Rule 63 - 4. Pagkalinawan v. Rodas 80 Phil.

218 (1948)

Facts: In an ejectment suit between Manuel Tambunting, plaintiff-respondent, and Alfonso Pagkalinawan and Manuel
Pagkalinawan, defendant-petitioners, appealed from the municipal court to the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
latter court rendered a decision sentencing the defendants to vacate the house in question and to pay the plaintiff the
rentals. Defendant-petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the CFI which issued an order setting aside the
decision. On motion for reconsideration in turn filed by the plaintiff-respondent, an order was issued directing the
defendant-petitioners to pay the rentals directly to the plaintiff-respondent and providing for their ejectment in case of
default. Upon petition of the plaintiff-respondent, the CFI of Manila ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The
defendants sought to stay the execution on the ground that they had in the meantime filed with the same court an
interpleader suit against the plaintiff-responded and one Angel de Leon Ong, praying that the latter two be ordered to
litigate their conflicting claims to the rentals due from the defendants, it appearing that said defendants received a
notice from the Attorney of Angel de Leon Ong advising the defendants to stop paying rentals to the plaintiff-
respondent. The CFI of Manila acceded to the motion for stay of execution, but, proceeded with the execution. The
defendants instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking from us an order directing Hon. Sotero
Rodas, Judge of the CFI of Manila, and Joaquin Garcia, sheriff, to desist from carrying out the writ of execution.

Issue: WON the decision of Respondent Judge was incorrect

Ruling: Yes. It is true that the decision of the respondent judge orders the defendant-petitioners to pay the rentals
directly to the plaintiff-respondent Manuel Tambunting and provides for their ejectment in case of default. But it
appears that, in connection with the interpleader suit filed by the herein petitioners in the CFI of Manila, said rentals
were deposited with the clerk of court, of which fact the respondent judge was informed by the petitioners. Such
deposits, in our opinion, constitute a bona fide compliance with the decision of the respondent judge, since the
defendant-petitioners were warned by Angel de Leon Ong not to pay rentals to the respondent Manuel Tambunting.
That there is really a conflicting claim between Angel de Leon Ong and respondent Manuel Tambunting as evidenced
by the fact that there are pending in the CFI of Manila civil case No. 815, between Manuel Tambunting and Angel de
Leon Ong and Ong Hoa for the annulment of a contract of sale involving the premises in question, and civil case No.
2690, between Angel de Leon Ong and Manuel Tambunting for the ejectment of Tambunting from the property which
includes the premises held by the petitioners. Under the law, the latter have a right to file the interpleader suit in view
of the claim for rentals of Angel de Leon Ong; and if the respondent Tambunting believes that he is legally entitled to
said rentals, he is free to move for withdrawal of the deposits made by the petitioners.

Rule 63 - 3. Tambunting, Jr. and Commercial House of Finance, Inc. v. Sps. Sumabat
GR 144101, Sept 16 2005

Facts: A parcel of land was previously registered in the names of respondents, spouses Emilio Sumabat and
Esperanza Baello. Respondents mortgaged it to petitioner Antonio Tambunting, Jr. to secure the payment of a
P7,727.95 loan. Respondents were informed that their indebtedness had ballooned to P15,000 for their failure to pay
the monthly amortizations. Because respondents defaulted in their obligation, petitioner Commercial House of
Finance, Inc. (CHFI), as assignee of the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property but
the same did not push through. It was restrained by the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan in a complaint
for injunction filed by respondents against petitioners. However, the case was dismissed.

Respondents filed an action for declaratory relief with the CFI of Caloocan City seeking a declaration of the extent of
their actual indebtedness. The CFI fixed respondents liability at P15,743.83. In compliance with the decision,
respondents consigned the required amount.

