9/17/2015 G.R. No.

L-24396

TodayisThursday,September17,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L24396July29,1968

SANTIAGOP.ALALAYAN,ETAL.,suinginhisbehalfandforthebenefitofallotherpersonshaving
commonorgeneralinterestwithhiminaccordancewithSec.12,Rule3,RulesofCourt,petitioners
appellants,
vs.
NATIONALPOWERCORPORATIONandADMINISTRATOROFECONOMICCOORDINATION,respondents
appellees.

AlafrizLawOfficesforpetitionersappellants.
TheGovernmentCorporateCounselandOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforrespondentsappellees.

FERNANDO,J.:

Thisdeclaratoryreliefproceedingwasstartedinthelowercourtbypetitioners,AlalayanandPhilippinePowerand
Development Company, both franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an
amendatory act,1 empowering respondent National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric
powertoafranchiseholder,"receivingatleast50%ofitselectricpowerandenergyfromittorequireasacondition
thatsuchfranchiseholder"shallnotrealizeanetprofitofmorethantwelvepercentannuallyofitsinvestmentsplus
twomonthoperatingexpenses."Respondent,undersuchprovision,couldlikewise"renewallexistingcontractswith
franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that the provisions of the Act could be given
effect.2 This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional
provisionrequiringthatabill,whichmaybeenactedintolaw,cannotembracemorethanonesubject,whichshallbe
expressed in its title,3 as well as the due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being infringed
upon.Thelowercourtsustaineditsvalidity.Wesustainthelowercourtinthisappeal.

Inthepetitionfordeclaratoryrelief,aftertheusualallegationsastoparties,itwasstatedthatrespondentNational
Power Corporation "has for some years now been, and still is, by virtue of similar, valid and existing contracts
enteredintobyitwithonehundredandthirtyseven(137)naturalpersonsandcorporationsdistributedalloverthe
country,supplying,distributing,servicingandsellingelectricpowerandenergyatfixedritesschedulestothelatter
who have for some years now been and still are, legally engaged in resupplying, redistributing, reservicing and
reselling the said electric power and energy to individual customers within the coverage of their respective
franchises."4Petitionersareincludedamongthesaid197naturalpersonsandentities.5Then,referencewasmade
totheparticularcontractspetitionersenteredintowithrespondent,thecontractstocontinueindefinitelyunlessand
untileitherpartywouldgivetotheothertwoyearspreviousnoticeinwritingofitsintentiontoterminatethesame.6
Afterwhich,itwasnotedthatonJune18,1960,anactauthorizingtheincreaseofthecapitalstockoftheNational
PowerCorporationtoP100milliontookeffect.7Ayearlater,onJune17,1961,itwasallegedthatthechallenged
legislationbecamealaw,purportedlytoincreasefurthertheauthorizedcapitalstock,butincludingtheallegedrider
referredtoabove,which,intheopinionofpetitioners,transgressedtheconstitutionalprovisiononthesubjectmatter
and title of bills as well as the due process clause.8 Mention was then made of the National Power Corporation
approvingarateincreaseofatleast17.5%,theeffectivityofwhich,wasatfirstdeferredtoNovember1,1962,then
subsequently to January 15, 1963, with the threat that in case petitioners would fail to sign the revised contract
providingfortheincreasedrate,respondentNationalPowerCorporationwouldthencease"tosupply,distributeand
serviceelectricpowerandenergytothem."9

That would be, in the opinion of petitioners, violative of their rights, proceeding from legislation suffering from
constitutionalinfirmities.10Adeclarationofunconstitutionalitywasthereforesoughtbythem.Itwasprayed:"(1)To
giveduecoursetothispetition(2)Toissueawritofpreliminaryinjunction,uponthepostingoftherequisitebond,
enjoiningrespondentNPCfromcarryingorprosecutingitsthreattoenforcetheprovisionsoftheriderorSection3
of Republic Act No. 3043 ... in the manner stated in paragraph 18 of this petition until this Honorable Court shall
have finally decided or disposed, by final judgment, of the issues raised in this petition (3) After due hearing, to
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declaretheriderorSection3ofRepublicActNo.3043nullandvoidforbeingillegalandunconstitutional,andto
issueapermanentinjunctionrequiringrespondentNPCtorefrainfromenforcingorimplementingtheprovisionsof
thesamelaw."11

