace & darshan in this life. So please dont
compare with your limited understanding, perception and judge my attainment and
divine mother blessings. Remember, you and I can be late but Divine Mother is
always at Right time and never be late. Om Mulanji 64 www.srividyasadhana.com
Recommended books Those who fail to scale the heights with holy books to guide, If
to outer things of life they yield, fruitless is all their lore; On rod of Vairagya lean,
and away fly the Birds of Desire; And yet, men to Ignorance clinging, in stupor ever
lie. Tirumantiram 295 Om Mulanji 65 www.srividyasadhana.com What are the books
to be studied by srividya sadhaka? Books In Sankrit: 1. Lalitha sahasranama bhasya
by Bhaskararaya 2. Varivasya Rahasya by Bhaskararaya 3. Nitya Sodasikarnava &
Yogini hridaya with the commentary Setubandha by Bhaskararaya 4. Kamakala
Vilasa by Punyanandanatha 5. Soundarya Lahari by Sankaracharya 6. Srividya
Saparya Paddhati by Sri Chidananda Natha Sutras: 1.Parasurama Kalpa Sutra with
the commentary of Ramesvara Suri & the Manual Nityotsava of Umananda Natha
2. Srividya Sutras by Gaudapada English books by Arthur Avalon (Sir John
Woodroffe): 1. Introduction to tantra sastra 2. Principles of Tantra 3. Sakti and
Shakta 4. Satchakra Nirupana 5. Kamakala vilasa 6. Hymn of Kali Om Mulanji 66
www.srividyasadhana.com Books in Tamil by Sri Chidananda Natha (published by
Guhananda Nath Mandali, Chennai): 1. Srividya Saparya Vasana 2. Varivasya
Rahasyam 3. Kamakala Vilasam 4. Srividya Geetha 5. Sri Niagara Vimarsam 6. Davi
mahima Stritram 7. Varivasya Rahasyam Om Mulanji 67 www.srividyasadhana.com
Sadguru Sri Sivapremanandaji Since childhood days, Sivapremanandaji had a basic
questions of life in his mind like who am I? where I came from? What is the link
between me and Universe?. He was searching for the answers for years together. In
the quest for truth, He met his Guru Sivakami OmAnandi in the year 2000 and later
had a darshan of Satguru Mahasiddhar Thirumoolar whose grace enlightened him.
In his youth, he used to spend daily 4 to 5 hours during morning hours in mantra
recitation, kriya pranayama and meditation. On festival days, he used to spend a
whole day or whole night in doing such practices. Sometimes joined to local siddhas
who had shared many spiritual secrets and truths. This started in 1999 and
continued for many years. Even though he never involved into tantric practices, his
spiritual experiences gave him a deep insight into the inner meanings of mantras,
yantras and tantras. Once the elevation of soul starts, it will be able to receive the
divine blessings and Guidance from Siddha Masters. An old yogi started appearing
many times in his dreams giving instructions when he got initiated from Om Mulanji
68 www.srividyasadhana.com Sivakami OmAnandi. Soon he realized that the yogi is
none other than the Mahasiddhar Thirumoolar. On several occasions he had darshan
of Lord Siva as Nilakanta, Mahavatar babaji and Lahari mahashaya and sometimes
other gods and goddesses whom he never heard of. Sivapremanandaji shared his
experiences here not with an intention to boast himself, but with an intention to
boost confidence in the people who are ascending the spiritual ladder. After
experiencing higher states of Samadhi, Sivapremanandaji willing to share Sri Vidya
teachings for the benefit of those who aspire for SelfRealization but dont know
where to begin, or their worldly responsibilities are too great to allow them the time
to pursue in-depth studies or attend lengthy retreats. Now Sivapremanandaji
helping sincere spiritual seekers through Thirumoolar Siva Yoga and Sri Vidya
Sadhana Online. His Professional Education is as follows, M.S. in Biochemical
Science from Technical University Munich, Germany. PhD in Biomedicine from
University of Barcelona, Spain. Post-Doctorate in Cancer Biology in from Loyola
University Chicago, USA. Om Mulanji 69 www.srividyasadhana.com Srividya
Sadhana If you are interested in Srividya workshop/shivir conducted by guruji then
please visit following link: http://srividyasadhana.com/srividya-workshop/ If you are
interested in Srividya Deeksha Online/Distance then please visit following link:
http://srividyasadhana.com/deeksha.html If you are interested to buy Sri Yantra and
Mahameru then please visit the link: http://srividyasadhana.com/sriyantra/ For any
Queries, Please contact: Mulavarg Self-Realization Centre Email:
prem999ananda@gmail.com Mobile: 09742118385 (Mr.Soham)
http://www.srividyasadhana.com Everyone can practice srividya sadhana now
Everyone can experience divine mother grace now Everyone can heal and change
their life now

Srividya Sutras by Gaudapada

Shri Vidya Ratna Sutras
The Vidyaratna Sutra is an interesting work on Tripura Agama attributed to Gaudapada. Though
the identity of this author is not yet established, it seems ..
Thou who has stolen the left half of the body of Shambhu art yet methinks
dissatisfied therewith. It would seem that the other half has been stolen also,
so that Thou art now red and three-eyed, weighted with two breasts, and with
the whole of the crescent moon Thou art crowned - Wave of Bliss V23,
Woodroffe translation
This brief work, available in an iTrans Sanskrit version elsewhere on this site,
gives in a concise form details of Devi Lalita, the Triple Goddess,
Mahatripurasundari, along with her attendant and subsidiary forms with their
yantras and mantras.

It is apparent from the work below that Lalita is outside or above the cardinal
points, in the palace of gems on the paradise island. The throne she occupies
is surrounded by four gates, each presided over by a vidya (Devi as sound).
The whole work, in the original Sanskrit, uses a number code for the yantras
and vidyas (mantras) of the different retinues, with consonants representing
numbers, vowels zero.

The vidya (translated here as female excellence), the form of the Devi, and
her yantra are all one.

Below, and before our translation, is the English introduction to the Sanskrit
text, published in 1924 as Volume II of the Princess of Wales Sarasvati
Bhavana series, written by Narayana Shastri Khiste, and out of copyright. The
Sanskrit text as published in that text has jumbled the numbers.

We apologise in advance for any defects in our translation, and welcome

corrections.

Introduction
The Vidyaratna Sutra is an interesting work on Tripura Agama attributed to
Gaudapada. Though the identity of this author is not yet established, it seems
probable that he was the same as the Parama Guru of the great
Shankaracharya. That Shankaracharya was also a Tantric teacher of the
Tripura Line is now beyond doubt; and it is well known that Gaudapada was
the author of a stotra called Subhagodaya, which sings the glories of the
Supreme Goddess in the form of Tripura.
Bhaskara Raya in his Saubhagyabhaskara refers to and quotes from Shri
Vidyaratna sutra as a work of Gaudapada.

The author of the Commentary on the sutras, also published with the text (as
far as available), was one Shankararanya who calls himself a pupil of
Vidyaranya muni. He must be distinguished from Shankarananda, another
pupil of Vidyaranya, whose style of composition as evident from his numerous
commentaries on the Upanisads is widely different from that of the present
author.

Though Shankararanya associates himself with the name of the great

Vidyaranya, his fame will not thereby be ensured. The whole commentary
bears traces of grammatical aberrations, faulty Sanskrit and lack of mastery of
the subject.

Assuming that the author did not wilfully beguile his relations, he may be
assigned to the 14th or 15th Century AD.

The sutras of Gaudapada are 101 in number, of which the first 21 only have
been commented upon. The commentary did not extend further, the author
observing that as the remaining sutras are plain in meaning they do not call
for notes.

The subject matter of the sutras may be touched upon in a few words:

Brahma is described by the author as the Principle of Light, which is its

Essence and Power. It is self-luminous in character, and the relation between
Brahma and Shakti is one of non-difference. This Power is called anAmA,
better known as Shrividya, which though one becomes manifold by means of
the three tattvas.

The Tattva is the same as Brahma or Shakti.

It is threefold, viz. Atma, Vidya and Shiva. In the guru too we have a triple
Ogha (viz. Divya, Siddha and Manava), Krama otherwise known as
Adhisthana, Sadhana, Tattva, charana, or as Shakti, Kamaraja and Vagbhava
Kutas, or as Para, Pashyanti and Madhyama.

The Shakti as thus triplicated, becomes Vidya, Shyama and Shambhavi,

which are associated respectively with Brahma, Vishnu and Shambhu.

The lords (Purushas) of these three powers, are Parama Shiva (of Para
Vidya), Sadashiva (of Shyamala) and Rudra (of Shambhavi).

The Vidya is by reason of perfection of Saundarya called Tripurasundari.

She is also called Kameshvari after the name of her Purusha Parama Shiva
who is called Kameshvara.

She is referred to as Rajarajeshvari, Shodashi, &c. also.

From the above sketch it will appear that Shyama and Shambhavi are
respectively the Purva and Uttara Vidyas of Shrividya, from which many
Vidyas appeared and came to be regarded as belonging to the family of Maha
Vidya.

Thus the Vidyas issuing from Shyama of the Purvamnaya preside over the
Rgveda at the Eastern Gate. The Shambhavi Vidyas are of the Uttaramnaya
and preside over the Samaveda at the Northern Gate.

The Supreme Vidya Tripurasundari, as Anuttara, is mistress of the Baindava

Chakra within the Chintamani grha.

The above will suffice, I believe, to give an idea of the general contents of the
book now published.

The present edition of the sutras and their commentary is based upon the
following data:

(1) Ms, marked as ka obtained from my friend Pandita Gopinatha Shastri

Dravida BA Rajaguru of Jaipur State (for which I thank him very much) and
now deposited in the Govt. Sanskrit Library, Sarasvati Bhavana, Benares.
Fols 1-18. Size, 9-2" x 4-5". Lines, 13 in a page, and letters, 40 in a line.
Script, Nagari. Material, country made paper. Date, Samvat 1838 (= 1781 AD).
(2) Ms. marked as kha. It is a transcript prepared from a Ms of the Govt.
Oriental Mss Library Madras and collated with another Ms of the same Library.
Fols 1-11 (sutras); 1-59 (commentary). Size, 8.2" x 6.3". Lines, 11 in a page,
and letters, 14 (Text) - 24 (commentary) in a line.

Script, Nagari. Material, English paper. The Ms is useless except for purposes
of collation.

Govt. Sanskrit Library,

Sarasvati Bhavana,
Benares,
March 31, 1924

Translation

Now the investigation into the Shakti mantra agama.

This indivisible creatrix is the self.
Chit-Shakti is the very essence of consciousness (chaitanya).
She, known as Anama, is called Shri Vidya.
Through the three tattvas, she becomes many.
The multitude of triangles and petals is her chakra.
She is the sum total of Shambhavi, Vidya and Shyama, who are the three
tattvas and the three types.
She is the sum total of the various vidyas from east [clockwise] to north.
These vidyas are, therefore, her retinue.
Shyama is in the east.
Saubhagya, herself a composite-aggregate, is in the south.
Another composite-aggregate is in the west.
Shambhavi, with her retinue, is in the north.
There is another composite-aggregate above.
Mahavidya Tripurasundari, the Anuttara, is in the palace made from the wish-
fulfilling gem (Chintamani).
She, in order to kill (the anti-god) Bhandasura, became many.
From her arose the many mantras, yantras and tantras.
With their various kinds of devotion and their various principles of worship
(upasana).
From these arise various results (fruits).
The dwelling place of Shri is said to consist of bindu, triangle, eight triangles,
two series of 10 triangles, 14 triangles, eight petals, 16 petals, three lines, and
a rectangle.
This consists of nine enveloping gems.
Out of herself the mother created Saubhagya's yantra.
Having produced this, she created the western place.
These three have various attendants.
The yantra of Shuddhi Vidya, her dwelling place, has two, three, six and
sixteen petals.
The abode of Kumari has two, eight and 16 petals.
Each of these has a yantra with one, three, six, eight, five, eight, eight, 12 and
six petals.
The yantra and dwelling place of Shyama has bindu, four, five and eight
triangles, and 16 and eight petals.
This is the supreme abode of all the collectivity (?).
The yantra of Hari is bindu, eight, eight, six, 14 petals, and two sets of eight
triangles.
The yantra of Shri Guru consists of bindu, eight, three, eight petals, three
circles and a bhupura.
Or the abode of Shri Guru consists of the letters A-Ka-Tha within a triangle.
All of the vidyas of the Anuttara consist of Shuddha Vidya.
Vartali has five avaranas or subsidiary circles.
Vatuka has six.
Tirodhana has the same number.
Bhuvaneshi has seven.
Sannihita has six.
Kameshi has three kalas.
Turiya has five.
Maharddha has six.
Shambhavi has five.
Mrigeshi has six.
The abode of the female excellence Bodhaka has four avaranas.
The female excellence Saubhagya has 15 letters.
Similar to her is the western Vidya.
Shyama has 100 letters.
The female excellence (vidya) Pushpini has 22 syllables.
The female excellence Shuka Vidya has 42 letters.
The female excellence Hasanti Devata has 35 syllables.
The excellence known as Shuddhavidya has three letters.
This is the yantra of Pushpini.
Shri has, therefore, all these different kinds of flowery circles.
Sharika is the parrot-coloured one.
She has hosts of attendants.
Of all these, She (Shyama) is the world-gladdener.
Her own yantra is bindu, three, six, and eight triangles, eight petals and an
eight fold Earth square.
This number is (the number of) her hosts of attendants.
The yantra of Samaya Vidyeshvari originates from Shuddhi Vidya.
Saubhagya's yantra has three, six and six triangles and two sets of eight
petals with an earthsquare.
She has give attendants.
Vartali's yantra has bindu, three petals, three triangles, 16 petals and an
earthsquare.
Vatuka's yantra has a bindu, three and eight triangles, eight petals and 16
petals.
Tirodhana's yantra has 16 and eight petals and an earthsquare.
Bhuvaneshi's yantra consists of bindu, three and six angles, eight triangles,
eight petals, and an earthsquare.
Annapurna's abode is bindu, six and eight triangles, 16 petals, eight petals
and an earthsquare.
Bhuvaneshi has a secret yantra of bindu, triangle, four angles, a beautiful
circle of 16 petals and an earthsquare.
Maharddha has a bindu, eight angles, two petals, 16 petals, eight petals and
an earthsquare.
Svanayaki has a yantra of six angles.
Mishra Vidya's yantra is 16-fold.
Vagvadini's consists of eight lines.
Shambhavi's yantra is four fold.
Kumari is the female excellence (vidya) of three letters.
Dvadasharddha has 10 letters.
Saubhagya Sannihita has 36 letters.
The mantra of Maha Heramba is of 28 letters.
The mantra of Vatuka is of 28 letters.
The Boar-Faced One (Varahi) has both a mantra of 108 syllables and nine
syllables.
The female excellence (vidya) Yavantika has 56 letters.
The female excellence Bhuvaneshi is of one syllable.
Or else the female excellence of 27 letters.
The Kadi is the 15-lettered (vidya) starting with the letter Ka as first of the 15
letters.
Kamakala, the union of two things, the female excellence (vidya) of the fourth
letter.
Mukhya's vidya is one syllable.
The vidya Turya is of 13 letters.
Maharddha is the female excellence (vidya) of 109 letters.
Ashvarudha is the 12 syllabled female excellence.
The Mishra Vidya is the vidya of one syllable.
The Vagvadini is the vidya of 13 letters.
Para is the female excellence (vidya) of one syllable.
The Paraprasada form has two letters.
Parashambhu has both a six-fold and an 11-fold vidya of long and short
vowels.
Para Shambhavi has a vidya which is fivefold and of both long and short
vowels.
The chief vidya, the Annutara aggregate, has a vidya of 17 letters.
There is an infinite number of her divisions and sub-divisions.
These sutras were declared by Gaudapada.

Most historians are reluctant to deny that logic had a history in China, but one
does ... analysis of the processes of inference until the brief vogue of Buddhist
logic from India in ... Moral orthodoxy, adherence to social norms, was as
essential to successful ... Mathematics The two surviving canons of
mathematics are the Nine ...

Catuskot i
Catuskot i is a logical argument(s) of a 'suite of four discrete functions' or 'an indivisible
quaternity' that has multiple applications and has been important in the Dharmic traditions of
Indian logic and the Buddhist logico-epistemological traditions,
Catuskot i (Sanskrit; Devanagari: , Tibetan: , Wylie: mu bzhi) is a logical
argument(s) of a 'suite of four discrete functions' or 'an indivisible quaternity' that has multiple
applications and has been important in the Dharmic traditions of Indian logic and the Buddhist
logico-epistemological traditions, particularly those of the Madhyamaka school.

Robinson (1957: pp. 302303) states (negativism is employed in amplification of the Greek
tradition of Philosophical skepticism):

A typical piece of Buddhist dialectical apparatus is the ...(catuskoti). It consists of four members
in a relation of exclusive disjunction ("one of, but not more than one of, 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' is true").
Buddhist dialecticians, from Gautama onward, have negated each of the alternatives, and thus
have negated the entire proposition. As these alternatives were supposedly exhaustive, their
exhaustive negation has been termed "pure negation" and has been taken as evidence for the
claim that Madhyamika is negativism.[1]

In particular, the catuskot i is a "four-cornered" system of argumentation that involves the

systematic examination and rejection of each of the 4 possibilities of a proposition, P:

P; that is, being.

not P; that is, not being.
P and not P; that is, being and not being.
not (P or not P); that is, neither being nor not being.
Contents [hide]
1 Catuskot i algorithm mapped in partial logical algebra
2 Nagarjuna's Diamond Slivers
3 Exegesis
4 Nomenclature, orthography and etymology
5 Antecedents and pervasion
5.1 Gorgias
5.2 Sydvda
5.3 Brahmajala Sutta: The Supreme Net (What the Teaching Is Not)
5.4 Literature review
6 Nargarjuna
7 Catuskot i post-Nargarjuna
8 Catuskot i paradox: a simple complex
9 Four Extremes
9.1 Alternate Four Limits/Four Extremes
9.2 Lexicon: technical language and terminology
10 See also
11 Notes
12 See also
13 References
Catuskot i algorithm mapped in partial logical algebra[edit]
The following is an adaptation of the model of Puhakka (2003: p. 133)[2] with the clear
identification of the positive and negative configurations of the Catuskot i following Ng (1993: pp.
99105).[3]

P stands for any proposition and Not-P stands for the diametrical opposite or the contradiction
of P (in a relationship of contradistinction); P and Not-P constitute a complementary bifurcation
of mutual exclusivity, collectively constituting an exhaustive set of positions for any given (or
determined) propositional array. A propositional array is signified in the model by numerals,
traditionally though, propositional arrays were designated 'foot' (Sanskrit: pda), a lexical item
which holds the semantic field: 'line', 'one quartile of loka'; where 'loka' (Sanskrit) holds the
semantic field: 'verse', 'stanza'.[4]

Nagarjuna's Diamond Slivers[edit]

nyat is the ninth 'view' (Sanskrit: dr s t i), the viewless view, a superposition of the eight
possible arrays of proposition P [and its 'inseparable contradistinction' (Sanskrit: apoha)].

Positive configuration
P
Not-P
Both P and Not-P
Neither P nor Not-P

Negative configuration
Not (P)
Not (Not-P)
Not (Both P and Not-P)
Not (Neither P nor Not-P)
The eight arrays or octaves of the iconographic Dharmacakra represent drishti or traditional
views that Shakyamuni countered. These eight arrays may be plotted as coordinates on a
multidimensional field which may be rendered as a sphere, a mandala, a multidimensional
shunya or zero where shunyata denotes zero-ness. The eight arrays are in a concordant
relationship where they each constitute a chord to the sphere. The coordinates are equidistant
from the epicentre of shunya where the array of the positive configuration (or hemisphere) and
the array of the negative configuration (or hemisphere) constitute two polar radii or diametrical
complements, a diameter in sum. These are the 'eight limits' (Wylie: mtha' brgyad; Sanskrit:
ast nta) of 'openness' (Sanskrit: nyat),[5] where nyat is amplified by 'freedom from
constructs' or 'simplicity' (Wylie: spros bral; Sanskrit: aprapaca).[6][7] Karmay (1988: p. 118)
conveys that 'spros bral' is a homologue of 'thig le' (Sanskrit: bindu), where 'spros bral' is literally
"without amplification", understood as "that which cannot be displayed".[8]

P is true ``1 P is not true or Not P is true

Not P is true ``2. Not (Not P) is true i.e. P is true
Both P and Not P are true i.e. the universal set `` 3 Neither P nor not P are true i.e. it is a null set
Neither P nor not P are true it is a null set `` 4. Not (neither p nor not P are true ) = both P and
not P are true which is the universal set/ Thus, we can see that there are only 4 alternatives
available and the negative alternatives are mere rewritten alternatives.
In other words, it makes no difference whether you are working with positive configuration or
negative configuration.

More over, if you replace p with not P, then the positive configuration set for not P will be the
same as negative configuration of P.

Exegesis[edit]
Puhakka (2003: p. 134-145) charts the stylized reification process of a human sentient being,
the spell of reality,[9] a spell dispelled by the Catuskot i:

We are typically not aware of ourselves as taking something (P) as real. Rather, its reality "takes
us," or already has us in its spell as soon as we become aware of its identity (P). Furthermore,
it's impossible to take something (P) to be real without, at least momentarily, ignoring or denying
that which it is not (not-P). Thus the act of taking something as real necessarily involves some
degree of unconsciousness or lack of awareness. This is true even in the simple act of
perception when we see a figure that we become aware of as "something." As the German
gestalt psychologists demonstrated, for each figure perceived, there is a background of which
we remain relatively unaware. We can extend this to texts or spoken communications. For every
text we understand there is a context we are not fully cognizant of. Thus, with every figure
noticed or reality affirmed, there is, inevitably, unawareness. Is this how a spell works? It takes
us unawares.[10]

Nomenclature, orthography and etymology[edit]

The Catuskot i in Western Discourse has often been glossed, Tetralemma, which is the
nomenclature for the Greek form. Both of the variations have similarities but also differences
and the traditions were mutually iterating.

Antecedents and pervasion[edit]

Antecedents of the Catuskot i have been charted to grammatical structures in the Vedas. The
Nasadiya Sukta of the Rigveda (RV 10.129) contains ontological speculation in terms of various
logical divisions that were later recast formally as the four circles of catuskoti: "A", "not A", "A
and not A", and "not A and not not A".[11]

McEvilley (2002: p. 495) maps an interesting case for mutual iteration and pervasion between
Pyrrhonism and Madhyamika:

An extraordinary similarity, that has long been noticed, between Pyrrhonism and Mdhyamika is
the formula known in connection with Buddhism as the fourfold negation (catuskot i) and which
in Pyrrhonic form might be called the fourfold indeterminacy.[12]

Gorgias[edit]
Gorgias (c 487-376 BCE), the author of a lost work: 'On Nature or the Non-Existent'. This book
was lost but was paraphrased by Sextus Empiricus in Against the Professors.[13]

Sydvda[edit]
Jainism has a sevenfold logical architecture, the Sydvda, which is a formulation to convey the
insight of Anekantavada.

Brahmajala Sutta: The Supreme Net (What the Teaching Is Not)[edit]

kyamuni, as remembered by nanda and codified in the Brahmajala Sutta 2.27, when
expounding the sixteenth wrong view, or the fourth wrong view of the 'Eel-Wrigglers' (Pali:
amar-vikheppik), the non-committal equivocators, though the grammatical structure is
identical to the Catuskot i (and there are numerous other analogues of this fourfold grammatical
structure within this Sutta), the intentionality of the architecture employed by Nagarjuna is not
evident, as rendered into English by Walshe (1987, 1995: p. 81):

'What is the fourth way? Here, an ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid. Because of his dullness
and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like an eel:
"If you ask me whether there is another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise. And
I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not." "Is there no other world?..." "Is there both
another world and no other world?..."Is there neither another world nor no other world?..." "Are
there spontaneously-born beings?..." "Are there not...?" "Both...? "Neither...?" "Does the
Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist
after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?..." "If I thought so, I would say so...I
don't say so...I don't say it is not." This is the fourth case.'[14]

Literature review[edit]
Robinson (1957: p. 294)[15] holds that Stcherbatsky (1927),[16] opened a productive period in
Madhyamaka studies. Schayer (1933)[17] made a departure into the rules of inference
employed by early Buddhist dialecticians and examines the Catuskoti (Tetralemma) as an
attribute of propositional logic and critiques Stcherbatsky. Robinson (1957: p. 294)[15] states
that "Schayers criticisms of Stcherbatsky are incisive and just." Murti (1955)[18] makes no
mention of the logical contribution of Schayer. According to Robinson (1957: p. 294),[15] Murti
furthered the work of Stcherbatsky amongst others, and brought what Robinson terms "the
metaphysical phase of investigation" to its apogee though qualifies this with: "Murti has a lot to
say about 'dialectic,' but practically nothing to say about formal logic." Robinson (1957: p. 294)
[15] opines that Nakamura (1954),[19] developed Schayer's methodology and defended and
progressed its application.
Robinson (1957: p. 293) opines that the 'metaphysical approach' evident foremost in Murti
(1955) was not founded in a firm understanding of the 'logical structure of the system', i.e.
catuskoti, for example:

Several fundamental limitations of the metaphysical approach are now apparent. It has tried to
find comprehensive answers without knowing the answers to the more restricted questions
involved - such questions as those of the epistemological and logical structure of the system.
[20]

Robinson (1957: p. 296) conveys his focus and states his methodology, clearly identifying the
limitations in scope of this particular publication, which he testifies is principally built upon,
though divergent from, the work of Nakamura:

In considering the formal structure of Nagarjuna's argumentation, I exclude epistemology,

psychology, and ontology from consideration.... Such extra-logical observations as emerge will
be confined to the concluding paragraphs...[21]

Nargarjuna[edit]
The Catuskot i was employed particularly by Nagarjuna who developed it and engaged it as a
'learning, investigative, meditative'[22] portal to realize the 'openness' (Sanskrit: nyat), of
Shakyamuni's Second Turning of the Dharmacakra, as categorized by the Sandhinirmocana
Sutra.

Robinson (1957: p. 294), building on the foundations of Liebenthal (1948)[23] to whom he gives
credit, states:

What Nagarjuna wishes to prove is the irrationality of Existence, or the falsehood of reasoning
which is built upon the logical principle that A equals A.... Because two answers, assertion and
denial, are always possible to a given question, his arguments contain two refutations, one
denying the presence, one the absence of the probandum. This double refutation is called the
Middle Path. [emphasis evident in Robinson][24]

Catuskot i post-Nargarjuna[edit]
The Catuskot i , following Nagarjuna, has had a profound impact upon the development of
Buddhist logic and its dialectical refinement of Tibetan Buddhism.

Robinson (1957: p. 294) qualifies the import of Nagarjuna's work (which includes Nagarjuna's
application of the Catuskoti) due to the embedded noise in the scholarly lineage: "Certainly
some of Nagarjuna's ancient opponents were just as confused as his modern interpreters...".
[24] This noise may also have co-arisen with Nagarjuna, following the work of Jayatilleke
(1967).

Catuskot i paradox: a simple complex[edit]

Wayman (1977) proffers that the Catuskot i may be employed in different ways and often these
are not clearly stated in discussion nor the tradition. Wayman (1977) holds that the Catuskot i
may be applied in suite, that is all are applicable to a given topic forming a paradoxical matrix; or
they may be applied like trains running on tracks (or employing another metaphor, four mercury
switches where only certain functions or switches are employed at particular times). This
difference in particular establishes a distinction with the Greek tradition of the Tetralemma. Also,
predicate logic has been applied to the Dharmic Tradition, and though this in some quarters has
established interesting correlates and extension of the logico-mathematical traditions of the
Greeks, it has also obscured the logico-grammatical traditions of the Dharmic Traditions of
Catuskot i within modern English discourse.[original research?]

Four Extremes[edit]
The 'Four Extremes' (Tibetan: , Wylie: mtha' bzhi; Sanskrit: caturanta; Devanagari:
) [25] is a particular application of the Catuskot i:

Being (Wylie: yod)

Non-being (Wylie: med)
Both being and non-being (Wylie: yod-med)
Neither being and non-being (Wylie: yod-med min)[25]
Dumoulin et al. (1988, 2005: pp. 4344), in the initially groundbreaking work on Zen which is
now for the most part dated due to progress in scholarship (though still useful as the premier
English work of comprehensive overview), model a particular formulation of the Catus kot i that
approaches the Caturanta engaging the Buddhist technical term 'dharmas' and attribute the
model to Nagarjuna:

If we focus on the doctrinal agreement that exists between the Wisdom Stras[26] and the tracts
of the Mdhyamika we note that both schools characteristically practice a didactic negation. By
setting up a series of self-contradictory oppositions, Ngrjuna disproves all conceivable
statements, which can be reduced to these four:

All things (dharmas) exist: affirmation of being, negation of nonbeing

All things (dharmas) do not exist: affirmation of nonbeing, negation of being
All things (dharmas) both exist and do not exist: both affirmation and negation
All things (dharmas) neither exist nor do not exist: neither affirmation nor negation
With the aid of these four alternatives (catuskot ika: affirmation, negation, double affirmation,
double negation), Ngrjuna rejects all firm standpoints and traces a middle path between being
and nonbeing. Most likely the eight negations, arranged in couplets in Chinese, can be traced
back to Ngrjuna: neither destruction nor production, neither annihilation nor permanence,
neither unity nor difference, neither coming nor going.[27]

Alternate Four Limits/Four Extremes[edit]

A Mantrayana enumeration of the Four Limits or the Four Extremes within the Buddhadharma is
also common. These four 'limits' are evident in the earliest sutras of the Theravadin of the First
Turning, through the Second Turning philosophy of Nagarjuna and his disciples and
commentators and also evident in the Third Turning as evidenced in the presentation of
Padmasambhava. Padmasambhava in his 'Secret Instruction in a Garland of Vision' Tibetan:
, Wylie: man ngag lta ba'i phreng ba lists them as follows with the English
rendering following Dowman (2003)[28] and Wylie following Norbu et al. (2001):[29]

the Hedonist' or 'Chalpas' Tibetan: , Wylie: phyal pa: does not perceive, ascribe to the view
or realize that all events, dharmas, etc. have a cause and an effect;
the 'Atheist' or 'Gyangphenpas' Tibetan: , Wylie: rgyang 'phen pa: unable to see or
perceive past and future lives, the atheist toils for wealth and power in this lifetime alone. They
engage in intrigue;
the 'Nihilist' or 'Murthugpas' Tibetan:
, Wylie: mur thug pa: holds that there is no
causality or causal relationship between events and dharmas. They are of the view that
everything is adventitiously arisen due to chance and events and that dharmas dissipate and
vanish into the void. Death is the ultimate cessation and there is no continuity between lives;
and
the Eternalist' or 'Mutegpas' Tibetan:

, Wylie: mu stegs pa: holds to the view of an
eternal, unchanging 'atman', where atman is often rendered as 'soul' in English. There is
considerable diversity of the mechanics of causality with proponents of this view. Some perceive
the atman as having a cause but not effect, an effect but no cause, or indeed a complex
causality or causal relationship.
Each one of these extreme views, limits and binds the open, unbounded spaciousness of the
natural mind.

Lexicon: technical language and terminology[edit]

Within English Buddhist logico-epistemological discourse, there is and has been historically,
much obstruction to an understanding of the Caturanta (as the Catuskot i) due to inherent
negligence in terminology not being clearly defined from the outset. That said, acquisition of
terminology must be engaged and actualized though the sadhana of the 'mla praj', as
definitions are slippery and challenging to pinpoint that hold for all contexts. Language usage in
Buddhist logic is not intuitive but technical and must be learnt, acquired through the perfection
and power of 'diligence' (Sanskrit: vrya). The following quotations are cited to provide insight (in
lieu of technical definitions) into the understanding of the technical Buddhist terms 'existence',
'nature', 'being', 'entity' and 'svabhava' which are all mutually qualifying.

Robinson (1957: p. 297) renders Mlamadhyamakakrik 21.14, thus:

"He who posits an entity becomes entangled in eternalism and annihilism,

since that entity has to be either permanent or impermanent."[30]

Robinson (1957: p. 300) in discussing the Buddhist logic of Nagarjuna, frames a view of
'svabhava':

Svabhava is by defini[t]ion the subject of contradictory ascriptions. If it exists, it must belong to

an existent entity, which means that it must be conditioned, dependent on other entities, and
possessed of causes. But a svabhava is by definition unconditioned, not dependent on other
entities, and not caused. Thus the existence of a svabhava is impossible. [NB: typographical
errors repaired] [31]

"Nature" (a gloss of prakrti which in this context equals svabhava) does not entail an alter-entity:

The term "nature" (prakrti equals svabhava) has no complement..."If (anythings) existence is
due to its nature, its non-existence will not occur, since the alter-entity (complement) of a nature
never occurs." (Mlamadhyamakakrik, 15.8)

That is, a nature is the class of properties attributed to a class of terms Since they are
necessarily present throughout the range of the subject or class of subjects, cases of their
absence do not occur.[31]

Y Karunadasa (1999, 2000: p. 1) holds that Early Buddhism and early Buddhist discourse "often
refer to the mutual opposition between two views":

'permanence' or 'eternalism' (Pali: sassatavada) also sometimes referred to as 'the belief in

being' (Pali: bhava-ditti); and
'annihilation' or 'nihilism' (Pali: ucchadevada) also sometimes referred to as 'the belief in non-
being' (Pali: vibhava-ditti).[32]
As Shakyamuni relates in a 'thread' (Sanskrit: stra) of discourse to Kaccnagotta in the
Kaccnagotta Sutta, rendered into English by Myanmar Pit aka Association Editorial Committee
(1993: p. 35):

"For the most part, Kaccna, sentient beings depend on two kinds of belief - belief that 'there is'
(things exist) and belief that 'there is not' (things do not exist).[33]

Y Karunadasa (1999, 2000: p. 1) states that:

...it is within the framework of the Buddhist critique of sassatavada and ucchadavada that the
Buddhist doctrines seem to assume their significance. For it is through the demolition of these
two world-views that Buddhism seeks to construct its own world-view. The conclusion is that it
was as a critical response to the mutual opposition between these two views that Buddhism
emerged as a new faith amidst many other faiths.[32]

What is hetu

hetu | Buddhist philosophy

A seed, for example, is a direct cause of a plant, while sunshine, water, and earth
are auxiliary causes of a plant. Sometimes pratyaya means the cause in general.
hetu.

COMPARISON WITH PRATYAYA

in pratyaya
in Buddhist philosophy, an auxiliary, indirect cause, as distinguished from a direct
cause ( hetu). A seed, for example, is a direct cause of a plant, while sunshine,
water, and earth are auxiliary causes of a plant.
Epistemology
PHILOSOPHY
Epistemology, the study of the nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge. The
term is derived from the Greek epistm (knowledge) and logos (reason), and
accordingly the field is sometimes referred to as the theory of knowledge.
Epistemology has a long history, beginning with the ancient Greeks and continuing
to the present. Along with metaphysics, logic, and ethics, it is one of the four main
branches of philosophy, and nearly every great philosopher has contributed to it.

Epistemology as a discipline
Why should there be a discipline such as epistemology? Aristotle (384322 bce)
provided the answer when he said that philosophy begins in a kind of wonder or
puzzlement. Nearly all human beings wish to comprehend the world they live in,
and many of them construct theories of various kinds to help them make sense of it.
Because many aspects of the world defy easy explanation, however, most people
are likely to cease their efforts at some point and to content themselves with
whatever degree of understanding they have managed to achieve.
Unlike most people, philosophers are captivatedsome would say obsessedby the
idea of understanding the world in the most general terms possible. Accordingly,
they attempt to construct theories that are synoptic, descriptively accurate,
explanatorily powerful, and in all other respects rationally defensible. In doing so,
they carry the process of inquiry further than other people tend to do, and this is
what is meant by saying that they develop a philosophy about these matters.

Like most people, epistemologists often begin their speculations with the
assumption that they have a great deal of knowledge. As they reflect upon what
they presumably know, however, they discover that it is much less secure than they
realized, and indeed they come to think that many of what had been their firmest
beliefs are dubious or even false. Such doubts arise from certain anomalies in our
experience of the world. Although several of these anomalies are discussed below in
the section on the history of epistemology, two in particular will be described in
detail here in order to illustrate how they call into question our common claims to
knowledge about the world.

Two epistemological problems

SIMILAR TOPICS
transcendental ego
empiricism
transcendental argument
epoch
truth
Epicureanism
principle of sufficient reason
dialectic
skepticism
existentialism
Knowledge of the external world
Most people have noticed that vision can play tricks. A straight stick submerged in
water looks bent, though it is not; railroad tracks seem to converge in the distance,
but they do not; and a page of English-language print reflected in a mirror cannot be
read from left to right, though in all other circumstances it can. Each of these
phenomena is misleading in some way. Anyone who believes that the stick is bent,
that the railroad tracks converge, and so on is mistaken about how the world really
is.
Close-up of two straws in a glass of water. The straws appear bent owing to the
refraction of light.
Steve Lupton/Corbis

Although these anomalies may seem simple and unproblematic at first, deeper
consideration of them shows that just the opposite is true. How does one know that
the stick is not really bent and that the tracks do not really converge? Suppose one
says that one knows that the stick is not really bent because, when it is removed
from the water, one can see that it is straight. But does seeing a straight stick out of
water provide a good reason for thinking that, when it is in water, it is not bent?
Suppose one says that the tracks do not really converge because the train passes
over them at the point where they seem to converge. But how does one know that
the wheels on the train do not converge at that point also? What justifies our
preferring some of these beliefs to others, especially when all of them are based
upon what is seen? What one sees is that the stick in water is bent and that the
stick out of water is straight. Why then is the stick declared really to be straight?
Why in effect is priority given to one perception over another?

One possible answer is to say that vision is not sufficient to give knowledge of how
things are. Vision needs to be corrected with information derived from the other
senses. Suppose then that a person asserts that his reason for believing that the
stick in water is straight is that, when the stick is in water, he can feel with his
hands that it is straight. But what justifies him in believing that his sense of touch is
more reliable than his vision? After all, touch gives rise to misperceptions just as
vision does. For example, if a person chills one hand and warms the other and then
puts both in a tub of lukewarm water, the water will feel warm to the cold hand and
cold to the warm hand. Thus, the difficulty cannot be resolved by appealing to input
from the other senses.

Another possible response would begin by granting that none of the senses is
guaranteed to present things as they really are. The belief that the stick is really
straight, therefore, must be justified on the basis of some other form of awareness,
perhaps reason. But why should reason be accepted as infallible? It is often used
imperfectly, as when one forgets, miscalculates, or jumps to conclusions. Moreover,
why should one trust reason if its conclusions run counter to those derived from
sensation, considering that sense experience is obviously the basis of much of what
is known about the world?

Clearly, there is a network of difficulties here, and one will have to think hard in
order to arrive at a compelling defense of the apparently simple claim that the stick
is truly straight. A person who accepts this challenge will, in effect, be addressing
the larger philosophical problem of our knowledge of the external world. That
problem consists of two issues: how one can know whether there is a reality that
exists independently of sense experience, given that sense experience is ultimately
the only evidence one has for the existence of anything, and how one can know
what anything is really like, given that different kinds of sensory evidence often
conflict with each other.

The other-minds problem

CONNECT WITH BRITANNICA
Suppose a surgeon tells a patient who is about to undergo a knee operation that
when he wakes up he will feel a sharp pain. When the patient wakes up, the surgeon
hears him groaning and contorting his face in certain ways. Although we are
naturally inclined to say that the surgeon knows what the patient is feeling, there is
a sense in which he does not know, because he is not feeling that kind of pain
himself. Unless he has undergone such an operation in the past, he cannot know
what his patient feels. Indeed, the situation is more complicated than this, for even
if the surgeon has undergone such an operation, he cannot know that what he felt
after his operation is the same sort of sensation as what his patient is feeling now.
Because each persons sensations are in a sense private, for all the surgeon
knows, what he understands as pain and what the patient understands as pain
could be very different. (Similar remarks apply to our use of colour terms. For all a
person knows, the colour sensation he associates with green could be very
different from the sensations other people associate with that term. This possibility
is known as the problem of the inverted spectrum.)
It follows from this analysis that each human being is inevitably and even in
principle prevented from having knowledge of the minds of other human beings.
Despite the widely held conviction that in principle there is nothing in the world of
fact that cannot be known through scientific investigation, the other-minds problem
shows to the contrary that an entire domain of human experience is resistant to any
sort of external inquiry. Thus, there can never be a science of the human mind.

Issues In Epistemology

The nature of knowledge

As indicated above, one of the basic questions of epistemology concerns
the nature of knowledge. Philosophers normally treat this question as a
conceptual onei.e., as an inquiry into a certain concept or idea. The
question raises a perplexing methodological issue: namely, how does one
go about investigating concepts?

It is frequently assumed, though the matter is controversial, that one can

determine what knowledge is by considering what the word knowledge
means. Although concepts are not the same as words, wordsi.e.,
languagesare the medium in which concepts are displayed. Hence,
examination of the ways in which words are used can yield insight into the
nature of the concepts associated with them.
An investigation of the concept of knowledge, then, would begin by
studying uses of knowledge and cognate expressions in everyday
language. Expressions such as know him, know that, know how,
know where, know why, and know whether, for example, have been
explored in detail, especially since the beginning of the 20th century.
As Gilbert Ryle (190076) pointed out, there are important differences
between know that and know how. The latter expression is normally
used to refer to a kind of skill or ability, such as knowing how to swim.
One can have such knowledge without being able to explain to other
people what it is that one knows in such a casethat is, without being
able to convey the same skill. The expression know what is similar to
know how in this respect, insofar as one can know what a clarinet
sounds like without being able to say what one knowsat least not
succinctly. Know that, in contrast, seems to denote the possession of
specific pieces of information, and the person who has knowledge of this
sort generally can convey it to others. Knowing that the Concordat of
Worms was signed in the year 1122 is an example of this sort of
knowledge. Ryle argued that, given these differences, some cases of
knowing how cannot be reduced to cases of knowing that, and,
accordingly, the kinds of knowledge expressed by these phrases are
independent of each other.

For the most part, epistemology from the ancient Greeks to the present
has focused on knowing that. This sort of knowledge, often referred to
as propositional knowledge, raises a number of peculiar epistemological
problems, among which is the much-debated issue of what kind of thing
one knows when one knows that something is the case. In other words, in
sentences of the form A knows that pwhere A is the name of some
person and p is a sentential clause, such as snow is whitewhat sort
of entity does p refer to? The list of candidates has included beliefs,
propositions, statements, sentences, and utterances of sentences.
Although the arguments for and against the various candidates are
beyond the scope of this article, two points should be noted here: first,
the issue is closely related to the problem of universalsi.e., the problem
of whether qualities or properties, such as redness, are abstract objects,
mental concepts, or simply names. Second, it is agreed by all sides that
one cannot have knowledge that of that which is not true. A necessary
condition of A knows that p, therefore, is p.

Five distinctions

Mental and nonmental conceptions of knowledge

Some philosophers have held that knowledge is a state of mindi.e., a
special kind of awareness of things. According to Plato (428/427
348/347 bce), for example, knowing is a mental state akin to, but different
from, believing. Contemporary versions of this theory assert that knowing
is one member of a group of mental states that can be arranged in a
series according to increasing certitude. At one end of the series would be
guessing and conjecturing, for example, which possess the least amount
of certitude; in the middle would be thinking, believing, and feeling sure;
and at the end would be knowing, the most certain of all these states.
Knowledge, in all views of this type, is a form of consciousness, and
accordingly it is common for proponents of such views to hold that, if A
knows that p, A must be conscious of what he knows. That is, if A knows
that p, A knows that he knows that p.
In the 20th century, many philosophers rejected the notion that
knowledge is a mental state. Ludwig Wittgenstein (18891951), for
example, said in On Certainty, published posthumously in 1969, that
Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories. They are not
two mental states like, say surmising and being sure. Philosophers who
deny that knowledge is a mental state typically point out that it is
characteristic of mental states like doubting, being in pain, and having an
opinion that a person who is in such a state is aware that he is in it. They
then observe that it is possible to know that something is the case without
being aware that one knows it. A good example is found in Platos Meno,
where Socrates (c. 470399 bce) elicits from a slave boy geometrical
knowledge that the boy was not aware he had. They conclude that it is a
mistake to assimilate cases of knowing to cases of doubting, being in pain,
and the like.
But if knowing is not a mental state, what is it? Some philosophers have
held that knowing cannot be described as a single thing, such as a state of
consciousness. Instead, they claim that one can ascribe knowledge to
someone, or to oneself, only when certain complex conditions are
satisfied, among them certain behavioral conditions. For example, if a
person always gives the right answers to questions about a certain topic
under test conditions, one would be entitled, on this view, to say that he
has knowledge of that topic. Because knowing is tied to the capacity to
behave in certain ways, knowledge is not a mental state, though mental
states may be involved in the exercise of the capacity
that constitutes knowledge.
A well-known example of such a view was advanced by J.L. Austin (1911
60) in his 1946 paper Other Minds. Austin claimed that, when one says
I know, one is not describing a mental state; in fact, one is not
describing anything at all. Instead, one is indicating that one is in a
position to assert that such and such is the case (one has the proper
credentials and reasons) in circumstances where it is necessary to resolve
a doubt. When these conditions are satisfiedwhen one is, in fact, in a
position to assert that such and such is the caseone can correctly be
said to know.
Occasional and dispositional knowledge
A distinction closely related to the previous one is that between
occurrent and dispositional knowledge. Occurrent knowledge is
knowledge of which one is currently aware. If one is working on a problem
and suddenly sees the solution, for example, one can be said to have
occurrent knowledge of it, because seeing the solution involves being
aware of or attending to it. In contrast, dispositional knowledge, as the
term suggests, is a disposition, or a propensity, to behave in certain ways
in certain conditions. Although Smith may not now be thinking of his home
address, he certainly knows it in the sense that, if one were to ask him
what it is, he could provide it. Thus, one can have knowledge of things of
which one is not aware at a given moment.
A priori and a posteriori knowledge
Since at least the 17th century, a sharp distinction has been drawn
between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge. The distinction
plays an especially important role in the work of David Hume (171176)
and Immanuel Kant (17241804).
The distinction is easily illustrated by means of examples. Assume that the
sentence All Model T Fords are black is true and compare it to the true
sentence All husbands are married. How would one come to know that
these sentences are true? In the case of the second sentence, the answer
is that one knows that it is true by understanding the meanings of the
words it contains. Because husband means married male, it is true by
definition that all husbands are married. This kind of knowledge is a priori
in the sense that one need not engage in any factual or empirical inquiry
in order to obtain it.
In contrast, just such an investigation is necessary in order to know
whether the first sentence is true. Unlike the second sentence, simply
understanding the words is not enough. Knowledge of this kind is a
posteriori in the sense that it can be obtained only through certain kinds
of experience.
The differences between sentences that express a priori knowledge and
those that express a posteriori knowledge are sometimes described in
terms of four additional distinctions: necessary
versus contingent, analyticversus synthetic, tautological versus
significant, and logical versus factual. These distinctions are normally
spoken of as applying to propositions, which may be thought of as the
contents, or meanings, of sentences that can be either true or false. For
example, the English sentence Snow is white and the German sentence
Schnee ist wei have the same meaning, which is the proposition Snow
is white.
Necessary and contingent propositions
A proposition is said to be necessary if it holds (is true) in all logically
possible circumstances or conditions. All husbands are married is such a
proposition. There are no possible or conceivable conditions in which this
proposition is not true (on the assumption, of course, that the words
husband and married are taken to mean what they ordinarily mean).
In contrast, All Model T Fords are black holds in some circumstances
(those actually obtaining, which is why the proposition is true), but it is
easy to imagine circumstances in which it would not be true. To say,
therefore, that a proposition is contingent is to say that it is true in some
but not in all possible circumstances. Many necessary propositions, such
as All husbands are married, are a priorithough it has been argued
that some are not (see below Necessary a posteriori propositions)and
most contingent propositions are a posteriori.
Analytic and synthetic propositions
A proposition is said to be analytic if the meaning of the predicate term is
contained in the meaning of the subject term. Thus, All husbands are
married is analytic because part of the meaning of the term husband is
being married. A proposition is said to be synthetic if this is not so. All
Model T Fords are black is synthetic, since black is not included in the
meaning of Model T Ford. Some analytic propositions are a priori, and
most synthetic propositions are a posteriori. These distinctions were used
by Kant to ask one of the most important questions in the history of
epistemology, namely, whether a priori synthetic judgments are possible
(see below Modern philosophy: Immanuel Kant).
Tautological and significant propositions
A proposition is said to be tautological if its constituent terms repeat
themselves or if they can be reduced to terms that do, so that the
proposition is of the form a = a (a is identical to a). Such propositions
convey no information about the world, and accordingly they are said to
be trivial, or empty of cognitive import. A proposition is said to be
significant if its constituent terms are such that the proposition does
provide new information about the world.
The distinction between tautological and significant propositions figures
importantly in the history of the philosophy of religion. In the so-
called ontological argument for the existence of God, St. Anselm of
Canterbury (1033/341109) attempted to derive the significant conclusion
that God exists from the tautological premise that God is the only perfect
being together with the premise that no being can be perfect unless it
exists. As Hume and Kant pointed out, however, it is fallacious to derive a
proposition with existential import from a tautology, and it is now
generally agreed that, from a tautology alone, it is impossible to derive
any significant proposition. Tautological propositions are generally a
priori, necessary, and analytic, and significant propositions are generally a
posteriori, contingent, and synthetic.
Logical and factual propositions
A logical proposition is any proposition that can be reduced by
replacement of its constituent terms to a proposition expressing a logical
truthe.g., to a proposition such as If p and q, then p. The proposition
All husbands are married, for example, is logically equivalent to the
proposition If something is married and it is male, then it is married. In
contrast, the semantic and syntactic features of factual propositions make
it impossible to reduce them to logical truths. Logical propositions are
often a priori, always necessary, and typically analytic. Factual
propositions are generally a posteriori, contingent, and synthetic.
Necessary a posteriori propositions
The distinctions reviewed above have been explored extensively in
contemporary philosophy. In one such study, Naming and
Necessity (1972), Saul Kripke argued that, contrary to traditional
assumptions, not all necessary propositions are known a priori; some are
knowable only a posteriori. According to Kripke, the view that all
necessary propositions are a priori relies on a conflation of the concepts of
necessity and analyticity. Because all analytic propositions are both a
priori and necessary, most philosophers have assumed without much
reflection that all necessary propositions are a priori. But this is a mistake,
argues Kripke. His point is usually illustrated by means of a type of
proposition known as an identity statementi.e., a statement of the
form a = a. Thus, consider the true identity statements Venus is
Venus and The morning star is the evening star. Whereas Venus is
Venus is knowable a priori, The morning star [i.e., Venus] is the evening
star [i.e., Venus] is not. It cannot be known merely through reflection,
prior to any experience. In fact, the statement was not known until the
ancient Babylonians discovered, through astronomical observation, that
the heavenly body observed in the morning is the same as the heavenly
body observed in the evening. Hence The morning star is the evening
star is a posteriori. But it is also necessary, because, like Venus is
Venus, it says only that a particular object, Venus, is identical to itself,
and it is impossible to imagine circumstances in which Venus is not the
same as Venus. Other types of proposition that are both necessary and a
posteriori, according to Kripke, are statements of material origin, such as
This table is made of (a particular piece of) wood, and statements of
natural-kind essence, such as Water is H2O. It is important to note that
Kripkes arguments, though influential, have not been universally
accepted, and the existence of necessary a posteriori propositions
continues to be a much-disputed issue.
Description and justification
Throughout its very long history, epistemology has pursued two different
sorts of task: description and justification. The two tasks of description
and justification are not inconsistent, and indeed they are often closely
connected in the writings of contemporary philosophers.
In its descriptive task, epistemology aims to depict accurately certain
features of the world, including the contents of the human mind, and to
determine what kinds of mental content, if any, ought to count as
knowledge. An example of a descriptive epistemological system is
the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (18591938). Husserls aim was to
give an exact description of the phenomenon of intentionality, or the
feature of conscious mental states by virtue of which they are always
about, or directed toward, some object. In his posthumously
published masterpiece Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein
states that explanation must be replaced by description, and much of
his later work was devoted to carrying out that task. Other examples of
descriptive epistemology can be found in the work of G.E. Moore (1873
1958), H.H. Price (18991984), and Bertrand Russell (18721970), each of
whom considered whether there are ways of apprehending the world that
do not depend on any form of inference and, if so, what
this apprehension consists of (see belowContemporary philosophy:
Perception and knowledge). Closely related to this work were attempts by
various philosophers, including Moritz Schlick (18821936), Otto
Neurath (18821945), and A.J. Ayer (191089), to identify protocol
sentencesi.e., statements that describe what is immediately given in
experience without inference.
Epistemology has a second justificatory, or normative, function.
Philosophers concerned with this function ask themselves what kinds of
belief (if any) can be rationally justified. The question has normative
import since it asks, in effect, what one ought ideally to believe. (In this
respect, epistemology parallels ethics, which asks normative questions
about how one ought ideally to act.) The normative approach quickly takes
one into the central domains of epistemology, raising questions such as:
Is knowledge identical with justified true belief?, Is the difference
between knowledge and belief merely a matter of probability?, and
What is justification?
Knowledge and certainty
Philosophers have disagreed sharply about the complex relationship
between the concepts of knowledge and certainty. Are they the same? If
not, how do they differ? Is it possible for someone to know that p without
being certain that p, or to be certain that p without knowing that p? Is it
possible for p to be certain without being known by someone, or to be
known by someone without being certain?
In his 1941 paper Certainty, Moore observed that the word certain is
commonly used in four main types of idiom: I feel certain that, I am
certain that, I know for certain that, and It is certain that. He
pointed out that there is at least one use of I know for certain that p
and It is certain that p on which neither of these sentences can be true
unless p is true. A sentence such as I knew for certain that he would
come but he didnt, for example, is self-contradictory, whereas I felt
certain he would come but he didnt is not. On the basis of
considerations like these, Moore contended that a thing cant be certain
unless it is known. It is this fact that distinguishes the concept of
certainty from that of truth: a thing that nobody knows may quite well be
true, but cannot possibly be certain. Moore concluded that a necessary
condition for the truth of It is certain that p is that somebody should
know that p. Moore is therefore among the philosophers who answer in
the negative the question of whether it is possible for p to be certain
without being known.
Moore also argued that to say A knows that p is true cannot be a
sufficient condition for It is certain that p. If it were, it would follow
that, in any case in which at least one person did know that p is true, it
would always be false for anyone to say It is not certain that p; but
clearly this is not so. If a person says that it is not certain that Smith is
still alive, he is not thereby committing himself to the statement that
nobody knows that Smith is still alive. Moore is thus among the
philosophers who would answer in the affirmative the question of whether
it is possible for p to be known without being certain. Other philosophers
have disagreed, arguing that, if a persons knowledge that p is occurrent
rather than merely dispositional, it implies certainty that p.
The most radical position on these matters is the one taken
by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. Wittgenstein holds that knowledge is
radically different from certitude and that neither concept entails the
other. It is thus possible to be in a state of knowledge without being
certain and to be certain without having knowledge. For him, certainty is
to be identified not with apprehension, or seeing, but with a kind of
acting. A proposition is certain, in other words, when its truth (and the
truth of many related propositions) is presupposed in the various social
activities of a community. As he says: Giving grounds, justifying the
evidence comes to an endbut the end is not certain propositions striking
us immediately as truei.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our
acting which lies at the bottom of the language game.
The origins of knowledge
Philosophers wish to know not only what knowledge is but also how it
arises. This desire is motivated in part by the assumption that an
investigation into the origins of knowledge can shed light on its nature.
Accordingly, such investigations have been one of the major themes of
epistemology from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present.
Platos Republic contains one of the earliest systematic arguments to
show that sense experience cannot be a source of knowledge. The
argument begins with the assertion that ordinary persons have a clear
grasp of certain conceptse.g., the concept of equality. In other words,
people know what it means to say that a and b are equal, no matter what
a and b are. But where does such knowledge come from? Consider the
claim that two pieces of wood are of equal length. A close visual
inspection would show them to differ slightly, and the more detailed the
inspection, the more disparity one would notice. It follows that visual
experience cannot be the source of the concept of equality. Plato applies
this line of reasoning to all five senses and concludes that such knowledge
cannot originate in sense experience. As in the Meno, discussed above,
Plato concludes that such knowledge is recollected by the soul from an
earlier existence.
It is highly significant that Plato should use mathematical (specifically,
geometrical) examples to show that knowledge does not originate in
sense experience; indeed, it is a sign of his perspicacity. As the
subsequent history of philosophy reveals, mathematics provides the
strongest case for Platos view. Mathematical entitiese.g., perfect
triangles, disembodied surfaces and edges, lines without thickness, and
extensionless pointsare abstractions, none of which exists in the
physical world apprehended by the senses. Our knowledge of such
entities, it is argued, must therefore come from some other source.
Innate and acquired knowledge
The problem of the origins of knowledge has engendered two historically
important kinds of debate. One of them concerns the question of whether
knowledge is innatei.e., present in the mind, in some sense, from birth
or acquired through experience. This matter has been important not only
in philosophy but also, since the mid-20th century, in linguistics and
psychology. The American linguist Noam Chomsky, for example, has
argued that the ability of young (developmentally normal) children to
acquire any human language on the basis of invariably incomplete and
even incorrect data is proof of the existence of innate linguistic
structures. In contrast, the experimental psychologist B.F. Skinner (1904
90), a leading figure in the movement known as behaviourism, tried to
show that all knowledge, including linguistic knowledge, is the product
of learning through environmental conditioning by means of processes of
reinforcement and reward. There also have been a range of compromise
theories, which claim that humans have both innate and acquired
knowledge.
Rationalism and empiricism
The second debate related to the problem of the origins of knowledge is
that between rationalism and empiricism. According to rationalists, the
ultimate source of human knowledge is the faculty of reason; according to
empiricists, it is experience. The nature of reason is a difficult problem,
but it is generally assumed to be a unique feature or faculty of the mind
through which truths about reality may be grasped. Such a thesis is
double-sided: it holds, on the one hand, that reality is in principle
knowable and, on the other hand, that there is a human faculty (or set of
faculties) capable of knowing it. One thus might define rationalism as the
theory that there is an isomorphism (a mirroring relationship) between
reason and reality that makes it possible for the former to apprehend the
latter just as it is. Rationalists contend that, if such a correspondence
were lacking, it would be impossible for human beings to understand the
world.
Almost no philosopher has been a strict, thoroughgoing empiricisti.e.,
one who holds that literally all knowledge comes from experience.
Even John Locke (16321704), considered the father of modern empiricism,
thought that there is some knowledge that does not derive from
experience, though he held that it was trifling and empty of content.
Hume held similar views.
Empiricism thus generally acknowledges the existence of a priori
knowledge but denies its significance. Accordingly, it is more accurately
defined as the theory that all significant or factual propositions are known
through experience. Even defined in this way, however, it continues to
contrast significantly with rationalism. Rationalists hold that human
beings have knowledge that is prior to experience and yet significant.
Empiricists deny that this is possible.
The term experience is usually understood to refer to ordinary physical
sensationsor in Humes parlance, impressions. For strict empiricists
this definition has the implication that the human mind is passivea
tabula rasa that receives impressions and more or less records them as
they are.
The conception of the mind as a tabula rasa posed serious challenges for
empiricists. It raised the question, for example, of how one can have
knowledge of entities, such as dragons, that cannot be found in
experience. The response of classical empiricists such as Locke and Hume
was to show that the complex concept of a dragon can be reduced
to simple concepts (such as wings, the body of a snake, the head of a
horse), all of which derive from impressions. On such a view the mind is
still considered primarily passive, but it is conceded that it has the power
to combine simple ideas into complex ones.
But there are further difficulties. The empiricist must explain how abstract
ideas, such as the concept of a perfect triangle, can be reduced to
elements apprehended by the senses when no perfect triangles are found
in nature. He must also give an account of how general concepts are
possible. It is obvious that one does not experience mankind through
the senses; yet such concepts are meaningful, and propositions containing
them are known to be true. The same difficulty applies to colour concepts.
Some empiricists have argued that one arrives at the concept of red, for
example, by mentally abstracting from ones experience of individual red
items. The difficulty with this suggestion is that one cannot know what to
count as an experience of red unless one already has a concept of red in
mind. If it is replied that the concept of red and others like it are acquired
when we are taught the word red in childhood, a similar difficulty arises.
The teaching process, according to the empiricist, consists of pointing to a
red object and telling the child This is red. This process is repeated a
number of times until the child forms the concept of red by abstracting
from the series of examples he is shown. But these examples are
necessarily very limited: they do not include even a fraction of the shades
of red the child might ever see. Consequently, it is possible for the child to
abstract or generalize from them in a variety of different ways, only some
of which would correspond to the way the community of adult language
users happens to apply the term red. How then does the child know which
abstraction is the right one to draw from the examples? According to
the rationalist, the only way to account for the childs selection of the
correct concept is to suppose that at least part of it is innate.
Skepticism
Many philosophers, as well as many people studying philosophy for the
first time, have been struck by the seemingly indecisive nature of
philosophical argumentation. For every argument there seems to be a
counterargument, and for every position a counterposition. To a
considerable extent, skepticism is born of such reflection. Some ancient
skeptics contended that all arguments are equally bad and, accordingly,
that nothing can be proved. The contemporary American
philosopher Benson Mates, who claims to be a modern representative of
this tradition, has argued that all philosophical arguments are equally
good.
Ironically, skepticism itself is a kind of philosophy, and the question has
been raised whether it manages to escape its own criticisms. The answer
to this question depends on what is meant by skepticism. Historically, the
term refers to a variety of different views and practices. But however it is
understood, skepticism represents a challenge to the claim that human
beings possess or can acquire knowledge.
In giving even this minimal characterization, it is important to emphasize
that skeptics and nonskeptics alike accept the same definition of
knowledge, one that implies two things: (1) if A knows that p, then p is
true, and (2) if A knows that p, then A cannot be mistaken; i.e., it is
logically impossible that he is wrong. Thus, if a person says that he knows
Smith will arrive at nine oclock and Smith does not arrive at nine oclock,
then that person must withdraw his claim to know. He might say instead
that he thought he knew or that he felt sure, but he cannot rationally
continue to insist that he knew if what he claimed to know turns out to be
false.
Given this definition of knowledge, in order for the skeptical challenge to
succeed, it is not necessary to show that the person who claims to know
that p is in fact mistaken; it is enough to show that a mistake is
logically possible. This condition corresponds to the second of the two
clauses mentioned above. If the skeptic can establish that this clause is
false in the case of a persons claim to know that p, he will have proved
that the person does not know that p. Thus arises the skeptics practice of
searching for possible counterexamples to ordinary knowledge claims.
One variety of radical skepticism claims that there is no such thing as
knowledge of an external world. According to this view, it is at least
logically possible that one is merely a brain in a vat and that ones sense
experiences of apparently real objects (e.g., the sight of a tree) are
produced by carefully engineered electrical stimulations. Again, given the
definition of knowledge above, this kind of argument is sound, because it
shows that there is a logical gap between knowledge claims about the
external world and the sense experiences that can be adduced as
evidence to support them. No matter how much evidence of this sort one
has, it is always logically possible that the corresponding knowledge claim
is false.

