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G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of
the crime by an eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the perpetrator was reliable
and positive enough to support the conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of
AAA,1 a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision dated
August 19, 2002.2 The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On
June 28, 2005,3 the Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
intermediate review pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo. 4 On October 26, 2007,5 the
CA, although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and
modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a final bid to overturn his conviction.
Antecedents
The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with homicide perpetrated in
the following manner:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl,
against her will and consent; that on the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the
accuseds criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon said AAA by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy water and submerging her
underneath, which caused the death of said AAA soon thereafter.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
7659, otherwise known as the "Heinous Crimes Law". 6
At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in
Barangay Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the immediate cause of her death
was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year
old Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when she heard the
anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!; 8 that the cries
came from an area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what
was going on; that Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon
ended the girls cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was
happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there
she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number "11" mark, who dragged a girls
limp body into the river, where he submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and
stood over her body; that he later lifted the limp body and tossed it to deeper water; that he
next jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole time, Amegable could not
have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her; 9 that she
nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with
due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident; 10 that
after the man fled the crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house and told her
husband what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly reported the incident to the
barangay chairman.
It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an affidavit 11 that upon his station
receiving the incident report on AAAs death at about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two
other officers proceeded to the crime scene to investigate; that he interviewed Amegable
who identified the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants); that based on
such information, he traced Caliso as AAAs killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial
admission of the killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless
because the Prosecution did not present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.
Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested
that on the occasion of Calisos arrest and his custodial interrogation, he heard Caliso admit
to the investigating police officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime
scene; that the admission was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among
the curious onlookers that had gathered in the area; that Amegable, who saw SPO3
Pancipancis arrest of Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone home and
returned to the crime scene thereafter.12
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-mortem examination
on the body of AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the following injuries, to wit:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless shirt and
garter skirts.
2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth was filled
with mud.
3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.
4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).
5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.
6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of abdomen.
7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).
8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of both
scapula extending downwards.
9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter vertically
oriented to the right stained with moderate amount of yellowish fecal material.
10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora contracted and
retracted.
11. Theres no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the vulva.
There were old healed hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 oclock position.
12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).
13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior surface
middle 3rd left thigh.
14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left knee. 13
Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso and summed up
his findings thusly:
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P.E. FINDINGS:
1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion left side
of neck (Post ).
2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left
midclavicular line extending to the left anterioraxillary line.
3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal surface
(probably a scratch mark) middle 3rd left arm.
4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.
5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in
average size lateral boarder of scapula extending to left posterior axillary line.
6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark)
14x022 cm. and 5x0.2 cm. in size respectively at the upper left flank of the lower
back extending downward to the midline.
7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with an
average 5 cm left flank area.14
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day
of the killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.
Yangyang corroborated Calisos alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am
to 4 pm of June 5, 1997. He further recalled that Caliso was in his farm around 12:00 noon
because he brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded, however, that he was not aware where
Caliso was at the time of the killing.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby
sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The
accused is also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs the amount of P50, 000.00 as exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the old-
healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victims underwear had been
irregularly placed could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge; that the
examining physician also found no physical signs of rape on the body of AAA; and that as to
the killing of AAA, the identification by Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA
in the murky river was no other than Caliso himself was reliable.
Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Calisos
extrajudicial admission of the ownership of the short pants because the pants were not
presented as evidence and because the police officers involved did not testify about the pants
in court.16 The RTC cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise
the crime from homicide to murder, regarding the word homicide in the information to be
used in its generic sense as to include all types of killing.
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the accused-
appellant,17 namely:
i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt;
ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and
inconsistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength and the generic aggravating
circumstance of disregard of sex[; and]
iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.
As stated, the CA affirmed Calisos conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations
the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite
his back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she
made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the
incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that
Amegables view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAAs body had
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been submerged in the water; that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and
straightforward and worthy of credence; that no reason existed why Amegable would falsely
testify against Caliso; that Caliso did not prove the physical impossibility for him to be at the
crime scene or at its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident, for both Barangay San
Vicente, where AAAs body was found, and Barangay Tiacongan, where the rice field of
Yangyang was located, were contiguous; that the attendant circumstance of abuse of
superior strength qualified the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of sex should not have
been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to its not being alleged in the
information and its not being proven during trial; and that the death penalty could not be
imposed because of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its imposition in the
Philippines.
The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002, finding
appellant guilty of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Delfin
Caliso is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and is directed to pay the victims heirs the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, as well as the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by
the trial court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issue
The primordial issue is whether Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA
at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not
to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the
crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt.19
The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as
the culprit by Amegable in the following manner:20

As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable
was replete with discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that Soledad failed to see the
assailants face. Moreover, considering the distance between where Soledad was supposedly
hiding and where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to
have heard and seen the incident. According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even
remember if at that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.
At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could
very well recognize appellant. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that
was facing her, she asserted being familiar with the physical features of appellant,
considering that he frequented their barangay. Even during her cross-examination by the
defense counsel, Soledad remained steadfast in categorically stating that she recognized
appellant:
Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin
Caliso, the accused in this case, several times passed by your barangay, am I
correct?
A: Several times.
Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you acquainted with him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Even if he is in his back position?
A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)
Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses
of the profile of the appellant at the time of the incident. She related, in addition, that when
the victim was being submerged in the water, there was no object obstructing her view.
The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegables declaration in court
and her affidavit, such as the tree or plant from where she was hiding behind at the time of
the incident, are insignificant and cannot negate appellants criminal liability. Her whole
attention was riveted to the incident that was unfolding before her. Besides, any such
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inconsistencies are minor. Slight contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony
and could even serve to strengthen the witness credibility. A witness who is telling the truth
is not always expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time
and the treachery of human memory.
In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as
such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial
court. Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely against
appellant.
Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the
trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude.lawphi1 Findings of the trial court on such matters are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court.
Contrary to the CAs holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegables recognition
of him was reliable, the Court considers the identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to
meet the requirement of moral certainty.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always
require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in
crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can
equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of
the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People
v. Gallarde,21 to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is
last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to
that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are
two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal
case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances
where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of
a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the
persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms

part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that
the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to
the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness,
because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an
accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled
that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would
not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons
would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. 22
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in
her barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was
obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore,
Calisos conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegables
identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and
cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is
required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her
identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means
by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral
certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass
unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the
distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts
that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
A witness familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive
identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of
mistake.
No matter how honest Amegables testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by
a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to
generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other
reliable circumstances showing him to be AAAs killer. Her identification of him in that manner
lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being
mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community where the
crime was committed whose backs might have looked like Calisos back. Moreover, many
factors could have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation,
her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her
excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the
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records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them into consideration. But
the influence of such varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is
even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with
one another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer
view of anothers back. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. 23
Amegables recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did
not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-
a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had
been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso
without proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime was
perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to
Caliso guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of
competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in
Amegables identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and
immaterial, for even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions
of persons involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is
neither fair nor judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of
Amegable raise her identification to the level of moral certainty.
The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical
certificate dated June 9, 1997, 24 did not support the culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which
were mostly mere scratch marks, 25 were not even linked by the examining physician to the
crime charged. Inasmuch as the injuries of Caliso might also have been due to other causes,
including one related to his doing menial labor most of the time, their significance as
evidence of guilt is nil.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the
accuseds constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, 26 though his innocence may be doubted. 27 The
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary
importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense
he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution. 28
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime
of murder.
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The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release DECISION
Delfin Caliso from confinement, unless there is another lawful cause warranting his further
detention. PANGANIBAN, J.:

No pronouncement on costs of suit. When the identity of the appellant is not established beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal
necessarily follows. Conviction for a crime rests on the strength of the prosecutions
evidence, never on the weakness of that of the defense.
SO ORDERED.

The Case

Michael Maguing y Saligumba appeals the December 1, 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in Criminal Case No. 93-9911. The RTC found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Michael Maguing GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Murder charged in the Information, as qualified by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Crisanto Saul for the death
of the latter the amounts of P50,000.00 x x x; actual damages of P41,000.00 for burial
expenses; and moral damages of P100,000.00; and to pay the costs."2

The Information3 dated August 18, 1993, charged appellant in these words:

"That on or about the 12th day of August, 1993, in the Municipality of Cainta, Province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with a certain John Doe whose true [name] and
whereabout[s] is unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, both of them armed
with guns, with intent to kill and by means of treachery did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully, feloniously shoot one Crisanto Saul thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound
which directly caused his death."4

During his arraignment on February 8, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de
oficio,5 pleaded not guilty to the charge. 6 After a trial on the merits, appellant was found
guilty of murder.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

G.R. No. 144090 June 26, 2003
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, facts in this manner:
vs.
MICHAEL MAGUING y SALIGUMBA, Appellant. "On August 12, 1993, around 11:30 p.m., spouses Crisanto and Evelyn Saul were in the
house of the Jamias couple (Aniceto and Angelita) located at Block 29, Lot 28, Kabisig
 TRIAL TECH| 7

Floodway, Cainta, Rizal. With them were Honoria Ontanillas and Nestor Jamias. The group The trial court erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that the identification
was talking animatedly concerning the deployment abroad of Honorio Ontanillas as well as of the accused-appellant as the alleged perpetrator of the offense charged was not clear,
Crisantos deployment on the last week of that month of August. In the course of their positive and convincing.
conversation, two (2) masked intruders suddenly appeared from the door. One of the
intruders pointed a gun at the temple of Crisanto then a shot rang out. Crisanto slumped "II
on the floor. Evelyn was shoved inside a room by Aniceto Jamias and a scuffle ensued
between the second intruder and the rest of the group of the Jamiases. The second intruder
The trial court erred in giving credence to the incredible testimonies of the prosecution
was subdued. Evelyn vividly recalled that the gunman who shot her husband had the letter
witnesses and in disregarding the evidence adduced by the accused-appellant which was
M tattooed between his thumb and forefinger.
corroborated on material points.

"Post mortem examination conducted on the corpse of Crisanto Saul showed that the cause
"III
of his death was penetrating gunshot wound, left eye."7 (Citations omitted)

The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged
Version of the Defense
notwithstanding the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts simply as follows:
"IV

"Accused Michael Maguing interposed the defense of alibi.1wphi1 He testified that on August
On the assumption that the accused-appellant is guilty, the trial court erred in convicting him
12, 1993, he together with a certain Alex, Tetet and Dante were in the house of his uncle,
of murder instead of homicide."10
Reynaldo Tanco, doing some repair works. They started working at 8:00 oclock in the
morning and finished their job at 5:30 oclock in the afternoon. Thereafter, they engaged in a
drinking session until 7:30 in the evening. They then took their dinner and watched Simply stated, the main issue is the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
television. After his companions left, he stayed in the house of his uncle.
The Courts Ruling
"The foregoing testimony of the accused was corroborated by Reynaldo Tanco and Alex
Agustin."8 The appeal is meritorious.

The Trial Courts Ruling Main Issue:

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to establish appellants Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
criminal liability for murder. It gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses -- especially the wife of the victim. She was allegedly able to see the actual Positive Identification Required
shooting and to identify the assailant through the tattoo mark on his right hand.

to Sustain a Conviction
Hence, this appeal.9

In every criminal prosecution, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the commission of
The Issues the crime and (2) the identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 11 Cursory
identification does not suffice to convict the accused. What is needed is positive identification
In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration: made with moral certainty as to the person of the offender.12Verily, the critical consideration
in this appeal is whether the identity of the assailant was sufficiently established by the
"I prosecution.

At the outset it must be noted that the assailants wore masks, which completely covered
their faces during the entire course of the shooting. The prosecution never denied this vital
 TRIAL TECH| 8

piece of information at any stage of the proceedings. Further, even the trial court took From the testimony of Prosecution Witness Evelyn Saul, it is clear that in identifying the
cognizance of this fact. Given this factual premise, the prosecution had the task of showing assailant, her only point of reference was the tattoo on his right hand. Nonetheless, she
that one of the masked assailants and appellant were one and the same person. Regrettably, audaciously declared that she was able to recognize the assailant, who was wearing a mask
it failed to discharge this task. the whole time, as herein appellant. She testified as follows:

Masked Man "Q: So, there were 5 persons present [on] x x x August [12] 1993 at 11:30 P.M.?

Unrecognized by Witnesses A: Yes, [maam].

First, not having had any chance at all to see the face of the masked gunman, none of the
eyewitnesses was able to recognize or give a definite description of him later on. Thus, their
act of positively pointing to the accused as the assailant during the police lineup and the trial
was the result of pure speculation and was contrary to human knowledge and common
experience.
Q: What were you and your husband doing at the residence of Mrs. Angelita Jamias?
A: We were talking because her cousin has just had a medical examination and he was about
to leave on that coming Saturday while my husband [was] going to leave on the last week of
August.

In recent cases, this Court has upheld the validity of the identification of masked assailants Q: So, what this group, you and your husband and Mrs. Jamias and a brother of Mrs. Jamias
by prosecution witnesses, but only because of peculiar circumstances that served as reliable and who else?
bases for pointing to the accused as the culprits.
A: Honorio.
In People v. Mante,13 the accused was convicted because the yellow sando (undershirt),
which he had used to mask his face, was the same apparel he was wearing when he was
Q: Is he also with your group?
seen by witnesses in the vicinity of the crime scene prior to the killing. In People v.
Nang,14 appellants were deemed to have been positively identified, because the mask worn
by one of them accidentally dropped from his face in the course of a struggle with the victim. A: Yes, [maam].
In the same vein, we ruled in People v. Sotto 15 that the prosecution witness had positively
identified the masked assailant, because the two of them were previously known to each Q: Cousin Honorio Ontanillas did anything unusual happen?
other. The witness was therefore familiar with the body contour and movements of the
accused. Moreover, the gun used in the shooting belonged to the latter. He also tested A: While we were talking then suddenly entered two armed men. And they entered the house
positive for powder burns after undergoing a paraffin test. and one of them poked a gun to my husband.

Indubitably, the identification of the accused in the aforecited cases was based on significant Q: How many person entered?
facts and on circumstantial evidence other than the prosecution witnesses self-serving
declarations or statements.
A: Two (2), [maam].
In the present case, it was not established that the prosecution witnesses had previously
known appellant or were familiar with his voice, gestures and mannerisms. Neither was it ATTY. OLEDAN
shown that the mask he was wearing was dislodged from his face, so as to allow thereby a
reasonable view or even a slight glimpse of his facial features. Q: Did they [enter] x x x to a door?

