Coherentism
Coherentism is the name given to a few philosophical
theories in modern epistemology, the study of knowl-
edge. There are two distinct types of coherentism. One
is the coherence theory of truth; the other, the coher-
ence theory of justication. Coherent truth is divided
between an anthropological approach, which applies only
to localized networks ('true within a given sample of a
population, given our understanding of the population'),
and an approach that is judged on the basis of universals,
such as categorical sets. The anthropological approach
belongs more properly to Correspondence theory, while
the universal theories are a small development within
Analytic philosophy. The coherentist theory of justi-
cation, which may be interpreted as relating to either the-
ory of coherent truth, characterizes epistemic justica-
tion as a property of a belief only if that belief is a mem-
ber of a coherent set. What distinguishes coherentism
from other theories of justication is that the set is the
primary bearer of justication.[1] As an epistemological
theory, coherentism opposes dogmatic foundationalism
and also innitism through its insistence on denitions.
It also attempts to oer a solution to the regress argu-
ment that plagues correspondence theory. In an epis-
temological sense, it is a theory about how belief can
be proof-theoretically justied. Coherentism is a view
about the structure and system of knowledge, or else jus-
tied belief. The coherentists thesis is normally formu-
lated in terms of a denial of its contrary, such as dog-
matic foundationalism, which lacks a proof-theoretical
framework, or correspondence theory, which lacks uni-
versalism. Counterfactualism, through a vocabulary de-
veloped by David K. Lewis and his Many worlds the-
ory[2] although popular with philosophers, has had the
eect of creating wide disbelief of universals amongst
academics. Many diculties lie in between hypotheti-
cal coherence and its eective actualization. Coheren-
tism claims, at a minimum, that not all knowledge AND
justied belief rest ultimately on a foundation of nonin-
ferential knowledge OR justied belief. To defend this
view, they may argue that conjunctions (AND) are more
specic, and thus in some way more defensible, than dis-
junctions (OR).
After responding to foundationalism, coherentists nor-
mally characterize their view positively by replacing the
foundationalism metaphor of a building as a model for the
structure of knowledge with dierent metaphors, such as
the metaphor which models our knowledge on a ship at
sea whose seaworthiness must be ensured by repairs to
any part in need of it. This metaphor fullls the purpose Perhaps the best-known objection to a coherence the-
of explaining the problem of incoherence, which was rst ory of truth is Bertrand Russell's argument concerning
1
raised in mathematics, and which poses a risk to Moral
objectivism. Coherentists typically hold that justication
is solely a function of some relationship between beliefs,
none of which are privileged beliefs in the way main-
tained by dogmatic foundationalists. In this way universal
truths are in closer reach. Dierent varieties of coheren-
tism are individuated by the specic relationship between
a system of knowledge and justied belief, which can be
interpreted in terms of Predicate logic, or ideally, Proof
theory.
1 Denition
As a theory of truth, coherentism restricts true sentences
to those that cohere with some specied set of sentences.
Someones belief is true if and only if it is coherent with
all or most of his or her other (true) beliefs. The termi-
nology of coherence is then said to correlate with truth
via some concept of what qualies all truth, such as ab-
soluteness or universalism. These further terms become
the qualiers of what is meant by a truth statement, and
the truth-statements then decide what is meant by a true
belief. Usually, coherence is taken to imply something
stronger than mere consistency. Statements that are com-
prehensive and meet the requirements of Occams razor
are usually to be preferred.
As an illustration of the principle, if people lived in a
virtual reality universe, they could see birds in the trees
that aren't really there. Not only are the birds not really
there, but the trees aren't really there either. The peo-
ple may or may not know that the bird and the tree are
there, but in either case there is a coherence between the
virtual world and the real one, expressed in terms of true
beliefs within available experience. Coherence is a way of
explicating truth values while circumventing beliefs that
might be false in any way. More traditional critics from
the Correspondence theory of truth have said that it can-
not have contents and proofs at the same time, unless the
contents are innite, or unless the contents somehow ex-
ist in the form of proof. Such a form of 'existing proof'
might seem ridiculous, but coherentists tend to think it
is non-problematic. It therefore falls into a group of the-
ories that are sometimes deemed excessively generalis-
tic, what Gabor Forrai calls 'blob realism'.[3] This falls in
line with the traditional debate between Empiricism and
Rationalism.
2 3
contradiction. Russell maintained that a belief and its
negation will each separately cohere with one complete
set of all beliefs, thus making it internally inconsistent.
For example, if someone holds a belief that is false, how
might we determine that the belief refers to something
real although it is false, or that the right belief is true,
although it is not believed? Coherence must thus rely
on a theory that is either non-contradictory or accepts
some limited degree of incoherence, such as Relativism
or Paradox. Additional necessary criteria for coherence
may include universalism or absoluteness, suggesting that
the theory remains anthropological or incoherent when it
does not use the concept of innity. A coherentist might
argue that this scenario applies regardless of the theo-
ries being considered, and so, that coherentism must be
the preferred truth-theoretical framework in avoiding rel-
ativism.
2 History
Coherentism was primarily outlined by Harold Henry
Joachim in his book The Nature of Truth (1906). More
recently, several contemporary epistemologists have sig-
nicantly contributed to and defended the theory; pri-
marily Laurence BonJour and Keith Lehrer.
3 The regress argument
Both coherence and foundationalist theories of justica-
tion attempt to answer the regress argument, a fundamen-
tal problem in epistemology that goes as follows. Given
some statement P, it appears reasonable to ask for a jus-
tication for P. If that justication takes the form of an-
other statement, P', one can again reasonably ask for a
justication for P', and so forth. There are three possible
outcomes to this questioning process:
1. the series is innitely long, with every statement jus-
tied by some other statement.
2. the series forms a loop, so that each statement is ul-
timately involved in its own justication.
3. the series terminates with certain statements having 3.2
to be self-justifying.
An innite series appears to oer little help, unless a
way is found to model innite sets. This might entail
additional assumptions. Otherwise, it is impossible to
check that each justication is satisfactory without mak-
ing broad generalizations.
Coherentism is sometimes characterized as accepting that
the series forms a loop, but although this would produce
a form of coherentism, this is not what is generally meant
by the term. Those who do accept the loop theory some-
times argue that the body of assumptions used to prove
THE REGRESS ARGUMENT
the theory is not what is at question in considering a loop
of premises. This would serve the typical purpose of cir-
cumventing the reliance on a regression, but might be
considered a form of logical foundationalism. But oth-
erwise, it must be assumed that a loop begs the question,
meaning that it does not provide sucient logic to con-
stitute proof.
3.1 Foundationalisms response
One might conclude that there must be some statements
that, for some reason, do not need justication. This
view is called foundationalism. For instance, rationalists
such as Descartes and Spinoza developed axiomatic sys-
tems that relied on statements that were taken to be self-
evident: "I think therefore I am" is the most famous ex-
ample. Similarly, empiricists take observations as pro-
viding the foundation for the series.
Foundationalism relies on the claim that it is not necessary
to ask for justication of certain propositions, or that they
are self-justifying. Coherentists argue that this position
is overly dogmatic. In other words, it does not provide
real criteria for determining what is true and what is not.
The Coherentist analytic project then involves a process
of justifying what is meant by adequate criteria for non-
dogmatic truth. As an oshoot of this, the theory insists
that it is always reasonable to ask for a justication for
any statement. For example, if someone makes an obser-
vational statement, such as it is raining, the coherentist
contends that it is reasonable to ask for example whether
this mere statement refers to anything real. What is real
about the statement, it turns out, is the extended pattern
of relations that we call justications. But, unlike the rel-
ativist, the coherentist argues that these associations may
be objectively real. Coherentism contends that dogmatic
foundationalism does not provide the whole set of pure
relations which might result in actually understanding the
objective context of phenomena, because dogmatic as-
sumptions are not proof-theoretic, and therefore remain
incoherent or relativistic. Coherentists therefore argue
that the only way to reach proof-theoretical truth that is
not relativistic is through coherency.
Coherentisms response
Coherentism denies the soundness of the regression ar-
gument. The regression argument makes the assumption
that the justication for a proposition takes the form of
another proposition: P justies P', which in turn justi-
es P. For coherentism, justication is a holistic process.
Inferential justication for the belief that P is nonlinear.
This means that P and P' are not epistemically prior to
P. Rather, the beliefs that P, P', and P work together to
achieve epistemic justication. Catherine Elgin has ex-
pressed the same point dierently, arguing that beliefs
must be mutually consistent, cotenable, and supportive.
 3