The History Of Epistemology

Ancient philosophy
RELATED TOPICS
foundationalism
Plato
sensationalism
Pramana-varttika
tabula rasa
innate idea
analytic-synthetic distinction
coherentism
sense-data
Aristotle
The pre-Socratics

The central focus of ancient Greek philosophy was the problem of motion.
Many pre-Socratic philosophers thought that no logically coherent account
of motion and change could be given. Although this problem was primarily
a concern of metaphysics, not epistemology, it had the consequence that
all major Greek philosophers held that knowledge must not itself change
or be changeable in any respect. This requirement motivated Parmenides
(fl. 5th century bc), for example, to hold that thinking is identical with
being (i.e., all objects of thought exist and are unchanging) and that it
is impossible to think of nonbeing or becoming in any way.

Plato
Plato accepted the Parmenidean constraint that knowledge must be
unchanging. One consequence of this view, as Plato pointed out in the
Theaetetus, is that sense experience cannot be a source of knowledge,
because the objects apprehended through it are subject to change. To the
extent that humans have knowledge, they attain it by transcending sense
experience in order to discover unchanging objects through the exercise
of reason.

The Platonic theory of knowledge thus contains two parts: first, an investigation into
the nature of unchanging objects and, second, a discussion of how these objects
can be known through reason. Of the many literary devices Plato used to illustrate
his theory, the best known is the allegory of the cave, which appears in Book VII of
the Republic. The allegory depicts people living in a cave, which represents the
world of sense-experience. In the cave people see only unreal objects, shadows, or
images. Through a painful intellectual process, which involves the rejection and
overcoming of the familiar sensible world, they begin an ascent out of the cave into
reality. This process is the analogue of the exercise of reason, which allows one to
apprehend unchanging objects and thus to acquire knowledge. The upward journey,
which few people are able to complete, culminates in the direct vision of the Sun,
which represents the source of knowledge.

Platos investigation of unchanging objects begins with the observation that every
faculty of the mind apprehends a unique set of objects: hearing apprehends sounds,
sight apprehends visual images, smell apprehends odours, and so on. Knowing also
is a mental faculty, according to Plato, and therefore there must be a unique set of
objects that it apprehends. Roughly speaking, these objects are the entities denoted
by terms that can be used as predicatese.g., good, white, and triangle. To
say This is a triangle, for example, is to attribute a certain property, that of being
a triangle, to a certain spatiotemporal object, such as a figure drawn in the sand.
Plato is here distinguishing between specific triangles that are drawn, sketched, or
painted and the common property they share, that of being triangular. Objects of
the former kind, which he calls particulars, are always located somewhere in
space and timei.e., in the world of appearance. The property they share is a
form or idea (though the latter term is not used in any psychological sense).
Unlike particulars, forms do not exist in space and time; moreover, they do not
change. They are thus the objects that one apprehends when one has knowledge.
Reason is used to discover unchanging forms through the method of dialectic, which
Plato inherited from his teacher Socrates. The method involves a process of
question and answer designed to elicit a real definition. By a real definition Plato
means a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that exactly determine the
entities to which a given concept applies. The entities to which the concept being a
brother applies, for example, are determined by the concepts being male and
being a sibling: it is both necessary and sufficient for a person to be a brother that
he be male and a sibling. Anyone who grasps these conditions understands
precisely what being a brother is.

In the Republic, Plato applies the dialectical method to the concept of justice. In
response to a proposal by Cephalus that justice means the same as honesty in
word and deed, Socrates points out that, under some conditions, it is just not to tell
the truth or to repay debts. Suppose one borrows a weapon from a person who later
loses his sanity. If the person then demands his weapon back in order to kill
someone who is innocent, it would be just to lie to him, stating that one no longer
had the weapon. Therefore, justice cannot mean the same as honesty in word
and deed. By this technique of proposing one definition after another and
subjecting each to possible counterexamples, Socrates attempts to discover a
definition that cannot be refuted. In doing so he apprehends the form of justice, the
common feature that all just things share.
latos search for definitions and, thereby, forms is a search for knowledge. But how
should knowledge in general be defined? In the Theaetetus Plato argues that, at a
minimum, knowledge involves true belief. No one can know what is false. A person
may believe that he knows something, which is in fact false, but in that case he
does not really know, he only thinks he knows. But knowledge is more than simply
true belief. Suppose that someone has a dream in April that there will be an
earthquake in September, and on the basis of his dream he forms the belief that
there will be an earthquake in September. Suppose also that in fact there is an
earthquake in September. The person has a true belief about the earthquake, but
not knowledge of it. What he lacks is a good reason to support his true belief. In a
word, he lacks justification. Using arguments such as these, Plato contends that
knowledge is justified true belief.

Although there has been much disagreement about the nature of justification, the
Platonic definition of knowledge was widely accepted until the mid-20th century,
when the American philosopher Edmund L. Gettier produced a startling
counterexample. Suppose that Kathy knows Oscar very well. Kathy is walking across
the mall, and Oscar is walking behind her, out of sight. In front of her, Kathy sees
someone walking toward her who looks exactly like Oscar. Unbeknownst to her,
however, it is Oscars twin brother. Kathy forms the belief that Oscar is walking
across the mall. Her belief is true, because Oscar is in fact walking across the mall
(though she does not see him doing it). And her true belief seems to be justified,
because the evidence she has for it is the same as the evidence she would have
had if the person she had seen were really Oscar and not Oscars twin. In other
words, if her belief that Oscar is walking across the mall is justified when the person
she sees is Oscar, then it also must be justified when the person she sees is Oscars
twin, because in both cases the evidencethe sight of an Oscar-like figure walking
across the mallis the same. Nonetheless, Kathy does not know that Oscar is
walking across the mall. According to Gettier, the problem is that Kathys belief is
not causally connected to its object (Oscar) in the right way.

Aristotle

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle (384322 bc) claims that each science consists
of a set of first principles, which are necessarily true and knowable directly, and a
set of truths, which are both logically derivable from and causally explained by the
first principles. The demonstration of a scientific truth is accomplished by means of
a series of syllogismsa form of argument invented by Aristotlein which the
premises of each syllogism in the series are justified as the conclusions of earlier
syllogisms. In each syllogism, the premises not only logically necessitate the
conclusion (i.e., the truth of the premises makes it logically impossible for the
conclusion to be false) but causally explain it as well. Thus, in the syllogism
All stars are distant objects.All distant objects twinkle.Therefore, all stars twinkle.
the fact that stars twinkle is explained by the fact that all distant objects twinkle
and the fact that stars are distant objects. The premises of the first syllogism in the
series are first principles, which do not require demonstration, and the conclusion of
the final syllogism is the scientific truth in question.
Much of what Aristotle says about knowledge is part of his doctrine about the nature
of the soul, and in particular the human soul. As he uses the term, the soul (psyche)
of a thing is what makes it alive; thus, every living thing, including plant life, has a
soul. The mind or intellect (nous) can be described variously as a power, faculty,
part, or aspect of the human soul. It should be noted that for Aristotle soul and
intellect are scientific terms.

In an enigmatic passage, Aristotle claims that actual knowledge is identical with its
object. By this he seems to mean something like the following. When a person
learns something, he acquires it in some sense. What he acquires must be either
different from the thing he knows or identical with it. If it is different, then there is a
discrepancy between what he has in mind and the object of his knowledge. But such
a discrepancy seems to be incompatible with the existence of knowledge. For
knowledge, which must be true and accurate, cannot deviate from its object in any
way. One cannot know that blue is a colour, for example, if the object of that
knowledge is something other than that blue is a colour. This idea, that knowledge
is identical with its object, is dimly reflected in the modern formula for expressing
one of the necessary conditions of knowledge: A knows that p only if it is true that
p.

To assert that knowledge and its object must be identical raises a question: In what
way is knowledge in a person? Suppose that Smith knows what dogs arei.e., he
knows what it is to be a dog. Then, in some sense, dogs, or being a dog, must be in
the mind of Smith. But how can this be? Aristotle derives his answer from his
general theory of reality. According to him, all (terrestrial) substances are composed
of two principles: form and matter. All dogs, for example, consist of a formthe
form of being a dogand matter, which is the stuff out of which they are made. The
form of an object makes it the kind of thing it is. Matter, on the other hand, is
literally unintelligible. Consequently, what is in the knower when he knows what
dogs are is just the form of being a dog.
In his sketchy account of the process of thinking in De anima (On the Soul), Aristotle
says that the intellect, like everything else, must have two parts:
something analogous to matter and something analogous to form. The first of these
is the passive intellect; the second is active intellect, of which Aristotle speaks
tersely. Intellect in this sense is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its
essential nature activity. When intellect is set free from its present conditions it
appears as just what it is and nothing more: it alone is immortal and eternaland
without it nothing thinks.
This part of Aristotles views about knowledge is an extension of what he says about
sensation. According to him, sensation occurs when the sense organ is stimulated
by the sense object, typically through some medium, such as light for vision and air
for hearing. This stimulation causes a sensible species to be generated in the
sense organ itself. This species is some sort of representation of the object
sensed. As Aristotle describes the process, the sense organ receives the form of
sensible objects without the matter, just as the wax receives the impression of the
signet-ring without the iron or the gold.
Ancient Skepticism
After the death of Aristotle the next significant development in the history of
epistemology was the rise of Skepticism, of which there were at least two kinds. The
first, Academic Skepticism, arose in the Academy (the school founded by Plato) in
the 3rd century bc and was propounded by the Greek
philosopher Arcesilaus (c. 315c. 240 bc), about whom Cicero (10643 bc), Sextus
Empiricus (fl. 3rd century ad), and Diogenes Lartius (fl. 3rd century ad) provide
information. The Academic Skeptics, who are sometimes called dogmatic
Skeptics, argued that nothing could be known with certainty. This form of Skepticism
seems susceptible to the objection, raised by the Stoic Antipater (fl. c. 135 bc) and
others, that the view is self-contradictory. To know that knowledge is impossible is to
know something; hence, dogmaticSkepticism must be false.
Carneades (c. 213129 bc), also a member of the Academy, developed a subtle
reply to this charge. Academic Skepticism, he insisted, is not a theory about
knowledge or the world but rather a kind of argumentative strategy. According to
this strategy, the skeptic does not try to prove that he knows nothing. Instead, he
simply assumes that he knows nothing and defends that assumption against attack.
The burden of proof, in other words, is on those who believe that knowledge is
possible.
Carneades interpretation of Academic Skepticism renders it very similar to the
other major kind, Pyrrhonism, which takes its name from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365
275 bc). Pyrrhonists, while not asserting or denying anything, attempted to show
that one ought to suspend judgment and avoid making any knowledge claims at all,
even the negative claim that nothing is known. The Pyrrhonists strategy was to
show that, for every proposition supported by some evidence, there is an opposite
proposition supported by evidence that is equally good. Arguments like these, which
are designed to refute both sides of an issue, are known as tropes. The judgment
that a tower is round when seen at a distance, for example, is contradicted by the
judgment that the tower is square when seen up close. The judgment that
Providence cares for all things, which is supported by the orderliness of the
heavenly bodies, is contradicted by the judgment that many good people suffer
misery and many bad people enjoy happiness. The judgment that apples have
many propertiesshape, colour, taste, and aromaeach of which affects a sense
organ, is contradicted by the equally good possibility that apples have only one
property that affects each sense organ differently.
What is at stake in these arguments is the problem of the criterioni.e., the
problem of determining a justifiable standard against which to measure the worth or
validity of judgments, or claims to knowledge. According to the Pyrrhonists, every
possible criterion is either groundless or inconclusive. Thus, suppose that something
is offered as a criterion. The Pyrrhonist will ask what justification there is for it. If no
justification is offered, then the criterion is groundless. If, on the other hand, a
justification is produced, then the justification itself is either justified or it is not. If it
is not justified, then again the criterion is groundless. If it is justified, then there
must be some criterion that justifies it. But this is just what the dogmatist was
supposed to have provided in the first place.
If the Pyrrhonist needed to make judgments in order to survive, he would be in
trouble. In fact, however, there is a way of living that bypasses judgment. He can
live quite nicely, according to Sextus, by following custom and accepting things as
they appear to him. In doing so, he does not judge the correctness of anything but
merely accepts appearances for what they are.
Ancient Pyrrhonism is not strictly an epistemology, since it has no theory of
knowledge and is content to undermine the dogmatic epistemologies of others,
especially Stoicism and Epicureanism. Pyrrho himself was said to have
had ethical motives for attacking dogmatists: being reconciled to not knowing
anything, Pyrrho thought, induced serenity (ataraxia).
St. Augustine
St. Augustine of Hippo (354430) claimed that human knowledge would be
impossible if God did not illumine the human mind and thereby allow it to see,
grasp, or understand ideas. Ideas as Augustine construed them arelike Platos
timeless, immutable, and accessible only to the mind. They are indeed in some
mysterious way a part of God and seen in God. Illumination, the other element of
the theory, was for Augustine and his many followers, at least through the 14th
century, a technical notion, built upon a visual metaphor inherited
from Plotinus (205270) and other Neoplatonic thinkers. According to this view, the
human mind is like an eye that can see when and only when God, the source of
light, illumines it. Varying his metaphor, Augustine sometimes says that the human
mind participates in God and even, as in On the Teacher (389), that Christ
illumines the mind by dwelling in it. It is important to emphasize that Augustines
theory of illumination concerns all knowledge, and not specifically mystical or
spiritual knowledge.
Before he articulated this theory in his mature years, soon after his conversion to
Christianity, Augustine was concerned to refute the Skepticism of the Academy.
In Against the Academicians (386) he claimed that, if nothing else, humans know
disjunctive tautologies such as Either there is one world or there is not one world
and Either the world is finite or it is infinite. Humans also know many propositions
that begin with the phrase It appears to me that, such as It appears to me that
what I perceive is made up of earth and sky, or what appears to be earth and sky.
Furthermore, they know logical (or what he calls dialectical) propositionsfor
example, If there are four elements in the world, there are not five, If there is one
sun, there are not two, One and the same soul cannot die and still be immortal,
and Man cannot at the same time be happy and unhappy.
Many other refutations of Skepticism occur in Augustines later works, notably On
the Free Choice of the Will (389395), On the Trinity (399/400416/421), and The
City of God (413426/427). In the last of these, Augustine proposes other examples
of things about which people can be absolutely certain. Again in explicit refutation
of the Skeptics of the Academy, he argues that, if a person is deceived, then it is
certain that he exists. Expressing the point in the first person, as Ren
Descartes (15961650) did some 1,200 years later, Augustine says, If I am
deceived, then I exist (Si fallor, sum). A variation on this line of reasoning appears
in On the Trinity, where he argues that, if he is deceived, he is at least certain that
he is alive.
Augustine also points out that, since he knows, he knows that he knows; and he
notes that this can be reiterated an infinite number of times: If I know that I know
that I am alive, then I know that I know that I know that I am alive. In 20th-century
epistemic logic, this thesis was codified as the axiom If A knows that p, then A
knows that A knows that p. In The City of God Augustine claims that he knows that
he loves: For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I
love I am not deceived. With Skepticism thus refuted, Augustine simply denies that
he has ever been able to doubt what he has learned through his sensations or even
through the testimony of most people.
One thousand years passed before Skepticism recovered from Augustines
criticisms, but then it arose like the phoenix of Egyptian mythology. Meanwhile,
Augustines Platonic epistemology dominated the Middle Ages until the mid-13th
century, when St. Albertus Magnus (120080) and his student St. Thomas
Aquinas (1224/2574) developed an alternative to Augustinian illuminationism.
Medieval philosophy
St. Anselm of Canterbury
The phrase that St. Anselm of Canterbury (c. 10331109) used to describe his
philosophynamely, faith seeking reason (fides quaerens intellectum)well
characterizes medieval philosophy as a whole. All the great medieval philosophers
Christian, Jewish, and Islamic alikewere also theologians. Virtually every object of
interest was related to their belief in God, and virtually every solution to every
problem, including the problem of knowledge, contained God as an essential part.
Indeed, Anselm himself equated truth and intelligibility with God. As he noted at the
beginning of his Proslogion (107778), however, there is a tension between the view
that God is truth and intelligibility and the fact that humans have no perception of
God. How can there be knowledge of God, he asks, when all knowledge comes
through the senses and God, being immaterial, cannot be sensed? His answer is to
distinguish between knowing something by being acquainted with it through
sensation and knowing something through a description. Knowledge by description
is possible using concepts formed on the basis of sensation. Thus, all knowledge of
God depends upon the description that he is the thing than which a greater cannot
be conceived. From this premise Anselm infers, in his ontological argument for the
existence of God, that humans can know that there exists a God that is all-powerful,
all-knowing, all-just, all-merciful, and immaterial. Eight hundred years later, Russell
would develop an epistemological theory based on a similar distinction between
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, though he would have
vigorously denied that the distinction could be used to show that God exists.
St. Thomas Aquinas
With the translation into Latin of Aristotles On the Soul in the early 13th century,
the Platonic and Augustinian epistemology that dominated the early Middle Ages
was gradually displaced. Following Aristotle, Aquinas recognized different kinds of
knowledge. Sensory knowledge arises from sensing particular things. Because it has
individual things as its object and is shared with brute animals, however, sensory
knowledge is a lower form of awareness than scientific knowledge, which is
characterized by generality. To say that scientific knowledge is characteristically
general is not to diminish the importance of specificity: scientific knowledge also
should be rich in detail, and Gods knowledge is the most detailed of all. The detail,
however, must be essential to the kind of thing being studied and not peculiar to
certain instances of it. Aquinas thought that, though the highest knowledge humans
can possess is knowledge of God, knowledge of physical objects is better suited to
human capabilities. Only this kind of knowledge will be considered here.
Aquinass discussion of knowledge in the Summa theologiae is an elaboration on the
thought of Aristotle. Aquinas claims that knowledge is obtained when the active
intellect abstracts a concept from an image received from the senses. In one
account of this process, abstraction is the act of isolating from an image of a
particular object the elements that are essential to its being an object of that kind.
From the image of a dog, for example, the intellect abstracts the ideas of being
alive, being capable of reproduction and movement, and whatever else might be
essential to being a dog. These ideas are distinguished from ideas of properties that
are peculiar to particular dogs, such as the property of being owned by Smith or the
property of weighing 20 pounds.
As stated earlier, Aristotle typically spoke of the form of an object as being in the
mind or intellect of the knower and the matter as being outside it. Although it was
necessary for Aristotle to say something like this in order to escape the absurdity of
holding that material objects exist in the mind exactly as they do in the physical
world, there is something unsatisfying about it. Physical things contain matter as an
essential element, and, if their matter is no part of what is known, then it seems
that human knowledge is incomplete. In order to counter this worry, Aquinas revised
Aristotles theory to say that not only the form but also the species of an object is
in the intellect. A species is a combination of form and something like a general idea
of matter, which Aquinas called common matter. Common matter is contrasted
with individuated matter, which is the stuff that comprises the physical bulk of an
object. One objection to this theory is that it seems to follow from it that the objects
of human knowledge are ideas rather than things. That is, if knowing a thing
consists of having its form and species in ones intellect, then it appears that the
form and species, not the thing, is what is known. It might seem, then, that
Aquinass view is a type of idealism.
Aquinas had anticipated this kind of criticism in a number of ways. Because it
includes the idea of matter, the species of an object seems more like the object
itself than does an immaterial Aristotelian form. Moreover, for Aquinas science does
not aim at knowing any particular object but rather at knowing what is common to
all objects of a certain kind. In this respect, Aquinass views are similar to those of
modern scientists. For example, the particular billiard ball that Smith drops from his
window is of no direct concern to physics. What physicists are interested in are the
laws that govern the behaviour of any falling object.
As assuaging as these considerations might be, they do not blunt the main force of
the objection. In order to meet it, Aquinas introduced a distinction between what is
known and that by which what is known is known. To specify what is knownsay, an
individual dogis to specify the object of knowledge; to specify that by which what
is known is knownsay, the image or the species of a dogis to specify the
apparatus of knowledge. Thus the species of a thing that is known is not itself an
object of knowledge, though it can become an object of knowledge by being
reflected upon.
John Duns Scotus
Although he accepted some aspects of Aristotelian abstractionism, John Duns
Scotus (c. 12661308) did not base his account of human knowledge on this alone.
According to him, there are four classes of things that can be known with certainty.
First, there are things that are knowable simpliciter, including true identity
statements such as Cicero is Tully and propositions, later called analytic, such as
Man is rational. Duns Scotus claims that such truths coincide with that which
makes them true. One consequence of this view is that the negation of a simple
truth is always inconsistent, even if it is not explicitly contradictory. The negation of
The whole is greater than any proper part, for example, is not explicitly
contradictory, as is Snow is white and snow is not white. Nevertheless it is
inconsistent, because there is no possible situation in which it is true.
The second class consists of things that are known through experience, where
experience is understood in an Aristotelian sense implying numerous encounters.
The knowledge afforded by experience is inductive, grounded in the principle that
whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free is the natural
effect of that cause. It is important to note that Duns Scotuss confidence
in induction did not survive the Middle Ages. Nicholas of Autrecourt (130050),
whose views anticipated the radical skepticism of Hume, argued at length that no
amount of observed correlation between two types of events is sufficient to
establish a necessary causal connection between them, and thus
that inferencesbased on causal assumptions are never rationally justified.
The third class consists of things that directly concern ones own actions. Humans
who are awake, for example, know immediately and with certaintyand not through
any inferencethat they are awake; similarly, they know with certainty that they
think and that they see and hear and have other sense experiences. Even if a sense
experience is caused by a defective sense organ, it remains true that one is directly
aware of the content of the sensation. When one has the sensation of seeing a
round object, for example, one is directly aware of the roundness, even if the thing
one is seeing is not really round.
Finally, the fourth class contains things that are knowable through the human
senses. Apparently unconcerned by the threat of Skepticism, Duns Scotus
maintained that sensation affords knowledge of the heavens, the earth, the sea,
and all the things that are in them.
Duns Scotuss most important contribution to epistemology is his distinction
between intuitive and abstractive cognition. Intuitive cognition is the immediate
and indubitable awareness of the existence of a thing. It is knowledge precisely of
a present object [known] as being present and of an existent object [known] as
being existent. If a person sees Socrates before him, then, according to Duns
Scotus, he has intuitive knowledge of the proposition that Socrates exists and of the
proposition that Socrates is the cause of that knowledge. Abstractive cognition, in
contrast, is knowledge about a thing that is abstracted from, or logically
independent of, that things actual existence or nonexistence.
William of Ockham
Several parts of Duns Scotuss account are vulnerable to Skeptical challengese.g.,
his endorsement of the certainty of knowledge based on sensation and his claim
that intuitive knowledge of an object guarantees its existence. William of
Ockham (c. 12851349?) radically revised Duns Scotuss theory of intuitive
knowledge. Unlike Duns Scotus, Ockham did not require the object of intuitive
knowledge to exist; nor did he hold that intuitive knowledge must be caused by its
object. To the question, What is the distinction between intuitive and abstractive
knowledge?, Ockham answered that they are simply different. His answer
notwithstanding, it is characteristic of intuitive knowledge, according to Ockham,
that it is unmediated. There is no gap between the knower and the known that
might undermine certainty: I say that the thing itself is known immediately without
any medium between itself and the act by which it is seen or apprehended.
According to Ockham, there are two kinds of intuitive knowledge: natural and
supernatural. In cases of natural intuitive knowledge, the object exists, the knower
judges that the object exists, and the object causes the knowledge. In cases of
supernatural intuitive knowledge, the object does not exist, the knower judges that
the object does not exist, and God is the cause of the knowledge.
Ockham recognized that God might cause a person to think that he has intuitive
knowledge of an existent object when in fact there is no such object. But this would
be a case of false belief, he contends, not intuitive knowledge. Unfortunately, by
acknowledging that there is no way to distinguish between genuine intuitive
knowledge and divine counterfeits, Ockham effectively conceded the issue to the
Skeptics.
Later medieval philosophy followed a fairly straight path toward Skepticism. John of
Mirecourt (fl. 14th century) was censured by the University of Paris in 1347 for
maintaining, among other things, that external reality cannot be known with
certainty because God can cause illusions to seem real. A year earlier, Nicholas of
Autrecourt was condemned by Pope Clement VI for holding that one can have
certain knowledge only of the logical principles of identity and contradiction and the
immediate reports of sensation. As noted above, he denied that causal relations
exist; he also denied the reality of substance. He credited these errors, along with
many others, to Aristotle, about whom he said: In all his natural philosophy and
metaphysics, Aristotle had hardly reached two evidently certain conclusions,
perhaps not even a single one. By this time, the link between Skepticism and
criticism of Aristotle had become fairly strong. In On My Ignorance and That of Many
Others (1367), for example, the Italian poet Petrarch (130474) cited Aristotle as
the most famous of those who do not have knowledge.
Scientific theology to secular science
For most of the Middle Ages there was no distinction between theology and science
(scientia). Science was knowledge that was deduced from self-evident principles,
and theology received its principles from God, the source of all principles. By the
14th century, however, scientific and theological thinking began to diverge. Roughly
speaking, theologians began to argue that human knowledge was narrowly
circumscribed. They often invoked the omnipotence of God in order to undercut the
pretensions of human reason, and in place of rationalism in theology they promoted
a kind of fideism (i.e., a philosophy based entirely on faith).
The Italian theologian Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358) exemplified this development.
Inspired by Ockham, Gregory argued that, whereas science concerns what is
accessible to humans through natural meansi.e., through sensation and
intelligencetheology deals with what is accessible only in a supernatural way.
Thus, theology is not scientific. The role of theology is to explain the meaning of the
Bible and the articles of faith and to deduce conclusions from them. Since the
credibility of the Bible rests upon belief in divine revelation, theology lacks a rational
foundation. Furthermore, since there is neither self-evident knowledge of God nor
any natural experience of him, humans can have only an abstract understanding of
what he is.
Ockham and Gregory did not intend their views to undermine theology. To the
contrary, for them, theology is in a sense more certain than science, because it is
built upon principles that are guaranteed to be true by God, whereas the principles
of science must be as fallible as their human creators. Unfortunately for theology,
the prestige of science increased in the 16th century and skyrocketed in the 17th
and 18th centuries. Modern thinkers preferred to reach their own conclusions using
reason and experience, even if ultimately these conclusions did not have the
authority of God to support them. As theologians lost confidence in reason, other
thinkers, who had little or no commitment to Aristotelian thought, became its
champions, thus furthering the development of modern science.
Modern philosophy
Faith and reason
Although modern philosophers as a group are usually thought to be
purely secular thinkers, in fact nothing could be further from the truth. From the
early 17th century until the middle of the 18th century, all the great philosophers
incorporated substantial religious elements into their work. In
his Meditations (1641), for example, Descartes offered two distinct proofs of the
existence of God and asserted that no one who does not have a rationally well-
founded belief in God can have knowledge in the proper sense of the term. Benedict
de Spinoza (163277) began his Ethics (1677) with a proof of Gods existence and
then discussed at length its implications for understanding all reality. And George
Berkeley (16851753) explained the apparent stability of the sensible world by
appealing to Gods constant thought of it.
Among the reasons modern philosophers are mistakenly thought to be primarily
secular thinkers is that many of their epistemological principles, including some that
were designed to defend religion, were later interpreted as subverting the
rationality of religious belief. The views of Thomas Hobbes (15881679) might
briefly be considered in this connection. In contrast to the standard view of
the Middle Ages that propositions of faith are rational, Hobbes argued that such
propositions belong not to the intellect but to the will. The significance of religious
propositions, in other words, lies not in what they say but in how they are used. To
profess a religious proposition is not to assert a factual claim about the world, which
may then be supported or refuted with reasons, but merely to give praise and
honour to God and to obey the commands of lawful religious authorities. Indeed,
one does not even need to understand the meanings of the words in the proposition
in order for this function to be fulfilled: simply mouthing them would be sufficient.
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke further eroded the
intellectual status of religious propositions by making them subordinate to reason in
several respects. First, reason can restrict the possible content of propositions
allegedly revealed by God; in particular, no proposition of faith can be a
contradiction. Furthermore, because no revelation can contain an idea not derived
from sense experience, we should not believe St. Paul when he speaks of
experiencing things as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into
the heart of man to conceive. Another respect in which reason
takes precedence over faith is that knowledge based on immediate sense
experience (what Locke calls intuitive knowledge) is always more certain than
any alleged revelation. Thus, a person who sees that someone is dead cannot have
it revealed to him that that person is at that moment alive. Rational proofs in
mathematics and science also cannot be controverted by divine revelation. The
interior angles of a rectangle equal 360, and no alleged revelation to the contrary
is credible. In short, says Locke, Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with,
the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to
as a matter of faith.
What space, then, does faith occupy in the mansion of human beliefs? According to
Locke, it shares a room with probable truths, which are propositions of which reason
cannot be certain. There are two types of probable truth: that which concerns
observable matters of fact, and that which goes beyond the discovery of our
sense. Religious propositions can belong to either category, as can empirical and
scientific propositions. Thus the propositions Caesar crossed the Rubicon and
Jesus walked on water belong to the first category, because they make claims
about events that would be observable if they occurred; on the other hand,
propositions like Heat is caused by the friction of imperceptibly small bodies and
Angels exist belong to the second category, because they concern entities that by
definition cannot be objects of sense experience.
Although it might seem that Lockes mixing of religious and scientific claims helped
to secure a place for the former, in fact it did not. For Locke also held that reason
must judge whether or not something is a revelation and more generally that
Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything. Although this maxim was
intended to reconcile reason and revelationindeed, he calls reason natural
revelation and revelation natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries
communicated by Godover the course of 200 years reason repeatedly judged
that alleged revelations had no scientific or intellectual standing.
Despite the strong religious elements in the thought of modern philosophers,
especially those writing before the middle of the 18th century, contemporary
epistemologists have been interested only in the purely secular aspects of their
work. Accordingly, these aspects will predominate in the following discussion.
Epistemology and modern science
The Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (14731543) argued in On the
Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres (1543) that the Earth revolves around the Sun.
His theory was epistemologically shocking for at least two reasons. First, it directly
contravened the way in which humans experienced their relation to the Sun, and in
doing so it made ordinary nonscientific reasoning about the world seem unreliable
indeed, like a kind of superstition. Second, it contradicted the account presented in
several books of the Bible, most importantly the story in Genesis of the structure of
the cosmos, according to which the Earth is at the centre of creation.
If Copernicus were right, then the Bible could no longer be treated as a reliable
source of scientific knowledge.
Many of the discoveries of the Italian astronomer Galileo Galilei (15641642) were
equally unsettling. His telescope seemed to reveal that unaided human vision gives
false, or at least seriously incomplete, information about the nature of celestial
bodies. In addition, his mathematical descriptions of physical phenomena indicated
that much of our sense experience of these phenomena contributes nothing to our
knowledge of them.
Another counterintuitive theory of Galileo was his distinction between the primary
and the secondary qualities of an object. Whereas primary qualitiessuch as
figure, quantity, and motionare genuine properties of things and are knowable by
mathematics, secondary qualitiessuch as colour, odour, taste, and soundexist
only in human consciousness and are not part of the objects to which they are
normally attributed.
Ren Descartes
Both the rise of modern science and the rediscovery of Skepticism were important
influences on Descartes. Although he believed that certain knowledge was possible
and that modern science would one day enable humans to become the masters of
nature, he also thought that Skepticism presented a legitimate challenge that
needed an answer, one that only he could provide.
The challenge of Skepticism, as Descartes saw it, is vividly described in his
Meditations. He considered the possibility that an evil genius with extraordinary
powers has deceived him to such an extent that all his beliefs are false. But it is not
possible, Descartes contended, that all his beliefs are false, for if he has false
beliefs, he is thinking, and if he is thinking, then he exists. Therefore, his belief that
he exists cannot be false, as long as he is thinking. This line of argument is
summarized in the formula cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am).

Descartes distinguished two sources of knowledge: intuition and deduction. Intuition

is an unmediated mental seeing, or direct apprehension. Descartess intuition of
his own thinking guarantees that his belief that he is thinking is true. Although his
formula might suggest that his belief that he exists is guaranteed by deduction
rather than intuition (because it contains the term therefore), in the Objections
and Replies (1642) he states explicitly that the certainty of this belief also is based
upon intuition.

If one could know only that one thinks and that one exists, human knowledge would
be depressingly meager. Accordingly, Descartes attempted to broaden the limits of
knowledge by proving to his own satisfaction that God exists; that the standard for
knowing something is having a clear and distinct idea of it; that mind is more
easily known than body; that the essence of matter is extension; and, finally, that
most of his former beliefs are true.

Unfortunately for Descartes, few people were convinced by these arguments. One
major problem with them has come to be known as the Cartesian circle.
Descartess argument to show that his knowledge extends beyond his own
existence depends upon the claim that whatever he perceives clearly and
distinctly is true. This claim in turn is supported by his proof of the existence of
God, together with the assertion that God, because he is not a deceiver, would not
cause Descartes to be deceived in what he clearly and distinctly perceives. But
because the criterion of clear and distinct perception presupposes the existence of
God, Descartes cannot rely upon it in order to guarantee that he was not deceived
(i.e., that he did not make a mistake) in the course of proving that God exists.
Therefore, he does not know that his proof is cogent. But if he does not know this,
then he cannot use the criterion of clear and distinct perception to show that he
knows more than that he exists.
John Locke
As mentioned above (The origins of knowledge: Rationalism and empiricism),
whereas rationalist philosophers such as Descartes held that the ultimate source of
human knowledge is reason, empiricists such as Locke argued that it is experience.
Rationalist accounts of knowledge also typically involved the claim that at least
some kinds of ideas are innate, or present in the mind at (or even before) birth.
For philosophers such as Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (16461716), the
hypothesis of innateness is required in order to explain how humans come to have
ideas of certain kinds. These ideas include not only mathematical concepts such as
numbers, which appear not to be derived from sense experience, but also,
according to some thinkers, certain general metaphysical principles, such as every
event has a cause.

Locke claimed that this line of argument has no force. He held that all ideas (except
those that are trifling) can be explained in terms of experience. Instead of
attacking the doctrine of innate ideas directly, however, his strategy was to refute it
by showing that it is explanatorily otiose and hence dispensable.

There are two kinds of experience, according to Locke: observation of external

objectsi.e., sensationand observation of the internal operations of the mind.
Locke called this latter kind of experience, for which there is no natural word in
English, reflection. Some examples of reflection are perceiving, thinking, doubting,
believing, reasoning, knowing, and willing.

As Locke uses the term, a simple idea is anything that is an immediate object of
perception (i.e., an object as it is perceived by the mind) or anything that the mind
perceives in itself through reflection. Simple ideas, whether they are ideas of
perception or ideas of reflection, may be combined or repeated to produce
compound ideas, as when the compound idea of an apple is produced by bringing
together simple ideas of a certain colour, texture, odour, and figure. Abstract ideas
are created when ideas taken from particular beings become general
representatives of all of the same kind.
The qualities of an object are its powers to cause ideas in the mind. One
consequence of this usage is that, in Lockes epistemology, words designating the
sensible properties of objects are systematically ambiguous. The word red, for
example, can mean either the idea of red in the mind or the quality in an object that
causes that idea. Locke distinguished between primary and secondary qualities, as
Galileo did. According to Locke, primary qualities, but not secondary qualities, are
represented in the mind as they exist in the object itself. The primary qualities of an
object, in other words, resemble the ideas they cause in the mind. Examples of
primary qualities include solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number.
Secondary qualities are configurations or arrangements of primary qualities that
cause sensible ideas such as sounds, colours, odours, and tastes. Thus, according to
Lockes view, the phenomenal redness of a fire engine is not in the fire engine itself,
but its phenomenal solidity is. Similarly, the phenomenal sweet odour of a rose is
not in the rose itself, but its phenomenal extension is.

In Book IV of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke defines knowledge

as the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and
repugnancy of any of our ideas. Knowledge so defined admits of three degrees,
according to Locke. The first is what he calls intuitive knowledge, in which the
mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by
themselves, without the intervention of any other. Although Lockes first examples
of intuitive knowledge are analytic propositions such as white is not black, a
circle is not a triangle, and three are more than two, later he says that the
knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. Relying on the metaphor of light
as Augustine and others had, Locke says of this knowledge that the mind is
presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends all the
certainty and evidence of all our knowledge.

The second degree of knowledge obtains when the mind perceives the agreement
or disagreement of . . . ideas, but not immediately. In these cases, some mediating
idea makes it possible to see the connection between two other ideas. In a
demonstration (or proof), for example, the connection between any premise and the
conclusion is mediated by other premises and by the laws of logic. Demonstrative
knowledge, although certain, is not as certain as intuitive knowledge, according to
Locke, because it requires effort and attention to go through the steps needed to
recognize the certainty of the conclusion.

A third degree of knowledge, sensitive knowledge, is roughly the same as what

Duns Scotus called intuitive cognition, namely, the perception of the particular
existence of finite beings without us. Unlike intuitive cognition, however, Lockes
sensitive knowledge is not the most certain kind of knowledge it is possible to have.
For him, it is less certain than intuitive or demonstrative knowledge.
Next in certainty to knowledge is probability, which Locke defines as the
appearance of agreement or disagreement of ideas with each other. Like
knowledge, probability admits of degrees, the highest of which attaches to
propositions endorsed by the general consent of all people in all ages. Locke may
have had in mind the virtually general consent of his contemporaries in the
proposition that God exists, but he also explicitly mentions beliefs about causal
relations.

The next-highest degree of probability belongs to propositions that hold not

universally but for the most part, such as people prefer their own private
advantage to the public good. This sort of proposition is typically derived from
history. A still lower degree of probability attaches to claims about specific facts, for
example, that a man named Julius Caesar lived a long time ago. Problems arise
when testimonies conflict, as they often do, but there is no simple rule or set of
rules that determines how one ought to resolve such controversies.

Probability can concern not only objects of possible sense experience, as most of
the foregoing examples do, but also things that are outside the sensible realm, such
as angels, devils, magnetism, and molecules.
George Berkeley
The next great figure in the development of empiricist epistemology was George
Berkeley (16851753). In his major work, Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledge (1710), Berkeley asserted that nothing exists except ideas and
spirits (minds or souls). He distinguished three kinds of ideas: those that come from
sense experience correspond to Lockes simple ideas of perception; those that come
from attending to the passions and operations of the mind correspond to Lockes
ideas of reflection; and those that come from compounding, dividing, or otherwise
representing ideas correspond to Lockes compound ideas. By spirit Berkeley
meant one simple, undivided, active being. The activity of spirits consists of both
understanding and willing: understanding is spirit perceiving ideas, and will is spirit
producing ideas.

For Berkeley, ostensibly physical objects like tables and chairs are really nothing
more than collections of sensible ideas. Since no idea can exist outside a mind, it
follows that tables and chairs, as well all the other furniture of the physical world,
exist only insofar as they are in the mind of someonei.e., only insofar as they are
perceived. For any nonthinking being, esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived).
The clichd question of whether a tree falling in an uninhabited forest makes a
sound is inspired by Berkeleys philosophy, though he never considered it in these
terms. He did, however, consider the implicit objection and gave various answers to
it. He sometimes says that a table in an unperceived room would be perceived if
someone were there. This conditional response, however, is inadequate. Granted
that the table would exist if it were perceived, does it exist when it is not perceived?
Berkeleys more pertinent answer is that, when no human is perceiving a table or
other such object, God is; and it is Gods thinking that keeps the otherwise
unperceived object in existence.

Although this doctrine initially strikes most people as strange, Berkeley claimed that
he was merely describing the commonsense view of reality. To say that colours,
sounds, trees, dogs, and tables are ideas is not to say that they do not really exist, it
is merely to say what they really are. Moreover, to say that animals and pieces of
furniture are ideas is not to say that they are diaphanous, gossamer, and
evanescent. Opacity, density, and permanence are also ideas that partially
constitute these objects.

Berkeley supports his main thesis with a syllogistic argument: physical thingssuch
as trees, dogs, and housesare things perceived by sense; things perceived by
sense are ideas; therefore, physical things are ideas. If one objects that the second
premise of the syllogism is falsepeople sense things, not ideasBerkeley would
reply that there are no sensations without ideas and that it makes no sense to
speak of some additional thing that ideas are supposed to represent or resemble.
Unlike Locke, Berkeley did not believe that there is anything behind or
underlying ideas in a world external to the mind. Indeed, Berkeley claims that no
clear idea can be attached to this notion.

One consequence of this view is that Lockes distinction between primary and
secondary qualities is spurious. Extension, figure, motion, rest, and solidity are as
much ideas as green, loud, and bitter are; there is nothing special about the former
kind of idea. Furthermore, matter, as philosophers conceive it, does not exist, and
indeed it is contradictory. For matter is supposedly unsensed extension, figure, and
motion; but since extension, figure, and motion are ideas, they must be sensed.

Berkeleys doctrine that things unperceived by human beings continue to exist in

the thought of God was not novel. It was part of the traditional belief of Christian
philosophers from Augustine through Aquinas and at least to Descartes that God not
only creates all things but also keeps them in existence by thinking of them.
According to this view, if God were ever to stop thinking of a creature, it would
immediately be annihilated.
David Hume
Although Berkeley rejected the Lockean notions of primary and secondary qualities
and matter, he retained Lockes beliefs in the existence of mind, substance, and
causation as an unseen force or power in objects. Hume, in contrast, rejected all
these notions.
Kinds of perception
Hume recognized two kinds of perception: impressions and ideas. Impressions
are perceptions that the mind experiences with the most force and violence, and
ideas are the faint images of impressions. Hume considered this distinction so
obvious that he demurred from explaining it at any length: as he indicates in a
summary explication in A Treatise of Human Nature (173940), impressions are felt,
and ideas are thought. Nevertheless, he concedes that sometimes sleep, fever, or
madness can produce ideas that approximate to the force of impressions, and some
impressions can approach the weakness of ideas. But such occasions are rare.
The distinction between impressions and ideas is problematic in a way that Hume
did not notice. The impression (experience) of anger, for example, has an
unmistakable quality and intensity. But the idea of anger is not the same as a
weaker experience of anger. Thinking of anger no more guarantees being angry
than thinking of happiness guarantees being happy. So there seems to be a
difference between the impression of anger and the idea of anger that Humes
theory does not capture.
All perceptions, whether impressions or ideas, can be either simple or complex.
Whereas simple perceptions are not subject to further separation or distinction,
complex perceptions are. To return to an example mentioned above, the perception
of an apple is complex, insofar as it consists of a combination of simple perceptions
of a certain shape, colour, texture, and aroma. It is noteworthy that, according to
Hume, for every simple impression there is a simple idea that corresponds to it and
differs from it only in force and vivacity, and vice versa. Thus, corresponding to the
impression of red is the idea of red. This correlation does not hold true in general for
complex perceptions. Although there is a correspondence between the complex
impression of an apple and the complex idea of an apple, there is no impression
that corresponds to the idea of Pegasus or to the idea of a unicorn; these complex
ideas do not have a correlate in reality. Similarly, there is no complex idea
corresponding to the complex impression of, say, an extensive vista of the city of
Rome.
Because the formation of every simple idea is always preceded by the experience of
a corresponding simple impression, and because the experience of every simple
impression is always followed by the formation of a corresponding simple idea, it
follows, according to Hume, that simple impressions are the causes of their
corresponding simple ideas.
There are two kinds of impressions: those of sensation and those of reflection.
Regarding the former, Hume says little more than that sensation arises in the soul
originally from unknown causes. Impressions of reflection arise from a complicated
series of mental operations. First, one experiences impressions of heat or cold, thirst
or hunger, pleasure or pain; second, one forms corresponding ideas of heat or cold,
thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain; and third, ones reflection on these ideas
produces impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear.
Because the faculty of imagination can divide and assemble disparateideas at will,
some explanation is needed for the fact that people tend to think in regular and
predictable patterns. Hume says that the production of thoughts in the mind is
guided by three principles: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Thus, a
person who thinks of one idea is likely to think of another idea that resembles it; his
thought is likely to run from red to pink to white or from dog to wolf to coyote.
Concerning contiguity, people are inclined to think of things that are next to each
other in space and time. Finally and most importantly, people tend to create
associations between ideas of things that are causally related. The ideas of fire and
smoke, parent and child, and disease and death are connected in the mind for this
reason.
Hume uses the principle of resemblance for another purpose: to explain the nature
of general ideas. Hume holds that there are no abstract ideas, and he affirms that
all ideas are particular. Some of them, however, function as general ideasi.e.,
ideas that represent many objects of a certain kindbecause they incline the mind
to think of other ideas that they resemble.
Relations of ideas and matters of fact
According to Hume, the mind is capable of apprehending two kinds of proposition or
truth: those expressing relations of ideas and those expressing matters of fact.
The former can be intuitedi.e., seen directlyor deduced from other propositions.
That a is identical with a, that b resembles c, and that d is larger than e are
examples of propositions that are intuited. The negations of true propositions
expressing relations of ideas are contradictory. Because the propositions of
arithmetic and algebra are exclusively about relations of ideas, these disciplines are
more certain than others. In the Treatise, Hume says that geometry is not quite as
certain as arithmetic and algebra, because its original principles derive from
sensation, and about sensation there can never be absolute certainty. He revised his
views later, however, and in the An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding (1748) he put geometry on an equal footing with the other
mathematical sciences.
Unlike propositions about relations of ideas, propositions about matters of fact are
known only through experience. By far the most important of these propositions are
those that express or presuppose causal relationse.g., Fire causes heat and A
moving billiard ball communicates its motion to any stationary ball it strikes. But
how is it possible to know through experience that one kind of object or event
causes another? What kind of experience would justify such a claim?
Cause and effect
In the Treatise, Hume observes that our idea of causation contains three
components: contiguity (i.e., near proximity) of time and place, temporal priority of
the cause, and a more mysterious component, which he calls necessary
connection. In other words, when we say that x is a cause of y, we mean that
instances of x and instances of y are always near each other in time and space, that
instances of x occur before instances of y, and that there is some connection
between xs and ys that makes it necessary that an instance of y occurs if an
instance of x does.
It is easy to explain the origin in experience of the first two components of the idea
of causation. In our past experience, all events consisting of a moving billiard ball
striking a stationary one were quickly followed by events consisting of the
movement of the formerly stationary ball. In addition, the first sort of event always
preceded the second, and never the reverse. But whence the third component of
the idea of causation, whereby we think that the striking of the stationary ball
somehow necessitates that it will move? We certainly have not seen or otherwise
directly observed this necessity in past experience, as we have the contiguity and
temporal order of the striking and moving of billiard balls.
It is important to note that, were it not for the idea of necessary connection, we
would have no reason to believe that a currently observed cause will produce an
unseen effect in the future or that a currently observed effect was produced by an
unseen cause in the past. For the mere fact that past instances of the cause and
effect were contiguous and temporally ordered in a certain way does not logically
imply that present and future instances will display the same relations. (Such an
inference could be justified only if one assumed a principle such as instances, of
which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had
experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.
The problem with this principle is that it too stands in need of justification, and the
only possible justification is question-begging. That is, one could argue that present
and future experience will resemble past experience, because, in the past, present
and future experience resembled past experience. But this argument clearly
assumes what it sets out to prove.)
Hume offers a skeptical solution of the problem of the origin of our idea of
necessary connection. According to him, it arises from the feeling of
determination that is created in the mind when it experiences the first member of
a pair of events that it is long accustomed to experiencing together. When the mind
observes the moving billiard ball strike the stationary one, it is moved by force of
habit and custom to form an idea of the movement of the stationary balli.e., to
believe that the stationary ball will move. The feeling of being carried along in this
process is the impression from which the idea of necessary connection is derived.
Humes solution is skeptical in the sense that, though it accounts for the origins of
our idea of necessary connection, it does not make our causal inferences any more
rational than they were before. The solution explains why we are psychologically
compelled to form beliefs about future effects and past causes, but it does not
justify those beliefs logically. It remains true that our only evidence for these beliefs
is our past experience of contiguity and temporal precedence. All inferences from
experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning. Thus, it is that
custom, not reason, is the great guide of life.
Substance
From the time of Plato, one of the most basic notions in philosophy has been
substancethat whose existence does not depend upon anything else. For Locke,
the substance of an object is the hidden substratum in which the objects
properties inhere and on which they depend for their existence. One of the reasons
for Humes importance in the history of philosophy is that he rejected this notion. In
keeping with his strict empiricism, he held that the idea of substance, if it answers
to anything genuine, must arise from experience. But what kind of experience can
this be? By its proponents own definition, substance is that which underlies an
objects properties, including its sensible properties; it is therefore in principle
unobservable. Hume concludes, We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct
from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning
when we either talk or reason concerning it. Furthermore, the things that earlier
philosophers had assumed were substances are in fact nothing but a collection of
simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name
assigned to them. Gold, to take Humes example, is nothing but the collection of
the ideas of yellow, malleable, fusible, and so on. Even the mind, or the self, is
only a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain
relations and supposd tho falsely, to be endowd with a perfect simplicity or
identity. This conclusion had important consequences for the problem of personal
identity, to which Locke had devoted considerable attention. For if there is nothing
to the mind but a collection of perceptions, then there is no self that perdures as the
subject of these perceptions. Therefore, it does not make sense to speak of the
subject of certain perceptions yesterday as the same self, or the same person, as
the subject of certain perceptions today or in the future. There is no self or person
there.
Immanuel Kant
Idealism is often defined as the view that everything that exists is mentalin other
words, everything is either a mind or dependent for its existence on a mind. Kant
was not strictly an idealist according to this definition. His doctrine of
transcendental idealism held that all theoretical (i.e., scientific) knowledge is a
mixture of what is given in sense experience and what is contributed by the mind.
The contributions of the mind are necessary conditions for having any sense
experience at all. They include the spatial and temporal forms in which physical
objects appear, as well as various extremely general features that together give the
experience an intelligible structure. These features are imposed when the mind, in
the act of forming a judgment about experience, brings the content of experience
under one of the pure concepts of the understanding. These concepts are unity,
plurality, and totality; reality, negation, and limitation; inherence and subsistence,
causality and dependence, and community (or reciprocity); and possibility,
existence, and necessity. Among the more noteworthy of the minds contributions to
experience is causality, which Hume asserted has no real existence.
His idealism notwithstanding, Kant also believed that there exists a world
independent of the mind and completely unknowable by it. This world consists of
things-in-themselves, which do not exist in space and time and do not enter into
causal relations. Because of his commitment to realism (minimal though it may
have been) Kant was disturbed by Berkeleys uncompromising idealism, which
amounted to a denial of the existence of the external world. Kant found this
incredible and rejected the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance
without anything that appears.

Because Kants theory attributes to the mind many aspects of reality that earlier
theories had assumed were given in or derived from experience, it can be thought
of as inverting the traditional relation in epistemology between the mind and the
world. According to Kant, knowledge results not when the mind accommodates itself
to the world but rather when the world conforms to the requirements of human
sensibility and rationality. Kant compared his reorientation of epistemology to the
Copernican revolution in astronomy, which placed the Sun rather than the Earth at
the center of the universe.

According to Kant, the propositions that express human knowledge can be divided
into three kinds (see above A priori and a posteriori knowledge: Analytic and
synthetic propositions): (1) analytic a priori propositions, such as All bachelors are
unmarried and All squares have four sides, (2) synthetic a posteriori propositions,
such as The cat is on the mat and It is raining, and (3) what he called synthetic
a priori propositions, such as Every event has a cause. Although in the last kind
of proposition the meaning of the predicate term is not contained in the meaning of
the subject term, it is nevertheless possible to know the proposition independently
of experience, because it expresses a condition imposed by the forms of sensibility.
Nothing can be an object of experience unless it is experienced as having causes
and effects. Kant stated that the main purpose of his doctrine of transcendental
idealism was to show how these synthetic a priori propositions are possible.

Because human beings can experience the world only as a system that is bounded
by space and time and completely determined by causal laws, it follows that they
can have no theoretical (i.e., scientific) knowledge of anything that is inconsistent
with such a realm or that by definition exists independently of itthis includes God,
human freedom, and the immortality of the soul. Nevertheless, belief in these ideas
is justified, according to Kant, because each is a necessary condition of our
conceiving of ourselves as moral agents.
G.W.F. Hegel
The positive views of the German idealist philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
(17701831) are notoriously difficult, and his epistemology is not susceptible of
adequate summary within the scope of this article. Some of his criticisms of earlier
epistemological views should be mentioned, however, since they helped to bring
the modern era in philosophy to a close.

In his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel criticized traditional empiricist

epistemology for assuming that at least some of the sensory content of experience
is simply given to the mind and apprehended directly as it is, without the
mediation of concepts. According to Hegel, there is no such thing as direct
apprehension, or unmediated knowledge. Although Kant also held that empirical
knowledge necessarily involves concepts (as well as the mentally contributed forms
of space and time), he nevertheless attributed too large a role to the given,
according to Hegel.

Another mistake of earlier epistemological theoriesboth empiricist and rationalist

is the assumption that knowledge entails a kind of correspondence between
belief and reality. The search for such a correspondence is logically absurd, Hegel
argues, since every such search must end with some belief about whether the
correspondence holds, in which case one has not advanced beyond belief. In other
words, it is impossible to compare our beliefs with reality, because our experience of
reality is always mediated by our beliefs. We cannot step outside belief altogether.
For Hegel, the Kantian distinction between the phenomena of experience and the
unknowable thing-in-itself is an instance of this absurdity.

A.P. Martinich
Contemporary philosophy
Contemporary philosophy begins in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Much of
what sets it off from modern philosophy is its explicit criticism of the modern
tradition and sometimes its apparent indifference to it. There are two basic strains
of contemporary philosophy: Continental philosophy, which is the philosophical style
of western European philosophers, and analytic philosophy (also called Anglo-
American philosophy), which includes the work of many European philosophers who
immigrated to Britain, the United States, and Australia shortly before World War II.

