Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Gross Estate

EN BANC
Real Property 2 parcels of land in Baguio,
covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379 P43,500.00
G.R. No. L-11622 January 28, 1961

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, Personal Property

vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX (1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at
APPEALS, respondents. P10.00 each 1,770.00

x---------------------------------------------------------x
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per share 79,800.00
G.R. No. L-11668 January 28, 1961.

DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner, (3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. 4,870.88
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT OF TAX (4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India,
APPEALS, respondents. Australia & China 851.97

BARRERA, J.:
Total Gross Assets P130,792.85

This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the
On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in
Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will
the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on January
was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary
23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in
administrator of the estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established their
return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their
permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22,
values six months after the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary
1947, and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951,
administrator in order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the
Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal
1 inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.
properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the Philippines, described and preliminary
which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States. Acting upon said return, the
assessed as follows:
Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties declared therein,
but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair
market value in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions
claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22, 1951 22.47 10,022.47
the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of
P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.
Sub-Total P21,365.88
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax
return in pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and
the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.

In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and
Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in
from a total valuation of P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was the amended return of September 22, 1952, except that it contained new claims for additional
based by the ancillary administrator on the market notation of the stock obtaining at the San exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate
Francisco California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of Stevenson, that is, As of of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code
August 22, 1931. In addition, the ancillary administrator made claim for the following deductions: which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in
case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the
Funeral expenses ($1,04326) P2,086.52
imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National
Judicial Expenses: Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the
amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it
had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was
(a) Administrator's Fee P1,204.34
accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector denied the claim. For this reason, action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, as assignees of Beatrice
(b) Attorney's Fee 6.000.00 Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the
case was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
(c) Judicial and Administration expenses
as of August 9, 1952 1,400.05
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half () share of the surviving spouse
in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such
8,604.39 property should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant
to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property
Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio real belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the
properties (O.R. No. B-1 686836) 652.50 provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California
2 Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the
computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real
Claims against the estate: estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the
($5,000.00) P10,000.00 P10,000.00 Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of
P8,604.39.
From this decision, both parties appealed.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four errors allegedly
committed by the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher hereinafter called
respondents, made six assignments of error. Together, the assigned errors raise the following
main issues for resolution by this Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half () of the net
estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our
law on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue
Code;
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122
of the National Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the payment of estate and
inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861,
U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by
the lower court;
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and
administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and
P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during
his lifetime; and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it claims to
3
have overpaid the government and to be refundable to it.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the
absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted
the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. The
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
application of this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector
of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the
property relation of the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law,
but by the national law of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by
petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that what
obtains in that jurisdiction is another regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired
during the marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his
stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in
testate and intestate proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among others, is to be
determined by the national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took
place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the
New Civil Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-
called nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a
foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the administration disposition, and
ownership of their conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes
the dominant law in determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a
difference between the two articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides
that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or
abroad while Article 13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign
land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in
the Philippines. Manresa,3 in his Commentaries, has this to say on this point:
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en Espana y entre
espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno de los conyuges es
espanol. En cuanto a la regla procedente cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana, o dos
espanoles en el extranjero hay que atender en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a que
aquellos pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y
10 de nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of the
Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English law even if the marriage was celebrated in
the Philippines, both of them being foreigners. But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the
pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of the
properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere
allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what
English law says on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in
indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in presuming that the law of England
on this matter is the same as our law.4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil
Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the
one applicable, shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to govern the question of
property relation between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of successional
rights and this term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property
that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be
pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their successional rights,
is governed differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new
Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court
correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by
the deceased Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the
respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on
the ground that: (1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been
duly proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign countries and not
of residents of a state in the United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the
Philippines and the state of California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate
and inheritance taxes on intangible personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of
inheritance tax..
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents,
testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the
revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the
4
pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited
article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in
Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of his
testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the
respondents.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before
our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance
with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471,
that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule
123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent
evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we considered the testimony of
an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil
Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error,
therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by
respondents' witness.
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death taxes, between
the State of California and the Philippines.F
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:
... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible
personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in
respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time
of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in
respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country." (Emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as pertinent,
reads:.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal property is exempt
from the tax imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
territory or another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then imposed
a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal property of its own residents,
but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to intangible
personal property of residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a non-
resident was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or
other State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the nonresident resided
allowed a similar exemption in respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory
or State of the United States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that is, with
respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the Philippine law,
and to legacy, succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the
California law. Therefore, if any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. This is
the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in both laws.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties
therein, there are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance
tax. Under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal
Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents not citizens of the United
States,7 but does not provide for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws
in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will have a situation where a
Californian, who is non-resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties here,
will the subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of the
inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible
personal properties there, be entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since the
Californian has not been exempted from every character of legacy, succession, or death tax
because he is, under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we
exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a Filipino to be
exempt from a similar estate tax in California because under the Federal Law, which is equally
enforceable in California he is bound to pay the same, there being no reciprocity recognized in
respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a disadvantage. We do not
believe that our legislature has intended such an unfair situation to the detriment of our own
5
government and people. We, therefore, find and declare that the lower court erred in exempting
the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lara (G.R.
Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
deceased Hugo H. Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of
Internal Revenue. It will be noted, however, that the issue of reciprocity between the pertinent
provisions of our tax law and that of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and
the ruling therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar. Be that as it may, we now
declare that in view of the express provisions of both the Philippine and California laws that the
exemption would apply only if the law of the other grants an exemption from legacy, succession,
or death taxes of every character, there could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total
or none at all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00 based on the
U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere
to our ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal
Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an exemption regarding which
reciprocity cannot be claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal
Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated in Baguio City,
it is contended that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death
of Stevenson, ought to have been considered by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to
section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however, that in
accordance with said proviso the properties are required to be appraised at their fair market
value and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair market value only when
evidence to the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are satisfied that
such evidence exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which was sustained by the tax
court, for as the tax court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the administrator of
the estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at P43,500.00 which is the
assessed value of said properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at
P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this Court can take judicial notice of it, that
assessments for real estate taxation purposes are very much lower than the true and fair market
value of the properties at a given time and place. In fact one year after decedent's death or in
1952 the said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no showing that special
or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase from the price of P43,500.00, if we
were to accept this value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1951. Even more, the counsel for
plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he was willing to purchase the said properties at
P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts we believe and therefore hold that the
valuation of P52,200.00 of the real estate in Baguio made by defendant is fair, reasonable and
justified in the premises." (Decision, p. 19).

In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, 3) Judicial and Administrative expenses 2,052.55
Inc., (a domestic corporation), respondents contend that their value should be fixed on the basis
of the market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the Total Deductions P8,604.39
theory that the certificates of stocks were then held in that place and registered with the said
stock exchange. We cannot agree with respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of stock,
An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were considered
for purposes of taxation, being located here in the Philippines, as respondents themselves
deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the probate court to which said
concede and considering that they are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with the
expenses, we may presume, had also been presented for consideration. It is to be supposed
exercise of our government's taxing authority, their fair market value should be taxed on the
that the probate court would not have approved said items were they not supported by evidence
basis of the price prevailing in our country.
presented by the estate. In allowing the items in question, the Tax Court had before it the
pertinent order of the probate court which was submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said shares of stock
2", p. 100, record). As the Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the
commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the death of
probate court, as it must have been satisfied that those expenses were actually incurred. Under
Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that time a share of
the circumstances, we see no ground to reverse this finding of fact which, under Republic Act of
said stock was bid for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in
California National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson
this respect has never been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before this court or in the
obtained we are not inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the additional
court below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained to reverse
amount of P86.52 for funeral expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack of
the Tax Court on this point and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining company on
evidence.
August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by respondents..

In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty taxes paid in 1951
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock of P.38 on the
on the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City, which respondents claim was disallowed by
basis of the declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return. Patently, this should not
the Tax Court, we find that this claim has in fact been allowed. What happened here, which a
have been the case, in view of the fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and availed
careful review of the record will reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the
of his legal right to have the properties of the estate declared at their fair market value as of six
estate, viz:
months from the time the decedent died..

1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34

On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or disallowance
of which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and respondents have appealed..
2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the allowance of
the sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:. 6 3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9, 1952 2,052.55

1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34

Total P9,256.89

2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for judicial and
administration expenses approved by the court, making a total of P2,052.55, exactly the same
figure which was arrived at by the Tax Court for judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the
difference between the total of P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the
P8,604.39 as found by the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty
taxes. An evident oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral
expenses in the final computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the lower court
and there is no reason why it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1) in relation to
section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of
P10,022.47 should have been allowed the estate as a deduction, because it represented an
indebtedness of the decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support thereof, they offered in
evidence a duly certified claim, presented to the probate court in California by the Bank of
California National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson
obtained a loan of $5,000.00 secured by pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59, record). The Tax Court disallowed
this item on the ground that the local probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim
against the estate and because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal
property which the Tax Court held to be exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular indebtedness
of the decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, it is averred has been already
admitted and approved by the corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or
domiciliary administration. It is true that we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary
administration in this case, but, it has been held, the distinction between domiciliary or principal
administration and ancillary administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the
other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent. 8 The reason for the ancillary
administration is that, a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore, have any effect
beyond the limits of the country in which it was granted. Hence, we have the requirement that
before a will duly probated outside of the Philippines can have effect here, it must first be proved
7 which is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate
and allowed before our courts, in much the same manner as wills originally presented for
9 wherever situated. Stated differently, if the properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the
allowance therein. And the estate shall be administered under letters testamentary, or letters of
administration granted by the court, and disposed of according to the will as probated, after
payment of just debts and expenses of administration. 10 In other words, there is a regular
administration under the control of the court, where claims must be presented and approved,
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
and expenses of administration allowed before deductions from the estate can be authorized.
Otherwise, we would have the actuations of our own probate court, in the settlement and
distribution of the estate situated here, subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over
which our courts have no control. We do not believe such a procedure is countenanced or
contemplated in the Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs from the
provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal Revenue Code which
reads:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case of a non-resident
not a citizen of the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or anyone of the heirs, as the
case may be, includes in the return required to be filed under section ninety-three the value at
the time of his death of that part of the gross estate of the non-resident not situated in the
Philippines."
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident Stevenson not
situated in the Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to the court or to the office of
the petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the
revenue officer to determine how much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted,
pursuant to (b), number (1) of the same section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code which
provides:
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. In the case of a non-resident not a citizen of
the Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross estate which at the time of
his death is situated in the Philippines
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. That proportion of the deductions specified in
paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of this section 11 which the value of such part bears the value of
his entire gross estate wherever situated;"
In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the indebtedness
entire assets wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But since,
as heretofore adverted to, there is no statement of the value of the estate situated outside the
Philippines, no part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89,
letter (d), number (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the deduction of
the alleged indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.
In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:
(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal partnership property
constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there existing no
complete total reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, nor
is the decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate
tax;
(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share; and
(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination of the net asset
of the deceased Stevenson.
In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually results after a
recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby denied in line with our recent decision
in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein
we held that, "in the absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing
such payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the National Government cannot be
required to pay interest."
WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of the lower court
is hereby affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Gutierrez David,
8
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
1
ART. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner, whether
celebrated in the Philippines or abroad, the following rules shall prevail: (1) If the husband is a
citizen of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner, the provisions of this Code shall govern
their property relations; (2) If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the
Philippines, the laws of the husband's country shall be followed, without prejudice to the
provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property."
2
ART. 1325. Should the marriage be contracted in a foreign country, between a Spaniard and a
foreign woman or between a foreigner and a Spanish woman, and the contracting parties should
not make any statement or stipulation with respect to their property, it shall be understood, when
the husband is a Spaniard, that he marries under the system of the legal conjugal partnership,
and when the wife is a Spaniard, that she marries under the system of law in force in the
husband's country, all without prejudice to the provisions of this code with respect to real
property.
CIR v Fisher
Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents, married in Manila to
another British subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where he and his wife
moved to.
In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal
properties, among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines
(Mines).
Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed an
estate and inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure the waiver of
the CIR on the inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.
In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses
Fisher.
Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIOANL
EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines shares of
stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from
what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed in the CFI of Manila
for the said amount.
 CFI ruled that (a) the share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net estate of
Walter, (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is exempt
from inheritance tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
I: W/N the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting
exemption from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock
R: No.
Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not
exempt any transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity
does not work.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with
properties, there are imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an inheritance tax.
But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although the
Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant exemption on
the basis of reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be at a disadvantage. This
is not what the legislators intended.
SPECIFICALLY:
Section122 of the NIRC provides that No tax shall be collected under this Title in
respect of intangible personal property
o (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or
o (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at
the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by
citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 9
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law
provides that intangible personal property is exempt from tax if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a territory or another
State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible
personal property of its own residents, but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any
character in respect to intangible personal property of residents of
this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible
personal property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or
other State of the United States or foreign state or country in
which the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in
respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory
or State of the United States or foreign state or country of
residence of the decedent."
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher
GR. No. L-11622
January 28, 1961
DOCTRINE:
Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.
FACTS:
Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents, married in Manila to another
British subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where he and his wife moved to.
In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal properties,
among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines).
Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed an estate and
inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure the waiver of the CIR on the
inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.
In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses Fisher.
Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death
one of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines shares of stock pursuant to a allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from what he initially paid. The intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
collector denied the claim. He then filed in the CFI of Manila for the said amount. country."