Soon after, petitioner Philippine Power and Development Company moved that insofar as it was concerned, the
case be dismissed, which motion was granted by the lower court on January 25, 1963.12 The sole petitioner is
thereforeSantiagoP.Alalayan,suinginhisbehalfandforthebenefitofallotherpersonshavingcommonorgeneral
interestwithhim.RespondentNationalPowerCorporationfiledanoppositiononFebruary15,1963,opposingthe
issuanceofawritforpreliminaryinjunction.13OnMarch21,1963,thelowercourt,consideringthattherewas"no
sufficientgroundfortheissuanceofthewritforpreliminaryinjunction,"deniedthesame.14

Therewasintheanswer,datedMarch29,1963,anadmissionofthemainfactsalleged,withadenialofthelegal
conclusionwhichpetitionerwoulddeducetherefrom,respondentNationalPowerCorporationupholdingthevalidity
ofthechallengedprovision.Then,cameapartialstipulationoffactssubmittedonOctober1,1964,consistingofa
resolution of the Philippine Electric Plant Owners Association to take the necessary steps to stop respondent
National Power Corporation from enforcing its announced increase, samples of contracts between electric plant
operators on the one hand and respondent National Power Corporation on the other, the contract with petitioner
Alalayan, dated May 26, 1956, showing that he did purchase and take power and energy as follows: "Sixty (60)
kilowatts and of not less than 140,000 kilowatthours in any contract year at the rate of P120.00 per kilowatt per
year"payableintwelveequalmonthlyinstallments,"plusanenergychargeofP0.013perkilowatthour,payableon
the basis of monthly delivery" a letter of June 22, 1962 of respondent National Power Corporation to petitioner
approvinghis17.5%rateincreaseofpowersothatbeginningJuly1,1962,thedemandchargewouldbeP10.00per
kilowattpermonthandtheenergychargewouldbeP0.02perkilowatthouraletterofAugust15,1962,wherein
respondentNationalPowerCorporationnotifiedpetitionerthatitdeferredtheeffectivityofthenewrates,butitwill
be enforced on November 1, 1962 a letter of June 25, 1963 enforcing respondent National Power Corporation
deferringonceagaintheeffectivityofthenewratesuntilJanuary1,1964aswellasthecongressionaltranscripts
onHouseBillNo.5377andSenateBillNo.613,nowRepublicActNo.3043.15

InanorderofNovember5,1964,thelowercourtgavethepartiesaperiodoftwentydayswithinwhichtosubmit
simultaneouslytheirrespectivememoranda.Afterthesubmissionthereof,thelowercourt,inadecisionofJanuary
30,1965,sustainedthevalidityandconstitutionalityofthechallengedprovision.Hence,thisappeal.

As was set forth earlier, this appeal cannot prosper. We share the view of the lower court that the provision in
questioncannotbeimpugnedeitheronthegroundofitsbeingviolativeoftheconstitutionalrequirementthatabill
cannotembracemorethanonesubjecttobeexpressedinitstitleorbyvirtueofitsallegedfailuretosatisfythedue
processcriterion.

1. We consider first the objection that the statute in question is violative of the constitutional provision that no bill
"whichmaybeenactedintolawshallembracemorethanonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedin[its]title..."16
ThisprovisionissimilartothosefoundinmanyAmericanStateConstitutions.Itisaimedagainsttheevilsoftheso
called omnibus bills and logrolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.17 Where the
subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the
subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in
legislation,ariderbeingaprovisionnotgermanetothesubjectmatterofthebill.PetitionerAlalayanassertsthatthe
provisionobjectedtoissucharider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper
legislation.Toimparttoitameaningwhichisreasonableandnotundulytechnical,itmustbedeemedsufficientthat
thetitlebecomprehensiveenoughreasonablytoincludethegeneralobjectwhichthestatuteseekstoeffectwithout
expressingeachandeveryendandmeansnecessaryforitsaccomplishment.Thus,meredetailsneednotbeset
forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision
merelycallsforallpartsofanactrelatingtoitssubjectfindingexpressioninitstitle.18Morespecifically,ifthelaw
amendsasectionorpartofastatute,itsufficesifreferencebemadetothelegislationtobeamended,therebeing
noneedtostatetheprecisenatureoftheamendment.19

