Miciano vs Brimo
Oppositor-appellant Brimo claimed
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927|
50 Phil 867
FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial
administrator of the estate in question, filed
a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo)
opposed Micianos participation in the
inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or
Philippine law will be the basis on the
distribution of Joseph Brimos estates.
HELD: Though the last part of the second
clause of the will expressly said that it be
made and disposed of in accordance with
the laws in force in the Philippine Island,
this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in
his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator, in
such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as
one of the legatees.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO,
JUAN MICIANO, Administrator,
petitioner-appellee, vs ANDRE BRIMO,
opponent-appellant
50 Phil. 867 November 01, 1927
Facts: Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of
Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate of
the deceased Joseph Brimo. The property
was said to be in the Philippines and the
testatrix wished that the distribution of his
properties and everything in connection
with it be in accordance with the Philippine
laws.
that the will of the testatrix is not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality. The errors he (oppositor)
assigned in his opposition were the
following: (1) the approval of said scheme
partition, (2) denial of his participation in
the inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the
partition, (4) the approval of the purchase
made by the Pietro Lanza of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said
business, and (5) the declaration that the
Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause,
and the failure not to postpone the approval
of the scheme of partition and the delivery
of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza
until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine laws shall
be applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, a
Turkish citizen who have resided for a
considerable length of time in the
Philippines.
Held: Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the
Philippine law was applied on the estate of
Joseph Brimo, where it was provided,
nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property or the country in
which it may be situated. However, the
oppositor did not prove, though was
granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, that said
testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws.
Therefore, there is no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testatrix
was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed; thus, the
approval of the scheme of partition in this
respect was not erroneous.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are
modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include the herein appellant
Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED.
MICIANO vs. BRIMO
FACTS: A will of an American testator
provided that his estate should be disposed
of in accordance with the Philippine law.
The testator further provided that whoever
would oppose his wishes that his estate
should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine laws would forfeit their
inheritance
ISSUE: Will there be forfeiture?
HELD: Even if the testators wishes must be
given paramount importance, if the wishes
of the testator contravene a specific
provision of law, then that provision in a will
should not be given effect. A persons will
is merely an instrument which is
PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It
should be subject to the provisions of the
Philippine laws. The estate of a
decedent shall be distributed in accordance
with his national law. He cannot provide
otherwise. The SC held that those who
opposed would not forfeit their inheritance
because that provision is not legal.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon.
Corona Ibay-Somera CITATION: GR No.
80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, was married with private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of
Germany. They have a child who was born
on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated
in private respondent and he initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed
2 complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still
married to Imelda, latter had an affair with
William Chia as early as 1982 and another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can
prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce was
already issued.
HELD: The law specifically provided that in
prosecution for adultery and concubinage,
the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse
and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the
offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines
in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under
the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR
AND GEILING et al G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, and private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married in
Germany. After about three and a half years
of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of
the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while
still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an
affair with a certain William Chia. The
Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal
of the cases on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal Victor approved a
resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint
for adultery against the petitioner. The case
entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia
was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same
case which was denied by the respondent.
Pilapil filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order
of the lower court denying her motion to
quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of
the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for
adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at
the time of the filing of the complaint for
adultery, considering that it was done after
obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order
denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
TRO issued in this case is hereby made
permanent.
NO. Under Article 344 of the RPC, the
crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since
been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. This is a
logical consequence since the raison detre
of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be
whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former
against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons
Under the same considerations and
rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
PILAPIL vs. IBAY SOMERA
FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda
Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich
Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. After about
three and a half years of marriage, Geiling
initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil
in Germany in January 1983.
Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed
an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before RTC of Manila
on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending
as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the
local Court of Germany promulgated a
divorce decree on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery alleging that,
while still married to respondent, petitioner
had an affair with a certain William Chua
as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution
directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a motion in both criminal
cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon.