CFI ruled that (a) the share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net estate of Walter, (b)
the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is exempt from inheritance tax
pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
ISSUE/S:
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law provides that intangible
personal property is exempt from tax if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
territory or another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then imposed
a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal property of its own residents,
but either:.

Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to intangible
exemption from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock. personal property of residents of this State, or

Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a non-resident
was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other
State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the nonresident resided allowed a
similar exemption in respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State
of the United States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent."
RULING:

NO.

Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.

In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with
properties, there are imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an inheritance tax.

But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although the
Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant exemption on the basis
of reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be at a disadvantage. This is not what the
legislators intended.

SPECIFICALLY:

Section122 of the NIRC provides that No tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property 10

(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time
of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of
intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country, or

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters
that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999
of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial
Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the
order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders
partially set aside the trial courts order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of
resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their
children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. 4 Out of
their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25,
1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
Republic of the Philippines motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.
SUPREME COURT
Manila On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
SECOND DIVISION the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and
remanded the case to the RTC.
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, The decree provides in part:
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
11 [T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van
QUISUMBING, J.: Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
The parental custody for the children though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a
divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981 the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same
Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to
these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
is granted to the father.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part
private respondent.
of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioners motion to
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed
dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the
by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the
Germany.14
petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the
marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of
Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce
the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the
implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code, 10 endowing the petitioner with
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law. Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her 1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated
order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order
provides: 2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and
12
retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by divorce decree from a German court.
petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order
227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny
the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a courts action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim,
denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July
14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondents motion for
reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.The trial court may set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the
motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or
final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order
accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear
to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or
only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant
13
reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order
upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that
has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still
be modified. Moreover, in Saado v. Court of Appeals,16we held that the court could modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying
or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening
events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this
case, judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant
to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not
been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the
trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent
the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody
of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof. 30 Given the factual admission by the
thing; parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no
basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private
clear mistake of law or fact. respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of
the parties, which is not at issue.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby
rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24 parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne
and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two SO ORDERED.
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondents participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.
proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who
was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the
German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the
marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the
offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the
children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is
in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the childs welfare is
28
always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
14

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the
bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property
relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in
Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already
been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the
purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the
case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after
the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust
and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and
when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant
it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as
regards child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE
JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003 our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.
QUISUMBING, J.: Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section
a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati15
Regional Trial res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children.
Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
vested to Wolfgang.

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, nullity case as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, which was granted by
support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. respondent Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case should proceed for the purpose of determining
the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the
issues of support and custody of their children.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the granting the motion to dismiss the nullity case valid ; it is valid to assume
jurisdiction to tackle child custody and support.

HELD:

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. The court
can modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable. Where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment
has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice
or when supervening events warrant it.

ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognized in our jurisdiction, but
the legal effects thereof, such as custody must still be determined by our courts. Before our
courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so. In the present case, it
cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of
FACTS:
the German court. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the
issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, children.
a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine. 16

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati RTC. Meanwhile,
Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from Germany. The decree provides that the parental
custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss the