Unreliable Basis A: Yes, [maam].

for Identification
Q: And how did they enter, they just entered slowly or what?
Second, the prosecutions basis for identifying the assailant was belatedly established,
unsubstantiated, uncorroborated and therefore unreliable.
 TRIAL TECH| 9

A: They suddenly entered forcibly and then I just had transferred to the seat near my Q: So, what else happened after that?
husband.
A: There was already a commotion while we were inside and I was trying to peep to see my
xxx xxx xxx husband if he was already dead and Mr. Jamias was able to wrestle from the other gunman
the gun by self defense.
Q: So, you said the two armed men forcibly entered and immediately one proceeded, what
did the one do? Q: What happened to the gunman who shot your husband?

A: One of them entered through the other door because there were two doors. A: There were shooting at the door, because they were trying to enter the room.

Q: Now, what did the one who entered the place where you were did? What did the one who xxx xxx xxx
entered exactly where you and your husband and the others were seated [did]?
Q: Did you see the gunman who shot your husband?
A: The man who entered through the door poked a gun to my husbands left temple while the
other man entered to the other door. A: Yes, [maam].

Q: Now when this man who poked a gun on the left side temple and pointed near the eyelid Q: If he is around the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
of your late husband what happen[ed]?
A: Yes, [maam].
A: I was pushed inside by Mr. Aniceto Jamias and when I was pushed inside there was
already a shot.
Q: Will you please point him out.

Q: And did you know where did the shot come from?
INTERPRETER:

A: Yes, [maam].
Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom who when asked gave the name Michael
Maguing.
Q: Where?
ATTY. OLEDAN:
A: When he entered there was already a shot.
Q: Was there any particular mark this gunman have that you specifically can recall?
Q: Was it the same man who poked the gun who shot your husband?
A: He has a tattoo in his right hand with letter m.
A: Yes, [maam].
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Q: Aside from you, you said that Mr. Jamias pushed you in the room, is that true?
Your Honor, the accused has a tattoo on his right hand with letter m between his thumb and
A: Yes, [maam]. his forefinger."16(Italics supplied)

Q: What about the others, what happened to them? On cross-examination, she candidly admitted that the gunman indeed had a mask on.

A: They also went inside the room. Mr. Jamias, myself, my husband and the [gunmen] were "Q: After the crime took place you reported the matter to the police?
the ones who were left.
 TRIAL TECH| 10

A: After the incident police arrived and we were brought to the police station. their credibility is seriously impaired, 24 the veracity of their claim is negated, 25 and their
probative value greatly diminished -- if not rendered useless altogether. On the whole, the
Q: And you [told] the police about the incident that transpired on that day? impression they create is that they were feigned or fabricated.

A: Yes, [maam]. While Evelyn spoke much of the supposedly ostentatious tattoo on the assailants hand,
nowhere in the testimony of the corroborating witnesses was there any mention of it. In fact,
Prosecution Witness Angelita Jamias, who was also present during the shooting, denied
Q: What was your description of the accused?
having seen it, much less the person who had shot the victim.

A: I stated that he has a mask on, he is a big man but I recall on the second time that he
This denial notwithstanding, Angelita conveniently and casually pointed to appellant as the
had [an] initial marked letter M in his hand."17 (Italics supplied)
killer, even as she admitted her inability to recognize him then. Moreover, contrary to
Evelyns narration, her claim was that she saw three killers instead of just two. She testified
We note that Evelyn mentioned noticing the tattoo only during the "second time." By "second as follows:
time" she meant August 16, 2002, when the followup investigation was conducted and her
Sworn Testimony18 executed. The initial investigation was conducted on August 13, 1993, or
"Q: And on the evening at 11:30, you said [that] there were persons who entered, who came
the day following the shooting incident. 19 During both investigations, particularly during a
in first? Were there [persons] who came first or they came in inside this [terrace] through
police lineup, she pointed to appellant as the killer. Surprisingly, she made no reference to
that door?
any tattoo or identification mark on his person during either of these investigations. It was
only in open court that she mentioned the tattoo for the first time.
A: They entered all at the same time at the side of the [terrace].
We find it strange why in her Sworn Testimony taken only a few days after the killing, this
witness did not even refer to any supposedly noticeable identification mark or tattoo on the Q: You mean to say they entered all of the three?
gunman. Neither did she disclose the fact that the assailant was wearing a mask. It seems
that she deliberately omitted this information to make it appear that she had a clear and A: There is a gate in this sketch so they entered to this gate, 3 persons.
positive view of the killer.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, it is baffling why the information about the tattoo was completely disregarded in the
Sworn Testimony, only to be used during trial as the sole determining factor to establish the Q: What about the third person, where did he enter?
identity of the killer. The material omissions therein gravely affect her credibility as to her
identification of the accused.20
A: He entered to the portion [of the] marked door.

It is beyond comprehension how she could have failed to mention an important factual detail
Q: Did you come to know who was this person who entered to this door?
such as the tattoo, especially in the initial stages of the investigation, when she knew that it
was the only means by which her identification of the assailant could be substantiated. We
cannot repeat often enough that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from A: I did not [notice] him.
the mouth of a credible witness, but must itself be credible. 21 Thus, it must also be
reasonable and in accord with human experience; failing to be so, it must be rejected. 22 Q: Did you come to know who he was?

Discrepancies and Inconsistencies A: I cannot recognize him.

in the Testimonies of Witnesses
Q: Will you please look around the courtroom who is that person if he is around?
Third, the eyewitness testimonies as to the identification of appellant are replete with
irreconcilable inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities pertaining to material facts. When A: Yes, sir.
they contradict themselves on a vital question such as the identity of the offender, the
element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. 23 Consequently,
INTERPRETER:
 TRIAL TECH| 11

Witness is pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when asked x x x gave the name of one of them was obviously fabricated to feign credibility, thus exposing even further her
Michael Maguing. predilection to prevaricate. The Court ruled in this wise:

ATTY. OLEDAN: "Inconsistencies on negligible details do not destroy the truth of a witness testimony, so long
as they refer only to collateral or incidental matters. But by no means can the inconsistencies
Witness pointed to the accused. and contradictions in Merdelyns testimony be characterized as trivial or insignificant. Her
propensity to make contradictory statements reflects her own uncertainty as to the actual
events leading to her fathers death.1wphi1 It is clear that she speaks not from memory or
Q: When the accused entered this door, what did he do?
experience. She cannot even give a definite chronology of the events that transpired before
her father was killed. We are convinced that she was simply fashioning her story and making
A: I did not exactly notice. spur-of-the-moment improvisations in an attempt to render her testimony credible. Instead
of so doing, she exhibited a disposition to fabricate that makes her testimony unworthy of
Q: You mean to say he just entered, he did not do anything? belief and credence."30

A: I saw him entered but I did not see what he did but he entered inside."26 (Italics supplied) By and large, the only piece of evidence linking appellant to the crime is the tattoo, which
one of the eyewitnesses claimed was identical to the one she had seen on the assailants
Upon inquiry from the trial court, Angelita affirmed her statements and categorically denied right hand. As explained above, such testimony hardly serves as reliable basis for identifying
having seen the person who had shot the victim. She further testified thus: the assailant. Thus, the trial courts conviction based on the uncorroborated claim of Evelyn
Saul -- that she recognized appellant as the assailant by the tattoo on his right hand -- must
be regarded as erroneous and set aside.
"COURT:
When the records are bereft of any indication that an eyewitness has given a description that
You did not see the victim from the very moment when he was shot? will enable an anonymous person to point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, the
court cannot judge whether a correct and proper identification has been made. 31
A: No, sir.
To be sure, the identification of appellant as the assailant in this case cannot in any way be
Q: You did not know how the victim was shot? considered positive and credible. 32 It is a settled rule that when the identification is doubtful,
inconclusive or unreliable, an acquittal is called for.33 The doubtful identification of the
A: No, sir. accused herein, when taken with the absence of any other evidence showing his guilt,
justifies his acquittal.34
Q: Neither do you know who shot him?
When Positive Identification
Does Not Prevail Over Alibi
A: No, sir.

In passing, we shall discuss the jurisprudential rule regarding the defense of alibi vis--vis
Q: Neither did you see who shot him?
the positive identification made by a credible witness. Although such defense is inherently
weak, the prosecution is not released from its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused
A: No, sir."27 (Italics supplied) beyond reasonable doubt.35 More important, before a court can apply the rule that positive
identification prevails over alibi, it is necessary to first establish beyond question the
When the testimonies of key witnesses cannot cohere to form a positive depiction of the credibility of the eyewitness as to the identification of the accused. 36 In the present case,
criminal act as well as its perpetrator, the inevitable conclusion is that one or more of them such credibility was not established. Hence, there can be no positive identification to speak
must be lying and merely concocting a story.28 of, and no application of the aforementioned rule.

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court acquitted the accused because of the inconsistent The defense of alibi becomes irrelevant when the prosecution fails to establish the guilt of the
testimonies and contradictory statements of the alleged eyewitnesses to the crime. The story accused beyond reasonable doubt. 37 A conviction for the crime of murder cannot be based on
 TRIAL TECH| 12

the appellants inherently weak defenses of denial and alibi. 38 Rather, guilt should be PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
premised on the strength of the prosecutions evidence. vs.
GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING", GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY
"While the defenses of denial and alibi are concededly weak, appellants conviction cannot be RAMENTOS, and RICKY VILLARICO, Accused-Appellants.
based thereon. It is a well-settled doctrine that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
uphold the Peoples cause based on the strength of its own evidence on the guilt of the
DECISION
accused. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show to the court to the point of moral
certainty that the accused indeed committed the offense charged. In the case at hand, the
prosecution, armed with evidence secured by police investigators, failed to discharge its BERSAMIN, J:
appointed task of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, by
constitutional mandate, appellant deserves exoneration." 39
The identification of the accused as the person responsible for the imputed crime is the
primary duty of the State in every criminal prosecution. Such identification, to be positive,
In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is whether the court reasonably
need not always be by direct evidence from an eyewitness, for reliable circumstantial
doubts, not the innocence, but the guilt of the accused. 40 Unless the identity of the culprit is
evidence can equally confirm it as to overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of
established beyond reasonable doubt to the exclusion of all others, the charge must be
dismissed on the ground that the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been the accused.
overcome.41 While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty, it
connotes that degree of proof which, after an investigation of the whole record, produces in On appeal by the accused is the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June
an unprejudiced mind the moral certainty that the accused is culpable. 42 6, 2003,1 finding Gilberto Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos, 2 and Ricky
Villarico guilty of murder for the killing of Haide Cagatan, and imposing the penalty
In this case, the quantum of proof required to justify a conviction for a criminal offense was of reclusion perpetua on each of them, thereby modifying the decision of the Regional Trial
not satisfied by the prosecution. Thus, the Court has no option but to uphold the
Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Tangub City that had pronounced them guilty of homicide
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. 43
aggravated by dwelling.3

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in Criminal
Case No. 93-9911 is hereby REVERSED. Appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is With treachery having attended the killing, we affirm the CA but correct the civil liability to
ordered RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. accord with pertinent law and jurisprudence.

The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith Antecedents
and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was
actually released from confinement, or of the reasons why he could not be freed therefrom.
On October 7, 1999, an information for murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court in
Costs de oficio.
Misamis Occidental (RTC) against all the accused,4 the accusatory portion of which reads:

SO ORDERED.
That on or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 oclock in the morning at Barangay
Bolinsong, Municipality of Bonifacio, Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with a short firearms (sic), did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot HAIDE
CAGATAN at the back penetrating through the neck which cause(d) the instant death of said
victim and that he had no chance to avoid or defend himself from the attack.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011

All the accused pleaded not guilty at their December 15, 1999 arraignment.
Version of the Prosecution
At around 7:50 p.m. on August 8, 1999, Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of
his familys residence in Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. The kitchen, located at the
rear of the residence, had a wall whose upper portion was made of three-feet high bamboo
slats (sa-sa) and whose lower portion was also made of bamboo slats arranged like a
chessboard with four-inch gaps in between. At that time, Haides sister-in-law Remedios
Cagatan was attending to her child who was answering the call of nature near the toilet.
From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the kitchen
aiming their firearms at the door Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood
behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos behind him. When
Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to the
ground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-in-law and Haides mother: Nay, Nay
tawo Nay (Mother, mother, there are people outside, mother). At that instant, Remedios
heard three gunshots.5
Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was coming out of
the toilet, making him instinctively jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and
recognize Gilberto, Sr., Gilberto, Jr. and Ricky who were then standing by the kitchen door.
They were aiming their guns upward, and soon after left together with Ramentos. 6
Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came
towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I
was shot by Berting).7 At that, she and Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica
Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot wounds on his left scapular region (back of left
shoulder) and right elbow. He succumbed shortly thereafter due to hypovolemic shock or
massive loss of blood.8
Version of the Defense
The accused denied the accusations and each proffered an alibi.
Gilberto, Sr. claimed that he was sleeping in his home with a fever when he heard a gunshot.
He insisted that he learned that Haide had been shot only in the next morning. 9 His denial
and alibi were corroborated by his wife Carmelita 10 and his daughter Jersel.11
Gilberto, Jr. testified that on the day of the incident, he went to Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis
Occidental at around 5:00 p.m. to visit his girlfriend together with Charlie Bacus and Randy
TRIAL TECH| 13
Hernan. They stayed there until 9:00 p.m. Thereafter, they proceeded to Tiaman to attend
the wake for one Helen Oligario Cuizon, and were there for an hour. They then returned to
Bolinsong and spent the night in the house of Randy. It was only in the morning that Randys
father informed them that Haide had been shot. 12
Ricky declared that he stayed throughout the whole evening of August 8, 1999 in the house
of his aunt Flordeliza.13 Myrna Hernan, a neighbor of Flordeliza, corroborated his testimony.14
Ramentos alleged that he was drinking tuba with others at the store owned by Cinderella
Bacus at the time of the shooting; and that he went home at around 9:00 p.m. after his
group was done drinking. He did not recall hearing any gunshots while drinking and came to
know of the shooting only from a certain Anecito Duyag on the following morning.1avvphi1
To discredit the testimony about Haide being able to identify his assailants, the Defense
presented Peter Ponggos, who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-
habal) when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita and
Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital. According to Peter, he asked Haide who had shot
him, but Haide replied that there had been only one assailant whom he did not recognize. 15
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling,
disposing:16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, with one aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each one of them to a penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day, as its minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day, as its maximum, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay jointly and
solidarily, the heirs of the victim P50,000.00, as civil liability and to pay the costs.
Let all the accused be credited of the time that they were placed in jail under preventive
imprisonment, applying the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecutions
witnesses, and disbelieved their denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical
improbability for them to be at the crime scene, for the distances between the crime scene
and the places where the accused allegedly were at the time of the commission of the crime