That is, the components must be reasonable in light of one raised by Luc Bovens and Stephen Hartmann in the form
another. Since both cotenability and supportiveness are of 'impossibility' results,[5] and by Erik J. Olsson.[6] At-
matters of degree, coherence is too.[4] Usually the sys- tempts have been made to construct a theoretical account
tem of belief is taken to be the complete set of beliefs of of the coherentist intuition.[7]
the individual or group, that is, their theory of the world.
It is necessary for coherentism to explain in some detail
what it means for a system to be coherent. At the least, 4 See also
coherence must include logical consistency. It also usu-
ally requires some degree of integration of the various 4.1 Epistemological theories
components of the system. A system that contains more
than one unrelated explanation of the same phenomenon Foundherentism
is not as coherent as one that uses only one explanation,
all other things being equal. Conversely, a theory that
explains divergent phenomena using unrelated explana- 4.2 Theories of truth
tions is not as coherent as one that uses only one explana-
tion for those divergent phenomena. These requirements
are variations on Occams razor. The same points can be
5 References
made more formally using Bayesian statistics. Finally, the
[1] Klein, P. D. (2007). Human Knowledge and the Innite
greater the number of phenomena explained by the sys-
Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies , 134 (1),
tem, the greater its coherence. 1-17.

[2] Lewis, David K. Counterfactuals. Wiley-Blackwell, 2001.