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6897. November 29, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Claim for Attorneys Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant-Appellee, vs.
ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M. Harden from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent part of which is of the following tenor:
The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit
JJJ or 20, is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.
17
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the Commissioner with the
above-stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the sum of
THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND
NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS (P384,110.97), representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Hardens
share in the conjugal properties owned by her and her husband, Fred M. Harden, as contingent
fee stipulated in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
said Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said amount above-stated. It appears
that sometime in July, 1941, Appellant, Mrs. Harden, and Appellee, Claro M. Recto, executed the
following:
CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to Fred M. Harden, and temporarily
residing in the Philippines, with address at 534 Sales Street, Manila, have engaged the services
of Attorney Claro M. Recto to appear and act as my counsel in the action which I will file against
my husband, Fred M. Harden, for the purpose of securing an increase in the amount of support
being received by me from the conjugal partnership of myself and said Fred M. Harden, and for
the purpose likewise of protecting and preserving my rights in the properties of the said conjugal
partnership, in contemplation of the divorce suit which I intent to file against him in the
competent Court of California and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between us, this
contract of services to be under the following conditions:
1. That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the circumstances I am not in a position to pay, I
hereby agree to pay Attorney Claro M. Recto, such payment to be made monthly, during the
pendency of the litigation and until the termination of the same, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the
total increase in allowance or pension which may be awarded to me by the court over and above
the amount of P1,500.00 which I now receive monthly from Defendant Fred M. Harden out of the
funds of the conjugal partnership; Provided, that should the case be terminated or an amicable
settlement thereof be arrived at by the parties before the expiration of two years from the date of
the filing of the complaint, I shall continue to pay the said twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the
end of said period.
2. That the aforesaid monthly payments shall be in addition to whatever amount may be
adjudged by the court against the Defendant Fred M. Harden or against the conjugal partnership
by way of litis expense, that is, attorneys fees chargeable as expenses of litigation.
3. That as full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney Claro M. Recto in connection
with the case above referred to, and said case being for the purposes aforestated, that is, to
secure an increase in the amount of support I now receive as well as to protect and preserve my
rights and interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership, in contemplation of divorce and
of the liquidation of said partnership, I hereby agree to pay said Attorney Claro M. Recto twenty
(20%) per cent of the value of the share and participation which I may receive in the funds and
properties of the said conjugal partnership of myself and Defendant Fred M. Harden, as a result
of the liquidation thereof either by death, divorce, judicial separation, compromise or by any
means or method by virtue of which said partnership is or may be liquidated.
4. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my account, but the same may be
advanced by Attorney Claro M. Recto, to be reimbursed to him either from the money which I
receive by way of support or from the funds of the conjugal partnership.
5. It is hereby understood that this contract includes the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto in
connection with the securing of the liquidation of the properties and assets of the conjugal
partnership of myself and Fred M. Harden, upon dissolution of said partnership or for any other
cause mentioned in Paragraph (3) hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed these presents in the City _____ of Manila, Philippines
this _______ day of July, 1941.
s/ Esperanza P. de Harden
t/ ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN
ACCEPTED
s/ Claro M. Recto
t/ CLARO M. RECTO
In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the Appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden,
commenced Civil Case No. 59634 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Esperanza P.
de Harden vs. Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides. In the complaint therein filed, it was
prayed, among other things:(a) that Mrs. Harden be given the exclusive administration of the
business and all properties of the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (b) that, in the
event of denial of this prayer, the Defendants be ordered to inform her of everything pertaining
to the administration of said business and properties, as well as to render accounts thereof and
to permit her to examine the books and records pertinent thereto; (c) that Mr. Harden be ordered
to account to Mrs. Harden, and to return to this jurisdiction, the sum of P449,015.44 allegedly
withdrawn by him from the Philippines or sent by him to Hongkong on April 1, 1941; (d)
that Defendant Salumbides be ordered to account for all moneys, amounting to P285,000.00,
belonging to the business and assets of said conjugal partnership and deposited by him in a
safety box, either in his name, or in that of Antonio Wilson, from January 23 to December 23,
1940; (e) that the transfer, in the name of Salumbides, of certain shares of stock, allegedly
belonging to the conjugal partnership, be rescinded and said Defendant ordered to transfer said
18 Mr. Harden
shares of stock in the name of Mrs. Harden or in that of Mr. and Mrs. Harden, should
be allowed to continue as administrator of said partnership; ( f ) that the transfer, made by Mr.
Harden and/or by Defendant Salumbides, as his attorney-in-fact, of 36,000 shares of stock of the
Angelo Mining Company, to some residents of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares
returned to the assets of the conjugal partnership and placed in the name of Mr. and Mrs.
Harden; (g) that the monthly allowance of Mrs. Harden be increased from P1,500 to P15,000; (h)
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
that, pending final decision, Mr. Harden be ordered to increase the allowance or pension of Mrs.
Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to P10,000 a month; (i) that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining the Defendants from disposing of the assets of the conjugal
partnership in fraud of Mrs. Harden.
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the issuance of said writ, upon the filing of
the corresponding bond. It appears that, pursuant to an agreement submitted by both parties,
and with a view to avoiding unnecessary embarrassment, restraint or inconvenience in the
financial operations of the business enterprises affected by said writ of preliminary injunction, the
same was amended by an order dated July 19, 1941, in the sense that.
without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties in this case, a separate bank account be
established in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, of Manila, and all transactions in
connection with the aforesaid businesses passed through that account by Mr. Harden or his duly
authorized representative, who at present is Mr. Salumbides, without the necessity of securing a
particular order from this Court on each occasion; that the present funds in the Philippine
National Bank in the name of Plaza Lunch and Fred M. Harden be utilized for the purpose of
starting said special bank account in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; that all
income from the aforesaid businesses be deposited in this special bank account and no checks
be drawn upon the same, except to pay the necessary overhead and running expenses
including purchases of tobacco, merchandise, etc., required for the proper operation of said
businesses;that a new set of books be opened by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized
representative covering all business transactions passed through said special bank account and
the same be opened for inspection by the Plaintiffs duly authorized representative.
The order of injunction of July 12, 1941, is modified only to the above extent, and in all other
respects is maintained.
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under military
occupation. Then came the liberation, in the course of which the records of this case were
destroyed. On October 23, 1946, said records were reconstituted at the instance
of Appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed and, in due course, the Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered, on or about October 31, 1949, a decision the dispositive part
of which we quote:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so holds that
(a) Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New Jersey and established a domicile
of choice in Manila, Philippines, since 1901;
(b) The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden was established
in Manila, Philippines, from the date of their marriage on December 14, 1917;
(c) Since they did not execute any antenuptial contract before their marriage, all the properties,
real or personal, acquired by either or both of them on and after December 14, 1917, up to the
present, over and above the sum of P20,000.00 representing Fred M. Hardens capital, are
hereby declared conjugal properties;
(d) The total amount of P1,944,794.37 representing deposits in safety deposit boxes in the
name of Jose Salumbides, the selling price of the house in Los Angeles, California, and the pre-
war and post-war remittances abroad of Fred M. Harden, from which has already been deducted
the sum of P160,000.00 covering payments for deficiency Federal income taxes and attorneys
fees, both in the tax case and the present one, is hereby declared chargeable to the share
of Defendant Harden and deductible from whatever participation he may still have in the said
conjugal partnership upon the liquidation thereof, upon his failure to return and deposit them in
the name of the Plaza Lunch with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China up to the time this decision shall become final;
(e) A conjugal lien be annotated in the original and owners duplicate of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 24393, 52436 and 54911 of the Register of Deeds of Manila and in Original Certificate
of Title No. 2292 of Quezon Province, and on all the certificates of shares belonging to said
conjugal partnership, as well as in the corresponding books of the companies or corporations
issuing them, whereby it will be made to appear that any subsequent alienation or encumbrance
of said properties by Fred M. Harden alone or his representative without the consent of his wife
will be deemed fraudulent and subject to revocation or cancellation for being in fraud and
prejudicial to the right of Esperanza P. de Harden;
( f ) Within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M.
Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden are hereby ordered to execute a document to be approved
by this court creating and express active trust upon the remaining cash assets and income of the
conjugal partnership in the Philippines, whereby the Philippine Trust Company, with offices in
Manila, will act as trustee, subject to the right of Fred M. Harden to receive therefrom the sum of
P2,500,00 a month by way of allowance and an equal amount for the Plaintiff as separate
support and maintenance;
(g) Within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M. Harden shall
inform the Plaintiff of all the properties and businesses of the conjugal partnership, be they in the
Philippines or abroad, and render a true and complete accounting of the earnings and profits
thereof;
(h) The Plaintiff is entitled to litis expensae in the amount of P175,000.00 for services
19 rendered
by her counsel up to the rendition of this judgment, which Fred M. Harden or the herein receiver
is ordered to pay within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision has become final;
(i) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12, 1941, is hereby declared permanent and the
order of receivership of November 20, 1946, is hereby maintained, but said auxiliary remedies
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
will be automatically lifted upon the conclusion of the annotation of the conjugal lien and the
execution of the deed of trust above mentioned. Without costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Defendants appealed from said decision to this Court, where the case was docketed as
case No. L-3687. While the appeal was thus pending before us, herein Appellee filed a
manifestation and a motion, both dated February 20, 1952. In said
manifestation, Appellee stated that Mrs. Harden had instructed him, by letter, to discontinue all
proceedings relative to said case, vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein, and
abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between her and Mr.
Harden, in accordance with several instruments dated January 29, 1952, and executed without
the knowledge, advise and consent of said Appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, whereby:(1)
Mr. and Mrs. Harden had purportedly agreed to settle their differences in consideration of the
sum of $5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of P500 to be paid by
him to her; (2) Mr. Harden had created a trust fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension
of $500 would be taken; and (3) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had mutually released and forever
discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the
conjugal partnership, in consideration of the sum of $1. It was further asserted, in Appellees
manifestation, that the purpose of the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was
to defeat the claim of the former for attorneys fees, for which reason, he prayed, in his
aforementioned motion, that
a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed herein be authorized to
continue holding the properties above mentioned in his custody in order not to defeat the
undersigneds inchoate lien on them;
b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and those of the Plaintiff and
the Defendant Fred M. Harden, in order to determine the amount of fees due to the undersigned,
by the appointment of a referee or commissioner for the reception of such
c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum of P400,000.00 as his
fees for services rendered in behalf of the Plaintiff in this case, under paragraph 3 of the
contract, Annex A, and to that end a charging lien therefore be established upon the properties
above-mentioned;
d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full amount of the fees to which
the latter is found to be entitled.
Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants, in turn, moved for the dismissal of the case, to
which Appellee objected. Acting upon the issues raised in such motion for dismissal and
in Appellees motion to establish and enforce his charging lien, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, this
Court issued on July 22, 1952, a resolution the pertinent part of which reads:
It will be seen from the above that the Defendants-Appellants pray for the complete dismissal of
the above entitled case without prejudice to the annotation of the contingent claim of Attorney
Claro M. Recto on the property under receivership, other than the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc
Mining Company which belong to Fred M. Harden. On the other hand, Attorney Claro M. Recto
agrees to the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment,
and all other interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this case, with the exception
of the receivership, but objects to the dismissal of the case on the ground that, since
receivership is merely an auxiliary remedy, the present case should be allowed to remain
pending for the purpose of maintaining the receivership to safeguard his right to collect the fees
that may be due him.
Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or referee be immediately appointed by this
Court to receive evidence in support of his allegations as to his attorneys lien and its
enforcement. Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants does not object to this proceeding provided
that the restrictions set forth by him be observed. However, this Court does not have the proper
facilities for receiving evidence in order to determine the amount of the fees claimed by Attorney
Claro M. Recto, and it is deemed advisable that this matter be determined by the Court of First
Instance. This is specially so considering the opposition to the claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto
filed by Attorney J. W. Ferrier, Sr. in behalf of Esperanza P. de Harden.
In view of the foregoing, the above entitled case is hereby remanded to the court of origin in
order to determine the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto in his motion dated
February 20, 1952.
It is understood that, after said fees had been finally determined and paid, this case will be
completely dismissed as prayed for by the Defendants-Appellants, without prejudice to
considering the claim of the receiver for compensation as stated in his urgent motion dated July
2, 1952. Pending the determination of the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto,
the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment, and all interlocutory
orders which were issued in the course of this case, are hereby lifted and vacated, and with
regard to the receivership, the same is hereby dissolved, only with respect to the 368,553 shares
of the Balatoc Mining Company. As to the rest of the properties, the receivership shall be
maintained.
In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were remanded to the lower court,
which, on September 2, 1952, designated a commissioner to receive evidence on the amount of
the fees collectible by herein Appellee and to report thereon. After due hearing, said
commissioner submitted, on February 6, 1953, a report of about one hundred (100) 20pages of the
printed record on appeal, setting forth, in detail, the evidence introduced by both parties, and his
findings of fact, with the following conclusion and recommendation:
Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in this litigation, the length of time
in which claimant had handled the same for Esperanza Harden, the volume and quality of the
work performed, the complicated legal questions involved, the responsibility assumed by the
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
claimant as counsel, his reputation in the bar, the difficulties encountered by him while handling
the same in which he had to work hard every inch of the way because of the stiff oppositions
filed by adverse counsel, the diligence he employed not only in the preservation of the records in