Itwasin1938,inGovernmentv.Hongkong&ShanghaiBank,20where,forthefirsttimeaftertheinaugurationofthe
Commonwealth,thisCourtpasseduponaprovisionofthatcharacter.WeheldtherethattheReorganizationLaw,21
providingforthemodeinwhichthetotalannualexpensesoftheBureauofBankingcouldbereimbursedthrough
assessmentlevieduponallbankinginstitutionssubjecttoinspectionbytheBankCommissionerwasnotviolativeof
sucharequirementintheJonesLaw,thepreviousorganicact.JusticeLaurel,however,vigorouslydissented,his
view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with
reorganizationbutwithtaxation.ThiscaseofGovernmentv.Hongkong&ShanghaiBankwas decided by a bare
majorityoffourjusticesagainstthree.Thereafter,itwouldappearthattheconstitutionalrequirementistobegiven
theliberaltestasindicatedinthemajorityopinionpennedbyJusticeAbadSantos,andnotthestricttestasdesired

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bytheminorityheadedbyJusticeLaurel.

Such a trend is made manifest in the cases beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,22 up to and
includingFelwav.Salas,23a1966decision,theopinioncomingfromChiefJusticeConcepcion.Thereisnothingin
Lidasanv.CommissiononElections,24whereastatute25wasannulledonthisground,toindicatethecontrary.As
aptlyexpressedbyJusticeSanchez:"Ofcourse,theConstitutiondoesnotrequireCongresstoemployinthetitleof
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators,thepersonsinterestedinthesubjectofthebill,andthepublic,ofthenature,scopeandconsequencesof
theproposedlawanditsoperation.Andthis,toleadthemtoinquireintothebodyofthebill,studyanddiscussthe
same,takeappropriateactionthereon,and,thus,preventsurpriseorfrauduponthelegislators."

We thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision which requires that any bill enacted into law
shallembraceonlyonesubjecttobeexpressedinthetitlethereof.

2.Norispetitioneranymoresuccessfulinhispleaforthenullificationofthechallengedprovisiononthegroundof
hisbeingdeprivedofthelibertytocontractwithoutdueprocessoflaw.

Itistobeadmittedofcoursethatpropertyrightsfindshelterinspecificconstitutionalprovisions,oneofwhichisthe
due process clause. It is equally certain that our fundamental law framed at a time of "surging unrest and
dissatisfaction",26whentherewasthefearexpressedinmanyquartersthataconstitutionaldemocracy,inviewof
its commitment to the claims of property, would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty and
misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is not susceptible to the indictment that the government
thereinestablishedisimpotenttotakethenecessaryremedialmeasures.Theframerssawtothat.Thewelfarestate
conceptisnotalientothephilosophyofourConstitution.27Itisimplicitinquiteafewofitsprovisions.Itsufficesto
mentiontwo.

There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the wellbeing and economic security of all the
people,28 as well as the pledge of protection to labor with the specific authority to regulate the relations between
landownersandtenantsandbetweenlaborandcapital.29Thisparticularizedreferencetotherightsofworkingmen
whetherinindustryandagriculturecertainlycannotprecludeattentiontoandconcernfortherightsofconsumers,
whoaretheobjectsofsolicitudeinthelegislationnowcomplainedof.Thepolicepowerasanattributetopromote
thecommonwealwouldbedilutedconsiderablyofitsreachandeffectivenessifonthemerepleathatthelibertyto
contractwouldberestricted,thestatutecomplainedofmaybecharacterizedasadenialofdueprocess.Therightto
propertycannotbepressedtosuchanunreasonableextreme.