Respondent judge merely reset the date of
the arraignment but before such scheduled
date, petitioner moved for the suspension
of proceedings. On September 8, 1987,
respondent judge denied the motion to
quash and also directed the arraignment of
both accused. Petitioner refused to be
arraigned and thus charged with direct
contempt and fined.
ISSUE:Whether or not the case for adultery
should prosper.
RULING: The petition entered dismissing the
complaint in criminal case was upheld for
lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case was
made permanent. The law provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse.
The fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, is admitted.
Private respondent, being no longer married
to petitioner has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the
posture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German
citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980
in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981
in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Makati
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a
motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also
provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree
had already been promulgated, and said
motion was granted by Public Respondent
RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, with a prayer that the
case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of
children and the distribution of the
properties between her and Wolfgang.
Judge Salonga partially setting aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling
the issues of support and custody of their
children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in
granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes. A judge can order a partial
reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality, as in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that
the court can modify or alter a judgment
even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after
the judgment has become final and
executory and when it becomes imperative
in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was
valid when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction as regards child custody and
support.
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, divorce
decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof,
e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our
courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the
award of custody to Wolfgang by the
German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50
of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section
48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that
private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of
the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have
parental custody of their two children. The
proceedings in the German court were
summary. As to what was the extent of
Carmens participation in the proceedings
in the German court, the records remain
unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent
is unfit to obtain custody of the children,
the trial court was correct in setting the
issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of
the children.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen
and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11
December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany.
Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two
daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria
Kristine.
Private respondent filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on
28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss but was denied by trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by
private respondent but was again denied by
the trial court.
In 1997, petitioner obtained a
decree of divorce from the Court of First
Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and
granting the custody of the children to the
father.
It was June 14, 1999 when public
respondent issued an order granting the
petitioners motion to dismiss, but was
partially set aside on September 1999 for
the purpose of tackling issues regarding
property relations of the spouses as well as
support and custody of their children.
Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack
of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent
judge.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts
can determine the legal effects of a decree
of divorce from a foreign country.
Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the
legal effects of a divorce obtained from a
foreign country such as those concerning
with support and custody of the children.
In this case, the decree did not
touch as to who the offending spouse was.
The trial court was correct in setting the
issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and
education of the best interests of the
children. After all, the childs welfare is
always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149,
issued on September 30, 1999 and March
31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
We hereby declare that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the issue between the
parties as to who has parental custody,
including the care, support and education of
the children, namely Carolyne and
Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of
this case be remanded promptly to the trial
court for continuation of appropriate
proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND
RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a.
AMAY BISAYA
FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994,
while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko, respondent was invited by a friend,
Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration
of the birthday of the hotels manager.
During the party and when respondent was
lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped
by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the
hotel, and asked to leave the party.
Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart,
who was herself a guest. Not long after, a
Makati policeman approached him and
escorted him out of her party.
Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent
to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstances painted by Mr.
Reyes, that she did the act politely and
discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the
celebrant to keep the party intimate and
exclusive, she spoke to the respondent
herself when she saw him by the buffet
table with no other guests in the immediate
vicinity. She asked him to leave the party
after he finished eating. After she had
turned to leave, the latter screamed and
made a big scene.
Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the
celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes
to the party.
Respondent filed an action for actual, moral
and/or exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. The lower court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling of the trial court,
consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko
moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant
petition for review.
ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is
liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party
as he was not invited by the celebrant
thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as
the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable
with her.
RULING: The Court found more credible the
lower courts findings of facts. There was no
proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to
humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to
ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes version of
the story was unsupported, failing to
present any witness to back his story. Ms.
Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable for
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its
liability springs from that of its employees.
When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. Article 21 states that
any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part,
Ms. Lims act cannot amount to abusive
conduct.
The maxim Volenti Non Fit Injuria (self-
inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court,
that is, to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury, that consent to
injury precludes the recovery of damages
by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger.
Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes
FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila
and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of
RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner
liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka
Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994,
Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby
of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet
Filart, a friend several years back.