3.3 Problems for coherentism
[3] Forrai, G. Reference, Truth, and Conceptual Schemes.
Synthese Library.
A problem coherentism has to face is the plurality ob-
jection. There is nothing within the denition of coher- [4] Elgin, Catherine Z. (2005.) Non-foundationalist Episte-
ence which makes it impossible for two entirely dierent mology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability. In Matthias
sets of beliefs to be internally coherent. Thus there might Steup and Ernest Sosa. (Eds.) Contemporary Debates in
be several such sets. But if one supposesin line with Epistemology. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 156 167.
the principle of non-contradictionthat there can only
[5] Luc Bovens (2003), Bayesian epistemology, Oxford:
be one complete set of truths, coherentism must there-
Clarendon, ISBN 0-19-926975-0, OCLC 53393352,
fore resolve internally that these systems are not contra- 0199269750
dictory, by establishing what is meant by truth. At this
point, Coherence could be faulted for adopting its own [6] Erik J. Olsson (2005), Against coherence, Oxford: Oxford
variation of dogmatic foundationalism by arbitrarily se- University Press, ISBN 0-19-927999-3, 0199279993
lecting truth values. Coherentists must argue that their
[7] Why Does Coherence Appear Truth-Conducive?". Syn-
truth-values are not arbitrary for provable reasons. these. 157 (3): 361372. 2007. doi:10.1007/s11229-
A second objection also emerges, the nite problem: 006-9062-8. JSTOR 27653566.
that arbitrary, ad hoc relativism could reduce statements
of relatively insignicant value to non-entities during
the process of establishing universalism or absoluteness. 6 Bibliography
This might result in a totally at truth-theoretic frame-
work, or even arbitrary truth values. Coherentists gen- Rescher, Nicholas. The Coherence Theory of Truth.
erally solve this by adopting a metaphysical condition of Oxford UP. 1973.
universalism, sometimes leading to Materialism, or by ar-
guing that Relativism is trivial.
However, Metaphysics poses another problem, the prob- 7 External links
lem of the stowaway argument that might carry epistemo-
logical implications. However, a coherentist might say Coherentism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclo-
that if the truth conditions of the logic hold, then there pedia of Philosophy.
will be no problem regardless of any additional conditions
that happen to be true. Thus, the stress is on making the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
theory valid within the set, and also veriable.
A number of philosophers have raised concerns over the
link between intuitive notions of coherence that form the
foundation of epistemic forms of coherentism and some
formal results in Bayesian probability. This is an issue
4 8 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

8 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

8.1 Text
Coherentism Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coherentism?oldid=741699837 Contributors: LionKimbro, Heron, Michael Hardy,
Owl, Snoyes, Poor Yorick, Andrewman327, Markhurd, Populus, Banno, Goethean, AceMyth, Snobot, Layman, Lucidish, Nathan Ladd, El
C, Skeppy, Pearle, Mtreinik, TigerShark, Kzollman, Ruud Koot, Eaolson, Zzyzx11, BD2412, KYPark, The wub, DJProFusion, PWhittle,
Tomisti, Brz7, Teryx, Innity0, Tom Morris, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Yamaguchi , Wikikris, Chris the speller, Adler F, WikiPedant,
Go For It, Radagast83, Salt Yeung, Jon Awbrey, Vina-iwbot~enwiki, Clicketyclack, Byelf2007, K, Gregbard, Peterdjones, Danny lost,
Alphachimpbot, The Transhumanist, Jcamtzf, Avicennasis, STBot, The Tetrast, Larklight, SieBot, Sanya3, ClueBot, PixelBot, Schreiber-
Bike, Dylanfromthenorth, XLinkBot, Addbot, Vasi, Yobot, KamikazeBot, Omnipaedista, JonDePlume, Aaron Kauppi, Bonniedougall,
PBS-AWB, Hebertr, Helpful Pixie Bot, BG19bot, Dexbot, Caleb Crabb, Aubreybardo, NCoppedge, Tloveless, MLODROB and Anony-
mous: 43

8.2 Images
File:Ambox_important.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg License: Public do-
main Contributors: Own work, based o of Image:Ambox scales.svg Original artist: Dsmurat (talk contribs)
File:Edit-clear.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The
Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist:
The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the le, specically: Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although
minimally).
File:Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/48/Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg License: Cc-by-
sa-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:People_icon.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/People_icon.svg License: CC0 Contributors: Open-
Clipart Original artist: OpenClipart
File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?
Original artist: ?
File:Question_book-new.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/99/Question_book-new.svg License: Cc-by-sa-3.0
Contributors:
Created from scratch in Adobe Illustrator. Based on Image:Question book.png created by User:Equazcion Original artist:
Tkgd2007
File:Socrates.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cd/Socrates.png License: Public domain Contributors:
Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. Original artist: The original uploader was Magnus Manske at English Wikipedia Later versions
were uploaded by Optimager at en.wikipedia.
File:Symbol_book_class2.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/Symbol_book_class2.svg License: CC
BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: Mad by Lokal_Prol by combining: Original artist: Lokal_Prol
File:Symbol_template_class.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/5/5c/Symbol_template_class.svg License: Public
domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

8.3 Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0