his possession during the days of enemy occupation but also in the protection of the interests of
Esperanza Harden, his successful handling of said case and those cases growing out of it which
reached the Supreme Court, and the extra services he rendered in her behalf in the tax and
other court cases, the undersigned Commissioner concludes that claimant is entitled to the full
amount of 20% of Esperanza Hardens share of the conjugal properties, as provided in
paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that Atty. Claro M.
Recto be paid the equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de Hardens share of the conjugal
properties or the sum of P369,410.04 as his contingent fee for services rendered in her behalf.
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April 30, 1953,
adopting substantially said report of the commissioner, but increasing the contingent fee
of Appellee herein from P369,410.04, the sum recommended in the report, to P384,110.97.
Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of
services, which the Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground:(1) that Mrs. Harden
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husbands consent; (2) that Article 1491 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; (3) that the contract in question
has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and
1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh,
inequitable and oppressive.
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the
conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself or
assumed the personal obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said
partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to the Appellee any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis
for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been
held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by
our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45
Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker,
p. 176).
cralaw in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for
contingent fees, provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is only
when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim
is condemned. (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq.; Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show
that Appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client
Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by
the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or
promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in
the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United
States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United
States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil
Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract
in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines by the laws of the United
States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and
herein Appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity
must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; 30 C.J. S. 475),
and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our
satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the
differences between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating
the rights of herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden.
Indeed, having secured a judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the
conjugal partnership, which turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis
expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such
rights, as well as the benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the
paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be
paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a month. In fact, no explanation has been given
for this most unusual avowed settlement between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. One cannot even
consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the spouses, the same being inconsistent
with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement. What is more, the records show that
the relations between said spouses which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when Mrs.
Harden engaged the services of the Appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were
separated since 1938 had worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for
divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of
infidelity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
21
Again, it appears that Appellee had rendered, under the contract in question, the following
services, for the benefit of Mrs. Harden:
1. He succeeded in defeating Defendants motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction, issued by the Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on July 19, 1941.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
2. On November 12, 1946, Appellee moved for the appointment of a receiver, upon the ground
that, despite said writ of preliminary injunction, the Defendants had been disposing of the
properties of the conjugal partnership for the purpose of defrauding Mrs. Harden. After due
hearing, the court, by an order dated November 20, 1946, directed the appointment of Abelardo
Perez as receiver of said properties, upon the filing of a P10,000 bond. Defendants asked, on
February 13, 1947, that the receivership be suspended, or else, that they be allowed to file a
bond for the discharge of the receivership. Appellee replied objecting thereto, unless
the Defendants posted a P4,000,000 bond. Subsequently or on March 5, 1947,
the Defendants sought a reconsideration of the order of November 20, 1946, and the discharge
of the receiver. By an order dated March 21, 1947, the Court authorized said discharged upon
the filing, by the Defendants, of a bond in the sum of P500,000, provided that Mr. Harden
should bring back all the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., in his name to the
Philippines for deposit with the Clerk of Court, or with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and
China, at Manila.
3. On motion of the Appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by an order dated April 5, 1947,
directed Mr. Harden to remit to Mrs. Harden the sum of $2,500, to be charged against her litis
expensae. Upon similar motion, filed by Appellee on or about April 26, 1947, the Court ordered
Mr. Harden, on May 13, 1947, to furnish Mrs. Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same
conditions.
4. On June 21, 1947, the Defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L-1499 of this Court,
entitled Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides vs. Emilio Pea, Abelardo Perez and Esperanza
P. Harden for the purpose of annulling and setting aside, by writ of certiorari, the
aforementioned orders of the lower court dated July 12, 1941, November 20, 1946, and April 5
and May 13, 1947, and to restrain, in the meantime, the enforcement thereof. After appropriate
proceedings, in the course of which Appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like
counsel for the Petitioners therein, filed several lengthy, detailed pleadings and memoranda,
decision was rendered on November 21, 1950, denying the writ of certiorari prayed for.
5. On or about September 9, 1947, Appellee filed a motion alleging that despite the writ of
preliminary injunction above mentioned, the Defendants had, fraudulently and without judicial
consent, remitted abroad several sums of money aggregating P1,000,608.66, and praying that
Mr. Harden be ordered to return this sum to the Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to
be deposited with the account of the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of
India, Australia and China. Mr. Harden objected to said motion. Appellee filed a rejoinder, to
which Mr. Harden replied. Appellee filed a rejoinder to the rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the
Court granted Appellees motion. Mr. Harden sought a reconsideration, which was opposed by
the Appellee on October 27, 1947, and denied by an order dated November 13, 1947. Mr.
Harden moved, on November 18, 1947, for the suspension of this order, which was immediately
objected to by the Appellee and then denied by the Court.
6. Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied with, Appellee filed on
November 27, 1947, a motion praying that Mr. Harden be declared in contempt of court and
punished accordingly. Meanwhile, or on November 24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G.
R. No. L-1816 of this Court against Hon. Emilio Pea, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and Mrs. Harden. In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden applied for a writ of certiorari
annulling said orders of Judge Pea of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and prayed that,
pending disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
the Respondents therein from enforcing said orders, particularly through contempt proceedings.
Hence, the lower court deferred action on the aforementioned motion of November 27, 1947.
After due hearing, this Court, in a resolution dated February 12, 1948, refused to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for. Subsequently, or on November 21, 1950, decision was
rendered denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
7. Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816, dated February 12,
1948, or to be exact on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued an order directing Mr. Harden to
comply, within five (5) days from notice, with the order of October 7, 1947. On April 6,
1948, Appellee filed with the lower court the corresponding formal charges against Mr. Harden
for contempt of court. After due hearing, Mr. Harden was, by an order of April 28, 1948, found
guilty as charged and ordered confined until he complies with the aforementioned orders of
October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr. Harden, said order of April 28, 1948 was
suspended until May 4, 1948, on which date he was arrested and placed in confinement at the
New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinglupa, Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he filed with this Court a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349, entitled Fred M.
Harden vs. The Director of Prisons), which, in due course was denied in a decision promulgated
on October 22, 1948.
8. During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the Appellee made
representations with the Japanese Government to prevent the commandeering of a business
establishment belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the
Japanese to refrain from interning Mrs. Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw,
from the formers deposit in a local bank, from P200 to P250 a month, for their subsistence. He,
likewise, lent her money to meet her needs and spent the sum of P55,000 in the preservation of
the records and papers pertaining to the business and other properties of the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
9. Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such capacity, took all steps
essential for the proper discharge of the duties of the former. Among other
things, Appellee sought and obtained judicial authority for some important acts of administration
of, and disposition by, the receiver. He (Appellee) secured judicial intervention for the protection
and preservation of the assets of the conjugal partnership, including orders for the delivery of
22
certificates of stock, the return thereof and/or its deposit with the clerk of court. He, likewise,
represented the receiver in seeking war damage payments.
10. In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Francisco Dalupan
vs. Fred M. Harden for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was decided, through Appellees
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
intervention, that the conjugal assets would bear the payment of P22,767.43 only, the balance to
be chargeable exclusively against Mr. Hardens share of the conjugal partnership.
11. Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
Abelardo Perez vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Fred M. Harden, for the
recovery of P1,000,608.66 and the return of stock certificates of the Balatoc Mining Co., which
had been sent abroad.
12. He (Appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a million-peso federal tax case
against Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
13. Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Hardens attempts to withdraw: (1) $53,000 and forward
the same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles, California; (2) $50,000.00,
allegedly to defray expenses in resisting a new tax assessment against him in the United
States;and (3) P65,000 for his expenses.
Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business interests and its assets
were worth almost P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions, oppositions, rejoinders, and memoranda
filed, and the evidence introduced, in the aforementioned cases in which Appellee was pitted
against one of the most experienced and able members of the Philippine Bar were numerous,
extensive and exhaustive. For instance, the record on appeal in one of those cases, namely, G.
R. No. L-3687, consisted of 966 pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the Appellee, the nature and
importance of the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time (1941 to 1952) and trouble
involved therein, the skill displayed in connection with said cases, the value of the property
affected by the controversy, the professional character and standing of the Appellee, the risks
assumed and the results obtained, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the contract of
services in question is neither harsh nor oppressive or inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, Appellants maintain that:
The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the evidence that the legal services
of Attorney Claro M. Recto to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden, payment, for which is sought by him
in this case, have already been paid by his immediate execution pending appeal of the decision
in Civil Case No. CFI-R-59634 (SC-G.R. No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of
P176,000.00 for all such legal services.
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000 represents litis
expensae, and the contract between the Appellee and Mrs. Harden explicitly declares that said
litis expensae shall be in addition to Appellees share of 25% of the increase in the allowance
of Mrs. Harden and his attorneys fees of 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The
second assignment of error is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that: settlement thereof within two (2) years from the filing of the complaint. No such limitation
appears in the second and third paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the same were intended by
3. The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share of the wife, Esperanza P. de Harden, the parties to be fully operative under any and all conditions.
in the undissolved and unliquidated conjugal partnership properties of the Harden spouses, is
capable of certain valuation before such dissolution and liquidation, and summarily assessing It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has been assessed, not
the value of Mrs. Hardens share in such conjugal properties without proper evidence. summarily, but after due notice and full dress hearing, in the course of which both parties
introduced testimonial and documentary evidence. Appellants presented Exhibits 1 to 58,
4. The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate share to Attorney Claro M. Recto whereas those of the Appellee were so numerous that, having begun with Exhibit A, his last
from Mrs. Hardens interests in the Harden conjugal properties, summarily assessing such 20% piece of documentary evidence was marked Exhibit 26 Ys. The transcript of the hearing, which
inchoate share as of a value of P384,110.97, and ordering the payment of said sum to Attorney lasted ten (10) days, covers over 220 pages.
Recto in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services.
The other assignments of error made by Appellants herein are mere corollaries of those already
Appellants arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows: The contract of disposed of, and, hence, no further discussion thereof is necessary.
services in question provides that Appellees contingent fees shall be 20% of the share of Mrs.
Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of Mrs. Harden shall be In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership between Mr. and Mrs.
determined upon the liquidation of said partnership, which has not taken place, as yet. What is Harden are reasonably valued at P3,841,109.70. One-half (1/2) thereof, representing the share
more, it cannot be effected until the dissolution of the marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. of Mrs. Harden, is therefore, worth P1,920,554.85. Twenty percentum (20%) of this sum is
Harden. Inasmuch as this relation subsists, it follows that the amount of attorneys fees due P384,110.97, which is the contingent fee due to the Appellee, apart from the litis expensae
to Appellee herein should not have been determined in the decision appealed from. already paid to him. Inasmuch as the Appellee has collected, also, the sum of P80,000.00, on
account of said contingent fees, there results in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made, principally, in
contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she intended to file before a Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, therefore, with costs
competent court in California, and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between her against the Appellants. SO ORDERED.
and Mr. Harden. Had she filed said action for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said
conjugal partnership would have been dissolved and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Harden therein would have been fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
foreseeable future, owing to the aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden,
which were made for the evident purpose of defeating Appellees claim for attorneys fees. In
other words, the occurrence, within the time contemplated by the parties bearing in mind the
nature of, and the circumstances under which they entered into, said contract of services of
the event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was rendered impossible by Mrs.
Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a period, she may not
insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the herein Appellee, for the
condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment (Art. 1186,
Civil Code) and the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period when he violates
any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period. (Art. 1198, Civil
Code.)
23
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for Appellees services, consists of
three (3) parts, namely: (a) 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden; (b) litis
expensae; and (c) 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The first part was dealt with in
the first paragraph of their contract of services. The second and third parts were the object of the
second and third paragraphs, respectively. The first paragraph limited the rights
of Appellee thereunder to two (2) years, in the event of termination of the case or amicable