Itisunderstandablethoughwhybusinessenterprises,notunnaturallyevincinglackofenthusiasmforpolicepower
legislationthataffectthemadverselyandrestricttheirprofitscouldpredicateallegedviolationoftheirrightsonthe
dueprocessclause,whichasinterpretedbythemisabartoregulatorymeasures.Invariably,theresponsefromthis
Court,fromthetimetheConstitutionwasenacted,hasbeenfarfromsympathetic.Thus,duringtheCommonwealth,
wesustainedlegislationprovidingforcollectivebargaining,30securityoftenure,31 minimum wages,32 compulsory
arbitration,33 and tenancy regulation.34 Neither did the objections as to the validity of measures regulating the
issuanceofsecurities35andpublicservices36prevail.

For it is to be remembered that the liberty relied upon is not freedom of the mind, which occupies a preferred
position, nor freedom of the person, but the liberty to contract, associated with business activities, which, as has
beensorepeatedlyannounced,maybesubjected,intheinterestofthegeneralwelfareunderthepolicepower,to
restrictions varied in character and wide ranging in scope as long as due process is observed. In Calalang v.
Williams,37 this Court found no objection to an enactment limiting the use of and traffic in the national roads and
streets as against the assertion that the exercise of such an authority amounted to an unlawful interference with
legitimate business and abridgment of personal liberty. The opinion by Justice Laurel explains why such an
argumentwasfarfrompersuasive.Thus:"Inenactingsaidlaw,therefore,theNationalAssemblywaspromptedby
considerationsofpublicconvenienceandwelfare.Itwasinspiredbyadesiretorelievecongestionoftraffic,which
is,tosaytheleast,amenacetopublicsafety.Publicwelfare,then,liesatthebottomoftheenactmentofsaidlaw,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
businessandoccupations.Personsandpropertymaybesubjectedtoallkindsofrestraintsandburdens,inorderto
securethegeneralcomfort,health,andprosperityofthestate..."38Theabovedoctrine,validthenandequallyvalid
now,constitutedmorethansufficientjustificationforstatutescurtailingthelibertyenjoyedbybusinessenterprises,
whetherconductedbynaturalorjuridicalpersons,tosatisfytheneedsofpublicwelfare.

SoitcontinuestobeundertheRepublic.ThisCourthasinvariablygiventhesealofapprovaltostatutesintendedto
improvethelotoftenants,39whothereafterweregiventheoptiontotransformtheirrelationshipwithlandownersto
oneoflease,whichgrantofauthoritywassustainedin1964.40Retailtradewasnationalized,themeasurereceiving
judicialapprovalasagainstdueprocessobjection,41adecisionforeshadowedearlierwiththefavorableactiontaken
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onlegislationgrantingpreferencetoFilipinocitizensintheleaseofpublicmarketstalls.42Itiseasilyunderstandable
why the regulation of practice of medicine43 limitation of the hours of labor44 imposition of price control45
requirement of separation pay for one month46 as well as a social security scheme47 cannot be impugned as
unconstitutional. While not exhaustive, the above decisions manifest in no certain terms the inherent difficulty of
assailingregulatorylegislationbasedonallegeddenialofdueprocess.

ItwouldthusappearthatunlessthisCourtispreparedtooverturnadoctrinesofirmlyadheredtoinanumberof
casesnotablefortheunanimityoftheirresponsetoanobjectionsimilartotheonehereraised,petitionerAlalayan
cannotprevail.Certainly,thisCourtisnotpreparedtotakethatstep.Forinthefaceofaconstitutionalprovisionthat
allowsdeprivationofliberty,includinglibertyofcontract,aslongasdueprocessisobserved,theallegednullityofa
legislative act of this character can only be shown if in fact there is such a denial. The relevant question then is,
whatdoesdueprocessrequire?