Continental epistemology
In epistemology, Continental philosophers during the first quarter of the 20th
century were preoccupied with the problem of overcoming the apparent gap
between the knower and the known. If a human being has access only to his own
ideas of the world and not to the world itself, how can there be knowledge at all?
The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (18591938) thought that the standard
epistemological theories of his day lacked insight, because they did not focus on
objects of knowledge as they are actually experienced by human beings. To
emphasize this reorientation of thinking, he adopted the slogan, To the things
themselves. Philosophers needed to recover a sense of what is given in experience
itself, and this could be accomplished only through a careful description of
experiential phenomena. Thus, Husserl called his philosophy phenomenology,
which was to begin as a purely descriptive science and only later to ascend to a
theoretical, or transcendental, one.
According to Husserl, the philosophies of Descartes and Kant presupposed a gap
between the aspiring knower and what is known, one that made claims to
knowledge of the external world dubious and in need of justification. These
presuppositions violated Husserls belief that philosophy, as the most fundamental
science, should be free of presuppositions. Thus, he held that it is illegitimate to
assume that there is a problem about our knowledge of the external world prior to
conducting a completely presuppositionless investigation of the matter. The device
that Husserl used to remove these presuppositions was the epoch (Greek:
withholding or suspension), originally a principle of ancient Greek skepticism but
in Husserls philosophy a technique of bracketing, or removing from consideration,
not only all traditional philosophical theories but also all commonsensical beliefs so
that pure phenomenological description can proceed.
The epoch was just one of a series of so-called transcendental reductions that
Husserl proposed in order to ensure that he was not presupposing anything. One of
these reductions supposedly gave one access to the transcendental ego, or pure
consciousness. Although one might expect phenomenology then to describe the
experience or contents of this ego, Husserl instead aimed at eidetic reduction
that is, the discovery of the essences of various sorts of ideas, such as redness,
surface, or relation. All these moves were part of Husserls project of discovering a
perfect methodology for philosophy, one that would ensure absolute certainty.
Husserls transcendental ego seemed very much like the Cartesian mind that thinks
of a world but has neither direct access to nor certainty of it. Accordingly, Husserl
attempted, in Cartesian Meditations (1931), to overcome the apparent gap between
the ego and the worldthe very thing he had set out to destroy or to bypass in
earlier works. Because the transcendental ego seems to be the only genuinely
existent consciousness, Husserl also was faced with the task of overcoming the
problem of solipsism.
Many of Husserls followers, including his most famous student, Martin
Heidegger (18891976), recognized that something had gone radically wrong with
the original direction of phenomenology. According to Heideggers diagnosis, the
root of the problem was Husserls assumption that there is an Archimedean point
of human knowledge. But there is no such ego detached from the world and filled
with ideas or representations, according to Heidegger. In Being and Time (1927),
Heidegger returned to the original formulation of the phenomenological project as a
return to the things themselves. Thus, in Heideggers approach, all transcendental
reductions are abandoned. What he claimed to discover is that human beings are
inherently world-bound. The world does not need to be derived; it is presupposed by
human experience. In their prereflective experience, humans inhabit a
sociocultural environment in which the primordial kind of cognition is practical and
communal, not theoretical or individual (egoistic). Human beings interact with the
things of their everyday world (Lebenswelt) as a workman interacts with his tools;
they hardly ever approach the world as a philosopher or scientist would. The
theoretical knowledge of a philosopher is a derivative and specialized form of
cognition, and the major mistake of epistemology from Descartes to Kant to Husserl
was to treat philosophical knowledge as a paradigm of all knowledge.
Notwithstanding Heideggers insistence that a human being is something that
inhabits a world, he marked out human reality as ontologically special. He called
this reality Daseinthe being, apart from all others, which is present to the world.
Thus, as in Husserls phenomenology, a cognitive being takes pride of place in
Heideggers philosophy.
In France, the principal representative of phenomenology in the mid-century
was Maurice Merleau-Ponty (190861). Merleau-Ponty rejected Husserls bracketing
of the world, arguing that human experience of the world is primary, a view
he encapsulated in the phrase the primacy of perception. He furthermore held
that dualistic analyses of knowledge, best exemplified by traditional Cartesian mind-
body dualism, are inadequate. In fact, no conceptualization of the world can be
complete in his view. Because human cognitive experience requires a body and the
body a position in space, human experience is necessarily perspectival and thus
incomplete. Although humans experience material beings as multidimensional
objects, part of the object always exceeds the cognitive grasp of the person, just
because of his limited perspective. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945),
Merleau-Ponty develops these ideas (along with a detailed attack on the sense-
datum theory, discussed below).
The epistemological views of Jean-Paul Sartre (190580) are similar in some
respects to those of Merleau-Ponty. Both philosophers reject Husserls
transcendental reductions, and both think of human reality as being-in-the-world.
But Sartres views have Cartesian elements that were anathemato Merleau-Ponty.
Sartre distinguished between two basic kinds of being. Being-in-itself (en soi) is the
inert and determinate world of nonhuman existence. Over and against it is being-
for-itself (pour soi), which is the pure consciousness that defines human reality.
Later Continental philosophers attacked the entire philosophical tradition from
Descartes to the 20th century for its explicit or implicit dualisms. Being/nonbeing,
mind/body, knower/known, ego/world, being-in-itself/being-for-itself are all
variations of a pattern of thinking that the philosophers of the last third of the 20th
century tried to undermine. The structuralist Michel Foucault (192684), for
example, wrote extensive historical studies, most notably The Archaeology of
Knowledge (1969), in an attempt to demonstrate that all concepts are historically
conditioned and that many of the most important ones serve the political function of
controlling people rather than any purely cognitive purpose. Jacques Derrida has
claimed that all dualisms are value-laden and indefensible. His technique
of deconstruction aimed to show that every philosophical dichotomy is incoherent,
because whatever can be said about one term of the dichotomy can also be said of
the other.
Dissatisfaction with the Cartesian philosophical tradition can also be found in the
United States. The American pragmatist John Dewey (18591952) directly
challenged the idea that knowledge is primarily theoretical; experience, he argued,
consists of an interaction between a living being and his environment. Knowledge is
not a fixed apprehension of something but a process of acting and being acted
upon. Richard Rorty has done much to reconcile Continental and analytic
philosophy. He has argued that Dewey, Heidegger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein are the
three greatest philosophers of the 20th century, specifically because of their attacks
on the epistemological tradition of modern philosophy.
A.P. Martinich
Analytic epistemology
Analytic philosophy, the prevailing philosophy in the Anglo-American world from the
beginning of the 20th century, has its origins in symbolic logic (or formal logic) on
the one hand and in British empiricism on the other. Some of its most important
contributions have been made in areas other than epistemology, though its
epistemological contributions also have been of the first order. Its main
characteristics have been the avoidance of system building and a commitment to
detailed, piecemeal analyses of specific issues. Within this tradition there have been
two main approaches: a formal style deriving from logic and an informal style
emphasizing ordinary language. Among those identified with the first method
are Gottlob Frege (18481925), Bertrand Russell (18721970), Rudolf Carnap (1891
1970), Alfred Tarski (190283), and W.V.O. Quine (19082000); and among those
identified with the second are G.E. Moore (18731958), Gilbert Ryle (190076), J.L.
Austin (191160), Norman Malcolm (191190), P.F. Strawson, and Zeno
Vendler. Ludwig Wittgenstein (18891951) can be situated in both groups, his early
work, including the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), belonging to the former
tradition and his later work, including the posthumously published Philosophical
Investigations (1953) and On Certainty (1969), to the latter.
Bertrand Russell.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of analytic philosophy is its emphasis on the
role that language plays in the creation and resolution of philosophical problems.
These problems, it is said, arise through misunderstandings of the forms and uses of
everyday language. Wittgenstein said in this connection: Philosophy is a battle
against the bewitchment of the intelligence by means of language. The adoption at
the beginning of the 20th century of the idea that philosophical problems are in
some important sense linguistic (or conceptual), a hallmark of the analytic
approach, has been called the linguistic turn.
Commonsense philosophy, logical positivism, and naturalized
epistemology
Three of the most notable schools of thought in analytic philosophy are
commonsense philosophy, logical positivism, and naturalized epistemology.
Commonsense philosophy is the name given to the epistemological views of Moore,
who attempted to defend what he called the commonsense view of the world
against both skepticism and idealism. This view, according to Moore, comprises a
number of propositionssuch as the propositions that the Earth exists, that it is
very old, and that other persons now exist on itthat virtually everybody knows
with certainty to be true. Any philosophical theory that runs counter to the
commonsense view, therefore, can be rejected out of hand as mistaken. Into this
category fall all forms of skepticism and idealism. Wittgenstein also rejected
skepticism and idealism, though for very different reasons. For him, these positions
are based on simplistic misunderstandings of epistemic concepts,
misunderstandings that arise from a failure to recognize the rich variety of ways in
which epistemic language (including words like belief, knowledge, certainty,
justification, and doubt) is used in everyday situations. In On Certainty,
Wittgenstein contrasted the concepts of certainty and knowledge, arguing that
certainty is not a surer form of knowledge but the necessary backdrop against
which the language games of knowing, doubting, and inquiring take place. As that
which stands fast for all of us, certitude is ultimately a kind of action: Action lies
at the bottom of the language game.
The doctrines associated with logical positivism (also called logical empiricism) were
developed originally in the 1920s and 30s by a group of philosophers and scientists
known as the Vienna Circle. Logical positivism became one of the dominant schools
of philosophy in England with the publication in 1936 of Language, Truth, and Logic,
by A.J. Ayer (191089). Among the most influential theses put forward by the logical
positivists was the claim that in order for a proposition with empirical contenti.e.,
one that purports to say something about the worldto be meaningful, or
cognitively significant, it must be possible, at least in principle, to verify the
proposition through experience. Since many of the utterances of traditional
philosophy (especially metaphysical utterances, such as God exists) are not
empirically verifiable even in principle, they are, according to the logical positivists,
literally nonsense. In their view, the only legitimate function of philosophy is
conceptual analysisi.e., the logical clarification of concepts, especially those
associated with natural science (e.g., probability and causality).
In his 1950 essay Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine launched an attack upon the
traditional distinction between analytic statements, which were said to be true by
virtue of the meanings of the terms they contain, and synthetic statements, which
were supposed to be true (or false) by virtue of certain facts about the world. He
argued powerfully that the difference is one of degree rather than kind. In a later
work, Word and Object (1960), Quine developed a doctrine known as naturalized
epistemology. According to this view, epistemology has no normative function
i.e., it does not tell us what we ought to believe; instead, its only legitimate role is to
describe the way knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, is actually
obtained. In effect, its function is to describe how present science arrives at the
beliefs accepted by the scientific community.
Perception and knowledge
The epistemological interests of analytic philosophers in the first half of the 20th
century were largely focused on the relationship between knowledge
and perception. The major figures in this period were Russell, Moore, H.H.
Price (18991984), C.D. Broad (18871971), Ayer, and H. Paul Grice (191388).
Although their views differed considerably, all of them were advocates of a general
doctrine known as sense-data theory.
The technical term sense-data is sometimes explained by means of examples. If one
is hallucinating and sees pink rats, one is having a certain visual sensation of rats of
a certain colour, though there are no real rats present. The sensation is what is
called a sense-datum. The image one sees with ones eyes closed after looking
fixedly at a bright light (an afterimage) is another example. Even in cases of normal
vision, however, one can be said to be apprehending sense-data. For instance, when
one looks at a round penny from a certain angle, the penny will seem to have an
elliptical shape. In such a case, there is an elliptical sense-datum in ones visual
field, though the penny itself continues to be round. This last example was held by
Broad, Price, and Moore to be particularly important, for it seems to make a strong
case for holding that one always perceives sense-data, whether ones perception is
normal or abnormal.
In each of these examples, according to defenders of sense-data theory, there is
something of which one is directly aware, meaning that ones awareness of it is
immediate and does not depend on any inference or judgment. A sense-datum is
thus frequently defined as an object of direct perception. According to Broad, Price,
and Ayer, sense-data differ from physical objects in that they always have the
properties they appear to have; i.e., they cannot appear to have properties they do
not really have. The problem for the philosopher who accepts sense-data is then to
show how, on the basis of these private sensations, one can be justified in believing
that there are physical objects that exist independently of our perceptions. Russell
in particular tried to show, in such works as The Problems of Philosophy (1912)
and Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), that knowledge of the external
world could be logically constructed out of sense-data.
Sense-data theory was criticized by proponents of the so-called theory of appearing,
such as G.A. Paul and W.H.F. Barnes, who claimed that the arguments for their
existence are invalid. From the fact that a penny looks elliptical from a certain
perspective, they objected, it does not follow that there must exist a separate
entity, distinct from the penny itself, that has the property of being elliptical. To
assume that it does is simply to misunderstand how common perceptual situations
are described. The most powerful such attack on sense-data theory was presented
by Austin in his posthumously published lectures Sense and Sensibilia (1962).
The theory of appearing was in turn rejected by many philosophers, who held that it
failed to provide an adequate account of the epistemological status of illusions and
other visual anomalies. The aim of these thinkers was to give a coherent account of
how knowledge is possible given the existence of sense-data and the possibility of
perceptual error. The two main types of theories they developed were realism and
phenomenalism.
Realism
Realism is both an epistemological and a metaphysical doctrine. In its
epistemological aspect, realism claims that at least some of the objects
apprehended through perception are public rather than private. In its
metaphysical aspect, realism holds that at least some objects of perception exist
independently of the mind. It is especially the second of these principles that
distinguishes realists from phenomenalists.
Realists believe that an intuitive, commonsense distinction can be made between
two classes of entities perceived by human beings. One class, typically called
mental, consists of things like headaches, thoughts, pains, and desires; the other
class, typically called physical, consists of things such as tables, rocks, planets,
persons, and animals and certain physical phenomena such as rainbows, lightning,
and shadows. According to realist epistemology, mental entities are private, in the
sense that each of them is apprehensible by one person only. Although more than
one person can have a headache or feel pain, for example, no two people can have
the very same headache or feel the very same pain. In contrast, physical objects
are publicmore than one person can see or touch the same chair.
Realists also believe that, whereas physical objects are mind-independent, mental
objects are not. To say that an object is mind-independent is just to say that
its existence does not depend on its being perceived or experienced by anyone.
Thus, whether or not a particular table is being seen or touched by someone has no
effect upon its existence. Even if no one is perceiving it, it would still exist (other
things being equal). But this is not true of the mental. According to realists, if no
one is having a headache, then it does not make sense to say that a headache
exists. A headache is thus mind-dependent in a way in which tables, rocks, and
shadows are not.
Traditional realist theories of knowledge thus begin by assuming the public-private
distinction, and most realists also assume that one does not have to prove the
existence of mental phenomena. These are things of which each person is directly
aware, and there is no special problem about their existence. But they do not
assume this to be true of physical phenomena. As the existence of
visual aberrations, illusions, and other anomalies shows, one cannot be sure that in
any perceptual situation one is apprehending physical objects. All a person can be
sure of is that he is aware of something, an appearance of some sortsay of a bent
stick in water. Whether that appearance corresponds to anything actually existing in
the external world is an open question.
In his work Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940), Ayer called this difficulty
the egocentric predicament. When a person looks at what he thinks is a physical
object, such as a chair, what he is directly apprehending is a sense-datum, a certain
visual appearance. But such an appearance seems to be private to that person; it
seems to be something mental and not publicly accessible. What then justifies the
individuals belief in the existence of supposedly external objectsi.e., physical
entities that are public and exist independently of the mind? Realists developed two
main responses to this challenge: direct (or naive) realism and representative
realism, also called the causal theory.
In contrast to traditional realism, direct realism holds that physical objects
themselves are perceived directly. That is, what one immediately perceives is the
physical object itself (or a part of it); thus there is no problem about inferring the
existence of such objects from the contents of ones perception. Some direct
realists, such as Moore and his followers, continued to accept the existence of
sense-data, but unlike traditional realists they held that, rather than mental entities,
sense data might be physical parts of the surface of the perceived object itself.
Other direct realists, such as the perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson (190479),
rejected sense-data theory altogether, claiming that the surfaces of physical objects
are normally directly observed. Thompson Clarke went beyond Moore in arguing
that normally the entire physical object, rather than only its surface, is perceived
directly.
All these views have trouble explaining perceptual anomalies. Indeed, it was
because of such difficulties that Moore, in his last published paper, Visual Sense-
Data (1957), abandoned direct realism. He held that, because the elliptical sense-
datum one perceives when one looks at a round coin cannot be identical with the
coins circular surface, one cannot be seeing the coin directly. Hence, one cannot
have direct knowledge of physical objects.
Although developed in response to the failure of direct realism, the theory of
representative realism is in essence an old view; its best-known exponent in modern
philosophy was Locke. It is also sometimes called the scientific theory, because it
seems to be supported by findings in optics and physics. Like most forms of realism,
representative realism holds that the direct objects of perception are sense-data (or
their equivalents). What it adds is a scientifically grounded causal account of the
origin of sense-data in the stimulation of sense organs and the operation of the
central nervous system. Thus the theory would explain visual sense-data as follows.
Light is reflected from an opaque surface, traverses an intervening space, and, if
certain standard conditions are met, strikes the retina, where it activates a series of
nerve cells, including the rods and cones, the bipolar cells, and the ganglion cells of
the optic nerve, eventually resulting in an event in the brain consisting of the
experience of a visual sense-datumi.e., seeing.
Given an appropriate normal causal connection between the original external object
and the sense-datum, representative realists assert that the sense-datum will
accurately represent the object as it really is. Visual illusion is explained in various
ways, but usually as the result of some anomaly in the causal chain that gives rise
to distortions and other types of aberrant visual phenomena.
Representative realism is thus a theory of indirect perception, because it holds that
human observers are directly aware of sense-data, and only indirectly aware of the
physical objects that cause these data in the brain. The difficulty with this view is
that, since one cannot compare the sense-datum that is directly perceived with the
original object, one can never be sure that it gives an accurate representation of it;
and therefore human beings cannot know that the real world corresponds to their
perceptions. They are still confined within the circle of appearance after all. It thus
seems that neither version of realism satisfactorily solves the problem with which it
began.
Phenomenalism
In light of the difficulties faced by realist theories of perception some philosophers,
so-called phenomenalists, proposed a completely different way of analyzing the
relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, they rejected the
distinction between independently existing physical objects and mind-dependent
sense-data. They claimed that either the very notion of independent existence is
nonsense because human beings have no evidence for it, or what is meant by
independent existence must be understood in such a way as not to go beyond the
sort of perceptual evidence human beings do or could have for the existence of
such things. In effect, these philosophers challenged the cogency of the intuitive
ideas that the ordinary person supposedly has about independent existence.
All variants of phenomenalism are strongly verificationist. That is, they wish to
maintain that claims about the purported external world must be capable of
verification, or confirmation. This entails that no such claim can assert the existence
of, or otherwise make reference to, anything that is beyond the realm of possible
perceptual experience.
Phenomenalists have thus tried to analyze in wholly perceptual terms what it means
to say that a particular objectsay a tomatoexists. Any such analysis, they claim,
must begin by deciding what sort of an object a tomato is. In their view, a tomato is
first of all something that has certain perceptible properties, including a certain size,
weight, colour, and shape. If one were to abstract the set of all such properties from
the object, however, nothing would be left overthere would be no presumed
Lockean substratum that supports these properties and that itself is unperceived.
There is thus no evidence in favour of such an unperceivable feature, and no
reference to it is needed in explaining what a tomato or any so-called physical
object is.
To talk about any existent object is thus to talk about a collection of perceivable
features localized in a particular portion of space-time. Accordingly, to say that a
tomato exists is to describe either a collection of properties that an observer is
actually perceiving or a collection that such an observer would perceive under
certain specified conditions. To say, for instance, that a tomato exists in the next
room is to say that, if one went into that room, one would see a familiar reddish
shape, one would obtain a certain taste if one bit into it, and one would feel
something soft and smooth if one touched it. To speak about the tomatos existing
unperceived in the next room thus does not entail that it is unperceivable. In
principle, everything that exists is perceivable. Therefore, the notion of existing
independently of perception has been misunderstood or mischaracterized by both
philosophers and nonphilosophers. Once it is understood that objects are merely
sets of properties and that such properties are in principle always perceivable, the
notion that there is some sort of unbridgeable gap between peoples perceptions
and the objects they perceive is seen to be just a mistake.
In this view, perceptual error is explained in terms of coherence and predictability.
To say with truth that one is perceiving a tomato means that ones present set of
perceptual experiences and an unspecified set of future experiences will cohere in
certain ways. That is, if the object a person is looking at is a tomato, then he can
expect that, if he touches, tastes, and smells it, he will experience a recognizable
grouping of sensations. If the object he has in his visual field is hallucinatory, then
there will be a lack of coherence between what he touches, tastes, and smells. He
might, for example, see a red shape but not be able to touch or taste anything.
The theory is generalized to include what others would touch, see, and hear as well,
so that what the realists call public will also be defined in terms of the coherence
of perceptions. A so-called physical object is public if the perceptions of many
persons cohere or agree; otherwise it is not. This explains why a headache is not a
public object. In similar fashion, a so-called physical object will be said to have an
independent existence if expectations of future perceptual experiences are borne
out. If tomorrow, or the day after, a person has perceptual experiences similar to
those he had today, then he can say that the object he is perceiving has an
independent existence. The phenomenalist thus attempts to account for all the
facts that the realist wishes to explain without positing the existence of anything
that transcends possible experience.
Criticisms of this view have tended to be technical. Generally speaking, however,
realists have objected to it on the ground that it is counterintuitive to think of
physical objects such as tomatoes as being sets of actual or possible perceptual
experiences. The realist argues that human beings do have such experiences, or
under certain circumstances would have them, because there is an object out there
that exists independently of them and is their source. Phenomenalism, they
contend, implies that, if no perceivers existed, then the world would contain no
objects, and this is surely inconsistent both with what ordinary persons believe and
with the known scientific fact that all sorts of objects existed in the universe long
before there were any perceivers. But supporters deny that phenomenalism carries
such an implication, and the debate about its merits remains unresolved.
Analytic epistemology today
In the last quarter of the 20th century, important contributions to epistemology
were made by researchers in neuroscience, psychology, artificial intelligence, and
computer science. These investigations produced insights into the nature of vision,
the formation of mental representations of the external world, and the storage and
retrieval of information in memory, among many other processes. The new
approaches in effect revived indirect theories of perception that emphasized the
subjective experience of the observer. Indeed, many of them made use of concepts
such as qualia, and felt sensationthat were essentially equivalent to the
notion of sense-data.
Some of the new approaches also seemed to lend support to skeptical conclusions
of the sort that early sense-data theorists had attempted to overcome. The
neurologist Richard Gregory, for example, argued in 1993 that no theory of direct
perception, such as that proposed by Gibson, could be supported, given the
indirectness imposed by the many physiological steps or stages of visual and other
sensory perception. For these and other reasons we may safely abandon direct
accounts of perception in favor of indirectly related and never certain
hypotheses of reality. Similarly, work by another neurologist, Vilayanur
Ramachandran, showed that the stimulation of certain areas of the brain in normal
people produces sensations comparable to those felt in so-called phantom limb
phenomena (the experience by an amputee of pains or other sensations that seem
to be located in a missing limb). The conclusion that Ramachandran drew from his
work is a modern variation of Descartess evil genius hypothesis: that we can
never be certain that the sensations we experience accurately reflect an external
reality.
On the basis of experimental findings such as these, many philosophers adopted
forms of radical skepticism. Benson Mates, for example, has declared: Ultimately
the only basis I can have for a claim to know that there exists something other than
my own perceptions is the nature of those very perceptions. But they could be just
as they are even if there did not exist anything else. Ergo, I have no basis for the
knowledge-claim in question. Mates concluded, following Sextus Empiricus, that
human beings cannot make any justifiable assertions about anything other than
their own sense experiences.
Philosophers have responded to these challenges in a variety of ways. Avrum Stroll,
for example, has argued that the views of skeptics such as Mates, as well those of
many other modern proponents of indirect perception, rest on a conceptual mistake:
the failure to distinguish between scientific and philosophical accounts of the
connection between sense experience and objects in the external world. In the case
of vision, the scientific account (or, as he calls it, the causal story) describes the
familiar sequence of events that occurs according to well known optical and
physical laws. Citing this account, proponents of indirect perception point out that
every event in such a causal sequence effects some modification of the input it
receives from the preceding event. Thus, the light energy that strikes the retina is
converted to electrochemical energy by the rods and cones, among other nerve
cells, and the electrical impulses transmitted along the nervous pathways leading to
the brain are reorganized in important ways at every synapse. From the fact that
the input to every event in the sequence undergoes some modification, it follows
that the end result of the process, the visual representation of the external object,
must differ considerably from the elements of the original input, including the object
itself. From this observation, theorists of indirect perception who are inclined toward
skepticism conclude that one cannot be certain that the sensation one experiences
in seeing a particular object represents the object as it really is.
But this last inference is unwarranted, according to Stroll. What the argument shows
is only that the visual representation of the object and the object itself are different
(a fact that hardly needs pointing out); it does not show that we cannot be certain
whether the representation is accurate. Indeed, a strong argument can be made to
show that our perceptual experiences cannot all be inaccurate, or modified, in this
way. For if they were, then it would be impossible to compare any given perception
with its object in order to determine whether the sensation represented the object
accurately. But in that case, it also would be impossible to verify the claim that all
our perceptions are inaccurate. Hence, the claim that all our perceptions are
inaccurate is scientifically untestable. According to Stroll, this is a decisive objection
against the skeptical position.
The implications of these developments in the cognitive sciences are clearly
important for epistemology. The experimental evidence adduced for indirect
perception has raised philosophical discussion of the nature of human perception to
a new level. It is clear that a serious debate has begun, and at this point it is
impossible to predict its outcome.
Avrum Stroll

what is pramana
Prama (Sanskrit: , Pramas) literally means "proof" and "means of
knowledge". It refers to epistemology in Indian philosophies, and is one of the key,
much debated fields of study in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, since ancient
times.

pramana | Indian philosophy

Prama, (Sanskrit: measure), in Indian philosophy, the means by which one
obtains accurate and valid knowledge (pram, pramiti) about ..
Prama, (Sanskrit: measure), in Indian philosophy, the means by which one
obtains accurate and valid knowledge (pram, pramiti) about the world. The
accepted number of prama varies, according to the philosophical system or
school; the exegetic system of Mms accepts five, whereas Vednta as a whole
proposes three.
The three principal means of knowledge are (1) perception, (2) inference, and (3)
word. Perception (pratyaka) is of two kinds, direct sensory perception (anubhava)
and such perception remembered (smti). Inference (anumna) is based on
perception but is able to conclude something that may not be open to perception.
The word (abda) is, in the first place, the Veda, the validity of which is self-
authenticated. Some philosophers broaden the concept of abda to include the
statement of a reliable person (pta-vkya). To these, two additional means of
knowledge have been added: (4) analogy(upamna), which enables one to grasp
the meaning of a word by analogy of the meaning of a similar word, and (5)
circumstantial implication (arthpatti), which appeals to common sense (e.g., one
does not see the sun move from minute to minute, but, as it is in a different place at
different times of day, one must conclude that it has moved.
LEARN MORE in these related articles:
arthapatti
Arthapatti, ( Sanskrit: the incidence of a case) in Indian philosophy, the fifth of the
five means of knowledge (pramana) by which one obtains accurate knowledge of
the world. Arthapatti is knowledge arrived at by circumstantial implication.
Prama, (Sanskrit: measure), in Indian philosophy, the means by which one
obtains accurate and valid knowledge (pram, pramiti) about the world. The
accepted number of prama varies, according to the philosophical system or
school; the exegetic system of Mms accepts five, whereas Vednta as a whole
proposes three.
The three principal means of knowledge are (1) perception, (2) inference, and (3)
word. Perception (pratyaka) is of two kinds, direct sensory perception (anubhava)
and such perception remembered (smti). Inference (anumna) is based on
perception but is able to conclude something that may not be open to perception.
The word (abda) is, in the first place, the Veda, the validity of which is self-
authenticated. Some philosophers broaden the concept of abda to include the
statement of a reliable person (pta-vkya). To these, two additional means of
knowledge have been added: (4) analogy(upamna), which enables one to grasp
the meaning of a word by analogy of the meaning of a similar word, and (5)
circumstantial implication (arthpatti), which appeals to common sense (e.g., one
does not see the sun move from minute to minute, but, as it is in a different place at
different times of day, one must conclude that it has moved.
arthapatti
Arthapatti, ( Sanskrit: the incidence of a case) in Indian philosophy, the fifth of the
five means of knowledge (pramana) by which one obtains accurate knowledge of
the world. Arthapatti is knowledge arrived at by circumstantial implication.

Indian philosophy, the systems of thought and reflection that were developed by the
civilizations of the Indian subcontinent. They include both orthodox (astika)
systems, namely, the Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa (or
Mimamsa), and Vedanta schools of philosophy, and unorthodox (nastika) systems,
such as Buddhism and Jainism. Indian thought has been concerned with various
philosophical problems, significant among which are the nature of the world
(cosmology), the nature of reality (metaphysics), logic, the nature of knowledge
(epistemology), ethics, and the philosophy of religion.

The Hindu deity Krishna, an avatar of Vishnu, mounted on a horse pulling Arjuna,
hero of the epic poem Mahabharata; 17th-century illustration.
The Hindu deity Krishna, an avatar of Vishnu, mounted on a horse pulling Arjuna,
hero of the epic
Photos.com/Jupiterimages

General Considerations
Significance of Indian philosophies in the history of philosophy
In relation to Western philosophical thought, Indian philosophy offers both surprising
points of affinity and illuminating differences. The differences highlight certain
fundamentally new questions that the Indian philosophers asked. The similarities
reveal that, even when philosophers in India and the West were grappling with the
same problems and sometimes even suggesting similar theories, Indian thinkers
were advancing novel formulations and argumentations. Problems that the Indian
philosophers raised for consideration, but that their Western counterparts never did,
include such matters as the origin (utpatti) and apprehension (jnapti) of truth
(pramanya). Problems that the Indian philosophers for the most part ignored but
that helped shape Western philosophy include the question of whether knowledge
arises from experience or from reason and distinctions such as that between
analytic and synthetic judgments or between contingent and necessary truths.
Indian thought, therefore, provides the historian of Western philosophy with a point
of view that may supplement that gained from Western thought. A study of Indian
thought, then, reveals certain inadequacies of Western philosophical thought and
makes clear that some concepts and distinctions may not be as inevitable as they
may otherwise seem. In a similar manner, knowledge of Western thought gained by
Indian philosophers has also been advantageous to them.

Vedic hymns, Hindu scriptures dating from the 2nd millennium bce, are the oldest
extant record from India of the process by which the human mind makes its gods
and of the deep psychological processes of mythmaking leading to profound
cosmological concepts. The Upanishads (speculative philosophical texts) contain
one of the first conceptions of a universal, all-pervading, spiritual reality leading to a
radical monism (absolute nondualism, or the essential unity of matter and spirit).
The Upanishads also contain early speculations by Indian philosophers about
nature, life, mind, and the human body, not to speak of ethics and social philosophy.
The classical, or orthodox, systems (darshanas) debate, sometimes with penetrating
insight and often with a degree of repetition that can become tiresome to some,
such matters as the status of the finite individual; the distinction as well as the
relation between the body, mind, and the self; the nature of knowledge and the
types of valid knowledge; the nature and origin of truth; the types of entities that
may be said to exist; the relation of realism to idealism; the problem of whether
universals or relations are basic; and the very important problem of moksha, or
liberation (literally release)its nature and the paths leading up to it.

General characteristics of Indian philosophy

Common concerns
The various Indian philosophies contain such a diversity of views, theories, and
systems that it is almost impossible to single out characteristics that are common to
all of them. Acceptance of the authority of the Vedas characterizes all the orthodox
(astika) systemsbut not the unorthodox (nastika) systems, such as Charvaka
(radical materialism), Buddhism, and Jainism. Moreover, even when philosophers
professed allegiance to the Vedas, their allegiance did little to fetter the freedom of
their speculative ventures. On the contrary, the acceptance of the authority of the
Vedas was a convenient way for a philosophers views to become acceptable to the
orthodox, even if a thinker introduced a wholly new idea. Thus, the Vedas could be
cited to corroborate a wide diversity of views; they were used by the Vaisheshika
thinkers (i.e., those who believe in ultimate particulars, both individual souls and
atoms) as much as by the Advaita (monist) Vedanta philosophers.

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.In most Indian philosophical systems, the acceptance of the ideal of moksha, like
allegiance to the authority of the scriptures, was only remotely connected with the
systematic doctrines that were being propounded. Many epistemological, logical,
and even metaphysical doctrines were debated and decided on purely rational
grounds that did not directly bear upon the ideal of moksha. Only the Vedanta (end
of the Vedas) philosophy and the Samkhya (a system that accepts a real matter
and a plurality of the individual souls) philosophy may be said to have a close
relationship to the ideal of moksha. The logical systemsNyaya, Vaisheshika, and
Purva-Mimamsaare only very remotely related. Also, both the philosophies and
other scientific treatises, including even the Kama-sutra (Aphorisms on Love) and
the Artha-shastra (The Science of Material Gain), recognized the same ideal and
professed their efficacy for achieving it.
When Indian philosophers speak of intuitive knowledge, they are concerned with
making room for it and demonstrating its possibility, with the help of logicand
there, as far as they are concerned, the task of philosophy ends. Indian philosophers
do not seek to justify religious faith; philosophic wisdom itself is accorded the
dignity of religious truth. Theory is not subordinated to practice, but theory itself, as
theory, is regarded as being supremely worthy and efficacious.

Three basic concepts form the cornerstone of Indian philosophical thought: the self
or soul (atman), works (karma), and liberation (moksha). Leaving the Charvakas
aside, all Indian philosophies concern themselves with these three concepts and
their interrelations, though this is not to say that they accept the objective validity
of these concepts in precisely the same manner. Of these, the concept of karma,
signifying moral efficacy of human actions, seems to be the most typically Indian.
The concept of atman, not altogether absent in Western thought, corresponds in a
certain sense to the Western concept of a transcendental or absolute spirit self
important differences notwithstanding. The concept of moksha as the concept of the
highest ideal has likewise been one of the concerns of Western thought, especially
during the Christian era, though it probably has never been as important as for the
Hindu mind. Most Indian philosophies assume that moksha is possible, and the
impossibility of moksha (anirmoksha) is regarded as a material fallacy likely to
vitiate a philosophical theory.
In addition to karma, the lack of two other concerns further differentiates Indian
philosophical thought from Western thought in general. Since the time of the
Greeks, Western thought has been concerned with mathematics and, in the
Christian era, with history. Neither mathematics nor history has ever raised
philosophical problems for the Indian. In the lists of pramanas, or ways of knowing
accepted by the different schools, there is none that includes mathematical
knowledge or historical knowledge. Possibly connected with their indifference
toward mathematics is the significant fact that Indian philosophers have not
developed formal logic. The theory of the syllogism (a valid deductive argument
having two premises and a conclusion) is, however, developed, and much
sophistication has been achieved in logical theory. Indian logic offers an instructive
example of a logic of cognitions (jnanani) rather than of abstract propositionsa
logic not sundered and kept isolated from psychology and epistemology, because it
is meant to be the logic of actual human striving to know what is true of the world.
Forms of argument and presentation
There is, in relation to Western thought, a striking difference in the manner in which
Indian philosophical thinking is presented as well as in the mode in which it
historically develops. Out of the presystematic age of the Vedic hymns and the
Upanishads and many diverse philosophical ideas current in the pre-Buddhistic era,
there emerged with the rise of the age of the sutras (aphoristic summaries of the
main points of a system) a neat classification of systems (darshanas), a
classification that was never to be contradicted and to which no further systems are
added. No new school was founded, no new darshana came into existence. But this
conformism, like conformism to the Vedas, did not check the rise of independent
thinking, new innovations, or original insights. There is, apparently, an underlying
assumption in the Indian tradition that no individual can claim to have seen the
truth for the first time and, therefore, that an individual can only explicate, state,
and defend in a new form a truth that has been seen, stated, and defended by
countless others before himhence the tradition of expounding ones thoughts by
affiliating oneself to one of the darshanas.
If one is to be counted as a great master (acharya), one has to write a commentary
(bhashya) on the sutras of the darshana concerned, or one must comment on one of
the bhashyas and write a tika (subcommentary). The usual order is sutrabhashya
varttika (collection of critical notes)tika. At any stage a person may introduce a
new and original point of view, but at no stage can one claim originality for oneself.
Not even authors of sutras could do that, for they were only systematizing the
thoughts and insights of countless predecessors. The development of Indian
philosophical thought has thus been able to combine, in an almost unique manner,
conformity to tradition and adventure in thinking.
Roles of sacred texts, mythology, and theism
The role of the sacred texts in the growth of Indian philosophy is different in each of
the different systems. In those systems that may be called adhyatmavidya, or
sciences of spirituality, the sacred texts play a much greater role than they do in the
logical systems (anvikshikividya). In the case of the former, Shankara, a leading
Advaita Vedanta philosopher (c. 788820 ce), perhaps best laid down the principles:
reasoning should be allowed freedom only as long as it does not conflict with the
scriptures. In matters regarding supersensible reality, reasoning left to itself cannot
deliver certainty, for, according to Shankara, every thesis established by reasoning
may be countered by an opposite thesis supported by equally strong, if not
stronger, reasoning. The sacred scriptures, embodying as they do the results of
intuitive experiences of seers, therefore, should be accepted as authoritative, and
reasoning should be made subordinate to them.
Whereas the sacred texts thus continued to exercise some influence on
philosophical thinking, the influence of mythology declined considerably with the
rise of the systems. The myths of creation and dissolution of the universe persisted
in the theistic systems but were transformed into metaphors and models. With the
Nyaya (problem of knowledge)Vaisheshika (analysis of nature) systems, for
example, the model of a potter making pots determined much philosophical
thinking, as did that of a magician conjuring up tricks in the Advaita (nondualist)
Vedanta. The nirukta (etymology) of Yaska, a 5th-century-bce Sanskrit scholar, tells
of various attempts to interpret difficult Vedic mythologies: the adhidaivata
(pertaining to the deities), the aitihasika (pertaining to the tradition), the adhiyajna
(pertaining to the sacrifices), and the adhyatmika (pertaining to the spirit). Such
interpretations apparently prevailed in the Upanishads; the myths were turned into
symbols, though some of them persisted as models and metaphors.
The issue of theism vis--vis atheism, in the ordinary senses of the English words,
played an important role in Indian thought. The ancient Indian tradition, however,
classified the classical systems (darshanas) into orthodox (astika) and unorthodox
(nastika). Astika does not mean theistic, nor does nastika mean atheistic.
Panini, a 5th-century-bce grammarian, stated that the former is one who believes in
a transcendent world (asti paralokah) and the latter is one who does not believe in it
(nasti paralokah). Astika may also mean one who accepts the authority of the
Vedas; nastika then means one who does not accept that authority. Not all among
the astika philosophers, however, were theists, and, even if they were, they did not
all accord the same importance to the concept of God in their systems. The
Samkhya system did not involve belief in the existence of God, without ceasing to
be astika, and Yoga (a mental-psychological-physical meditation system) made
room for God not on theoretical grounds but only on practical considerations. The
Purva-Mimamsa of Jaimini (c. 400 bce), the greatest philosopher of the Mimamsa
school, posits various deities to account for the significance of Vedic rituals but
ignores, without denying, the question of the existence of God. The Advaita Vedanta
of Shankara rejects atheism in order to prove that the world had its origin in a
conscious, spiritual being called Ishvara, or God, but in the long run regards the
concept of Ishvara as a concept of lower order that becomes negated by a
metaphysical knowledge of brahman, the absolute, nondual reality. Only the non-
Advaita schools of Vedanta and the Nyaya-Vaisheshika remain zealous theists, and,
of these schools, the god of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school does not create the
eternal atoms, universals, or individual souls. For a truly theistic conception of God,
one has to look to the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta, the Vaishnavite (devotees of
Vishnu as the supreme God), and the Shaivite (devotees of Shiva as the supreme
God) philosophical systems. Whereas Hindu religious life continues to be dominated
by these last-mentioned theistic systems, the philosophies went their own ways, far
removed from that religious demand.
A general history of development and cultural background
S.N. Dasgupta, a 20th-century Indian philosopher, divided the history of Indian
philosophy into three periods: the prelogical (up to the beginning of the Christian
era), the logical (from the beginning of the Christian era to the 11th century ce),
and the ultralogical (from the 11th century to the 18th century). What Dasgupta
calls the prelogical stage covers the pre-Mauryan and the Mauryan period (c. 321
185 bce) in Indian history. The logical period begins roughly with the Kushanas (1st
2nd centuries ce) and reaches its highest development during the Gupta era (3rd
5th centuries ce) and the age of imperial Kanauj (7th century ce).
The prelogical period
In its early prelogical phase, Indian thought, freshly developing in the Indian
subcontinent, actively confronted and assimilated the diverse currents of pre-Vedic
and non-Vedic elements in the native culture that the Indo-Aryan-speaking migrants
from the north sought to appropriate. The marks of this confrontation are to be
noted in every facet of Indian religion and thought: in the Vedic hymns in the form
of conflicts, with varying fortunes, between the people referred to as nobles (arya)
and the people already living in the land; in the conflict between a positive attitude
that is interested in making life fuller and richer and a negative attitude
emphasizing asceticism and renunciation; in the great variety of skeptics,
naturalists, determinists, indeterminists, accidentalists, and no-soul theorists that
filled the Ganges Plain; in the rise of the heretical, unorthodox schools of Jainism
and Buddhism protesting against the Vedic religion and the Upanishadic theory of
atman; and in the continuing confrontation, mutually enriching and nourishing, that
occurred between the Brahmanic (Hindu priestly) and Buddhist logicians,
epistemologists, and dialecticians. The Indo-Aryan speakers, however, were soon
followed by a host of foreign invaders, Greeks, Shakas and Hunas from Central Asia,
Pashtuns (Pathans), Mongols, and Mughals (Muslims). Both religious thought and
philosophical discussion received continuous challenges and confrontations. The
resulting responses have a dialectical character: sometimes new ideas have been
absorbed and orthodoxy has been modified; sometimes orthodoxy has been
strengthened and codified in order to be preserved in the face of the dangers of
such confrontation; sometimes, as in the religious life of the Christian Middle Ages,
bold attempts at synthesis of ideas have been made. Nevertheless, through all the
vicissitudes of social and cultural life, Brahmanical thought has been able to
maintain a fairly strong current of continuity.

In the chaotic intellectual climate of the pre-Mauryan era, there were skeptics
(ajnanikah) who questioned the possibility of knowledge. There were also
materialists, the chief of which were the Ajivikas (deterministic ascetics) and the
Lokayatas (the name by which Charvaka doctrinesdenying the authority of the
Vedas and the soulare generally known). Furthermore, there existed the two
unorthodox schools of yadrichhavada (accidentalists) and svabhavaha (naturalists),
who rejected the supernatural. Kapila, the legendary founder of the Samkhya
school, supposedly flourished during the 7th century bce. Proto-Jain ideas were
already in existence when Mahavira (flourished 6th century bce), the founder of
Jainism, initiated his reform. Gautama the Buddha (flourished c. 6th4th centuries
bce) apparently was familiar with all these intellectual ideas and was as dissatisfied
with them as with the Vedic orthodoxy. He sought to forge a new paththough not
new in all respectsthat was to assure blessedness to man. Orthodoxy, however,
sought to preserve itself in a vast Kalpa-sutra (ritual) literaturewith three parts:
the Shrauta-sutra, based on shruti (revelation); the Grihya-sutra, based on smriti
(tradition); and the Dharma-sutra, pertaining to rules of religious lawwhereas the
philosophers tried to codify their doctrines in systematic form, leading to the rise of
the philosophical sutras. Though the writing of the sutras continued over a long
period, the sutras of most of the various darshanas probably were completed
between the 6th and 3rd centuries bce. Two of the sutras appear to have been
composed in the pre-Mauryan period but after the rise of Buddhism; these works are
the Mimamsa-sutras of Jaimini and the Vedanta-sutras of Badarayana (c. 500200
bce).
The Mauryan period brought, for the first time, a strong centralized state. The
Greeks had been ousted, and a new self-confidence characterized the beginning of
the period. This seems to have been the period in which the epics Mahabharata and
Ramayana were initiated, though their composition went on through several
centuries before they took the forms they now have. Manu, a legendary lawgiver,
codified the Dharma-shastra; Kautilya, a minister of King Chandragupta Maurya,
systematized the science of political economy (Artha-shastra); and Patanjali, an
ancient author or authors, composed the Yoga-sutras. Brahmanism tried to adjust
itself to the new communities and cultures that were admitted into its fold: new
godsor rather, old Vedic gods that had been rejuvenatedwere worshipped; the
Hindu trinity (Trimurti) of Brahma (the creator), Vishnu (the preserver), and Shiva
(the destroyer) came into being; and the Pashupata (Shaivite), Bhagavata
(Vaishnavite), and Tantra (esoteric meditative) systems were initiated. The
Bhagavadgitathe most famous work of this periodsymbolized the spirit of the
creative synthesis of the age. A new ideal of karma as opposed to the more ancient
one of renunciation was emphasized. Orthodox notions were reinterpreted and
given a new symbolic meaning, as, for example, the Gita does with the notion of
yajna (sacrifice). Already in the pre-Christian era, Buddhism had split up into
several major sects, and the foundations for the rise of Mahayana (Greater
Vehicle) Buddhism had been laid.
The logical period
The logical period of Indian thought began with the Kushan dynasty (1st2nd
centuries ce). Gautama (author of the Nyaya-sutras; probably flourished at the
beginning of the Christian era) and his 5th-century commentator Vatsyayana
established the foundations of the Nyaya as a school almost exclusively
preoccupied with logical and epistemological issues. The Madhyamika (Middle
Way) school of Buddhismalso known as the Shunyavada (Way of Emptiness)
schoolarose, and the analytical investigations of Nagarjuna (c. 200), the great
propounder of Shunyavada (dialectical thinking), reached great heights. Though
Buddhist logic in the strict sense of the term had not yet come into being, an
increasingly rigorous logical style of philosophizing developed among the
proponents of these schools of thought.
During the reign of the Guptas, there was a revival of Brahmanism of a gentler and
more-refined form. Vaishnavism of the Vasudeva cult, centring on the prince-god
Krishna and advocating renunciation by action, and Shaivism prospered, along with
Buddhism and Jainism. Both the Mahayana and the Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle), or
Theravada (Way of the Elders), schools flourished. The most notable feature,
however, was the rise of the Buddhist Yogachara school, of which Asanga (4th
century ce) and his brother Vasubandhu were the great pioneers. Toward the end of
the 5th century, Dignaga, a Buddhist logician, wrote the Pramanasamuccaya
(Compendium of the Means of True Knowledge), a work that laid the foundations
of Buddhist logic.
The greatest names of Indian philosophy belong to the post-Gupta period from the
7th to the 10th century. At that time Buddhism was on the decline and the Tantric
cults were rising, a situation that led to the development of the Tantric forms of
Buddhism. Shaivism was thriving in Kashmir and Vaishnavism in the southern part
of India. The great philosophers Mimamshakas Kumarila (7th century), Prabhakara
(7th8th centuries), Mandana Mishra (8th century), Shalikanatha (9th century), and
Parthasarathi Mishra (10th century) belong to this age. The greatest Indian
philosopher of the period, however, was Shankara. All these men defended
Brahmanism against the unorthodox schools, especially against the criticisms of
Buddhism. The debate between Brahmanism and Buddhism was continued, on a
logical level, by philosophers of the Nyaya schoolUddyotakara, Vachaspati Mishra,
and Udayana (Udayanacharya).

The ultralogical period

Muslim rule in India had consolidated itself by the 11th century, by which time
Buddhism, for all practical purposes, had disappeared from the country. Hinduism
had absorbed Buddhist ideas and practices and reasserted itself, with the Buddha
appearing in Hindu writings as an incarnation of Vishnu. The Muslim conquest
created a need for orthodoxy to readjust itself to a new situation. In this period the
great works on Hindu law were written. Jainism, of all the unorthodox schools,
retained its purity, and great Jaina works, such as Devasuris
Pramananayatattvalokalamkara (The Ornament of the Light of Truth of the
Different Points of View Regarding the Means of True Knowledge, 12th century ce)
and Prabhachandras Prameyakamalamartanda (The Sun of the Lotus of the
Objects of True Knowledge, 11th century ce), were written during this period.
Under the Chola kings (c. 8501279) and later in the Vijayanagara kingdom (which,
along with Mithila in the north, remained strongholds of Hinduism until the middle of
the 16th century), Vaishnavism flourished. The philosopher Yamunacharya
(flourished 1050 ce) taught the path of prapatti, or complete surrender to God. The
philosophers Ramanuja (11th century), Madhva, and Nimbarka (c. 12th century)
developed theistic systems of Vedanta and severely criticized Shankaras Advaita
Vedanta.

Toward the end of the 12th century, creative work of the highest order began to
take place in the fields of logic and epistemology in Mithila and Bengal. The 12th
13th-century philosopher Gangesas Tattvachintamani (The Jewel of Thought on the
Nature of Things) laid the foundations of the school of Navya-Nyaya (New
Nyaya). Four great members of this school were Pakshadhara Mishra of Mithila,
Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (16th century), his disciple Raghunatha Shiromani (both of
Bengal), and Gadadhara Bhattacharyya.

Religious life was marked by the rise of great mystic saints, chief of which are
Ramananda, Kabir, Chaitanya, and Guru Nanak, who emphasized the path of bhakti,
or devotion, a wide sense of humanity, freedom of thought, and a sense of unity of
all religions. Somewhat earlier than these were the great Muslim Sufi (mystic)
saints, including Khwja Muin-ud-Din asan, who emphasized asceticism and
taught a philosophy that included both love of God and love of humanity.

The British period in Indian history was primarily a period of discovery of the ancient
tradition (e.g., the two histories by Radhakrishnan, scholar and president of India
from 1962 to 1967, and S.N. Dasgupta) and of comparison and synthesis of Indian
philosophy with the philosophical ideas from the West. Among modern creative
thinkers have been Mohandas K. Gandhi, who espoused new ideas in the fields of
social, political, and educational philosophy; Sri Aurobindo, an exponent of a new
school of Vedanta that he calls Integral Advaita; and K.C. Bhattacharyya, who
developed a phenomenologically oriented philosophy of subjectivity that is
conceived as freedom from object.

Historical Development Of Indian Philosophy

Presystematic philosophy
Shruti and the nature of authority
All orthodox philosophies can trace their basic principles back to some statement
or other in the Vedas, the texts that are generally awarded the status of scripture in
Hinduism but not in Buddhism or Jainism. The Vedanta schools, especially, had an
affiliation with the authority of shruti (literally that which is heard; texts that are
taken to be revealed), and the school of Mimamsa concerned itself chiefly with the
questions of interpreting the sacred texts. The Hindu tradition regards the Vedas as
being apaurusheyai.e., not composed by any person. Sayana, a famous Vedic
commentator, said that this means an absence of a human author. For Sayana, the
eternality of the Vedas is like that of space and time; no human being experiences
their beginning or their end. But they are, in fact, created by Brahma, the supreme
creator. For the Advaita Vedanta, because no author of the Vedas is mentioned, an
unbroken chain of Vedic teachers is quite conceivable, so that the scriptures bear
testimony to their own eternality. The authoritative character of shruti may then be
deduced from the fact that it is free from any fault (dosha), or limitation, which
characterizes human words. Furthermore, the Vedas give knowledge about things
whether dharma (what ought to be done) or brahman (Absolute Reality)which
cannot be known by any other empirical means of knowledge. The authority of the
Vedas cannot, therefore, be contradicted by any empirical evidence. Later logicians
of the orthodox schools sought to give these arguments precision and logical
rigour.
Vishnu with his 10 avatars (incarnations): Fish, Tortoise, Boar, Man-Lion, Dwarf,
Rama with the Ax,
The Vedic hymns (mantras) seem to be addressed to gods and goddesses (deva,
one who gives knowledge or light), who are personifications of natural forces and
phenomena (Agni, the fire god; Indra, the rain god; Vayu, the wind god). But there
are gods not identifiable with such phenomena (e.g., Aditi, the infinite mother of all
gods; Mitra, the friend; Varuna, the guardian of truth and righteousness; and
Vishvakarman, the all-maker). Also, the hymns show an awareness of the unity of
these deities, of the fact that it is one God who is called by different names. The
famed conception of ritameaning at once natural law, cosmic order, moral law,
and the law of truthmade the transition to a monistic view of the universe as
being but a manifestation of one reality about which the later hymns continue to
raise fundamental questions in a poignant manner, without, however, suggesting
any dogmatic answer.

Development of the notion of transmigration

The hymns may, in general, be said to express a positive attitude toward human life
and to show interest in the full enjoyment of life here and hereafter rather than an
anxiety to escape from it. The idea of transmigration and the conception of the
different paths and worlds traversed by those who are good and those who are not
goodi.e., the world of Vishnu (the preserver) and the realm of Yama (the god of
death and the dead)are found in the Vedas. The chain of rebirth as a product of
ignorance and the conception of release from this chain as the greatest good of the
spiritual life are markedly absent in the hymns.
Origin of the concept of brahman and atman
The Upanishads answer the question Who is that one Being? by establishing the
equation brahman = atman. Brahmanmeaning now that which is the greatest,
than which there is nothing greater, and also that which bursts forth into the
manifested world, the one Being of which the hymn of creation spokeis viewed as
nothing but atman, identifiable as the innermost self in a human being but also, in
reality, the innermost self in all beings. Both the words gain a new, extended, and
spiritual significance through this identification. Atman was originally used to mean
breath, the vital essence, and even the body. Later etymologizing brought out
several strands in its meaning: that which pervades (yad apnoti), that which gives
(yadadatte), that which eats (yad atti), and that which constantly accompanies
(yacca asya santato bhavam). Distinctions were made between the bodily self, the
vital self, the thinking self, and the innermost self, whose nature is bliss (ananda),
the earlier ones being sheaths (koshas) covering the innermost being, or the inner,
eternal core of a person. Distinctions were sometimes drawn between the waking
(jagrat), dreaming (svapna), and dreamless-sleep (sushupti) states of the self, and
these three are contrasted with the fourth, or transcendent (turiya), state that both
transcends and includes them all. The identification of the Absolute Reality
underlying the universe with the innermost being within the human person resulted
in a spiritualization of the former concept and a universalization of the latter. This
final conception of brahman or atman received many different explications from
different teachers in the Upanishads, some of which were negative in character (neti
neti, not this, not this) while others positively affirmed the all-pervasiveness of
brahman. But there were still others who insisted on both the transcendence and
immanence of brahman in the universe. Brahman is also characterized as infinity,
truth, and knowledge and as existence, consciousness, and bliss.

The principles underlying macrocosm and microcosm

Though the objective and the subjective, the macrocosm (universal) and the
microcosm (individual), came to be identified according to their true essences,
attempts were made to correlate different macrocosmic principles with
corresponding microcosmic principles. The manifested cosmos was correlated with
the bodily self; the soul of the world, or Hiranyagarbha, with the vital self; and
Ishvara, or God as a self-conscious being, with the thinking self. The transcendent
self and brahman as bliss are not correlates but rather are identical.

Early Buddhist developments

Background
Buddhism was not a completely new phenomenon in the religious history of India; it
was built upon the basis of ideas that were already current, both Brahmanic and
non-Brahmanic. Protests against the Brahmanic doctrines of atman, karma, and
moksha were being voiced in the 6th century bce, prior to preaching of the Buddha,
by various schools of thought: by naturalists, such as Purana (The Old One)
Kassapa, who denied both virtue and vice (dharma and adharma) and thus all moral
efficacy of human deeds; by determinists, such as the Ajivika Makkhali Gosala, who
denied sin and freedom of will; and by materialists, such as Ajita Keshakambalin,
who, besides denying virtue, vice, and afterlife, resolved being into material
elements. Protests were also voiced by Nigantha Nataputta, who believed in
salvation by an ascetic life of self-discipline and hence in the efficacy of deeds and
the possibility of omniscience, and, finally, Sanjaya Belathiputta, the skeptic, who, in
reply to the question Is there an afterlife? would not say It is so or It is
otherwise, nor would he say It is not so or It is not not so.
Devotees worshipping at a stupa, the monument that symbolizes the Buddhas
Of these six, the Jain tradition identifies Nigantha with Mahavira; the designation
Ajivika is applied, in a narrow sense, to the followers of Makkhali and in a loose
sense to all nonorthodox sects other than the Jainasthe skeptics and the
Charvakas.

Buddhism, Jainism, and the Ajivikas rejected, in common, the sacrificial polytheism
of the Brahmanas and the monistic mysticism of the Upanishads. All three of them
recognized the rule of natural law in the universe. Buddhism, however, retained the
Vedic notions of karma and moksha, though rejecting the other fundamental
concept of atman.
The Four Noble Truths and the nature of suffering
In such an intellectual climate, Gotama (Sanskrit Gautama), the historical Buddha,
taught his Four Noble Truths: (1) dukkha (Sanskrit duhkha; generally but
misleadingly translated as suffering, as it implies a broader sense of
dissatisfaction with existence in the phenomenal world); (2) the origination of
dukkha in tanha (desire or craving); (3) the cessation of dukkha; and finally (4)
the way leading to that cessation by following the Eightfold Path.

Although the word dukkha in common parlance means suffering, its use by the
Buddha was meant to include both pleasure and pain, both happiness and suffering.
There are three aspects of this conception: dukkha as suffering in the ordinary
sense; dukkha arising out of the impermanence of things, even of a state of
pleasure; and dukkha in the sense of five aggregates meaning that the I
constituted by any individual is nothing but a totality of five aggregatesi.e., form,
feeling, conception, disposition, and consciousness. In brief, whatever is noneternal
i.e., whatever is subject to the law of causalityis characterized by dukkha; for
the Buddha, this is the human situation. One who recognizes the nature of dukkha
also knows its causes. Dukkha arises out of craving (tanha; Sanskrit trishna),
craving arises out of sensation (vedana), and sensation arises out of contact
(sparsha), so that a human being is faced with a series of conditions leading back to
ignorance (avijja; avidya)a series in which the rise of each succeeding member
depends upon and originates from the preceding one (paticca-samuppada;
pratityasamutpada; literally dependent origination).

The path of liberation: methods of the Eightfold Path

The Four Noble Truths follow the middle way (madhyamika) between the two
extremes of sensual indulgence and ascetic self-torture, both of which the Buddha
rejected as spiritually useless. Only the middle path consisting in the eight steps
called the Eightfold Pathleads to enlightenment (bodhi) and to nibbana (nirvana).
The eight steps are (1) right views, (2) right intention, (3) right speech, (4) right
action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right
concentration. Of these eight, steps 3, 4, and 5 are grouped under right morality
(sila; shila); steps 6, 7, and 8 under right concentration (samadhi); and steps 1 and
2 under right wisdom (prajna).
The concepts of anatta and nibbana
Two key notions, even in early Buddhism, are those of anatta (Sanskrit anatman;
no-self) and nibbana. The Buddha apparently wanted his famed doctrine of anatta
to be a phenomenological account of how things are rather than a theory. In his
discourse to the wandering monk Vacchagotta, he rejected the theories of both
eternalism and annihilationism. The former, he stated, would be incompatible with
his thesis that all laws (dhammas; Sanskrit dharmas) are selfless (sabbe dhamma
anatta); the latter would be significant only if one had a self that is no more in
existence. Thus, by not taking sides with the metaphysicians, the Buddha described
how the consciousness I am comes to constitute itself in the stream of
consciousness out of the five aggregates of form, feeling, conception, disposition,
and consciousness. The doctrine of no-self actually has two aspects: as applied to
puggala (pudgala), or the individual person, and as applied to the dhammas, or the
elements of being. In its former aspect, it asserts the fact that an individual is
constituted out of five aggregates (khandas; skandhas); in its latter aspect it means
the utter insubstantiality of all elements. Intuitive realization of the former truth
leads to the disappearance of passions and desires, realization of the latter removes
all misconceptions about the nature of things in general. The former removes the
covering of the passions; the latter removes the concealment of things.
Together, they result in nibbana.
Both negative and positive accounts of nibbana are to be found in the Buddhas
teachings and in early Buddhist writings. Nibbana is a state of utter extinctionnot
of existence but of passions and suffering; it is a state beyond the chain of
causation, a state of freedom and spontaneity. It is in addition a state of bliss.
Nibbana is not the result of a process; were it so, it would be but another perishing
state. It is the truthnot, however, an eternal, everlasting substance like the atman
of the Upanishads but the truth of utter selflessness and the insubstantiality of
things, of the emptiness of the ego, and of the impermanence of all things. With the
realization of this truth, ignorance is destroyed, and, consequently, all craving,
suffering, and hatred is destroyed with it.
The philosophical portions of the Mahabharata
The great epic Mahabharata represents the attempt of Vedic Brahmanism to adjust
itself to the new circumstances reflected in the process of the Sanskritization
(integration of Vedic beliefs, practices, and institutions) of the various non-Vedic
communities. Many diverse trends of religious and philosophical thought have thus
been synthesized in this work.

Mokshadharma
Proto-Samkhyan texts
In its philosophical views, the epic contains an early version of Samkhya (a belief in
real matter and the plurality of individual souls), which is prior to the classical
Samkhya of Ishvarakrishna, a 3rd-century-ce philosopher. The chapter on
Mokshadharma in Book 12 of the Mahabharata is full of such proto-Samkhya
texts. Mention is made of four main philosophical schools: Samkhya-Yoga, taught by
Kapila (a sage living before the 6th century bce); Pancharatra, taught by Vishnu; the
Vedas; and Pashupata (Lord of Creatures), taught by Shiva. Belonging to the
Pancharatra school, the epic basically attempts to accommodate certain
presystematic Samkhya ideas into the Bhagavata faith. Samkhya and Yoga are
sometimes put together and sometimes distinguished. Several different schemata
of the 25 principles (tattvas) of the Samkhya are recorded. One common
arrangement is that of eight productive forms of prakriti (the unmanifest, intellect,
egoism, and five fine elements: sound, smell, form or colour, taste, and touch) and
16 modifications (five organs of perception, five organs of action, mind, and five
gross elements: ether, earth, fire, water, and air), and purusha (person). An un-
Samkhyan element is the 26th principle: Ishvara, or the supreme lord. One notable
result is the identification of the four living forms (vyuhas) of the Pancharatra school
with four Samkhya principles: Vasudeva with spirit, Samkarshana with individual
soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with ego-sense.
Non-Samkhyan texts
Beside the Samkhya-Yoga, which is in the foreground of the epics philosophical
portions, there are Vedanta texts emphasizing the unity of spirits and theistic texts
emphasizing not only a personal deity but also the doctrine of the avatar (avatara),
or incarnation. The Vasudeva-Krishna cult characterizes the theistic part of the epic.
Early theories of kingship and state
In the Shanti Parvan (Book of Consolation, 12th book) of the Mahabharata, there is
also a notable account of the origin of kingship and of rajadharma, or the dharma
(law) of the king as king. Bhishma, who is discoursing, refers with approval to two
different theories of the origin of kingship, both of which speak of a prior period in
which there were no kings. According to one account, this age was a time
characterized by insecurity for the weak and unlimited power for the strong; the
other regards it as an age of peace and tranquillity. The latter account contains a
theory of the fall of humankind from this ideal state, which led to a need for
institutionalized power, or kingship; the former account leads directly from the
insecurity of the prekingship era to the installation of king by the divine ruler for the
protection and the security of humankind. Kingship is thus recognized as having a
historical origin. The primary function of the king is that of protection, and
dandaniti, or the art of punishment, is subordinated to rajadharma, or dharma of the
king. Though it recognizes a quasi-divinity of the king, the Mahabharata makes the
dharma, the moral law, superior to the king.