were shown to range from only 100 to 700 meters. 17 The RTC found, however, that the
Prosecution was not able to prove treachery because:
xxx The medical report of "gunshot wound left scapular region" which the doctor interpreted
to be at the back of the left shoulder is not sufficient to prove treachery, it being susceptible
to 2 different interpretations: one: that victim had his back towards his assailants, and two:
that he was actually facing them but he turned around for cover upon seeing the armed
"group of Berting". The Court is inclined to believe the second interpretation because the
victim was able to see and identify his assailants. Two prosecution witnesses testified that
the victim identified to them who shot him.18
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTCs decision, holding instead that murder was
established beyond reasonable doubt because the killing was attended by treachery, viz: 19
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Pursuant to Section 13, paragraph
2 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, We render JUDGMENT without entering it,
as follows:
1. We find all accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER. Each accused is
hereby SENTENCED TO SUFFER the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to CERTIFY and ELEVATE the entire
records of this case to the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED.20
Citing People v. Valdez,21 the CA explained that the attendance of treachery did not depend
on the position of the victim at the time of the attack, for the essence of treachery was in the
element of surprise the assailants purposely adopted to ensure that the victim would not be
able to defend himself. Considering that the accused had purposely positioned themselves at
night outside the door to the kitchen from where they could see Haide, who was then busy
preparing dinner, through the holes of the kitchen wall, the CA concluded that Haide was thus
left unaware of the impending assault against him.
Issues
In this recourse, the accused raise the following errors:
TRIAL TECH| 14
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF
MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE
ASSAILANT AS WELL AS ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY.
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses failed to positively identify them as the
persons who had actually shot Haide; that treachery was not attendant because there was no
proof showing that they had consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attacking the
victim; and that assuming that they committed the killing, they could only be convicted of
homicide.
The decisive queries are, therefore, the following:
(a) Should an identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who
actually saw the assailants?
(b) Was treachery attendant in the killing of Haide as to qualify the crime as murder?
Ruling
We affirm the finding of guilt for the crime of murder, but modify the civil liability.
1.
Positive identification refers to
proof of identity of the assailant
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no
conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. 22 In that
regard, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be
accorded any evidentiary force.23 The intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any
 TRIAL TECH| 15

weakness in the identification simply means that the accuseds constitutional right of Moreover, the following portions of Lolitas testimony show that Haide himself recognized and
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an identified his assailants, to wit:
acquittal,24 even if doubt may cloud his innocence. 25 Indeed, the presumption of innocence
constitutionally guaranteed to every individual is forever of primary importance, and every Atty. Fernandez:
conviction for crime must rest on the strength of the evidence of the State, not on the
weakness of the defense.26 Q. And where were you at that time when he was shot?

The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had shot Haide; A. In the sala.
hence, their identification as the malefactors was not positively and credibly made.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Honorable Court what actually took place when your son was
We cannot uphold the contention of the accused. shot?

The established circumstances unerringly show that the four accused were the perpetrators A. He came from the kitchen at that time when I heard gunreports, he said "Nay" help me
of the fatal shooting of Haide. Their identification as his assailants by Remedios and Francisco because I was shot by Berting.29
was definitely positive and beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, Remedios saw all the four
accused near the door to the kitchen immediately before the shots were fired and recognized xxx
who they were. She even supplied the detail that Gilberto, Jr. had trained his firearm towards
her once he had noticed her presence at the crime scene. On his part, Francisco attested to
Atty. Anonat:
seeing the accused near the door to the kitchen holding their firearms right after he heard
the gunshots, and also recognized them.
Q. And that affidavit was executed by you at the Bonifacio Police Station?

The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about seeing the four accused
standing near the door to the kitchen immediately before and after the shooting of Haide
inside the kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other logical inference than
that the four accused were the persons who had just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios
nor Francisco needed to have actually seen who of the accused had fired at Haide, for it was
enough that they testified that the four armed accused: (a) had strategically positioned
themselves by the kitchen door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same
positions after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had continuously aimed their firearms at the
kitchen door even as they were leaving the crime scene.
The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim as well as their familiarity
with the accused who were their neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as
Haides assailants. In Marturillas v. People,27the Court observed that the familiarity of the
witness with the assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred; and noted
that a witness related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the
person involved in the attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else,
would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the
law.28
A. Yes.
xxx
Q. And you affirm to the truth of what you have stated in this affidavit?
A. Yes.
Q. On question No. 7 you were asked in this manner "Giunsa man nimo pagkasayod nga
sila maoy responsible sa kamatayon sa imong anak? How do you know that they were
responsible (for) the death of your son? And your answer is this "Tungod kay ang biktima
nakasulti pa man sa wala pa siya namatay ug ang iyang pulong mao nga TABANG NAY KAY
GIPUSIL KO NILA NI BERTING ug nasayod ako nga sila gumikan sa akong mga testigos."
which translated into English Because the victim was able to talk before he died and the
words which he told me help me Nay I am shot by the group of Berting and I know this
because of my witnesses. 30
xxx

The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting
uttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim was a true
part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to
the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 42.Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. (36 a)
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." 31 In a general
way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous
with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. 32 The rule
on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately
after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 33
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and
also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 34 A
declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. 35
We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act the shooting of Haide
was a startling occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the
group of Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it
was uttered immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned
the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the
assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being uttered in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
TRIAL TECH| 16
In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused, it did not matter whether only
one or two of them had actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a
conspiracy existed among them. Indeed, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 36 Direct
proof of a previous agreement among the accused to commit the crime is not necessary, 37 for
conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of their commission
of the crime that evinces a common understanding among them on perpetrating the
crime.38 Thus, the concerted acts of the four manifested their agreement to kill Haide,
resulting in each of them being guilty of the crime regardless of whether he actually fired at
the victim or not. It is axiomatic that once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act
of all;39 and that all the conspirators are then liable as co-principals. 40
But did not the fact that the name Berting without any surname being too generic open the
identification of the accused as the assailants to disquieting doubt about their complicity?
We hold that there was no need for a surname to be attached to the nickname Berting in
order to insulate the identification by Haide from challenge. The victims res gestae
statement was only one of the competent and reliable pieces of identification evidence. As
already shown, the accused were competently incriminated also by Remedios and Francisco
in a manner that warranted the logical inference that they, and no others, were the
assailants. Also, that Berting was the natural nickname for a person whose given name was
Gilberto, like herein accused Gilberto, Sr. and Gilberto, Jr., was a matter of common
knowledge in the Philippines. In fine, the pieces of identification evidence, including Haides
res gestae statement, collaborated to render their identification unassailable.
Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v.
Gallarde,41 namely: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is
last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to
that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are
two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal
case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances
where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of
a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the
persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms
part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence

constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that
the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to
the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness,
because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an
accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled
that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would
not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons
would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. 42
To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction,
does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be
possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial
evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed
innocence of the accused.
Faced with their positive identification, the four accused had to establish convincing defenses.
They opted to rely on denial and their respective alibis, however, but both the RTC and the
CA rightly rejected such defenses.
The rejection was warranted. Long judicial experience instructs that their denial and alibis,
being too easy to invent, could not overcome their positive identification by credible
Prosecution witnesses whose motives for the identification were not shown to be ill or vile.
Truly, a positive identification that is categorical, consistent, and devoid of any showing of ill
or vile motive on the part of the Prosecution witnesses always prevails over alibi and denial
that are in the nature of negative and self-serving evidence. 43 To be accepted, the denial and
alibi must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence establishing not only that the
accused did not take part in the commission of the imputed criminal act but also that it was
physically impossible for the accused to be at or near the place of the commission of the act
at or about the time of its commission. In addition, their proffered alibis were really unworthy
of credit because only the accused themselves and their relatives and other intimates
substantiated them.44
2.
The essence of treachery is in the mode of attack,
not in the relative position of the victim and the assailant
The RTC ruled out the attendance of treachery due to its persuasion that the victim must
have been facing his assailants at the time of the assault and was thus not taken by surprise.
TRIAL TECH| 17
The CA differed from the RTC, however, and stressed that regardless of the position of the
victim, the essence of treachery was the element of surprise that the assailants purposely
adopted to ensure that the victim was not able to defend himself.45
We uphold the ruling of the CA.
There is treachery when: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. 46 The essence of treachery lies in the
suddenness of the attack that leaves the victim unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring
the commission of the offense. 47 It is the suddenness of the attack coupled with the inability
of the victim to defend himself or to retaliate that brings about treachery; consequently,
treachery may still be appreciated even if the victim was facing the assailant. 48
Here, the elements of treachery were present. His assailants gunned Haide down while he
was preoccupied in the kitchen of his own abode with getting dinner ready for the household.
He was absolutely unaware of the imminent deadly assault from outside the kitchen, and was
for that reason in no position to defend himself or to repel his assailants.
The argument of the accused that the Prosecution did not show that they had consciously
and deliberately adopted the manner of killing Haide had no substance, for the testimonies of
Remedios and Francisco disclose the contrary.
Remedios testimony about seeing the four accused taking positions near the door to the
kitchen immediately preceding the shooting of Haide was as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
xxx
Q. Were you present when the late Haide Cagatan was shot?
A. Yes, I was present.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Court in what particular place you were when the alleged
incident took place?
A. I was in the ground floor.
Q. What were you doing there?

A. I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of his (sic) nature.
Q. Now, could you possibly describe before this Honorable Court, Mrs. Cagatan, the exact
event that took place when the alleged shooting incident took place in your presence?
A. At that time, I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of (his) nature and after doing
that when I was about to stand up to go up I saw the Villaricos was (sic) at the back of the
kitchen.
Q. At the time you saw them was (sic) any one of them saw you likewise?
A. There was.
Q. Who was he?
A. Gilberto Villarico, Jr.
Q. At that precise time when you saw them and one of them saw you, what did Villarico, Jr.
do?
A. He aimed his gun to me.
Q. Could you possibly demonstrate that to the Court?
A. (Witness demonstrated by squatting position)
Q. Now at that precise moment when you saw Villarico, Jr. on a squatting position pointing
his gun at you, what was the exact action that you did?
A. When he aimed his gun to me I immediately dropped to the ground.
xxx
Q. Since you were personally present could you still remember Mrs. Cagatan how many gun
burst you head at that precise moment when you dropped to the ground because Villarico Jr.
was aiming his gun at you. How many gun burst did you hear?
A. Three gunbursts.
TRIAL TECH| 18
Q. Let us go back to the time when Villarico, Jr. pointed his gun to you. Do you still
remember what were the other accused doing or where were they at that time?
A. I can remember.
Q. Please tell the Honorable Court.
A. Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was on the right side; Ricky Villarico was on the left side and behind
Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was Jerry Ramientos and behind Ricky Villarico is (sic) Gilberto Villarico
Jr.
Q. What were Ricky and Gilberto Villarico, Jr. doing at the time?
A. They were also dropping themselves on the ground and aimed their guns.
Q. To what particular object that they were aiming their guns?
A. To the door of our kitchen.
Q. How about Ramientos, where was he at that time when you saw the accused pointing
their guns towards the door of your kitchen?
A. Ramientos was standing behind Gilberto Villarico Sr.49
Likewise, Francisco saw the four accused in the same positions that Remedios had seen them
moments prior to the shooting. He claimed that they were aiming their firearms at the
kitchen and continued aiming their firearms even as they were leaving the crime scene, viz:
Atty. Fernandez:
xxx
Q. Now you said that you saw all of the accused at the time when your late son Haide
Cagatan was murdered in the evening of August 8. Could you possibly explain to this
Honorable Court at the very first time what did you see?
A. After I came from the toilet I was proceeding to the kitchen because Haide was preparing
food and he was calling for dinner. When Haide Cagatan was calling for dinner and at the
time I was proceeding to the door of the kitchen, when I was near the door I heard the gun
shots.

Q. At the time when you heard gunshots, what did you do?
A. I laid down flat on the ground while my head is (sic) looking up and there I saw the 3
Villaricos bringing a revolver. They came from aiming their guns towards upstairs and they
are about to withdraw from that place together with Jerry Ramientos.
xxx
Q. Now, since you said that you saw the accused Villaricos, could you possibly tell the Court,
what were their responsible position(s) in relation to the door of the kitchen?
A. They were in shooting position as they aimed upward and they were bringing revolver
aiming upstairs.
Q. In relation to the door of the kitchen, could you possibly tell the Court what were their
responsible position at that time when you saw them?
A. The four of them were situated in front of the kitchen door. Villarico Jr. and Villarico Sr.
were facing each other while Ricky Villarico and Jerry Ramientos were also facing each
other.50
The testimonies of Remedios and Francisco on how and where the four accused had
deliberately and strategically positioned themselves could not but reveal their deliberate
design to thereby ensure the accomplishment of their design to kill Haide without any
possibility of his escape or of any retaliation from him. Aptly did the CA observe:
A perusal of the information shows that treachery was properly alleged to qualify the killing
of Heide [sic] Cagatan to murder. The prosecution was likewise able to prove treachery
through the element of surprise rendering the victim unable to defend himself. In this case,
the evidence shows that the victim, who was in the kitchen preparing dinner, could be seen
from the outside through the holes of the wall. The witnesses consistently described the
kitchens wall as three feet high bamboo splits (sa-sa), accented with bamboo splits woven to
look like a chessboard with 4-inch holes in between. The accused-appellants, likewise,
positioned themselves outside the kitchen door at night where the victim could not see them.
When the accused-appellants shot him, he was caught unaware. 51
3.
Penalty and Damages
TRIAL TECH| 19
There is no question that the CA justly pronounced all the four accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, and punished them with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
24852 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code, considering the absence of any generic aggravating circumstance.
However, the CA did not explain why it did not review and revise the grant by the RTC of civil
liability in the amount of only P50,000.00. Thereby, the CA committed a plainly reversible
error for ignoring existing laws, like Article 2206 of the Civil Code, 53 which prescribes a death
indemnity separately from moral damages, and Article 2230 of the Civil Code, 54 which
requires exemplary damages in case of death due to crime when there is at least one
aggravating circumstance; and applicable jurisprudence, specifically, People v.
Gutierrez,55 where we held that moral damages should be awarded to the heirs without need
of proof or pleading in view of the violent death of the victim, and People v.Catubig, 56 where
we ruled that exemplary damages were warranted whenever the crime was attended by an
aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary. Here, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, albeit attendant or qualifying in its effect, justified the grant of
exemplary damages.
Plain oversight might have caused both the RTC and the CA to lapse into the serious
omissions.1avvphil Nonetheless, a rectification should now be made, for, indeed, gross
omissions, intended or not, should be eschewed. It is timely, therefore, to remind and to
exhort all the trial and appellate courts to be always mindful of and to apply the pertinent
laws and jurisprudence on the kinds and amounts of indemnities and damages appropriate in
criminal cases lest oversight and omission will unduly add to the sufferings of the victims or
their heirs. Nor should the absence of specific assignment of error thereon inhibit the sua
sponte rectification of the omissions, for the grant of all the proper kinds and amounts of civil
liability to the victim or his heirs is a matter of law and judicial policy not dependent upon or
controlled by an assignment of error. An appellate tribunal has a broad discretionary power to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned, 57 for
technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving
the rights and obligations of the parties. Indeed, the trend in modern day procedure is to
accord broad discretionary power such that the appellate court may consider matters bearing
on the issues submitted for resolution that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court
ignored.58
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the heirs of Haide P75,000.00 as death
indemnity;59P75,000.00 as moral damages;60 and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.61 As
clarified in People v. Arbalate, 62damages in such amounts are to be granted whenever the
accused are adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder
charged and proved herein. Indeed, the Court, observing in People v. Sarcia, 63 citing People
v. Salome64 and People v. Quiachon,65 that the "principal consideration for the award of