TheholdingofthisCourtinErmitaMalateHotelandMotelOperatorsAsso.v.CityMayor,48shedssomelight.Thus:
"Thereisnocontrollingandprecisedefinitionofdueprocess.Itfurnishesthoughastandardtowhichgovernmental
actionshouldconforminorderthatdeprivationoflife,libertyorproperty,ineachappropriatecase,bevalid.What
thenisthestandardofdueprocesswhichmustexistbothasaproceduralandassubstantiverequisitetofreethe
challengedordinance,oranygovernmentalactionforthatmatter,fromtheimputationoflegalinfirmitysufficientto
spellitsdoom?Itisresponsivenesstothesupremacyofreason,obediencetothedictatesofjustice.Negativelyput,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus
hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness.Itistheembodimentofthesportingideaoffairplay.Itexactsfealty"tothosestrivingsforjustice"and
judgestheactofofficialdomofwhateverbranch"inthelightofreasondrawnfromconsiderationsoffairnessthat
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowlyorpedanticallyinslaverytoformorphrases.".

Thedueprocessobjectionissoughttobebolsteredbyanallegationthatsuchpowerconferredinthechallenged
legislationtolimitthenetprofitsto"12%annuallyof[petitioner's]investmentsplustwomonthoperatingexpenses"
hasaconfiscatoryaspect.Thisargumenthastheringoffutility.Precisely,inManilaElectricCo.v.PublicService
Commission,49thisCourtinanopinionbythepresentChiefJusticeupheldsuchafigureasagainstthecontention
thatitwasrathertoogeneroustothepublicutility.Tospeakofitasconfiscatorythenistoemploythelanguageby
hyperbole.Moreover,intheabsenceanyevidencetodemonstratetheallegedconfiscatoryeffectoftheprovisionin
question, there would be no basis for its nullification, in view of the wellknown presumption of validity that every
statutehasinitsfavor.50

In the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the
legislationassailedcontravenesthedueprocessclause. 1wph1.t

3. While not explicitly avowed by petitioner, there is the intimation that to apply the challenged legislation to
contractstheninexistencewouldbeaninfringementoftheconstitutionalprohibitionagainstanylawimpairingthe
obligation of contracts.51 No such fear need be entertained. A citation from a 1940 decision of this Court, in
PangasinanTransportationCo.v.PublicServiceCommission,52isparticularlyrelevant.InthelanguageofJustice
Laurel,speakingfortheCourt:"Upontheotherhand,statutesenactedfortheregulationofpublicutilities,beinga
properexercisebythestateofitspolicepower,areapplicablenotonlytothosepublicutilitiescomingintoexistence
after its passage, but likewise to those already, existence established and in operation."53 Such a doctrine was
followedinthecaseofatenancylegislation,theCongressundoubtedlyhavinginmindandnothavingfailedtotake
notice"oftheexistenceofcontracts"whichstipulatedadivisionofthecropsona5050basisandthereforemust
haveintendedtoregulatethesame.Therewasthusnoimpairmentofanobligationofcontract,suchanenactment
underthepolicepowerbeingremedialinnature,thenonapplicabilityofwhichtoexistingconditionswouldbeself
defeatingincharacter.54

InAbev.FosterWheelerCorp.,55JusticeBarrera,speakingfortheCourt,tooknoteofthecontention"thatasthe
contracts of employment were entered into at a time when there was no law granting the workers said right, the
application as to them of the subsequent enactment restoring the same right constitutes an impairment of their
contractualobligations."Thenhe,madeclearwhytheCourtwasofacontraryviewas,"theconstitutionalguaranty
ofnonimpairment...islimitedbytheexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheState,intheinterestofpublichealth,safe,
moralsandgeneralwelfare."Thuswasreaffirmedwhatpreviouslyhadbeenannouncedastherule.Suchadoctrine
wasreiteratedearlythisyearinPhilippineAmericanLifeInsuranceCo.v.AuditorGeneral,56wherethisCourtfound
noobjectiontotheapplicabilityoftheMarginLaw,57evenifitbeassumedthatareinsurancetreatywasalreadyin
existenceandhadimposedthecorrespondingobligationonthepartiespriortoitsenactment.