The Bhagavadgita
The Bhagavadgita (Song of the Lord) forms a part of the Mahabharata and
deserves separate consideration by virtue of its great importance in the religious life
and thought of the Hindus. Not itself a shruti, it has, however, been accorded the
status of an authoritative text and is regarded as one of the sources of the Vedanta
philosophy. At a theoretical level, it brings together Samkhya metaphysics,
Upanishadic monism, and a devotional theism of the Krishna-Vasudeva cult. In its
practical teaching, it steers a middle course between the path of action of the
Vedic ritualism and the path of renunciation of the Upanishadic mysticism, and it
accommodates all the three major paths to moksha: the paths of action (karma),
devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jnana). This synthetic character of the work
accounts for its great hold on the Hindu mind. The Hindu tradition treats it as one
homogenous work, with the status of an Upanishad.

Neither performance of the duties prescribed in the scriptures nor renunciation of all
action is conducive to the attainment of moksha. If the goal is freedom, then the
best path to the goal is to perform ones duties with a spirit of nonattachment
without caring for the fruits of ones actions and without the thought of pleasure or
pain, profit or loss, or victory or failure, with a sense of equanimity and equality. The
Kantian ethic of duty for dutys sake seems to be the nearest Western parallel to
Krishnas teaching at this stage. But Krishna soon went beyond it by pointing out
that performance of action with complete nonattachment requires knowledge
(jnana) of the true nature of the self, its distinction from prakriti, or Matter (the
primeval stuff, not the world of matter perceived by the senses), with its three
component elements (sattvai.e., tension or harmony; rajasi.e., activity; and
tamasi.e., inertia), and of the highest self (purushottama), whose higher and
lower aspects are Matter and finite individuals, respectively. This knowledge of the
highest self or the supreme lord, however, would only require a devotional attitude
of complete self-surrender and performance of ones duties in the spirit of offering
to him. Thus, karma-yoga (discipline of action) is made to depend on jnana-yoga
(discipline of knowledge), and the latter is shown to lead to bhakti-yoga
(discipline of devotion). Instead of looking upon Krishnas teaching as laying down
alternative ways for different persons in accordance with their aptitudes, it would
seem more logical to suppose that he taught the essential unity and
interdependence of these ways. How one should begin is left to ones aptitude and
spiritual makeup.
Doctrines and ideas of the Buddhist Tipitaka
In the Tipitaka (Sanskrit Tripitaka; The Three Baskets), collected and compiled at
the council at Pataliputra (3rd century bce) 300 years after the Buddhas
mahaparinibbana (attainment of final nibbana upon death), both the canonical and
philosophical doctrines of early Buddhism were codified. Abhidhamma Pitaka, the
last of the pitakas, has seven parts: Dhammasangani, which gives an enumeration
of dhammas, or elements of existence; Vibhanga, which gives further analysis of the
dhammas; Dhatukatha, which is a detailed classification, following many different
principles, of the elements; Puggalapannatti, which gives descriptions of individual
persons according to stages of their development; Kathavatthu, which contains
discussions and refutation of other Buddhist schools; Yamaka, which deals with pairs
of questions; and Patthana, which gives an analysis of relations among the
elements.

The key notion in all this is that of the dhammas. Because Buddhist philosophers
denied any permanence, whether in outer nature or in inner life, they felt compelled
to undertake a detailed, systematic, and complete listing and classification of the
different elements that constitute both the external world and the mental, inner life.
Each of these elements, except for the three elements that are not composed of
parts (i.e., space, or akasha, and the two cessations, nibbana and a temporary
stoppage, in states of meditation, of the flow of passions, or
apratisamkhyanivodha), is momentary. The primary object of this exhaustive
analysis was an understanding not so much of outer nature as of the human person
(puggala). The human person, however, consists in material (rupa) and mental
(nama) factors, which leads to an account of the various elements of matter. The
primary interest, nevertheless, is in the human being, who is regarded as an
aggregate of various elements. The analysis of these components, together with the
underlying denial of an eternal self, was supposed to provide the theoretical basis
for the possibility of a good life conducive to the attainment of nibbana.

The individual person was analyzed into five aggregates (khandhas): material form
(rupa); feeling (vedana); conception (samjna); disposition (samskara); and
consciousness (vijnana). Of these, the last four constitute the mental; the first alone
is the material factor. The material is further analyzed into 28 states, the samskara
into 50 (falling into three groups: intellectual, affectional, and volitional), and the
vijnana into 89 kinds of states of consciousness. Another principle of classification
leads to a list of 18 elements (dhatus): five sense organs, five objects of those
senses, mind, the specific object of mind, and six kinds of consciousness (visual,
auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual, and purely mental). A third classification is
into 12 bases (ayatanas), which is a list of six cognitive faculties and their objects.
The Buddhist analysis of matter was in terms of sensations and sense data, to which
the sense organs were also added. The analysis of mind was also in terms of
corresponding modes of consciousness and their objects.

Early system building

The history of the sutra style
A unique feature of the development of Indian thought was the systematization of
each school of thought in the form of sutras, or extremely concise expressions,
intended to reduce the doctrines of a science or of a philosophy into a number of
memorizable aphorisms, formulas, or rules. The word sutra, originally meaning
thread, came to mean such concise expressions. A larger work containing a
collection of such sutras also came to be called a sutra. The aid of commentaries
becomes indispensable for the understanding of the sutras, and it is not surprising
that philosophical composition took the form of commentaries and
subcommentaries. The earliest sutras, the Kalpa-sutras, however, are not
philosophical but ritualistic. These Kalpa-sutras fell into three major parts: the
Shrauta-sutras, dealing with Vedic sacrifices; the Grihya-sutras, dealing with the
ideal life of a householder; and the Dharma-sutras, dealing with moral injunctions
and prohibitions.

In the works of Panini, a Hindu grammarian, the sutra style reached a perfection
never attained before and only imperfectly approximated by the later practitioners.
The sutra literature began before the rise of Buddhism, though the philosophical
sutras all seem to have been composed afterward. The Buddhist sutra (Pali sutta)
differs markedly in style and content from the Hindu sutra. Buddhist sutras are
rather didactic texts, discourses, or sermons, possibly deriving their name from the
sense in which they carry the thread of the tradition of the Buddhas teachings.
The Purva-mimamsa-sutras and Shabaras commentary
The Purva-mimamsa (First Reflection), or Karmamimamsa (Study of [Ritual]
Action), is the system that investigates the nature of Vedic injunctions. Though this
is the primary purpose of the system, this task also led to the development of
principles of scriptural interpretation and, therefore, to theories of meaning and
hermeneutics (critical interpretations). Jaimini, who composed sutras about the 4th
century bce, was critical of earlier Mimamsa authors, particularly of one Badari, to
whom is attributed the view that the Vedic injunctions are meant to be obeyed
without the expectation of benefits for oneself. According to Jaimini, Vedic
injunctions do not merely prescribe actions but also recommend these actions as
means to the attainment of desirable goals. For both Jaimini and Shabara (3rd
century), his chief commentator, performance of the Vedic sacrifices is conducive to
the attainment of heaven; both emphasize that nothing is a duty unless it is
instrumental to happiness in the long run.

Jaiminis central concern is dharma, which is defined as the desired object (artha),
whose desirability is testified only by the injunctive statements of the scriptures
(chodana-lakshano). In order to substantiate the implied thesis that what ought to
be donei.e., dharmacannot be decided by either perception or reasoning, Jaimini
proceeds to a discussion of the nature of ways of knowing. Because perceptual
knowledge arises from contact of the sense organs with reality that is present,
dharma that is not an existent reality but a future course of action cannot possibly
be known by sense-experience. Reasoning based on such sense-experience is for
the same reason useless. Only injunctive statements can state what ought to be
done. Commands made by finite individuals are not reliable, because the validity of
what they say depends upon the presumption that the persons concerned are free
from those defects that render ones words dependable. Therefore, only the
injunctions contained in the scriptureswhich, according to Mimamsa and the Hindu
tradition, are not composed by any finite individual (apaurusheya)are the sources
of all valid knowledge of dharma. The Mimamsa rejects the belief that the scriptures
are utterances of God. The words themselves are authoritative. In accordance with
this thesis, Jaimini developed the theory that the relation between words and their
meanings is natural (autpattikastu shabdasyarthena sambandhah, or the relation
of word to its meaning is eternal) and not conventional, that the primary meaning
of a word is a universal (which is also eternal), that in a sentence the principal
element is the verb, and that the principal force of the verb is that which specifically
belongs to the verb with an optative ending and which instigates a person to take a
certain course of action in order to effect the desired end.

Though this theory provided the Mimamsa with a psychological and semantic
technique for interpreting the sentences of the scriptures that are clearly in the
injunctive form, there are also other kinds of sentences: prayers, glorifications,
those referring to a thing by a name, and prohibitions. Attempts were therefore
made to show how each one of these types of sentences bears, directly or
indirectly, on the central, injunctive texts. Furthermore, a systematic classification
of the various forms of injunctions is undertaken: those that indicate the general
nature of an action, those that show the connection of a subsidiary rite to the main
course of action, those that suggest promptness in performance of the action, and
those that indicate the right to enjoy the results to be produced by the course of
action enjoined.

The commentary of Shabara elaborated on the epistemological themes of the

sutras; in particular, Shabara sought to establish the intrinsic validity of experiences
and traced the possibility of error to the presence of defects in the ways of knowing.
He also critically examined Buddhist subjective idealism and the theory of utter
emptiness of things and proved the existence of soul as a separate entity that
enjoys the results of ones actions in this or the next life.
The Vedanta-sutras
Relation to the Mimamsa-sutras
Along with Badari and Jaimini, Badarayana, a contemporary of Jaimini, was the other
major interpreter of Vedic thought. Just as the Mimamsa-sutra traditions of Badaris
tradition were revived by Prabhakara, a 7th8th-century scholar, and Jaiminis were
defended by Shabara and Kumarila, a 7th8th-century scholar, Badarayanas sutras
laid the basis for the development of Vedanta philosophy. The relation of the
Vedanta-sutras to the Mimamsa-sutras, however, is difficult to ascertain.
Badarayana approves of the Mimamsa view that the relation between words and
their significations is eternal. There are, however, clear statements of difference:
according to Jaimini, for example, the dispenser of the fruits of ones actions is
dharma, the law of righteousness itself, but for Badarayana it is the supreme lord,
Ishvara. Often, Jaiminis interpretation is contrasted with that of Badari; in such
cases, Badarayana sometimes supports Badaris view and sometimes regards both
as defensible.

The overall difference that emerges is that whereas Jaimini lays stress on the
ritualistic parts of the Vedas, Badarayana lays stress on the philosophical portions
i.e., the Upanishads. The former recommends the path of Vedic injunctions, hence
the ideal of karma; the latter recommends the path of knowledge. The central
concept of Jaiminis investigation is dharmai.e., what ought to be done; the central
theme of Badarayanas investigations is brahmani.e., the Absolute Reality. The
relationship between these two treatises remains a matter of controversy between
later commentatorsRamanuja, a great South Indian philosopher of the 11th12th
centuries, defending the thesis that they jointly constitute a single work with
Jaiminis coming first and Badarayanas coming after it in logical order, and
Shankara, an earlier great South Indian philosopher of the 8th9th centuries, in
favour of the view that the two are independent of each other and possibly also
inconsistent in their central theses.
Contents and organization of the four books
Badarayanas sutras have four books (adhyayas), each book having four chapters
(padas). The first book is concerned with the theme of samanvaya (reconciliation).
The many conflicting statements of the scriptures are all said to agree in converging
on one central theme: the concept of brahman, the one Absolute Being from whom
all beings arise, in whom they are maintained, and into whom they return. The
second book establishes avirodha (consistency) by showing the following: (1) that
dualism and Vaisheshika atomism are neither sustainable interpretations of the
scriptures nor defensible rationally; (2) that though consciousness cannot
conceivably arise out of a nonconscious nature, the material world could arise out of
spirit; (3) that the effect in its essence is not different from the cause; and (4) that
though brahman is all-perfect and has no want, creation is an entirely unmotivated
free act of delight (lila). The Yogachara Buddhist view that there are no external
objects but only minds and their conceptions is refuted, as also the Buddhist
doctrine of the momentariness of all that is. The Jain pluralism and the theism of the
Pashupatas and the Bhagavatas are also rejected. Because, according to Vedanta,
only brahman is external, the third and the fourth chapters of the second book
undertake to show that nothing else is eternal. The third book concerns the spiritual
discipline and the various stages by which the finite individual (jiva) may realize an
essential identity with brahman. The fourth and last book deals with the final result
of the modes of discipline outlined in the preceding book and distinguishes between
the results achieved by worshipping a personal Godhead and those achieved by
knowing the one brahman. Included is some discussion of the possible worlds
through which the spirits travel after death, but all this discussion is subordinate to
the one dominant goal of liberation and consequent escape from the chain of
rebirth.
Variations in views
Badarayanas sutras refer to interpreters of Vedanta before him who were
concerned with such central issues as the relation between the finite individual soul
(jiva) and the Absolute (brahman) and the possible bodily existence of a liberated
individual. To Ashmarthya, an early Vedanta interpreter, is ascribed the view that
the finite individual and the Absolute are both identical and different (as causes and
their effects are differenta view that seems to have been the ancestor of the later
theory of Bhedabheda). Audulomi, another pre-Badarayana Vedanta philosopher, is
said to have held the view that the finite individual becomes identical with brahman
after going through a process of purification. Another interpreter, Kashakritsna,
holds that the two are identicala view that anticipates the later unqualified
monism of Shankara. Badarayanas own views on this issue are difficult to
ascertain: the sutras are so concise that they are capable of various interpretations,
though there are reasons to believe that Ramanujas is closer to their intentions
than Shankaras.

The Samkhya-karikas
Relation to orthodoxy
Ishvarakrishnas Samkhya-karika (Verses on Samkhya, c. 2nd century ce) is the
oldest available Samkhya work. Ishvarakrishna describes himself as laying down the
essential teachings of Kapila as taught to Asuri and by Asuri to Panchashika. He
refers also to Shashtitantra (Doctrine of 60 Conceptions), the main doctrines of
which he claims to have expounded in the karikas. The Samkhya of Charaka, which
is substantially the same as is attributed to Panchashika in the Mahabharata, is
theistic and regards the unmanifested (avyakta) as being the same as the purusha
(the self). The Mahabharata refers to three kinds of Samkhya doctrines: those that
accept 24, 25, or 26 principles, the last of which are theistic. The later Samkhya-
sutra is more sympathetic toward theism, but the karikas are atheistic, and the
traditional expositions of the Samkhya are based on this work.

The nature of the self (purusha)

According to the karikas, there are many selves, each being of the nature of pure
consciousness. The self is neither the original matter (prakriti) nor an evolute of it.
Though matter is composed of the three gunas (qualities), the self is not; though
matter, being nonintelligent, cannot discriminate, the self is discriminating; though
matter is object (vishaya), the self is not; though matter is common, the self is an
individual (asamanya); unlike matter, the self is not creative (aprasavadharmin).
The existence of selves is proved on the ground that nature exhibits an ordered
arrangement the like of which is known to be meant for another (pararthatva). This
other must be a conscious spirit. That there are many such selves is proved on the
grounds that different persons are born and die at different times, that they do not
always act simultaneously, and that they show different qualities, aptitudes, and
propensities. All selves are, however, passive witnesses (sakshin), essentially alone
(kevala), neutral (madhyastha), and not agents (akarta).
The nature, origin, and structure of the world (prakriti)
Phenomenal nature, with its distinctions of things and persons (taken as
psychophysical organisms), is regarded as an evolution out of a primitive state of
matter. This conception is based on a theory of causality known as the
satkaryavada, according to which an effect is implicitly pre-existent in its cause
prior to its production. This latter doctrine is established on the ground that if the
effect were not already existent in its cause, then something would have to come
out of nothing. The original prakriti (primeval stuff) is the primary matrix out of
which all differentiations arose and within which they all were contained in an
undistinguished manner. Original Matter is uncaused, eternal, all-pervading, one,
independent, self-complete, and has no distinguishable parts; the things that
emerge out of this primitive matrix are, on the other hand, caused, noneternal,
limited, many, dependent, wholes composed of parts, and manifested. But Matter,
whether in its original unmanifested state or in its manifested forms, is composed of
three gunas, nondiscriminating (avivekin), object (vishaya), general, nonconscious,
and yet creative.

The order in which Matter evolves is laid down as follows: prakriti mahat or
buddhi (intelligence) ahamkara (ego-sense) manas (mind) five tanmatras
(the sense data: colour, sound, smell, touch, and taste) five sense organs five
organs of action (tongue, hands, feet, organs of evacuation and of reproduction)
five gross elements (ether, air, light, water, and earth). This emanation schema may
be understood either as an account of cosmic evolution or as a logical
transcendental analysis of the various factors involved in experience or as an
analysis of the concrete human personality.
The concept of the three qualities (gunas)
A striking feature of this account is the conception of guna: nature is said to consist
of three gunasoriginally in a state of equilibrium and subsequently in varying
states of mutual preponderance. The karikas do not say much about whether the
gunas are to be regarded as qualities or as component elements. Of the three,
harmony or tension (sattva) is light (laghu), pleasing, and capable of manifesting
others. Activity (rajas) is dynamic, exciting, and capable of hurting. Inertia (tamas)
is characterized by heaviness, conceals, is static, and causes sadness. The varying
psychological responses of human beings are thus hypostatized and made into
component properties or elements of naturean argument whose fallacy was
exposed, among others, by Shankara.
Epistemology
The Samkhya-karika delineates three ways of knowing (pramana): perception,
inference, and verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the application of the
sense organs to their respective objects (prativishayadhyavasaya). Inference, which
is not defined, is divided first into three kinds, and then into two. According to the
former classification, an inference is called purvavat if it is based on past experience
(such as when one, on seeing a dark cloud, infers that it will rain); it is called
sheshavat when from the presence of a certain property in one part of a thing the
presence of the same property is inferred in the rest (such as when, on finding a
drop of sea water to be saline, one infers the rest to be so); it is called samanyato-
drishta when it is used to infer what is not perceivable (such as when one infers the
movement of a star on seeing it occupy two different positions in the firmament at
different times). According to the other classification, an inference may be either
from the mark to that of which it is the mark or in the reverse direction. Verbal
testimony, in order to be valid, must be the word of one who has authoritative
knowledge.

There is, in addition to the three ways of knowing, consideration of the modes of
functioning of the sense organs. The outer senses apprehend only the present
objects, the inner senses (manas, antahkarana, and buddhi) have the ability to
apprehend all objectspast, present, and future. The sense organs, on
apprehending their objects, are said to offer them to buddhi, or intelligence, which
both makes judgments and enjoys the objects of the senses. Buddhi is also credited
with the ability to perceive the distinction between the self and the natural
components of the person.
Ethics
In its ethics, the karikas manifest an intellectualism that is characteristic of the
Samkhya system. Suffering is due to ignorance of the true nature of the self, and
freedom, the highest good, can be reached through knowledge of the distinction
between the self and nature. In this state of freedom, the self becomes indifferent to
nature; it ceases to be an agent and an enjoyer. It becomes what it in fact is, a pure
witness consciousness.

The Yoga-sutras
Relation to Samkhya
The Yoga-sutras of Patanjali (2nd century bce) are the earliest extant textbook on
Yoga. Scholars now generally agree that the author of the Yoga-sutras is not the
grammarian Patanjali. In any case, the Yoga-sutras stand in close relation to the
Samkhya system, so much so that tradition regards the two systems as one. Yoga
adds a 26th principle to the Samkhya list of 25i.e., the supreme lord, or Ishvara
and has thus earned the name of Seshvara-Samkhya, or theistic Samkhya.
Furthermore, there is a difference in their attitudes: Samkhya is intellectualistic and
emphasizes metaphysical knowledge as the means to liberation; Yoga is
voluntaristic and emphasizes the need of going through severe self-control as the
means of realizing intuitively the same principles.
God, self, and body
In the Yoga-sutras, God is defined as a distinct self (purusha), untouched by
sufferings, actions, and their effects; his existence is proved on the ground that the
degrees of knowledge found in finite beings, in an ascending order, has an upper
limiti.e., omniscience, which is what characterizes God. He is said to be the source
of all secular and scriptural traditions; he both revealed the Vedas and taught the
first fathers of humankind. Surrender of the effects of action to God is regarded as a
recommended observance.

As in Samkhya, the self is distinguished from the mind (chitta): the mind is viewed
as an object, an aggregate. This argument is used to prove the existence of a self
other than the mind. The mental state is not self-intimating; it is known in
introspection. It cannot know both itself and its object. It rather is known by the self,
whose essence is pure, undefiled consciousness. That the self is not changeable is
proved by the fact that were it changeable the mental states would be sometimes
known and sometimes unknownwhich, however, is not the case, because a
mental state is always known. To say that the self knows means that the self is
reflected in the mental state and makes the latter manifested. The aim of Yoga is to
arrest mental modifications (chitta-vritti) so that the self remains in its true,
undefiled essence and is, thus, not subject to suffering.

The attitude of the Yoga-sutras to the human body is ambivalent. The body is said to
be filthy and unclean. Thus, the ascetic cultivates a disgust for it. Yet, much of the
discipline laid down in the Yoga-sutras concerns perfection of the body, with the
intent to make it a fit instrument for spiritual perfection. Steadiness in bodily
posture and control of the breathing process are accorded a high place. The
perfection of body is said to consist in beauty, grace, strength and adamantine
hardness.
Theories and techniques of self-control and meditation
Patanjali lays down an eightfold path consisting of aids to Yoga: restraint (yama),
observance (niyama), posture (asana), regulation of breathing (pranayama),
abstraction of the senses (pratyahara), concentration (dharana), meditation
(dhyana), and trance (samadhi). The first two constitute the ethical core of the
discipline: the restraints are abstinence from injury, veracity, abstinence from
stealing, continence, and abstinence from greed. The observances are cleanliness,
contentment, purificatory actions, study, and surrender of the fruits of ones actions
to God. Ahimsa (nonviolence) also is glorified, as an ethics of detachment.

Various stages of samadhi are distinguished: the conscious and the superconscious,
which are subdivided into achievements with different shades of perfection. In the
final stage, all mental modifications cease to be and the self is left in its pure,
undefiled state of utter isolation. This is freedom (kaivalya), or absolute
independence.
The Vaisheshika-sutras
The Vaisheshika-sutras were written by Kanada, a philosopher who flourished c.
2nd4th centuries. The system owes its name to the fact that it admits ultimate
particularities (vishesha). The metaphysics is, therefore, pluralistic.
Organization and contents

The Vaisheshika-sutras are divided into 10 chapters, each with two sections.
Chapter 1 states the purpose of the work: to explain dharma, defined as that which
confers prosperity and ultimate good on human beings. This is followed by an
enumeration of the categories of being recognized in the system: substance, quality
(guna), action, universality, particularity, and inherence (samavaya). Later authors
add a seventh category: negation (abhava). This enumeration is followed by an
account of the common features as well as the dissimilarities among these
categories: the categories of universal and particularity and the concepts of
being and existence. Chapter 2 classifies substances into nine kinds: earth, water,
fire, air, ether, space, time, self, and mind. There next follows a discussion of the
question of whether sound is eternal or noneternal. Chapter 3 is an attempt to prove
the existence of self by an inference. Chapter 4 explains the words eternal and
noneternal, the noneternal being identified with avidya, and distinguishes between
three different forms of the substances earth, water, fire, and aireach of these is
either a body, a sense organ, or an object. Chapter 5 deals with the notion of action
and the connected concept of effort, and the next traces various special phenomena
of nature to the supersensible force, called adrishta. Chapter 6 argues that
performance of Vedic injunctions generates this supersensible force and that the
merits and demerits accumulated lead to moksha. Chapter 7 argues that qualities of
eternal things are eternal and those of noneternal things are noneternal. Chapter 8
argues that the self and mind are not perceptible. Chapter 9 argues that neither
action nor qualities may be ascribed to what is nonexistent and, further, that
negation may be directly perceived. Chapter 9 also deals with the nature of hetu, or
the middle term in syllogism, and argues that the knowledge derived from hearing
words is not inferential. Chapter 10 argues that pleasure and pain are not cognitions
because they do not leave room for either doubt or certainty.

Structure of the world

This account of the contents of the sutras shows that the Vaisheshika advocates an
atomistic cosmology (theory of order) and a pluralistic ontology (theory of being).
The material universe arises out of the conjunction of four kinds of atoms: the earth
atom, water atom, fire atom, and air atom. There also are the eternal substances:
ether, in which sound inheres as a quality; space, which accounts for the human
sense of direction and distinctions between far and near; and time, which accounts
for the notions of simultaneity and nonsimultaneity and which, like space, is eternal
and is the general cause of all that has origin.

Naturalism
The overall naturalism of the Vaisheshika, its great interest in physics, and its
atomism are all counterbalanced by the appeal to adrishta (a supersensible force),
to account for whatever the other recognized entities cannot explain. Among things
ascribed to this supersensible force are movements of needles toward a magnet,
circulation of water in plant bodies, upward motion of fire, movement of mind, and
movements of soul after death. These limit the naturalism of the system.
Epistemology
Knowledge belongs to the self; it appears or disappears with the contact of the self
with the senses and of the senses with the objects. Perception of the self results
from the conjunction of the self with the mind. Perception of objects results from
proximity of the self, the senses, and the objects. Error exists because of defects of
the senses. Inference is of three kinds: inference of the nonexistence of something
from the existence of some other things, inference of the existence of something
from nonexistence of some other, and inference of existence of something from the
existence of some other thing.
Ethics
Moksha is a state in which there is no body and no rebirth. It is achieved by
knowledge. Works in accordance with the Vedic injunction may help in its
attainment.
The Nyaya-sutras
The Nyaya-sutras probably were composed by Gautama or Akshapada about the
2nd century bce, though there is ample evidence that many sutras were
subsequently interpolated.

Content and organization

The sutras are divided into five chapters, each with two sections. The work begins
with a statement of the subject matter, the purpose, and the relation of the subject
matter to the attainment of that purpose. The ultimate purpose is salvationi.e.,
complete freedom from painand salvation is attained by knowledge of the 16
categories: hence the concern with these categories, which are means of valid
knowledge (pramana); objects of valid knowledge (prameya); doubt (samshaya);
purpose (prayojana); example (drishtanta); conclusion (siddhanta); the constituents
of a syllogism (avayava); argumentation (tarka); ascertainment (nirnaya); debate
(vada); disputations (jalpa); destructive criticism (vitanda); fallacy (hetvabhasa);
quibble (chala); refutations (jati); and points of the opponents defeat
(nigrahasthana).

Epistemology
The words knowledge, buddhi, and consciousness are used synonymously. Four
means of valid knowledge are admitted: perception, inference, comparison, and
verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the knowledge that arises from the
contact of the senses with the object, which is nonjudgmental, or unerring or
judgmental. Inference is defined as the knowledge that is preceded by perception
(of the mark) and classified into three kinds: that from the perception of a cause to
its effect; that from perception of the effect to its cause; and that in which
knowledge of one thing is derived from the perception of another with which it is
commonly seen together. Comparison is defined as the knowledge of a thing
through its similarity to another thing previously well-known.

The validity of the means of knowing is established as against Buddhist skepticism,

the main argument being that if no means of knowledge is valid then the
demonstration of their invalidity cannot itself claim validity. Perception is shown to
be irreducible to inference, inference is shown to yield certain knowledge, and errors
in inference are viewed as being faults in the person, not in the method itself.
Knowledge derived from verbal testimony is viewed as noninferential.
Theory of causation and metaphysics
Although the sutras do not explicitly develop a detailed theory of causation, the
later Nyaya theory is sufficiently delineated in Chapter 4. No event is uncaused. No
positive entity could arise out of mere absencea thesis that is pressed against
what seems to be a Buddhist view that in a series of momentary events every
member is caused by the destruction of the preceding member. Cause and effect
should be homogeneous in nature, and yet the effect is a new beginning and was
not already contained in the cause. The Buddhist thesis that all things are negative
in nature (inasmuch as a things nature is constituted by its differences from others)
is rejected, as is the view that all things are eternal or that all things are noneternal.
Both these latter views are untrue to experience. Thus, the resulting metaphysics
admits two kinds of entities: eternal and noneternal. The whole is a new entity over
and above the parts that constitute it. Also, the idea that God is the material cause
of the universe is rejected. God is viewed as the efficient cause, and human deeds
produce their results under the control and cooperation of God.

The syllogism and its predecessors

Of the four main topics of the Nyaya-sutras (art of debate, means of valid
knowledge, syllogism, and examination of opposed views), there is a long history.
There is no direct evidence for the theory that though inference (anumana) is of
Indian origin, the syllogism (avayava) is of Greek origin. Vatsayana, the
commentator on the sutras, referred to some logicians who held a theory of a 10-
membered syllogism (the Greeks had three). The Vaisheshika-sutras give five
propositions as constituting a syllogism but give them different names. Gautama
also supports a five-membered syllogism with the following structure:

This hill is fiery (pratijna: a statement of that which is to be proved).

Because it is smoky (hetu: statement of reason).
Whatever is smoky is fiery, as is a kitchen (udaharana: statement of a general rule
supported by an example).
So is this hill (upanaya: application of the rule of this case).
Therefore, this hill is fiery (nigamana: drawing the conclusion).
The characteristic feature of the Nyaya syllogism is its insistence on the example
which suggests that the Nyaya logician wanted to be assured not only of formal
validity but also of material truth. Five kinds of fallacious middle (hetu) are
distinguished: the inconclusive (savyabhichara), which leads to more conclusions
than one; the contradictory (viruddha), which opposes that which is to be
established; the controversial (prakaranasama), which provokes the very question
that it is meant to settle; the counterquestioned (sadhyasama), which itself is
unproved; and the mistimed (kalatita), which is adduced when the time in which it
might hold good does not apply.
Other characteristic philosophic matters
Other philosophical theses stated in the sutras are as follows: the relation of words
to their meanings is not natural but conventional; a word means neither the bare
individual nor the universal by itself but all threethe individual, the universal, and
structure (akriti); desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and cognition are the
marks of the self; body is defined as the locus of gestures, senses, and sentiments;
and the existence and atomicity of mind are inferred from the fact that there do not
arise in the self more acts of knowledge than one at a time.
The beginnings of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy
Contributions of the Mahasangikas
When the Mahasangikas (School of the Great Assembly) seceded from the Elders
(Theravadins) about 400 bce, the germs were laid for the rise of the Mahayana
branch of Buddhism. The Mahasangikas admitted non-arhat monks and worshippers
(i.e., those who had not attained perfection), defied the Buddha, taught the doctrine
of the emptiness of the elements of being, distinguished between the mundane and
the supramundane reality, and considered consciousness (vijnana) to be intrinsically
free from all impurities. These ideas found varied expression among the various
groups into which the Mahasangikas later divided.

Contributions of the Sarvastivadins

The Sarvastivadins (realists who believe that all things, mental and material, exist
and also that all dharmaspast, present, and futureexist) seceded from the Elders
about the middle of the 3rd century bce. They rejected, in common with all other
sects, pudgalatma, or a self of the individual, but admitted dharmatmani.e., self-
existence of the dharmas (categories), or the elements of being. Each dharma is a
self-being; the law of causality applies to the formation of aggregates, not to the
elements themselves. Dharmas, whether they are past or are in the future, exist all
the same. Of these, three are said to be unconditioned: space (akasha) and the two
cessations (nirodha)the cessation that arises from knowledge and the cessation
that arises prior to the attainment of knowledge, the former being nirvana, the
latter being an arrest of the flow of passions through meditation prior to the
achievement of nirvana. By shunyata the Sarvastivadins mean only the truth that
there is no eternal substance called I. Because all elementspast, present, or
futureexist, the Sarvastivadins are obliged to account for these temporal
predicates, and several different theories are advanced. Of these, the theory
advanced by Vasumitra, a 1st2nd-century-ce Sarvastivadin, viz., that temporal
predicates are determined by the function of a dharma, is accepted by the
Vaibhashikasi.e., those among the Sarvastivadins who follow the authority of the
texts known as the Vibhasha.
Contributions of the Sautrantikas
The Vaibhashika doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be inconsistent with the
fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The Sautrantikas (so called because they rest
their case on the sutras) insist on the noneternality of the dharma as well. The past
and the future dharmas do not exist, and only the present ones do. The so-called
unconditioned dharmas are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the
Sautrantikas seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes
near to regarding nirvana as entirely negative. In their epistemology, whereas the
Vaibhashikas are direct realists, the Sautrantikas hold a sort of representationism,
according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions
that alone are directly apprehended.
The worldview of the Arthashastra
Kautilyas Arthashastra (c. 321296 bce) is the science of artha, or material
prosperity, which is one of the four goals of human life. By artha, Kautilya meant
the means of subsistence of humanity, which is, primarily, wealth and,
secondarily, earth. The work is concerned with the means of fruitfully maintaining
and using the latteri.e., land. It is a work on politics and diplomacy.

Theories of kingship and statecraft

Though Kautilya recognized that sovereignty may belong to a clan (kula), he was
himself concerned with monarchies. He advocated the idea of the kings divine
nature, or divine sanction of the kings office, but he also attempted to reconcile it
with a theory of the elective origin of the king. He referred to a state of nature,
without king, as an anarchy in which the stronger devours the weaker. The four
functions of the king are to acquire what is not gained, to protect what is gained, to
increase what is protected, and to bestow the surplus upon the deserving. The
political organization is held to have seven elements: the king, the minister, the
territory, the fort, the treasury, the army, and the ally. These are viewed as being
organically related. The three powers of the king are power of good counsel, the
majesty of the king himself, and the power to inspire. The priest is not made an
element of the state organization. The king, however, is not exempt from the laws
of dharma. Being the promulgator of dharma, the king should himself be free from
the six passions of sex, anger, greed, vanity, haughtiness, and overjoy. What
Kautilya advocated was an enlightened monarchical paternalism.
Concepts of the public good
In the happiness of the subjects lies the kings happiness. The main task of the king
is to offer protection. Monarchy is viewed as the only guarantee against anarchy.
Thus, the kings duty is to avert providential visitations such as famine, flood, and
pestilence; he ought also to protect agriculture, industry, and mining, the orphaned,
the aged, the sick, and the poor, to control crime with the help of spies, and to
settle legal disputes.
Relations between states
Regarding relations with other states, Kautilyas thoughts were based not so much
on high moral idealism as on the needs of self-interest. He wrote of six types of
foreign policy: treaty (sandhi), war (vigraha), marching against the enemy (yana),
neutrality (asana), seeking protection from a powerful king (samshraya), and dual
policy (dvaidhibhava). The rules concerning these are: he who is losing strength in
comparison to the other shall make peace; he who is gaining strength shall make
war; he who thinks neither he nor the enemy can win shall be neutral; he who has
an excess of advantage shall march; he who is wanting in strength shall seek
protection; he who undertakes work requiring assistance shall adopt a dual policy.
The formation and implementation of policy
Kautilyas views about the formation and implementation of policy were as follows:
a treaty based on truth and oath is binding for temporal and spiritual consequences;
a treaty based on security is binding only as long as the party is strong. He who
inflicts severe punishments becomes oppressive; he who inflicts mild punishments
is overpowered; and he who inflicts just punishments is respected. Kautilya
advocated an elaborate system of espionage for domestic as well as foreign affairs.
Fragments from the Ajivikas and the Charvakas
The Ajivikas
About the time of the rise of Buddhism, there was a sect of religious mendicants,
the Ajivikas, who held unorthodox views. In the strict sense, this name is applied to
the followers of one Makkhali Gosala, but in a wide sense it is also applied to those
who taught many different shades of heretical teachings. Primary sources of
knowledge about these are the Digha Nikaya, the Anguttara Nikaya, the Samyutta
Nikaya, the Sutrakritanga-sutra, Shilankas commentary on the Sutrakritanga-sutra,
the Bhagavati-sutra, the Nandi-sutra, and Abhayadevas commentary on
Samavayanga-sutra.

Makkhalis views may be thus summarized: There is no cause of the depravity of

things; they become depraved without any reason or cause. There is also no cause
of the purity of beings; they become pure without any reason or cause. Nothing
depends either on ones own efforts or on the efforts of others. All things are
destitute of power, force, or energy. Their changing states are due to destiny,
environment, and their own nature.
Thus, Makkhali denies sin, or adharma, and denies human freedom in shaping the
destiny of the species. He is thus a determinist, although scholars have held the
view that he might leave room for chance, if not for freedom of will. He is supposed
to have held an atomistic cosmology and that all beings, in the course of time, are
destined to culminate in a state of final salvation. He believes not only in rebirth but
also in a special doctrine of reanimation according to which it is possible for one
persons soul to be reanimated in the dead bodies of others. Thus, the Ajivikas are
far from being materialists.
The Charvakas
Another pre-Buddhistic system of philosophy, the Charvaka, or the Lokayata, is one
of the earliest materialistic schools of philosophy.The name Charvaka is traced back
to one Charvaka, supposed to have been one of the great teachers of the school.
The other name, Lokayata, means the view held by the common people, the
system which has its base in the common, profane world, the art of sophistry,
and also the philosophy that denies that there is any world other than this one.
Brihaspati probably was the founder of this school. Much knowledge of the
Charvakas, however, is derived from the expositions of the later Hindu writings,
particularly from Madhavas Sarva-darshana-samgraha (Compendium of All
Philosophies, 14th century). Haribhadra in his Shaddarshanasamuccaya
(Compendium of the Six Philosophies, 5th century ce) attributes to the Charvakas
the view that this world extends only to the limits of possible sense experience.

The Charvakas apparently sought to establish their materialism on an

epistemological basis. In their epistemology, they viewed sense perception alone as
a means of valid knowledge. The validity of inferential knowledge was challenged
on the ground that all inference requires a universal major premise (All that
possesses smoke possesses fire) whereas there is no means of arriving at a
certainty about such a proposition. No amount of finite observations could possibly
yield the required universal premise. The supposed invariable connection may be
vitiated by some unknown condition, and there is no means of knowing that such
a vitiating factor does not exist. Since inference is not a means of valid knowledge,
all such supersensible objects as afterlife, destiny, or soul do not exist. To say
that such entities exist though there is no means of knowing them is regarded as
absurd, for no unverifiable assertion of existence is meaningful.

The authority of the scriptures also is denied. First, knowledge based on verbal
testimony is inferential and therefore vitiated by all the defects of inference. The
Charvakas regard the scriptures as characterized by the three faults: falsity, self-
contradiction, and tautology. On the basis of such a theory of knowledge, the
Charvakas defended a complete reductive materialism according to which the four
elements of earth, water, fire, and air are the only original components of being and
all other forms are products of their composition. Consciousness thus is viewed as a
product of the material structure of the body and characterizes the body itself
rather than a souland perishes with the body. In their ethics, the Charvakas
upheld a hedonistic theory according to which enjoyment of the maximum amount
of sensual pleasure here in this life and avoidance of pain that is likely to
accompany such enjoyment are the only two goals that human beings ought to
pursue.
Further developments of the system
Developments in Mahayana

Nagarjuna and Shunyavada

Though the beginnings of Mahayana are to be found in the Mahasangikas and many
of their early sects, Nagarjuna gave it a philosophical basis. Not only is the
individual person empty and lacking an eternal self, according to Nagarjuna, but the
dharmas also are empty. He extended the concept of shunyata to cover all concepts
and all entities. Emptiness thus means subjection to the law of causality or
dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) and lack of an immutable essence
and an invariant mark (nihsvabhavata). It also entails a repudiation of dualities
between the conditioned and the unconditioned, between subject and object,
relative and absolute, and between samsara and nirvana. Thus, Nagarjuna arrived
at an ontological monism, but he carried through an epistemological dualism (i.e., a
theory of knowledge based on two sets of criteria) between two orders of truth: the
conventional (samvritti) and the transcendental (paramartha). The one reality is
ineffable. Nagarjuna undertook a critical examination of all the major categories
with which philosophers had sought to understand reality and showed them all to
involve self-contradictions. The world is viewed as a network of relations, but
relations are unintelligible. If two terms, A and B, are related by the relation R, then
either A and B are different or they are identical. If they are identical, they cannot
be related; if they are altogether different then they cannot also be related, for they
would have no common ground. The notion of partial identity and partial
difference is also rejected as unintelligible. The notion of causality is rejected on
the basis of similar reasonings. The concepts of change, substance, self, knowledge,
and universals do not fare any better. Nagarjuna also directed criticism against the
concept of pramana, or the means of valid knowledge.

The Buddha preaching, relief from Gandhara, schist, c. 2nd century ce; in the Prince
of Wales Museum of Western India, Mumbai.
The Buddha preaching, relief from Gandhara, schist, c. 2nd century ce; in the Prince
of
P. Chandra
Nagarjunas philosophy is also called Madhyamika, or Middle Path, because it
claims to tread the middle path, which consists not in synthesizing opposed views
such as The real is permanent and The real is changing but in showing the
hollowness of both the claims. To say that reality is both permanent and changing is
to make another metaphysical assertion, another viewpoint, whose opposite is
Reality is neither permanent nor changing. In relation to the former, the latter is a
higher truth, but the latter is still a point of view, a drishti, expressed in a
metaphysical statement, though Nagarjuna condemned all metaphysical
statements as false.

Nagarjuna used reason to condemn reason. Those of his disciples who continued to
limit the use of logic to this negative and indirect method, known as prasanga, are
called the prasangikas; of these, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, and Chandrakirti are the
most important. Bhavaviveka, however, followed the method of direct reasoning
and thus founded what is called the svatantra (independent) school of Madhyamika
philosophy. With him Buddhist logic comes to its own, and during his time the
Yogacharas split away from the Shunyavadins.
Contributions of Vasubandhu and Asanga
Converted by his brother Asanga to the Yogachara, Vasubandhu wrote the Vijnapti-
matrata-siddhi (Establishment of the Thesis of CognitionsOnly), in which he
defended the thesis that the supposedly external objects are merely mental
conceptions. Yogachara idealism is a logical development of Sautrantika
representationism: the conception of a merely inferred external world is not
satisfying. If consciousness is self-intimating (svaprakasha) and if consciousness can
assume forms (sakaravijnana), it seems more logical to hold that the forms ascribed
to alleged external objects are really forms of consciousness. One only needs
another conception: a beginningless power that would account for this tendency of
consciousness to take up forms and to externalize them. This is the power of
kalpana, or imagination. Yogachara added two other modes of consciousness to the
traditional six: ego consciousness (manovijnana) and storehouse consciousness
(alaya-vijnana). The alaya-vijnana contains stored traces of past experiences, both
pure and defiled seeds. Early anticipations of the notions of the subconscious or the
unconscious, they are theoretical constructs to account for the order of individual
experience. It still remained, however, to account for a common worldwhich in
fact remains the main difficulty of Yogachara. The state of nirvana becomes a state
in which the alaya with its stored seeds would wither away (alayaparavritti).
Though the individual ideas are in the last resort mere imaginations, in its essential
nature consciousness is without distinctions of subject and object. This ineffable
consciousness is the suchness (tathata) underlying all things. Neither the alaya
nor the tathata, however, is to be construed as being substantial.

Vasubandhu and Asanga are also responsible for the growth of Buddhist logic.
Vasubandhu defined perception as the knowledge that is caused by the object, but
this was rejected by Dignaga, a 5th-century logician, as a definition belonging to his
earlier realistic phase. Vasubandhu defined inference as a knowledge of an object
through its mark, but Dharmottara, an 8th-century commentator, pointed out that
this is not a definition of the essence of inference but only of its origin.
Contributions of Dignaga and Dharmakirti
Dignagas Pramanasamuccaya (Compendium of the Means of True Knowledge) is
one of the greatest works on Buddhist logic. Dignaga gave a new definition of
perception: a knowledge that is free from all conceptual constructions, including
name and class concepts. In effect, he regarded only the pure sensation as
perception. In his theory of inference, he distinguished between inference for
oneself and inference for the other and laid down three criteria of a valid middle
term (hetu)that it should cover the minor premise (paksha), be present in the
similar instances (sapaksha), and be absent in dissimilar instances (vipaksha). In his
Hetuchakra (The Wheel of Reason), Dignaga set up a matrix of nine types of
middle terms, of which two yield valid conclusions, two contradictory, and the rest
uncertain conclusions. Dignagas tradition is further developed in the 7th century by
Dharmakirti, who modified his definition of perception to include the condition
unerring and distinguished, in his Nyayabindu, between four kinds of perception:
that by the five senses, that by the mind, self-consciousness, and perception of the
yogins. He also introduced a threefold distinction of valid middle terms: the middle
must be related to the major either by identity (This is a tree, because this is an
oak) or as cause and effect (This is fiery, because it is smoky), or the hetu is a
nonperception from which the absence of the major could be inferred. Dharmakirti
consolidated the central epistemological thesis of the Buddhists that perception and
inference have their own exclusive objects. The object of the former is the pure
particular (svalakshana), and the object of the latter (he regarded judgments as
containing elements of inference) is the universal (samanyalakshana). In their
metaphysical positions, Dignaga and Dharmakirti represent a moderate form of
idealism.
Purva-Mimamsa: the Bhatta and Prabhakara schools
Principal texts and relation to Shabara
Kumarila commented on Jaiminis sutras as well as on Shabaras bhashya. The
Varttika (critical gloss) that he wrote was commented upon by Sucharita Mishra in
his Kashika (The Shining), by Someshvara Bhatta in his Nyayasudha (The Nectar
of Logic), and by Parthasarathi Mishra in Nyayaratnakara (The Abode of Jewels of
Logic). Parthasarathis Shastradipika (Light on the Scripture) is a famous
independent Mimamsa treatise belonging to Kumarilas school.

Prabhakara, who most likely lived after Kumarila, was the author of the commentary
Brihati (The Large Commentary), on Shabaras bhashya. On many essential
matters, Prabhakara differs radically from the views of Kumarila. Prabhakaras
Brihati has been commented upon by Shalikanatha in his Rijuvimala (The Straight
and Free from Blemishes), whereas the same authors Prakaranapanchika
(Commentary of Five Topics) is a very useful exposition of the Prabhakara system.
Other works belonging to this school are Madhavas Jaiminiya-nyayamala-vistara
(Expansion of the String of Reasonings by Jaimini), Appaya Dikshitas
Vidhirasayana (The Elixir of Duty), Apadevas Mimamsa-nyaya-prakasha
(Illumination of the Reasonings of Mimamsa), and Laugakshi Bhaskaras Artha-
samgraha (Collection of Treasures).

Where Kumarila and Prabhakara differed, Kumarila remained closer to both Jaimini
and Shabara. Kumarila, like Jaimini and Shabara, restricted Mimamsa to an
investigation into dharma, whereas Prabhakara assigned to it the wider task of
enquiring into the meaning of the Vedic texts. Kumarila understood the Vedic
injunction to include a statement of the results to be attained; Prabhakara
following Badariexcluded all consideration of the result from the injunction itself
and suggested that the sense of duty alone should instigate a person to act.

Metaphysics and epistemology

Both the Bhatta (the name for Kumarilas school) and Prabhakara schools, in their
metaphysics, were realists; both undertook to refute Buddhist idealism and nihilism.
The Bhatta ontology recognized five types of entities: substance (dravya), quality
(guna), action (karma), universals (samanya), and negation (abhava). Of these,
substance was held to be of 10 kinds: the nine substances recognized by the
Vaisheshikas and the additional substance darkness. The Prabhakara ontology
recognized eight types of entities; from the Bhatta list, negation was rejected, and
four more were added: power (shakti), resemblance (sadrisa), inherence-relation
(samavaya), and number (samkhya). Under the type substance, the claim of
darkness was rejected on the ground that it is nothing but absence of perception
of colour; the resulting list of nine substances is the same as that of the
Vaisheshikas. Though both schools admitted the reality of the universals, their views
on this point differed considerably. The Prabhakaras admitted only such universals
as inhere in perceptible instances and insisted that true universals themselves must
be perceivable. Thus, they rejected abstract universals, such as existence, and
merely postulated universals, such as Brahmanhood (which cannot be
perceptually recognized in a person).

The epistemologies of the two schools differ as much as their ontologies. As ways of
valid knowing, the Bhattas recognized perception, inference, verbal testimony
(shabda), comparison (upamana), postulation (arthapatti), and nonperception
(anupalabdhi). The last is regarded as the way that human beings validly, and
directly, apprehend an absence; this was in conformity with Shabaras statement
that abhava (nonexistence) itself is a pramana (way of true knowledge). Postulation
is viewed as the sort of process by which one may come to know for certain the
truth of a certain proposition, and yet the Bhattas refused to include such cases
under inference on the grounds that in such cases one does not say to himself I am
inferring but rather says I am postulating. Comparison is the name given to the
perception of resemblance with a perceived thing of another thing that is not
present at that moment. It is supposed that because the latter thing is not itself
being perceived, the resemblance belonging to it could not have been perceived;
thus, it is not a case of perception when one says My cow at home is similar to this
animal.

The Prabhakaras rejected nonperception as a way of knowing and were left with a
list of five concerning definitions of perception. The Bhattas, following the sutra,
define perception in terms of sensory contact with the object, whereas the
Prabhakaras define it in terms of immediacy of the apprehension.
Ethics
As pointed out earlier, Kumarila supported the thesis that all moral injunctions are
meant to bring about a desired benefit and that knowledge of such benefit and of
the efficacy of the recommended course of action to bring it about is necessary for
instigating a person to act. Prabhakara defended the ethical theory of duty for its
own sake, the sense of duty alone being the proper incentive. The Bhattas recognize
apurva, the supersensible efficacy of actions to produce remote effects, as a
supersensible link connecting the moral action performed in this life and the
supersensible effect (such as going to heaven) to be realized afterward. Prabhakara
understood by apurva only the action that ought to be done.
Hermeneutics and semantics
In their principles of interpretation of the scriptures, and consequently in their
theories of meaning (of words and of sentences), the two schools differ radically.
Prabhakara defended the thesis that words primarily mean either some course of
action (karya) or things connected with action. Connected with this is the further
Prabhakara thesis that the sentence forms the unit of meaningful discourse, that a
word is never used by itself to express a single unrelated idea, and that a sentence
signifies a relational complex that is not a mere juxtaposition of word meanings.
Prabhakaras theory of language learning follows these contentions: the child learns
the meanings of sentences by observing the elders issuing orders like Bring the
cow and the juniors obeying them, and he learns the meaning of words
subsequently by a close observation of the insertion (avapa) and extraction
(uddhara) of words in sentences and the resulting variations in the meaning of
those sentences. From this semantic approach follows Prabhakaras principle of
Vedic interpretation: all Vedic texts are to be interpreted as bearing on courses of
action prescribed, and there are no merely descriptive statements in the scriptures.
Furthermore, only the Vedic injunctions yield the authoritative verbal testimony that
may be regarded as a unique way of knowing, whereas all other verbal knowledge is
really inferential in character. In matters concerning what ought to be done,
Prabhakara therefore regarded only the Vedas as authoritative.

Kumarilas theory is very different. In his view, words convey their own meanings,
not relatedness to something else. He therefore was more willing to accommodate
purely descriptive sentences as significant. Furthermore, he regarded sentence
meaning as composed of separate word meanings held together in a relational
structure; the word meaning formed, for him, the simplest unit of sense. Persons
thus learn the meaning of words by seeing others talking as well as from advice of
the elders.
Religious consequences
The Mimamsa views the universe as being eternal and does not admit the need of
tracing it back to a creator. It also does not admit the need of admitting a being who
is to distribute moral rewards and inflict punishmentsthis function being taken
over by the notion of apurva, or supersensible power generated by each action.
Theoretically not requiring a God, the system, however, posits a number of deities
as entailed by various ritualistic procedures, with no ontological status assigned to
the gods.
The linguistic philosophies: Bhartrihari and Mandana-Mishra
The linguistic philosophers considered here are the grammarians led by Bhartrihari
(7th century ce) and Mandana-Mishra (8th century ce); the latter, reputed to be a
disciple of Kumarila, held views widely different from the Mimamsakas. The
grammarians share with the Mimamsakas their interest in the problems of language
and meaning. But their own theories are so different that they cut at the roots of the
Mimamsa realism. The chief text of this school is Bhartriharis Vakyapadiya.
Mandanas chief works are Brahma-siddhi (Establishment of Brahman), Sphota-
siddhi (Establishment of Word Essence), and Vidhiviveka (Inquiry into the Nature
of Injunctions).

As his first principle, Bhartrihari rejects a doctrine on which the realism of Mimamsa
and Nyaya had been builtthe view that there is a kind of perception that is
nonconceptualized and that places persons in direct contract with things as they
are. For Bhartrihari this is not possible, for all knowledge is penetrated by words
and illuminated by words. Thus, all knowledge is linguistic, and the distinctions of
objects are traceable to distinctions among words. The metaphysical monism of
word (shabdadvaita) is not far from thisi.e., the view that the one word essence
appears as this world of names and forms because of the human capacity for
imaginative construction (kalpana). Metaphysically, Bhartrihari comes close both to
Shankaras Advaita and the Buddhist philosophers, such as Dharmakirti. This
metaphysical theory also uses the doctrine of sphota (that from which the meaning
bursts forth). Most Indian philosophical schools were concerned with the problem
of what precisely is the bearer of the meaning of a word or a sentence. If the letters
are evanescent and if, as one hears the sounds produced by the letters of a word,
each sound is replaced by another, one never comes to perceive the word as a
whole, and the question is how one grasps the meaning of the word. The same
problem could be stated with regard to a sentence. The Mimamsakas postulated an
eternity of sounds and distinguished between the eternal sounds and sound
complexes (words, sentences) from their manifestations. The grammarians, instead,
distinguished between the word and sound and made the word itself the bearer of
meaning. As bearer of meaning, the word is the sphota.

Sounds have spatial and temporal relations; they are produced differently by
different speakers. But the word as meaning bearer has to be regarded as having no
size or temporal dimension. It is indivisible and eternal. Distinguished from the
sphota are the abstract sound pattern (prakritadhvani) and the utterances
(vikritadhvani). Furthermore, Bhartrihari held that the sentence is not a collection of
words or an ordered series of them. A word is rather an abstraction from a
sentence; thus, the sentence-sphota is the primary unit of meaning. A word is also
grasped as a unity by an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha). This theory of
sphota, which is itself a linguistic theory required by the problems arising from the
theory of meaning, was employed by the grammarians to support their theory of
word monism.

Mandana-Mishra, in his Vidhiviveka, referred to three varieties of this monism:

shabdapratyasavada (the doctrine of superimposition on the word; also called
shabdadhyasavada), shabda-parinamavada (the doctrine of transformation of the
word), and shabdavivartavada (the doctrine of unreal appearance of the word).
According to the first two, the phenomenal world is still real, though either falsely
superimposed on words or a genuine transformation of the word essence. The last,
and perhaps most consistent, doctrine holds that the phenomenal distinctions are
unreal appearances of an immutable word essence.

Mandana attempted to integrate this linguistic philosophy into his own form of
advaitavada, though later followers of Shankara did not accept the doctrine of
sphota. Even Vachaspati, who accepted many of Mandanas theories, rejected the
theory of sphota and in general conformed to the Shankarites acceptance of the
Bhatta epistemology.
Nyaya-Vaisheshika
The old school
Although as early as the commentators Prashastapada (5th century ce) and
Uddyotakara (7th century ce) the authors of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika schools used
each others doctrines and the fusion of the two schools was well on its way, the
two schools continued to have different authors and lines of commentators. About
the 10th century ce, however, there arose a number of texts that sought to combine
the two philosophies more successfully. Well known among these syncretist texts
are the following: Bhasarvajnas Nyayasara (written c. 950; The Essence of
Nyaya), Varadarajas Tarkikaraksha (c. 1150; In Defense of the Logician),
Vallabhas Nyayalilavati (12th century; The Charm of Nyaya), Keshava Mishras
Tarkabhasha (c. 1275; The Language of Reasoning), Annam Bhattas
Tarkasamgraha (c. 1623; Compendium of Logic), and Vishvanathas
Bhashapariccheda (1634; Determination of the Meaning of the Verses).

Both the Nyaya-Vaisheshika schools are realistic with regard to things, properties,
relations, and universals. Both schools are pluralistic (also with regard to individual
selves) and theistic. Both schools admit external relations (the relation of inherence
being only partly internal), atomistic cosmology, new production, and the concept of
existence (satta) as the most comprehensive universal. Both schools regard
knowledge as a quality of the self, and they subscribe to a correspondence theory
regarding the nature of truth and a theory of pragmatism-cum-coherence regarding
the test of truth. The points that divide the schools are rather unimportant: they
concern, for example, their theories of number, and some doctrines in their physical
and chemical theories.

Gautamas sutras were commented upon about 400 ce by Vatsayana, who replied to
the Buddhist doctrines, especially to some varieties of Shunyavada skepticism.
Uddyotakaras Varttika (c. 635) was written after a period during which major
Buddhist works, but no major Hindu work, on logic were written. Uddyotakara
undertook to refute Nagarjuna and Dignaga. He criticized and refuted Dignagas
theory of perception, the Buddhist denial of soul, and the anyapoha (exclusion of
the other) theory of meaning. Positively, he introduced, for the first time, the
doctrine of six modes of contact (samnikarsa) of the senses with their objects, which
has remained a part of Nyaya-Vaisheshika epistemology. He divided inferences into
those whose major premise (sadhya) is universally present, those in which one has
to depend only upon the rule Wherever there is absence of the major, there is
absence of the middle (hetu), and those in which both the positive and the
negative rules are at ones disposal. He rejected the sphota theory and argued that
the meaning of a word is apprehended by hearing the last letter of the word
together with recollection of the preceding ones. Vachaspati Mishra in the 9th
century wrote his Tatparyatika (c. 840) on Uddyotakaras Varttika and further
strengthened the Nyaya viewpoint against the Buddhists. He divided perception into
two kinds: the indeterminate, nonlinguistic, and nonjudgmental and the determinate
and judgmental. In defining the invariable connection (vyapti) between the middle
and the major premises, he introduced the concept of a vitiating condition (upadhi)
and stressed that the required sort of connection, if an inference is to be valid,
should be unconditional. He also proposed a modified version of the theory of the
extrinsic validity of knowledge by holding that inferences as well as knowledges that
are the last verifiers (phalajnana) are self-validating.

Prashastapadas Vaisheshika commentary (c. 5th century) does not closely follow
the sutras but is rather an independent explanation. Prashastapada added seven
more qualities to Kanadas list: heaviness (gurutva), fluidity (dravatva), viscidity
(sneha), traces (samskara), virtue (dharma), vice (adharma), and sound. The last
quality was regarded by Kanada merely as a mark of ether, whereas Prashastapada
elevated it to a defining quality of the latter. He also made the Vaisheshika fully
theistic by introducing doctrines of creation and dissolution.

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika general metaphysical standpoint allows for both particulars

and universals, both change and permanence. There are ultimate differences as
well as a hierarchy of universals, the highest universal being existence. Substance is
defined as the substrate of qualities and in terms of what alone can be an inherent
cause. A quality may be defined as what is neither substance nor action and yet is
the substratum of universals (for universals are supposed to inhere only in
substances, qualities, and actions). Universal is defined as that which is eternal and
inheres in many. Ultimate particularities belong to eternal substances, such as
atoms and souls, and these account for all differences among particulars that
cannot be accounted for otherwise. Inherence (samavaya) is the relation that is
maintained between a universal and its instances, a substance and its qualities or
actions, a whole and its parts, and an eternal substance and its particularity. This
relation is such that one of the relations cannot exist without the other (e.g., a
whole cannot exist without the parts). Negation (abhava), the seventh category, is
initially classified into difference (A is not B) and absence (A is not in B), absence
being further divided into absence of a thing before its origin, its absence after its
destruction, and its absence in places other than where it is present. For these
schools, all that is is knowable and also nameable.