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions, debts,
duties, and claims to the conjugal partnership

-Recto filed motion contesting agreement

-defense: contract of services invalid: to secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws

WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT? YES

*CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS,

PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY

The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal
partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit

-NOT

to secure divorce

to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce

RECTO V. HARDEN (1959)
Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow
Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP case for protection of divorce (following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the
her interest in the conjugal property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce marriage)
proceeding she's going to file in US. They won in TC, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to
settle. Recto now wants to collect fees for services, but as defense, Harden spouses argues that
the contract's object was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is invalid, thus, Recto cannot
enforce it against them. Court ruled for Recto

Facts:

Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for suit

to secure an increase in the amount of support she was receinging

to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal partnership

24
in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US.

Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal partnership after liquidation

TC: for Mrs. Harden

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27
years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and
a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were
deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had
planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they
started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their
Republic of the Philippines engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor,
SUPREME COURT Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
Manila time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
EN BANC trysting place.

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken
vs. home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees. suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for
the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does
not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an
25 Instance of
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-
the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, 1 all surnamed "Escao,"
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous
respectively.2

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was
aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She
fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days
passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in
Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez,
to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left
for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950,
a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the26 marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce
from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for
moral damages.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting
his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of
Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this
Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao
liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents
on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic
priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the
separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which
was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects, 3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of
said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized
the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco
vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the
authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents
consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the
undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant
Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that
Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree
of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, 27 quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present
Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in
effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad
and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in
the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of
private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of
a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in
this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her
marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not
her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to
a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art.
333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the
Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to
the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr.
Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated
and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded.
The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage
to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore,
justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage,
that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind
are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict
or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
28
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his
wife, the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her
conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-
Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have
been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at
such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not
due to defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it.
That the spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute
in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money
while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to
live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-
132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in
the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being
always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger
to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that
of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in
good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the
marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely
solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or
result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection
and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously
entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently
been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the
case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this
suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the
face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable
claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its
failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the
parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to
the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and
with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and
Mena Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this
unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the
same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them,
lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not
guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules: 29
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently
to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other
to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in
the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Tenchavez v Escano (1965)
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June
1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On
Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of
Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13,
1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him
in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8,
1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against
VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award
for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and
timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez
obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be
considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to
support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that
contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection
involves the performance of a positive act.
Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the
grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her
husband.
Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC
then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent
violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC.
Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to
the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn
abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
30
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law,
which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a
manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article
2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation
has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her
wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to
individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can
be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting
spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award
damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private
relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and
factum".
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAO
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military chaplain in one of
Pastors friends house. Upon learning about the secret marriage, Vicentas parents arranged for
them to be married properly in a church so as to validate their marriage as advised by a priest.
Vicenta opposed to a second marriage after receiving an anonymous letter alleging that Pastor
and is having an amorous relationship with matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta continued to live
with her parents and Pastor went back to work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her
husbands welfare in her letters, she was not as endearing and becomes less and less until they
became estranged.
Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for non-prosecution
because she never went to any of the set hearings. Without informing her husband, she applied
for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single and left for the United States. She
filed for divorce (1950) against Pastor in Nevada on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character which the Nevada court granted even when she was not yet an American
citizen (1958).
Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents Mamerto and
Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections. He asked for legal separation and one million pesos
in damages.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
Can the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage
HELD:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party. That the remarriage of
divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter
to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party entitles the other to
recover damages;
That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
15 Phil. 355 Civil Law Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
Unfounded Suit
In February 1948, Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao secretly married each other and of
course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The
marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they
insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a re-celebration because
she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, 31 their
relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of
absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an
American.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos
parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and caused her to be estranged from him hence
hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal
separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim
by the Escaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to
public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the
marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same
was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents
dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be
awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez
and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC
awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao
and not her parents.
On the part of Escaos parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is
unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from
P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAO
Facts:
Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married before a Catholic chaplain and
planned to elope.The elopement did not materialize because Vicentas mother discovered such
marriage. Her parents asked the advice of one Father Reynes and subsequently agreed to
recelebrate the marriage. However, Vicenta refused to proceed with the ceremony because a
letter from the students of san Carlos College disclosed that Pastor and their matchmaker,
Pacita Noel had an amorous relationship. Vicenta left for the States, acquired a foreign divorce
and married an American, Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She sought for a divorce from
Tenchavez in 1950 and sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954.
Escano claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church's disavowal of her marriage
with Tenchavez.. Escano argued that her second marriage deserves the laws recognition and
protection over the other.es the laws recognition and protection over the other since it fits
concept of a marriage as a social institution because publicly contracted, recognized by both civil
and ecclesiastical authorities, and blessed by three children. She also contends that the court
has no jurisdiction over her.
Husband filed complaint:
Vs. Parents: for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband and
alienating her affections 32
Vs. Roman Catholic Church: for having decreed annulment
Parents filed counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Issue
WON marriage between Tenchavez and Escano still subsists in lieu of the divorce
WON there is an action for alienation of affections against parents
Held
NO
Ratio:
1. no proof of malice
2. parents themselves suggested that the marriage be celebrated again
3. also, Vicenta appeared to have acted independently and being of age, she was entitled to 4.
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected
THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves:
With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident
defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or
for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because,
then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of
the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff
domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot
be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established,
in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they
contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicentas refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against
the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action
for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the
case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over
the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the
plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive:
filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously
injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6768. July 31, 1954.]
SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER. JR., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALFREDO
JAVIER, Defendant-Appellant.
David F. Barrera, for Appellant.
Jose P. Santillan, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. DIVORCE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO DECLARE FOREIGN DIVORCE IN THIS
JURISDICTION; ANSWER FILED BY LOCAL RESIDENT DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION
TO FOREIGN COURT. In 1937, A, a natural born Filipino citizen, married S, another Filipino
citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, who thereby became33 legitimated. a
enlisted in the United States Navy and later sailed for the United States leaving behind his wife
and child. On August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of mobile
Country, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy
of the complaint, S filed an answer alleging, among other things, that A was not a resident of
Mobile Country, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause of their
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
separation was abandonment on her part but that A was in the United States, without her,
because he was then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. The Circuit Court of Mobile Country granted the
divorce on April 9, 1941. does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction? Held: This court,
in a number of cases of similar nature, has invariably denied the validity of the cases of similar
nature, has invariably denied the validity of the divorce decree. In essence, it was held that one
of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be
domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix v. Fluemer, 55 Phil.,
851,856). . . . "and assuming that (plaintiff)acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada
through the approval of his citizenship papers, this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada
court to grant divorce that would be valid i this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determined
their matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada
court never acquired jurisdiction over her person." (Sikat v. Canson, 67 Phil., 207.) The answer
filed by S, in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, cannot be interpreted as
placing hereunder the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim
of A that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile Country, and to show that the
ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered
as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the
case.
2. RESIDENCE; PERMANENT RESIDENCE REQUIRED TO CONFER JURISDICTION OF
FOREIGN COURT. Where a local resident went to a foreign country, not with the intention of
permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole
purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife, such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
on the foreign court.
3. ID.; GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE UNDER ACT No. 2710; FOREIGN JUDGMENT CONTRARY
TO LAWS OF THE FORUM, CANNOT BE ENFORCED. Under section 1 of Act No. 2710, the
courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if the decree is predicated on another ground,
that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction. The divorce decree in question was granted
on the ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. This is in keeping with
the well-known principle of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of foreign
judgment, or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the
State of the forum. (Minor Conflict of Laws, pp. 8-14)
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him to give a
monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31, 1953, and to pay them attorney's fees
in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court attributing five errors to the
court below. This implies that the facts are not disputed.
The important facts which need to be considered in relation to the errors assigned appear well
narrated in the decision of the court below which, for purposes of this appeal, are quoted
hereunder:
On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had their marriage
solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of their
marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier, Junior who was born on
December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938, defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United States on
board a ship of the United States Navy, for it appears that he had joined the United States Navy
since 1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca, defendant Alfredo
Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. Because of defendant Alfredo
Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife, Salud R. Arca, who is from
(Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's parents at Naic, Cavite. But for certain
incompatibility of character (frictions having occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and
defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant's parents'
abode and transfer her residence to (Maragondon), Cavite her native place Since then the
relation between plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained such that
on August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce against Salud R. Arca
before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, docketed as civil case No.
14313 of that court and marked as Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a copy of the
complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca answering the complaint
alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September 23, 1940
although she was directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13, 1940. In that
answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Arca averred among other things that defendant Alfredo
Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the period of twelve months
preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was a resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines.
34
Another averment of interest, which is essential to relate here, is that under paragraph 5 of her
answer to the complaint for divorce, Salud R. Arca alleged that it was not true that the cause of
their separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United
States at that time and she was not with him then it was because he was in active duty as an
enlisted man of the United States Navy, as a consequence of which he had to leave for the
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
United States without her. She further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for
the United States, he had always supported her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through
allotments made by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She denied,
furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic, Cavite, and their
separation was due to physical impossibility for they were separated by about 10,000 miles from
each other. At this juncture, under the old Civil Code the wife is not bound to live with her
husband if the latter has gone to ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff Salud R. Arca, in her answer to
the complaint for divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be
dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R. Arca's averments in her answer, contesting the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, to take cognizance of the
divorce proceeding filed by defendant Alfredo Javier, as shown by her answer marked Exhibit
2(d), nevertheless the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of
the marriage of Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of divorce
dated April 9, 1941, a certified copy of which is marked Exhibit 2(f). Thereupon, the evidence
discloses that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines but went
back to the United States.
In July, 1941 that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9, 1941
defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and bought a house and
lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife,
obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having
retired from the United States Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines, arriving
here on February 13, 1950. After his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce
one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma
Francis issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant
Alfredo Javier married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal
Court of Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b).
At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of
Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13310 and marked Exhibit 2(a). However, defendant
Alfredo Javier was acquitted of the charge of Bigamy in a decision rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila through Judge Alejandro J. Panlilio, dated August 10, 1951, predicated on the
proposition that the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was made in all
good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca had been legally
dissolved by the decree of divorce obtained by him from the Circuit Court of Mobile County,
State of Alabama, USA which had the legal effect of dissolving the marital ties between
defendant Alfredo Javier and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's
opinion that defendant Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that Criminal Case No. 13310 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila by Judge Panlilio was due to the fact that the accused had no criminal
intent in contracting a second or subsequent marriage while his first marriage was still
subsisting.
Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R. Arca,
another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who
thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for
the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service leaving behind his wife and
child, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,
Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of the
complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant was not a
resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause
of their separation was abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United States,
without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of
Mobile County rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9, 1941.
The issue now to be determined is: Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction?
The issue is not new. This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similar
nature in a number of cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to the decree. In
essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is
that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be
acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins
Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson, 67 Phil.,
207, which involves a case of divorce also based on the ground of desertion. In that case, John
Canson claimed not only that he had legal residence in the State of Nevada, where the action
was brought, but he was an American citizen, although it was proven that his wife never
accompanied him there but has always remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that
"it is not ... the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but
his legal residence within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Canson
acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers,
this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in this
35
jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was
still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person."
It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in
view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim
of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that
the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be
considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the
court over the case.
In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously decided on
the matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among the cases invoked are Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales,
58 Phil., 67. In the cases just mentioned, this court laid down the following doctrines:
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce
granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of
Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does
not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or
country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family
domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of
the State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of
the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)" (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the
appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no new
domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not
having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer
jurisdiction upon said court over her person. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the
residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce
was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State to
dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs.
Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)
In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court
of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was
filed appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legal
residence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that
time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay
during his occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently
is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York
where he bought a house and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement
from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite,
where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with
the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode,
but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the court.
It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority or precedent in the present
case for the reason that the Haddeck case which was cited by the court in the course of the
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim is not quite correct, for the Haddeck case was merely
cited as authority for the statement that a divorce case is not a proceeding in rem, and the
reversal did not necessarily overrule the ruling laid down therein that before a court may acquire
jurisdiction over a divorce case, it is necessary that plaintiff be domiciled in the State in which it
is filed. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the Canson
case may be justified on another ground: The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on
the ground of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if
the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction.
Said the Court in the Canson case:
. . . In Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales (55 Phil., 67), we observed:
. . . While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign
divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil
Code now enforced in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
36
"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country."
"And Article 11, the last part of which reads
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to
promote public order and good morals shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country."
"It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under
conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce."
The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of
the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1 of Act No.
2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion, clearly not a
cause for divorce under our laws. That our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too liberal is
not for this court decide. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra). The allotment of powers
between the different governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the confines of
interpretation, not of legislation. The legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction
is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been upheld by this court (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda,
35 Phil., 252; Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943-952; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil.,
855; Chereau vs. Fuentebella, 43 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil., 123;
Gorayeb vs. Hashim, supra; Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil., 42; Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng
Shun and Lim Tingco, 52 Phil., 571; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra; and Barretto Gonzales vs.
Gonzales, supra).
The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle of Private
International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law affecting the
same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of the forum. (Minor, Conflict
of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in keeping with our concept or moral values which has always
looked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually crystallized in a more
tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate
altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely to
any attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs,
morals, and traditions. (Article 11, old Civil Code; Articles 15 and 17, new Civil Code;
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)
With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of bigamy
and consequently she forfeited her right to support, and that her child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not
also entitled to support because he has already reached his age of majority, we do not need to
consider it here, it appearing that these questions have already been passed upon in G. R. No.
L-6706.1 These questions were resolved against the pretense of appellant.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier Jr. v. Alfredo Javier | GR No L-6768 | July 31, 1954
Nature of the Case
Petition for Certiorari on the decision of the CFI granting the P60.00 monthly allowance for the
Petitioner herein.
Facts:
- Salud and Alfredo got married in 1937, solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the
Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of marriage, Junior was already born. Alfredo left
for the US in 1938, and at the time of their marriage Alfredo was already an enlisted
Navy armyman.
- When Alfredo left, Salud moved in with the formers parents. Due to friction, Salud went
back to her hometown. Eventually the couples relations soured, wherein Alfredo filed
an action for divorce against Salud before the Alabaman courts.
- In response to the complaint, Arca alleged that Javier was not a resident of Alabama,
but of Naic, Cavite, and that she alleged that the reason for their separation was that
Alfredo was in the US-Navy, thus leaving her behind in the Philippines, and that he has
37
always supported them. Their separation was due to physical impossibility (also, the
Civil Code stated that the wife is not bound to live her with her husband if the latter has
gone to marine colonies). Salud then prayed for the complaint for divorce to be
dismissed, contesting the jurisdiction of the Mobile County courts.
Issue: Whether the divorce decree is recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Holding: The divorce decree has no valid effect in Philippine jurisdiction
Ratio: In order to determine whether a country has jurisdiction over valid decree of divorce,
plaintiff must have been domiciled in good faith in the State in which it was granted. It is true that
Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the
summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as placing her
under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant
that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground
of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a
special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce
granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the
defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. It follows that, to give
a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial
forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to
another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his
residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. This is especially
true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own
domicile. But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding
upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no
new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not
having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer
jurisdiction upon said court over her person. At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple
has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the
husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony.
It cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction
over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was
then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County
when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in the service of the U.S.
Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift
duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that after his
marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house and a lot,
and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to
the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may
therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently
residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of
obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
It is a well known principle of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a
foreign judgment, or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental
policy of the State of the forum. It is also in keeping with our concept or moral values
which has always looked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually
crystallized in a more tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through
Congress, decided to eliminate altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such
concept we cannot but react adversely to any attempt to extend here the effect of a
decree which is not in consonance with our customs, morals, and traditions.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 11796. August 5, 1918. ]
In the matter of the estate of Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller. ANA M. RAMIREZ, executrix-
appellant, v. OTTO GMUR, as guardian of the minors Esther Renate Mory, Carmen Maria
Mory, and Leontina Elizabeth, claimant-appellant.
C. Lozano for executrix and Appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for claimant and Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. PARENT AND CHILD; ILLEGITIMACY; PRESUMPTION AS TO CAPACITY OF PARENTS TO
MARRY. Where an illegitimate child is in fact recognized by the father, the presumption is that
the parents had the capacity to marry at the time the child was born or begotten, and that the
child is a natural child and therefore capable of recognition. The burden of proof to show the
contrary is upon the party impugning the legality of the act of recognition.
38
2. SUCCESSIONS; RECOGNIZED CHILD AS FORCED HER. Where a person dies testate
but without legitimate descendants or ascendants a recognized natural child for whom no
provision is made in the will is a forced heir and as such entitled to one-third of the estate. (Art.
842, Civil Code.)
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
3. DIVORCE; DOMICILE OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION OF FOREIGN COURT The court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The
voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction.
4. SUCCESSIONS; ADULTEROUS CHILDREN INCAPABLE OF INHERITING. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated, and acknowledged natural children, the offspring of
adulterous relations being excluded. The word "descendants," as used in article 941 of the Civil
Code, cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
5. WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION; LEGITIME OF FORCED HEIR; EFFECT OF DECREE OF
PROBATE. The right of a forced heir to his legitime is not divested b~ a decree admitting a
will to probate in which no provision is made for him. The decree of probate is conclusive only as
regards the due execution of the will. The question of the intrinsic validity of its provisions is in no
wise determined thereby.
6. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE RIGHT OF HEIR TO
PARTICIPATE IN FINAL DIVISION. An heir who is not a party to the proceedings for the
probate of a will and the distribution of the testators estate may intervene at any time while the
court yet retains jurisdiction over the estate and establish his right to participate in the final
division thereof.
DECISION
STREET, J. :
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, native of the Republic of Switzerland, but for many years a
resident of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Iloilo on June 29, 1913, leaving a valuable
estate of which he disposed by will. A few days after his demise the will was offered for probate
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and, upon publication of notice, was duly allowed and
established by the court. His is widow, Doa Ana M. Ramirez, was named as executrix in the
will, and to her accordingly letters testamentary were issued. By the will everything was given to
the widow, with the exception of a piece of real property located in the City of Thun, Switzerland,
which was devised to the testators brothers and sisters.
The first clause of the will contains a statement to the effect that inasmuch as the testator had no
children from his marriage with Ana M. Ramirez he was therefore devoid of forced heirs. In
making this statement the testator ignored the possible claims of two sets of children, born to his
natural daughter, Leona Castro.
The pertinent biographical facts concerning Leona Castro are these: As appears from the
original baptismal entry made in the church record of Bacolod, she was born in that pueblo on
April 11, 1875, her mother being Felisa Castro, and father "unknown." Upon the margin of this
record there is written in Spanish an additional annotation of the following tenor: "According to a
public document (escritura) which was exhibited, she was recognized by Samuel Bischoff on
June 22, 1877." This annotation as well as the original entry is authenticated by the signature of
Father Ferrero, whose deposition was taken in this case. He testifies that the word "escritura" in
this entry means a public document; and he says that such document was exhibited to him when
the marginal note which has been quoted was added to the baptismal record and supplied the
basis for the annotation in question.
As the years passed Leona Castro was taken into the family of Samuel Bischoff and brought up
by him and his wife as a member of the family; and it is sufficiently shown by the evidence
adduced in this case that Samuel Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona as his daughter and treated
her as such. In the year 1895 Leona Castro was married to Frederick von Kauffman, a British
subject, born in Hongkong, who had come to live in the city of Iloilo. Three children were born of
this marriage, namely, Elena, Federico, and Ernesto, the youngest having been born on
November 10, 1898. In the month of April 1899, Leona Castro was taken by her husband from
Iloilo to the City of Thun, Switzerland, for the purpose of recuperating her health. She was there
placed in a sanatorium, and on August 20th the husband departed for the Philippine Islands,
where he arrived on October 10, 1899.
Leona Castro continued to remain in Switzerland, and a few years later informed her husband,
whom she had not seen again, that she desired to remain free and would not resume life in
common with him. As a consequence, in the year 1904, Mr. Kauffman went to the 39City of Paris,
France, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce from his wife under the French laws; and there is
submitted in evidence in this case a certified copy of an extract from the minutes of the Court of
First Instance of the Department of the Seine, from which it appears that a divorce was there
decreed on January 5, 1905, in favor of Mr. Kauffman and against his wife, Leona, in default.
Though the record recites that Leona was then in fact residing at No. 6, Rue Donizetti, Paris,
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
there is no evidence that she had acquired a permanent domicile in that city.
The estrangement between the von Kauffman spouses is explained by the fact that Leona
Castro had become attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, the physician in charge of the sanatorium
in Switzerland where she was originally placed; and soon after the decree of divorce was
entered, as aforesaid, Doctor Mory and Leona Castro repaired to the City of London, England,
and on May 5, 1905, in the registrars. office in the district of Westminster, went through the
forms of a marriage ceremony before an officer duly qualified to celebrate marriages under the
English law. It appears that Doctor Mory himself had been previously married to one Helena
Wolpman, and had been divorced from her; but how or under what circumstances this divorce
had been obtained does not appear.
Prior to the celebration of this ceremony of marriage a daughter, named Leontina Elizabeth, had
been born (July 21, 1900) to Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, in Thun, Switzerland. On July 2,
1906, a second daughter, named Carmen Maria, was born to them in Berne, Switzerland, now
the place of their abode; and on June 10, 1909, a third daughter was born, named Esther. On
October 6, 1910, the mother died.
In the present proceedings Otto Gmur has appeared as the guardian of the three Mory
claimants, while Frederick von Kauffman has appeared as the guardian of his own three
children, Elena, Federico, and Ernesto.
As will be surmised from the foregoing statement, the claims of both sets of children are founded
upon the contention that Leona Castro was the recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff
and that as such she would, if living, at the time of her fathers death, have been a forced heir of
his estate and would have been entitled to participate therein to the extent of a one-third interest.
Ana M. Ramirez, as the widow of Samuel Bischoff and residuary legatee under his will, insists
at least as against the Mory claimants, that Leona Castro had never been recognized at all by
Samuel Bischoff.
In behalf of Leontina, the oldest of the Mory claimants, it was originally insisted in the court
below, that, having been born while her mother still passed as the wife of Frederick von
Kauffman, she was to be considered as a legitimate daughter of the wedded pair. This
contention has been abandoned on this appeal as untenable; and it is now contended here
merely that, being originally-the illegitimate daughter of Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, she was
legitimated by their subsequent marriage.
In behalf of Carmen Maria and Esther Renate, the two younger of the Mory claimants, it is
argued that the bonds of matrimony which united Frederick von Kauffman and Leona Castro
were dissolved by the decree of divorce granted by the Paris court on January 5, 1905; that the
marriage ceremony which was soon thereafter celebrated between Doctor Mory and Leona in
London was in all respects valid; and that therefore these claimants are to be considered the
legitimate offspring of their mother.
In behalf of the children of Frederick von Kauffman it is insisted that the decree of divorce was
wholly invalid, that all three of the Mory children are the offspring of adulterous relations, and that
the von Kauffman children, as the legitimate offspring of Leona Castro, are alone entitled to
participate in the division of such part of the estate of Samuel Bischoff as would have been
inherited by their mother, if living.
We are of the opinion that the status of Leona Castro as a recognized natural daughter of
Samuel Bischoff is fully and satisfactorily shown. It is proved that prior to her marriage with
Frederick von Kauffman she was in an uninterrupted enjoyment of the de facto status of a
natural child and was treated as such by Samuel Bischoff and his kindred. The proof of tacit
recognition is full and complete.
From the memorandum made by Padre Ferrero in the record of the birth, as well as from the
testimony of this priest, taken upon the deposition, it also appears that Samuel Bischoff had
executed a document, authenticated by a notarial act, recognizing Leona as his daughter, that
said document was presented to the priest, as custodian of the church records, and upon the
faith of that document the marginal note was added to the baptismal record, showing the fact of
such recognition. The original document itself was not produced in evidence but it is shown that
diligent search was made to discover its whereabouts, without avail. This was sufficient to justify
the introduction of secondary evidence concerning its contents; and the testimony of the priest
shows that the fact of recognition was therein stated. Furthermore, the memorandum in the
baptismal record itself constitutes original and substantive proof of the facts therein recited.
It will be observed that the recognition of Leona Castro as the daughter of Samuel Bischoff
occurred prior to the date when the Civil Code was put in force in these Islands; and
consequently her rights as derived from that recognition must be determined under the law as it
then existed, that is, under Law 11 of Toro, which afterwards became Law 1, title 5, book 10, of
the Novisima Recopilacion. (See Capistrano v. Estate of Gabino, 8 Phil., 135, 139, where this
statute is quoted in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Torres.) Under that law recognition
40 could be
established by proof of acts on the part of the parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his
offspring. (Cosio v. Pili, 10 Phil., 72, 77.) In other words at tacit recognition was sufficient. Under
article 131 of the present Civil Code, the acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the
record of birth, by will, or in other public instrument. We are of the opinion that the recognition of
Leona Castro is sufficiently shown whether the case be judged by the one provision or the other.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
But it is contended by counsel for Doa Ana Ramirez that only children born o persons free to
marry may possess the status of recognized natural children, and there is no evidence to show
that Felisa Castro was either a single woman or widow at the time of the conception or birth of
Leona. In the absence of proof to the contrary, however, it must be presumed that she was a
single woman or a widow.
Relative to this presumption of the capacity of the parents to marry, the author Sanchez Roman
makes the following comment:
"Furthermore, viewing the conception of natural child in connection with two mutually interrelated
circumstances, to wit, the freedom of the parents to intermarry, with or without dispensation, at
the time of the conception of the offspring stigmatized as natural, the first of these, or freedom to
marry, is a point upon which there is, according to the jurisprudence of our former law, whose
spirit is maintained in the Code, an affirmative presumption which places the burden of proving
the contrary upon those who are interested in impugning the natural filiation." (Vol. 5, Derecho
Civil, pp. 1018-1019.)
The contrary presumption would be that Felisa Castro was guilty of adultery, which cannot be
entertained. If such had in fact been the case, the burden of proving it would have been upon the
persons impugning the recognition of the child by her father. (Sec. 334, par. 1, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
From the fact that Leona Castro was an acknowledged natural daughter of her father, it follows
that had she survived him she would have been his forced heir, he having died after the Civil
Code took effect. (Civil Code, article 807 [3], art. 939; Civil Code, first transitory disposition); and
as such forced heir she would have been entitled to one-third of the inheritance (art. 842, Civil
Code).
With reference to the rights of the von Kauffman children, it is enough to say that they are
legitimate children, born to their parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore entitled to
participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother, if she had survived
the testator.
As regards the Mory claimants, it is evident that their rights principally depend upon the effect to
be given by this court to the decree of divorce granted to von Kauffman by the Court of First
Instance of the City of Paris. If this decree is valid, the subsequent marriage of Doctor Mory and
Leona Castro must also be conceded to be valid; and as a consequence the two younger
children, born after said marriage, would be the legitimate offspring of their mother, and would be
entitled to participate in their mothers portion of Mr. Bischoffs estate. With respect to Leontina family and of society, without which there could be neither civilization nor progress. (Maynard v.
Elizabeth, the older one of the Mory claimants, there would in the case still be the insuperable Hill 125 U. S., 210; 31 L. ed., 659.) Until the adoption of Act No. 2710 by the Philippine
obstacle which results from the fact that she was the offspring of adulterous intercourse and as Legislature (March 11 1917) it had been the law of these Islands that marriage, validly
such was incapable of legitimation (art. 119, Civil Code). contracted, could not be dissolved absolutely except by the death of one of the parties; and such
was the law in this jurisdiction at the time when the divorce in question was procured The Act to
We are of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by the which we have referred permits an absolute divorce to be granted where the wife has been guilty
representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippine of adultery or the husband of concubinage. The enactment Of this statute undoubtedly reflects a
Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a change in the policy of our laws upon the subject of divorce, the exact effect and bearing of
marriage contracted in these Islands by persons domiciled here, such marriage being which need not be here discussed. But inasmuch as the tenets of the Catholic Church absolutely
indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country. deny the validity of marriages where one of the parties is divorced, it is evident that the
recognition of a divorce obtained under the conditions revealed in this case would be as
The evidence shows conclusively that Frederick von Kauffman at all times since earliest youth repugnant to the moral sensibilities of our people as it is contrary to the well-established rules of
has been, and is now, domiciled in the city of Iloilo in the Philippine Islands; that he there married law.
Leona Castro, who was a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and that Iloilo was their matrimonial
domicile; that his departure from Iloilo for the purpose of taking his wife to Switzerland was As the divorce granted by the French court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
limited to that purpose alone, without any intent to establish a domicile elsewhere; and finally Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
that he went to Paris in 1904, for the sole purpose of getting a divorce, without any intention of and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her
establishing a permanent residence in that city. The evidence shows that the decree was death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the Mory children to participate in the
entered against the defendant in default, for failure to answer, and there is nothing to show that estate of Samuel Bischoff must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate,
she had acquired, or had attempted to acquire, a permanent domicile in the City of Paris. It is legitimated, and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
evident of course that the presence of both the spouses in that city was due merely to the mutual excluded. The word "descendants," as used in article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted
desire to procure a divorce from each other. to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.