Upon foreclosure of the mortage by CHFI, respondents instituted a petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO, with the RTC of Caloocan City. However, the public auction scheduled on that same day
proceeded and the property was sold to CHFI as the highest bidder. Respondents failed to redeem the same. Hence,
title to the property was consolidated in favor of CHFI and a new certificate of title was issued in its name. The RTC
issued the assailed decision ruling that CFI decision fixing respondents liability at P15,743.83 and authorizing
consignation had long attained finality. The mortgage was extinguished. The ten-year period within which petitioners
should have foreclosed the property was already barred by prescription. They abused their right to foreclose the
property and exercised it in bad faith. As a consequence, the trial court nullified the foreclosure and extrajudicial sale
of the property, as well as the consolidation of title in CHFIs

Issue: WON the CFI decision was final and executory

Ruling: No. Petitioners claim that the trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the consignation. taking
cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since, petitioners being already in default in their loan amortizations,
there existed a violation of the mortgage deed even before the institution of the action. Hence, the CFI could not have
rendered a valid judgment and the consignation made pursuant to a void judgment was void.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or
violation thereof. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which
it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief,
the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an
action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action. Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place
before the filing of the case in the CFI. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance. Thereof. And in the
absence of jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect.

Rule 63 13 Sps. Crisologo v. Sps. Centeno GR 20014, Nov 27 1968

Facts: Spouses Francisco Crisologo and Consolacion Florentino filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur an ex parte petition for consolidation of ownership in them as vendees a retro of two parcels of land on
the ground that the vendors, the spouses Isaac Centeno and Asuncion Aquino, have failed to exercise their
right of repurchase within the periods stipulated in the two contracts of sale with pacto de retro. On
January 28, 1955, the court a quo granted the petition. The vendors filed a motion to set aside the Order
of January 28, 1955, and on July 27, 1956, the court a quo granted the motion on the ground that the
movants had not been duly notified of the hearing. On motion by the petitioners to set aside the Order of
July 27, 1956, on the ground that the vendors had been notified by registered mail of the hearing, the
lower court, by its Order of February 27, 1957, granted the motion and set aside the Order of July 27,
1956. The vendors appealed the Order of February 27, 1957, to the Court of Appeals. On June 27, 1958,
the Court of Appeals set aside the lower courts Order of February 27, 1957, after holding that the vendors
had not been legally notified of the petition and the hearing, and the Order of January 28, 1955, was a
patent nullity. The Court of Appeals remanded the record to the lower court for reopening. After being
served with summons, the vendors filed their answer alleging that the two contracts of sale with pacto de
retro were really intended as equitable mortgages as securities for usurious loans. After trial, the lower court
rendered its decision on October 26, 1960, holding that respondents allegation was substantiated by their
evidence. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme
Court on questions of law.

Petitioner-appellants contend that the lower court erred in not finding that the Order of January 28, 1955
was valid, final and executory, and that all proceedings thereafter taken, including the vendors appeal to the
Court of Appeals and its decision rendered in said appeal setting aside the Order of February 27, 1957,
and remanding the case for reopening as well as the proceedings thereafter taken, including the decision of
October 26, 1960, are null and void.

Issue: WON the petitioner is correct

Ruling: No. The judgment of the lower court of October 26, 1960, is hereby affirmed
(1) Article 1607 of the Civil Code which provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In case of real property, the consolidations of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply
with the provisions of Article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the
vendor has been duly heard."cralaw virtua1aw library

contemplates a contentious proceeding wherein the vendor a retro must be named respondent in the caption and title
of the petition for consolidation of ownership and duly summoned and heard.

In the instant case, the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of ownership named the vendees as
petitioners, but did not name the vendors as respondents, the said vendors were not duly summoned and heard. In
view thereof, the Order of January 28, 1955, was a patent nullity having been issued contrary to the contentious
proceeding contemplated in Article 1607 of the Civil Code, and the lower court not having acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of the vendors;

(2) The judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Order of February 27, 1957, and in consequence thereof
the Order of January 28, 1955, as a patent nullity on the ground that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the vendors because they had not been summoned is res judicata on the question of nullity of said
orders; and

(3) After the remand to the court below, the proceedings further taken wherein the vendors were named as
respondents and duly summoned and heard, after which on October 26, 1960, the appealed judgment was rendered
in favor of the respondents, were valid, being in accordance with the contentious proceeding provided for in Article
1607 of the Civil Code.