Knowledge is regarded as a distinguishing but not essential property of a self. It

arises when the appropriate conditions are present. Consciousness is defined as a
manifestation of object but is not itself self-manifesting; it is known by an act of
inner perception (anuvyavasaya). Knowledge either is memory or is not; knowledge
other than memory is either true or false; and knowledge that is not true is either
doubt or error. In its theory of error, these philosophers maintained an
uncompromising realism by holding that the object of error is still real but is only not
here and now. True knowledge (prama) apprehends its object as it is; false
knowledge apprehends the object as what it is not. True knowledge is either
perception, inference, or knowledge derived from verbal testimony or comparison.
Perception is defined as knowledge that arises from the contact of the senses with
their objects, and it is viewed as either indeterminate and nonlinguistic or as
determinate and judgmental. Both aspects of the definition of perception are viewed
as valida point that is made against both the Buddhists and the grammarians.
Furthermore, perception is either ordinary (laukika) or extraordinary (alaukika). The
former takes place through any of the six modes of sense-object contact recognized
in the system. The latter takes place when one perceives the proper object of one
sense through another sense (The cushion looks soft) or when, on recognizing
universal in a particular, one perceives all instances of the universal as its
instances. Also extraordinary are the perceptions of the yogins, who are supposed
to be free from the ordinary spatiotemporal limitations.

Four conditions must be satisfied in order that a combination of words may form a
meaningful sentence: a word should generate an intention or expectancy for the
words to follow (BringWhat?A jar); there should be mutual fitness
(SprinkleWith what?Water, not fire); there should be proximity in space
and time; and the proper intention of the speaker must be ascertained, otherwise
there would be equivocation.

Among theistic proofs offered in the system, the most important are the causal
argument (The world is produced by an agent, since it is an effect, as is a jar); the
argument from a world order to a lawgiver; and the moral argument from the law of
karma to a moral governor. Besides adducing these and other arguments, Udayana
in his Nyaya-kusumanjali stressed the point that the nonexistence of God could not
be proved by means of valid knowledge.

The new school

The founder of the school of Navya-Nyaya (New Nyaya), with an exclusive
emphasis on the pramanas, was Gangesha Upadhyaya (13th century), whose
Tattvachintamani (The Jewel of Thought on the Nature of Things) is the basic text
for all later developments. The logicians of this school were primarily interested in
defining their terms and concepts and for this purpose developed an elaborate
technical vocabulary and logical apparatus that came to be used by, other than
philosophers, writers on law, poetics, aesthetics, and ritualistic liturgy. The school
may broadly be divided into two subschools: the Mithila school, represented by
Vardhamana (Gangeshas son), Pakshadhara or Jayadeva (author of the Aloka
gloss), and Shankara Mishra (author of Upaskara); and the Navadvipa school, whose
chief representatives were Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (14501525), Raghunatha
Shiromani (c. 1475c. 1550), Mathuranatha Tarkavagisha (flourished c. 1570),
Jagadisha Tarkalankara (flourished c. 1625), and Gadadhara Bhattacharya
(flourished c. 1650).

By means of a new technique of analyzing knowledge, judgmental knowledge can

be analyzed into three kinds of epistemological entities in their interrelations:
qualifiers (prakara); qualificandum, or that which must be qualified (visheshya);
and relatedness (samsarga). There also are corresponding abstract entities:
qualifierness, qualificandumness, and relatedness. The knowledge expressed by the
judgment This is a blue pot may then be analyzed into the following form: The
knowledge that has a qualificandumness in what is denoted by this is conditioned
by a qualifierness in blue and also conditioned by another qualifierness in potness.

A central concept in the Navya-Nyaya logical apparatus is that of limiterness

(avacchedakata), which has many different uses. If a mountain possesses fire in one
region and not in another, it can be said, in the Navya-Nyaya language, The
mountain, as limited by the region r, possesses fire, but as limited by the region r
possesses the absence of fire. The same mode of speech may be extended to
limitations of time, property, and relation, particularly when one is in need of
constructing a description that is intended to suit exactly some specific situation
and none other.

Inference is defined by Vatsayana as the posterior knowledge of an object (e.g.,

fire) with the help of knowledge of its mark (e.g., smoke). For Navya-Nyaya,
inference is definable as the knowledge caused by the knowledge that the minor
term (paksha, the hill) possesses the middle term (hetu, smoke), which is
recognized as pervaded by the major (sadhya, fire). The relation of invariable
connection, or pervasion, between the middle (smoke) and the major (fire)
Wherever there is smoke, there is fireis called vyapti.

The logicians developed the notion of negation to a great degree of sophistication.

Apart from the efforts to specify a negation with references to its limiting
counterpositive (pratiyogi), limiting relation, and limiting locus, they were
constrained to discuss and debate such typical issues as the following: Is one to
recognize, as a significant negation, the absence of a thing x so that the limiter of
the counterpositive x is not x-ness but y-ness? In other words, can one say that a jar
is absent as a cloth even in a locus in which it is present as a jar? Also, is the
absence of an absence itself a new absence or something positive? Furthermore, is
the absence of colour in general nothing but the sum total of the absences of the
particular colours, or is it a new kind of absence, a generic absence? Gangesha
argued for the latter alternative, though he answers the first of the above three
questions in the negative.

Though the philosophers of this school did not directly write on metaphysics, they
nevertheless did tend to introduce many new kinds of abstract entities into their
discourse. These entities are generally epistemological, though sometimes they are
relational. Chief of these are entities called qualifierness, qualificandumness,
and limiterness. Various relations were introduced, such as direct and indirect
temporal relations, paryapti relation (in which a number of entities reside, in sets
rather than in individual members of those sets), svarupa relation (which holds, for
example, between an absence and its locus), and relation between a knowledge and
its object.

Among the Navya-Nyaya philosophers, Raghunatha Shiromani in

Padarthatattvanirupana undertook a bold revision of the traditional categorical
scheme by (1) identifying time, space, and ether with God, (2) eliminating the
category of mind by reducing it to matter, (3) denying atoms (paramanu) and
dyadic (paired) combinations of them (dvyanuka), (4) eliminating number,
separateness, remoteness, and proximity from the list of qualities, and (5)
rejecting ultimate particularities (vishesha) on the grounds that it is more rational to
suppose that the eternal substances are by nature distinct. He added some new
categories, however, such as causal power (shakti) and the moment (kshana), and
recognized that there are as many instances of the relation of inherence as there
are cases of it (as contrasted with the older view that there is only one inherence
that is itself present in all cases of inherence).

Samkhya and Yoga

Texts and commentaries until Vachaspati and the Samkhya-sutras
There are three commentaries on the Samkhya-karika: that by Raja, much referred
to but not extant; that by Gaudapada (7th century), on which there is a
subcommentary Chandrika by Narayanatirtha; and the Tattva-kaumudi by
Vachaspati (9th century). The Samkhya-sutras are a much later work (c. 14th
century) on which Aniruddha (15th century) wrote a vritti and Vijnanabhikshu (16th
century) wrote the Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya (Commentary on the Samkhya
Doctrine). Among independent works, mention may be made of Tattvasamasa (c.
11th century; Collection of Truths).

The Yoga-sutras were commented upon by Vyasa in his Vyasa-bhashya (5th

century), which has two excellent subcommentaries: Vachaspatis Tattvavaisharadi
and Vijnanabhikshus Yogavarttika, besides the vritti by Bhoja (c. 1000).

Metaphysics and epistemology

For Vachaspati, creation was viewed in terms of the mere presence of the selves
and the mere presentation to them of Matter (the undifferentiated primeval stuff).
Such a view has obvious difficulties, for it would make creation eternal, because the
selves and Matter are eternally copresent. Vijnanabhikshu considered the relation
between the selves and Matter to be a real relation that affects Matter but leaves
the selves unaffected. Creation, in accordance with Bhikshus theism, is due to the
influence of the chief selfi.e., God. Furthermore, whereas the earlier Samkhya
authors, including Vachaspati, did not consider the question about the ontological
status of the gunas, Bhikshu regards them as real, as extremely subtle substances
so that each guna is held to be infinite in number. In general, the Samkhya-sutras
show a greater Brahmanical influence, and there is a clear tendency to explain away
the points of difference between the Samkhya and the Vedanta. The author of the
sutras tried to show that the Samkhya doctrines are consistent with theism or even
with the Upanishadic conception of brahman. Vijnanabhikshu made use of such
contexts to emphasize that the atheism of Samkhya is taught only to discourage
human beings from trying to be God, that originally the Samkhya was theistic, and
that the original Vedanta also was theistic. The Upanishadic doctrine of the unity of
selves is interpreted by him to mean an absence of difference of kind among selves,
which is consistent with the Samkhya. Maya (illusion) for Bhikshu means nothing
but the prakriti (Matter) of the Samkhya. The sutras also give cosmic significance to
mahat, the first aspect to evolve from Matter, which then means cosmic
Intelligence, a sense not found in the karikas.

In epistemology the idea of reflection of the spirit in the organs of knowing,

particularly in the buddhi, or intelligence, comes to the forefront. Every cognition
(jnana) is a modification of the buddhi, with consciousness reflected in it. Though
this is Vachaspatis account, it does not suffice according to Bhikshu. If there is the
mere reflection of the self in the state of the buddhi, this can only account for the
fact that the state of cognition seems to be a conscious state; it cannot account for
the fact that the self considers itself to be the owner and experiencer of that state.
Accounting for this latter fact, Bhikshu postulated a real contact between the self
and buddhi as a reflection of the buddhi state back in the self.

Vachaspati, taking over a notion emphasized in Indian epistemology for the first
time by Kumarila, introduced into the Samkhya theory of knowledge a distinction
between two stages of perceptual knowledge. In the first, a stage of
nonconceptualized (nirvikalpaka) perception, the object of perception is
apprehended vaguely and in a most general manner. In the second stage, this
vague knowledge (alochanamatram) is then interpreted and conceptualized by the
mind. The interpretation is not so much synthesis as analysis of the vaguely
presented totality into its parts. Bhikshu, however, ascribed to the senses the ability
to apprehend determinate properties, even independently of the aid of manas. For
Samkhya, in general, error is partial truth; there is no negation of error, only
supplementation, though later Samkhya authors tended to ascribe error to wrong
interpretation.

An important contribution to epistemology was made by the writers on the Yoga:

this concerns the key notion of vikalpa, which stands for mental states referring to
pseudo-objects posited only by words. Such mental states are neither valid nor
invalid and are said to be unavoidable accompaniments of ones use of language.
Ethics
Because the self is not truly an agent acting in the world, neither merit nor demerit,
arising from ones actions, attaches to the self. Morality has empirical significance.
In the long run, what really matters is knowledge. Nonattached performance of
ones duties is an aid toward purifying intelligence so that it may be conducive to
the attainment of knowledgehence the importance of the restraints and
observances laid down in the Yoga-sutras. The greatest good is freedomi.e.,
aloofness (kaivalya) from matter.
Raja Yoga and Hatha Yoga
Patanjalis Yoga is known as Raja Yoga (that in which one attains to self-rule), and
Hatha Yoga emphasizes bodily postures, regulation of breathing, and cleansing
processes as means to spiritual perfection (hatha = violence, violent effort: ha
= sun, tha = moon, hatha = sun and moon, breaths, or breaths travelling
through the right and left nostrils). A basic text on Hatha Yoga is the Hatha-yoga-
pradipika (c. 15th century; Light on the Hatha Yoga). As to the relation between
the two yogas, a well-known maxim lays down that No raja without hatha, and no
hatha without raja.
Religious consequences
The one religious consequence of the emergence of Samkhya and Yoga is an
emphasis on austere asceticism and a turning away from the ritualistic elements of
Hinduism deriving from the Brahmanical sources. Though they continue to remain
as an integral part of the Hindu faith, no major religious order thrived on the basis of
these philosophies.

Vedanta
Fragments from the Mandukya-karika until Shankara
No commentary on the Vedanta-sutras survives from the period before Shankara,
though both Shankara and Ramanuja referred to the vrittis by Bodhayana and
Upavarsha (the two may indeed be the same person). There are, however, pre-
Shankara monistic interpreters of the scriptures, three of whom are important:
Bhartrihari, Mandana (both mentioned earlier), and Gaudapada. Shankara referred
to Gaudapada as the teacher of his own teacher Govinda, complimented him for
having recovered the advaita (nondualism) doctrine from the Vedas, and also wrote
a bhashya on Gaudapadas main work: the karikas on the Mandukya Upanishad.

Gaudapadas karikas are divided into four parts: the first part is an explanation of
the Upanishad itself, the second part establishes the unreality of the world, the third
part defends the oneness of reality, and the fourth part, called Alatashanti
(Extinction of the Burning Coal), deals with the state of release from suffering. It is
not accidental that Gaudapada used as the title of the fourth part of his work a
phrase in common usage among Buddhist authors. His philosophical views show a
considerable influence of Madhyamika Buddhism, particularly of the Yogachara
school, and one of his main purposes probably was to demonstrate that the
teachings of the Upanishads are compatible with the main doctrines of the Buddhist
idealists. Among his principal philosophical theses were the following: All things are
as unreal as those seen in a dream, for waking experience and dream are on a par
in this regard. In reality, there is no production and no destruction. His criticisms of
the categories of change and causality are reminiscent of Nagarjunas. Duality is
imposed on this one reality by maya, or the power of illusion-producing ignorance.
Because there is no real coming into being, Gaudapadas philosophy is often called
ajativada (discourse on the unborn). Though thus far agreeing with the Buddhist
Yogacharins, Gaudapada rejected their thesis that chitta, or mind, is real and that
there is a real flow of mental conception.

Shankara greatly moderated Gaudapadas extreme illusionistic theory. Though he

regarded the phenomenal world as a false appearance, he never made use of the
analogy of dream. Rather, he contrasted the objectivity of the world with the
subjectivity of dreams and hallucinations. The distinction between the empirical and
the illusoryboth being opposed to the transcendentalis central to his way of
thinking.

Varieties of Vedanta schools

Though Vedanta is frequently referred to as one darshana (viewpoint), there are, in
fact, radically different schools of Vedanta; what binds them together is common
adherence to a common set of texts. These texts are the Upanishads, the Vedanta-
sutras, and the Bhagavadgitaknown as the three prasthanas (the basic scriptures,
or texts) of the Vedanta. The founders of the various schools of Vedanta have all
substantiated their positions by commenting on these three sourcebooks. The
problems and issues around which their differences centre are the nature of
brahman; the status of the phenomenal world; the relation of finite individuals to
the brahman; and the nature and the means to moksha, or liberation. The main
schools are: Shankaras unqualified nondualism (shuddhadvaita); Ramanujas
qualified nondualism (vishishtadvaita); Madhvas dualism (dvaita); Bhaskaras
doctrine of identity and difference (bhedabheda); and the schools of Nimbarka and
Vallabha, which assert both identity and difference though with different emphasis
on either of the two aspects. From the religious point of view, Shankara extolled
metaphysical knowledge as the sole means to liberation and regarded even the
concept of God as false; Ramanuja recommended the path of bhakti combined with
knowledge and showed a more tolerant attitude toward the tradition of Vedic
ritualism; and Madhva, Nimbarka, and Vallabha all propounded a personalistic
theism in which love and devotion to a personal God are rated highest. Although
Shankaras influence on Indian philosophy could not be matched by these other
schools of Vedanta, in actual religious life the theistic Vedanta schools have
exercised a much greater influence than the abstract metaphysics of Shankara.

The concepts of nondualism

Shankaras philosophy is one among a number of other nondualistic philosophies:
Bhartriharis shabhadvaita, the Buddhists vijnanadvaita, and Gaudapadas
ajativada. Shankaras system may then be called atmadvaitathe thesis that the
one, universal, eternal, and self-illuminating self whose essence is pure
consciousness without a subject (ashraya) and without an object (vishaya) from a
transcendental point of view alone is real. The phenomenal world and finite
individuals, though empirically real, arefrom the higher point of viewmerely
false appearances. In substantiating this thesis, Shankara relied as much on the
interpretation of scriptural texts as on reasoning. He set down a methodological
principle that reason should be used only to justify truths revealed in the scriptures.
His own use of reasoning was primarily negative; he showed great logical skill in
refuting his opponents theories. Shankaras followers, however, supplied what is
missed in his worksi.e., a positive rational support for his thesis.

Shankaras metaphysics is based on a criterion of reality, which may be briefly

formulated as follows: the real is that whose negation is not possible. It is then
argued that the only thing that satisfies this criterion is consciousness, because
denial of consciousness presupposes the consciousness that denies. It is
conceivable that any object is not existent, but the absence of consciousness is not
conceivable. Negation may be either mutual negation (of difference) or absence.
The latter is either absence of a thing prior to its origination or after its destruction
or absence of a thing in a place other than where it is present. If the negation of
consciousness is not conceivable, then none of these various kinds of negations can
be predicated of consciousness. If difference cannot be predicated of it, then
consciousness is the only reality and anything different from it would be unreal. If
the other three kinds of absence are not predicable of it, then consciousness should
be beginningless, without end, and ubiquitous. Consequently, it would be without
change. Furthermore, consciousness is self-intimating; all objects depend upon
consciousness for their manifestation. Difference may be either among members of
the same class or of one individual from another of a different class or among parts
of one entity. None of these is true of consciousness. In other words, there are not
many consciousnesses; the plurality of many centres of consciousness should be
viewed as an appearance. There is no reality other than consciousnessi.e., no real
prakriti; such a thing would only be an unreal other. Also, consciousness does not
have internal parts; there are not many conscious states. The distinction between
consciousness of blue and consciousness of yellow is not a distinction within
consciousness but one superimposed on it by a distinction among its objects, blue
and yellow. With this, the Samkhya, Vijnanavadin Buddhist, and Nyaya-Vaisheshika
pluralism are refuted. Reality is one, infinite, eternal, and self-shining spirit; it is
without any determination, for all determination is negation.
Shankaras theory of error and religious and ethical concerns
The basic problem of Shankaras philosophy is how such pure consciousness
appears, in ordinary experience, to be individualized (my consciousness) and to
be of an object (consciousness of blue). As he stated it, subject and object are as
opposed to each other as light and darkness, yet the properties of one are
superimposed on the other. If something is a fact of experience and yet ought not to
be soi.e., is rationally unintelligiblethen this must be false. According to
Shankaras theory of error, the false appearance is a positive, presented entity that
is characterized neither as existent (because it is sublated when the illusion is
corrected) nor as nonexistent (because it is presented, given as much as the real
is). The false, therefore, is indescribable either as being or as nonbeing; it is not a
fiction, such as a round square. Shankara thus introduced a new category of the
false apart from the usual categories of the existent and the nonexistent. The
world and finite individuals are false in this sense: they are rationally unintelligible,
their reality is not logically deducible from brahman, and their experience is
cancelled with the knowledge of brahman. The world and finite selves are not
creations of brahman; they are not real emanations or transformations of it.
Brahman is not capable of such transformation or emanation. They are appearances
that are superimposed on brahman because of human ignorance. This
superimposition was sometimes called adhyasa by Shankara and was often
identified with avidya. Later writers referred to avidya as the cause of the error.
Thus, ignorance came to be regarded as a beginningless, positive something that
conceals the nature of reality and projects the false appearances on it. Shankara,
however, did distinguish between three senses of being: the merely illusory
(pratibhasika), the empirical (vyavaharika; which has unperceived existence and
pragmatic efficacy), and transcendental being of one, indeterminate brahman.

In his epistemology, Shankaras followers in general accepted the point of view of

the Mimamsa of Kumarilas school. Like Kumarila, they accepted six ways of
knowing: perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, nonperception, and
postulation. In general, cognitions are regarded as modifications of the inner sense
in which the pure spirit is reflected or as the pure spirit limited by respective mental
modifications. The truth of cognitions is regarded as intrinsic to them, and a
knowable fact is accepted as true so long as it is not rejected as false. In perception
a sort of identity is achieved between the form of the object and the form of the
inner sense; in fact, the inner sense is said to assume the form of the object. In their
theory of inference, the Nyaya five-membered syllogism is rejected in favour of a
three-membered one. Furthermore, the sort of inference admitted by the Nyaya, in
which the major term is universally present, is rejected because nothing save
brahman has this property according to the system.

Shankara regarded moral life as a necessary preliminary to metaphysical knowledge

and thus laid down strict ethical conditions to be fulfilled by one who wants to study
Vedanta. For him, however, the highest goal of life is to know the essential identity
of his own self with brahman, and, though moral life may indirectly help in purifying
the mind and intellect, over an extended period of time knowledge comes from
following the long and arduous process whose three major stages are study of the
scriptures under appropriate conditions, reflection aimed at removing all possible
intellectual doubts about the nondualistic thesis, and meditation on the identity of
atman and brahman. Moksha is not, according to Shankara, a perfection to be
achieved; it is rather the essential reality of ones own self to be realized through
destruction of the ignorance that conceals it. God is how brahman appears to an
ignorant mind that regards the world as real and looks for its creator and ruler.
Religious life is sustained by dualistic concepts: the dualism between mortal and
God, between virtue and vice, and between this life and the next. In the state of
moksha, these dualisms are transcended. An important part of Shankaras faith was
that moksha was possible in bodily existence. Because what brings this supreme
state is the destruction of ignorance, nothing need happen to the body; it is merely
seen for what it really isan illusory limitation on the spirit.

Shankaras chief direct pupils were Sureshvara, the author of Varttika (Gloss) on
his bhashya and of Naishkarmya-siddhi (Establishment of the State of Nonaction),
and Padmapada, author of Panchapadika, a commentary on the first five padas, or
sections, of the bhashya. These early pupils raised and settled issues that were not
systematically discussed by Shankara himselfissues that later divided his
followers into two large groups: those who followed the Vivarana (a work written on
Padmapadas Panchapadika by one Prakashatman in the 12th century) and those
who followed Vachaspatis commentary (known as Bhamati) on Shankaras bhashya.
Among the chief issues that divided Shankaras followers was the question about
the locus and object of ignorance. The Bhamati school regarded the individual self
as the locus of ignorance and sought to avoid the consequent circularity (arising
from the fact that the individual self is itself a product of ignorance) by postulating a
beginningless series of such selves and their ignorances. The Vivarana school
regarded both the locus and the object of ignorance to be brahman and sought to
avoid the contradiction (arising from the fact that brahman is said to be of the
nature of knowledge) by distinguishing between pure consciousness and valid
knowledge (pramajnana). The latter, a mental modification, destroys ignorance, and
the former, far from being opposed to ignorance, manifests ignorance itself, as
evidenced by the judgment I am ignorant. The two schools also differed in their
explanations of the finite individual. The Bhamati school regarded the individual as
a limitation of brahman just as the space within the four walls of a room is a
limitation of the big space. The Vivarana school preferred to regard the finite
individual as a reflection of brahman in the inner sense. As the moon is one but its
reflections are many, so also brahman is one but its reflections are many. Later
followers of Shankara, such as Shriharsha in his Khandanakhandakhadya and his
commentator Chitsukha, used a destructive, negative dialectic in the manner of
Nagarjuna to criticize humanitys basic concepts about the world.
Concepts of bhedabheda
The philosophies of transcendence and immanence (bhedabheda) assert both
identity and difference between the world and finite individuals on the one hand and
brahman on the other. The world and finite individuals are real and yet both
different and not different from the brahman.

Among pre-Shankara commentators on the Vedanta-sutras, Bhartriprapancha

defended the thesis of bhedabheda, and Bhaskara (c. 9th century) closely followed
him. Bhartriprapanchas commentary is not extant; the only known source of
knowledge is Shankaras reference to him in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka
Upanishad, in which Bhartriprapancha is said to have held that though brahman as
cause is different from brahman as effect, the two are identical inasmuch as the
effect dissolves into the cause, as the waves return into the sea. Bhaskara viewed
brahman as both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The doctrine of
maya was totally rejected. Brahman undergoes the modifications by its own power.
As waves are both different from and identical with the sea, so are the world and
the finite individuals in relation to brahman. The finite selves are parts of brahman,
as sparks of fire are parts of fire. But the finite soul exists, since beginningless time,
under the influence of ignorance. It is atomic in extension and yet animates the
whole body. Corresponding to the material world and the finite selves, Bhaskara
ascribed to God two powers of self-modification. Bhaskara, in his theory of
knowledge, distinguished between self-consciousness that is ever-present and
objective knowledge that passively arises out of appropriate causal conditions but is
not an activity. Mind, thus, is a sense organ. Bhaskara subscribed to the general
Vedanta thesis that knowledge is intrinsically true, though falsity is extrinsic to it. In
his ethical views, Bhaskara regarded religious duties as binding at all stages of life.
He upheld a theory known as jnana-karmasamuccaya-vada: performance of duties
together with knowledge of brahman leads to liberation. In religious life Bhaskara
was an advocate of bhakti, but bhakti is not a mere feeling of love or affection for
God but rather is dhyana, or meditation, directed toward the transcendent brahman
which is not exhausted in its manifestations. Bhaskara denied the possibility of
liberation in bodily existence.

The bhedabheda point of view had various other adherents: Vijnanabhikshu,

Nimbarka, Vallabha, and Chaitanya.
Ramanuja
Ramanuja (11th century) sought to synthesize a long tradition of theistic religion
with the absolutistic monism of the Upanishads, a task in which he had been
preceded by no less an authority than the Bhagavadgita. In his general
philosophical position, he followed the vrittikara Bodhayana, Vakyakara (to whom he
referred but whose identity is not established except that he advocated a theory of
real modification of brahman), Nathamuni (c. 1000), and his own teachers teacher
Yamunacharya (c. 1050).

The main religious inspirations are from the theistic tradition of the Azhvar poet-
saints and their commentators known as the Acharyas, who sought to combine
knowledge with action (karma) as the right means to liberation. There is also,
besides the Vedic tradition, the religious tradition of Agamas, particularly of the
Pancharatra literature. It is within this old tradition that Ramanujas philosophical
and religious thought developed.

Ramanuja rejected Shankaras conception of brahman as an indeterminate,

qualityless, and differenceless reality on the ground that such a reality cannot be
perceived, known, thought of, or even spoken about, in which case it is nothing
short of a fiction. In substantiating this contention, Ramanuja undertook, in his Shri-
bhashya on the Vedanta-sutras, a detailed examination of the different ways of
knowing. Perception, either nonconceptualized or conceptualized, always
apprehends its object as being something, the only difference between the two
modes of perception being that the former takes place when one perceives an
individual of a certain class for the first time and thus does not subsume it under
the same class as some other individuals. Nor can inference provide one with
knowledge of an indeterminate reality, because in inference one always knows
something as coming under a general rule. The same holds true of verbal testimony.
This kind of knowledge arises from understanding sentences. For Ramanuja there is
nothing like a pure consciousness without subject and without object. All
consciousness is of something and belongs to someone. He also held that it is not
true that consciousness cannot be the object of another consciousness. In fact,
ones own past consciousness becomes the object of present consciousness.
Consciousness is self-shining only when it reveals an object to its own owneri.e.,
the self.

Rejecting Shankaras conception of reality, Ramanuja defended the thesis that

brahman is a being with infinitely perfect excellent virtues, a being whose
perfection cannot be exceeded. The world and finite individuals are real, and
together they constitute the body of brahman. The category of body and soul is
central to his way of thinking. Body is that which can be controlled and moved for
the purpose of the spirit. The material world and the conscious spirits, though
substantive realities, are yet inseparable from brahman and thus qualify him in the
same sense in which body qualifies the soul. Brahman is spiritual-material-qualified.
Ramanuja and his followers undertook criticisms of Shankaras illusionism,
particularly of his doctrine of avidya (ignorance) and the falsity of the world. For
Ramanuja, such a beginningless, positive avidya could not have any locus or any
object, and if it does conceal the self-shining brahman, then there would be no way
of escaping from its clutches.

A most striking feature of Ramanujas epistemology is his uncompromising realism.

Whatever is known is real, and only the real can be known. This led him to advocate
the thesis that even the object of error is realerror is really incomplete knowledge
and correction of error is really completion of incomplete knowledge.

The state of moksha is not a state in which the individuality is negated. In fact, the
sense of I persists even after liberation, for the self is truly the object of the notion
of I. What is destroyed is egoism, the false sense of independence. The means
thereto is bhakti, leading to Gods grace. But by bhakti Ramanuja means dhyana, or
intense meditation with love. Obligation to perform ones scriptural duties is never
transcended. Liberation is a state of blessedness in the company of God. A path
emphasized by Ramanuja for all persons is complete self-surrender (prapatti) to
Gods will and making oneself worthy of his grace. In his social outlook, Ramanuja
believed that bhakti does not recognize barriers of caste and classes.

The doctrinal differences among the followers of Ramanuja is not so great as among
those of Shankara. Writers such as Sudarshana Suri and Venkatanatha continued to
elaborate and defend the theses of the master, and much of their writing is
polemical. Some differences are to be found regarding the nature of emancipation,
the nature of devotion, and other ritual matters. The followers are divided into two
schools: the Uttara-kalarya, led by Venkatanatha, and the Dakshina-kalarya, led by
Lokacharya. One of the points at issue is whether or not emancipation is
destructible; another is whether there is a difference between liberation attained by
mere self-knowledge and that attained by knowledge of God. There also were
differences in interpreting the exact nature of self-surrender to God and the degree
of passivity or activity required of the worshipper.
Madhva
Madhva (born 1199?) belonged to the tradition of Vaishnava religious faith and
showed a great polemical spirit in refuting Shankaras philosophy and in converting
people to his own fold. An uncompromising dualist, he traced back dualistic thought
even to some of the Upanishads. His main works are his commentaries on the
Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita, and the Vedanta-sutras. He also wrote a
commentary on the Mahabharata and several logical and polemical treatises.

He glorified difference. Five types of differences are central to Madhvas system:

difference between soul and God, between soul and soul, between soul and matter,
between God and matter, and between matter and matter. Brahman is the fullness
of qualities, and by its own intrinsic nature brahman produces the world. The
individual, otherwise free, is dependent only upon God. The Advaita concepts of
falsity and indescribability of the world were severely criticized and rejected. In his
epistemology, Madhva admitted three ways of knowing: perception, inference, and
verbal testimony. In Madhvas system the existence of God cannot be proved; it can
be learned only from the scriptures.

Bondage and release both are real, and devotion is the only way to release, but
ultimately it is Gods grace that saves. Scriptural duties, when performed without
any ulterior motive, purify the mind and help one to receive Gods grace.

Among the other theistic schools of Vedanta, brief mention may be made of the
schools of Nimbarka (c. 12th century), Vallabha (15th century), and Chaitanya (16th
century).
Nimbarka
Nimbarkas philosophy is known as Bhedabheda because he emphasized both
identity and difference of the world and finite souls with brahman. His religious sect
is known as the Sanaka-sampradaya of Vaishnavism. Nimbarkas commentary of the
Vedanta-sutras is known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha and is commented on by
Shrinivasa in his Vedanta-kaustubha. Of the three realities admittedGod, souls,
and matterGod is the independent reality, self-conscious, controller of the other
two, free from all defects, abode of all good qualities, and both the material and
efficient cause of the world. The souls are dependent, self-conscious, capable of
enjoyment, controlled, atomic in size, many in number, and eternal but seemingly
subject to birth and death because of ignorance and karma. Matter is of three kinds:
nonnatural matter, which constitutes divine body; natural matter constituted by the
three gunas; and time. Both souls and matter are pervaded by God. Their relation is
one of difference-with-nondifference. Liberation is because of a knowledge that
makes Gods grace possible. There is no need for Vedic duties after knowledge is
attained, nor is performance of such duties necessary for acquiring knowledge.
Vallabha
Vallabhas commentary on the Vedanta-sutras is known as Anubhashya (The Brief
Commentary), which is commented upon by Purushottama in his Bhashya-
prakasha (Lights on the Commentary). His philosophy is called pure nondualism
pure meaning undefiled by maya. His religious sect is known as the Rudra-
sampradaya of Vaishnavism and also Pushtimarga, or the path of grace. Brahman,
or Shri Krishna (the incarnation of Vishnu), is viewed as the only independent
reality; in his essence he is existence, consciousness, and bliss, and souls and
matter are his real manifestations. Maya is but his power of self-manifestation.
Vallabha admitted neither parinama (of Samkhya) nor vivarta (of Shankara).
According to him, the modifications are such that they leave brahman unaffected.
From his aspect of existence spring life, senses, and body. From consciousness
spring the finite, atomic souls. From bliss spring the presiding deities, or
antaryamins, for whom Vallabha finds place on his ontology. This threefold nature of
God pervades all beings. World is real, but samsara, the cycle of birth and death, is
unreal, and time is regarded as Gods power of action. Like all other Vedantins,
Vallabha rejected the Vaisheshika relation of samavaya and replaced it by tadatmya,
or identity. The means to liberation is bhakti, which is defined as firm affection for
God and also loving service (seva). Bhakti does not lead to knowledge, but
knowledge is regarded as a part of bhakti. The notion of grace plays an important
role in Vallabhas religious thought. He is also opposed to renunciation.
Chaitanya
Chaitanya (14851533) was one of the most influential and remarkable of the
medieval saints of India. His life is characterized by almost unique emotional
fervour, hovering on the pathological, which was directed toward Shri Krishna. He
has not written anything, but the discourses recorded by contemporaries give an
idea of his philosophical thought that was later developed by his followers,
particularly by Rupa Gosvamin and Jiva Gosvamin. Rupa is the author of two great
works: Bhakti-rasamrita-sindhu (The Ocean of the Nectar of the Essence of Bhakti)
and Ujjvalanilamani (The Shining Blue Jewel). Jivas main work is the great and
voluminous Shatsamdarbha. These are the main sources of the philosophy of
Bengal Vaishnavism. Chaitanya rejected the conception of an intermediate
brahman. Brahman, according to him, has three powers: the transcendent power
that is threefold (the power of bliss, the power of being, and the power of
consciousness) and the two immanent powersnamely, the powers of creating
souls and the material world. Jiva Gosvamin regarded bliss to be the very substance
of brahman, who, with the totality of all his powers, is called God. Jiva distinguished
between Gods essential power, his peripheral power that creates the souls, and the
external power (called maya) that creates cosmic forms. The relation between God
and his powers is neither identity nor difference nor identity-with-difference. This
relation, unthinkable and suprarational, is central to Chaitanyas philosophy. For Jiva,
the relation between any whole and its parts is unthinkable. Bhakti is the means to
emancipation. Bhakti is conceived as a reciprocal relation between mortal and God,
a manifestation of Gods power in humanity. The works of Jiva and Rupa delineated
a detailed and fairly exhaustive classification of the types and gradations of bhakti.
Vaishnava schools
The main philosophers of the medieval Vaishnavism have been noted above.
Vaishnavism, however, has a long history, traceable to the Vishnu worship of the
Rigveda, the Bhakti conception of the epics, and the Vasudeva cult from before the
Common Era. Of the two main Vaishnava scriptures, or agamas, the Pancharatra
(Relating to the Period of Five Nights) and the Vaikhanasa (Relating to a Hermit or
Ascetic) are the most important. Though Vaishnava philosophers trace the
Pancharatra works to Vedic origin, absolutists such as Shankara refused to
acknowledge this claim. The main topics of the Pancharatra literature concern
rituals and forms of image worship and religious practices of the Vaishnavas. Of
philosophical importance are the Ahirbudhnya-samhita (Collection of Verses for
Shiva) and Jayakhya-samhita (Collection of Verses Called Jaya). The best-known
Pancharatra doctrine concerns the four spiritual forms of God: the absolute,
transcendent state, known as Vasudeva; the form in which knowledge and strength
predominate (known as Samkarshana); the form in which wealth and courage
predominate (known as Pradyumna); and the form in which power and energy
predominate (known as Aniruddha). Shankara identified Samkarshana with the
individual soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with the ego sense.
Furthermore, five powers of God are distinguished: creation, maintenance,
destruction, favour, and disfavour. Bhakti is regarded as affection for God and
associated with a sense of his majesty. The doctrine of prapatti, or complete self-
surrender, is emphasized.
Shaivite schools
The Shaivite schools are the philosophical systems within the fold of Shaivism, a
religious sect that worships Shiva as the highest deity. There is a long tradition of
Shiva worship going back to the Rudra hymns of the Rigveda, the Shiva-Rudra of the
Vajasaneyi Samhita, the Atharvaveda, and the Brahmanas. Madhava in his Sarva-
darshana-samgraha referred to three Shaivite systems: the Nakulisha-Pashupata,
the Shaiva, and the Pratyabhijna systems. The Shaiva system of Madhavas
classification probably corresponds to Shaiva-siddhanta of Tamil regions, and the
Pratyabhijna is known as Kashmiri Shaivism. The Shaiva-siddhanta is realistic and
dualistic; the Kashmiri system is idealistic and monistic.

Shaiva-siddhanta
The source literature of the Shaiva-siddhanta school consists of the Agamas, Tamil
devotional hymns written by Shaiva saints but collected by Nambi (c. 1000 ce) in a
volume known as Tirumurai, Chiva-nana-potam (Understanding of the Knowledge
of Shiva) by Meykantatevar (13th century), Shivacharyas Shiva-jnana-siddhiyar
(Attainment of the Knowledge of Shiva), Umapatis Shivaprakasham (Lights on
Shiva) in the 14th century, Shrikanthas commentary on the Vedanta-sutras (14th
century), and Appaya Dikshitas commentary thereon.

This school admits three categories (padarthas)God (Shiva or Pati, Lord), soul
(pashu), and the bonds (pasha)and 36 principles (tattvas). These 36 are divided
into three groups: at the top, in order of manifestation from Shiva, are the five pure
principles, which are shivatattva (the essence of Shiva), shakti (power), sada-shiva
(the eternal good), ishivara (lord), and shuddha-vidya (true knowledge); seven
mixed principles, which are pure maya, five envelopes (destiny, time, interest,
knowledge, and power), and purusha, or self; and 24 impure principles beginning
with prakriti (this list is broadly the same as that of Samkhya).
Shiva is the first cause: his shakti, or power, is the instrumental cause, maya the
material cause. This maya-shakti is not Gods essential power but is assumed by
him; it is parigraha-shakti (Assumed Power). The relation of Shiva to his essential
power is one of identity. Bonds are of three kinds: karma, maya, and avidya. The
world and souls are real, and emancipation requires the grace of Shiva. The Shaiva-
siddhanta always insisted on the preservation of the individuality of the finite soul,
even in the state of emancipation, and rejected Shankaras nondualism. Appaya
Dikshitas commentary shows the tendency to attempt a reconciliation between the
Agama tradition of realism and pluralism with the Advaita tradition. The soul is
eternal and all-pervasive, but, owing to original ignorance, it is reduced to the
condition of anava, which consists in regarding oneself as finite and atomic.
Knowledge of its own nature as well as Gods is possible only by Gods grace.
Kashmiri Shaivism
The source literature of this school consists in the Shiva-sutra, Vasuguptas Spanda-
karika (8th9th centuries; Verses on Creation), Utpalas Pratyabhijna-sutra (c. 900;
Aphorisms on Recognition), Abhinavaguptas Paramarthasara (The Essence of the
Highest Truth), Pratyabhijna-vimarshini (Reflections on Recognition), and
Tantraloka (Lights on the Doctrine) in the 10th century, and Kshemarajas Shiva-
sutra-vimarshini (Reflections on the Aphorisms on Shiva).

As contrasted with the Shaiva-siddhanta, this school is idealist and monist, and,
although it accepts the 36 tattvas and the three padarthas, it is Shiva, the Lord, who
is the sole reality. God is viewed as both the material and efficient cause of the
universe. Five aspects of Gods power are distinguished: consciousness (chit), bliss
(ananda), desire (iccha), knowledge (jnana), and action (kriya). Shiva is one
without a second, infinite spirit. He has a transcendent aspect and an immanent
aspect, and his power with its fivefold functions constitutes his immanent aspect.
The individual soul of a person is identical with Shiva; recognition of this identity is
essential to liberation.
Jain philosophy
Jainism, founded about the 6th century bce by Vardhamana Mahavira, the 24th in a
succession of religious leaders known either as Tirthankaras (Saviours) or as Jinas
(Conquerors), rejects the idea of God as the creator of the world but teaches the
perfectibility of humanity, to be accomplished through the strictly moral and ascetic
life. Central to the moral code of Jainism is the doctrine of ahimsanoninjury to all
living beings, an idea that may have arisen in reaction to Vedic sacrifice ritual.
There is also a great emphasis on vows (vratas) of various orders.

The aamagalas, or eight auspicious Jaina symbols, seen above and below the
seated image of the Jina (saviour), miniature from the Kalpa-stra, 15th century; in
the Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
The astamangalas, or eight auspicious Jaina symbols, seen above and below the
seated image of the
Courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution, Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
Although earlier scriptures, such as the Bhagavati-sutra, contained assorted ideas
on logic and epistemology, the 2nd-century-ce philosopher Kundakunda was the
first to develop Jaina logic. The Tattvarthadhigama-sutra of Umasvatis, however, is
the first systematic work, and Siddhasena (7th century ce) the first great logician.
Other important figures are Akalanka (8th century), Manikyanandi, Vadideva,
Hemchandra (12th century), Prabhachandra (11th century), and Yasovijaya (17th
century).

The principal ingredients of Jaina metaphysics are: an ultimate distinction between

living substance or soul (jiva) and nonliving substance (ajiva); the doctrine of
anekantavada, or nonabsolutism (the thesis that things have infinite aspects that no
determination can exhaust); the doctrine of naya (the thesis that there are many
partial perspectives from which reality can be determined, none of which is, taken
by itself, wholly true but each of which is partially so); and the doctrine of karma, in
Jainism a substance, rather than a process, that links all phenomena in a chain of
cause and effect.

As a consequence of their metaphysical liberalism, the Jaina logicians developed a

unique theory of seven-valued logic, according to which the three primary truth
values are true, false, and indefinite and the other four values are true and
false, true and indefinite, false and indefinite, and true, false, and indefinite.
Every statement is regarded as having these seven values, considered from
different standpoints.

Knowledge is defined as that which reveals both itself and another (svaparabhasi).
It is eternal, as an essential quality of the self; it is noneternal, as the perishable
empirical knowledge. Whereas most Hindu epistemologists regarded pramana as
the cause of knowledge, the Jainas identified pramana with valid knowledge.
Knowledge is either perceptual or nonperceptual. Perception is either empirical or
nonempirical. Empirical perception is either sensuous or nonsensuous. The latter
arises directly in the self, not through the sense organs but only when the covering
ignorance is removed. With the complete extinction of all karmas, a person attains
omniscience (kevala-jnana).
Mughal philosophy
Reference has been made earlier to the Sufi (Islamic mystics), who found a
resemblance between the ontological monism of Ibn al-Arabi and that of Vedanta.
The Shattari order among the Indian Sufis practiced Yogic austerities and even
physical postures. Various minor syncretistic religious sects attempted to harmonize
Hindu and Muslim religious traditions at different levels and with varying degrees of
success. Of these, the most famous are Ramananda, Kabir, and Guru Nanak. Kabir
harmonized the two religions in such a manner that, to an enquiry about whether he
was a Hindu or a Muslim, the answer given by a contemporary was, It is a secret
difficult to comprehend. One should try to understand. Guru Nanak rejected the
authority of both Hindu and Muslim scriptures alike and founded his religion,
Sikhism, on a rigorously moralistic, monotheistic basis.

Among the great Mughals, Akbar attempted in 1581 to promulgate a new religion,
Dn-e Ilh, which was to be based on reason and ethical teachings common to all
religions and which was to be free from priestcraft. This effort, however, was short-
lived, and a reaction of Muslim orthodoxy was led by Shaykh Amed Sirhind, who
rejected ontological monism in favour of orthodox unitarianism and sought to
channel mystical enthusiasm along Qurnic lines. By the middle of the 17th
century, the tragic figure of Dr Shikh, the Mughal emperor Shh Jahns son and
disciple of the Qdir Sufis, translated Hindu scriptures, such as the Bhagavadgita
and the Upanishads, into Persian and in his translation of the latter closely followed
Shankaras commentaries. In his Majma al-barayn he worked out correlations
between Sufi and Upanishadic cosmologies, beliefs, and practices. During this time,
the Muslim elite of India virtually identified Vedanta with Sufism. Later, Shh Wal
Allhs son, Shh Abd-ul-Azz, regarded Krishna among the awliy (saints).
19th- and 20th-century philosophy in India and Pakistan
In the 19th century, India was not marked by any noteworthy philosophical
achievements, but the period was one of great social and religious reform
movements. The newly founded universities introduced Indian intellectuals to
Western thought, particularly to the empiricist, utilitarian, and agnostic philosophies
in England, and John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and Herbert Spencer became the
most influential thinkers in the Indian universities by the end of the century. These
Western-oriented ideas served to generate a secular and rational point of view and
stimulated social and religious movements, most noteworthy among them being the
Brahmo Samaj movement founded by Ram Mohun Roy. Toward the later decades of
the century, the great saint Ramakrishna Paramahamsa of Calcutta (now Kolkata)
renewed interest in mysticism, and many young rationalists and skeptics were
converted into the faith exemplified in his person. Ramakrishna taught, among
other things, an essential diversity of religious paths leading to the same goal, and
this teaching was given an intellectual form by Swami Vivekananda, his famed
disciple.

The first Indian graduate school in philosophy was founded in the University of
Calcutta during the first decades of the 20th century, and the first incumbent of the
chair of philosophy was Sir Brajendranath Seal, a versatile scholar in many branches
of learning, both scientific and humanistic. Seals major published work is The
Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, which, besides being a work on the history
of science, shows interrelations among the ancient Hindu philosophical concepts
and their scientific theories. Soon, however, the German philosophers Immanuel
Kant and Georg F.W. Hegel came to be the most-studied philosophers in the Indian
universities. The ancient systems of philosophy came to be interpreted in the light
of German idealism. The Hegelian notion of Absolute Spirit found a resonance in the
age-old Vedanta notion of brahman. The most eminent Indian Hegelian scholar is
Hiralal Haldar, who was concerned with the problem of the relation of the human
personality with the Absolute, as is evidenced by his book Neo-Hegelianism. The
most eminent Kantian scholar is K.C. Bhattacharyya.

Among those who deserve mention for their original contributions to philosophical
thinking are Sri Aurobindo (died 1950), Mohandas K. Gandhi (died 1948),
Rabindranath Tagore (died 1941), Sir Muammed Iqbl (died 1938), K.C.
Bhattacharyya (died 1949), and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (died 1975). Of these, Sri
Aurobindo was first a political activist and then a yogin, Tagore and Iqbl poets,
Gandhi a political and social leader, and only Radhakrishnan and Bhattacharyya
university professors. This fact throws some light on the state of Indian philosophy
in that century.

In his major work, The Life Divine, Sri Aurobindo starts from the fact of human
aspiration for a kingdom of heaven on earth and proceeds to give a theoretical
framework in which such an aspiration would be not a figment of imagination but a
drive in nature, working through man toward a higher stage of perfection. Both the
denial of the materialist and that of the ascetic are rejected as being one-sided. The
gulf between unconscious matter and fully self-conscious spirit is sought to be
bridged by exhibiting them as two poles of a series in which spirit continuously
manifests itself. The Vedantic concept of a transcendent and all-inclusive brahman
is sought to be harmonized with a theory of emergent evolution. Illusionism is
totally rejected. The purpose of man is to go beyond his present form of
consciousness. Yoga is interpreted as a technique not for personal liberation but for
cooperating with the cosmic evolutionary urge that is destined to take humankind
ahead from the present mental stage to a higher, supramental stage of
consciousness. A theory of history, in accordance with this point of view, is worked
out in his The Human Cycle.

Rabindranath Tagores philosophical thinking is no less based on the Upanishads,

but his interpretation of them is closer to Vaishnava theism and the bhakti cults
than to traditional monism. He characterized the absolute as the supreme person
and placed love higher than knowledge. In his Religion of Man, Tagore sought to
give a philosophy of man in which human nature is characterized by a concept of
surplus energy that finds expression in creative art. In his lectures on Nationalism,
Tagore placed the concept of society above that of the modern nation-state.

Gandhi preferred to say that the truth is God rather than God is the truth, because
the former proposition expresses a belief that even the atheists share. The belief in
the presence of an all-pervading spirit in the universe led Gandhi to a strict
formulation of the ethics of nonviolence (ahimsa). But he gave this age-old ethical
principle a wealth of meaning so that ahimsa for him became at once a potent
means of collective struggle against social and economic injustice, the basis of a
decentralized economy and decentralized power structure, and the guiding principle
of ones individual life in relation both to nature and to other persons. The unity of
existence, which he called the truth, can be realized through the practice of ahimsa,
which requires reducing oneself to zero and reaching the furthest limit of humility.

Influenced by the British philosopher J.M.E. McTaggarts form of Hegelian idealism

and the French philosopher Henri Bergsons philosophy of change, Muammed Iqbl
conceived reality as creative and essentially spiritual, consisting of egos. The truth,
however, is that matter is spirit, he wrote,

in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when we look at it as acting in
regard to what we call external world; it is mind or soul when we look at it as acting
in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting.
Influenced by British Neo-Hegelianism in his interpretation of the Vedantic tradition,
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was primarily an interpreter of Indian thought to the
Western world. He defended a realistic interpretation of the concept of maya
thereby playing down its illusionistic connotation, a theory of intuition as the means
of knowing reality, and a theory of emergent evolution of spirit (not unlike Sri
Aurobindo, but without his doctrine of supermind) in nature and history. The most
original among modern Indian thinkers, however, is K.C. Bhattacharyya, who
rejected the conception of philosophy as a construction of a worldview and
undertook a phenomenological description of the various grades of subjectivity: (1)
the bodily, (2) the psychic, and (3) the spiritual. With regard to (1), he distinguished
between the objective body and the felt body and regarded the latter as the most
primitive level of the subjective sense of freedom from the objective world. The
stage (2) includes the range of mental life from image to free thought. In
introspection, the level (2) is transcended, but various levels of introspection are
distinguished, all leading to greater freedom from objectivity. It would seem,
however, that for Bhattacharyya absolute freedom from objectivity was a spiritual
demand. According to his theory of value, value is not an adjective of the object but
a feeling absolute, of which the object evaluated appears as an adjective, and his
logic of alternation is a modern working out of the Jaina theories of anekantavada
(non-absolutism) and syadvada (doctrine of may be).

Among later philosophers, N.V. Banerjee (190181) and Kalidas Bhattacharyya

(191184), the son of K.C. Bhattacharyya, have made important contributions. In
Language, Meaning and Persons (1963), Banerjee examines the development of
personhood from a stage of individualized bondage to liberation in a collective
identity, a life-with-others. This liberation, according to Banerjee, also entails an
awareness of time and freedom from spatialized objects.

In his earlier writings such as Object, Content and Relation (1951) and Alternative
Standpoints in Philosophy (1953), Bhattacharyya developed his fathers idea of
theoretically undecidable alternatives in philosophy. In the later works Philosophy,
Logic and Language (1965) and Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy (1974),
he developed the concept of metaphysics as a science of the nonempirical a priori
essences that are initially discerned as the structure of the empirical but are
subsequently recognized as autonomous entities. The method of metaphysics for
him is reflection, phenomenological and transcendental. Kalidas Bhattacharyya was
concerned with the nature and function of philosophical reflection and its relation to
unreflective experience. What reflection brings to light, he held, is present in pre-
reflective experience, but only as undistinguished and fused, in a state of objective
implicitness. The essences as such are not real but demand realization in pure
reflective consciousness. At the same time, he emphasized the limitations of any
doctrine positing the constitution of nature in consciousness. Such a doctrine, he
insisted, cannot be carried out in details.

Among those who apply the phenomenological method and concepts to

understanding the traditional Indian philosophies, D. Sinha, R.K. Sinari, and J.N.
Mohanty are especially noteworthy. Others who interpret the Indian philosophies by
means of the methods and concepts of analytical philosophy include B.K. Matilal
and G. Misra. In the field of philosophy of logic, P.K. Sen has worked on the
paradoxes of confirmation and the concept of quantification, and Sibajiban on the
liar paradox and on epistemic logic. Sibajiban and Matilal have made important
contributions toward rendering the concepts of Navya-Nyaya logic into the language
of modern logic. In ethics and social philosophy, notable work has been done by Abu
Sayyid Ayub, Daya Krishna, Rajendra Prasad, and D.P. Chattopadhyaya.

Indian philosophy, the systems of thought and reflection that were developed by the
civilizations of the Indian subcontinent. They include both orthodox (astika)
systems, namely, the Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa (or
Mimamsa), and Vedanta schools of philosophy, and unorthodox (nastika) systems,
such as Buddhism and Jainism. Indian thought has been concerned with various
philosophical problems, significant among which are the nature of the world
(cosmology), the nature of reality (metaphysics), logic, the nature of knowledge
(epistemology), ethics, and the philosophy of religion.

The Hindu deity Krishna, an avatar of Vishnu, mounted on a horse pulling Arjuna,
hero of the epic poem Mahabharata; 17th-century illustration.
The Hindu deity Krishna, an avatar of Vishnu, mounted on a horse pulling Arjuna,
hero of the epic
Photos.com/Jupiterimages
General Considerations

Significance of Indian philosophies in the history of philosophy

In relation to Western philosophical thought, Indian philosophy offers both surprising
points of affinity and illuminating differences. The differences highlight certain
fundamentally new questions that the Indian philosophers asked. The similarities
reveal that, even when philosophers in India and the West were grappling with the
same problems and sometimes even suggesting similar theories, Indian thinkers
were advancing novel formulations and argumentations. Problems that the Indian
philosophers raised for consideration, but that their Western counterparts never did,
include such matters as the origin (utpatti) and apprehension (jnapti) of truth
(pramanya). Problems that the Indian philosophers for the most part ignored but
that helped shape Western philosophy include the question of whether knowledge
arises from experience or from reason and distinctions such as that between
analytic and synthetic judgments or between contingent and necessary truths.
Indian thought, therefore, provides the historian of Western philosophy with a point
of view that may supplement that gained from Western thought. A study of Indian
thought, then, reveals certain inadequacies of Western philosophical thought and
makes clear that some concepts and distinctions may not be as inevitable as they
may otherwise seem. In a similar manner, knowledge of Western thought gained by
Indian philosophers has also been advantageous to them.

SIMILAR TOPICS
humanism
Cartesianism
Japanese philosophy
carpe diem
irrationalism
best of all possible worlds
philosophy of law
cosmopolitanism
Arabic philosophy
dialectic
Vedic hymns, Hindu scriptures dating from the 2nd millennium bce, are the oldest
extant record from India of the process by which the human mind makes its gods
and of the deep psychological processes of mythmaking leading to profound
cosmological concepts. The Upanishads (speculative philosophical texts) contain
one of the first conceptions of a universal, all-pervading, spiritual reality leading to a
radical monism (absolute nondualism, or the essential unity of matter and spirit).
The Upanishads also contain early speculations by Indian philosophers about
nature, life, mind, and the human body, not to speak of ethics and social philosophy.
The classical, or orthodox, systems (darshanas) debate, sometimes with penetrating
insight and often with a degree of repetition that can become tiresome to some,
such matters as the status of the finite individual; the distinction as well as the
relation between the body, mind, and the self; the nature of knowledge and the
types of valid knowledge; the nature and origin of truth; the types of entities that
may be said to exist; the relation of realism to idealism; the problem of whether
universals or relations are basic; and the very important problem of moksha, or
liberation (literally release)its nature and the paths leading up to it.
General characteristics of Indian philosophy
Common concerns
The various Indian philosophies contain such a diversity of views, theories, and
systems that it is almost impossible to single out characteristics that are common to
all of them. Acceptance of the authority of the Vedas characterizes all the orthodox
(astika) systemsbut not the unorthodox (nastika) systems, such as Charvaka
(radical materialism), Buddhism, and Jainism. Moreover, even when philosophers
professed allegiance to the Vedas, their allegiance did little to fetter the freedom of
their speculative ventures. On the contrary, the acceptance of the authority of the
Vedas was a convenient way for a philosophers views to become acceptable to the
orthodox, even if a thinker introduced a wholly new idea. Thus, the Vedas could be
cited to corroborate a wide diversity of views; they were used by the Vaisheshika
thinkers (i.e., those who believe in ultimate particulars, both individual souls and
atoms) as much as by the Advaita (monist) Vedanta philosophers.

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In most Indian philosophical systems, the acceptance of the ideal of moksha, like
allegiance to the authority of the scriptures, was only remotely connected with the
systematic doctrines that were being propounded. Many epistemological, logical,
and even metaphysical doctrines were debated and decided on purely rational
grounds that did not directly bear upon the ideal of moksha. Only the Vedanta (end
of the Vedas) philosophy and the Samkhya (a system that accepts a real matter
and a plurality of the individual souls) philosophy may be said to have a close
relationship to the ideal of moksha. The logical systemsNyaya, Vaisheshika, and
Purva-Mimamsaare only very remotely related. Also, both the philosophies and
other scientific treatises, including even the Kama-sutra (Aphorisms on Love) and
the Artha-shastra (The Science of Material Gain), recognized the same ideal and
professed their efficacy for achieving it.

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David Hume in the background St. Giles Cathedral, Edinburgh, Scotland. Scottish
philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, known especially for his
philosophical empiricism and skepticism. Whats In a Name? Philosopher Edition
When Indian philosophers speak of intuitive knowledge, they are concerned with
making room for it and demonstrating its possibility, with the help of logicand
there, as far as they are concerned, the task of philosophy ends. Indian philosophers
do not seek to justify religious faith; philosophic wisdom itself is accorded the
dignity of religious truth. Theory is not subordinated to practice, but theory itself, as
theory, is regarded as being supremely worthy and efficacious.

Three basic concepts form the cornerstone of Indian philosophical thought: the self
or soul (atman), works (karma), and liberation (moksha). Leaving the Charvakas
aside, all Indian philosophies concern themselves with these three concepts and
their interrelations, though this is not to say that they accept the objective validity
of these concepts in precisely the same manner. Of these, the concept of karma,
signifying moral efficacy of human actions, seems to be the most typically Indian.
The concept of atman, not altogether absent in Western thought, corresponds in a
certain sense to the Western concept of a transcendental or absolute spirit self
important differences notwithstanding. The concept of moksha as the concept of the
highest ideal has likewise been one of the concerns of Western thought, especially
during the Christian era, though it probably has never been as important as for the
Hindu mind. Most Indian philosophies assume that moksha is possible, and the
impossibility of moksha (anirmoksha) is regarded as a material fallacy likely to
vitiate a philosophical theory.

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In addition to karma, the lack of two other concerns further differentiates Indian
philosophical thought from Western thought in general. Since the time of the
Greeks, Western thought has been concerned with mathematics and, in the
Christian era, with history. Neither mathematics nor history has ever raised
philosophical problems for the Indian. In the lists of pramanas, or ways of knowing
accepted by the different schools, there is none that includes mathematical
knowledge or historical knowledge. Possibly connected with their indifference
toward mathematics is the significant fact that Indian philosophers have not
developed formal logic. The theory of the syllogism (a valid deductive argument
having two premises and a conclusion) is, however, developed, and much
sophistication has been achieved in logical theory. Indian logic offers an instructive
example of a logic of cognitions (jnanani) rather than of abstract propositionsa
logic not sundered and kept isolated from psychology and epistemology, because it
is meant to be the logic of actual human striving to know what is true of the world.
Forms of argument and presentation
There is, in relation to Western thought, a striking difference in the manner in which
Indian philosophical thinking is presented as well as in the mode in which it
historically develops. Out of the presystematic age of the Vedic hymns and the
Upanishads and many diverse philosophical ideas current in the pre-Buddhistic era,
there emerged with the rise of the age of the sutras (aphoristic summaries of the
main points of a system) a neat classification of systems (darshanas), a
classification that was never to be contradicted and to which no further systems are
added. No new school was founded, no new darshana came into existence. But this
conformism, like conformism to the Vedas, did not check the rise of independent
thinking, new innovations, or original insights. There is, apparently, an underlying
assumption in the Indian tradition that no individual can claim to have seen the
truth for the first time and, therefore, that an individual can only explicate, state,
and defend in a new form a truth that has been seen, stated, and defended by
countless others before himhence the tradition of expounding ones thoughts by
affiliating oneself to one of the darshanas.

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If one is to be counted as a great master (acharya), one has to write a commentary
(bhashya) on the sutras of the darshana concerned, or one must comment on one of
the bhashyas and write a tika (subcommentary). The usual order is sutrabhashya
varttika (collection of critical notes)tika. At any stage a person may introduce a
new and original point of view, but at no stage can one claim originality for oneself.
Not even authors of sutras could do that, for they were only systematizing the
thoughts and insights of countless predecessors. The development of Indian
philosophical thought has thus been able to combine, in an almost unique manner,
conformity to tradition and adventure in thinking.
Roles of sacred texts, mythology, and theism
The role of the sacred texts in the growth of Indian philosophy is different in each of
the different systems. In those systems that may be called adhyatmavidya, or
sciences of spirituality, the sacred texts play a much greater role than they do in the
logical systems (anvikshikividya). In the case of the former, Shankara, a leading
Advaita Vedanta philosopher (c. 788820 ce), perhaps best laid down the principles:
reasoning should be allowed freedom only as long as it does not conflict with the
scriptures. In matters regarding supersensible reality, reasoning left to itself cannot
deliver certainty, for, according to Shankara, every thesis established by reasoning
may be countered by an opposite thesis supported by equally strong, if not
stronger, reasoning. The sacred scriptures, embodying as they do the results of
intuitive experiences of seers, therefore, should be accepted as authoritative, and
reasoning should be made subordinate to them.

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Whereas the sacred texts thus continued to exercise some influence on
philosophical thinking, the influence of mythology declined considerably with the
rise of the systems. The myths of creation and dissolution of the universe persisted
in the theistic systems but were transformed into metaphors and models. With the
Nyaya (problem of knowledge)Vaisheshika (analysis of nature) systems, for
example, the model of a potter making pots determined much philosophical
thinking, as did that of a magician conjuring up tricks in the Advaita (nondualist)
Vedanta. The nirukta (etymology) of Yaska, a 5th-century-bce Sanskrit scholar, tells
of various attempts to interpret difficult Vedic mythologies: the adhidaivata
(pertaining to the deities), the aitihasika (pertaining to the tradition), the adhiyajna
(pertaining to the sacrifices), and the adhyatmika (pertaining to the spirit). Such
interpretations apparently prevailed in the Upanishads; the myths were turned into
symbols, though some of them persisted as models and metaphors.

The issue of theism vis--vis atheism, in the ordinary senses of the English words,
played an important role in Indian thought. The ancient Indian tradition, however,
classified the classical systems (darshanas) into orthodox (astika) and unorthodox
(nastika). Astika does not mean theistic, nor does nastika mean atheistic.
Panini, a 5th-century-bce grammarian, stated that the former is one who believes in
a transcendent world (asti paralokah) and the latter is one who does not believe in it
(nasti paralokah). Astika may also mean one who accepts the authority of the
Vedas; nastika then means one who does not accept that authority. Not all among
the astika philosophers, however, were theists, and, even if they were, they did not
all accord the same importance to the concept of God in their systems. The
Samkhya system did not involve belief in the existence of God, without ceasing to
be astika, and Yoga (a mental-psychological-physical meditation system) made
room for God not on theoretical grounds but only on practical considerations. The
Purva-Mimamsa of Jaimini (c. 400 bce), the greatest philosopher of the Mimamsa
school, posits various deities to account for the significance of Vedic rituals but
ignores, without denying, the question of the existence of God. The Advaita Vedanta
of Shankara rejects atheism in order to prove that the world had its origin in a
conscious, spiritual being called Ishvara, or God, but in the long run regards the
concept of Ishvara as a concept of lower order that becomes negated by a
metaphysical knowledge of brahman, the absolute, nondual reality. Only the non-
Advaita schools of Vedanta and the Nyaya-Vaisheshika remain zealous theists, and,
of these schools, the god of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school does not create the
eternal atoms, universals, or individual souls. For a truly theistic conception of God,
one has to look to the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta, the Vaishnavite (devotees of
Vishnu as the supreme God), and the Shaivite (devotees of Shiva as the supreme
God) philosophical systems. Whereas Hindu religious life continues to be dominated
by these last-mentioned theistic systems, the philosophies went their own ways, far
removed from that religious demand.
A general history of development and cultural background
S.N. Dasgupta, a 20th-century Indian philosopher, divided the history of Indian
philosophy into three periods: the prelogical (up to the beginning of the Christian
era), the logical (from the beginning of the Christian era to the 11th century ce),
and the ultralogical (from the 11th century to the 18th century). What Dasgupta
calls the prelogical stage covers the pre-Mauryan and the Mauryan period (c. 321
185 bce) in Indian history. The logical period begins roughly with the Kushanas (1st
2nd centuries ce) and reaches its highest development during the Gupta era (3rd
5th centuries ce) and the age of imperial Kanauj (7th century ce).

The prelogical period

In its early prelogical phase, Indian thought, freshly developing in the Indian
subcontinent, actively confronted and assimilated the diverse currents of pre-Vedic
and non-Vedic elements in the native culture that the Indo-Aryan-speaking migrants
from the north sought to appropriate. The marks of this confrontation are to be
noted in every facet of Indian religion and thought: in the Vedic hymns in the form
of conflicts, with varying fortunes, between the people referred to as nobles (arya)
and the people already living in the land; in the conflict between a positive attitude
that is interested in making life fuller and richer and a negative attitude
emphasizing asceticism and renunciation; in the great variety of skeptics,
naturalists, determinists, indeterminists, accidentalists, and no-soul theorists that
filled the Ganges Plain; in the rise of the heretical, unorthodox schools of Jainism
and Buddhism protesting against the Vedic religion and the Upanishadic theory of
atman; and in the continuing confrontation, mutually enriching and nourishing, that
occurred between the Brahmanic (Hindu priestly) and Buddhist logicians,
epistemologists, and dialecticians. The Indo-Aryan speakers, however, were soon
followed by a host of foreign invaders, Greeks, Shakas and Hunas from Central Asia,
Pashtuns (Pathans), Mongols, and Mughals (Muslims). Both religious thought and
philosophical discussion received continuous challenges and confrontations. The
resulting responses have a dialectical character: sometimes new ideas have been
absorbed and orthodoxy has been modified; sometimes orthodoxy has been
strengthened and codified in order to be preserved in the face of the dangers of
such confrontation; sometimes, as in the religious life of the Christian Middle Ages,
bold attempts at synthesis of ideas have been made. Nevertheless, through all the
vicissitudes of social and cultural life, Brahmanical thought has been able to
maintain a fairly strong current of continuity.

In the chaotic intellectual climate of the pre-Mauryan era, there were skeptics
(ajnanikah) who questioned the possibility of knowledge. There were also
materialists, the chief of which were the Ajivikas (deterministic ascetics) and the
Lokayatas (the name by which Charvaka doctrinesdenying the authority of the
Vedas and the soulare generally known). Furthermore, there existed the two
unorthodox schools of yadrichhavada (accidentalists) and svabhavaha (naturalists),
who rejected the supernatural. Kapila, the legendary founder of the Samkhya
school, supposedly flourished during the 7th century bce. Proto-Jain ideas were
already in existence when Mahavira (flourished 6th century bce), the founder of
Jainism, initiated his reform. Gautama the Buddha (flourished c. 6th4th centuries
bce) apparently was familiar with all these intellectual ideas and was as dissatisfied
with them as with the Vedic orthodoxy. He sought to forge a new paththough not
new in all respectsthat was to assure blessedness to man. Orthodoxy, however,
sought to preserve itself in a vast Kalpa-sutra (ritual) literaturewith three parts:
the Shrauta-sutra, based on shruti (revelation); the Grihya-sutra, based on smriti
(tradition); and the Dharma-sutra, pertaining to rules of religious lawwhereas the
philosophers tried to codify their doctrines in systematic form, leading to the rise of
the philosophical sutras. Though the writing of the sutras continued over a long
period, the sutras of most of the various darshanas probably were completed
between the 6th and 3rd centuries bce. Two of the sutras appear to have been
composed in the pre-Mauryan period but after the rise of Buddhism; these works are
the Mimamsa-sutras of Jaimini and the Vedanta-sutras of Badarayana (c. 500200
bce).

The Mauryan period brought, for the first time, a strong centralized state. The
Greeks had been ousted, and a new self-confidence characterized the beginning of
the period. This seems to have been the period in which the epics Mahabharata and
Ramayana were initiated, though their composition went on through several
centuries before they took the forms they now have. Manu, a legendary lawgiver,
codified the Dharma-shastra; Kautilya, a minister of King Chandragupta Maurya,
systematized the science of political economy (Artha-shastra); and Patanjali, an
ancient author or authors, composed the Yoga-sutras. Brahmanism tried to adjust
itself to the new communities and cultures that were admitted into its fold: new
godsor rather, old Vedic gods that had been rejuvenatedwere worshipped; the
Hindu trinity (Trimurti) of Brahma (the creator), Vishnu (the preserver), and Shiva
(the destroyer) came into being; and the Pashupata (Shaivite), Bhagavata
(Vaishnavite), and Tantra (esoteric meditative) systems were initiated. The
Bhagavadgitathe most famous work of this periodsymbolized the spirit of the
creative synthesis of the age. A new ideal of karma as opposed to the more ancient
one of renunciation was emphasized. Orthodox notions were reinterpreted and
given a new symbolic meaning, as, for example, the Gita does with the notion of
yajna (sacrifice). Already in the pre-Christian era, Buddhism had split up into
several major sects, and the foundations for the rise of Mahayana (Greater
Vehicle) Buddhism had been laid.
The logical period
The logical period of Indian thought began with the Kushan dynasty (1st2nd
centuries ce). Gautama (author of the Nyaya-sutras; probably flourished at the
beginning of the Christian era) and his 5th-century commentator Vatsyayana
established the foundations of the Nyaya as a school almost exclusively
preoccupied with logical and epistemological issues. The Madhyamika (Middle
Way) school of Buddhismalso known as the Shunyavada (Way of Emptiness)
schoolarose, and the analytical investigations of Nagarjuna (c. 200), the great
propounder of Shunyavada (dialectical thinking), reached great heights. Though
Buddhist logic in the strict sense of the term had not yet come into being, an
increasingly rigorous logical style of philosophizing developed among the
proponents of these schools of thought.
During the reign of the Guptas, there was a revival of Brahmanism of a gentler and
more-refined form. Vaishnavism of the Vasudeva cult, centring on the prince-god
Krishna and advocating renunciation by action, and Shaivism prospered, along with
Buddhism and Jainism. Both the Mahayana and the Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle), or
Theravada (Way of the Elders), schools flourished. The most notable feature,
however, was the rise of the Buddhist Yogachara school, of which Asanga (4th
century ce) and his brother Vasubandhu were the great pioneers. Toward the end of
the 5th century, Dignaga, a Buddhist logician, wrote the Pramanasamuccaya
(Compendium of the Means of True Knowledge), a work that laid the foundations
of Buddhist logic.

The greatest names of Indian philosophy belong to the post-Gupta period from the
7th to the 10th century. At that time Buddhism was on the decline and the Tantric
cults were rising, a situation that led to the development of the Tantric forms of
Buddhism. Shaivism was thriving in Kashmir and Vaishnavism in the southern part
of India. The great philosophers Mimamshakas Kumarila (7th century), Prabhakara
(7th8th centuries), Mandana Mishra (8th century), Shalikanatha (9th century), and
Parthasarathi Mishra (10th century) belong to this age. The greatest Indian
philosopher of the period, however, was Shankara. All these men defended
Brahmanism against the unorthodox schools, especially against the criticisms of
Buddhism. The debate between Brahmanism and Buddhism was continued, on a
logical level, by philosophers of the Nyaya schoolUddyotakara, Vachaspati Mishra,
and Udayana (Udayanacharya).
The ultralogical period
Muslim rule in India had consolidated itself by the 11th century, by which time
Buddhism, for all practical purposes, had disappeared from the country. Hinduism
had absorbed Buddhist ideas and practices and reasserted itself, with the Buddha
appearing in Hindu writings as an incarnation of Vishnu. The Muslim conquest
created a need for orthodoxy to readjust itself to a new situation. In this period the
great works on Hindu law were written. Jainism, of all the unorthodox schools,
retained its purity, and great Jaina works, such as Devasuris
Pramananayatattvalokalamkara (The Ornament of the Light of Truth of the
Different Points of View Regarding the Means of True Knowledge, 12th century ce)
and Prabhachandras Prameyakamalamartanda (The Sun of the Lotus of the
Objects of True Knowledge, 11th century ce), were written during this period.
Under the Chola kings (c. 8501279) and later in the Vijayanagara kingdom (which,
along with Mithila in the north, remained strongholds of Hinduism until the middle of
the 16th century), Vaishnavism flourished. The philosopher Yamunacharya
(flourished 1050 ce) taught the path of prapatti, or complete surrender to God. The
philosophers Ramanuja (11th century), Madhva, and Nimbarka (c. 12th century)
developed theistic systems of Vedanta and severely criticized Shankaras Advaita
Vedanta.

Toward the end of the 12th century, creative work of the highest order began to
take place in the fields of logic and epistemology in Mithila and Bengal. The 12th
13th-century philosopher Gangesas Tattvachintamani (The Jewel of Thought on the
Nature of Things) laid the foundations of the school of Navya-Nyaya (New
Nyaya). Four great members of this school were Pakshadhara Mishra of Mithila,
Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (16th century), his disciple Raghunatha Shiromani (both of
Bengal), and Gadadhara Bhattacharyya.

Religious life was marked by the rise of great mystic saints, chief of which are
Ramananda, Kabir, Chaitanya, and Guru Nanak, who emphasized the path of bhakti,
or devotion, a wide sense of humanity, freedom of thought, and a sense of unity of
all religions. Somewhat earlier than these were the great Muslim Sufi (mystic)
saints, including Khwja Muin-ud-Din asan, who emphasized asceticism and
taught a philosophy that included both love of God and love of humanity.

The British period in Indian history was primarily a period of discovery of the ancient
tradition (e.g., the two histories by Radhakrishnan, scholar and president of India
from 1962 to 1967, and S.N. Dasgupta) and of comparison and synthesis of Indian
philosophy with the philosophical ideas from the West. Among modern creative
thinkers have been Mohandas K. Gandhi, who espoused new ideas in the fields of
social, political, and educational philosophy; Sri Aurobindo, an exponent of a new
school of Vedanta that he calls Integral Advaita; and K.C. Bhattacharyya, who
developed a phenomenologically oriented philosophy of subjectivity that is
conceived as freedom from object.

Historical Development Of Indian Philosophy

Presystematic philosophy
Shruti and the nature of authority
All orthodox philosophies can trace their basic principles back to some statement
or other in the Vedas, the texts that are generally awarded the status of scripture in
Hinduism but not in Buddhism or Jainism. The Vedanta schools, especially, had an
affiliation with the authority of shruti (literally that which is heard; texts that are
taken to be revealed), and the school of Mimamsa concerned itself chiefly with the
questions of interpreting the sacred texts. The Hindu tradition regards the Vedas as
being apaurusheyai.e., not composed by any person. Sayana, a famous Vedic
commentator, said that this means an absence of a human author. For Sayana, the
eternality of the Vedas is like that of space and time; no human being experiences
their beginning or their end. But they are, in fact, created by Brahma, the supreme
creator. For the Advaita Vedanta, because no author of the Vedas is mentioned, an
unbroken chain of Vedic teachers is quite conceivable, so that the scriptures bear
testimony to their own eternality. The authoritative character of shruti may then be
deduced from the fact that it is free from any fault (dosha), or limitation, which
characterizes human words. Furthermore, the Vedas give knowledge about things
whether dharma (what ought to be done) or brahman (Absolute Reality)which
cannot be known by any other empirical means of knowledge. The authority of the
Vedas cannot, therefore, be contradicted by any empirical evidence. Later logicians
of the orthodox schools sought to give these arguments precision and logical
rigour.

Vishnu with his 10 avatars (incarnations): Fish, Tortoise, Boar, Man-Lion, Dwarf,
Rma with the Ax, King Rma, Krishna, Buddha, and Kalkin. Painting from Jaipur,
India, 19th century; in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London.
Vishnu with his 10 avatars (incarnations): Fish, Tortoise, Boar, Man-Lion, Dwarf,
Rama with the Ax,
Courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London
The Vedic hymns (mantras) seem to be addressed to gods and goddesses (deva,
one who gives knowledge or light), who are personifications of natural forces and
phenomena (Agni, the fire god; Indra, the rain god; Vayu, the wind god). But there
are gods not identifiable with such phenomena (e.g., Aditi, the infinite mother of all
gods; Mitra, the friend; Varuna, the guardian of truth and righteousness; and
Vishvakarman, the all-maker). Also, the hymns show an awareness of the unity of
these deities, of the fact that it is one God who is called by different names. The
famed conception of ritameaning at once natural law, cosmic order, moral law,
and the law of truthmade the transition to a monistic view of the universe as
being but a manifestation of one reality about which the later hymns continue to
raise fundamental questions in a poignant manner, without, however, suggesting
any dogmatic answer.
Development of the notion of transmigration

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The hymns may, in general, be said to express a positive attitude toward human life
and to show interest in the full enjoyment of life here and hereafter rather than an
anxiety to escape from it. The idea of transmigration and the conception of the
different paths and worlds traversed by those who are good and those who are not
goodi.e., the world of Vishnu (the preserver) and the realm of Yama (the god of
death and the dead)are found in the Vedas. The chain of rebirth as a product of
ignorance and the conception of release from this chain as the greatest good of the
spiritual life are markedly absent in the hymns.
Origin of the concept of brahman and atman
The Upanishads answer the question Who is that one Being? by establishing the
equation brahman = atman. Brahmanmeaning now that which is the greatest,
than which there is nothing greater, and also that which bursts forth into the
manifested world, the one Being of which the hymn of creation spokeis viewed as
nothing but atman, identifiable as the innermost self in a human being but also, in
reality, the innermost self in all beings. Both the words gain a new, extended, and
spiritual significance through this identification. Atman was originally used to mean
breath, the vital essence, and even the body. Later etymologizing brought out
several strands in its meaning: that which pervades (yad apnoti), that which gives
(yadadatte), that which eats (yad atti), and that which constantly accompanies
(yacca asya santato bhavam). Distinctions were made between the bodily self, the
vital self, the thinking self, and the innermost self, whose nature is bliss (ananda),
the earlier ones being sheaths (koshas) covering the innermost being, or the inner,
eternal core of a person. Distinctions were sometimes drawn between the waking
(jagrat), dreaming (svapna), and dreamless-sleep (sushupti) states of the self, and
these three are contrasted with the fourth, or transcendent (turiya), state that both
transcends and includes them all. The identification of the Absolute Reality
underlying the universe with the innermost being within the human person resulted
in a spiritualization of the former concept and a universalization of the latter. This
final conception of brahman or atman received many different explications from
different teachers in the Upanishads, some of which were negative in character (neti
neti, not this, not this) while others positively affirmed the all-pervasiveness of
brahman. But there were still others who insisted on both the transcendence and
immanence of brahman in the universe. Brahman is also characterized as infinity,
truth, and knowledge and as existence, consciousness, and bliss.
The principles underlying macrocosm and microcosm

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Though the objective and the subjective, the macrocosm (universal) and the
microcosm (individual), came to be identified according to their true essences,
attempts were made to correlate different macrocosmic principles with
corresponding microcosmic principles. The manifested cosmos was correlated with
the bodily self; the soul of the world, or Hiranyagarbha, with the vital self; and
Ishvara, or God as a self-conscious being, with the thinking self. The transcendent
self and brahman as bliss are not correlates but rather are identical.
Early Buddhist developments
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David Hume in the background St. Giles Cathedral, Edinburgh, Scotland. Scottish
philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, known especially for his
philosophical empiricism and skepticism. Whats In a Name? Philosopher Edition
Background
Buddhism was not a completely new phenomenon in the religious history of India; it
was built upon the basis of ideas that were already current, both Brahmanic and
non-Brahmanic. Protests against the Brahmanic doctrines of atman, karma, and
moksha were being voiced in the 6th century bce, prior to preaching of the Buddha,
by various schools of thought: by naturalists, such as Purana (The Old One)
Kassapa, who denied both virtue and vice (dharma and adharma) and thus all moral
efficacy of human deeds; by determinists, such as the Ajivika Makkhali Gosala, who
denied sin and freedom of will; and by materialists, such as Ajita Keshakambalin,
who, besides denying virtue, vice, and afterlife, resolved being into material
elements. Protests were also voiced by Nigantha Nataputta, who believed in
salvation by an ascetic life of self-discipline and hence in the efficacy of deeds and
the possibility of omniscience, and, finally, Sanjaya Belathiputta, the skeptic, who, in
reply to the question Is there an afterlife? would not say It is so or It is
otherwise, nor would he say It is not so or It is not not so.

Devotees worshipping at a stupa, the monument that contains the Buddhas relics
and symbolizes his final nirvana; detail of a Bharhut Stupa railing, mid-2nd century
bce.
Devotees worshipping at a stupa, the monument that symbolizes the Buddhas
Pramod Chandra

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Of these six, the Jain tradition identifies Nigantha with Mahavira; the designation
Ajivika is applied, in a narrow sense, to the followers of Makkhali and in a loose
sense to all nonorthodox sects other than the Jainasthe skeptics and the
Charvakas.

Buddhism, Jainism, and the Ajivikas rejected, in common, the sacrificial polytheism
of the Brahmanas and the monistic mysticism of the Upanishads. All three of them
recognized the rule of natural law in the universe. Buddhism, however, retained the
Vedic notions of karma and moksha, though rejecting the other fundamental
concept of atman.
The Four Noble Truths and the nature of suffering
In such an intellectual climate, Gotama (Sanskrit Gautama), the historical Buddha,
taught his Four Noble Truths: (1) dukkha (Sanskrit duhkha; generally but
misleadingly translated as suffering, as it implies a broader sense of
dissatisfaction with existence in the phenomenal world); (2) the origination of
dukkha in tanha (desire or craving); (3) the cessation of dukkha; and finally (4)
the way leading to that cessation by following the Eightfold Path.

Although the word dukkha in common parlance means suffering, its use by the
Buddha was meant to include both pleasure and pain, both happiness and suffering.
There are three aspects of this conception: dukkha as suffering in the ordinary
sense; dukkha arising out of the impermanence of things, even of a state of
pleasure; and dukkha in the sense of five aggregates meaning that the I
constituted by any individual is nothing but a totality of five aggregatesi.e., form,
feeling, conception, disposition, and consciousness. In brief, whatever is noneternal
i.e., whatever is subject to the law of causalityis characterized by dukkha; for
the Buddha, this is the human situation. One who recognizes the nature of dukkha
also knows its causes. Dukkha arises out of craving (tanha; Sanskrit trishna),
craving arises out of sensation (vedana), and sensation arises out of contact
(sparsha), so that a human being is faced with a series of conditions leading back to
ignorance (avijja; avidya)a series in which the rise of each succeeding member
depends upon and originates from the preceding one (paticca-samuppada;
pratityasamutpada; literally dependent origination).
The path of liberation: methods of the Eightfold Path

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The Four Noble Truths follow the middle way (madhyamika) between the two
extremes of sensual indulgence and ascetic self-torture, both of which the Buddha
rejected as spiritually useless. Only the middle path consisting in the eight steps
called the Eightfold Pathleads to enlightenment (bodhi) and to nibbana (nirvana).
The eight steps are (1) right views, (2) right intention, (3) right speech, (4) right
action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right
concentration. Of these eight, steps 3, 4, and 5 are grouped under right morality
(sila; shila); steps 6, 7, and 8 under right concentration (samadhi); and steps 1 and
2 under right wisdom (prajna).
The concepts of anatta and nibbana
Two key notions, even in early Buddhism, are those of anatta (Sanskrit anatman;
no-self) and nibbana. The Buddha apparently wanted his famed doctrine of anatta
to be a phenomenological account of how things are rather than a theory. In his
discourse to the wandering monk Vacchagotta, he rejected the theories of both
eternalism and annihilationism. The former, he stated, would be incompatible with
his thesis that all laws (dhammas; Sanskrit dharmas) are selfless (sabbe dhamma
anatta); the latter would be significant only if one had a self that is no more in
existence. Thus, by not taking sides with the metaphysicians, the Buddha described
how the consciousness I am comes to constitute itself in the stream of
consciousness out of the five aggregates of form, feeling, conception, disposition,
and consciousness. The doctrine of no-self actually has two aspects: as applied to
puggala (pudgala), or the individual person, and as applied to the dhammas, or the
elements of being. In its former aspect, it asserts the fact that an individual is
constituted out of five aggregates (khandas; skandhas); in its latter aspect it means
the utter insubstantiality of all elements. Intuitive realization of the former truth
leads to the disappearance of passions and desires, realization of the latter removes
all misconceptions about the nature of things in general. The former removes the
covering of the passions; the latter removes the concealment of things.
Together, they result in nibbana.

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Both negative and positive accounts of nibbana are to be found in the Buddhas
teachings and in early Buddhist writings. Nibbana is a state of utter extinctionnot
of existence but of passions and suffering; it is a state beyond the chain of
causation, a state of freedom and spontaneity. It is in addition a state of bliss.
Nibbana is not the result of a process; were it so, it would be but another perishing
state. It is the truthnot, however, an eternal, everlasting substance like the atman
of the Upanishads but the truth of utter selflessness and the insubstantiality of
things, of the emptiness of the ego, and of the impermanence of all things. With the
realization of this truth, ignorance is destroyed, and, consequently, all craving,
suffering, and hatred is destroyed with it.
The philosophical portions of the Mahabharata
The great epic Mahabharata represents the attempt of Vedic Brahmanism to adjust
itself to the new circumstances reflected in the process of the Sanskritization
(integration of Vedic beliefs, practices, and institutions) of the various non-Vedic
communities. Many diverse trends of religious and philosophical thought have thus
been synthesized in this work.

Mokshadharma
Proto-Samkhyan texts
In its philosophical views, the epic contains an early version of Samkhya (a belief in
real matter and the plurality of individual souls), which is prior to the classical
Samkhya of Ishvarakrishna, a 3rd-century-ce philosopher. The chapter on
Mokshadharma in Book 12 of the Mahabharata is full of such proto-Samkhya
texts. Mention is made of four main philosophical schools: Samkhya-Yoga, taught by
Kapila (a sage living before the 6th century bce); Pancharatra, taught by Vishnu; the
Vedas; and Pashupata (Lord of Creatures), taught by Shiva. Belonging to the
Pancharatra school, the epic basically attempts to accommodate certain
presystematic Samkhya ideas into the Bhagavata faith. Samkhya and Yoga are
sometimes put together and sometimes distinguished. Several different schemata
of the 25 principles (tattvas) of the Samkhya are recorded. One common
arrangement is that of eight productive forms of prakriti (the unmanifest, intellect,
egoism, and five fine elements: sound, smell, form or colour, taste, and touch) and
16 modifications (five organs of perception, five organs of action, mind, and five
gross elements: ether, earth, fire, water, and air), and purusha (person). An un-
Samkhyan element is the 26th principle: Ishvara, or the supreme lord. One notable
result is the identification of the four living forms (vyuhas) of the Pancharatra school
with four Samkhya principles: Vasudeva with spirit, Samkarshana with individual
soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with ego-sense.
Non-Samkhyan texts
Beside the Samkhya-Yoga, which is in the foreground of the epics philosophical
portions, there are Vedanta texts emphasizing the unity of spirits and theistic texts
emphasizing not only a personal deity but also the doctrine of the avatar (avatara),
or incarnation. The Vasudeva-Krishna cult characterizes the theistic part of the epic.
Early theories of kingship and state
In the Shanti Parvan (Book of Consolation, 12th book) of the Mahabharata, there is
also a notable account of the origin of kingship and of rajadharma, or the dharma
(law) of the king as king. Bhishma, who is discoursing, refers with approval to two
different theories of the origin of kingship, both of which speak of a prior period in
which there were no kings. According to one account, this age was a time
characterized by insecurity for the weak and unlimited power for the strong; the
other regards it as an age of peace and tranquillity. The latter account contains a
theory of the fall of humankind from this ideal state, which led to a need for
institutionalized power, or kingship; the former account leads directly from the
insecurity of the prekingship era to the installation of king by the divine ruler for the
protection and the security of humankind. Kingship is thus recognized as having a
historical origin. The primary function of the king is that of protection, and
dandaniti, or the art of punishment, is subordinated to rajadharma, or dharma of the
king. Though it recognizes a quasi-divinity of the king, the Mahabharata makes the
dharma, the moral law, superior to the king.
The Bhagavadgita
The Bhagavadgita (Song of the Lord) forms a part of the Mahabharata and
deserves separate consideration by virtue of its great importance in the religious life
and thought of the Hindus. Not itself a shruti, it has, however, been accorded the
status of an authoritative text and is regarded as one of the sources of the Vedanta
philosophy. At a theoretical level, it brings together Samkhya metaphysics,
Upanishadic monism, and a devotional theism of the Krishna-Vasudeva cult. In its
practical teaching, it steers a middle course between the path of action of the
Vedic ritualism and the path of renunciation of the Upanishadic mysticism, and it
accommodates all the three major paths to moksha: the paths of action (karma),
devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jnana). This synthetic character of the work
accounts for its great hold on the Hindu mind. The Hindu tradition treats it as one
homogenous work, with the status of an Upanishad.

Neither performance of the duties prescribed in the scriptures nor renunciation of all
action is conducive to the attainment of moksha. If the goal is freedom, then the
best path to the goal is to perform ones duties with a spirit of nonattachment
without caring for the fruits of ones actions and without the thought of pleasure or
pain, profit or loss, or victory or failure, with a sense of equanimity and equality. The
Kantian ethic of duty for dutys sake seems to be the nearest Western parallel to
Krishnas teaching at this stage. But Krishna soon went beyond it by pointing out
that performance of action with complete nonattachment requires knowledge
(jnana) of the true nature of the self, its distinction from prakriti, or Matter (the
primeval stuff, not the world of matter perceived by the senses), with its three
component elements (sattvai.e., tension or harmony; rajasi.e., activity; and
tamasi.e., inertia), and of the highest self (purushottama), whose higher and
lower aspects are Matter and finite individuals, respectively. This knowledge of the
highest self or the supreme lord, however, would only require a devotional attitude
of complete self-surrender and performance of ones duties in the spirit of offering
to him. Thus, karma-yoga (discipline of action) is made to depend on jnana-yoga
(discipline of knowledge), and the latter is shown to lead to bhakti-yoga
(discipline of devotion). Instead of looking upon Krishnas teaching as laying down
alternative ways for different persons in accordance with their aptitudes, it would
seem more logical to suppose that he taught the essential unity and
interdependence of these ways. How one should begin is left to ones aptitude and
spiritual makeup.
Doctrines and ideas of the Buddhist Tipitaka
In the Tipitaka (Sanskrit Tripitaka; The Three Baskets), collected and compiled at
the council at Pataliputra (3rd century bce) 300 years after the Buddhas
mahaparinibbana (attainment of final nibbana upon death), both the canonical and
philosophical doctrines of early Buddhism were codified. Abhidhamma Pitaka, the
last of the pitakas, has seven parts: Dhammasangani, which gives an enumeration
of dhammas, or elements of existence; Vibhanga, which gives further analysis of the
dhammas; Dhatukatha, which is a detailed classification, following many different
principles, of the elements; Puggalapannatti, which gives descriptions of individual
persons according to stages of their development; Kathavatthu, which contains
discussions and refutation of other Buddhist schools; Yamaka, which deals with pairs
of questions; and Patthana, which gives an analysis of relations among the
elements.

The key notion in all this is that of the dhammas. Because Buddhist philosophers
denied any permanence, whether in outer nature or in inner life, they felt compelled
to undertake a detailed, systematic, and complete listing and classification of the
different elements that constitute both the external world and the mental, inner life.
Each of these elements, except for the three elements that are not composed of
parts (i.e., space, or akasha, and the two cessations, nibbana and a temporary
stoppage, in states of meditation, of the flow of passions, or
apratisamkhyanivodha), is momentary. The primary object of this exhaustive
analysis was an understanding not so much of outer nature as of the human person
(puggala). The human person, however, consists in material (rupa) and mental
(nama) factors, which leads to an account of the various elements of matter. The
primary interest, nevertheless, is in the human being, who is regarded as an
aggregate of various elements. The analysis of these components, together with the
underlying denial of an eternal self, was supposed to provide the theoretical basis
for the possibility of a good life conducive to the attainment of nibbana.

The individual person was analyzed into five aggregates (khandhas): material form
(rupa); feeling (vedana); conception (samjna); disposition (samskara); and
consciousness (vijnana). Of these, the last four constitute the mental; the first alone
is the material factor. The material is further analyzed into 28 states, the samskara
into 50 (falling into three groups: intellectual, affectional, and volitional), and the
vijnana into 89 kinds of states of consciousness. Another principle of classification
leads to a list of 18 elements (dhatus): five sense organs, five objects of those
senses, mind, the specific object of mind, and six kinds of consciousness (visual,
auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual, and purely mental). A third classification is
into 12 bases (ayatanas), which is a list of six cognitive faculties and their objects.
The Buddhist analysis of matter was in terms of sensations and sense data, to which
the sense organs were also added. The analysis of mind was also in terms of
corresponding modes of consciousness and their objects.
Early system building
The history of the sutra style
A unique feature of the development of Indian thought was the systematization of
each school of thought in the form of sutras, or extremely concise expressions,
intended to reduce the doctrines of a science or of a philosophy into a number of
memorizable aphorisms, formulas, or rules. The word sutra, originally meaning
thread, came to mean such concise expressions. A larger work containing a
collection of such sutras also came to be called a sutra. The aid of commentaries
becomes indispensable for the understanding of the sutras, and it is not surprising
that philosophical composition took the form of commentaries and
subcommentaries. The earliest sutras, the Kalpa-sutras, however, are not
philosophical but ritualistic. These Kalpa-sutras fell into three major parts: the
Shrauta-sutras, dealing with Vedic sacrifices; the Grihya-sutras, dealing with the
ideal life of a householder; and the Dharma-sutras, dealing with moral injunctions
and prohibitions.

In the works of Panini, a Hindu grammarian, the sutra style reached a perfection
never attained before and only imperfectly approximated by the later practitioners.
The sutra literature began before the rise of Buddhism, though the philosophical
sutras all seem to have been composed afterward. The Buddhist sutra (Pali sutta)
differs markedly in style and content from the Hindu sutra. Buddhist sutras are
rather didactic texts, discourses, or sermons, possibly deriving their name from the
sense in which they carry the thread of the tradition of the Buddhas teachings.
The Purva-mimamsa-sutras and Shabaras commentary
The Purva-mimamsa (First Reflection), or Karmamimamsa (Study of [Ritual]
Action), is the system that investigates the nature of Vedic injunctions. Though this
is the primary purpose of the system, this task also led to the development of
principles of scriptural interpretation and, therefore, to theories of meaning and
hermeneutics (critical interpretations). Jaimini, who composed sutras about the 4th
century bce, was critical of earlier Mimamsa authors, particularly of one Badari, to
whom is attributed the view that the Vedic injunctions are meant to be obeyed
without the expectation of benefits for oneself. According to Jaimini, Vedic
injunctions do not merely prescribe actions but also recommend these actions as
means to the attainment of desirable goals. For both Jaimini and Shabara (3rd
century), his chief commentator, performance of the Vedic sacrifices is conducive to
the attainment of heaven; both emphasize that nothing is a duty unless it is
instrumental to happiness in the long run.

Jaiminis central concern is dharma, which is defined as the desired object (artha),
whose desirability is testified only by the injunctive statements of the scriptures
(chodana-lakshano). In order to substantiate the implied thesis that what ought to
be donei.e., dharmacannot be decided by either perception or reasoning, Jaimini
proceeds to a discussion of the nature of ways of knowing. Because perceptual
knowledge arises from contact of the sense organs with reality that is present,
dharma that is not an existent reality but a future course of action cannot possibly
be known by sense-experience. Reasoning based on such sense-experience is for
the same reason useless. Only injunctive statements can state what ought to be
done. Commands made by finite individuals are not reliable, because the validity of
what they say depends upon the presumption that the persons concerned are free
from those defects that render ones words dependable. Therefore, only the
injunctions contained in the scriptureswhich, according to Mimamsa and the Hindu
tradition, are not composed by any finite individual (apaurusheya)are the sources
of all valid knowledge of dharma. The Mimamsa rejects the belief that the scriptures
are utterances of God. The words themselves are authoritative. In accordance with
this thesis, Jaimini developed the theory that the relation between words and their
meanings is natural (autpattikastu shabdasyarthena sambandhah, or the relation
of word to its meaning is eternal) and not conventional, that the primary meaning
of a word is a universal (which is also eternal), that in a sentence the principal
element is the verb, and that the principal force of the verb is that which specifically
belongs to the verb with an optative ending and which instigates a person to take a
certain course of action in order to effect the desired end.

Though this theory provided the Mimamsa with a psychological and semantic
technique for interpreting the sentences of the scriptures that are clearly in the
injunctive form, there are also other kinds of sentences: prayers, glorifications,
those referring to a thing by a name, and prohibitions. Attempts were therefore
made to show how each one of these types of sentences bears, directly or
indirectly, on the central, injunctive texts. Furthermore, a systematic classification
of the various forms of injunctions is undertaken: those that indicate the general
nature of an action, those that show the connection of a subsidiary rite to the main
course of action, those that suggest promptness in performance of the action, and
those that indicate the right to enjoy the results to be produced by the course of
action enjoined.

The commentary of Shabara elaborated on the epistemological themes of the

sutras; in particular, Shabara sought to establish the intrinsic validity of experiences
and traced the possibility of error to the presence of defects in the ways of knowing.
He also critically examined Buddhist subjective idealism and the theory of utter
emptiness of things and proved the existence of soul as a separate entity that
enjoys the results of ones actions in this or the next life.
The Vedanta-sutras
Relation to the Mimamsa-sutras
Along with Badari and Jaimini, Badarayana, a contemporary of Jaimini, was the other
major interpreter of Vedic thought. Just as the Mimamsa-sutra traditions of Badaris
tradition were revived by Prabhakara, a 7th8th-century scholar, and Jaiminis were
defended by Shabara and Kumarila, a 7th8th-century scholar, Badarayanas sutras
laid the basis for the development of Vedanta philosophy. The relation of the
Vedanta-sutras to the Mimamsa-sutras, however, is difficult to ascertain.
Badarayana approves of the Mimamsa view that the relation between words and
their significations is eternal. There are, however, clear statements of difference:
according to Jaimini, for example, the dispenser of the fruits of ones actions is
dharma, the law of righteousness itself, but for Badarayana it is the supreme lord,
Ishvara. Often, Jaiminis interpretation is contrasted with that of Badari; in such
cases, Badarayana sometimes supports Badaris view and sometimes regards both
as defensible.

The overall difference that emerges is that whereas Jaimini lays stress on the
ritualistic parts of the Vedas, Badarayana lays stress on the philosophical portions
i.e., the Upanishads. The former recommends the path of Vedic injunctions, hence
the ideal of karma; the latter recommends the path of knowledge. The central
concept of Jaiminis investigation is dharmai.e., what ought to be done; the central
theme of Badarayanas investigations is brahmani.e., the Absolute Reality. The
relationship between these two treatises remains a matter of controversy between
later commentatorsRamanuja, a great South Indian philosopher of the 11th12th
centuries, defending the thesis that they jointly constitute a single work with
Jaiminis coming first and Badarayanas coming after it in logical order, and
Shankara, an earlier great South Indian philosopher of the 8th9th centuries, in
favour of the view that the two are independent of each other and possibly also
inconsistent in their central theses.
Contents and organization of the four books
Badarayanas sutras have four books (adhyayas), each book having four chapters
(padas). The first book is concerned with the theme of samanvaya (reconciliation).
The many conflicting statements of the scriptures are all said to agree in converging
on one central theme: the concept of brahman, the one Absolute Being from whom
all beings arise, in whom they are maintained, and into whom they return. The
second book establishes avirodha (consistency) by showing the following: (1) that
dualism and Vaisheshika atomism are neither sustainable interpretations of the
scriptures nor defensible rationally; (2) that though consciousness cannot
conceivably arise out of a nonconscious nature, the material world could arise out of
spirit; (3) that the effect in its essence is not different from the cause; and (4) that
though brahman is all-perfect and has no want, creation is an entirely unmotivated
free act of delight (lila). The Yogachara Buddhist view that there are no external
objects but only minds and their conceptions is refuted, as also the Buddhist
doctrine of the momentariness of all that is. The Jain pluralism and the theism of the
Pashupatas and the Bhagavatas are also rejected. Because, according to Vedanta,
only brahman is external, the third and the fourth chapters of the second book
undertake to show that nothing else is eternal. The third book concerns the spiritual
discipline and the various stages by which the finite individual (jiva) may realize an
essential identity with brahman. The fourth and last book deals with the final result
of the modes of discipline outlined in the preceding book and distinguishes between
the results achieved by worshipping a personal Godhead and those achieved by
knowing the one brahman. Included is some discussion of the possible worlds
through which the spirits travel after death, but all this discussion is subordinate to
the one dominant goal of liberation and consequent escape from the chain of
rebirth.
Variations in views
Badarayanas sutras refer to interpreters of Vedanta before him who were
concerned with such central issues as the relation between the finite individual soul
(jiva) and the Absolute (brahman) and the possible bodily existence of a liberated
individual. To Ashmarthya, an early Vedanta interpreter, is ascribed the view that
the finite individual and the Absolute are both identical and different (as causes and
their effects are differenta view that seems to have been the ancestor of the later
theory of Bhedabheda). Audulomi, another pre-Badarayana Vedanta philosopher, is
said to have held the view that the finite individual becomes identical with brahman
after going through a process of purification. Another interpreter, Kashakritsna,
holds that the two are identicala view that anticipates the later unqualified
monism of Shankara. Badarayanas own views on this issue are difficult to
ascertain: the sutras are so concise that they are capable of various interpretations,
though there are reasons to believe that Ramanujas is closer to their intentions
than Shankaras.
The Samkhya-karikas
Relation to orthodoxy
Ishvarakrishnas Samkhya-karika (Verses on Samkhya, c. 2nd century ce) is the
oldest available Samkhya work. Ishvarakrishna describes himself as laying down the
essential teachings of Kapila as taught to Asuri and by Asuri to Panchashika. He
refers also to Shashtitantra (Doctrine of 60 Conceptions), the main doctrines of
which he claims to have expounded in the karikas. The Samkhya of Charaka, which
is substantially the same as is attributed to Panchashika in the Mahabharata, is
theistic and regards the unmanifested (avyakta) as being the same as the purusha
(the self). The Mahabharata refers to three kinds of Samkhya doctrines: those that
accept 24, 25, or 26 principles, the last of which are theistic. The later Samkhya-
sutra is more sympathetic toward theism, but the karikas are atheistic, and the
traditional expositions of the Samkhya are based on this work.
The nature of the self (purusha)
According to the karikas, there are many selves, each being of the nature of pure
consciousness. The self is neither the original matter (prakriti) nor an evolute of it.
Though matter is composed of the three gunas (qualities), the self is not; though
matter, being nonintelligent, cannot discriminate, the self is discriminating; though
matter is object (vishaya), the self is not; though matter is common, the self is an
individual (asamanya); unlike matter, the self is not creative (aprasavadharmin).
The existence of selves is proved on the ground that nature exhibits an ordered
arrangement the like of which is known to be meant for another (pararthatva). This
other must be a conscious spirit. That there are many such selves is proved on the
grounds that different persons are born and die at different times, that they do not
always act simultaneously, and that they show different qualities, aptitudes, and
propensities. All selves are, however, passive witnesses (sakshin), essentially alone
(kevala), neutral (madhyastha), and not agents (akarta).
The nature, origin, and structure of the world (prakriti)
Phenomenal nature, with its distinctions of things and persons (taken as
psychophysical organisms), is regarded as an evolution out of a primitive state of
matter. This conception is based on a theory of causality known as the
satkaryavada, according to which an effect is implicitly pre-existent in its cause
prior to its production. This latter doctrine is established on the ground that if the
effect were not already existent in its cause, then something would have to come
out of nothing. The original prakriti (primeval stuff) is the primary matrix out of
which all differentiations arose and within which they all were contained in an
undistinguished manner. Original Matter is uncaused, eternal, all-pervading, one,
independent, self-complete, and has no distinguishable parts; the things that
emerge out of this primitive matrix are, on the other hand, caused, noneternal,
limited, many, dependent, wholes composed of parts, and manifested. But Matter,
whether in its original unmanifested state or in its manifested forms, is composed of
three gunas, nondiscriminating (avivekin), object (vishaya), general, nonconscious,
and yet creative.

The order in which Matter evolves is laid down as follows: prakriti mahat or
buddhi (intelligence) ahamkara (ego-sense) manas (mind) five tanmatras
(the sense data: colour, sound, smell, touch, and taste) five sense organs five
organs of action (tongue, hands, feet, organs of evacuation and of reproduction)
five gross elements (ether, air, light, water, and earth). This emanation schema may
be understood either as an account of cosmic evolution or as a logical
transcendental analysis of the various factors involved in experience or as an
analysis of the concrete human personality.
The concept of the three qualities (gunas)
A striking feature of this account is the conception of guna: nature is said to consist
of three gunasoriginally in a state of equilibrium and subsequently in varying
states of mutual preponderance. The karikas do not say much about whether the
gunas are to be regarded as qualities or as component elements. Of the three,
harmony or tension (sattva) is light (laghu), pleasing, and capable of manifesting
others. Activity (rajas) is dynamic, exciting, and capable of hurting. Inertia (tamas)
is characterized by heaviness, conceals, is static, and causes sadness. The varying
psychological responses of human beings are thus hypostatized and made into
component properties or elements of naturean argument whose fallacy was
exposed, among others, by Shankara.
Epistemology
The Samkhya-karika delineates three ways of knowing (pramana): perception,
inference, and verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the application of the
sense organs to their respective objects (prativishayadhyavasaya). Inference, which
is not defined, is divided first into three kinds, and then into two. According to the
former classification, an inference is called purvavat if it is based on past experience
(such as when one, on seeing a dark cloud, infers that it will rain); it is called
sheshavat when from the presence of a certain property in one part of a thing the
presence of the same property is inferred in the rest (such as when, on finding a
drop of sea water to be saline, one infers the rest to be so); it is called samanyato-
drishta when it is used to infer what is not perceivable (such as when one infers the
movement of a star on seeing it occupy two different positions in the firmament at
different times). According to the other classification, an inference may be either
from the mark to that of which it is the mark or in the reverse direction. Verbal
testimony, in order to be valid, must be the word of one who has authoritative
knowledge.

There is, in addition to the three ways of knowing, consideration of the modes of
functioning of the sense organs. The outer senses apprehend only the present
objects, the inner senses (manas, antahkarana, and buddhi) have the ability to
apprehend all objectspast, present, and future. The sense organs, on
apprehending their objects, are said to offer them to buddhi, or intelligence, which
both makes judgments and enjoys the objects of the senses. Buddhi is also credited
with the ability to perceive the distinction between the self and the natural
components of the person.
Ethics
In its ethics, the karikas manifest an intellectualism that is characteristic of the
Samkhya system. Suffering is due to ignorance of the true nature of the self, and
freedom, the highest good, can be reached through knowledge of the distinction
between the self and nature. In this state of freedom, the self becomes indifferent to
nature; it ceases to be an agent and an enjoyer. It becomes what it in fact is, a pure
witness consciousness.
The Yoga-sutras
Relation to Samkhya
The Yoga-sutras of Patanjali (2nd century bce) are the earliest extant textbook on
Yoga. Scholars now generally agree that the author of the Yoga-sutras is not the
grammarian Patanjali. In any case, the Yoga-sutras stand in close relation to the
Samkhya system, so much so that tradition regards the two systems as one. Yoga
adds a 26th principle to the Samkhya list of 25i.e., the supreme lord, or Ishvara
and has thus earned the name of Seshvara-Samkhya, or theistic Samkhya.
Furthermore, there is a difference in their attitudes: Samkhya is intellectualistic and
emphasizes metaphysical knowledge as the means to liberation; Yoga is
voluntaristic and emphasizes the need of going through severe self-control as the
means of realizing intuitively the same principles.
God, self, and body
In the Yoga-sutras, God is defined as a distinct self (purusha), untouched by
sufferings, actions, and their effects; his existence is proved on the ground that the
degrees of knowledge found in finite beings, in an ascending order, has an upper
limiti.e., omniscience, which is what characterizes God. He is said to be the source
of all secular and scriptural traditions; he both revealed the Vedas and taught the
first fathers of humankind. Surrender of the effects of action to God is regarded as a
recommended observance.

As in Samkhya, the self is distinguished from the mind (chitta): the mind is viewed
as an object, an aggregate. This argument is used to prove the existence of a self
other than the mind. The mental state is not self-intimating; it is known in
introspection. It cannot know both itself and its object. It rather is known by the self,
whose essence is pure, undefiled consciousness. That the self is not changeable is
proved by the fact that were it changeable the mental states would be sometimes
known and sometimes unknownwhich, however, is not the case, because a
mental state is always known. To say that the self knows means that the self is
reflected in the mental state and makes the latter manifested. The aim of Yoga is to
arrest mental modifications (chitta-vritti) so that the self remains in its true,
undefiled essence and is, thus, not subject to suffering.

The attitude of the Yoga-sutras to the human body is ambivalent. The body is said to
be filthy and unclean. Thus, the ascetic cultivates a disgust for it. Yet, much of the
discipline laid down in the Yoga-sutras concerns perfection of the body, with the
intent to make it a fit instrument for spiritual perfection. Steadiness in bodily
posture and control of the breathing process are accorded a high place. The
perfection of body is said to consist in beauty, grace, strength and adamantine
hardness.
Theories and techniques of self-control and meditation
Patanjali lays down an eightfold path consisting of aids to Yoga: restraint (yama),
observance (niyama), posture (asana), regulation of breathing (pranayama),
abstraction of the senses (pratyahara), concentration (dharana), meditation
(dhyana), and trance (samadhi). The first two constitute the ethical core of the
discipline: the restraints are abstinence from injury, veracity, abstinence from
stealing, continence, and abstinence from greed. The observances are cleanliness,
contentment, purificatory actions, study, and surrender of the fruits of ones actions
to God. Ahimsa (nonviolence) also is glorified, as an ethics of detachment.

Various stages of samadhi are distinguished: the conscious and the superconscious,
which are subdivided into achievements with different shades of perfection. In the
final stage, all mental modifications cease to be and the self is left in its pure,
undefiled state of utter isolation. This is freedom (kaivalya), or absolute
independence.
The Vaisheshika-sutras
The Vaisheshika-sutras were written by Kanada, a philosopher who flourished c.
2nd4th centuries. The system owes its name to the fact that it admits ultimate
particularities (vishesha). The metaphysics is, therefore, pluralistic.
Organization and contents
The Vaisheshika-sutras are divided into 10 chapters, each with two sections.
Chapter 1 states the purpose of the work: to explain dharma, defined as that which
confers prosperity and ultimate good on human beings. This is followed by an
enumeration of the categories of being recognized in the system: substance, quality
(guna), action, universality, particularity, and inherence (samavaya). Later authors
add a seventh category: negation (abhava). This enumeration is followed by an
account of the common features as well as the dissimilarities among these
categories: the categories of universal and particularity and the concepts of
being and existence. Chapter 2 classifies substances into nine kinds: earth, water,
fire, air, ether, space, time, self, and mind. There next follows a discussion of the
question of whether sound is eternal or noneternal. Chapter 3 is an attempt to prove
the existence of self by an inference. Chapter 4 explains the words eternal and
noneternal, the noneternal being identified with avidya, and distinguishes between
three different forms of the substances earth, water, fire, and aireach of these is
either a body, a sense organ, or an object. Chapter 5 deals with the notion of action
and the connected concept of effort, and the next traces various special phenomena
of nature to the supersensible force, called adrishta. Chapter 6 argues that
performance of Vedic injunctions generates this supersensible force and that the
merits and demerits accumulated lead to moksha. Chapter 7 argues that qualities of
eternal things are eternal and those of noneternal things are noneternal. Chapter 8
argues that the self and mind are not perceptible. Chapter 9 argues that neither
action nor qualities may be ascribed to what is nonexistent and, further, that
negation may be directly perceived. Chapter 9 also deals with the nature of hetu, or
the middle term in syllogism, and argues that the knowledge derived from hearing
words is not inferential. Chapter 10 argues that pleasure and pain are not cognitions
because they do not leave room for either doubt or certainty.
Structure of the world
This account of the contents of the sutras shows that the Vaisheshika advocates an
atomistic cosmology (theory of order) and a pluralistic ontology (theory of being).
The material universe arises out of the conjunction of four kinds of atoms: the earth
atom, water atom, fire atom, and air atom. There also are the eternal substances:
ether, in which sound inheres as a quality; space, which accounts for the human
sense of direction and distinctions between far and near; and time, which accounts
for the notions of simultaneity and nonsimultaneity and which, like space, is eternal
and is the general cause of all that has origin.
Naturalism
The overall naturalism of the Vaisheshika, its great interest in physics, and its
atomism are all counterbalanced by the appeal to adrishta (a supersensible force),
to account for whatever the other recognized entities cannot explain. Among things
ascribed to this supersensible force are movements of needles toward a magnet,
circulation of water in plant bodies, upward motion of fire, movement of mind, and
movements of soul after death. These limit the naturalism of the system.
Epistemology
Knowledge belongs to the self; it appears or disappears with the contact of the self
with the senses and of the senses with the objects. Perception of the self results
from the conjunction of the self with the mind. Perception of objects results from
proximity of the self, the senses, and the objects. Error exists because of defects of
the senses. Inference is of three kinds: inference of the nonexistence of something
from the existence of some other things, inference of the existence of something
from nonexistence of some other, and inference of existence of something from the
existence of some other thing.
Ethics
Moksha is a state in which there is no body and no rebirth. It is achieved by
knowledge. Works in accordance with the Vedic injunction may help in its
attainment.
The Nyaya-sutras
The Nyaya-sutras probably were composed by Gautama or Akshapada about the
2nd century bce, though there is ample evidence that many sutras were
subsequently interpolated.

Content and organization

The sutras are divided into five chapters, each with two sections. The work begins
with a statement of the subject matter, the purpose, and the relation of the subject
matter to the attainment of that purpose. The ultimate purpose is salvationi.e.,
complete freedom from painand salvation is attained by knowledge of the 16
categories: hence the concern with these categories, which are means of valid
knowledge (pramana); objects of valid knowledge (prameya); doubt (samshaya);
purpose (prayojana); example (drishtanta); conclusion (siddhanta); the constituents
of a syllogism (avayava); argumentation (tarka); ascertainment (nirnaya); debate
(vada); disputations (jalpa); destructive criticism (vitanda); fallacy (hetvabhasa);
quibble (chala); refutations (jati); and points of the opponents defeat
(nigrahasthana).
Epistemology
The words knowledge, buddhi, and consciousness are used synonymously. Four
means of valid knowledge are admitted: perception, inference, comparison, and
verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the knowledge that arises from the
contact of the senses with the object, which is nonjudgmental, or unerring or
judgmental. Inference is defined as the knowledge that is preceded by perception
(of the mark) and classified into three kinds: that from the perception of a cause to
its effect; that from perception of the effect to its cause; and that in which
knowledge of one thing is derived from the perception of another with which it is
commonly seen together. Comparison is defined as the knowledge of a thing
through its similarity to another thing previously well-known.

The validity of the means of knowing is established as against Buddhist skepticism,

the main argument being that if no means of knowledge is valid then the
demonstration of their invalidity cannot itself claim validity. Perception is shown to
be irreducible to inference, inference is shown to yield certain knowledge, and errors
in inference are viewed as being faults in the person, not in the method itself.
Knowledge derived from verbal testimony is viewed as noninferential.
Theory of causation and metaphysics
Although the sutras do not explicitly develop a detailed theory of causation, the
later Nyaya theory is sufficiently delineated in Chapter 4. No event is uncaused. No
positive entity could arise out of mere absencea thesis that is pressed against
what seems to be a Buddhist view that in a series of momentary events every
member is caused by the destruction of the preceding member. Cause and effect
should be homogeneous in nature, and yet the effect is a new beginning and was
not already contained in the cause. The Buddhist thesis that all things are negative
in nature (inasmuch as a things nature is constituted by its differences from others)
is rejected, as is the view that all things are eternal or that all things are noneternal.
Both these latter views are untrue to experience. Thus, the resulting metaphysics
admits two kinds of entities: eternal and noneternal. The whole is a new entity over
and above the parts that constitute it. Also, the idea that God is the material cause
of the universe is rejected. God is viewed as the efficient cause, and human deeds
produce their results under the control and cooperation of God.
The syllogism and its predecessors
Of the four main topics of the Nyaya-sutras (art of debate, means of valid
knowledge, syllogism, and examination of opposed views), there is a long history.
There is no direct evidence for the theory that though inference (anumana) is of
Indian origin, the syllogism (avayava) is of Greek origin. Vatsayana, the
commentator on the sutras, referred to some logicians who held a theory of a 10-
membered syllogism (the Greeks had three). The Vaisheshika-sutras give five
propositions as constituting a syllogism but give them different names. Gautama
also supports a five-membered syllogism with the following structure:

This hill is fiery (pratijna: a statement of that which is to be proved).

Because it is smoky (hetu: statement of reason).
Whatever is smoky is fiery, as is a kitchen (udaharana: statement of a general rule
supported by an example).
So is this hill (upanaya: application of the rule of this case).
Therefore, this hill is fiery (nigamana: drawing the conclusion).
The characteristic feature of the Nyaya syllogism is its insistence on the example
which suggests that the Nyaya logician wanted to be assured not only of formal
validity but also of material truth. Five kinds of fallacious middle (hetu) are
distinguished: the inconclusive (savyabhichara), which leads to more conclusions
than one; the contradictory (viruddha), which opposes that which is to be
established; the controversial (prakaranasama), which provokes the very question
that it is meant to settle; the counterquestioned (sadhyasama), which itself is
unproved; and the mistimed (kalatita), which is adduced when the time in which it
might hold good does not apply.
Other characteristic philosophic matters
Other philosophical theses stated in the sutras are as follows: the relation of words
to their meanings is not natural but conventional; a word means neither the bare
individual nor the universal by itself but all threethe individual, the universal, and
structure (akriti); desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and cognition are the
marks of the self; body is defined as the locus of gestures, senses, and sentiments;
and the existence and atomicity of mind are inferred from the fact that there do not
arise in the self more acts of knowledge than one at a time.
The beginnings of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy
Contributions of the Mahasangikas
When the Mahasangikas (School of the Great Assembly) seceded from the Elders
(Theravadins) about 400 bce, the germs were laid for the rise of the Mahayana
branch of Buddhism. The Mahasangikas admitted non-arhat monks and worshippers
(i.e., those who had not attained perfection), defied the Buddha, taught the doctrine
of the emptiness of the elements of being, distinguished between the mundane and
the supramundane reality, and considered consciousness (vijnana) to be intrinsically
free from all impurities. These ideas found varied expression among the various
groups into which the Mahasangikas later divided.
Contributions of the Sarvastivadins
The Sarvastivadins (realists who believe that all things, mental and material, exist
and also that all dharmaspast, present, and futureexist) seceded from the Elders
about the middle of the 3rd century bce. They rejected, in common with all other
sects, pudgalatma, or a self of the individual, but admitted dharmatmani.e., self-
existence of the dharmas (categories), or the elements of being. Each dharma is a
self-being; the law of causality applies to the formation of aggregates, not to the
elements themselves. Dharmas, whether they are past or are in the future, exist all
the same. Of these, three are said to be unconditioned: space (akasha) and the two
cessations (nirodha)the cessation that arises from knowledge and the cessation
that arises prior to the attainment of knowledge, the former being nirvana, the
latter being an arrest of the flow of passions through meditation prior to the
achievement of nirvana. By shunyata the Sarvastivadins mean only the truth that
there is no eternal substance called I. Because all elementspast, present, or
futureexist, the Sarvastivadins are obliged to account for these temporal
predicates, and several different theories are advanced. Of these, the theory
advanced by Vasumitra, a 1st2nd-century-ce Sarvastivadin, viz., that temporal
predicates are determined by the function of a dharma, is accepted by the
Vaibhashikasi.e., those among the Sarvastivadins who follow the authority of the
texts known as the Vibhasha.
Contributions of the Sautrantikas
The Vaibhashika doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be inconsistent with the
fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The Sautrantikas (so called because they rest
their case on the sutras) insist on the noneternality of the dharma as well. The past
and the future dharmas do not exist, and only the present ones do. The so-called
unconditioned dharmas are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the
Sautrantikas seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes
near to regarding nirvana as entirely negative. In their epistemology, whereas the
Vaibhashikas are direct realists, the Sautrantikas hold a sort of representationism,
according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions
that alone are directly apprehended.
The worldview of the Arthashastra
Kautilyas Arthashastra (c. 321296 bce) is the science of artha, or material
prosperity, which is one of the four goals of human life. By artha, Kautilya meant
the means of subsistence of humanity, which is, primarily, wealth and,
secondarily, earth. The work is concerned with the means of fruitfully maintaining
and using the latteri.e., land. It is a work on politics and diplomacy.