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Thisisnottosaythatineachandeverycasetheinvocationoftheprotectionofthenonimpairmentclausewouldbe
unavailingoncethelegislationcomplainedofisshowntobeanexerciseofthepolicepower.Otherwise,thatwould
rendernugatory theconstitutional guarantee ofnonimpairment,and for thatmatterboth the equal protection and
due process clauses which equally serve to protect property rights. Here, as in other cases where governmental
authoritymaytrenchuponpropertyrights,theprocessofbalancing,adjustmentorharmonizationiscalledfor.

Rutter v. Esteban58 lends support to such an approach. In that leading case, the continued operation and
enforcement of the Moratorium Act59 which allowed an eightyear period of grace for the payment of prewar
obligations on the part of debtors who suffered as a consequence of World War II was, in a 1953 decision, held
"unreasonableandoppressive,andshouldnotbeprolongedaminutelonger"forbeingviolativeoftheconstitutional
provisionprohibitingtheimpairmentoftheobligationofthecontracts"and,therefore,...shouldbedeclarednulland
voidandwithouteffect."60Asofthedateofitsenactmentin1948,thepolicepowercouldbereliedupontosustain
itsvalidity,inviewoftheseriouseconomicconditionfacedbythecountryuponliberationandthestateofpenury
thatthenafflictedagreaterportionoftheFilipinopeople.By1953however,theMoratoriumActcouldberightfully
considered as an infringement of the nonimpairment clause, as the economy had in the meanwhile considerably
changedforthebetter.

There is no clearer instance then of the process of harmonization and balancing which is incumbent upon the
judiciarytoundertakewheneveraregulatorymeasureunderthepolicepowerisassailedasviolativeofconstitucess
or equal protection, all of which are intended to safeguard property rights. Three leading decisions of the United
StatesSupremeCourt,HomeBuilding&LoanAstionalguarantees,whetherofnonimpairment,dueprosociationv.
Blaisdell,61Nebbiav.NewYork,62andNormanv.BaltimoreandOhioRailroadCo.,63speaksimilarly.

Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the nonimpairment clause by petitioner and the process of adjustment or
harmonization be undertaken to ascertain whether the applicability of the statutory provision assailed to existing
contractswouldruncountertosuchaguarantee,stillthesameconclusionemerges.Thereisafailuretomakeouta
caseforitsinvalidity.

WHEREFORE,therebeingnoshowingthatSection3ofRepublicActNo.3043isunconstitutional,thedecisionof
thelowercourt,dismissingthepetition,isaffirmed.WithcostsagainstpetitionerAlalayan.

Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Sanchez,CastroandAngeles,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1 Section 3, Republic Act No. 3043, approved June 17, 1961, entitled "An Act to Further Amend
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six
HundredandFortyOne."
2Section3ofRepublicActNo.3043readsthus

"SEC.3.TheNationalPowerCorporationisherebyauthorizedtorepresentandtransactforthebenefit
andinbehalfofthepublicconsumers,anditshallinanycontractforthesupplyofelectricpowertoa
franchiseholderrequireasaconditionthatthefranchiseholder,ifitreceivesatleastfiftypercentofits
electricpowerandenergyfromtheNationalPowerCorporation,shallnotrealizeanetprofitofmore
than twelve percent annually of its investments plus twomonth operating expenses. The National
Power Corporation shall renew all existing contracts with franchise holder for the supply of electric
power and energy, in order to give effect to the provisions hereof. In the event that the net profit as
verifiedbythePublicServiceCommissionshouldexceedthesaidtwelvepercent,thepublicService
Commissionshallordersuchexcesstobereturnedproratatothecustomerseitherincashorascredit
forfutureelectricbills."

3ArticleVI,Section21,par.1,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.Theconstitutionalprovisionreadsthus:"Nobill
whichmaybeenactedintolawshallembracemorethanonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitleof
thebill."
4Petition,RecordonAppeal,par.4,pp.34.

5Ibid,par.5,p.4.

6Ibid,pars.6,7and8,pp.46.

7Ibid,par.9,pp.68.

8Ibid,par.10,pp.89.

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9Ibid,pars.11,12and13,pp.911.

10Ibid,pars.15,16,17and18,pp.1218.

11Ibid,p.25.