damages xxx is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender," announced that:
The litmus test[,] therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous
character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death
penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on June 6, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No.
24711, finding GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR., GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and
RICKY VILLARICO guilty of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer reclusion perpetua,
subject to the modification that they are held jointly and solidarily liable to pay to the heirs of
the late Haide Cagatan death indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P75,000.00, and
exemplary damages of P30,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137519 March 16, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANGELITO MARTINEZ and DEXTER TAGLE, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the decision1 of Branch 259 of the Regional Trial Court in Paraaque
City finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by RA 7659, and imposing upon them the death penalty and moral
damages of P1,000,000. This case is now before us on automatic review.
In an amended information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, appellants
Angelito Martinez and Dexter Tagle, together with accused Rosita Yu, Genaro de Jesus, Rigor
Aguilar, Rico Basa and Dennis Rivera, were charged with kidnapping for ransom:
That at about 10:30 oclock in the evening of 4 August 1996 along Quirino Avenue,
Paraaque City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
TRIAL TECH| 20
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another together with some
other persons whose liabilities are still being determined in a preliminary investigation, did
then and there, by force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry
away and kidnap ATTY. AQUILES LOPEZ against his will, and thereafter detain him, thereby
depriving ATTY. AQUILES LOPEZ of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom for his
release.
Records show that on August 2, 1996, appellants Martinez and Tagle met with accused
Aguilar, Rivera and Basa at the Emilio Aguinaldo College along Taft Avenue, Manila. The
group conjured up a plan to kidnap any person for ransom on August 5, 1996.
On August 4, 1996 at around 6:00 p.m., on board a red Toyota Corolla with tinted windows
and bearing a California plate, appellant Tagle and accused Aguilar and Rivera first proceeded
to appellant Martinez house in Valenzuela City. Wearing military and police uniforms, they
then went to SM Mega Mall in Ortigas where they planned to intercept classy cars violating
traffic rules as a prelude to spotting a suitable kidnap victim. Unable to find one, the group
drove to Paraaque City. At around 10:30 p.m., the group spotted a black Honda Accord with
plate no. TPA-762 along Quirino Avenue, Paraaque City. The driver of said car was later
identified as the kidnap victim, Atty. Aquiles Lopez. Overtaking Lopez on the left (drivers
side), appellant Martinez who was occupying the front seat, brandished a long firearm at
him. Lopez tried to speed away but the red car succeeded in blocking his path. As Lopez
brought his car to a stop, the group alighted from the red car and introduced themselves as
members of the police Narcotics Command. He was able to see their faces clearly because
the headlights of his car were on. Accused Aguilar approached him and demanded to see his
car registration papers while appellant Tagle searched the trunk of his car. Realizing that
Lopez was the president of a company, appellant Martinez ordered appellant Tagle and
accused Aguilar to transfer him to the backseat of the black Honda Accord where he was
handcuffed and blindfolded. The group drove to the North Expressway with appellant Tagle at
the wheel of the black Honda. Accused Basa was seated at the front seat while appellant
Martinez, victim Lopez and accused Aguilar were at the back. Accused Rivera drove the
kidnappers red Toyota Corolla. Upon reaching the Sta. Rita exit, Lopez was transferred to the
red car. They proceeded to appellant Martinez house where the victim was hold captive for
four nights and three days.
During his detention, Lopez conveyed to his daughter Rosalinda Lopez Medina his abductors
demand for ransom of P10,000,000 which was later reduced to P2,000,000.
In the meantime, on August 5, 1996, the family of Lopez reported his disappearance to the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) after his daughter received several phone calls
early in the morning informing her of her fathers kidnapping. After receiving the report,
Senior Supt. Roberto Calinisan, head of the Task Force Habagat, immediately dispatched his

men to ascertain the whereabouts of Lopez. On August 6, 1996, the monitoring team
assigned to the northern sector of the metropolis spotted the black Honda Accord with plate
no. TPA-762 parked inside a residence in Yakal Street, Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. At around 11:00 p.m. the next day, August 7, 1996, after surveillance operations
confirmed that the victim was indeed being detained inside one of the rooms of the house,
operatives of the PACC Task Force Habagat raided the said residence and successfully
rescued Lopez. While the PACC agents were still inside the house, about three persons
outside and on board a red Toyota Corolla traded shots with perimeter security personnel of
the PACC Task Force. The occupants of the red car were able to elude arrest but appellant
Martinez and accused Yu and de Jesus were arrested during the raid. Several items were
recovered from the scene.2
In a subsequent report by the members of the Valenzuela Police, the same red Toyota Corolla
with California plates was found abandoned inside Fortune Village Subdivision. Several items
were likewise recovered inside the abandoned vehicle. 3
On August 9, 1996, accused Aguilar and, on August 10, 1996, appellant Tagle surrendered to
the authorities after learning that they were being implicated in the kidnapping of Lopez.
Appellant Tagle even accompanied the operatives of the PNP-CIU in a follow-up operation at
Fortune 7, Parada St., Valenzuela. The operation resulted as well in the recovery of some
items.4
On arraignment and with the assistance of their respective counsels, appellants Martinez and
Tagle, accused Yu, de Jesus and Aguilar all pleaded not guilty to the charge against them
while accused Rivera and Basa remained at large. Pre-trial was terminated and trial
proceeded accordingly.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses: kidnap victim Atty. Aquiles Lopez, the kidnap
victims daughter Rosalinda Lopez Medina, Sr. Insp. Narciso Ouano, Jr., SPO Jesus C. Sagisi,
PNP member Romeo Biete, Chief Insp. Gilbert Cruz, Sr. Insp. Ronaldo Mendoza, and accused
turned state witness Rigor Aguilar. For the defense, appellant Martinez testified in his behalf
and presented as witnesses Felicidad Condino, Perla Condino and co-accused Rosita Yu.
Appellant Tagle, on the other hand, testified in his own behalf and presented his mother,
Manuela Tagle, as his other witness. Accused Yu and de Jesus did not present any witnesses
but relied solely on their own respective testimonies.
On April 29, 1997, the prosecution filed a motion to discharge accused Aguilar from the
information for utilization as state witness. The trial court granted the motion despite
opposition from the accused and also denied their joint motion for reconsideration.
TRIAL TECH| 21
On July 1, 1997, appellant Martinez and accused de Jesus filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayers for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, to nullify the trial courts order discharging
accused Aguilar as state witness and denying their joint motion for reconsideration. After
their petition was denied, a petition for review under Rule 45 was filed with this Court. We
denied said petition.
On December 7, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Angelito Martinez and Dexter Tagle
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by RA 7659, both accused Martinez and Tagle are hereby sentenced to the supreme penalty
of death by lethal injection and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law specifically
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. They are also ordered to pay moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 each.
As earlier pronounced, accused Rosita Yu and Genaro de Jesus are declared NOT GUILTY for
insufficiency of evidence while the case against Dennis Rivera and Rico Basa is ordered
archived pending their apprehension.
Rigor Aguilar, having been discharged to testify as a witness for the prosecution, is hereby
set free pursuant to Section[s] 9 and 11 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and towards this
end, the PACC is directed to immediately release him from custody unless there by
(sic) some other reasons for his further detention.
The Jail Warden of Paraaque is also ordered to release Rosita Yu and Genaro de Jesus unless
there be some reasons also for their further detention.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to prepare the MITTIMUS for the immediate
transfer of Angelito Martinez and Dexter Tagle to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City
and finally forward all the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review in
accordance with Section 8 Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Section 22 of RA 7659.5
In his brief,6 appellant Tagle raises the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM NOTWITHSTANDING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
PROSECUTION.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISCHARGE OF STATE WITNESS RIGOR
AGUILAR FROM THE INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 9 [now Section 17],
RULE 119 OF THE RULES OF COURT DESPITE HIS INADMISSIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DEXTER TAGLE
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY
AMONG THE PERPETRATORS WITH CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DEXTER TAGLE ON THE
BASIS OF THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE VICTIM DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS
NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE POLICE LINE-UP WHEN IDENTIFIED.
Appellant Martinez, on the other hand, assigns the following errors: 7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING MARTINEZ GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MARTINEZ WAS
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE (SIC) LOPEZ, THE KIDNAP VICTIM.
(THE) TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE
WITNESS, RIGOR AGUILAR.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING ACCUSED APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
The issue in this case boils down to ascertaining whether or not the guilt of both appellants
Martinez and Tagle was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The defense stresses that, due to the doubtful identification and description by Lopez, there
was a lack of ample evidence positively pinpointing appellants as the abductors. Appellant
Martinez alleges that it was impossible for Lopez to clearly see his abductors and therefore
his description of his kidnappers was too general and vague. On the other hand, appellant
Tagle claims that the identification made by the victim during the police line-up was
inadmissible because he stood there without the assistance of counsel.
We disagree. Lopez described the man who brandished a rifle at his left as "tall, well-built,
slightly dark and wearing a police uniform," while the man who opened the trunk of his car
"was wearing a white t-shirt, not very tall, fair complexioned but pretty well-built," and the
man who ordered the others to put him at the back seat of the car "was tall, well-built, husky
and wearing a camouflage uniform." The description given by the victim was acceptable as it
TRIAL TECH| 22
sufficiently identified his abductors. In addition, Lopez stated in open court that he could
recognize his kidnappers if he saw them again. Thus, even if the description he gave was
allegedly general in character, recognition and description are two different processes that do
not necessarily jibe. Description presupposes a facility of communication that many persons
do not possess.8
The most important evidence was the positive testimony of Lopez recognizing appellants as
his abductors. Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances
take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court
has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
committed. Lopez positively identified appellant Martinez as one of his captors. He testified
that he saw the faces of his abductors because the headlights of his car were focused on
them when they alighted from their car. This enabled him to clearly see their faces. All too
often, the face of the assailant and his body movements create a lasting impression on the
victim's mind and cannot thus be easily erased from his memory.
On the allegation of appellant Tagle that his identification by the victim during the line-up
without his counsel violated his constitutional right (to counsel), suffice it to say that such
right attaches only upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information, confession or admission from the accused. In
this case, when appellant Tagle was identified by Lopez in the police line-up, he had not yet
been held to answer for the criminal offense for which he has since been charged and
convicted. Thus, appellant Tagles right to counsel could not have been violated as the
confrontation between the State and the accused had not yet begun. This Court has
consistently held that the prohibition against custodial investigation conducted without the
assistance of counsel does not extend to a person in a police line-up. This particular stage of
an investigation where a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be
outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it as yet involves a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held
that an identification without the presence of counsel at a police line-up does not preclude
the admissibility of an in-court identification.9
Appellant Tagle claims that, when the police line-up was conducted, he was already indicted
for the offense charged and thus had the right to counsel. This is not correct for it has been
ruled that a persons right to counsel while under custodial investigation cannot be invoked
until such time as the police investigators start questioning, interrogating or exacting a
confession from the person under investigation. 10 During the police line-up, appellant Tagle
was not interrogated at all and no statement or confession was extracted from him.
Therefore, there was no deprivation of his right to counsel because the accusatory process
had not yet begun nor had the police, at that stage, exacted a confession from him.

Moreover, the appellants have not shown any ill-motive on the part of the victim to fabricate
charges against them. It is well-settled that when there is no evidence to show that the
prosecution witness is actuated by an improper motive, identification of the appellants as the
offenders should be given full faith and credit. 11
Furthermore, appellant Tagle avers that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of
conspiracy. On this point, we have time and again held that conspiracy need not be
established by direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to commit a crime but that it
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of
interest.12The conspiracy in this case was clear from the overt acts of the accused which
facilitated the kidnapping of Lopez.
The group of Tagle, masterminded by appellant Martinez, armed with high-powered weapons
and simulating public authority, carried out their plan to commit kidnapping for ransom.
Contrary to appellant Tagles contention, his complicity in the kidnapping was established not
only by the testimony of state witness Rigor Aguilar but also by the testimony of victim Lopez
himself. Both Aguilar and Lopez positively identified him. It is well-settled that the trial
courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded great respect owing to its
opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses conduct and demeanor on the witness
stand.13 In this case, the trial court found the testimonies of Aguilar and Lopez totally
credible.14 This Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the court a quo.
The appellants also fault the trial court for not giving credence to their defense of alibi,
claiming that where the evidence of the prosecution is weak, the defense of alibi assumes
importance and bears looking into. This contention, however, must fail in the face of the
positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime by the victim himself
and state witness Aguilar.
Tagle averred that on August 4, 1996, he was at home helping his mother prepare for the
death anniversary of his father. He accompanied her to Divisoria and later, at around 7:00
p.m., he went to the house of accused Rivera who wanted to borrow his car. Thereafter, he
visited to his girlfriend and went home at around 11:00 p.m. His mother, Manuela Tagle,
corroborated his story. On the other hand, appellant Martinez stated that on August 2, 1996,
he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Paraaque to fetch one Perla Condino.
Perla and her mother, Felicidad Condino, attested that Martinez accompanied Felicidad in
fetching Perla from the airport. Further, appellant Martinez alleged that, in the evening of
August 4, 1996, he was with his girlfriend, accused Rosita Yu, in Valenzuela. He was
awakened when the group of accused Aguilar arrived at around 1:00 a.m. on August 5, 1996
and asked to spend the night in his house.
TRIAL TECH| 23
Both appellants failed to establish that it was impossible for them to be at the scene of the
crime. In the case of Tagle, the fact that he accompanied and helped his mother prepare for
his fathers death anniversary was of no moment for he admitted that he left their house in
the evening of August 4, 1996. It was therefore not impossible for him to join the other
accused to commit the crime and still be back home immediately thereafter. In the case of
Martinez, his claim that he was then sleeping at home in Valenzuela at the time the crime
was committed deserves scant consideration. Since both Ortigas and Paraaque City are no
more than a few hours drive from Valenzuela, it was not impossible for Martinez to be
physically present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
The alibis proffered by the appellants cannot prevail over the unequivocal testimony of the
victim categorically and positively pointing to them as his abductors. The defense of alibi, to
be given full credit, must be clearly established and must not leave room for doubt.
The contention of both appellants that the discharge of Aguilar as state witness was
erroneous as it allegedly failed to comply with the conditions set forth under Rule 119,
Section 17 of the Rules of Court 15 lacks merit. The discharge of an accused as a state witness
is at the discretion of the court. The prosecution can only propose such discharge and the
court can refuse it if the objective of the prosecution will not be served thereby. Absolute
certainty is not required in the determination of whether the conditions for discharge are
present since the trial court has perforce to rely in large part on the representations of the
prosecution. In this case, there was no other direct evidence available to prove the
conspiracy to commit kidnapping and to establish the circumstances leading to Lopez
abduction. Hence, the necessity of discharging Aguilar as state witness. In any event,
Aguilars testimony was substantially corroborated by those of the other prosecution
witnesses. Furthermore, Aguilar did not appear to be the most guilty among the accused
since it was clear that he was not the leader of the group. In addition, there was no showing
that Aguilar had ever been previously convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Appellant Tagle likewise contends that Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
(now Section 17 of the Revised Rules, as amended on October 3, 2000) requires that the
sworn statement of the accused intended to be discharged must be presented in court. Since
Aguilars sworn statement was obtained without the assistance of an independent counsel
(he secured the services of the assisting lawyer in the execution of his sworn statement), it
was made in violation of his constitutional rights. Hence, it was inadmissible and could not be
made the basis of his discharge as state witness.
It can be gleaned, however, from the sworn statement of Aguilar that he was the one who
obtained the services of the lawyer who assisted him in the execution of his sworn
statement. It was also significant that Aguilar was duly informed of his constitutional rights.
He was warned that any statement he made could be used against him and that he was