Theories of kingship and statecraft

Though Kautilya recognized that sovereignty may belong to a clan (kula), he was
himself concerned with monarchies. He advocated the idea of the kings divine
nature, or divine sanction of the kings office, but he also attempted to reconcile it
with a theory of the elective origin of the king. He referred to a state of nature,
without king, as an anarchy in which the stronger devours the weaker. The four
functions of the king are to acquire what is not gained, to protect what is gained, to
increase what is protected, and to bestow the surplus upon the deserving. The
political organization is held to have seven elements: the king, the minister, the
territory, the fort, the treasury, the army, and the ally. These are viewed as being
organically related. The three powers of the king are power of good counsel, the
majesty of the king himself, and the power to inspire. The priest is not made an
element of the state organization. The king, however, is not exempt from the laws
of dharma. Being the promulgator of dharma, the king should himself be free from
the six passions of sex, anger, greed, vanity, haughtiness, and overjoy. What
Kautilya advocated was an enlightened monarchical paternalism.
Concepts of the public good
In the happiness of the subjects lies the kings happiness. The main task of the king
is to offer protection. Monarchy is viewed as the only guarantee against anarchy.
Thus, the kings duty is to avert providential visitations such as famine, flood, and
pestilence; he ought also to protect agriculture, industry, and mining, the orphaned,
the aged, the sick, and the poor, to control crime with the help of spies, and to
settle legal disputes.
Relations between states
Regarding relations with other states, Kautilyas thoughts were based not so much
on high moral idealism as on the needs of self-interest. He wrote of six types of
foreign policy: treaty (sandhi), war (vigraha), marching against the enemy (yana),
neutrality (asana), seeking protection from a powerful king (samshraya), and dual
policy (dvaidhibhava). The rules concerning these are: he who is losing strength in
comparison to the other shall make peace; he who is gaining strength shall make
war; he who thinks neither he nor the enemy can win shall be neutral; he who has
an excess of advantage shall march; he who is wanting in strength shall seek
protection; he who undertakes work requiring assistance shall adopt a dual policy.
The formation and implementation of policy
Kautilyas views about the formation and implementation of policy were as follows:
a treaty based on truth and oath is binding for temporal and spiritual consequences;
a treaty based on security is binding only as long as the party is strong. He who
inflicts severe punishments becomes oppressive; he who inflicts mild punishments
is overpowered; and he who inflicts just punishments is respected. Kautilya
advocated an elaborate system of espionage for domestic as well as foreign affairs.
Fragments from the Ajivikas and the Charvakas
The Ajivikas
About the time of the rise of Buddhism, there was a sect of religious mendicants,
the Ajivikas, who held unorthodox views. In the strict sense, this name is applied to
the followers of one Makkhali Gosala, but in a wide sense it is also applied to those
who taught many different shades of heretical teachings. Primary sources of
knowledge about these are the Digha Nikaya, the Anguttara Nikaya, the Samyutta
Nikaya, the Sutrakritanga-sutra, Shilankas commentary on the Sutrakritanga-sutra,
the Bhagavati-sutra, the Nandi-sutra, and Abhayadevas commentary on
Samavayanga-sutra.

Makkhalis views may be thus summarized: There is no cause of the depravity of

things; they become depraved without any reason or cause. There is also no cause
of the purity of beings; they become pure without any reason or cause. Nothing
depends either on ones own efforts or on the efforts of others. All things are
destitute of power, force, or energy. Their changing states are due to destiny,
environment, and their own nature.

Thus, Makkhali denies sin, or adharma, and denies human freedom in shaping the
destiny of the species. He is thus a determinist, although scholars have held the
view that he might leave room for chance, if not for freedom of will. He is supposed
to have held an atomistic cosmology and that all beings, in the course of time, are
destined to culminate in a state of final salvation. He believes not only in rebirth but
also in a special doctrine of reanimation according to which it is possible for one
persons soul to be reanimated in the dead bodies of others. Thus, the Ajivikas are
far from being materialists.
The Charvakas
Another pre-Buddhistic system of philosophy, the Charvaka, or the Lokayata, is one
of the earliest materialistic schools of philosophy.The name Charvaka is traced back
to one Charvaka, supposed to have been one of the great teachers of the school.
The other name, Lokayata, means the view held by the common people, the
system which has its base in the common, profane world, the art of sophistry,
and also the philosophy that denies that there is any world other than this one.
Brihaspati probably was the founder of this school. Much knowledge of the
Charvakas, however, is derived from the expositions of the later Hindu writings,
particularly from Madhavas Sarva-darshana-samgraha (Compendium of All
Philosophies, 14th century). Haribhadra in his Shaddarshanasamuccaya
(Compendium of the Six Philosophies, 5th century ce) attributes to the Charvakas
the view that this world extends only to the limits of possible sense experience.

The Charvakas apparently sought to establish their materialism on an

epistemological basis. In their epistemology, they viewed sense perception alone as
a means of valid knowledge. The validity of inferential knowledge was challenged
on the ground that all inference requires a universal major premise (All that
possesses smoke possesses fire) whereas there is no means of arriving at a
certainty about such a proposition. No amount of finite observations could possibly
yield the required universal premise. The supposed invariable connection may be
vitiated by some unknown condition, and there is no means of knowing that such
a vitiating factor does not exist. Since inference is not a means of valid knowledge,
all such supersensible objects as afterlife, destiny, or soul do not exist. To say
that such entities exist though there is no means of knowing them is regarded as
absurd, for no unverifiable assertion of existence is meaningful.

The authority of the scriptures also is denied. First, knowledge based on verbal
testimony is inferential and therefore vitiated by all the defects of inference. The
Charvakas regard the scriptures as characterized by the three faults: falsity, self-
contradiction, and tautology. On the basis of such a theory of knowledge, the
Charvakas defended a complete reductive materialism according to which the four
elements of earth, water, fire, and air are the only original components of being and
all other forms are products of their composition. Consciousness thus is viewed as a
product of the material structure of the body and characterizes the body itself
rather than a souland perishes with the body. In their ethics, the Charvakas
upheld a hedonistic theory according to which enjoyment of the maximum amount
of sensual pleasure here in this life and avoidance of pain that is likely to
accompany such enjoyment are the only two goals that human beings ought to
pursue.
Further developments of the system
Developments in Mahayana
Nagarjuna and Shunyavada
Though the beginnings of Mahayana are to be found in the Mahasangikas and many
of their early sects, Nagarjuna gave it a philosophical basis. Not only is the
individual person empty and lacking an eternal self, according to Nagarjuna, but the
dharmas also are empty. He extended the concept of shunyata to cover all concepts
and all entities. Emptiness thus means subjection to the law of causality or
dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) and lack of an immutable essence
and an invariant mark (nihsvabhavata). It also entails a repudiation of dualities
between the conditioned and the unconditioned, between subject and object,
relative and absolute, and between samsara and nirvana. Thus, Nagarjuna arrived
at an ontological monism, but he carried through an epistemological dualism (i.e., a
theory of knowledge based on two sets of criteria) between two orders of truth: the
conventional (samvritti) and the transcendental (paramartha). The one reality is
ineffable. Nagarjuna undertook a critical examination of all the major categories
with which philosophers had sought to understand reality and showed them all to
involve self-contradictions. The world is viewed as a network of relations, but
relations are unintelligible. If two terms, A and B, are related by the relation R, then
either A and B are different or they are identical. If they are identical, they cannot
be related; if they are altogether different then they cannot also be related, for they
would have no common ground. The notion of partial identity and partial
difference is also rejected as unintelligible. The notion of causality is rejected on
the basis of similar reasonings. The concepts of change, substance, self, knowledge,
and universals do not fare any better. Nagarjuna also directed criticism against the
concept of pramana, or the means of valid knowledge.

The Buddha preaching, relief from Gandhara, schist, c. 2nd century ce; in the Prince
of Wales Museum of Western India, Mumbai.
The Buddha preaching, relief from Gandhara, schist, c. 2nd century ce; in the Prince
of
P. Chandra
Nagarjunas philosophy is also called Madhyamika, or Middle Path, because it
claims to tread the middle path, which consists not in synthesizing opposed views
such as The real is permanent and The real is changing but in showing the
hollowness of both the claims. To say that reality is both permanent and changing is
to make another metaphysical assertion, another viewpoint, whose opposite is
Reality is neither permanent nor changing. In relation to the former, the latter is a
higher truth, but the latter is still a point of view, a drishti, expressed in a
metaphysical statement, though Nagarjuna condemned all metaphysical
statements as false.

Nagarjuna used reason to condemn reason. Those of his disciples who continued to
limit the use of logic to this negative and indirect method, known as prasanga, are
called the prasangikas; of these, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, and Chandrakirti are the
most important. Bhavaviveka, however, followed the method of direct reasoning
and thus founded what is called the svatantra (independent) school of Madhyamika
philosophy. With him Buddhist logic comes to its own, and during his time the
Yogacharas split away from the Shunyavadins.
Contributions of Vasubandhu and Asanga
Converted by his brother Asanga to the Yogachara, Vasubandhu wrote the Vijnapti-
matrata-siddhi (Establishment of the Thesis of CognitionsOnly), in which he
defended the thesis that the supposedly external objects are merely mental
conceptions. Yogachara idealism is a logical development of Sautrantika
representationism: the conception of a merely inferred external world is not
satisfying. If consciousness is self-intimating (svaprakasha) and if consciousness can
assume forms (sakaravijnana), it seems more logical to hold that the forms ascribed
to alleged external objects are really forms of consciousness. One only needs
another conception: a beginningless power that would account for this tendency of
consciousness to take up forms and to externalize them. This is the power of
kalpana, or imagination. Yogachara added two other modes of consciousness to the
traditional six: ego consciousness (manovijnana) and storehouse consciousness
(alaya-vijnana). The alaya-vijnana contains stored traces of past experiences, both
pure and defiled seeds. Early anticipations of the notions of the subconscious or the
unconscious, they are theoretical constructs to account for the order of individual
experience. It still remained, however, to account for a common worldwhich in
fact remains the main difficulty of Yogachara. The state of nirvana becomes a state
in which the alaya with its stored seeds would wither away (alayaparavritti).
Though the individual ideas are in the last resort mere imaginations, in its essential
nature consciousness is without distinctions of subject and object. This ineffable
consciousness is the suchness (tathata) underlying all things. Neither the alaya
nor the tathata, however, is to be construed as being substantial.

Vasubandhu and Asanga are also responsible for the growth of Buddhist logic.
Vasubandhu defined perception as the knowledge that is caused by the object, but
this was rejected by Dignaga, a 5th-century logician, as a definition belonging to his
earlier realistic phase. Vasubandhu defined inference as a knowledge of an object
through its mark, but Dharmottara, an 8th-century commentator, pointed out that
this is not a definition of the essence of inference but only of its origin.
Contributions of Dignaga and Dharmakirti
Dignagas Pramanasamuccaya (Compendium of the Means of True Knowledge) is
one of the greatest works on Buddhist logic. Dignaga gave a new definition of
perception: a knowledge that is free from all conceptual constructions, including
name and class concepts. In effect, he regarded only the pure sensation as
perception. In his theory of inference, he distinguished between inference for
oneself and inference for the other and laid down three criteria of a valid middle
term (hetu)that it should cover the minor premise (paksha), be present in the
similar instances (sapaksha), and be absent in dissimilar instances (vipaksha). In his
Hetuchakra (The Wheel of Reason), Dignaga set up a matrix of nine types of
middle terms, of which two yield valid conclusions, two contradictory, and the rest
uncertain conclusions. Dignagas tradition is further developed in the 7th century by
Dharmakirti, who modified his definition of perception to include the condition
unerring and distinguished, in his Nyayabindu, between four kinds of perception:
that by the five senses, that by the mind, self-consciousness, and perception of the
yogins. He also introduced a threefold distinction of valid middle terms: the middle
must be related to the major either by identity (This is a tree, because this is an
oak) or as cause and effect (This is fiery, because it is smoky), or the hetu is a
nonperception from which the absence of the major could be inferred. Dharmakirti
consolidated the central epistemological thesis of the Buddhists that perception and
inference have their own exclusive objects. The object of the former is the pure
particular (svalakshana), and the object of the latter (he regarded judgments as
containing elements of inference) is the universal (samanyalakshana). In their
metaphysical positions, Dignaga and Dharmakirti represent a moderate form of
idealism.
Purva-Mimamsa: the Bhatta and Prabhakara schools
Principal texts and relation to Shabara
Kumarila commented on Jaiminis sutras as well as on Shabaras bhashya. The
Varttika (critical gloss) that he wrote was commented upon by Sucharita Mishra in
his Kashika (The Shining), by Someshvara Bhatta in his Nyayasudha (The Nectar
of Logic), and by Parthasarathi Mishra in Nyayaratnakara (The Abode of Jewels of
Logic). Parthasarathis Shastradipika (Light on the Scripture) is a famous
independent Mimamsa treatise belonging to Kumarilas school.

Prabhakara, who most likely lived after Kumarila, was the author of the commentary
Brihati (The Large Commentary), on Shabaras bhashya. On many essential
matters, Prabhakara differs radically from the views of Kumarila. Prabhakaras
Brihati has been commented upon by Shalikanatha in his Rijuvimala (The Straight
and Free from Blemishes), whereas the same authors Prakaranapanchika
(Commentary of Five Topics) is a very useful exposition of the Prabhakara system.
Other works belonging to this school are Madhavas Jaiminiya-nyayamala-vistara
(Expansion of the String of Reasonings by Jaimini), Appaya Dikshitas
Vidhirasayana (The Elixir of Duty), Apadevas Mimamsa-nyaya-prakasha
(Illumination of the Reasonings of Mimamsa), and Laugakshi Bhaskaras Artha-
samgraha (Collection of Treasures).

Where Kumarila and Prabhakara differed, Kumarila remained closer to both Jaimini
and Shabara. Kumarila, like Jaimini and Shabara, restricted Mimamsa to an
investigation into dharma, whereas Prabhakara assigned to it the wider task of
enquiring into the meaning of the Vedic texts. Kumarila understood the Vedic
injunction to include a statement of the results to be attained; Prabhakara
following Badariexcluded all consideration of the result from the injunction itself
and suggested that the sense of duty alone should instigate a person to act.
Metaphysics and epistemology
Both the Bhatta (the name for Kumarilas school) and Prabhakara schools, in their
metaphysics, were realists; both undertook to refute Buddhist idealism and nihilism.
The Bhatta ontology recognized five types of entities: substance (dravya), quality
(guna), action (karma), universals (samanya), and negation (abhava). Of these,
substance was held to be of 10 kinds: the nine substances recognized by the
Vaisheshikas and the additional substance darkness. The Prabhakara ontology
recognized eight types of entities; from the Bhatta list, negation was rejected, and
four more were added: power (shakti), resemblance (sadrisa), inherence-relation
(samavaya), and number (samkhya). Under the type substance, the claim of
darkness was rejected on the ground that it is nothing but absence of perception
of colour; the resulting list of nine substances is the same as that of the
Vaisheshikas. Though both schools admitted the reality of the universals, their views
on this point differed considerably. The Prabhakaras admitted only such universals
as inhere in perceptible instances and insisted that true universals themselves must
be perceivable. Thus, they rejected abstract universals, such as existence, and
merely postulated universals, such as Brahmanhood (which cannot be
perceptually recognized in a person).

The epistemologies of the two schools differ as much as their ontologies. As ways of
valid knowing, the Bhattas recognized perception, inference, verbal testimony
(shabda), comparison (upamana), postulation (arthapatti), and nonperception
(anupalabdhi). The last is regarded as the way that human beings validly, and
directly, apprehend an absence; this was in conformity with Shabaras statement
that abhava (nonexistence) itself is a pramana (way of true knowledge). Postulation
is viewed as the sort of process by which one may come to know for certain the
truth of a certain proposition, and yet the Bhattas refused to include such cases
under inference on the grounds that in such cases one does not say to himself I am
inferring but rather says I am postulating. Comparison is the name given to the
perception of resemblance with a perceived thing of another thing that is not
present at that moment. It is supposed that because the latter thing is not itself
being perceived, the resemblance belonging to it could not have been perceived;
thus, it is not a case of perception when one says My cow at home is similar to this
animal.

The Prabhakaras rejected nonperception as a way of knowing and were left with a
list of five concerning definitions of perception. The Bhattas, following the sutra,
define perception in terms of sensory contact with the object, whereas the
Prabhakaras define it in terms of immediacy of the apprehension.
Ethics
As pointed out earlier, Kumarila supported the thesis that all moral injunctions are
meant to bring about a desired benefit and that knowledge of such benefit and of
the efficacy of the recommended course of action to bring it about is necessary for
instigating a person to act. Prabhakara defended the ethical theory of duty for its
own sake, the sense of duty alone being the proper incentive. The Bhattas recognize
apurva, the supersensible efficacy of actions to produce remote effects, as a
supersensible link connecting the moral action performed in this life and the
supersensible effect (such as going to heaven) to be realized afterward. Prabhakara
understood by apurva only the action that ought to be done.
Hermeneutics and semantics
In their principles of interpretation of the scriptures, and consequently in their
theories of meaning (of words and of sentences), the two schools differ radically.
Prabhakara defended the thesis that words primarily mean either some course of
action (karya) or things connected with action. Connected with this is the further
Prabhakara thesis that the sentence forms the unit of meaningful discourse, that a
word is never used by itself to express a single unrelated idea, and that a sentence
signifies a relational complex that is not a mere juxtaposition of word meanings.
Prabhakaras theory of language learning follows these contentions: the child learns
the meanings of sentences by observing the elders issuing orders like Bring the
cow and the juniors obeying them, and he learns the meaning of words
subsequently by a close observation of the insertion (avapa) and extraction
(uddhara) of words in sentences and the resulting variations in the meaning of
those sentences. From this semantic approach follows Prabhakaras principle of
Vedic interpretation: all Vedic texts are to be interpreted as bearing on courses of
action prescribed, and there are no merely descriptive statements in the scriptures.
Furthermore, only the Vedic injunctions yield the authoritative verbal testimony that
may be regarded as a unique way of knowing, whereas all other verbal knowledge is
really inferential in character. In matters concerning what ought to be done,
Prabhakara therefore regarded only the Vedas as authoritative.

Kumarilas theory is very different. In his view, words convey their own meanings,
not relatedness to something else. He therefore was more willing to accommodate
purely descriptive sentences as significant. Furthermore, he regarded sentence
meaning as composed of separate word meanings held together in a relational
structure; the word meaning formed, for him, the simplest unit of sense. Persons
thus learn the meaning of words by seeing others talking as well as from advice of
the elders.
Religious consequences
The Mimamsa views the universe as being eternal and does not admit the need of
tracing it back to a creator. It also does not admit the need of admitting a being who
is to distribute moral rewards and inflict punishmentsthis function being taken
over by the notion of apurva, or supersensible power generated by each action.
Theoretically not requiring a God, the system, however, posits a number of deities
as entailed by various ritualistic procedures, with no ontological status assigned to
the gods.
The linguistic philosophies: Bhartrihari and Mandana-Mishra
The linguistic philosophers considered here are the grammarians led by Bhartrihari
(7th century ce) and Mandana-Mishra (8th century ce); the latter, reputed to be a
disciple of Kumarila, held views widely different from the Mimamsakas. The
grammarians share with the Mimamsakas their interest in the problems of language
and meaning. But their own theories are so different that they cut at the roots of the
Mimamsa realism. The chief text of this school is Bhartriharis Vakyapadiya.
Mandanas chief works are Brahma-siddhi (Establishment of Brahman), Sphota-
siddhi (Establishment of Word Essence), and Vidhiviveka (Inquiry into the Nature
of Injunctions).

As his first principle, Bhartrihari rejects a doctrine on which the realism of Mimamsa
and Nyaya had been builtthe view that there is a kind of perception that is
nonconceptualized and that places persons in direct contract with things as they
are. For Bhartrihari this is not possible, for all knowledge is penetrated by words
and illuminated by words. Thus, all knowledge is linguistic, and the distinctions of
objects are traceable to distinctions among words. The metaphysical monism of
word (shabdadvaita) is not far from thisi.e., the view that the one word essence
appears as this world of names and forms because of the human capacity for
imaginative construction (kalpana). Metaphysically, Bhartrihari comes close both to
Shankaras Advaita and the Buddhist philosophers, such as Dharmakirti. This
metaphysical theory also uses the doctrine of sphota (that from which the meaning
bursts forth). Most Indian philosophical schools were concerned with the problem
of what precisely is the bearer of the meaning of a word or a sentence. If the letters
are evanescent and if, as one hears the sounds produced by the letters of a word,
each sound is replaced by another, one never comes to perceive the word as a
whole, and the question is how one grasps the meaning of the word. The same
problem could be stated with regard to a sentence. The Mimamsakas postulated an
eternity of sounds and distinguished between the eternal sounds and sound
complexes (words, sentences) from their manifestations. The grammarians, instead,
distinguished between the word and sound and made the word itself the bearer of
meaning. As bearer of meaning, the word is the sphota.

Sounds have spatial and temporal relations; they are produced differently by
different speakers. But the word as meaning bearer has to be regarded as having no
size or temporal dimension. It is indivisible and eternal. Distinguished from the
sphota are the abstract sound pattern (prakritadhvani) and the utterances
(vikritadhvani). Furthermore, Bhartrihari held that the sentence is not a collection of
words or an ordered series of them. A word is rather an abstraction from a
sentence; thus, the sentence-sphota is the primary unit of meaning. A word is also
grasped as a unity by an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha). This theory of
sphota, which is itself a linguistic theory required by the problems arising from the
theory of meaning, was employed by the grammarians to support their theory of
word monism.

Mandana-Mishra, in his Vidhiviveka, referred to three varieties of this monism:

shabdapratyasavada (the doctrine of superimposition on the word; also called
shabdadhyasavada), shabda-parinamavada (the doctrine of transformation of the
word), and shabdavivartavada (the doctrine of unreal appearance of the word).
According to the first two, the phenomenal world is still real, though either falsely
superimposed on words or a genuine transformation of the word essence. The last,
and perhaps most consistent, doctrine holds that the phenomenal distinctions are
unreal appearances of an immutable word essence.

Mandana attempted to integrate this linguistic philosophy into his own form of
advaitavada, though later followers of Shankara did not accept the doctrine of
sphota. Even Vachaspati, who accepted many of Mandanas theories, rejected the
theory of sphota and in general conformed to the Shankarites acceptance of the
Bhatta epistemology.
Nyaya-Vaisheshika
The old school
Although as early as the commentators Prashastapada (5th century ce) and
Uddyotakara (7th century ce) the authors of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika schools used
each others doctrines and the fusion of the two schools was well on its way, the
two schools continued to have different authors and lines of commentators. About
the 10th century ce, however, there arose a number of texts that sought to combine
the two philosophies more successfully. Well known among these syncretist texts
are the following: Bhasarvajnas Nyayasara (written c. 950; The Essence of
Nyaya), Varadarajas Tarkikaraksha (c. 1150; In Defense of the Logician),
Vallabhas Nyayalilavati (12th century; The Charm of Nyaya), Keshava Mishras
Tarkabhasha (c. 1275; The Language of Reasoning), Annam Bhattas
Tarkasamgraha (c. 1623; Compendium of Logic), and Vishvanathas
Bhashapariccheda (1634; Determination of the Meaning of the Verses).

Both the Nyaya-Vaisheshika schools are realistic with regard to things, properties,
relations, and universals. Both schools are pluralistic (also with regard to individual
selves) and theistic. Both schools admit external relations (the relation of inherence
being only partly internal), atomistic cosmology, new production, and the concept of
existence (satta) as the most comprehensive universal. Both schools regard
knowledge as a quality of the self, and they subscribe to a correspondence theory
regarding the nature of truth and a theory of pragmatism-cum-coherence regarding
the test of truth. The points that divide the schools are rather unimportant: they
concern, for example, their theories of number, and some doctrines in their physical
and chemical theories.

Gautamas sutras were commented upon about 400 ce by Vatsayana, who replied to
the Buddhist doctrines, especially to some varieties of Shunyavada skepticism.
Uddyotakaras Varttika (c. 635) was written after a period during which major
Buddhist works, but no major Hindu work, on logic were written. Uddyotakara
undertook to refute Nagarjuna and Dignaga. He criticized and refuted Dignagas
theory of perception, the Buddhist denial of soul, and the anyapoha (exclusion of
the other) theory of meaning. Positively, he introduced, for the first time, the
doctrine of six modes of contact (samnikarsa) of the senses with their objects, which
has remained a part of Nyaya-Vaisheshika epistemology. He divided inferences into
those whose major premise (sadhya) is universally present, those in which one has
to depend only upon the rule Wherever there is absence of the major, there is
absence of the middle (hetu), and those in which both the positive and the
negative rules are at ones disposal. He rejected the sphota theory and argued that
the meaning of a word is apprehended by hearing the last letter of the word
together with recollection of the preceding ones. Vachaspati Mishra in the 9th
century wrote his Tatparyatika (c. 840) on Uddyotakaras Varttika and further
strengthened the Nyaya viewpoint against the Buddhists. He divided perception into
two kinds: the indeterminate, nonlinguistic, and nonjudgmental and the determinate
and judgmental. In defining the invariable connection (vyapti) between the middle
and the major premises, he introduced the concept of a vitiating condition (upadhi)
and stressed that the required sort of connection, if an inference is to be valid,
should be unconditional. He also proposed a modified version of the theory of the
extrinsic validity of knowledge by holding that inferences as well as knowledges that
are the last verifiers (phalajnana) are self-validating.

Prashastapadas Vaisheshika commentary (c. 5th century) does not closely follow
the sutras but is rather an independent explanation. Prashastapada added seven
more qualities to Kanadas list: heaviness (gurutva), fluidity (dravatva), viscidity
(sneha), traces (samskara), virtue (dharma), vice (adharma), and sound. The last
quality was regarded by Kanada merely as a mark of ether, whereas Prashastapada
elevated it to a defining quality of the latter. He also made the Vaisheshika fully
theistic by introducing doctrines of creation and dissolution.

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika general metaphysical standpoint allows for both particulars

and universals, both change and permanence. There are ultimate differences as
well as a hierarchy of universals, the highest universal being existence. Substance is
defined as the substrate of qualities and in terms of what alone can be an inherent
cause. A quality may be defined as what is neither substance nor action and yet is
the substratum of universals (for universals are supposed to inhere only in
substances, qualities, and actions). Universal is defined as that which is eternal and
inheres in many. Ultimate particularities belong to eternal substances, such as
atoms and souls, and these account for all differences among particulars that
cannot be accounted for otherwise. Inherence (samavaya) is the relation that is
maintained between a universal and its instances, a substance and its qualities or
actions, a whole and its parts, and an eternal substance and its particularity. This
relation is such that one of the relations cannot exist without the other (e.g., a
whole cannot exist without the parts). Negation (abhava), the seventh category, is
initially classified into difference (A is not B) and absence (A is not in B), absence
being further divided into absence of a thing before its origin, its absence after its
destruction, and its absence in places other than where it is present. For these
schools, all that is is knowable and also nameable.

Knowledge is regarded as a distinguishing but not essential property of a self. It

arises when the appropriate conditions are present. Consciousness is defined as a
manifestation of object but is not itself self-manifesting; it is known by an act of
inner perception (anuvyavasaya). Knowledge either is memory or is not; knowledge
other than memory is either true or false; and knowledge that is not true is either
doubt or error. In its theory of error, these philosophers maintained an
uncompromising realism by holding that the object of error is still real but is only not
here and now. True knowledge (prama) apprehends its object as it is; false
knowledge apprehends the object as what it is not. True knowledge is either
perception, inference, or knowledge derived from verbal testimony or comparison.
Perception is defined as knowledge that arises from the contact of the senses with
their objects, and it is viewed as either indeterminate and nonlinguistic or as
determinate and judgmental. Both aspects of the definition of perception are viewed
as valida point that is made against both the Buddhists and the grammarians.
Furthermore, perception is either ordinary (laukika) or extraordinary (alaukika). The
former takes place through any of the six modes of sense-object contact recognized
in the system. The latter takes place when one perceives the proper object of one
sense through another sense (The cushion looks soft) or when, on recognizing
universal in a particular, one perceives all instances of the universal as its
instances. Also extraordinary are the perceptions of the yogins, who are supposed
to be free from the ordinary spatiotemporal limitations.

Four conditions must be satisfied in order that a combination of words may form a
meaningful sentence: a word should generate an intention or expectancy for the
words to follow (BringWhat?A jar); there should be mutual fitness
(SprinkleWith what?Water, not fire); there should be proximity in space
and time; and the proper intention of the speaker must be ascertained, otherwise
there would be equivocation.

Among theistic proofs offered in the system, the most important are the causal
argument (The world is produced by an agent, since it is an effect, as is a jar); the
argument from a world order to a lawgiver; and the moral argument from the law of
karma to a moral governor. Besides adducing these and other arguments, Udayana
in his Nyaya-kusumanjali stressed the point that the nonexistence of God could not
be proved by means of valid knowledge.
The new school
The founder of the school of Navya-Nyaya (New Nyaya), with an exclusive
emphasis on the pramanas, was Gangesha Upadhyaya (13th century), whose
Tattvachintamani (The Jewel of Thought on the Nature of Things) is the basic text
for all later developments. The logicians of this school were primarily interested in
defining their terms and concepts and for this purpose developed an elaborate
technical vocabulary and logical apparatus that came to be used by, other than
philosophers, writers on law, poetics, aesthetics, and ritualistic liturgy. The school
may broadly be divided into two subschools: the Mithila school, represented by
Vardhamana (Gangeshas son), Pakshadhara or Jayadeva (author of the Aloka
gloss), and Shankara Mishra (author of Upaskara); and the Navadvipa school, whose
chief representatives were Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (14501525), Raghunatha
Shiromani (c. 1475c. 1550), Mathuranatha Tarkavagisha (flourished c. 1570),
Jagadisha Tarkalankara (flourished c. 1625), and Gadadhara Bhattacharya
(flourished c. 1650).
By means of a new technique of analyzing knowledge, judgmental knowledge can
be analyzed into three kinds of epistemological entities in their interrelations:
qualifiers (prakara); qualificandum, or that which must be qualified (visheshya);
and relatedness (samsarga). There also are corresponding abstract entities:
qualifierness, qualificandumness, and relatedness. The knowledge expressed by the
judgment This is a blue pot may then be analyzed into the following form: The
knowledge that has a qualificandumness in what is denoted by this is conditioned
by a qualifierness in blue and also conditioned by another qualifierness in potness.

A central concept in the Navya-Nyaya logical apparatus is that of limiterness

(avacchedakata), which has many different uses. If a mountain possesses fire in one
region and not in another, it can be said, in the Navya-Nyaya language, The
mountain, as limited by the region r, possesses fire, but as limited by the region r
possesses the absence of fire. The same mode of speech may be extended to
limitations of time, property, and relation, particularly when one is in need of
constructing a description that is intended to suit exactly some specific situation
and none other.

Inference is defined by Vatsayana as the posterior knowledge of an object (e.g.,

fire) with the help of knowledge of its mark (e.g., smoke). For Navya-Nyaya,
inference is definable as the knowledge caused by the knowledge that the minor
term (paksha, the hill) possesses the middle term (hetu, smoke), which is
recognized as pervaded by the major (sadhya, fire). The relation of invariable
connection, or pervasion, between the middle (smoke) and the major (fire)
Wherever there is smoke, there is fireis called vyapti.

The logicians developed the notion of negation to a great degree of sophistication.

Apart from the efforts to specify a negation with references to its limiting
counterpositive (pratiyogi), limiting relation, and limiting locus, they were
constrained to discuss and debate such typical issues as the following: Is one to
recognize, as a significant negation, the absence of a thing x so that the limiter of
the counterpositive x is not x-ness but y-ness? In other words, can one say that a jar
is absent as a cloth even in a locus in which it is present as a jar? Also, is the
absence of an absence itself a new absence or something positive? Furthermore, is
the absence of colour in general nothing but the sum total of the absences of the
particular colours, or is it a new kind of absence, a generic absence? Gangesha
argued for the latter alternative, though he answers the first of the above three
questions in the negative.

Though the philosophers of this school did not directly write on metaphysics, they
nevertheless did tend to introduce many new kinds of abstract entities into their
discourse. These entities are generally epistemological, though sometimes they are
relational. Chief of these are entities called qualifierness, qualificandumness,
and limiterness. Various relations were introduced, such as direct and indirect
temporal relations, paryapti relation (in which a number of entities reside, in sets
rather than in individual members of those sets), svarupa relation (which holds, for
example, between an absence and its locus), and relation between a knowledge and
its object.
Among the Navya-Nyaya philosophers, Raghunatha Shiromani in
Padarthatattvanirupana undertook a bold revision of the traditional categorical
scheme by (1) identifying time, space, and ether with God, (2) eliminating the
category of mind by reducing it to matter, (3) denying atoms (paramanu) and
dyadic (paired) combinations of them (dvyanuka), (4) eliminating number,
separateness, remoteness, and proximity from the list of qualities, and (5)
rejecting ultimate particularities (vishesha) on the grounds that it is more rational to
suppose that the eternal substances are by nature distinct. He added some new
categories, however, such as causal power (shakti) and the moment (kshana), and
recognized that there are as many instances of the relation of inherence as there
are cases of it (as contrasted with the older view that there is only one inherence
that is itself present in all cases of inherence).
Samkhya and Yoga
Texts and commentaries until Vachaspati and the Samkhya-sutras
There are three commentaries on the Samkhya-karika: that by Raja, much referred
to but not extant; that by Gaudapada (7th century), on which there is a
subcommentary Chandrika by Narayanatirtha; and the Tattva-kaumudi by
Vachaspati (9th century). The Samkhya-sutras are a much later work (c. 14th
century) on which Aniruddha (15th century) wrote a vritti and Vijnanabhikshu (16th
century) wrote the Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya (Commentary on the Samkhya
Doctrine). Among independent works, mention may be made of Tattvasamasa (c.
11th century; Collection of Truths).

The Yoga-sutras were commented upon by Vyasa in his Vyasa-bhashya (5th

century), which has two excellent subcommentaries: Vachaspatis Tattvavaisharadi
and Vijnanabhikshus Yogavarttika, besides the vritti by Bhoja (c. 1000).
Metaphysics and epistemology
For Vachaspati, creation was viewed in terms of the mere presence of the selves
and the mere presentation to them of Matter (the undifferentiated primeval stuff).
Such a view has obvious difficulties, for it would make creation eternal, because the
selves and Matter are eternally copresent. Vijnanabhikshu considered the relation
between the selves and Matter to be a real relation that affects Matter but leaves
the selves unaffected. Creation, in accordance with Bhikshus theism, is due to the
influence of the chief selfi.e., God. Furthermore, whereas the earlier Samkhya
authors, including Vachaspati, did not consider the question about the ontological
status of the gunas, Bhikshu regards them as real, as extremely subtle substances
so that each guna is held to be infinite in number. In general, the Samkhya-sutras
show a greater Brahmanical influence, and there is a clear tendency to explain away
the points of difference between the Samkhya and the Vedanta. The author of the
sutras tried to show that the Samkhya doctrines are consistent with theism or even
with the Upanishadic conception of brahman. Vijnanabhikshu made use of such
contexts to emphasize that the atheism of Samkhya is taught only to discourage
human beings from trying to be God, that originally the Samkhya was theistic, and
that the original Vedanta also was theistic. The Upanishadic doctrine of the unity of
selves is interpreted by him to mean an absence of difference of kind among selves,
which is consistent with the Samkhya. Maya (illusion) for Bhikshu means nothing
but the prakriti (Matter) of the Samkhya. The sutras also give cosmic significance to
mahat, the first aspect to evolve from Matter, which then means cosmic
Intelligence, a sense not found in the karikas.
In epistemology the idea of reflection of the spirit in the organs of knowing,
particularly in the buddhi, or intelligence, comes to the forefront. Every cognition
(jnana) is a modification of the buddhi, with consciousness reflected in it. Though
this is Vachaspatis account, it does not suffice according to Bhikshu. If there is the
mere reflection of the self in the state of the buddhi, this can only account for the
fact that the state of cognition seems to be a conscious state; it cannot account for
the fact that the self considers itself to be the owner and experiencer of that state.
Accounting for this latter fact, Bhikshu postulated a real contact between the self
and buddhi as a reflection of the buddhi state back in the self.

Vachaspati, taking over a notion emphasized in Indian epistemology for the first
time by Kumarila, introduced into the Samkhya theory of knowledge a distinction
between two stages of perceptual knowledge. In the first, a stage of
nonconceptualized (nirvikalpaka) perception, the object of perception is
apprehended vaguely and in a most general manner. In the second stage, this
vague knowledge (alochanamatram) is then interpreted and conceptualized by the
mind. The interpretation is not so much synthesis as analysis of the vaguely
presented totality into its parts. Bhikshu, however, ascribed to the senses the ability
to apprehend determinate properties, even independently of the aid of manas. For
Samkhya, in general, error is partial truth; there is no negation of error, only
supplementation, though later Samkhya authors tended to ascribe error to wrong
interpretation.

An important contribution to epistemology was made by the writers on the Yoga:

this concerns the key notion of vikalpa, which stands for mental states referring to
pseudo-objects posited only by words. Such mental states are neither valid nor
invalid and are said to be unavoidable accompaniments of ones use of language.
Ethics
Because the self is not truly an agent acting in the world, neither merit nor demerit,
arising from ones actions, attaches to the self. Morality has empirical significance.
In the long run, what really matters is knowledge. Nonattached performance of
ones duties is an aid toward purifying intelligence so that it may be conducive to
the attainment of knowledgehence the importance of the restraints and
observances laid down in the Yoga-sutras. The greatest good is freedomi.e.,
aloofness (kaivalya) from matter.
Raja Yoga and Hatha Yoga
Patanjalis Yoga is known as Raja Yoga (that in which one attains to self-rule), and
Hatha Yoga emphasizes bodily postures, regulation of breathing, and cleansing
processes as means to spiritual perfection (hatha = violence, violent effort: ha
= sun, tha = moon, hatha = sun and moon, breaths, or breaths travelling
through the right and left nostrils). A basic text on Hatha Yoga is the Hatha-yoga-
pradipika (c. 15th century; Light on the Hatha Yoga). As to the relation between
the two yogas, a well-known maxim lays down that No raja without hatha, and no
hatha without raja.
Religious consequences
The one religious consequence of the emergence of Samkhya and Yoga is an
emphasis on austere asceticism and a turning away from the ritualistic elements of
Hinduism deriving from the Brahmanical sources. Though they continue to remain
as an integral part of the Hindu faith, no major religious order thrived on the basis of
these philosophies.
Vedanta
Fragments from the Mandukya-karika until Shankara
No commentary on the Vedanta-sutras survives from the period before Shankara,
though both Shankara and Ramanuja referred to the vrittis by Bodhayana and
Upavarsha (the two may indeed be the same person). There are, however, pre-
Shankara monistic interpreters of the scriptures, three of whom are important:
Bhartrihari, Mandana (both mentioned earlier), and Gaudapada. Shankara referred
to Gaudapada as the teacher of his own teacher Govinda, complimented him for
having recovered the advaita (nondualism) doctrine from the Vedas, and also wrote
a bhashya on Gaudapadas main work: the karikas on the Mandukya Upanishad.

Gaudapadas karikas are divided into four parts: the first part is an explanation of
the Upanishad itself, the second part establishes the unreality of the world, the third
part defends the oneness of reality, and the fourth part, called Alatashanti
(Extinction of the Burning Coal), deals with the state of release from suffering. It is
not accidental that Gaudapada used as the title of the fourth part of his work a
phrase in common usage among Buddhist authors. His philosophical views show a
considerable influence of Madhyamika Buddhism, particularly of the Yogachara
school, and one of his main purposes probably was to demonstrate that the
teachings of the Upanishads are compatible with the main doctrines of the Buddhist
idealists. Among his principal philosophical theses were the following: All things are
as unreal as those seen in a dream, for waking experience and dream are on a par
in this regard. In reality, there is no production and no destruction. His criticisms of
the categories of change and causality are reminiscent of Nagarjunas. Duality is
imposed on this one reality by maya, or the power of illusion-producing ignorance.
Because there is no real coming into being, Gaudapadas philosophy is often called
ajativada (discourse on the unborn). Though thus far agreeing with the Buddhist
Yogacharins, Gaudapada rejected their thesis that chitta, or mind, is real and that
there is a real flow of mental conception.

Shankara greatly moderated Gaudapadas extreme illusionistic theory. Though he

regarded the phenomenal world as a false appearance, he never made use of the
analogy of dream. Rather, he contrasted the objectivity of the world with the
subjectivity of dreams and hallucinations. The distinction between the empirical and
the illusoryboth being opposed to the transcendentalis central to his way of
thinking.
Varieties of Vedanta schools
Though Vedanta is frequently referred to as one darshana (viewpoint), there are, in
fact, radically different schools of Vedanta; what binds them together is common
adherence to a common set of texts. These texts are the Upanishads, the Vedanta-
sutras, and the Bhagavadgitaknown as the three prasthanas (the basic scriptures,
or texts) of the Vedanta. The founders of the various schools of Vedanta have all
substantiated their positions by commenting on these three sourcebooks. The
problems and issues around which their differences centre are the nature of
brahman; the status of the phenomenal world; the relation of finite individuals to
the brahman; and the nature and the means to moksha, or liberation. The main
schools are: Shankaras unqualified nondualism (shuddhadvaita); Ramanujas
qualified nondualism (vishishtadvaita); Madhvas dualism (dvaita); Bhaskaras
doctrine of identity and difference (bhedabheda); and the schools of Nimbarka and
Vallabha, which assert both identity and difference though with different emphasis
on either of the two aspects. From the religious point of view, Shankara extolled
metaphysical knowledge as the sole means to liberation and regarded even the
concept of God as false; Ramanuja recommended the path of bhakti combined with
knowledge and showed a more tolerant attitude toward the tradition of Vedic
ritualism; and Madhva, Nimbarka, and Vallabha all propounded a personalistic
theism in which love and devotion to a personal God are rated highest. Although
Shankaras influence on Indian philosophy could not be matched by these other
schools of Vedanta, in actual religious life the theistic Vedanta schools have
exercised a much greater influence than the abstract metaphysics of Shankara.
The concepts of nondualism
Shankaras philosophy is one among a number of other nondualistic philosophies:
Bhartriharis shabhadvaita, the Buddhists vijnanadvaita, and Gaudapadas
ajativada. Shankaras system may then be called atmadvaitathe thesis that the
one, universal, eternal, and self-illuminating self whose essence is pure
consciousness without a subject (ashraya) and without an object (vishaya) from a
transcendental point of view alone is real. The phenomenal world and finite
individuals, though empirically real, arefrom the higher point of viewmerely
false appearances. In substantiating this thesis, Shankara relied as much on the
interpretation of scriptural texts as on reasoning. He set down a methodological
principle that reason should be used only to justify truths revealed in the scriptures.
His own use of reasoning was primarily negative; he showed great logical skill in
refuting his opponents theories. Shankaras followers, however, supplied what is
missed in his worksi.e., a positive rational support for his thesis.

Shankaras metaphysics is based on a criterion of reality, which may be briefly

formulated as follows: the real is that whose negation is not possible. It is then
argued that the only thing that satisfies this criterion is consciousness, because
denial of consciousness presupposes the consciousness that denies. It is
conceivable that any object is not existent, but the absence of consciousness is not
conceivable. Negation may be either mutual negation (of difference) or absence.
The latter is either absence of a thing prior to its origination or after its destruction
or absence of a thing in a place other than where it is present. If the negation of
consciousness is not conceivable, then none of these various kinds of negations can
be predicated of consciousness. If difference cannot be predicated of it, then
consciousness is the only reality and anything different from it would be unreal. If
the other three kinds of absence are not predicable of it, then consciousness should
be beginningless, without end, and ubiquitous. Consequently, it would be without
change. Furthermore, consciousness is self-intimating; all objects depend upon
consciousness for their manifestation. Difference may be either among members of
the same class or of one individual from another of a different class or among parts
of one entity. None of these is true of consciousness. In other words, there are not
many consciousnesses; the plurality of many centres of consciousness should be
viewed as an appearance. There is no reality other than consciousnessi.e., no real
prakriti; such a thing would only be an unreal other. Also, consciousness does not
have internal parts; there are not many conscious states. The distinction between
consciousness of blue and consciousness of yellow is not a distinction within
consciousness but one superimposed on it by a distinction among its objects, blue
and yellow. With this, the Samkhya, Vijnanavadin Buddhist, and Nyaya-Vaisheshika
pluralism are refuted. Reality is one, infinite, eternal, and self-shining spirit; it is
without any determination, for all determination is negation.
Shankaras theory of error and religious and ethical concerns
The basic problem of Shankaras philosophy is how such pure consciousness
appears, in ordinary experience, to be individualized (my consciousness) and to
be of an object (consciousness of blue). As he stated it, subject and object are as
opposed to each other as light and darkness, yet the properties of one are
superimposed on the other. If something is a fact of experience and yet ought not to
be soi.e., is rationally unintelligiblethen this must be false. According to
Shankaras theory of error, the false appearance is a positive, presented entity that
is characterized neither as existent (because it is sublated when the illusion is
corrected) nor as nonexistent (because it is presented, given as much as the real
is). The false, therefore, is indescribable either as being or as nonbeing; it is not a
fiction, such as a round square. Shankara thus introduced a new category of the
false apart from the usual categories of the existent and the nonexistent. The
world and finite individuals are false in this sense: they are rationally unintelligible,
their reality is not logically deducible from brahman, and their experience is
cancelled with the knowledge of brahman. The world and finite selves are not
creations of brahman; they are not real emanations or transformations of it.
Brahman is not capable of such transformation or emanation. They are appearances
that are superimposed on brahman because of human ignorance. This
superimposition was sometimes called adhyasa by Shankara and was often
identified with avidya. Later writers referred to avidya as the cause of the error.
Thus, ignorance came to be regarded as a beginningless, positive something that
conceals the nature of reality and projects the false appearances on it. Shankara,
however, did distinguish between three senses of being: the merely illusory
(pratibhasika), the empirical (vyavaharika; which has unperceived existence and
pragmatic efficacy), and transcendental being of one, indeterminate brahman.

In his epistemology, Shankaras followers in general accepted the point of view of

the Mimamsa of Kumarilas school. Like Kumarila, they accepted six ways of
knowing: perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, nonperception, and
postulation. In general, cognitions are regarded as modifications of the inner sense
in which the pure spirit is reflected or as the pure spirit limited by respective mental
modifications. The truth of cognitions is regarded as intrinsic to them, and a
knowable fact is accepted as true so long as it is not rejected as false. In perception
a sort of identity is achieved between the form of the object and the form of the
inner sense; in fact, the inner sense is said to assume the form of the object. In their
theory of inference, the Nyaya five-membered syllogism is rejected in favour of a
three-membered one. Furthermore, the sort of inference admitted by the Nyaya, in
which the major term is universally present, is rejected because nothing save
brahman has this property according to the system.

Shankara regarded moral life as a necessary preliminary to metaphysical knowledge

and thus laid down strict ethical conditions to be fulfilled by one who wants to study
Vedanta. For him, however, the highest goal of life is to know the essential identity
of his own self with brahman, and, though moral life may indirectly help in purifying
the mind and intellect, over an extended period of time knowledge comes from
following the long and arduous process whose three major stages are study of the
scriptures under appropriate conditions, reflection aimed at removing all possible
intellectual doubts about the nondualistic thesis, and meditation on the identity of
atman and brahman. Moksha is not, according to Shankara, a perfection to be
achieved; it is rather the essential reality of ones own self to be realized through
destruction of the ignorance that conceals it. God is how brahman appears to an
ignorant mind that regards the world as real and looks for its creator and ruler.
Religious life is sustained by dualistic concepts: the dualism between mortal and
God, between virtue and vice, and between this life and the next. In the state of
moksha, these dualisms are transcended. An important part of Shankaras faith was
that moksha was possible in bodily existence. Because what brings this supreme
state is the destruction of ignorance, nothing need happen to the body; it is merely
seen for what it really isan illusory limitation on the spirit.

Shankaras chief direct pupils were Sureshvara, the author of Varttika (Gloss) on
his bhashya and of Naishkarmya-siddhi (Establishment of the State of Nonaction),
and Padmapada, author of Panchapadika, a commentary on the first five padas, or
sections, of the bhashya. These early pupils raised and settled issues that were not
systematically discussed by Shankara himselfissues that later divided his
followers into two large groups: those who followed the Vivarana (a work written on
Padmapadas Panchapadika by one Prakashatman in the 12th century) and those
who followed Vachaspatis commentary (known as Bhamati) on Shankaras bhashya.
Among the chief issues that divided Shankaras followers was the question about
the locus and object of ignorance. The Bhamati school regarded the individual self
as the locus of ignorance and sought to avoid the consequent circularity (arising
from the fact that the individual self is itself a product of ignorance) by postulating a
beginningless series of such selves and their ignorances. The Vivarana school
regarded both the locus and the object of ignorance to be brahman and sought to
avoid the contradiction (arising from the fact that brahman is said to be of the
nature of knowledge) by distinguishing between pure consciousness and valid
knowledge (pramajnana). The latter, a mental modification, destroys ignorance, and
the former, far from being opposed to ignorance, manifests ignorance itself, as
evidenced by the judgment I am ignorant. The two schools also differed in their
explanations of the finite individual. The Bhamati school regarded the individual as
a limitation of brahman just as the space within the four walls of a room is a
limitation of the big space. The Vivarana school preferred to regard the finite
individual as a reflection of brahman in the inner sense. As the moon is one but its
reflections are many, so also brahman is one but its reflections are many. Later
followers of Shankara, such as Shriharsha in his Khandanakhandakhadya and his
commentator Chitsukha, used a destructive, negative dialectic in the manner of
Nagarjuna to criticize humanitys basic concepts about the world.
Concepts of bhedabheda
The philosophies of transcendence and immanence (bhedabheda) assert both
identity and difference between the world and finite individuals on the one hand and
brahman on the other. The world and finite individuals are real and yet both
different and not different from the brahman.

Among pre-Shankara commentators on the Vedanta-sutras, Bhartriprapancha

defended the thesis of bhedabheda, and Bhaskara (c. 9th century) closely followed
him. Bhartriprapanchas commentary is not extant; the only known source of
knowledge is Shankaras reference to him in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka
Upanishad, in which Bhartriprapancha is said to have held that though brahman as
cause is different from brahman as effect, the two are identical inasmuch as the
effect dissolves into the cause, as the waves return into the sea. Bhaskara viewed
brahman as both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The doctrine of
maya was totally rejected. Brahman undergoes the modifications by its own power.
As waves are both different from and identical with the sea, so are the world and
the finite individuals in relation to brahman. The finite selves are parts of brahman,
as sparks of fire are parts of fire. But the finite soul exists, since beginningless time,
under the influence of ignorance. It is atomic in extension and yet animates the
whole body. Corresponding to the material world and the finite selves, Bhaskara
ascribed to God two powers of self-modification. Bhaskara, in his theory of
knowledge, distinguished between self-consciousness that is ever-present and
objective knowledge that passively arises out of appropriate causal conditions but is
not an activity. Mind, thus, is a sense organ. Bhaskara subscribed to the general
Vedanta thesis that knowledge is intrinsically true, though falsity is extrinsic to it. In
his ethical views, Bhaskara regarded religious duties as binding at all stages of life.
He upheld a theory known as jnana-karmasamuccaya-vada: performance of duties
together with knowledge of brahman leads to liberation. In religious life Bhaskara
was an advocate of bhakti, but bhakti is not a mere feeling of love or affection for
God but rather is dhyana, or meditation, directed toward the transcendent brahman
which is not exhausted in its manifestations. Bhaskara denied the possibility of
liberation in bodily existence.

The bhedabheda point of view had various other adherents: Vijnanabhikshu,

Nimbarka, Vallabha, and Chaitanya.
Ramanuja
Ramanuja (11th century) sought to synthesize a long tradition of theistic religion
with the absolutistic monism of the Upanishads, a task in which he had been
preceded by no less an authority than the Bhagavadgita. In his general
philosophical position, he followed the vrittikara Bodhayana, Vakyakara (to whom he
referred but whose identity is not established except that he advocated a theory of
real modification of brahman), Nathamuni (c. 1000), and his own teachers teacher
Yamunacharya (c. 1050).

The main religious inspirations are from the theistic tradition of the Azhvar poet-
saints and their commentators known as the Acharyas, who sought to combine
knowledge with action (karma) as the right means to liberation. There is also,
besides the Vedic tradition, the religious tradition of Agamas, particularly of the
Pancharatra literature. It is within this old tradition that Ramanujas philosophical
and religious thought developed.

Ramanuja rejected Shankaras conception of brahman as an indeterminate,

qualityless, and differenceless reality on the ground that such a reality cannot be
perceived, known, thought of, or even spoken about, in which case it is nothing
short of a fiction. In substantiating this contention, Ramanuja undertook, in his Shri-
bhashya on the Vedanta-sutras, a detailed examination of the different ways of
knowing. Perception, either nonconceptualized or conceptualized, always
apprehends its object as being something, the only difference between the two
modes of perception being that the former takes place when one perceives an
individual of a certain class for the first time and thus does not subsume it under
the same class as some other individuals. Nor can inference provide one with
knowledge of an indeterminate reality, because in inference one always knows
something as coming under a general rule. The same holds true of verbal testimony.
This kind of knowledge arises from understanding sentences. For Ramanuja there is
nothing like a pure consciousness without subject and without object. All
consciousness is of something and belongs to someone. He also held that it is not
true that consciousness cannot be the object of another consciousness. In fact,
ones own past consciousness becomes the object of present consciousness.
Consciousness is self-shining only when it reveals an object to its own owneri.e.,
the self.

Rejecting Shankaras conception of reality, Ramanuja defended the thesis that

brahman is a being with infinitely perfect excellent virtues, a being whose
perfection cannot be exceeded. The world and finite individuals are real, and
together they constitute the body of brahman. The category of body and soul is
central to his way of thinking. Body is that which can be controlled and moved for
the purpose of the spirit. The material world and the conscious spirits, though
substantive realities, are yet inseparable from brahman and thus qualify him in the
same sense in which body qualifies the soul. Brahman is spiritual-material-qualified.
Ramanuja and his followers undertook criticisms of Shankaras illusionism,
particularly of his doctrine of avidya (ignorance) and the falsity of the world. For
Ramanuja, such a beginningless, positive avidya could not have any locus or any
object, and if it does conceal the self-shining brahman, then there would be no way
of escaping from its clutches.

A most striking feature of Ramanujas epistemology is his uncompromising realism.

Whatever is known is real, and only the real can be known. This led him to advocate
the thesis that even the object of error is realerror is really incomplete knowledge
and correction of error is really completion of incomplete knowledge.

The state of moksha is not a state in which the individuality is negated. In fact, the
sense of I persists even after liberation, for the self is truly the object of the notion
of I. What is destroyed is egoism, the false sense of independence. The means
thereto is bhakti, leading to Gods grace. But by bhakti Ramanuja means dhyana, or
intense meditation with love. Obligation to perform ones scriptural duties is never
transcended. Liberation is a state of blessedness in the company of God. A path
emphasized by Ramanuja for all persons is complete self-surrender (prapatti) to
Gods will and making oneself worthy of his grace. In his social outlook, Ramanuja
believed that bhakti does not recognize barriers of caste and classes.

The doctrinal differences among the followers of Ramanuja is not so great as among
those of Shankara. Writers such as Sudarshana Suri and Venkatanatha continued to
elaborate and defend the theses of the master, and much of their writing is
polemical. Some differences are to be found regarding the nature of emancipation,
the nature of devotion, and other ritual matters. The followers are divided into two
schools: the Uttara-kalarya, led by Venkatanatha, and the Dakshina-kalarya, led by
Lokacharya. One of the points at issue is whether or not emancipation is
destructible; another is whether there is a difference between liberation attained by
mere self-knowledge and that attained by knowledge of God. There also were
differences in interpreting the exact nature of self-surrender to God and the degree
of passivity or activity required of the worshipper.
Madhva
Madhva (born 1199?) belonged to the tradition of Vaishnava religious faith and
showed a great polemical spirit in refuting Shankaras philosophy and in converting
people to his own fold. An uncompromising dualist, he traced back dualistic thought
even to some of the Upanishads. His main works are his commentaries on the
Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita, and the Vedanta-sutras. He also wrote a
commentary on the Mahabharata and several logical and polemical treatises.

He glorified difference. Five types of differences are central to Madhvas system:

difference between soul and God, between soul and soul, between soul and matter,
between God and matter, and between matter and matter. Brahman is the fullness
of qualities, and by its own intrinsic nature brahman produces the world. The
individual, otherwise free, is dependent only upon God. The Advaita concepts of
falsity and indescribability of the world were severely criticized and rejected. In his
epistemology, Madhva admitted three ways of knowing: perception, inference, and
verbal testimony. In Madhvas system the existence of God cannot be proved; it can
be learned only from the scriptures.

Bondage and release both are real, and devotion is the only way to release, but
ultimately it is Gods grace that saves. Scriptural duties, when performed without
any ulterior motive, purify the mind and help one to receive Gods grace.

Among the other theistic schools of Vedanta, brief mention may be made of the
schools of Nimbarka (c. 12th century), Vallabha (15th century), and Chaitanya (16th
century).
Nimbarka
Nimbarkas philosophy is known as Bhedabheda because he emphasized both
identity and difference of the world and finite souls with brahman. His religious sect
is known as the Sanaka-sampradaya of Vaishnavism. Nimbarkas commentary of the
Vedanta-sutras is known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha and is commented on by
Shrinivasa in his Vedanta-kaustubha. Of the three realities admittedGod, souls,
and matterGod is the independent reality, self-conscious, controller of the other
two, free from all defects, abode of all good qualities, and both the material and
efficient cause of the world. The souls are dependent, self-conscious, capable of
enjoyment, controlled, atomic in size, many in number, and eternal but seemingly
subject to birth and death because of ignorance and karma. Matter is of three kinds:
nonnatural matter, which constitutes divine body; natural matter constituted by the
three gunas; and time. Both souls and matter are pervaded by God. Their relation is
one of difference-with-nondifference. Liberation is because of a knowledge that
makes Gods grace possible. There is no need for Vedic duties after knowledge is
attained, nor is performance of such duties necessary for acquiring knowledge.
Vallabha
Vallabhas commentary on the Vedanta-sutras is known as Anubhashya (The Brief
Commentary), which is commented upon by Purushottama in his Bhashya-
prakasha (Lights on the Commentary). His philosophy is called pure nondualism
pure meaning undefiled by maya. His religious sect is known as the Rudra-
sampradaya of Vaishnavism and also Pushtimarga, or the path of grace. Brahman,
or Shri Krishna (the incarnation of Vishnu), is viewed as the only independent
reality; in his essence he is existence, consciousness, and bliss, and souls and
matter are his real manifestations. Maya is but his power of self-manifestation.
Vallabha admitted neither parinama (of Samkhya) nor vivarta (of Shankara).
According to him, the modifications are such that they leave brahman unaffected.
From his aspect of existence spring life, senses, and body. From consciousness
spring the finite, atomic souls. From bliss spring the presiding deities, or
antaryamins, for whom Vallabha finds place on his ontology. This threefold nature of
God pervades all beings. World is real, but samsara, the cycle of birth and death, is
unreal, and time is regarded as Gods power of action. Like all other Vedantins,
Vallabha rejected the Vaisheshika relation of samavaya and replaced it by tadatmya,
or identity. The means to liberation is bhakti, which is defined as firm affection for
God and also loving service (seva). Bhakti does not lead to knowledge, but
knowledge is regarded as a part of bhakti. The notion of grace plays an important
role in Vallabhas religious thought. He is also opposed to renunciation.
Chaitanya
Chaitanya (14851533) was one of the most influential and remarkable of the
medieval saints of India. His life is characterized by almost unique emotional
fervour, hovering on the pathological, which was directed toward Shri Krishna. He
has not written anything, but the discourses recorded by contemporaries give an
idea of his philosophical thought that was later developed by his followers,
particularly by Rupa Gosvamin and Jiva Gosvamin. Rupa is the author of two great
works: Bhakti-rasamrita-sindhu (The Ocean of the Nectar of the Essence of Bhakti)
and Ujjvalanilamani (The Shining Blue Jewel). Jivas main work is the great and
voluminous Shatsamdarbha. These are the main sources of the philosophy of
Bengal Vaishnavism. Chaitanya rejected the conception of an intermediate
brahman. Brahman, according to him, has three powers: the transcendent power
that is threefold (the power of bliss, the power of being, and the power of
consciousness) and the two immanent powersnamely, the powers of creating
souls and the material world. Jiva Gosvamin regarded bliss to be the very substance
of brahman, who, with the totality of all his powers, is called God. Jiva distinguished
between Gods essential power, his peripheral power that creates the souls, and the
external power (called maya) that creates cosmic forms. The relation between God
and his powers is neither identity nor difference nor identity-with-difference. This
relation, unthinkable and suprarational, is central to Chaitanyas philosophy. For Jiva,
the relation between any whole and its parts is unthinkable. Bhakti is the means to
emancipation. Bhakti is conceived as a reciprocal relation between mortal and God,
a manifestation of Gods power in humanity. The works of Jiva and Rupa delineated
a detailed and fairly exhaustive classification of the types and gradations of bhakti.
Vaishnava schools
The main philosophers of the medieval Vaishnavism have been noted above.
Vaishnavism, however, has a long history, traceable to the Vishnu worship of the
Rigveda, the Bhakti conception of the epics, and the Vasudeva cult from before the
Common Era. Of the two main Vaishnava scriptures, or agamas, the Pancharatra
(Relating to the Period of Five Nights) and the Vaikhanasa (Relating to a Hermit or
Ascetic) are the most important. Though Vaishnava philosophers trace the
Pancharatra works to Vedic origin, absolutists such as Shankara refused to
acknowledge this claim. The main topics of the Pancharatra literature concern
rituals and forms of image worship and religious practices of the Vaishnavas. Of
philosophical importance are the Ahirbudhnya-samhita (Collection of Verses for
Shiva) and Jayakhya-samhita (Collection of Verses Called Jaya). The best-known
Pancharatra doctrine concerns the four spiritual forms of God: the absolute,
transcendent state, known as Vasudeva; the form in which knowledge and strength
predominate (known as Samkarshana); the form in which wealth and courage
predominate (known as Pradyumna); and the form in which power and energy
predominate (known as Aniruddha). Shankara identified Samkarshana with the
individual soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with the ego sense.
Furthermore, five powers of God are distinguished: creation, maintenance,
destruction, favour, and disfavour. Bhakti is regarded as affection for God and
associated with a sense of his majesty. The doctrine of prapatti, or complete self-
surrender, is emphasized.
Shaivite schools
The Shaivite schools are the philosophical systems within the fold of Shaivism, a
religious sect that worships Shiva as the highest deity. There is a long tradition of
Shiva worship going back to the Rudra hymns of the Rigveda, the Shiva-Rudra of the
Vajasaneyi Samhita, the Atharvaveda, and the Brahmanas. Madhava in his Sarva-
darshana-samgraha referred to three Shaivite systems: the Nakulisha-Pashupata,
the Shaiva, and the Pratyabhijna systems. The Shaiva system of Madhavas
classification probably corresponds to Shaiva-siddhanta of Tamil regions, and the
Pratyabhijna is known as Kashmiri Shaivism. The Shaiva-siddhanta is realistic and
dualistic; the Kashmiri system is idealistic and monistic.

Shaiva-siddhanta
The source literature of the Shaiva-siddhanta school consists of the Agamas, Tamil
devotional hymns written by Shaiva saints but collected by Nambi (c. 1000 ce) in a
volume known as Tirumurai, Chiva-nana-potam (Understanding of the Knowledge
of Shiva) by Meykantatevar (13th century), Shivacharyas Shiva-jnana-siddhiyar
(Attainment of the Knowledge of Shiva), Umapatis Shivaprakasham (Lights on
Shiva) in the 14th century, Shrikanthas commentary on the Vedanta-sutras (14th
century), and Appaya Dikshitas commentary thereon.

This school admits three categories (padarthas)God (Shiva or Pati, Lord), soul
(pashu), and the bonds (pasha)and 36 principles (tattvas). These 36 are divided
into three groups: at the top, in order of manifestation from Shiva, are the five pure
principles, which are shivatattva (the essence of Shiva), shakti (power), sada-shiva
(the eternal good), ishivara (lord), and shuddha-vidya (true knowledge); seven
mixed principles, which are pure maya, five envelopes (destiny, time, interest,
knowledge, and power), and purusha, or self; and 24 impure principles beginning
with prakriti (this list is broadly the same as that of Samkhya).

Shiva is the first cause: his shakti, or power, is the instrumental cause, maya the
material cause. This maya-shakti is not Gods essential power but is assumed by
him; it is parigraha-shakti (Assumed Power). The relation of Shiva to his essential
power is one of identity. Bonds are of three kinds: karma, maya, and avidya. The
world and souls are real, and emancipation requires the grace of Shiva. The Shaiva-
siddhanta always insisted on the preservation of the individuality of the finite soul,
even in the state of emancipation, and rejected Shankaras nondualism. Appaya
Dikshitas commentary shows the tendency to attempt a reconciliation between the
Agama tradition of realism and pluralism with the Advaita tradition. The soul is
eternal and all-pervasive, but, owing to original ignorance, it is reduced to the
condition of anava, which consists in regarding oneself as finite and atomic.
Knowledge of its own nature as well as Gods is possible only by Gods grace.
Kashmiri Shaivism
The source literature of this school consists in the Shiva-sutra, Vasuguptas Spanda-
karika (8th9th centuries; Verses on Creation), Utpalas Pratyabhijna-sutra (c. 900;
Aphorisms on Recognition), Abhinavaguptas Paramarthasara (The Essence of the
Highest Truth), Pratyabhijna-vimarshini (Reflections on Recognition), and
Tantraloka (Lights on the Doctrine) in the 10th century, and Kshemarajas Shiva-
sutra-vimarshini (Reflections on the Aphorisms on Shiva).

As contrasted with the Shaiva-siddhanta, this school is idealist and monist, and,
although it accepts the 36 tattvas and the three padarthas, it is Shiva, the Lord, who
is the sole reality. God is viewed as both the material and efficient cause of the
universe. Five aspects of Gods power are distinguished: consciousness (chit), bliss
(ananda), desire (iccha), knowledge (jnana), and action (kriya). Shiva is one
without a second, infinite spirit. He has a transcendent aspect and an immanent
aspect, and his power with its fivefold functions constitutes his immanent aspect.
The individual soul of a person is identical with Shiva; recognition of this identity is
essential to liberation.
Jain philosophy
Jainism, founded about the 6th century bce by Vardhamana Mahavira, the 24th in a
succession of religious leaders known either as Tirthankaras (Saviours) or as Jinas
(Conquerors), rejects the idea of God as the creator of the world but teaches the
perfectibility of humanity, to be accomplished through the strictly moral and ascetic
life. Central to the moral code of Jainism is the doctrine of ahimsanoninjury to all
living beings, an idea that may have arisen in reaction to Vedic sacrifice ritual.
There is also a great emphasis on vows (vratas) of various orders.

The aamagalas, or eight auspicious Jaina symbols, seen above and below the
seated image of the Jina (saviour), miniature from the Kalpa-stra, 15th century; in
the Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
The astamangalas, or eight auspicious Jaina symbols, seen above and below the
seated image of the
Courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution, Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
Although earlier scriptures, such as the Bhagavati-sutra, contained assorted ideas
on logic and epistemology, the 2nd-century-ce philosopher Kundakunda was the
first to develop Jaina logic. The Tattvarthadhigama-sutra of Umasvatis, however, is
the first systematic work, and Siddhasena (7th century ce) the first great logician.
Other important figures are Akalanka (8th century), Manikyanandi, Vadideva,
Hemchandra (12th century), Prabhachandra (11th century), and Yasovijaya (17th
century).

The principal ingredients of Jaina metaphysics are: an ultimate distinction between

living substance or soul (jiva) and nonliving substance (ajiva); the doctrine of
anekantavada, or nonabsolutism (the thesis that things have infinite aspects that no
determination can exhaust); the doctrine of naya (the thesis that there are many
partial perspectives from which reality can be determined, none of which is, taken
by itself, wholly true but each of which is partially so); and the doctrine of karma, in
Jainism a substance, rather than a process, that links all phenomena in a chain of
cause and effect.

As a consequence of their metaphysical liberalism, the Jaina logicians developed a

unique theory of seven-valued logic, according to which the three primary truth
values are true, false, and indefinite and the other four values are true and
false, true and indefinite, false and indefinite, and true, false, and indefinite.
Every statement is regarded as having these seven values, considered from
different standpoints.

Knowledge is defined as that which reveals both itself and another (svaparabhasi).
It is eternal, as an essential quality of the self; it is noneternal, as the perishable
empirical knowledge. Whereas most Hindu epistemologists regarded pramana as
the cause of knowledge, the Jainas identified pramana with valid knowledge.
Knowledge is either perceptual or nonperceptual. Perception is either empirical or
nonempirical. Empirical perception is either sensuous or nonsensuous. The latter
arises directly in the self, not through the sense organs but only when the covering
ignorance is removed. With the complete extinction of all karmas, a person attains
omniscience (kevala-jnana).
Mughal philosophy
Reference has been made earlier to the Sufi (Islamic mystics), who found a
resemblance between the ontological monism of Ibn al-Arabi and that of Vedanta.
The Shattari order among the Indian Sufis practiced Yogic austerities and even
physical postures. Various minor syncretistic religious sects attempted to harmonize
Hindu and Muslim religious traditions at different levels and with varying degrees of
success. Of these, the most famous are Ramananda, Kabir, and Guru Nanak. Kabir
harmonized the two religions in such a manner that, to an enquiry about whether he
was a Hindu or a Muslim, the answer given by a contemporary was, It is a secret
difficult to comprehend. One should try to understand. Guru Nanak rejected the
authority of both Hindu and Muslim scriptures alike and founded his religion,
Sikhism, on a rigorously moralistic, monotheistic basis.

Among the great Mughals, Akbar attempted in 1581 to promulgate a new religion,
Dn-e Ilh, which was to be based on reason and ethical teachings common to all
religions and which was to be free from priestcraft. This effort, however, was short-
lived, and a reaction of Muslim orthodoxy was led by Shaykh Amed Sirhind, who
rejected ontological monism in favour of orthodox unitarianism and sought to
channel mystical enthusiasm along Qurnic lines. By the middle of the 17th
century, the tragic figure of Dr Shikh, the Mughal emperor Shh Jahns son and
disciple of the Qdir Sufis, translated Hindu scriptures, such as the Bhagavadgita
and the Upanishads, into Persian and in his translation of the latter closely followed
Shankaras commentaries. In his Majma al-barayn he worked out correlations
between Sufi and Upanishadic cosmologies, beliefs, and practices. During this time,
the Muslim elite of India virtually identified Vedanta with Sufism. Later, Shh Wal
Allhs son, Shh Abd-ul-Azz, regarded Krishna among the awliy (saints).
19th- and 20th-century philosophy in India and Pakistan
In the 19th century, India was not marked by any noteworthy philosophical
achievements, but the period was one of great social and religious reform
movements. The newly founded universities introduced Indian intellectuals to
Western thought, particularly to the empiricist, utilitarian, and agnostic philosophies
in England, and John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and Herbert Spencer became the
most influential thinkers in the Indian universities by the end of the century. These
Western-oriented ideas served to generate a secular and rational point of view and
stimulated social and religious movements, most noteworthy among them being the
Brahmo Samaj movement founded by Ram Mohun Roy. Toward the later decades of
the century, the great saint Ramakrishna Paramahamsa of Calcutta (now Kolkata)
renewed interest in mysticism, and many young rationalists and skeptics were
converted into the faith exemplified in his person. Ramakrishna taught, among
other things, an essential diversity of religious paths leading to the same goal, and
this teaching was given an intellectual form by Swami Vivekananda, his famed
disciple.

The first Indian graduate school in philosophy was founded in the University of
Calcutta during the first decades of the 20th century, and the first incumbent of the
chair of philosophy was Sir Brajendranath Seal, a versatile scholar in many branches
of learning, both scientific and humanistic. Seals major published work is The
Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, which, besides being a work on the history
of science, shows interrelations among the ancient Hindu philosophical concepts
and their scientific theories. Soon, however, the German philosophers Immanuel
Kant and Georg F.W. Hegel came to be the most-studied philosophers in the Indian
universities. The ancient systems of philosophy came to be interpreted in the light
of German idealism. The Hegelian notion of Absolute Spirit found a resonance in the
age-old Vedanta notion of brahman. The most eminent Indian Hegelian scholar is
Hiralal Haldar, who was concerned with the problem of the relation of the human
personality with the Absolute, as is evidenced by his book Neo-Hegelianism. The
most eminent Kantian scholar is K.C. Bhattacharyya.

Among those who deserve mention for their original contributions to philosophical
thinking are Sri Aurobindo (died 1950), Mohandas K. Gandhi (died 1948),
Rabindranath Tagore (died 1941), Sir Muammed Iqbl (died 1938), K.C.
Bhattacharyya (died 1949), and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (died 1975). Of these, Sri
Aurobindo was first a political activist and then a yogin, Tagore and Iqbl poets,
Gandhi a political and social leader, and only Radhakrishnan and Bhattacharyya
university professors. This fact throws some light on the state of Indian philosophy
in that century.

In his major work, The Life Divine, Sri Aurobindo starts from the fact of human
aspiration for a kingdom of heaven on earth and proceeds to give a theoretical
framework in which such an aspiration would be not a figment of imagination but a
drive in nature, working through man toward a higher stage of perfection. Both the
denial of the materialist and that of the ascetic are rejected as being one-sided. The
gulf between unconscious matter and fully self-conscious spirit is sought to be
bridged by exhibiting them as two poles of a series in which spirit continuously
manifests itself. The Vedantic concept of a transcendent and all-inclusive brahman
is sought to be harmonized with a theory of emergent evolution. Illusionism is
totally rejected. The purpose of man is to go beyond his present form of
consciousness. Yoga is interpreted as a technique not for personal liberation but for
cooperating with the cosmic evolutionary urge that is destined to take humankind
ahead from the present mental stage to a higher, supramental stage of
consciousness. A theory of history, in accordance with this point of view, is worked
out in his The Human Cycle.

Rabindranath Tagores philosophical thinking is no less based on the Upanishads,

but his interpretation of them is closer to Vaishnava theism and the bhakti cults
than to traditional monism. He characterized the absolute as the supreme person
and placed love higher than knowledge. In his Religion of Man, Tagore sought to
give a philosophy of man in which human nature is characterized by a concept of
surplus energy that finds expression in creative art. In his lectures on Nationalism,
Tagore placed the concept of society above that of the modern nation-state.

Gandhi preferred to say that the truth is God rather than God is the truth, because
the former proposition expresses a belief that even the atheists share. The belief in
the presence of an all-pervading spirit in the universe led Gandhi to a strict
formulation of the ethics of nonviolence (ahimsa). But he gave this age-old ethical
principle a wealth of meaning so that ahimsa for him became at once a potent
means of collective struggle against social and economic injustice, the basis of a
decentralized economy and decentralized power structure, and the guiding principle
of ones individual life in relation both to nature and to other persons. The unity of
existence, which he called the truth, can be realized through the practice of ahimsa,
which requires reducing oneself to zero and reaching the furthest limit of humility.

Influenced by the British philosopher J.M.E. McTaggarts form of Hegelian idealism

and the French philosopher Henri Bergsons philosophy of change, Muammed Iqbl
conceived reality as creative and essentially spiritual, consisting of egos. The truth,
however, is that matter is spirit, he wrote,

in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when we look at it as acting in
regard to what we call external world; it is mind or soul when we look at it as acting
in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting.
Influenced by British Neo-Hegelianism in his interpretation of the Vedantic tradition,
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was primarily an interpreter of Indian thought to the
Western world. He defended a realistic interpretation of the concept of maya
thereby playing down its illusionistic connotation, a theory of intuition as the means
of knowing reality, and a theory of emergent evolution of spirit (not unlike Sri
Aurobindo, but without his doctrine of supermind) in nature and history. The most
original among modern Indian thinkers, however, is K.C. Bhattacharyya, who
rejected the conception of philosophy as a construction of a worldview and
undertook a phenomenological description of the various grades of subjectivity: (1)
the bodily, (2) the psychic, and (3) the spiritual. With regard to (1), he distinguished
between the objective body and the felt body and regarded the latter as the most
primitive level of the subjective sense of freedom from the objective world. The
stage (2) includes the range of mental life from image to free thought. In
introspection, the level (2) is transcended, but various levels of introspection are
distinguished, all leading to greater freedom from objectivity. It would seem,
however, that for Bhattacharyya absolute freedom from objectivity was a spiritual
demand. According to his theory of value, value is not an adjective of the object but
a feeling absolute, of which the object evaluated appears as an adjective, and his
logic of alternation is a modern working out of the Jaina theories of anekantavada
(non-absolutism) and syadvada (doctrine of may be).

Among later philosophers, N.V. Banerjee (190181) and Kalidas Bhattacharyya

(191184), the son of K.C. Bhattacharyya, have made important contributions. In
Language, Meaning and Persons (1963), Banerjee examines the development of
personhood from a stage of individualized bondage to liberation in a collective
identity, a life-with-others. This liberation, according to Banerjee, also entails an
awareness of time and freedom from spatialized objects.

In his earlier writings such as Object, Content and Relation (1951) and Alternative
Standpoints in Philosophy (1953), Bhattacharyya developed his fathers idea of
theoretically undecidable alternatives in philosophy. In the later works Philosophy,
Logic and Language (1965) and Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy (1974),
he developed the concept of metaphysics as a science of the nonempirical a priori
essences that are initially discerned as the structure of the empirical but are
subsequently recognized as autonomous entities. The method of metaphysics for
him is reflection, phenomenological and transcendental. Kalidas Bhattacharyya was
concerned with the nature and function of philosophical reflection and its relation to
unreflective experience. What reflection brings to light, he held, is present in pre-
reflective experience, but only as undistinguished and fused, in a state of objective
implicitness. The essences as such are not real but demand realization in pure
reflective consciousness. At the same time, he emphasized the limitations of any
doctrine positing the constitution of nature in consciousness. Such a doctrine, he
insisted, cannot be carried out in details.

Among those who apply the phenomenological method and concepts to

understanding the traditional Indian philosophies, D. Sinha, R.K. Sinari, and J.N.
Mohanty are especially noteworthy. Others who interpret the Indian philosophies by
means of the methods and concepts of analytical philosophy include B.K. Matilal
and G. Misra. In the field of philosophy of logic, P.K. Sen has worked on the
paradoxes of confirmation and the concept of quantification, and Sibajiban on the
liar paradox and on epistemic logic. Sibajiban and Matilal have made important
contributions toward rendering the concepts of Navya-Nyaya logic into the language
of modern logic. In ethics and social philosophy, notable work has been done by Abu
Sayyid Ayub, Daya Krishna, Rajendra Prasad, and D.P. Chattopadhyaya.

Anumana, ( Sanskrit: measuring along some other thing or inference)

in Indian philosophy, the second of the pramanas, or the five means of
knowledge. Inference occupies a central place in the Hindu school of logic
(Nyaya). This school worked out a syllogism in the form of an argument
that goes through five stages: (1) the proposition (pratijna, literally
promise), (2) the ground (hetu), (3) the illustration (udaharana), (4) the
application (upanaya), and (5) the conclusion (nigamana). A syllogism is
vitiated by a fallacious ground; this is called hetvabhasa (the mere
appearance of a ground). A number of types of invalid grounds are
distinguished: simple error, contradiction, tautology, lack of proof for the
ground, and inopportunity.

Inference, in logic, derivation of conclusions from given information or

premises by any acceptable form of reasoning. Inferences are commonly
drawn (1) by deduction, which, by analyzing valid argument forms, draws
out the conclusions implicit in their premises, (2) by induction, which
argues from many instances to a general statement, (3) by probability,
which passes from frequencies within a known domain to conclusions of
stated likelihood, and (4) by statistical reasoning, which concludes that,
on the average, a certain percentage of a set of entities will satisfy the
stated conditions. See also deduction; implication

Deduction, (reason) in logic, a rigorous proof, or derivation, of one

statement (the conclusion) from one or more statements (the premises)
i.e., a chain of statements, each of which is either a premise or a
consequence of a statement occurring earlier in the proof. This usage is a
generalization of what the Greek philosopher Aristotle called the
syllogism, but a syllogism is now recognized as merely a special case of a
deduction. Also, the traditional view that deduction proceeds from the
general to the specific or from the universal to the particular has been
abandoned as incorrect by most logicians. Some experts regard all valid
inference as deductive in form and, for this and other reasons, reject the
supposed contrast between deduction and induction. See also axiomatic
method; formal system; inference.

Nyaya, ( Sanskrit: Rule or Method) one of the six systems (darshans)

of Indian philosophy, important for its analysis of logic and epistemology.
The major contribution of the Nyaya system is its working out in profound
detail the means of knowledge known as inference (see anumana).

Like the other systems, Nyaya is both philosophical and religious. Its
ultimate concern is to bring an end to human suffering, which results from
ignorance of reality. Liberation is brought about through right knowledge.
Nyaya is thus concerned with the means of right knowledge.

In its metaphysics, Nyaya is allied to the Vaisheshika system, and the two
schools were often combined from about the 10th century. Its principal
text is the Nyaya-sutras, ascribed to Gautama (c. 2nd century bce).

The Nyaya systemfrom Gautama through his important early

commentator Vatsyayana (c. 450 ce) until Udayanacharya (Udayana; 10th
century)became qualified as the Old Nyaya (Prachina-Nyaya) in the 11th
century when a new school of Nyaya (Navya-Nyaya, or New Nyaya) arose
in Bengal. The best-known philosopher of the Navya-Nyaya, and the
founder of the modern school of Indian logic, was Gangesha (13th
century).

The Nyaya school holds that there are four valid means of knowledge:
perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), comparison (upamana),
and sound, or testimony (shabda). Invalid knowledge involves memory,
doubt, error, and hypothetical argument.

The Nyaya theory of causation defines a cause as an unconditional and

invariable antecedent of an effect. In its emphasis on sequencean effect
does not preexist in its causethe Nyaya theory is at variance with the
Samkhya-Yoga and Vedantist views, but it is not unlike modern Western
inductive logic in this respect.
Three kinds of causes are distinguished: inherent or material cause (the
substance out of which an effect is produced), non-inherent cause (which
helps in the production of a cause), and efficient cause (the power that
helps the material cause produce the effect). God is not the material cause
of the universe, since atoms and souls are also eternal, but is rather the
efficient cause.

Karma, Sanskrit karman (act), Pali kamma, in Indian religion and

philosophy, the universal causal law by which good or bad actions
determine the future modes of an individuals existence. Karma
represents the ethical dimension of the process of rebirth (samsara),
belief in which is generally shared among the religious traditions of India.
Indian soteriologies (theories of salvation) posit that future births and life
situations will be conditioned by actions performed during ones present
lifewhich itself has been conditioned by the accumulated effects of
actions performed in previous lives. The doctrine of karma thus directs
adherents of Indian religions toward their common goal: release (moksha)
from the cycle of birth and death. Karma thus serves two main functions
within Indian moral philosophy: it provides the major motivation to live a
moral life, and it serves as the primary explanation of the existence of
evil.

Derived from the Sanskrit word karman, meaning act, the term karma
carried no ethical significance in its earliest specialized usage. In ancient
texts (1000700 bce) of the Vedic religion, karma referred simply to ritual
and sacrificial action. As the priestly theology of sacrifice was articulated
by Brahman priests over the following centuries, however, ritual action
came to be regarded as effective by itself, independent of the gods. Karma
as ritual functioned autonomously and according to a cosmic ritual law.

The earliest evidence of the terms expansion into an ethical domain is

provided in the Upanishads, a genre of the Vedas (sacred scriptures)
concerned with ontology, or the philosophical study of being. In the middle
of the 1st millennium bce, the Vedic theologian Yajnavalkya expressed a
belief that later became commonplace but was considered new and
esoteric at the time: A man turns into something good by good action and
into something bad by bad action. Although within the Vedic ritual
tradition good action and bad action may have included both ritual
and moral acts, this moral aspect of karma increasingly dominated
theological discourse, especially in the religions of Buddhism and Jainism,
which emerged about the middle of the 1st millennium bce. Both of these
religions embraced ascetic modes of life and rejected the ritual concerns
of the Brahman priests.

The connection between the ritual and moral dimensions of karma is

especially evident in the notion of karma as a causal law, popularly known
as the law of karma. Many religious traditions notably the Abrahamic
religions that emerged in the Middle East (Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam)place reward and punishment for human actions in the hands of a
divine lawgiver. In contrast, the classical traditions of IndiaHinduism,
Buddhism, and Jainism, much like the Vedic sacrificial theology that
preceded themview karma as operating according to an autonomous
causal law. No divine will or external agent intervenes in the relationship
of the moral act to its inevitable result. The law of karma thus represents
a markedly nontheistic theodicy, or explanation of why there is evil in the
world.

Once a divine judge is taken out of the equation, a new question arises:
within a causal sequence, how can an act produce an effect at a future
time far removed from the acts performance? Different Indian moral
philosophies provide different answers, but all acknowledge some kind of
karmic residue resulting from the initial act. Jainism, for example, regards
karma as a fine particulate substance that settles on the soul (jiva) of one
who commits immoral actions or has immoral thoughts, making it impure
and heavy and miring it in the material world of rebirth. The Vedic
ritualistic tradition that preceded Hinduism contributed the concept of the
apurva, the latent potency created within the soul by ritual and moral
actions. Much like a seed, an apurva sprouts into new realities in the
distant future. Other traditionse.g., Yoga and Buddhismprovide
psychological explanations in which karmic residue produces dispositional
tendencies (samskaras) and psychological traces (vasanas) that determine
the future births and personality traits of an individual. Each of these
examples demonstrates how the concept of karma provided a bridge
between cause and effect separated by time.

The doctrine of karma implies that one persons karma cannot have an
effect on another persons future. Yet, while karma is in theory specific to
each individual, many aspects of Indian religions reflect the widely held
belief that karma may be shared. For example, the doctrine of the transfer
of merit, whereby one person can transfer his good karma to another, is
found in both Buddhism and Hinduism. Ancestral offerings and other
rituals for the departed show that acts done by the living are believed to
influence the well-being of the dead. Finally, pious activities, including
pilgrimages, are often performed for the benefit of living or deceased
relatives.

Hinduism religion

Vaishnavism and Shaivism

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Shankara
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Vaishnavism
Vaishnavism is the worship and acceptance of Vishnu (Sanskrit: The
Pervader or The Immanent) or one of his various incarnations (avatars)
as the supreme manifestation of the divine. During a long and complex
development, many Vaishnava groups emerged with differing beliefs and
aims. Some of the major Vaishnava groups include the Shrivaishnavas
(also known as Vishishtadvaitins) and Madhvas (also known as Dvaitins) of
South India; the followers of the teachings of Vallabha in western India;
and several Vaishnava groups in Bengal in eastern India, who follow
teachings derived from those of the saint Chaitanya. Most Vaishnava
believers, however, draw from various traditions and blend worship of
Vishnu with local practices.

Vishnu with his 10 avatars (incarnations): Fish, Tortoise, Boar, Man-Lion,

Dwarf, Rma with the Ax, King Rma, Krishna, Buddha, and Kalkin.
Painting from Jaipur, India, 19th century; in the Victoria and Albert
Museum, London.
Vishnu with his 10 avatars (incarnations): Fish, Tortoise, Boar, Man-Lion,
Dwarf, Rama-with-the-Ax,
Courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London
In the Vedas and Brahmanas, Vishnu is the god of far-extending motion
and pervasiveness who, for humans in distress, penetrates and traverses
the entire cosmos to make their existence possible. All beings are said to
dwell in his three strides or footsteps (trivikrama): his highest step, or
abode, is beyond mortal ken in the realm of heaven. Vishnu is also the god
of the pillar of the universe and is identified with the sacrifice. He imparts
his all-pervading power to the sacrificer who imitates his strides and
identifies himself with the god, thus conquering the universe and
attaining the goal, the safe foundation, the highest light (Shatapatha
Brahmana).

In the centuries before the Common Era, Vishnu became the Ishvara
(supreme deity) of his worshipers, fusing with the Purusha-Prajapati
figure; with Narayana, worship of whom discloses a prominent influence of
ascetics; with Krishna, whom the Bhagavadgita identified with Vishnu in
many forms; and with Vasudeva, who was worshipped by a group known
as the Pancharatras.

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Dn-i Ilh
African religions
The extensive mythology attached to Vishnu is largely that of his avatars.
Although this notion is found elsewhere in Hinduism, it is basic to
Vaishnavism. Each of his incarnations, especially Krishna and Rama, has a
particular mythology and is the object of devotion (bhakti). The classical
number of these incarnations is 10the dashavatara (ten avatars)
ascending from theriomorphic (animal form) to fully anthropomorphic
manifestations. They are Fish (Matsya), Tortoise (Kurma), Boar (Varaha),
Man-Lion (Narasimha), Dwarf (Vamana), Rama-with-the-Ax (Parashurama),
King Rama, Krishna, Buddha, and the future incarnation, Kalkin. This list
varies, however, according to the text within which it appears and the
devotional community that maintains it. For example, some dashavatara
lists include Balarama, the brother of Krishna, instead of the Buddha.
Moreover, the number of incarnations is not fixed across all texts or
traditions; some texts list 24 incarnations of Vishnu. In addition, a
particular dashavatara list popularized by the 13th-century poet Jayadeva
in his song Gita Govinda names Krishna, not Vishnu, as the supreme deity
who incarnates himself 10 times. In Jayadevas list the first seven
incarnations are the same as those found in other Vaishnava lists.
Jayadeva then lists Balarama and Buddha as the eighth and ninth
incarnations. One common element in all these lists is Kalkin, who is
always the final incarnation.

Like most other Hindu gods, Vishnu has his especial entourage: his wife is
Lakshmi, or Shri, the lotus goddessgranter of success, wealth, and
liberationwho came forth from the ocean when gods and demons
churned it in order to recover from its depths the ambrosia or elixir of
immortality, amrita. At the beginning of the commercial year, special
worship is paid to her for success in personal affairs. Vishnus mount is
the bird Garuda, archenemy of snakes, and in his four hands are his
emblems: the lotus, conch shell, and his two weapons, the club and the
discus.

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This book cover is one of many given to Harper Lees classic work To Kill a
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Devotees hold that, in addition to having many avatars, Vishnu also
manifests himself in many temples. He may manifest himself within an
iconic form (archa avatara) for worship. In many South Indian temples, the
regional manifestations of Vishnu have distinct identities and are known
by local names (e.g., as Venkateswara in Tirumala-Tirupati and in the
Hindu diaspora). Each of these distinct forms has specific attributes and
weapons, which are depicted in particular locations or poses. Elaborate
treatises on iconography as well as on local custom and practice govern
the carving and interpretation of these icons. In many temples in South
India and Southeast Asia, Vishnu is depicted as standing, sitting, striding
the universe, or reclining. He sometimes reclines on the serpent Ananta
(Without End, suggesting the deitys mastery over infinite time). He is
frequently displayed in temple carvings and in calendar art with four arms
(though occasional depictions provide him with as many as eight), three of
which hold his conch shell, discus, and club. Although a few Vaishnava
philosophical schools may consider the image in the temple to be a symbol
pointing to the supreme being, most devotees perceive it as an actual
manifestation of the deity, a form that he takes to make himself accessible
to human beings.

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Whatever justification the different Vaishnava groups (such as the
Shrivaishnavas of South India or the worshipers of Vishnu Vithoba in
Maharashtra) offer for their philosophical position, all of them believe in
God as a person with distinctive qualities and worship him through his
manifestations and representations. Many schools teach that it is through
divine grace that the votary is lifted from transmigration to release. Much
of Vaishnava faith is monotheistic, whether the object of adoration be
Vishnu Narayana or one of his avatars. Preference for any one of these
manifestations is largely a matter of tradition. Thus, most South Indian
Shrivaishnavas worship Vishnu in one of his many local manifestations;
the North Indian groups prefer Krishna.
Shaivism
The character and position of the Vedic god Rudracalled Shiva, the
Auspicious One, when this aspect of his ambivalent nature is emphasized
remain clearly evident in some of the important features of the great
god Shiva, who together with Vishnu came to dominate Hinduism. Major
groups such as the Lingayats of southern India and the Kashmiri Shaivas
contributed the theological principles of Shaivism, and Shaiva worship
became a complex amalgam of pan-Indian Shaiva philosophy and local or
folk worship.
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In the minds of the ancient Hindus, Shiva was the divine representative of
the uncultivated, dangerous, and unpredictable aspects of nature. Shivas
character lent itself to being split into partial manifestationseach said to
represent only an aspect of himas well as to assimilating powers from
other deities. Already in the Rigveda, appeals to him for help in case of
disasterof which he might be the originatorwere combined with the
confirmation of his great power. In the course of the Vedic period, Shiva
originally a ritual and conceptual outsider, yet a mighty god whose
benevolent aspects were readily emphasizedgradually gained access to
the circle of prominent gods who preside over various spheres of human
interest. Many characteristics of the Vedic Prajapati, the creator; of Indra,
the god of rain and of the thunderbolt; and of Agni, the Vedic god of fire,
have been integrated into the figure of Shiva.

In those circles that produced the Shvetashvatara Upanishad (c. 400 bce),
Shiva rose to the highest rank. Its author proposed a way of escape from
samsara, proclaiming Shiva the sole eternal Lord. Rudra-Shiva developed
into an ambivalent and many-sided lord and master. His many
manifestations, however, were active among humankind: as Pashupati
(Lord of Cattle), he took over the fetters of the Vedic Varuna; as Aghora
(To Whom Nothing Is Horrible), he showed the uncanny traits of his
nature (evil, death, punishment) and also their opposites.

Like Vishnu, Shiva is held by devotees to be the entire universe, yet he is

worshipped in various manifestations and in hundreds of local temples.
Although it is not always clear whether Shiva is invoked as a great god of
frightful aspect, capable of conquering demonic power, or as the boon-
giving lord and protector, Hindus continue to invoke him in magical rites.

Shiva reconciles in his person semantically opposite though

complementary aspects: he is both terrifying and mild, destroyer and
restorer, eternal rest and ceaseless activity. These seeming contradictions
make him a paradoxical figure, transcending humanity and assuming a
mysterious sublimity of his own. From the standpoint of his devotees, his
character is so complicated and his interests are so widely divergent as to
seem incomprehensible. Yet, although Brahman philosophers like to
emphasize his ascetic aspects and the ritualists of the Tantric tradition his
sexuality, the seemingly opposite strands of his nature are generally
accepted as two sides of one character.

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Shiva temporarily interrupts his austerity and asceticism (tapas) to marry
Parvati, and he combines the roles of lover and ascetic to such a degree
that his wife must be an ascetic (yogi) when he devotes himself to
austerities and a loving companion when he is in his erotic mode. This
dual character finds its explanation in the ancient belief that, by his very
chastity, an ascetic accumulates (sexual) power that can be discharged
suddenly and completely, resulting in the fecundation of the soil. Various
mythical tales reveal that both chastity and the loss of chastity are
necessary for fertility and the intermittent process of regeneration in
nature. The erotic and creative experiences portrayed in these narratives
are a familiar feature in Hinduism, and they counterbalance the Hindu
bent for asceticism. Such sexuality, while rather idyllic in Krishna,
assumes a mystical aspect in Shiva, which is why the devotee can see in
him the realization of the possibilities of both the ascetic life and the
householder state. His marriage with Parvati is then a model of conjugal
love, the divine prototype of human marriage, sanctifying the forces that
carry on the human race.

Shivas many poses express various aspects of his nature. The cosmic
dancer, he is the originator of the eternal rhythm of the universe, dancing
through its creation and destruction. He also catches, in his thickly matted
hair, the waters of the heavenly Ganges River, which destroy all sin. He
wears in his headdress the crescent moon, which drips the nectar of
everlasting life.

Shiva Nataraja at the Brihadishvara Temple, Thanjavur, India.

Shiva Nataraja at the Brihadishvara Temple, Thanjavur (Tanjore).
Frederick M. Asher
Shiva is the master of both tandava, the fierce, violent dance that gives
rise to energy, and lasya, the gentle, lyric dance representing tenderness
and grace. Holding a drum upon which he beats the rhythm of creation, he
dances within a circle of flames that depicts the arc of dissolution. He
holds up the palm of one hand in a gesture of protection; with another he
points to his foot to indicate the refuge of his followers. The image of the
dancing Shiva is said by Shaivites to portray five cosmic activities:
creation, maintenance, destruction, concealing his true form from
adversaries, and, finally, the grace through which he saves his devotees.
The outer form of the dance, however, is only one aspect of the divine flow
of energy; followers of Shiva say that the dance is in the heart of every
devotee.
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Yet while the dancing Shiva is an important and popular representation,
the abstract form of Shiva is perhaps the most commonly seen portrayal
throughout India. Shiva is depicted as a conical shaft (lingam) of fire
within a womb (yoni), illustrating the creative powers of Shiva and
Parvati. In temples the lingam, which literally means distinguishing
symbol, is an upright structure that is often made of stone. It is placed in
a stone yoni that represents both the womb and the abode of all creation.
The union between the lingam and the yoni serves as a reminder that
male and female forces are united in generating the universe.

Shiva also represents the unpredictability of divinity. He is the hunter who

slays and skins his prey and dances a wild dance while covered with its
hide. Far from society and the ordered world, he sits on the inaccessible
Himalayan plateau of Mount Kailasa, an austere ascetic, averse to love,
who burns Kama, the god of love, to ashes with a glance from the third
eyethe eye of insight beyond dualityin the middle of his forehead. And
at the end of the eon, he will dance the universe to destruction. He is
nevertheless invoked as Shiva, Shambhu, Shankara (Benignant and
Beneficent), for the god that can strike down can also spare. Snakes
seek his company and twine themselves around his body. He wears a
necklace of skulls. He sits in meditation, with his hair braided like a
hermits, his body smeared white with ashes. These ashes recall the
burning pyres on which the sannyasis (renouncers) take leave of the social
order of the world and set out on a lonely course toward release, carrying
with them a human skull.

Shivas consort is Parvati (Daughter of the Mountain [Himalaya]), a

goddess who is an auspicious and powerful wife. She is also personified as
the Goddess (Devi), Mother (Amba), black and destructive (Kali), fierce
(Chandika), and inaccessible (Durga). As Shivas female counterpart, she
inherits some of Shivas more fearful aspects. She comes to be regarded
as the power (shakti) of Shiva, without which Shiva is helpless. Shakti is in
turn personified in the form of many different goddesses, often said to be
aspects of her.

Shiva and his family at the burning ground. Parvati, Shivas wife, holds
Skanda while watching Ganesa (left) and Shiva string together the skulls
of the dead. The bull Nandi rests behind the tree. Kangra painting, 18th
century; in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London.
Shiva and his family at the burning ground. Parvati, Shivas wife, holds
Skanda while watching
Courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London; photograph A.C.
Cooper
Narratives of culture heroes
A culture hero can easily be assimilated to a god by identifying him with
an incarnation of a god. Thus, great religious teachers are considered
manifestations of the god of their devotional preaching, and stories of
their lives have become part of a very rich storehouse of narratives.
Practically gods on earth, these ascetics, according to mythology, have
amassed tremendous powers that they do not hesitate to use. The sage
Kapila, meditating in the netherworld, burned to ashes 60,000 princes who
had dug their way to him. Another sage, Bhagiratha, brought the Ganges
River down from heaven to sanctify their ashes and, in the process,
created the ocean. Agastya, revered as the Brahman who brought
Sanskrit-speaking civilization to South India, drank and digested the
ocean. When the Vindhya mountain range would not stop growing,
Agastya crossed it to the south and commanded it to cease growing until
his return; he still has not returned. Vishvamitra, a king who became a
Brahman, created a new universe with its own galaxies to spite the gods.

Moving from myth to hagiography (biography of venerated persons), there

are also stories told of the great teachers, and every founder of a sect is
soon deified as an incarnation of a god: the philosopher Shankara (c. 788
820) as an incarnation of Shiva; the religious leader Ramanuja (d. 1137) as
that of Ananta, the sacred serpent of Vishnu; and the Bengal teacher
Chaitanya (14851533) simultaneously as that of Krishna and his beloved
Radha.
Myths of holy rivers and holy places
Of particular sanctity in India are the rivers, among which the Ganges
stands first. This river, personified as a goddess, originally flowed only in
heaven until she was brought down by Bhagiratha to purify the ashes of
his ancestors. She came down reluctantly, cascading first on the head of
Shiva in order to break her fall, which would have shattered the Earth.
Confluences are particularly holy, and the confluence of the Ganges with
the Yamuna at Allahabad is the most sacred spot in India. Another river of
importance is the Sarasvati, which loses itself in desert; it was personified
as a goddess of eloquence and learning.

All major and many minor temples and sanctuaries have their own myths
of how they were founded and what miracles were wrought there. The
same is true of famous places of pilgrimage, usually at sacred spots near
and in rivers; important among these are Vrindavana (Brindaban) on the
Yamuna, which is held to be the scene of the youthful adventures of
Krishna and the cowherd wives. Another such centre with its own myths is
Gaya, especially sacred for the funerary rites that are held there. And
there is no spot in Varanasi (Benares), along the Ganges, that is without
its own mythical history. Srirangam, a temple town set in an island in the
Kaveri River in Tamil Nadu, is considered to be heaven on earth (bhuloka
vaikuntham). There are also many places sacred to followers of Vishnu,
Shiva, or other deities.

Ritual bathing in the Ganges River at Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, India.

Ritual bathing in the Ganges River at Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Andrzej Wrotek (CC-BY-2.0) (A Britannica Publishing Partner)
Philosophical texts
Although the details of Indian philosophy, as it has been developed by
professional philosophers, may be treated as a subject separate from
Hinduism (see Indian philosophy), certain broad philosophical concepts
were absorbed into the myths and rituals of Hindus and are best viewed
as a component of the religious tradition.

Mysticism
One of the major trends of Indian religious philosophy is mysticism. This
term can be misleading, however, as it can evoke Western, and
particularly Christian, notions of religious experience, practice, and ends.
Nevertheless, many scholars of religion have long used such concepts to
study Hinduism and to interpret it for Western students. The desire for
union of the self with something greater than the self, whether that is
defined as a principle that pervades the universe or as a personal God, is
one sense in which Hinduism has a mystical dimension. Yet, while Hindu
mysticism at one extreme is the realization of the identity of the individual
self with the impersonal principle called brahman (the position of the
Vedanta school of Indian philosophy), at the other extreme it is the
intensive devotionalism to a personal God that is found in the bhakti
(devotional) groups.

Most Hindu mystical thought displays four common features. First, it is

based on experience: the state of realization, whatever it is called, is both
knowable and communicable, and the systems are all designed to teach
people how to reach it. It is not, in other words, pure speculation. Second,
it has as its goal the release of the spirit-substance of the individual from
its prison in matter, whether matter is considered real or illusory. Third,
many systems recognize the importance or the necessity of the control of
the mind and body as a means of realization; sometimes this takes the
form of extreme asceticism and mortification, and sometimes it takes the
form of the cultivation of mind and body in order that their energies may
be properly channeled. Finally, at the core of Hindu mystical thought is the
functional principle that knowing is being. Thus, knowledge is something
more than analytical categorizing: it is total understanding. This
understanding can be purely intellectual, and some schools equate the
final goal with omniscience, as does Yoga. But understanding can also
mean total transformation: if one truly knows something, one is that
thing. Thus, in the devotional schools, the goal of the devotee is to
transform into a being who, in eternity, is in immediate and loving
relationship to the deity. But despite the fact that these are both ways of
knowing, some consider the difference between them to be significant. In
the first instance, the individual has the responsibility to train and use his
own intellect. The love relationship of the second, on the other hand, is
one of dependence, and the deity assists the devotee through grace.
Thus, some theological schools emphasize self-control, while others stress
devotion and divine grace. Still other teachers say that the devotee should
not exert himself to control his mind; rather, with meditation his
consciousness will naturally try to transcend itself and reach a blissful
state. In fact, some Shrivaishnava theologians have said that one should
simply consent to the reception of divine grace and not assume any
responsibility in the scheme of salvation; others within this tradition have
emphasized the importance of bhakti understood as active self-surrender
to Vishnu and Lakshmi. The distinction between these two visions of
salvation is illustrated by the analogy of the cat and the monkey. The cat
carries her young in her mouth, and thus the kitten has no responsibility.
But the young monkey must cling by its own strength to its mothers back.
Philosophical sutras and the rise of the Six Schools of philosophy
The systems of the Six Schools (Saddarshana) of orthodox Hindu
philosophy were formulated in terse sutras from about the beginning of
the Common Era through the period of the Gupta empire (320540).

The most important of the Six Schools is the Vedanta (End of the
Vedas), also called Uttara-Mimamsa or, later, Mimamsa. The most-
renowned philosopher of this school was Shankara (traditionally dated c.
788820, though he probably lived in the first half of the 8th century).
Born at Kaladi in Kerala, he is said to have spent most of his life traveling
through India debating with members of other sects. The Shankaran
system has sounded the keynote of intellectual Hinduism down to the
present, but later teachers founded sub-schools of Vedanta, which are
perhaps equally important.

Shankara was also responsible for the growth of Hindu monasticism,

which had been in existence for more than a millennium in the form of
hermit colonies. Inscriptions from Gupta times onward also refer to
monklike orders of Shaiva ascetics, apparently living according to
distinctive disciplines and with distinguishing garments and emblems.
Shankara founded the dashanami, a closely disciplined Shiva order,
perhaps partly modeled on the Buddhist order, the sangha. The
dashanami, which is still the most influential orthodox Hindu ascetic
group, is composed of 10 brotherhoods (dashanami means those with 10
names). Orders became an established institution with wider geographic
affiliations. Some of these admitted Brahmans only; others were open to
all four classes or even to women; some made a practice of nudity; and all
are inclined to individual asceticism. Shankara is also said to have
founded the four main monasteries (matha) at the four corners of India:
Sringeri in Karnataka, Badrinath in the Himalayas, Dwaraka in Gujarat,
and Puri in Orissa. Many followers of Shankara in southern India, however,
aver that Shankara established a monastery in the city of Kanchipuram,
near Chennai, Tamil Nadu. The monastic head of this institution as well as
the abbots of the other monasteries control the spiritual lives of many
millions of devout laypersons throughout India, and their establishments
strive to maintain the traditional philosophical Hinduism of the strict
Vedanta. In modern times, certain dashanami leaders have incurred
criticism for their firm opposition to social change.

The theologians had to assume the task of explaining the relation between
God, the unaffected and unchanging cause of all things, and the universe.
According to the great South Indian thinker and devotee of Vishnu
Ramanuja (c. 10171137), brahman (i.e., God) is a Person as well as the
object of an individuals search for the higher knowledge that is the only
entrance to salvation. Because an absolute creation is denied, God is
viewed as the sole cause of his own modificationsnamely, the emanation,
existence, and absorption of the universe. The universe, consisting of chit
(consciousness) and achit (what is not conscious; this category includes
matter and time), forms the body of brahman, or Vishnu.

Ramanuja, bronze sculpture, 12th century; from a Vishnu temple in

Thanjavur (Tanjore) district, India.
Ramanuja, bronze sculpture, 12th century; from a Vishnu temple in
Thanjavur (Tanjore) district,
Courtesy of the Institut Franais de Pondichry
God is conceived to be essentially different from everything material, the
absolute opposite of any evil, free from any imperfection, omniscient,
omnipotent, possessed of all positive qualities (such as knowledge, bliss,
beauty, and truth), of incomparable majesty, the inner soul of all beings,
and the ultimate goal of every religious effort. The universe is considered
a real transformation of brahman, whose body consists of the conscious
souls and everything unconscious in their subtle and gross states. The
karma doctrine is modified as follows: the Lord, having determined good
and bad deeds, provides all individual souls with a body in which they
perform deeds, reveals to them the scriptures from which they may learn
the dharma, and enters into them as their internal regulator. The
individual acts at his own discretion but needs the Lords assent. If the
devotee wishes to please him, God induces him, with infallible justice and
loving regard, to intentions and effort to perform good deeds by which the
devotee will attain him; if not, God keeps him from that goal.

Influenced by the bhakti movement, Ramanuja had admitted two ways of

emancipation: in addition to the meditative method of the highest insight
(jnana) into the oneness of soul and God, which destroys the residues of
karma and propitiates God to win his grace, there is the way of bhakti.
Those who prefer the former way will reach a state of isolation, the others
an infinitely blissful eternal life in, through, and for God, with whom they
are one in nature but not identical. They do not lose their individuality and
may even meet Vishnu in his Vaikuntha heaven and enjoy delight beyond
description. Among many followers of Ramanuja, however, complete self-
surrender (prapatti) came to be distinguished from bhakti as a superior
means of spiritual realization.

Authors of Shaiva Puranas established two ingenious and complementary

doctrines to explain the nature and omnipotence of God, the existence of
the world, and the identity of God and the world. A theory of five faces,
or manifestationseach of which is given mythological names and related
mantrasis of great ritual significance. It associates Shivas so-called
creative function, by which he provokes the evolution of the material
cause of the universe, with his first face, or aspect; the maintenance and
reabsorption of the universe with his second and third faces; his power of
obscuration, by which he conceals the souls in the phenomena of samsara,
with his fourth face; and his ability to bestow his grace, which leads to
final emancipation, with his fifth face. The five functions are an emanation
of the unmanifested Shiva, who is the transcendent brahman.

The faces became the central elements of a comprehensive classification

system. They were identified with parts of Gods body, regions of the
universe, various ontological principles, organs of sense and action, and
the elements. The system was used to explain how Shivas being is the All
and how the universe is exclusively composed of aspects or
manifestations of Shiva. In his fivefold nature, Shiva was shown to be
identical with the 25 elements or principles assumed by the prominent
Samkhya school of Indian philosophy. The special significance of the
number five in Shaivism can be understood as a philosophical elaboration
of the time-honoured fourfold organization of the universe. (The four
quarters of the sky also play a prominent part in religious practice.)
According to this conception, a fifth aspect, when added to the four, is
considered the most important aspect of the group because it represents
each of the four and collectively unites all of their functions in itself. The
system finds its complement in the doctrine of the five sadakhyas (five
items that bear the name sat, is or being) representing the five
aspects of that state, which may be spoken of as the experience of there
is (sat) and which have evolved from Gods fivefold creative energy
(shakti). In these God dwells in his aspect called Sadashiva (Eternal
Shiva), which is regarded sometimes as a manifestation of and
sometimes as identical with the Supreme Being.

Another Shaiva doctrine posits eight embodiments of Shiva as the

elements of natureether, wind, fire, water, earthand the Sun, the Moon,
and the sacrificer, or consecrated worshiper (also called atman). To each of
these eight elements corresponds one of Shivas traditional names or
aspectsto the last one, usually Pashupati. The world is a product of
these eight forms, consists of them, and can exist and fulfill its task only
because the eight embodiments cooperate. Because each individual is also
composed of the same eight realities (e.g., the light of mans eyes
corresponds to that of the Sun), Shiva constitutes the corporeal frame and
the psychical organism of every living being. The eighth constituent is the
indispensable performer of the rites that sustain the gods who preside
over the cosmic processes and are really Shivas faculties.

Many branches of Shaivism having distinctive characteristics evolved in

different parts of India. According to the idealist monism of Kashmir
Shaivism, an important religious-philosophical school, Shiva manifests
himself through a special power as the first cause of creation, and he also
manifests himself through a second power as the innumerable individual
souls who, because of a veil of impurity, forget that they are the
embodiment of the Highest. This veil can be torn off by intense faith and
constant meditation on God, by which the soul transmutes itself into a
universal soul and eventually attains liberation through a lightning-like,
intuitive insight into its own nature. Hindus who adhere to this group
consider their doctrine a manifestation of the highest reality, Knowing
Consciousness, neither personal nor impersonal.

The Shaiva-siddhanta, a prominent school of Tamil-speaking South India,

assumes three eternal principles: God (who is independent existence,
unqualified intelligence, and absolute bliss), the universe, and the souls.
The world, because it is created by God (efficient cause) through his
conscious power (instrumental cause) and maya (material cause), is no
illusion. The main purpose of its creation is the liberation of the
beginningless souls, which are conceived as cattle (pashu) bound by the
noose (pasha) of impurity (mala) or spiritual ignorance, which forces them
to produce karma. Members of this school see the karma process as a
benefit, however, because they believe that, as soon as the soul has
sufficiently ripened and reached a state of purity enabling it to strive after
the highest insight, God graciously intervenes, appearing in the shape of a
fully qualified and liberated spiritual guide (guru), through whose words
God permits himself to be realized by the individual soul.

Connective, also called Sentential Connective, or Propositional Connective,

in logic, a word or group of words that joins two or more propositions together to
form a connective proposition. Commonly used connectives include but, and,
or, if . . . then, and if and only if. The various types of logical connectives
include conjunction (and), disjunction (or), negation (not), conditional (if . . .
then), and biconditional (if and only if). In a conjunction, two or more propositions
that are stated as true at the same time are joined by the connective and, as in
the statement Life is short, and art is long. In a sentence such as If the weather
remains mild and there is no frost, then there will be a good harvest, the
connective is If . . . then. The premises and conclusion of a syllogism are also
joined by connectives, as in All men are mortal and no gods are
mortal, therefore no men are gods.

The Megarians and the Stoics

...already been explored by the Megarians, they investigated disjunction (or) and
conjunction (and), along with words such as since and because. Some of these they
defined truth-functionally (i.e., solely in terms of the truth or falsehood of the
propositions they combined). For example, they defined a

The Megarians and the Stoics

Throughout the ancient world, the logic of Aristotle and his followers was one main
stream. But there was also a second tradition of logic, that of the Megarians and the
Stoics.
The Megarians were followers of Euclid (or Euclides) of Megara (c. 430c. 360 bce),
a pupil of Socrates. In logic the most important Megarians were Diodorus
Cronus (4th century bce) and his pupil Philo of Megara. The Stoics were followers
of Zeno of Citium (c. 336c. 265 bce). By far the most important Stoic logician
was Chrysippus (c. 279206 bce). The influence of Megarian on Stoic logic is
indisputable, but many details are uncertain, since all but fragments of the writings
of both groups are lost.
The Megarians were interested in logical puzzles. Many paradoxes have been
attributed to them, including the liar paradox (someone says that he is lying; is
his statement true or false?), the discovery of which has sometimes been credited
to Eubulides of Miletus, a pupil of Euclid of Megara. The Megarians also discussed
how to define various modal notions and debated the interpretation of conditional
propositions.
Diodorus Cronus originated a mysterious argument called the Master Argument. It
claimed that the following three propositions are jointly inconsistent, so at least one
of them is false:
1. Everything true about the past is now necessary. (That is, the past is now
settled, and there is nothing to be done about it.)
2. Theimpossible does not follow from the possible.
3. There is something that is possible, and yet neither is nor will be true. (That
is, there are possibilities that will never be realized.)
It is unclear exactly what inconsistency Diodorus saw among these propositions.
Whatever it was, Diodorus was unwilling to give up 1 or 2 and so rejected 3. That is,
he accepted the opposite of 3, namely: Whatever is possible either is or will be true.
In short, there are no possibilities that are not realized now or in the future. It has
been suggested that the Master Argument was directed against Aristotles
discussion of the sea battle tomorrow in the De interpretatione.
Diodorus also proposed an interpretation of conditional propositions. He held that
the proposition If p, then q is true if and only if it neither is nor ever was possible
for the antecedent p to be true and the consequent q to be false simultaneously.
Given Diodoruss notion of possibility, this means that a true conditional is one that
at no time (past, present, or future) has a true antecedent and a false consequent.
Thus, for Diodorus a conditional does not change its truth value; if it is ever true, it
is always true. But Philo of Megara had a different interpretation. For him, a
conditional is true if and only if it does not now have a true antecedent and a false
consequent. This is exactly the modern notion of material implication. In Philos
view, unlike Diodoruss, conditionals may change their truth value over time.
These and other theories of modality and conditionals were discussed not only by
the Megarians but by the Stoics as well. Stoic logicians, like the Megarians, were not
especially interested in scientific demonstration in Aristotles special sense. They
were more concerned with logical issues arising from debate and disputation:
fallacies, paradoxes, forms of refutation. Aristotle had also written about such
things, but his interests gradually shifted to his special notion of science. The Stoics
kept their interest focused on disputation and developed their studies in this area to
a high degree.
Unlike the Aristotelians, the Stoics developed propositional logic to the neglect of
term logic. They did not produce a system of logical laws arising from the internal
structure of simple propositions, as Aristotle had done with his account of
opposition, conversion, and syllogistic for categorical propositions. Instead, they
concentrated on inferences from hypothetical propositions as premises.
Theophrastus had already taken some steps in this area, but his work had little
influence on the Stoics.
Stoic logicians studied the logical properties and defining features of words used to
combine simpler propositions into more complex ones. In addition to the
conditional, which had already been explored by the Megarians, they
investigated disjunction (or) and conjunction (and), along with words such
as since and because. Some of these they defined truth-functionally (i.e., solely in
terms of the truth or falsehood of the propositions they combined). For example,
they defined a disjunction as true if and only if exactly one disjunct is true (the
modern exclusive disjunction). They also knew inclusive disjunction (defined as
true when at least one disjunct is true), but this was not widely used. More
important, the Stoics seem to have been the first to show how some of these truth-
functional words may be defined in terms of others.
Unlike Aristotle, who typically formulated his syllogisms as conditional propositions,
the Stoics regularly presented principles of logical inference in the form of
schematic arguments. While Aristotle had used Greek letters as variables replacing
terms, the Stoics used ordinal numerals as variables replacing whole propositions.
Thus: Either the first or the second; but not the second; therefore, the first. Here
the expressions the first and the second are variables or placeholders for
propositions, not terms.
Chrysippus regarded five valid inference schemata as basic or indemonstrable. They
are:
1. If the first, then the second; but the first; therefore, the second.
2. If the first, then the second; but not the second; therefore, not the first.
3. Not both the first and the second; but the first; therefore, not the second.
4. Either the first or the second; but the first; therefore, not the second.
5. Either the first or the second; but not the second; therefore, the first.
Using these five indemonstrables, Chrysippus proved the validity of many further
inference schemata. Indeed, the Stoics claimed (falsely, it seems) that all valid
inference schemata could be derived from the five indemonstrables.
The differences between Aristotelian and Stoic logic were ones of emphasis,
not substantive theoretical disagreements. At the time, however, it appeared
otherwise. Perhaps because of their real disputes in other areas, Aristotelians and
Stoics at first saw themselves as holding incompatible theories in logic as well. But
by the late 1st century bce, an eclectic movement had begun to weaken these
hostilities. Thereafter, the two traditions were combined in commentaries and
handbooks for general education.
Late representatives of ancient Greek logic
After Chrysippus, little important logical work was done in Greek. But the
commentaries and handbooks that were written did serve to consolidate the
previous traditions and in some cases are the only extant sources for the doctrines
of earlier writers. Among late authors, Galen the physician (129c. 199 ce) wrote
several commentaries, now lost, and an extant Introduction to Dialectic. Galen
observed that the study of mathematics and logic was important to a medical
education, a view that had considerable influence in the later history of logic,
particularly in the Arab world. Tradition has credited Galen with discovering
the fourth figure of the Aristotelian syllogism, although in fact he explicitly rejected
it.
Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200 ce) wrote extremely important commentaries on
Aristotles writings, including the logical works. Other important commentators
include Porphyry of Tyre (c. 232before 306), Ammonius Hermeiou (5th
century), Simplicius (6th century), and John Philoponus (6th century). Sextus
Empiricus (late 2ndearly 3rd century) and Diogenes Lartius (probably early 3rd
century) are also important sources for earlier writers. Significant contributions to
logic were not made again in Europe until the 12th century.