12Ibid,pp.143144.

13Ibid,pp.161172.

14Ibid,p.229.

15Ibid,pp.243248.

16Art.VI,Sec.21,par.1,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.

17Governmentv.Hongkong&ShanghaiBank,66Phil.483(1938).

18Peoplev.Carlos,78Phil.535(1947).

19Peoplev.Buenviaje,47Phil.536(1925).

2066Phil.483.

21ActNo.4007.

2273Phil.288(1941).

23 L26511, October 29, 1966. The other cases that may be cited follows People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535
(1947)Nuvalv.delaFuente,92Phil.1074(1953)Ichongv.Hernandez,101Phil.1155(1957)Corderov.
Cabatuando,L14542,Oct.31,1962Phil.AirLinesEmployeesAsso.v.Phil.AirLines,Inc.,L18559,June
30,1964MunicipalityofJosePanganibanv.ShellCo.,L18349,July30,1966.
24L28089,October25,1967.

25ActNo.4790.

26 The phrase is Justice Laurel's, appearing in his concurring opinion in Ang Tibay v. Court, cited with
approvalinAntamokGoldfieldsMiningCo.v.Court,70Phil.340(1940).
27 Cf. "Private property does not constitute for anyone an absolute and unconditioned right. .. All men are
equalintheirrighttoadecentlife...Itisnotasystemofjusticewhereonemanisverywealthyandanother
very poor. Where such a situation exists on a national scale, it becomes a matter of social justice... [In the
Philippines,while]afewhavefarmorethantheyneed,thevastmajoritylackeventhebarestessentialsof
life."PastoralLetteroftheCatholicHierarchy,May1,1968.

28Art.11,Sec.5,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.

29Art.XIV,Sec.6,id.

30PampangaBusCo.v.PambuscoEmployees'Union(1939)68Phil.541.

31ManilaTradingandSupplyCo.v.Zulueta,69Phil.485(1940).

32InternationalHardwoodandVeneerCompanyv.ThePangilFederationofLabor,70Phil.602(1940).

33AntamokGoldfieldsMiningCompanyv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,70Phil.340(1940).

34Tapangv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,72Phil.79(1941).

35Peoplev.Rosenthal,68Phil.328(1939).

36PangasinanTrans.Co.,Inc.v.PublicServiceCom.,70Phil.221(1940).

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3770Phil.726(1940).

38Ibid,p.733.

39Camachov.CourtofIndustrialRelations,80Phil.848(1948)Ongsiacov.Gamboa,86Phil.50(1950).

40DeRamasv.CourtofAgrarianRelations,L19555,May29,1964.Cf.DelRosariov.DelosSantos,L
2058990,March21,1968.
41Ichongv.Hernandez,101Phil.1155(1957).

42CoChiongv.Cuaderno,83Phil.242(1949).

43Peoplev.Ventura,L15079,Jan.31,1962.

44Phil.AirLinesEmployees'Asso.v.Phil.AirLines,Inc.,L18559,June30,1964.

45Peoplev.ChuChi,92Phil.977(1953).

46Abev.FosterWheelerCorp.,L14785,Nov.29,1960.

47RomanCatholicArchbishopofManilav.SocialSecurityCom.,L15045,Jan.20,1961.Cf.Directorof
Forestryv.Muoz,L24796,June28,1968.
48L24693,July31,1967.SeealsoMorfev.Mutuc,L20387,January31,1968.

49L24762,Nov.14,1966.

50Cf.ErmitaMalateHotelandMotelOperatorsAsso.v.CityMayor,L24693,July31,1967.

51Art.III,Sec.1,Par.11oftheConstitutionprovides"Nolawimpairingtheobligationsofcontractsshallbe
passed.

5270Phil.221(.1940).

53Ibid,p.232.

54Ongsiakov.Gamboa,86Phil.50(1950).

55L14785,November29,1960.

56L19255,January18,1968.

57RepublicActNo.2609.

5893Phil.68(1953).

59RepublicActNo.342.

6093Phil.68,82(1953).

61290US398(1934).

62291US502(1934).

63294US240(1935).

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