According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him
to join a birthday party at the penthouse for
the hotels former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart
agreed to vouch for him and carried a
basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He
lined up at the buffet table as soon as it
was ready but to his great shock, shame
and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels
Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in
a loud voice enough to be heard by the
people around them. He was asked to
leave the party and a Makati policeman
accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All
these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to
his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party but not in the
manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim
approached several people including Dr.
Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart
did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms.
Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts
group. She wasnt able to ask it personally
with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking
over the phone and doesnt want to
interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave
because the celebrant specifically ordered
that the party should be intimate consisting
only of those who part of the list. She even
asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his
food then leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he
was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr.
Reyes answered very close because we
nearly kissed each other. Considering the
close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention
to relay the request only be heard by him.
It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing
everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted
abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party.
HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners
did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish
any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms.
Lim who did all the necessary precautions
to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be
humiliated in requesting him to leave the
party. Considering almost 20 years of
experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is
experienced enough to know how to handle
such matters. Hence, petitioners will not
be held liable for damages brought under
Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Quisumbing vs MERALCO
FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio
and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a
house located at #94 Greenmeadows
Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on
March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were
assigned to conduct a routine on the spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the
house and observed as standard operating
procedure to ask permission and was
granted by the plaintiffs secretary. After
the inspection, it was found that the meter
had been tampered with. The result was
relayed to the secretary who conveyed the
information to the owners of the house.
The inspectors advised that the meter be
brought in their laboratory for further
verifications. In the event that the meter
was indeed tampered, defendant had to
temporarily disconnect the electric services
of the couple. After an hour, inspectors
returned and informed the findings of the
laboratory and asked the couple that unless
they pay the amount of P178,875.01
representing the differential bill their
electric supply will be disconnected. The
plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite the
immediate reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted
maliciously and malevolent manner done
without due process, lack of regard for
QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and
business reputation and therefore held
them accountable and plaintiff be entitled
for damages.
HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the
petition and ordered plaintiff to pay
respondent the billing differential of
P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay
petitioners moral and exemplary damages
including attorneys fees. Moral damages
may be recovered when rights of
individuals including right against the
deprivation of property without due process
of law are violated. Exemplary damages on
the other hand are imposed by way of
example or correction for public. SC
recognized the effort of MERALCO in
preventing illegal use of electricity.
However, any action must be done in strict
observance of the rights of the people.
Under the law, the Manila Electric
Company (Meralco) may immediately
disconnect electric service on the ground of
alleged meter tampering, but only if the
discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of
the law or by a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory
Board. During the inspection, no
government official or ERB representative
was present.
Petitioners claim for actual damages was
not granted for failure to supply proof and
was premised only upon Lornas testimony.
These are compensation for an injury that
will put the injure position where it was
before it was injured.
TITLE: Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondent, Marilou
Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October
27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner
for the alleged breach of their agreement to
get married. She met the petitioner in
Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian
medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The
petitioner even went to Marilous house to
secure approval of her parents. The
petitioner then forced the respondent to
leave with him in his apartment. Marilou
was a virgin before she lived with him.
After a week, she filed a complaint because
the petitioner started maltreating and
threatening her. He even tied the
respondent in the apartment while he was
in school and drugged her. Marilou at one
time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage
agreement and told Marilou to not live with
him since he is already married to someone
in Bacolod. He claimed that he never
proposed marriage or agreed to be married
neither sought consent and approval of
Marlious parents. He claimed that he
asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment
since the latter deceived him by stealing
money and his passport. The private
respondent prayed for damages and
reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry
can give rise to cause for damages.
HELD: The existing rule is that breach of
promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. The court held that when
a man uses his promise of marriage to
deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and
willfully injures the woman. In that
instance, the court found that petitioners
deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to
surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such
promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to
have carnal knowledge with the woman and
actual damages should be paid for the
wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA
disregard of the laws of the country. awarding damages to the respondent.