entitled to be assisted by a lawyer of his choice. At this point, Aguilar, on his own accord,
chose the assisting counsel to act as his lawyer. Considering the foregoing circumstances,
this Court is of the view that Aguilars admissions in his sworn statement, voluntarily made
and later confirmed by him in open court during the trial, negated the challenge now
interposed as to the admissibility of such sworn statement.
Furthermore, appellant Tagle alleges that since the pieces of evidence presented were
inadmissible for having been obtained without a search warrant, his conviction based thereon
was erroneous. This argument does not hold water either. The extraordinary circumstances
leading to the rescue of Lopez did not require a search warrant. The PACC had reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime was then being committed. Its agents conducted a series of
surveillance operations to confirm and ascertain that the victim was indeed being detained
inside one of the rooms in the house where the Black Honda Accord was parked.
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant the action they
undertook. In such an urgent situation, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Furthermore, appellant Tagles conviction was based not solely on the items recovered during
the raid but also on the testimony and positive identification by victim Lopez and state
witness Aguilar.
Also, in his futile attempt to secure exculpation, appellant Martinez would have us believe
that the testimonies of Lopez and state witness Aguilar on the manner the abduction was
carried out conflicted with each other. Lopez allegedly testified that a firearm was poked at
him to make him stop but Aguilar mentioned that a siren blast was used to make him stop.
He further alleged that Lopez tried to speed away while Aguilar testified that Lopez slowed
down. Furthermore, the victim stated that three armed men alighted from the red car while
Aguilar testified that all five of them get down therefrom. In addition, appellant Martinez
averred that the testimonies of Lopez and Aguilar contradicted each other as to the roles the
accused played, the clothes they wore and the abductors seating arrangement inside the
black Honda car.
Appellants attempts to destroy the prosecution witnesses testimonies are futile. The
inconsistencies cited refer to minor details. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance
of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and
discrepancies pointed out by appellant Martinez are not of such nature as would warrant the
reversal of the decision appealed from.
Appellants were charged with and convicted by the trial court of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC as amended by RA
7659.16 To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping for ransom
TRIAL TECH| 24
and serious illegal detention, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the
intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) the actual deprivation of the
victim of his liberty and (c) the motive of the accused to exact ransom for the release of the
victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which
may be proved by words or overt acts before, during or after the kidnapping and detention of
the victim.17 Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the
crime to be committed.18
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts were indisputably established: (1) Lopez
was abducted on August 4, 1996 by five men including appellants Martinez and Tagle; (2) the
victim was detained in the house of appellant Martinez against his will and was deprived of
his liberty, and (3) the kidnappers demanded payment of ransom, initially in the amount
of P10,000,000, for the release of the victim. After several negotiations, it was reduced
to P2,000,000. The daughter of Lopez testified that she received several phone calls
demanding the aforesaid amounts for the release of her father. Clearly, all the elements and
qualifying circumstance to warrant conviction for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
serious illegal detention were established beyond reasonable doubt. As provided in Article
267 of the RPC, the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom.
The award by the trial court of P1,000,000 as moral damages should be modified. Under
Article 2219, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded to a victim of
illegal detention or arrest. The appellants brandished a firearm at the victim, blindfolded him
and took him captive in Valenzuela. The victim suffered mental, physical and psychological
trauma. Under the circumstances, there is sufficient basis for an award of moral damages in
the amount of P300,000.19
We also note that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the
offended party to exemplary damages within the meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.20 This requisite has been met in this case. A band of five men, using a motor vehicle,
abducted the victim and demanded ransom for his liberty. Article 2234 of the Civil Code
provides that, while the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the Court
may impose exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. In this case, we have already
awarded the latter. In order to serve as a deterrent against socially deleterious acts, we hold
that the victim is entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000 by way of
example or correction, in addition to the moral damages herein awarded. 21
In the light of these premises, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision of the trial
court. Consequently, it is left with no alternative but to sustain the imposition of the death
penalty on the appellants.
 TRIAL TECH| 25

Three members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a
majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly
imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259 of the Regional Trial Court
in Paraaque City in Criminal Case No. 96-739 finding appellants Angelito Martinez and
Dexter Tagle guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
serious illegal detention and imposing upon them the death penalty is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that they shall pay the victim in solidum the amount of P300,000 as
moral damages and an additional amount of P100,000 as exemplary damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of RA 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this decision, to the Office
of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123273 July 16, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RUBEN TIDULA, VICTORIO TIDULA, DOMINGO GATO, SALVACION GATO, and JOSE
PRIOR, accused-appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The violation of the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation renders
inutile all statements, admissions and confessions taken from him. However, where no such
evidence was extracted from him, the alleged violation of his constitutional rights will not
affect the admissibility of other pieces of evidence legally obtained and presented during the

trial. So, too, objections the illegality of a warrant of arrest must be invoked by the
appellants prior to their plea; otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
The Case
These were the main principles that guided the Court in deciding this appeal from the
judgment dated February 11, 1995, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 35, 1 in Criminal Case No. 38946. Found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide were the following: Ruben Tidula, Domingo Gato, Salvacion C. Gato, Victorio
Tidula and Jose Prior.
In an Information dated October 8, 1992, the above-mentioned persons, together with Pablo
Genosa, were charged by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Bernabe D. Dusaban as follows:
That on or about August 31, 1992, in the Municipality of Oton, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another, taking advantage
of their superior strength and nighttime to better realize their purpose, by
means of force and violence upon person, entered the residence of Mark
Michael Lazaro Zulueta, and once inside, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously ransack, take, steal and carry away with intent to
gain one (1) Sony [c]assette tape recorder worth P3,000.00, two (2) jackets
worth P4,000.00, one (1) Citizen's men's wrist watch worth P1,500.00 and
undetermined cash of coins, all owned and belonging to Mark Michael Lazaro
Zulueta against his consent [and] to his damage and prejudice in the total
amount of [e]ight [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P8,500.00) [p]esos,
Philippine [c]urrency, and on the occasion or by reason of said robbery, the
above-named accused armed with bladed weapons, with a decided purpose
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and twist
the head of Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta with the weapons which they were
then provided, thereby hitting him and inflicting injuries which caused his
death.
Upon their arraignment on November 24, 1992, the accused, duly assisted by Atty. Edgar P.
Parker, Jr., pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the court a
quo rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of [r]obbery with [h]omicide and hereby sentences each to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties
provided by law.
TRIAL TECH| 26
Furthermore, the herein accused are likewise ordered to pay the
complainants, Spouses Joselito and Marilyn Manubag, the sum of [f]ifty
[t]housand (P50,000.00) [p]esos, as death indemnity, and another sum of
[f]ifty [t]housand (P50,000.00) [p]esos, as moral damages, and to pay the
value of the Citizen wrist watch and the Sony tape recorder which were the
items taken during the robbery, in the amount of [f]our [t]housand [f]ive
[h]undred (P4,500.00) [p]esos.
Exh."C", (gray jacket) and Exh. "D" (camouflage jacket) are ordered returned
to the Spouses Manubag.
The bail bond posted by accused Jose Prior is hereby cancelled, conformably
with Adm. Cir. No. 2-92 of the Supreme Court, dated January 20, 1992.
Consequently, his arrest is hereby ordered.
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
In his Brief, the solicitor general 3 adopted the trial court's summary of the prosecution
evidence (to which he added references to the transcript of stenographic notes):
The evidence of the prosecution shows that Joselito and Marilyn Manubag are
husband and wife. They live in a rented family dwelling in Brgy. Trapeche,
Oton, Iloilo, about 2-1/2 kilometers from the Poblacion of Oton.
Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta, son of the complainant Marilyn Manubag by a
previous [live]-in partner Lazaro Zulueta Jr., before her marriage to Joselito
Manubag, was living with them. (p. 7, November 24, 1992, TSN)
At about 6:45 in the evening of August 31, 1992 when the spouses returned
to their house from their grocery store at the public market, they found Mark
Michael Lazaro Zulueta, inside the comfort room lying on his stomach, both
hands tied behind his back, his mouth stuffed with [a] handkerchief, bloody
from several stab wounds, dead. (pp. 31-34, Ibid.)
Autopsy Report (Exh. "A") shows that the victim sustained the following
injuries:1. Stab wound length - 1", width - 1/2", depth - 3 1/2", 3 inches
from the right nipple, 1 1/2 inches from the right anterior axillary line.

2. Stab wound length - 1", width - 1/2", depth - 1 1/2", 1 1/2 inches from
the right nipple, 4 inches from the right axilla.
3. Stab wound length - 3/4", width - 1/2", depth - 1/2", 1 [inch] from the
right nipple, 3 1/2 inches from the right axilla.
4. Rope markings wrist both hands.
5. Cervical fracture.
and the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to multiple
stab wounds and cervical fracture. The spouses also discovered that the
victim's cassette recorder worth P3,000.00 and wrist watch valued at
P1,500.00 together with Joselito's two (2) jackets valued at P4,000.00 and
undetermined cash were also missing. (p. 15, Ibid.) The incident was
reported to the police authorities of Oton, Iloilo. Without loss of time, the
police conducted an intensive investigation to determine the probable authors
of the heinous crime. After a few days of sleuthing, the policemen were able
to gather positive statements from impartial witnesses to provide them with
lead[s]. (pp. 11-17, March 30, 1993, TSN) A search was thereafter launched
for the apprehension and arrest of the suspects. A team was sent to Negros
Occ. to track down the suspects which resulted in the arrest of the three (3)
accused Victorio Tidula, Jose Prior and Pablo Genosa, all residents of Brgy.
Nanga, Guimbal, Iloilo, at Brgy. Alambihod, Ilog, Negros on September 6,
1992. Recovered from Pablo Genosa was a jacket colored gray (Exh. "C") one
of the stolen jackets of Joselito in that incident of August 31,1992. (pp. 6-
9 Ibid.) The accused Ruben Tidula and Domingo Gato fled to Boracay Island
of Aklan and were arrested on September 8, 1992 in that place. Recovered
from them was a camouflage jacket (Exh. "D"). (pp. 4-7, May 17, 1993, TSN)
On September 7, 1992, during the police investigation, Pablo Genosa
confessed to the police authorities all he knew about the subject incident.
This is his story. On August 21, 1992 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning,
accused Ruben Tidula, Domingo Gato and Victorio Tidula went to his house in
Brgy. Nanga, Guimbal, Iloilo. The three invited him to join in a transaction to
kill Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta and his mother Marilyn Manubag at the
instance of the accused Salvacion Gato. The three informed him that
Salvacion Gato would pay P2,000.00 for the accomplishment of the purpose.
Pablo Genosa complained telling the three that the amount [was] too meager
for the work to be done but he was informed that they would also stage a
TRIAL TECH| 27
hold-up from which he could get more. Pablo Genosa agreed to join the four
male accused. They decided to carry out the plan on August 24, 1992
between 7:30 [and] 8:30 in the evening after the market day of Oton,
anticipating that Marilyn Manubag would bring home plenty of money as
proceeds of her sale on that day. (pp. 11-17, February 23, 1993, TSN)
On August 24, 1992, Pablo Genosa went to the house of Victorio Tidula and
Jose Prior. The three of them proceeded to the waiting shade [sic] at [the]
crossing [at] Nanga, Guimbal where they waited for Ruben Tidula and
Domingo Gato. When Ruben Tidula and Domingo Gato arrived, Victorio Tidula
inquired from Ruben Tidula about the P2,000.00 and he was told that they
would just pick-up the money at the house of their Lola Vacion. So the four of
them proceeded to the house of Salvacion Gato. Ruben Tidula received the
money and Salvacion told them to be careful in the execution in a manner
that she will not be implicated. From the house of Salvacion Gato they went
back to Oton Public Market to meet Tony Gato, son of Salvacion Gato. Ruben
Tidula was armed with a single shot hand gun while the rest were armed with
knives. When Tony Gato arrived, the six of them proceeded to Brgy.
Sinikway, a slum district by the seashore of Oton. in the house of Jose Prior's
friend, about a kilometer away from Oton Public Market where they took
[liquor] and talked about the execution of their murderous design. It was in
that meeting when Pablo Genosa learned from Tony Gato the reason why
their Lola Vacion wanted Marilyn Manubag and her son Mark Michael Lazaro
Zulueta killed. The reason as narrated was about the quarrel between Marilyn
and the daughters of Salvacion Gato inside the public market of Oton,
wherein Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta intervened leaving a threat to the
daughters of Salvacion to kill them someday. Salvacion Gato learned about
the threat upon her arrival from Hongkong. The news was not received
lightly. Accused Salvacion Gato commented: "If they will have us killed, it is
better that we will have them killed first." (pp. 18-25, Ibid.)
From the house of Jose Prior's friend at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
August 24, 1992 they left for Oton Public Market to execute the plan.
However, they were not able to accomplish the plan because of the presence
of many people. So the five proceeded to Brgy. Trapeche, Oton leaving
behind Tony Gato. The five noticed that Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta was
inside the house when Joselito Manubag and Marilyn Manubag arrived. Again,
they were not able to commit as planned because the place was well-lighted
and there were many people near the house at that time. The accused again
met in Brgy. Nanga, Guimbal to plan the execution of their scheme on August
31, 1992 which is also a Monday and market day of Oton. (pp. 25-29, Ibid.)
 TRIAL TECH| 28