It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce
granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of
Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does
not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L ed 366)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiffs residence in the State or
country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family
domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to Confer jurisdiction on41the courts of
that State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of
the State of his own domicile (14 Cyc., 817, 818.)
An important question arises in connection with the time within which the claims of the two sets
of children were presented to the court. In this connection it appears that the will of Samuel
Bischoff was probated in August, 1913. A committee on claims was appointed and its report was
filed and accepted February 20, 1914. About the same time Otto Gmur entered an appearance
for the Mory claimants and petitioned the court to enter a decree establishing their right to
participate in the distribution of the estate. The executrix, Doa Ana Ramirez, answered the
petition denying that said minors were the legitimate children of Leona Castro and further
denying that the latter was the recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff. Upon the issues
thus presented a trial was had before the Honorable Fermin Mariano, and on December 29,
1915, he rendered a decision in which he held (1) that Leona Castro was the recognized natural
daughter of Samuel Bischoff; (2) that the minor, Leontina Elizabeth, is a legitimate daughter of
Leona Castro; and (3) that the minors Carmen Maria and Esther Renate are illegitimate children
of Leona Castro.

As has been well said by the Supreme Court of the United States marriage is an institution in the From these facts the court drew the conclusion that Leontina Elizabeth was entitled to one-third
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the of the estate of the late Samuel Bischoff, and that his widow, Doa Ana Ramirez, was entitled to

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
the remaining two-thirds. From this decision both Doa Ana Ramirez and Otto Gmur, as Upon the facts above stated it is insisted for Ana M. Ramirez that her rights to the estate under
guardian, appealed. the will of Samuel Bischoff were at the latest determined by the final decree of December 29,
1915; and that it was thereafter incompetent for the court to take cognizance of the application of
Shortly after the appeals above-mentioned were taken, Mr. Frederick von Kauffman made the Mory claimants. If this contention is sustainable, the same considerations would operate to
application to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by petition filed in the proceedings therein defeat the later application filed on behalf of the von Kauffman children and indeed with even
pending upon the estate of the late Samuel Bischoff for appointment as guardian ad litem of his greater force, since this application was not made until the appeals from the decree of
minor children, the von Kauffman heirs, which petition was granted by order dated March 24, December 29, 1915, had actually been perfected and the cause had been transferred to the
1916. Thereafter, on April 1, 1916, von Kauffman, on behalf of the said minors, filed in the cause Supreme Court.
a petition setting forth their rights to share in the estate. This petition was answered by Mr. Otto
Gmur, guardian, on April 26, 1916, the sole contention of said answer being that the matter to Two questions are here involved, one as to the effect of the probate of a will upon the rights of
which the petition relates had been disposed of by the decision of the Court of First Instance forced heirs who do not appear to contest the probate, and the other as to the conclusiveness
rendered in said proceedings by Judge Mariano on December 29, 1915. Doa Ana Ramirez and finality of an order for the distribution of an estate, as against persons who are not before
answered denying all the allegations of von Kauffmans petition. the court.

The trial of the petition of von Kauffman, as guardian, came on for hearing before the Court of Upon the first of these questions it is enough to say that the rights of forced heirs to their legitime
First Instance of Iloilo on the 10th day of August, 1916. Upon the evidence taken at that hearing are not divested by the decree admitting a will to probate, and this regardless of the fact that
the Honorable J. S. Powell, as judge then presiding in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, no provision has been made for them in the will, for the decree of probate is conclusive only as
rendered a decision under date of November 14, 1916, in which he found as a fact that Leona regards the due execution of the will, the question of its intrinsic validity not being determined by
Castro was the acknowledged natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff and that the minors, Elena, such decree. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 625; Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Sahagun v.
Fritz, and Ernesto, are the legitimate children of Frederick von Kauffman and the said Leona De Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; JocSoy v. Valio, 8 Phil., 119; Limjuco v. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393, 395;
Castro, born in lawful wedlock. Upon the facts so found, Judge Powell based his conclusion that Austria v. Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180.)
all that portion of the estate of Samuel Bischoff pertaining to Leona Castro should be equally
divided among the children Federico, Ernesto, and Elena, thereby excluding by inference the Indeed it is evident, under the express terms of the proviso to section 753 of the Code of Civil
Mory claimants from all participation in the estate. Procedure, that the forced heirs cannot be prejudiced by the failure of the testator to provide for
them in his will; and regardless of the intention of the testator to leave all his property, or
From this judgment an appeal was taken by Mr. Otto Gmur as guardian, no appeal having been practically all of it, to his wife, the will is intrinsically invalid so far as it would operate to cut of
taken by Doa Ana Ramirez. their rights.

Though the circumstance is now of no practical importance, it may be stated in passing that the The question as to the conclusiveness of the order of distribution can best be considered with
appeals of Dofia Ana Ramirez and of Otto Gmur, guardian, from the decision of Judge Mariano reference to the von Kauffman children, as the solution of the problem as to them necessarily
of December 29, 1915, and the appeal of Otto Gmur, guardian, from the decision of Judge involves the disposition of the question as to the Mory claimants.
Powell, of November 14, 1916, were brought to this court separately; but the causes were
subsequently consolidated and have been heard together. The parties to the litigation have also It is evident that the von Kauffman children cannot be considered to have been in any sense
stipulated that all the "evidence, stipulations and admissions in each of the two42proceedings parties to the proceeding at the time Judge Mariano rendered his decision. So far as the record
above-mentioned may be considered for all purposes by this court in the other." The case is shows the court was then unaware even of their existence. No notice of any kind was served
therefore considered here as though there had been but one trial below and all the issues of law upon them; nor was any person then before the court authorized to act in their behalf.
and fact arising from the contentions of the opposing claimants had been heard at the same Nevertheless, as we have already shown, upon the death of Samuel Bischoff, the right to
time. participate in his estate vested immediately in this children, to the extent to which their mother
would have been entitled to participate had she survived her father. If the right vested upon the

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
death of Samuel Bischoff, how has it been since divested?
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, and Avancea, JJ., concur.
The record shows that the decision of December 29, 1915, in which Judge Mariano holds that
the estate should be divided between Leontina Elizabeth and the residuary legatee Doa Ana
Ramirez, was made without publication of notice, or service of any kind upon other persons who
might consider themselves entitled to participate in the estate. RAMIREZ V. GMUR, 42 PHIL 855 (1918)

The law in force in the Philippine Islands regarding the distribution of estates of deceased
persons is to be found in section 753 et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure. In general terms
the law is that after the payment of the debts and expenses of administration the court shall
distribute the residue of the estate among the persons who are entitled to receive it, whether by
the terms of the will or by operation of law. It will be noted that while the law (sec. 754) provides
that the order of distribution may be had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or
of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise,
of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be
seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte
proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the court
undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs
who are not represented therein.
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by
"occupancy, grant, descent, or otherwise" shall vest title in the possessor. This would indicate
that a decree of distribution under which one may be placed in possession of land acquired by
descent, is not in itself conclusive, and that, as held in Layre v. Pasco (5 Rob. [La. ], 9), the
action of revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put in possession by
decree of the probate court at any time within the period allowed by the general statute of
limitations.
Our conclusion is that the application of the von Kauffman children was presented in ample time
and that the judgment entered in their favor by Judge Powell was correct. The Mory claimants,
as already stated, are debarred from participation in the estate on other grounds.
So much of the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance, pursuant to the decision of
Judge Mariano of December 29, 1915, as admits Leontina Elizabeth Mory to participate
43 in the
estate of Samuel Bischoff is reversed; and instead the von Kauffman children will be admitted to
share equally in one-third of the estate as provided in the decision of Judge Powell of November
14, 1916. In other respects the judgment of Judge Mariano is affirmed. The costs of this instance
will be paid out of the estate. So ordered.
FACTS: Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland, but for many years a resident of
Philippines, died testate in Iloilo on June 29, 1913. A few days after his death, the will was
offered for probate in CFI Iloilo and was subsequently admitted.
1. His widow, Dona Ana Ramirez, was named executrix. According to the will, the
decedents estate was bequeathed to his widow, except for a property in Thun,
Switzerland, which was devised to the decedents brothers and sisters
2. It appears that while the decedent had no children with Ramirez, he ignored possible
claims of two sets of children, both to his natural daughter, Leona Castro
3. Based on the baptismal entry in Bacolod, Leona Castro was born on April 11, 1875, her
mother Felisa Castro and father unknown. On the margin of this record, there is
additional annotation (escritura or public document) that she was recognized by
Samuel Bischoff on June 22, 1877. Bischoff and his family raised Leona and he treated
her as his own.
4. Leona married Frederick von Kauffman in 1895 in Hong Kong. From this marriage, 3
children were born: Elena, Federico and Ernesto
5. Subsequently, Leona went with Frederick to Thun, Switzerland, to improve her health
and live there for a few years. Later she informed her husband that she wanted a
separation. As such, Kauffman went to Paris, France to obtain a divorce from his wife
under French laws. A divorce decree was then issued on Jan 5, 1905 in favor of
Kauffman against Leona, in default. Though the record shows that Leona was residing
in Paris, there is no evidence that she had acquired permanent domicile in that city
6. Leona later cohabited with her physician, Dr. Ernest Emil Mory (in charge of the
sanatorium in Switzerland) in London. They later married in London in 1905. It appears
that Mory had previously been married to one Helena Wolpman but later divorced. Prior
to Morys marriage to Leona, they had a daughter Leontina Elizabeth. In 106, they had
Carmen Maria and in 1909, Esther. Leona died on Oct 6, 1910
7. Respondent Otto Gmur appeared as guardian of the 3 Mory claimants, while Frederick
von Kauffman appeared as the guardian of his 3 children
8. Both sets of children anchor their claim on the contention that Leona was the
recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff, as a forced heir, the claimants are
entitled to 1/3 interest in Bischoffs estate
9. On the other hand, Ramirez contended that Leona Castro had never been recognized
at all by the decedent during his lifetime
10. On the part of the Mory claimants, they argue that the marriage between Leona and
Kauffman was dissolved by the decree of divorce granted by the Paris court in Jan 5,

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 1905 and that the subsequent marriage between Leona and Mory was in all respects
valid and the children legitimate offspring of Leona
11. On the part of the Kauffman claimants, they insisted that the decree of divorce was
invalid and they alone are the legitimate offspring of Leona who are entitled to
participate in the division of the estate of Bischoff
ISSUE: WON Leona is the recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff
HELD: Yes. It is proved that prior to her marriage with Kauffman, Leona was in an uninterrupted
enjoyment of the de facto status of a natural child and was treated as such by Bischoff and his
kindred. The proof of tacit recognition is full and complete.
From the memorandum made by Padre Ferrero in the record of birth as well as in his testimony,
it appears that Bischoff executed a notarized document recognizing Leona as his daughter.
While the note itself was not presented in evidence, it was shown that diligent search was made
to discover its whereabouts but without avail. This was sufficient to justify the introduction of
secondary evidence concerning its contents; and the testimony of the priest showed that the fact
of recognition was therein stated. Furthermore, the memorandum in the baptismal record itself
constitutes original and substantive proof of the facts therein.
The recognition of Leona as Samuel Bischoffs daughter occurred prior to the Civil Code and
consequently, her rights as derived from the recognition must be determined under the law when
it existed. Under the law, recognition could be established by proof of acts on the part of the
parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his offspring. In other words, tacit recognition was
sufficient.
ISSUE: WON Felisa Castro (Leonas mother) was without legal impediment
HELD: Yes. There is no evidence to show that Felisa Castro was either a single woman or
widow at the time of Leonas birth. In the absence of proof to the contrary, however, it must be
presumed that she was a single woman or a widow.
The contrary presumption would be that Felisa was guilty of adultery cannot be entertained. If
such had been the case, the burden of proving it would have been upon the persons impugning
the recognition of the child by her father.
ISSUE: WON Leona stands to inherit from the estate of Samuel Bischoff
44
HELD: Yes. From the fact that Leona was an acknowledged natural daughter of the decedent, it
follows that had she survived him she would have been his forced heir, he having died after the
Civil Code took effect; and as such forced heir, she would have been entitled to 1/3 of the
inheritance.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
ISSUE: WON the Kauffman claimants are entitled to participate in the division of the estate
HELD: Yes. Since the Kauffman children were born during the marriage of Leona and Kauffman,
it follows that they are entitled to participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon
their mother, if she had survived the testator.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree granted by the Paris court can be recognized in the Philippines
HELD: No. The divorce decree in question cannot be recognized as valid in the Philippines. The
French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage
contracted in the Philippines by a person domiciled her; such marriage being indissoluble under
the laws then prevailing in this country.
The evidence shows that both Kauffman and Leona are domiciled in Iloilo, Philippines and that
their departure to Switzerland was for medical purpose, and that Kauffman went to Paris in 1904
to obtain a divorce without an intention to establish permanent residence in that city.
A court, where neither of the spouses is domiciled, and to which one or both of them may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
ISSUE: WON the Mory claimants are entitled to the estate
HELD: No. With regard to the Mory claimants, their rights principally depend upon the effect to
be given by this court to divorce degree granted to Kauffman in Paris. If divorce decree is valid,
the subsequent marriage of Leona and Mory is also valid.
Since the divorce granted by the French court cannot be recognized, it follows that the marriage
between Mory and Leona in London could not legalize their relations. The claims of the Mory
children to participate in the estate of Bischoff must be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated, and acknowledged natural children.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the probate of a will upon the rights of forced heirs who did not
appear to contest the probate?
HELD: The rights of the forced heirs to their legitime are not divested by the decree admitting a
will to probatethis is regardless of the fact that no provision has been made for them in the will,
for the decree of probate is conclusive only with regard to the due execution of the will.
Under Sec 753 Code of Civil Procedure, forced heirs cannot be prejudiced by the failure of a
testator to provide for them in his will; and regardless of the intention of the testator to leave all
his property to his wife, the will is intrinsically invalid insofar as it would operate to cut off their
rights.
DISPOSITIVE: The order allowing Leontina Mory to participate in the estate of Samuel Bischoff Held:
is reversed; and instead the Kauffman children will be admitted to share equally in 1/3 of the
estate as provided in the decision of Judge Powell dated Nov 14, 1916. In other respects, the
decision of Judge Mariano is affirmed.
The status of Leona Castro as recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff is fully and
satisfactorily shown.

With reference to the right of the von Kauffman children, it is enough to say that they are
legitimate children, born to their parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore entitled to
participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother, if she had survived
the testator.

The Court is of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by
the representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the
Philippine Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the
dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands by person domiciled here, such marriage
being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country.

Ramirez v. Gmur

42 Phil 855 The evidence shows that the decree was entered against the defendant in default, for failure to
answer, and there is nothing to show that she had acquired, or had attempted to acquire, a
permanent domicile in the City of Paris. It is evident of course that the presence of both the
spouses in that city was due merely to the mutual desire to procure a divorce from each other.
Leona Castro was the natural daughter of decedent Samuel Bischoff. Whereas Ana Ramirez
was the latter's widow to which they had no children. Leona was married to Kauffman. They had
3 children, Elena, Federico, and Ernesto. Later, Kauffman brought Leona to Switzerland to
recuperate her health. A few years later, she fell for a Dr. Mory to whom she had a child, It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which
Leontina. She informed Kauffman that she no longer wished to stay with him to which the latter neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely
obtained a divorce in France where Leona was in default. Leona, after the divorce got married in for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
London, and after which bore two children from which the last childbirth caused Leona her life. status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
45
The heirs of Leona from the first marriage and the second now claims the Estate of Samuel to
which Ana Ramirez opposed since Leona is not a recognized natural child.

It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the
State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves
the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MAKALINTAL, J.:
courts of that State.
The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for review by certiorari of the
This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State
decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case No. CA-G.R. 30916. The case relates to the
of his own domicile.
execution of a joint and several judgment for money obtained by the said company against the
Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. and Jose Corominas, Jr., in a litigation started in 1952
in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 17014), whose decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals with only a slight modification in respect of the award for attorney's fees.

The proceedings which took place thereafter are narrated in the decision sought to be reviewed
as follows:

When said decision became final, respondent Manila Sure secured on September 20, 1961,
from the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 17014 a second alias writ of
execution addressed to respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal whose deputy, together with
counsel for respondent Manila Surety, repaired to the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794
Harvard Street, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and levied upon a car, some furniture, appliances and
personal properties found therein belonging solely and exclusively to the petitioner with the
exception of sewing machine which belonged to a maid by the name of Nati Fresco, a G.E.
television set which was the property of the minor Jose Alfonso Corominas, and a baby grand
piano as well as a Columbia radio phonograph which belonged to Jose Corominas, Jr. As the
petitioner was then abroad, her sister Josefina Teodoro, to whom she had entrusted the custody
Republic of the Philippines and safekeeping of the properties, had made representations to the deputy sheriff and to the
SUPREME COURT counsel of respondent Manila Surety regarding the ownership of the petitioner over certain
Manila personal effects levied upon, but they ignored the same and proceeded with the levy.

EN BANC Thus, respondents caused the posting at several places notices of sale, preparatory to disposing
petitioner's properties at public auction.
G.R. No. L-20530 June 29, 1967
To stay the sale at public auction of petitioner's properties, she filed on November 3, 1961, with
MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY COMPANY, INC., petitioner, the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint with injunction, entitled "Trinidad Teodoro vs
vs. Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal," praying among other things,
TRINIDAD TEODORO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. 46 for damages and a writ of preliminary injunction which was accordingly issued upon petitioner's
filing of a bond in the sum of P30,000.00 enjoining the provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at
De Santos and Delfino for petitioner. public auction the properties claimed by said petitioner.
V. J. Francisco and R. F. Francisco for respondents.
However, on November 9, 1961, respondent Manila Surety filed an "Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint and to Dissolve Injunction" to which an opposition was filed.

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
After the parties had adduced their evidence in support of their respective claims and after
hearing their arguments, the lower court declared that the properties in question are community
properties of Trinidad Teodoro (herein petitioner) and Jose Corominas, Jr., dissolved on May 12,
1962, the writ of preliminary injunction it had issued and dismissed the complaint (Civil case No.
6865, CFI Rizal).
Not satisfied, Trinidad Teodoro (as plaintiff in said civil case No. 6865 of Rizal) interposed an
appeal. In the meanwhile, however, the Manila Surety filed on May 29, 1962, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of a third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction
of the judgment debt in civil case No. 17014. Acting upon said motion the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued on June 2, 1962, the "Third Alias Writ of Execution."
Thus, on June 7,1962, deputies of the provincial sheriff of Rizal again repaired to the residence
of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard St., