1. Director o Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R.

Bayot
March 20, 1944

Facts: This is a case where in respondent is an attorney-at-law, is

charged with malpractice after having published in the Sunday tribune
an advertisement as to his services saying:

Marriage:

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay
or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of
parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential.

Herein repondent Bayot, at first, denied having publish such

advertisement but subsequently admitted having caused its
publication and indulged the court for mercy and promising not to
repeat such unprofessional conduct. He also said that the
advertisement was only published once in the Sunday tribune.

Issue: whether or not Respondent bayot is guilty of malpractice and in

violation of the ethics of the profession.

Held: The supreme court held that Bayot was in direct violation of the
ethics of the legal profession, it being a solicitation of business from
the public Sec. 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things
that the practice of soliciting cases at law for purposes of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes mal practice.

The supreme court further said that it is highly unethical for a lawyer to
advertise his profession like a merchant advertises his wares. Law is
not a profession not a trade. A lawyer who advertises his talents and
skill to the public degrades the legal profession and adopts the
practices of mercantilism.

2. Ledesma vs Climaco
June 28, 1974

Facts: Herein Petitioner Adelino Ledesma was appointed as the Election

Registrar for the municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental.
By virtue of the his appointment, he then commenced to file a motion
to withdraw form his duties as counsel de parte of one of the accused
at the sala of the respondent judge. The respondent judge did not just
deny such motion but instead, he appointed herein petitioner as the
counsel de officio of the accused whom he wished to withdraw from.
He again filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de officio of the
accused for the reason that he will not be able to devote his full time to
the cause of the accused by reason of his appointment as the Election
Registrar.

It was already apparent that the petitioner made several

postponements and that the government witnesses have to come all
the way from Manapala. It was noted that there was no incompatibility
between the responsibility of the petitioner to the accused and to the
courts as against his responsibility as the Election registrar.

Issue: whether or not that the petition of Atty. Ledesma to withdraw as

counsel de officio must fail.

Held: The supreme court held that the petition is of no merit and
therefore, must fail.

What is readily apparent in this case is that the petitioner was already
less than mindful about the cause of the accused in the case. He ought
to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.

In People vs Daban: There is need anew the disciplinary proceedings to

lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar
carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The
law is a profession, not a trade of craft. Those enrolled in the ranks are
called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of
the state, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
an indigent accused who cant afford the services of a lawyer is given
with one as a counsel de officio Such appointment even though it no
remuneration should not be equated as a diminution of zeal, but rather
to the contrary. It is true that a practicing lawyer still has to attend to
his paying cases, but this does not mean that such appointment as
counsel de officio must less regarded against those paying once What
is incumbent upon him as counsel de officio must be fulfilled.

The Supreme court further said that if the respondent judge is to allow
the petitioner to withdraw as counsel de officio, the accuseds right to
counsel could in effect be nugatory. It Is rendered in previous decisions
of the court that in criminal cases, there would no fair hearing unless
the accused be given opportunity to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
law, particularly in the rules of procedure. And he may be convicted
not because he is guilty, but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. It is the reason why the right to counsel is
deemed to be of much importance.

3. Jesus Ma. Cui vs. Antonio Cui and Romulo Cui

Facts: The Hospicio is a charitable institution founded and established

by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and
upport, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons. The spouses continued to administer the Hospicio
until their death in 1929. Thereafter the administration was transferred
to Muricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosaem. Maurico Cui died and
subsequently Dionisio Jakosalem. Afterwhich, Dr, Teodoro Cui became
the administrator. And afterwhich came several controversies and
court litigations ensued concerning the position of the administrator.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and Antonio Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, on of the nephews of the Spouses Don Pedro and Dona
Benigna Cui. The incumben administrator of the Hospicio Dr. Teodoro
Cui resigned in favor of Anotion Ma. Cui pursuant to a convenio
entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document and
thereafter, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. However, Jesus Ma.
Cui was not notified of such appointent of his brother and of the
convenio.

After the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui,the herein plaintiff wrote a letter to
the defendant demanding that the position turned over to him. The
demand not having been complied, he filed a complain in this cases.
Ronmulo Cui later on intervened and claiming the he is the rightful
administrator being the grand son of Vicente Cui, another one of the
newphews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of
donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio, the main issue turns on their respective
qualification to the position of administrator. Jesus being the older one
and upon the circumstances in sec. 2 of the deed of donation would be
preferred. que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor
impuesto o contribucion."
The spcific issue in dispute is the meaning of the term Titulo de
abogado. Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of bachelors of laws from
the University of Sto. Tomas but not as a member of the bar, however
on the other hand, Antonio Ma. Cui is a member of the bar and also
disbarred by the court on March 1957, was reinstated by a resolution
promigated on February, 1960 and two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator.

Issue: whether or not the meaning of titulo de abogado necessary

pertains to a person who is a member of the bar.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the term tituo de abogado means
not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelors of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying on for
the practice of law. A bachelors degree alone does not admit a person
to be the exercise of the legal profession. The term abogado refers to
a person who is an attorney-at-law, a person duy licensed to practice
the legal profession in the Philippines.

The admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the
authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138, such admission
requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyers oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being the
license to practice the legal profession. Under this criterion titulo de
abogado the plaintiff as against the defendant is not entitled to the
office of administrator. However, it is argued that although he is a
member of the bar, he is disqualified by virtue of the deed of donation
which provides that the adminstrator who lacks the evident sound
moral character be removed from the position. It is also a fact that he
was reinstated to the membership of the bar before he assumed office
and his reinstatement is a recognition of the rehabilitation of his moral
character.

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required if one

seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting
than that implied in the deed of donation as a requisite for the office
which is disputed in the case. When the defendant was restored to the
roll of lawyers, the restrictions and disabilities from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.

4. Raul Vilegas vs. Legaspi

March 25, 1982
 Facts: This involves two cases filed in May 1980 and Spetember 1979
respectively, involving the prohibition in Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the 1973
Charter.

Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel

before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction

On September 27, 2979, a complain for annulment of bank checks and

damages was filed agains Raul Villegas against Vera Cruz spouses and
Primo Canio Jr before the Court of First Instance Cebu, Branch XVI, the
presided by Hon. Ceferino Dulay and was filed through Assemblyman
Valentino Legaspim a member of the Batasang Pambansa from the
province of Cebu. Raul Villegas challenged the appearance of
Assemblyman Legaspi on the ground that members of the Batasang
Pambansa are not allowed to appear before the Courts of First
instance, which is a court of Original Jurisdiction. After the opposition
and reply of Assemblyman Legaspy, Hon. Ceferino Dulay inhibited
himself from the case and was re-raffled and re-docketed and
transferred to Branch II, presided by Judge Francisco P. Burgos.

Judge Burgos denied the disqualification of Assemblyman Legaspi and

likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.

On another case presided by Judge Burgos, Edgardo P. Reyes filed on

July 3, 1979 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch
XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsio-De Maas and
private respondent Eustaqui T.C. Acero to annul the sale of Excelsiors
shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporatiion. Assemblyman
Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as coundel for Excelsior
and such appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred
by Sec. 11, Art. VIII fof the 1973 charter.

This court then decided to jointly resolve the issue.

Issue: whether or not members of the Batasan Pambansa can appear

as counsels before the Courts of First Instance.

Held: The Supreme Court held to the negative.

Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any

Assemblyman from appearing as counsel "before any Court inferior to
a Court with appellate jurisdiction.

Under the amendment to Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a

national plebiscite held on Aprile 7, 1981, Sec. 11 reads:
No member of the Batasang Pambansa shal appear as counsel before
any court without appellate jurisdiction.

Although the case at bar were filed prior to the amendment, they
should be resolved under the amended provision, because as a general
rule, the provisions of a new constitution take effect immediately and
become operative on pending litigation.

Appearance has been defined as the voluntary submission to a courts

jurisdiction. Counsel means a an adviser, a person professionally
engaged in the trial or management of a cause in court; a lega
advocate managing a case at law; a lawyer appointed or engaged to
advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, public officer,
or public body. Ballantine's Law Dictionary says a counsel is "counselor,
an attorney at law; one or more attorneys representing parties in an
action". 4 Thus, "appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a
court's jurisdiction by a legal advocate or advising lawyer
professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another

From the above definition, it is therefore clear the Assemblymen

Legaspi and Fernandes are appearing as coundels to their respective
clients. They represent and plead the cause of another before a court
of justice.

As to the question that are the Courts of First Instance, courts with
appellate jurisdiction, the supreme courts said that courts with
appellate jurisdiction are courts that revises and corrects the
proceedings in a case already instituted and does not create that cause
or that is necessary that there should be an an inferior court that has
already decided upon a case being reviewed by the courts with
appellate jurisdiction.

Courts of First Instance has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) Original
and (b) appellate. They have appellate jurisdiction on cases arising
from the Municipal Trial courts. It is contended however, in these two
cases, that it took cognizance of the suits in the exercise of their
exclusive original and not appellate jursdiction, hence, Assemblymen
Fernandez and Legaspi are still prohibited from appearing before said
Courts as counsel.

5. Enriquez vs. Hon. Pedro Gimenez

Facts: On June 18, 1955 R.A 1383 creating the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority as a pubic corporation and vesting in it the
ownership, and jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory
embraced by the metropolitan Water District as well as areas served
by existing givernment owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage
system within the boundaries of cities, municioalities, and municipal
districts in the Philippines.

On March 1956, the municipal of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and

passed Resolution No 152 stating that it is the desire of the
municipality in the present administration not to submit our local
waterworks to the provisions of the RA. 1383. The municipal mayor
then transmitted a copy of such resolution to the provincial fiscal and
ask to render an opinion regarding the subject matter and whether he
would handle and prosecute the same in court should the municipal
council to question and test the validity of RA 1383.

The provincial fiscal then rendered his opinion and upheld the
constitutionality of RA 1383 and declined to handle and prosecute the
same. The municipal council then adopted and passed another
resolution authorizing the mayor to take steps to commence an action
or proceeding to challenge the constitutionality or FA 1383 and to
engage the services of a private counsel. The municipal mayor then
wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the
municipality in its action against the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority from filing of the complaint up to and including
appeal. His professional fee shall be 1,500 and payable upon filing,
upon termination of the hearing and 500 after judgement shall have
become final. The municipality will also answer for all the expenses
that he will incur during the handling of the case.

Upon filing of the complaint, petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal

treasurer to reimburse him of P40 that he paid for the docket fee and
the payment of P500 as payent for initial atty.s fee. The municipal
treasurer then forwarded petitioners claim to the Auditor Genera and
such was disallowed based upon the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
that the municipality of Bauan was not allowed to engage the services
of a private counsel and that its provincial counsel was not disqualified
to render such services to the municipality.

Issue: whether or not the Municipality of Bauan, Batangas is allowed to

engage the services of the petitioner as its counsel.

Held: The supreme court held that the Municipality of Bauan, Batangas,
thru its mayor is not allowed to engaged the services of a counsel
other than its Provincial Fiscal.
Under the Revised Administrative Code Secs. 2241, 1682, and 1683,
when the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any
relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the
municipal government, it shall frame such question in writing and
sbmit the same to the provincial fiscal. Futher, it is the duty of the
fiscal as egal adviser of the province and provincial subdivisions and
that it is the duty if the fiscal to represent privinces and provincial
subdivision in litigation, except in cases where the original jurisdiction
is vested on the supreme court.

Unlike practicing lawyers, the provincial fiscal cannot refuse the

performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law
without violating his oath of office, where he swore among others,
that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the
duties of the office.

Instead of hiring a special counsel, the municipal council should have

reuested the secretary of justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in
olace of the provincial fiscal who had declined t handle and prosecute
its case in court.

6. Felipe Salcedo vs Francisco Hernandez

August 8, 1935

Facts: Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant,

inserted alleged contemptuous paragraph in his motion for
reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the

resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed
at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust
all the means within out power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should
not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality
of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has
a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the
prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof
in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state
sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party
and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase
the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in
the administration of justice.

The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be
found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for that
purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having
employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion,
reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute
contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

Issue:Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

Held: The court held that Atty. Francisco is guilty of contempt. As a

member of the bar and an officer of the court, Aty. Vicente J. Francisco,
as an attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and
to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the
high privilege, not a right, but also in so doing, he neither creates or
promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents
anybody from haroring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder.

Yes, it is right for an attorney, in defending the cause of his client, to

deal with it with high energy of which he is capable. But not to the
point of resorting to intimidation without the proper respect that the
court deserves. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, but for the maintenance of its importance.
And whenever there be a problem against any judicial office, such
grievances should be brought to the proper authorities.

7. Sophia Alawi vs. Ashary Alauya

February 24, 1997

Facts: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B Villarosa &

partners Co, Lt. of Davao City, a real estate company. Ashari M. Alauya
is the incumbent clerk of court of the 4th judicial Sharia District in
Marawi City. They were classmates and used to be friends.

In this case, through Alawis agency, Alauya executed a contract for

the purchase on installments of one of the housing units belonging to
Villarosa and Co. and a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Mortgage Finance Corporation NHMFC.

Not ling afterwards, Alauya sent a letter to the president of Villarosa

and Co. advising the termination of his contract with the company
saying that he is terminating the agreement entered into between him
and Villarosa as represented by its sales agent Sophia Alawi, on the
grounds that Alauyas consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonest, and abuse if confidence by the aforesaid sales
agent making the contract void ab initio. Alauya further said that the
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made the contract an onerous one prejudicial
to his rights and interest.

On the same day, Alauya also sent a letter to the Vice president of
NHMFC repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa &
com and asking for the cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary deductions saying that
Sophia Alawi fraudulently and maliciously manipulated their contract
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without any
authority and against his will.

Alawi, on learning Alauyas letter, filed with this court a verified

complaint alleging the imputation of malicious and libelous charges
with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith; Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reoutation; Unauthorized enjoyment of privilage of free
postage; and usurpation of the title of attorney which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Issue: Whether or not the usage of the title attorney is allowed by

persons who passed only the Sharia Bar.

Held: As regards Alauyas use of the title Attorney, the Supreme Court
has already decided on previous cases that the those persons who
passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members if the Philippine
Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia Courts. While one who
passed the both the Sharia Bar and the Philippine Bar may both be
considered as consellors, in a sense that they can give advise in a
professional capacity. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

Alauya is saying that he does not wish to use the of counselor or

counselor at law, because in his region, because it is confused with
being a legislator. But that does not merit such use of the title attorney.
8. Santa Pangan vs. Atty. Dionisio Ramos
September 7, 1979

Facts: This is a case in reference to the motion of complain against the

respoindent of contempt. On Sept. 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the
hearings of the administrative case was postponed upon the motion of
the respondent for postponement. Upon verification of the attorney of
record of the accused in a criminal case in branch VII of CourtFirst
Instance of Manila, he is using the name of Atyy. Pedro D.D. Ramos.
The respondent then admit that he used the said name and avers that
he has the right to do so because in his birth certificate, his name is
Pedro Dionisio Ramos, and his parents are pedro ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in Pedor D.D Ramos is but the abbreviation of
Dionisio Dayaw, his other given name and maternal surname.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pedro Ramos is guilty of Contempt.

Held: the supreme court held that the explanation of the respondent is
untenable. Because the name that appears in the roll of attorneys is
Dionisio D. Ramos. The attorneys roll or register is the official record
containing the names and signatures contain of those who are
authorized to practice law and a lawyer is not allowed to use other
names other than that inscribed in the Roll.

The official oath obliges the attorney to solemnly swear that he will do
no falsehood. And as an officer of the court, an attorney has the
obligation of truthfulness, candor and frankness. With this, the
respondent violated his solemn oath for representing himself in court
as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos.

It is the duty of an attorney to the courts, for the purposes of

maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent
with truth and honor cannot be overemphasized. And with him doing
resorting to deceptions toward the courts, violates his oath of office.

9. PLA vs. Agrava

February 16, 1959

Facts: FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing
that he had scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining
who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines
Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical
training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner
contends that one who has passed the bar examination sand is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution
of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law
but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and
other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the
Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is
holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned
formally.

Issue:Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes
or is included in the practice of law.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights
in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also
embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work
involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of
facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.

10. Leslie Ui vs. Atty. Iris Bonifacio

Facts: On January 24, 1971 Complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos Ui in

Quezon City and as a result of their union they had 3 children all
surnamed UI. However sometime in 1987, she found out that her
husband was carrying an illicit relationship with the respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio whom he begot a daughter and they had been living
together in Ayala, Alabang.

Carlos Ui admitted to the complainant about his relationship with the

respondent. Complainant then visited the respondent to her office and
introduced herself as Carlos Uis Legal wife. Atty, Iris said to the
complainant that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Then
the complainant believed such representation and thought that such
relationship between respondent and her husband will come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship
between her and the respondent continued and that sometime in Dec.
1988, respondent and her husband had a second child. Complainant
then met again with the respondent and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui. But to no avail, the
illicit relationship persisted.

A complaint for disbarment was filed by the complainant against Atty.

Irie Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (Commission) on the ground of immorality,
particularly of carrying on an illicit relationship with he husband, Carlos
Ui. In the respondents answer, she avers that she met Carlos Ui back
in 1983 as a bachelor, with the knowledge that he had children back in
Amoy, China from whom he had long been estranged. Carlos Ui
formalized his intention to marry the complainant and they got married
in Hawaii, USA in 1985, and upon their return in manila, Carlos Ui lived
with his children and not in Ayala, Alabang where she lived.

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Hawai and she
would return occasionally to update her law practice and renew her
legal ties. During one of her trips, she was surprised that she was
confronted by a woman who insisted to be the legal wife of Carlos Ui.
Hurt and desolate by the happening, the respondent then cut all her
ties with Caros Ui. It is the respondents contention that her
relationship with Carlos Ui was not illicit because he represented
himself to the respondent as a bachelor and when he knew the civil
status of Carlos Ui, she cut off all her ties with him.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the IBP, the

complainant charged her husband and the respondent the crime of
Concubinage, but the same was dismissed due to insufficiency of
evidence to establish probable cause. The cmplainant then appeald to
the Secretary of Justice but the same was dismissed for the same
reason.

In the proceedings in the IBP, the complainant filed a motion to cite the
respondent in Contempt of the Commission wherein she charged
respondent for making false representation as to the year of the
respondents marriage with Carlos Ui. It appears that the true year of
the marriage between Carlos Ui and the respondent was in 1987 and in
1985 as confirmed by the State Registrar of Honolulu, Hawaii.
Respondent contended that the reason for such was to make an
impression that their first born was born within the wedlock. The
complainant then said that such act constitutes contempt of the
commission resulting as an indicative of her moral perversity and lack
of integrity which makes her unworthy to be a member of the bar. In
the respondents defense, she contends that she was the victim in this
case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was
already married, and that upon learning of the fact, she immediately
cut off ties with Carlos Ui.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio is guilt of contempt of the

Comission
Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immorality for
holding
Illicit relationship.

Held: In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,

on the issue of gross immorality against the respondent, they the
respondent to be the victim of this case as every man who wills to
court a woman will always present himself to be a bachelor. And the
commission does not find the that too difficult to believe in light of
contemporary human experience. However upon the charge of
contempt against the respondent, the commission reprimanded
respondent for knowingly and willfully attaching to her answer a
falsified Certificate of Marriage.

The Supreme Court agreed with all of the foregoing of the commission.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the
bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and dictates
of legal ethics.

An applicant to the bar must posses a good moral character and such
good moral character must be possessed not only upon application but
also upon the admission to the bar. Its continued possession is a
requirement for retaining membership in the legal profession
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have a good moral character.
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of
the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
In immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.