On August 29, 1992, Domingo Gato told Pablo Genosa to be at the crossing Accused Victorio Tidula and Jose Prior claim that they went to Brgy.
[at] Nanga, Guimbal on August 31, 1992. Alambihod, llog, Neg. Occ. on August 30, 1992, hence, they could not have
committed the crime in question on August 31, 1992. Their reason for being
Accordingly, Pablo Genosa went to [the] crossing [at] Nanga where Ruben in Brgy. Alambihod was to earn a livelihood by harvesting palay.
Tidula and Domingo Gato joined him. Ruben Tidula told him that Jose Prior
and Victorio Gato [sic] were already in the house of Salvacion Gato in Accused Domingo Gato claims that he was in Brgy. Malay, Boracay, Aklan on
Trapeche, Oton. So, the three of them went there. When they arrived, August 14, 1992 to earn a livelihood by fishing around the island of Boracay
Victorio Tidula, Jose Prior and Tony Gato were already there. At 6:00 o'clock until he was arrested, hence, he could not be present in Brgy. Trapeche, Oton
in the evening the accused Salvacion Gato directed them to proceed with on August 31, 1992.
their plan so they left towards the house of Joselito and Marilyn Manubag
which [was] only 150 meters away. When they reached the house, it was The other accused, Ruben Tidula claims that in the evening of August 31,
dark so they waited a little while. When Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta arrived, 1992 when the crime was committed, he was at home in Brgy. Nanga,
he opened the padlock of the gate. Ruben Tidula and Jose Prior appeared in Guimbal, hence, he could not have committed the crime although he
the dark and immediately approached him and pointed at him their single admitted that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of that day, he was in Brgy.
shot armalite hand gun and knife respectively. The three accused, Ruben Trapeche, Oton to deliver bamboo poles to Romulo, the son-in-law of
Tidula, Jose Prior and Domingo Gato, entered the gate and went inside the Salvacion Gato.
house thru the backdoor. About 15 minutes later Ruben Tidula and Jose Prior
went out of the house and were met by Pablo Genosa and Victorio Tidula. Accused Salvacion Gato alleged that she is a herbal doctor. When the crime
They were told to go ahead because Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta was was committed in the evening of August 31, 1992, she was out of Brgy.
already dead and Domingo Gato had already left. Witness Pablo Genosa Trapeche, Oton, attending to her patients, hence, she could not have
noticed that Ruben Tidula and Domingo Gato were already wearing jackets committed the offense.
while Jose Prior was carrying a cassette recorder. Pablo Genosa and Jose
Prior left together and took a passenger jeep in going home to Nanga, The Ruling of the Trial Court
Guimbal. The following day, September 1, 1992, Pablo Genosa heard over the
radio the news about the killing of Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta and the
Relying on the testimony of Pablo Genosa, the accused who was discharged as a state
robbery in house of the spouses Joselito and Marilyn Manubag. Later Victorio
witness, the trial court ruled in favor of the prosecution.
Tidula was picked-up by the police authorities. On September 2, 1992,
Domingo Gato gave to Pablo Genosa P200.00 as his share in the money
On the witness stand, Pablo Genosa testified on the planning and the execution of the crime
which came from the accused Salvacion Gato, informing him to prepare
and reiterated the account which he had earlier given to the police authorities of Oton, Iloilo,
because they would be leaving the following day, September 3, 1992, for
right after his arrest. The trial court also ruled that the evidence on record did not show that
Ilog, Negros Occ. where they were arrested on September 6, 1992. (pp. 29-
Pablo Genosa was coerced, promised anything, or motivated by any evil intent. 7
44, Ibid.)

Furthermore, Genosa's testimony was substantially corroborated in its material points by the
Evidence for the Defense
testimonies of SPO3 Roberto Panique, Joselito Manubag, Marilyn Manubag, Dr. Vicente
Carreon and by the following circumstances:
The defense contends that "the accusations against the accused were purely framed up and
that the sworn statement of . . . Pablo Genosa was a fabrication." 4
That the accused Ruben Tidula, Domingo Gato, Victorio Tidula and Jose Prior
as well as state witness Pablo Genosa are all residents of Brgy. Nanga,
Interposing alibi, the defense presented fourteen (14) witnesses, 5
whose testimonies were
Guimbal, Iloilo.
summarized by the court a quo as follows: 6

That immediately after the incident, all the accused, except Salvacion Gato,
left their place of residence. Pablo Genosa, Victorio [T]idula and Jose Prior
went to Ilog, Neg. Occ. where they were arrested by the police authorities on
September 6, 1992 and a gray jacket (Exh. "C") was recovered from their
possession. Accused Ruben Tidula and Domingo Gato went to Boracay Island
and were arrested on September 8, 1992 in that place. Recovered from them
was a camouflage jacket (Exh. "D").
Hence, this appeal direct to this Court. 8
Assignment of Errors
In assailing the trial court's Decision, appellants cite the following errors:
I the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Section 12 (3) of Article III of the 1987
The court erred in not ruling against the violation of the constitutional rights
of the accused during the custodial investigation.
II
The court erred in not ruling against the issuance of warrants of arrest in
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.
III
The court erred in discharging accused Pablo Genosa and utiliz[ing] him to
frame up and charge all the accused in consideration of reward and promise
by the offended party.
IV
The court erred in convicting the accused based on inconsistencies [in] the
testimony and purely circumstantial evidence of the prosecution witness.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
TRIAL TECH| 29
Violation of Constitutional Rights
During Custodial Investigation
Appellants contend that their constitutional rights were violated during their custodial
investigation, claiming that the police investigator of the Oton Police Station did not inform
them of such rights, and that they were not assisted by counsel. Appellants likewise claim
that the Sworn Statement of Pablo Genosa cannot be admitted in evidence, 9 because the
police investigator did not explain to him the legal effects of the investigation. 10
While we caution police officers to be resolute in safeguarding the rights of those under
custodial investigation, the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of the present
appellants is immaterial to the disposition of this case. This alleged infringement is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from
Constitution 11 states that a confession or admission obtained during custodial investigation
in a manner that violates the constitutional rights of the accused shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him or her.
In the present case, appellants, while under custodial investigation, did not give any
statement regarding the crime; much less did they write any confession or admission. Hence,
no inadmissible evidence was obtained from them despite the alleged violation of their
constitutional rights. In this light, the cases cited in the Appellants' Brief 12 are misplaced,
because they pertain to the inadmissibility of extrajudicial confessions obtained in violation of
constitutional rights.
Appellants' objections to the Sworn Statement of Pablo Genosa are likewise misplaced. It is
clear that Genosa was properly informed of his rights and the consequences of his
declarations. Furthermore, he was properly assisted by a lawyer, as shown by his Sworn
Statement which in part reads:
Preliminary: Mr. Pablo Genosa, you are being
informed that you are under investigation in
connection with the [r]obbery with [h]omicide
case happened on August 31, 1992, at Brgy.
Trapiche, Oton, Iloilo, which resulted [in] the
death of Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta wherein
you are one of the suspect[s]. Aside from this
you are also being informed that under Art.
III, Section 12 of the new Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, you have the right
 TRIAL TECH| 30

to remain silent and to be assisted by a
counsel of your own choice to assist you in
this investigation and do not answer any
question if you think it can discriminate [sic]
you. Is this understood by you?
Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering
that he never raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. 17

Answer: Yes Sir. Consequently, the defects in the arrest warrants and in the resulting arrests were cured by
appellants' voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the
xxx xxx xxx individual pleas they entered during their arraignment and by their active participation in the
trial thereafter, without any mention of such defects.
Question: Now that Atty. Rogelio C. Antiquera
is here to assist you in this investigation, do Third Issue:
we proceed in investigating you?
Discharge of Pablo Genosa
Answer: Yes Sir. 13

Appellants likewise question the discharge of Pablo Genosa as a state witness, claiming that
Moreover, Genosa's Sworn Statement was not the sole evidence presented by the he was merely used 18 by the police to "frame-up" the other accused, and that he was
prosecution. In fact, the trial court relied mainly on his testimony in open court, not on his promised a reward by Marilyn Manubag. Appellants also allege a conspiracy between the
Sworn Statement. police investigators and Pablo Genosa, pointing out that only he was given the assistance of
counsel during the custodial investigation, and that he alone executed a sworn statement
Second Issue: before the police investigators. These contentions, however, are of no moment, because
Genosa was the only one willing to make a statement and to tell the truth. In fact, he had
Legality of the Warrants of Arrest declared, when asked by the police investigators, that he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
This is clear from his Sworn Statement, which in part reads:

Next, appellants assail the legality of their arrest, emphasizing that Pablo Genosa, Victorio
Tidula and Jose Prior were all arrested without warrants. Also, the warrant for the arrest of Question: Do you want to be assisted by
Ruben Tidula and Domingo Gato was dated September 12, 1992, which was four days later counsel of your own choice to assist you in
than the date on which it was served, September 8, 1992. 14Appellants likewise claim that this investigation?
the warrant for the arrest of Salvacion Gato, which was dated September 5, 1992, was
supposedly based on the Sworn Statement of Pablo Genosa which was, however, dated two Answer: Yes Sir. 19
days later, September 7, 1992.
Moreover, the discharge of Genosa as an accused to become a state witness was contingent
It must be noted, though, that while the photocopy of the warrant for the arrest of Salvacion on the initiative of the prosecution and the sound discretion of the trial court. As stated by
Gato (submitted by accused-appellants) is dated September 5, 1992, a careful examination this Court in People v. Espanola, "part of the prosecutorial discretion is the determination of
of the records shows that the original copy of the said warrant is dated September 8, who should be used as state witness in order to bolster the successful prosecution of criminal
1992. 15 It is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy. offenses. 20

And assuming that the aforementioned warrants were indeed defective or void, 16 appellants The prosecution may move for, and the trial court may approve, the discharge of an accused
failed to make a timely objection thereto, that is, prior to the entry of their plea. In People v. in order that he may become a witness for the state, pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 119 of the
Salvatierra, the Court ruled: Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 9.Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion
of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more
of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be
witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
Justifying the discharge of Genosa, the trial court ratiocinated:
There is no question that there was no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the crime charged, except the testimony of Pablo
Genosa which impelled the necessity of discharging him to take the witness
stand. 21
Genosa's testimony was substantially corroborated by the testimonies of SPO3 Roberto
Panique, Joselito Manubag, Marilyn Manubag and Dr. Vicente Carreon. The subsequent
recovery of several stolen items from the accused-appellants further bolsters his credibility.
Furthermore, Genosa does not appear to be the most guilty among the accused, since it is
clear from the facts of the case that he was not the leader of their group. Neither was he one
of the three accused who entered the house of Marilyn Manubag and delivered the fatal blow
to Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta. In addition, there is no showing that Genosa had been
previously convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
TRIAL TECH| 31
Therefore, the trial court fully complied with the requisites set forth in Section 9 of Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, when it discharged Pablo Genosa as an accused in order to become a
state witness.
Fourth Issue:
Alleged Inconsistencies in Genosa's Testimony
Appellants also seek to discredit the testimony of Genosa, citing alleged glaring
inconsistencies in regard to (a) the time and the place where the plan to kill 22 and rob was
hatched and (b) the amount of money he received for his part in the crime.
We find the alleged inconsistencies insignificant. They do not affect the important points
Genosa established, namely, the commission of the crime itself and the identification of the
perpetrators thereof. 23 A witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect
recollection of minor and minute details. 24 Moreover, even the most truthful witnesses often
err and issue confused statements. What is important is that Genosa described in detail their
plan to kill and "hold-up" Marilyn Manubag and her son, as well as the manner in which they
carried out such plan, which resulted in the killing of Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta and the
asportation of his belongings.
According to Genosa, the plan was hatched on August 21, 1992, when Ruben Tidula,
Domingo Gato and Victorio Tidula went to his house to ask him to join them in a
"transaction" to kill Manubag and Zulueta. He testified as follows:
Q: What was your answer to Domingo Gato when he asked
you if you will go with them for a transaction?
A: I asked them if [sic] what was the transaction about.
Q: And what did they answer to you?
A: They answered that a transaction to kill Mark Lazaro
Zulueta and Marilyn [it was] Manubag, sir. 25
Genosa further testified that their grandmother, Salvacion Gato, ordered the killing and
promised to pay them P2,000 for the job. Since that amount was too small, they decided not
only to kill Marilyn Manubag and her son, but to rob them as well. The pertinent portion of
his testimony reads:
 TRIAL TECH| 32

Q: Now, when you were told that it was your Lola Vacion who
ordered to kill Marilyn Manubag and her son Mark, what did
you do?
A: I asked Ruben Tidula if [sic] how much will Lola Vacion
give to that transaction.
A: Domingo Gato told me that, "You Pablo, you wait at the
store near the house of Marilyn Manubag while Jose Prior will
stay across the road and I and Ruben Tidula will go to the
house of Marilyn Manubag," sir.
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx Q: Later on did anybody come?

Q: And what did you say when you learned that P2,000 will A: Yes, sir.
be given by Lola Vacion in killing Marilyn Manubag and Mark
Michael Lazaro Zulueta? Q: Who arrived?

A: I asked why the amount was so small. A: Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta, sir.

Q: What did he answer? xxx xxx xxx

A: He answered that what we will do is not only to kill but to Q: And as he was opening the padlock of the gate what
hold them up so what we will get is plenty, sir. 26 happened?

The motive for the killing was a quarrel between Marilyn Manubag and the daughters of A: Ruben Tidula and Domingo Gato approached him and
Salvacion Gato. pointed [at] him a single armalite and knife, sir.

Q: What did you talk about? xxx xxx xxx

A: I asked him if [sic] what is the reason why they wanted Q: What did they do?
Marilyn Manubag and her son Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta to
be killed, sir. A: They went at the side of the house and went around, sir.

Q: And what did Tony Gato answer? xxx xxx xxx

A: He told us the reason for all these was . . . the quarrel
between Marilyn Manubag and the daughters of Salvacion
Gato. . . 27
On August 31, 1992, they went to Brgy. Trapeche, Oton, positioned themselves in the vicinity
of Marilyn Manubag's house and waited for the arrival of their intended victims.
Q: After the main door was opened, what happened next?
A: Jose Prior went inside the house passing [by] the main
door, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did you talk about?


Q: When you saw them [go] out of the house what did you
do?
A: I stood up and approached them, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened when you and Victorio Tidula approached
them?
A: Ruben Tidula told us, ". . . just go ahead because Mark is
already dead. . ." 28
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of the
witness, was convinced of his credibility. We find no reason to reverse or alter its evaluation.
"It is a time-tested doctrine that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled great weight even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. 29
A witness' testimony is accorded great weight, particular when his or her accusation is
directed against a close relative. For one to prosecute a blood relative 30 especially when,
as in this case, no ill will or evil motive is shown goes beyond logic and normal human
experience.
The prosecution's case is further strengthened by the fact that the appellants, with the
exception of Salvacion Gato, all fled from their residences in Barangay Nanga, Guimbal,
Iloilo, immediately after the crime was committed. As held by this Court in People vs. Nell,
"flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of guilt." 31 More important, appellants were
likewise found in possession of the stolen items at the time of their arrest, a fact they could
not explain; much less, justify.
Alibi
Accused-appellants also interpose the defense of alibi, stating that at the time of the
commission of the crime, they were in places other than Brgy. Trapeche, Oton. This claim
must also be rejected. To succeed in using alibi, the accused-appellants must prove that it
was physically impossible for them to have been present at the place of the crime at the time
it was committed; 32 this they failed to do.
TRIAL TECH| 33
At 6:45 p.m. on August 31, 1992, Ruben Tidula was seen at a sari-sari store which was near
the victim's house. Although Defense Witness Nemesio Gelito testified that Domingo Gato
was in Brgy. Manokmanok, Boracay, from August 14 until his arrest on September 7, 1992,
the former's cross-examination, however, revealed that the former was sick from August 28
until September 7, 1992, during which time he stayed in his house. Thus, he could not have
stated with certainty that it was impossible for Domingo Gato to have been in Brgy. Trapeche,
Oton, on August 31, 1992, as revealed in this part of his testimony:
Q: Because your illness was continuous from August 28, 1992
to September 7, 1992 you stayed in your house?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And you were not able to go out?
A: Yes sir. 33
Victorio Tidula and Ruben Prior were supposedly seen by Defense Witness Erab Dicham on
board a ship bound for Bacolod at 7:30 a.m. of August 30, 1992, and by Defense Witness
Rogelio Procia in Negros Occidental at noon on the same date. However, Erab Dicham also
testified that there was a ship that could travel from Bacolod to Iloilo in the afternoon of
August 30, 1992, such that a person who went from Iloilo to Bacolod in the morning could
return to Iloilo on the same day by taking the afternoon trip. It was therefore not impossible
for both Victorio Tidula and Ruben Prior to have been in Brgy. Trapeche, Oton, on August 31,
1992.
The Crime
Appellants were convicted under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, . . . .
The elements of this crime were laid down by the Court in this wise:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed. 34
In the present case, we sustain the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The prosecution has sufficiently proven that
appellants, with intent to gain, asported one Sony cassette tape recorder worth P3,000, two
jackets worth P4,000 and one Citizen wristwatch worth P1,500, and that the said items
belonged to the household of Marilyn Manubag. It is also evident that homicide was
committed on the same occasion.
It is clear that robbery was not a mere afterthought; it was part of the appellants' original
design. They were hired not only to kill the Manubags, but also to commit robbery, as shown
in this portion of Genosa's testimony:
Q: And what did you say when you learned that P2,000 will
be given by Lola Vacion in killing Marilyn Manubag and Mark
Michael Lazaro Zulueta?
A: I asked why the amount was so small sir.
Q: What did he answer?
A: He answered that what we will do is not only to kill but to
hold them up so that we will get plenty, sir. 35
In fact, appellants deliberately planned to carry out their attack on a Monday, the market day
in Oton, in order to maximize their loot from Marilyn Manubag's earnings from the market, as
further indicated in Genosa's testimony.
Q: Now, you mentioned that you were told that aside from
killing, you and your companions will also hold up Marilyn
Manubag and Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta, so that you can
TRIAL TECH| 34
get plenty at that time[;] do you know why you expect[ed] to
get plenty when you h[e]ld them up?
A: Because Ruben Tidula told me that Lola Vacion said the
commission of the crime will be on August 24, 1992 because
it was a market day of Oton and Marilyn Manubag will bring
home plenty of money as her sale on that day, sir. 36
This point is confirmed by their subsequent decision to abort their planned attack on August
24, 1992, and to carry out the same on August 31, 1992, also a market day in Oton.
That the purpose of the malefactors was to kill and rob does not preclude their conviction for
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Thus, in People vs. Damaso, 37 the
defense counsel appealed the conviction for this special complex crime, arguing that the
double homicide could not have been committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery
because one of the accused had a motive to kill and not only to rob. Rejecting the argument,
the Court held that "the fact that the intent of the culprit was tempered with a desire to
avenge grievances against the person killed does not prevent the punishment of the accused
for the complex crime."
Conspiracy
It is also very clear that conspiracy, connivance, and unity of the accused in purpose and
intention were present before and throughout the execution of the crime. All the accused
participated in the planning of the crime. Although only Ruben Tidula, Domingo Gato and
Jose Prior entered the house and tied, stabbed and killed Mark Michael Lazaro Zulueta, the
others cannot escape liability because, in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Civil Liability
Accused-appellants are liable to pay the complainants, Spouses Joselito and Marilyn
Manubag, the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as indemnity for the death of their son.
They are also liable for the additional sum of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500),
which is the total value of the items taken during the incident.
However, the award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) representing moral damages should be
deleted, since no proof of anxiety, moral shock, wounded feelings or similar injury was shown
during the trial. 38
 TRIAL TECH| 35

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, but the award of moral damages is
DELETED. Cost against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103397 August 28, 1996

WILSON CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

Most crimes are conceived, planned and resolved to be committed in secret. As a

consequence, the facts which would sustain a conviction are known only to the participes
criminis themselves. In view of this, Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court allows
the dismissal of an information as to one of several persons accused of a crime in order that
he may be utilized as a witness for the state on condition that he testifies against his co-
accused in the commission of the crime. The transaction is in the nature of a contract
between the State and the criminal that, in recompense for his exemption or immunity from
criminal liability, he shall honestly and fairly make a full disclosure of the crime upon the trial
of a confederate, whether the confederate is convicted or not.

This, of course, sets a premium on treachery, but the state maintains that, without the aid of
said witnesses, many guilty parties would escape punishment where the facts, which would
sustain a conviction, are known only to the conspirators themselves.
Countless crimes would go unpunished as insolent and contumacious criminals would oft-
times defy the law with impunity if the rules of criminal procedure were so construed or
applied as to seal hermetically the mouths of accomplices, informers and participes in
general. 1
In the light of this perspective, we are called upon to resolve whether or not there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged in this case and whether
or not the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 25, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25348, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Jesus R Tabilon . . . and Wilson Chua" and of the Resolution, dated January 7, 1992, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On July 5, 1991, a petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the Philippines to set aside and declare null and
void the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLII, Dumaguete City, upon the ground
that the court a quo acted on the Solicitor General's petition with grave abuse of discretion.
The order in question denied the state's motion for the discharge of accused Arcadio Enriquez
in Criminal Case No. 9381 as a state witness against his co-accused, Wilson Chua.
A criminal case for Falsification of Private Documents was filed by complainant Tolong
Aquaculture Corporation (TAC) against petitioner, Wilson Chua, from whom the complainant,
TAC, leased several earth-moving equipment, and Arcadio Enriquez, the project accountant
of TAC. The complaint of TAC was that Chua instigated and indorsed Enriquez to make
alterations and changes in the Daily Equipment Utilization Reports (DEUR) to enable Chua to
charge more than what was legally due him for the use of the equipment. The Inquest
Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on December 19, 1989, on the ground of lack of probable
cause. On appeal by complainant TAC to the Department of Justice, the prosecutor was
ordered to file the corresponding information on the ground that "there exists a prima
facie case of Falsification of Private Documents." Subsequently, on July 27, 1990, the
Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding information with the Regional Trial Court.
TRIAL TECH| 36
On November 26, 1990, the prosecution filed a motion to discharge accused Arcadio Enriquez
so that he can be utilized as a state witness.
On December 5, 1990, the court a quo issued an Order denying the motion to discharge
accused Enriquez as a state witness on two grounds, viz: (1) the prosecution failed to adduce
evidence to the effect that all the requirements for the discharge of Enriquez had been
complied with; and (2) that accused Enriquez, whose discharge is sought, appears to be in
possession of the documents in question and has admitted that he was the one who falsified
the same. Thus, the trial court was of the belief that Enriquez was the most guilty.
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines elevated the issue of discharge to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus. On September 15, 1991, the Court
of Appeals granted the said petition, the pertinent portion of which, reads:
. . . The Orders dated December 5, 1991; February 26, 1991 and March 25,
1991 in Criminal Case No. 9381 are hereby declared null and void and set
aside; and the respondent court is hereby ordered to discharge the accused
Arcadio Enriquez so that he may testify as a state witness in said case so that
proceedings in said criminal case may continue. 2
Subsequently, a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by respondent
court in a Resolution, dated January 7, 1992.
Hence, this petition.
Before us, petitioner raises the following issues, viz:
Respondent Court erred
1. In ordering the discharge of accused Arcadio Enriquez in the face ( sic) of
the fact that prosecution has not, up to the present time, presented any of its
five witnesses listed in the information.
2. In not upholding the exclusive responsibility of the trial court in the matter
of discharging an accused for use as a state witness.
3. In not holding that respondent People's motion to discharge dated
November 26, 1990 is fatally inadequate.

4. In holding that accused Arcadio Enriquez does not appear to be the most
guilty.
5. In holding that Judge Jesus L. Tabilon abused his
discretion. 3
Petitioner, in his first assignment of error, claims that respondent Court committed a grave
error in ordering the discharge of accused Arcadio Enriquez inspite of the fact that the
prosecution has not presented any of its five witnesses listed in the information. He further
cites the case of Flores v. Sandiganbayan, 4 wherein we ruled that if there is an opposition to
the discharge of an accused, the trial court must defer or hold in abeyance "its resolution on
the motion until after the prosecution has presented all its other evidence. 5
Petitioner's contention is bereft of merit.
The case of Leo Flores involves facts different from the case at bar. The information in the
Flores case charged Leo Flores and seven other accused of the crime of robbery of a bank.
From the records of the preliminary investigation in the Tanodbayan, accused Abelardo
Licaros who was sought to be discharged, appeared to be the most guilty and appeared to be
the "mastermind" in the commission of the offense. In fact, even the National Bureau of
Investigation, which investigated the case, recommended that the accused be charged as a
principal. Furthermore, there was other evidence, as shown by the affidavits of the three
security guards of the bank, that Modesto Licaros, the remaining accused, was among the
bank robbers. When the motion for discharge of Abelardo Licaros was filed by the
prosecution, accused Leo Flores opposed on the following grounds, to wit: (a) that there was
no absolute necessity for the testimony of Abelardo Licaros for Modesto Licaros' conviction as
there were three witnesses who could testify on the direct participation of Modesto Licaros;
and (b) that Abelardo Licaros did not appear to be the least guilty. The Sandiganbayan ruled
in favor of the motion filed by the prosecutor and issued a resolution ordering the discharge
from the information of Abelardo Licaros. On appeal, this Court reversed the Sandiganbayan
and upheld the objection of Leo Flores.
The ruling in Flores that "considering the opposition of herein petitioners to the motion for
the discharge of Abelardo Licaros, particularly the contention that he is the most guilty and
that his testimony is not absolutely necessary, the trial court should have held in abeyance or
deferred its resolution on the motion until after the prosecution has presented all its other
evidence," should be read in the context of the facts obtaining therein. It was imperative for
the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance its resolution ordering the discharge of the accused
until after the prosecution had presented all its other evidence because the testimonies of the
three security guards might establish the participation of Modesto Licaros without needing
TRIAL TECH| 37
the testimony of Abelardo Licaros. Likewise, the evidence might show that Abelardo Licaros
was the most guilty.
In the case at bar, the Information charges only two defendants or having committed the
offense of falsification of private documents, to wit: petitioner and Arcadio Enriquez. The
allegations in the information show that the two had conspired to commit the crime charged.
In the Flores case, the crime of bank robbery was done in public and was witnessed by
several persons. In this case, the crime of falsification of private documents was done
clandestinely. In fact, only two persons petitioner and Arcadio Enriquez had knowledge
of the criminal conspiracy.
Clearly then, only one person can supply the DIRECT evidence required by Section 9, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and that is Arcadio Enriquez. Hence, the
principle that, where a crime is contrived in secret, then the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential so he can testify against the other conspirators, is applicable in this
case. 6
With regard to the other witnesses listed in the Information who have not yet been called to
the witness stand, they would not constitute DIRECT evidence of petitioner's guilt. This is
because none of these witnesses was privy to the conspiracy between petitioner and Arcadio
Enriquez. Their testimony would merely corroborate the testimony of Enriquez although such
corroborative testimony is necessary to fulfill one of the conditions for the discharge of an
accused as stated in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz: "that the
testimony of the discharge accused "can be substantially corroborated in its material points."
Furthermore, the said Rule does not require the prosecution to present all its other evidence
before an accused can be discharged. An accused may be discharged at any time before the
defendants have entered upon their defense. In fact even the Flores case which was heavily
relied upon by petitioner, states that:
At any rate, the discharge of an accused may be ordered at anytime before
they (defendants) have entered upon their defense, that is, at any stage of
the proceedings from the filing of the information to the time the defense
starts to offer any evidence.
Petitioner also contends that respondent court gravely erred in not upholding the exclusive
responsibility of the trial court in the matter of discharging an accused for use as a state
witness, citing the case of People v. Tabayoyong, 7 wherein we held that the discharge of an
accused who may turn state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court
which has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rules exist.
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the

Information, in order that he may be utilized as a prosecution witness rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court, 8 this discretion should be exercised by it strictly on the basis of
the conditions therein set forth in Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The court's discretion is not absolute and arbitrary. Sound judicial discretion should be
exercised with due regard to the proper administration of justice. 9
As regards the requisite that there must be absolute necessity for the testimony of the
defendant whose discharge is requested, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions and
the information presented by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious. The public
prosecutor should know better than the court, and the defense for that matter, as to which of
the accused would best qualify to be discharged to become a state witness. He is also
supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whom he needs to establish his case. 10
Hence, in People v. Court of Appeals, 11
we stated that:
It is believed that the record justifies the discharge of Ngo Sin to be utilized
as a State witness considering the absolute necessity of his testimony for the
successful prosecution of the criminal charge if it has to be established that
the accused Luciano Tan had planned and financed the theft. All conditions
for discharge prescribed by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court have been
met The Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining those
conditions Perforce, the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the
suggestions and the considerations presented by the prosecuting officer.
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself
with absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to
everything which may be developed in the course of the trial
in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint If that
were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the
formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested, as to the availability or non-availability of other
direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused
is the "most guilty" one; and the like, the judge must rely in
large part upon the suggestions and the information
furnished by the prosecuting officer . . .
In this case, the filing by the private prosecutor of the motion to discharge accused Enriquez
was done with the conformity of the public prosecutor to apprise the trial court of the role
and participation of petitioner in the commission of the crime charged. Furthermore, the trial
TRIAL TECH| 38
court was informed that, if accused Enriquez was discharged as a state witness, he would
testify:
1. About the middle of February 1989, he was approached at his office in
Tolong, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, by respondent Chua, who engaged
him in conversation . . . . Respondent Chua inquired into his work with TAC,
his duties and responsibilities, salary, problems and difficulties, and then
offered to help him out of his financial difficulties.
2. Respondent Chua induced and persuaded him to alter the DEURs, EORs,
and logbooks that were under his control and possession, and to convert the
idle hours to utilization hours so that respondent Chua could collect larger
payments than he was lawfully entitled for the use of his leased equipment
by TAC. Respondent Chua offered him a 50/50 cut of all monies received
from TAC by reason of such conversion of idle hours into utilization hours.
3. He succumbed to such inducements and blandishments of respondent
Chua, and thereafter started making alterations and changes in the DEURs,
EORs, and logbooks in his possession, choosing such documents that seemed
easy to change or alter without much risk of detention [He will point out and
identify the figures he had falsified in the documents, DEUR, EORs, and the
entries in the logbooks.]
4. When he arrived at the TAC prawn farm about mid-January 1989, he had
only about P50.00 left in his possession. He applied for a job with Arnulfo
Ilustre and Fernando Juanitez, both of whom he had met before during
several construction projects of ECCO, the last of which was the construction
of the NPC Angat Project in Bulacan in 1986. He pleaded with Ilustre and
Juanitez to give him a job because he had no money at all, no work during
the previous two years, and his family and children were suffering, especially
his eldest son who was seriously ill and in and out of the hospital. Ilustre and
Juanitez took pity on him and hired him.
xxx xxx xxx
6. The falsifications he made in the records for the rentals of respondent
Chua's equipment between February 16 and February 28, 1989, illegally
increased by P50,150 from the amount properly due respondent Chua. This
"bloated amount" was received on March 4, 1989 by respondent Chua, who
gave him on March 9, 1989 his "50/50 share" in the amount of P25,000.

7. Aside from the P25,000 he received on March 9, 1989, he had also
received from respondent Chua the sums of P10,000, P5,000, P5,000, and
P10,000, as his share in the loot extracted by respondent Chua from TAC by
means of the falsifications the latter had induced him to make. He had sent
to his wife immediately P15,000 out of the first P25,000 he received, and
P2,000 to his sick son, who sadly died anyway.
8. Aside from these amounts, he had also received from respondent Chua
several thousands of pesos for so-called commissions from the rentals paid
by TAC for another bulldozer that he and Mr. Ilustre had been instrumental in
convincing TAC to rent from respondent Chua.
9. Although the amounts he received from respondent Chua for the
falsifications of the DEURs and other documents were less than the 50/50
share promised him, respondent Chua compensated for it by taking him,
Juanitez, and Ilustre out drinking, night-clubbing, and womanizing on various
occasions, all at respondent Chua's expense. 12
Based on the foregoing allegations, only accused Enriquez can testify on its truthfulness as
the said facts are based on his personal knowledge. Thus, there is absolute necessity for his
testimony in order to provide direct evidence to petitioner's guilt.
The denial of the motion to discharge by the trial court is tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion which this Court must correct.
On the contention of petitioner that respondent court failed to consider the motion to
discharge as fatally inadequate as it states only three elements of discharge, viz: (1) that
Enriquez is the least guilty; (2) that there is absolute necessity for his testimony; and (3)
that Enriquez has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude, petitioner
seems to confuse a motion to discharge to that of an information or complaint. In an
information or a complaint, all the elements necessary to constitute an offense or to state a
cause of action must be alleged and failure to do so will constitute a ground for the other
party to file a motion to quash, in the case of an information, or a motion to dismiss, in the
case of a complaint. The motion to discharge will suffice if the allegations contained therein
adequately inform the adverse party and the court a quo what relief the movant is praying
for. The only requirement therefor was that a hearing on the motion be had. 13 It is at the
hearing where the movant should show the presence of all the elements required by the rule
for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. In this particular case, we can state
that this duty was complied with by the movant, as petitioner never claimed that he was ill-
informed of the nature of the motion. In fact, he was given the opportunity to oppose it and
he did so vehemently.
TRIAL TECH| 39
What then is the meaning of "absolute necessity" for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is sought?
The expedient should be availed of only when there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime,
and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence
in the hands of the
prosecution. 14
When there is a conspiracy for example, and the crime is committed clandestinely, then the
discharge of a conspirator is necessary to testify against the other conspirator. A conspiracy
can be established by the testimony of a co-conspirator. 15 In a conspiracy which was done in
secret, there is a necessity to discharge one of the accused to provide direct evidence of the
commission of the crime. 16 For who else outside the conspiracy can testify on what was
concocted between the conspirators, but they themselves?
In the case at bar, Judge Jesus Tabilon denied the motion to discharge Arcadio Enriquez in
spite of the fact that there were only two participes criminis in the crime of falsification of
private documents as alleged in the information, namely, petitioner and Enriquez. Moreover,
the conspiracy to defraud Tolong Aquaculture Corporation was known to only two persons
and all the other witnesses listed on the Information were not involved in the conspiracy, as
their involvement came only after the end of the conspiracy. Also, it was petitioner who
encashed the padded check payments and who principally benefited from the falsification of
the private documents.
Thus, in the case of People v. Court of Appeals, 17 we ordered the trial court to allow the
discharge of an accused because his testimony was absolutely necessary to prove conspiracy
among the accused. Specifically, we ruled that:
The Court therefore overrules respondent court's finding that there is no
absolute necessity for the testimony of Roncesvalles. A careful examination of
the records of the case supports the prosecution's stand to discharge
Roncesvalles in order that he may testify for the government. The testimony
of Roncesvalles is absolutely necessary to prove conspiracy among the
accused who are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other in
defrauding the Lucena Rural Rank in the amount of P30,000.00 under the
pretext of an agricultural loan granted to accused Flavia N. Valdenor.
Roncesvalles was the Assistant Chief Inspector of the Lucena Rural Bank and
he was the one who signed the investigation report which contained false
information as to the credit standing of accused Flavia Valdenor. Nobody is in
a better position to testify and (sic) prove the existence of conspiracy than

accused Roncesvalles, because he is an officer of the bank. There is ample
basis for the Solicitor General's submittal that "considering the foregoing
circumstances and inasmuch as the other accused cannot be compelled to
testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the accused would not be
revealed unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to testify for the State";
"unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to testify for the government, there
is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
charged, i.e., the role or participation of his co-accused in the preparation
and accomplishment of the falsified loan application and its supporting
papers. The testimony of accused Roncesvalles will prove conspiracy among
the perpetrators of the crime charged"; and "unless this petition is given due
course and granted, the accused in Criminal Case No. 0399 may be acquitted
and the State irretrievably prejudiced. Because of the Rule on double
jeopardy, the State has no other remedy except the instant petition."
Did the Court of Appeals err, as petitioner contends, in holding that Enriquez appears to be
the least guilty?
The offense charged is falsification of private documents, the principal element of which is
the damage, pecuniary or otherwise, caused to the victim. When Arcadio Enriquez falsified
the company records of Tolong Aquaculture Corporation (TAC) in order to inflate the work
hours of the equipment of Wilson Chua and allow him to inflate his billings for the use
thereof, there was, as yet, no damage to TAC. Damage was caused when petitioner received
the bloated checks and encashed them.
The testimonies of Steve Psinakis and Metodio Gono, as additional evidence against Arcadio
Enriquez, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be the basis for concluding that
petitioner is the most guilty. The fact that Arcadio Enriquez was in dire need of money at the
time he falsified the records does not eliminate the fact that petitioner was the mastermind.
It only shows that Arcadio Enriquez was then highly vulnerable to the evil proposition of
Wilson Chua.
If one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the determining cause of the
crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have been committed. 18 Indeed, it is
the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the criminal act. Without the inducement,
accused Enriquez would not have falsified the records of the company. Thus, on the basis of
the specific acts done by the two accused and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of
the crime of falsification of private documents, petitioner is the "most guilty" as between the
two accused.
TRIAL TECH| 40
Moreover, the rules do not disqualify an accused sought to be discharged as witness for the
state based on the ground that he has committed the falsification himself or that he had
actually committed the crime charged. The rules merely say that it is necessary that the said
accused appears to be not the most guilty. We can only conclude that the guilt of an accused
of the crime charged is not a basis why he may not be excluded as a witness for the state. As
a matter of fact, the candid admission of the accused of his participation in a crime is a
guaranty that he will testify truthfully in court. So, even if an accused actually participated in
the offense charged in the information, he still qualifies as a state witness. 19
Finally, while petitioner alleges that respondent court erred in holding that Judge Tabilon
abused his discretion when he denied the motion to discharge accused Enriquez, our perusal
of the records shows that the requirements for the discharge of accused Enriquez were met.
Thus, the denial by Judge Jesus Tabilon of the motion to discharge appears to be whimsical,
capricious and arbitrary.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
For reasons above indicated and construed in the light of the applicable law
and jurisprudence on the matter, we find the respondent's refusal to order
the discharge of the accused Enriquez so that he may testify for the
prosecution, a grave abuse of discretion as it amounts to an evasion of a duty
enjoined by law. (See Tavera-Luna vs. Noble, 67 Phil. 341). In refusing to
order the discharge of Enriquez, the trial court is most likely letting a crime
committed at the instance or not using another as a mere tool to perpetrate
it, go unpunished. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 25348 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63677 August 12, 1983
LEO M. FLORES, MODESTO L. LICAROS and MARIO LOPEZ VITO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondents.
Amadeo D. Seno Angel C. Cruz and Franklin Farolan for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking (1) to nullify the order, dated February 11,
1983, of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 6672,
TRIAL TECH| 41
entitled People vs. Modesto Licaros y Lacson, et al., ordering the discharge upon motion of
the Tanodbayan, of private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros from the information for robbery
to be utilized as a government witness and the order, dated March 21, 1983, denying the
motion for reconsideration; and (2) to enjoin respondents from presenting him as state
witness.
On June 5, 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank of the Philippines was robbed
and divested of cash amounting to P19,731,320.00.
On June 9, 1982, a sizable portion of the money was recovered at the Home Savings Bank &
Trust Company Building in Intramuros, Manila after a raid by the police authorities.
On July 6, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an information with the Sandiganbayan charging
Modesto Licaros, Leo Flores, Ramon Dolor, Glicerio Balansin Rolando Quejada Pio Edgardo
Flores, Mario Lopez Vito and Rogelio dela Cruz, as principals, and herein private respondent
Abelardo B. Licaros, as accessory with the crime of robbery committed on or about June 5
and 6, 1982 at the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank of the Philippines in which
P19,731,320.00 was taken therefrom. The National Bureau of Investigation which
investigated the case recommended that Abelardo B. Licaros be charged as principal but the
Tanodbayan included him only as an accessory after the fact.
On November 26, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information naming the same
persons as principals, except Rogelio dela Cruz who is now charged as an accessory, together
with private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros.
On November 29, 1982, the accused were arraigned, including private respondent Abelardo
B. Licaros, who interposed the plea of not guilty.
On January 7, 1983, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion for Discharge"
of accused Abelardo B. Licaros to be utilized as state witness, alleging that all the requisites
prescribed in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court have been fully complied with.
The motion for discharge was opposed by herein petitioner Leo Flores, on the ground that the
bare assertions of the prosecution (1) that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
Abelardo B. Licaros; (2) that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense charged except his testimony; and (3) that his testimony can be
substantially corroborated in its material points, are all self-serving' allegations which are not
substantiated. Further, petitioner Flores claims that from the records of the preliminary
investigation of the robbery case conducted by the Tanodbayan Abelardo B. Licaros appears

to be the most guilty and is, in fact, the mastermind in the commission of the offense
charged.
On February 11, 1983, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution granting the motion and
ordering the discharge from the information of private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros.
Petitioner Flores filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the court's
resolution dated March 21,1983.
Hence, this petition.
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 9.Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the
prosecution When two or more persons are charged with the commission
of a certain offense, the competent court, at any time before they have
entered upon their defense, may direct one or more of them to be discharged
with the latter's consent that he or they may be witnesses for the
government when in the judgment of the court:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
It is apparent from this rule that the discharge of an accused from the information so that he
may be utilized as a state witness is the exclusive responsibility of the trial court provided
that it sees to it that the requisites prescribed by the rules exist, particularly the requisite
that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is
requested. Under this requisite, the fiscal must show that there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the defendant whose discharge he seeks, in order to be a witness for the
prosecution. This requirement is aimed to curtail miscarriage of justice, before too common,
TRIAL TECH| 42
through the abuse of the power to ask for the discharge of one or more defendants. Absolute
necessity of the testimony of the defendant, whose discharge is requested must now be
shown if the discharge is to be allowed, and the power to determine the necessity is lodged
upon the court. (People vs. Ibanez, 92 Phil. 933). The expedient should be availed of, only
when there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would
simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution
(People vs. Borja, 106 Phil. 1111).
Petitioners claim that the contents of the affidavit dated June 14, 1982, of private respondent
Abelardo B. Licaros, which in all probability would be the nature of his testimony as a state
witness, is not absolutely necessary if the purpose is to pinpoint the role of petitioner
Modesto Licaros considering the other evidence submitted by the National Bureau of
Investigation to the Tanodbayan, like the affidavits executed by the three (3) Security Guards
of the Home Savings Bank, namely: Romeo Pomada, Edgardo Aranillo and Elias Gellecanao
mentioning petitioner Modesto Licaros. Thus, petitioners contend that there can be no basis
for the prosecution "to honestly assert that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
Abelardo B. Licaros for the purpose of establishing the participation of Modesto Licaros in
delivering the money to the Home Savings Bank. At most, the intended testimony of
Abelardo B. Licaros is only corroborative of the statements of the other witnesses submitted
by the NBI to the Tanodbayan." (p. 17, Memorandum for Petitioners)
At any rate, the discharge of an accused may be ordered "at any time before they
(defendants) have entered upon their defense," that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from
the thing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. In the case
at bar, considering the opposition of herein petitioners to the motion for the discharge of
Abelardo B. Licaros, particularly the contention that he (herein private respondent) is the
most guilty and that his testimony is not absolutely necessary, the trial court should have
held in abeyance or deferred its resolution on the motion until after the prosecution has
presented all its other evidence. Thereafter, it can fully determine whether the requisites
prescribed in Section 9, Rule 119 of the new Rules of Court, are fully complied with. Besides,
there lies the danger where one or more of the defendants are discharged before the
commencement of the hearing, he/they may disappear in which case the purpose of his/their
exclusion will come to naught. It is necessary that certain safeguards be taken, otherwise an
injustice may be committed.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, dated February 11, 1983,
ordering the discharge from the information of accused Abelardo B. Licaros in Criminal Case
No. 6672, as well as its resolution, dated March 21, 1983, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, are hereby SET ASIDE.
 TRIAL TECH| 43

SO ORDERED.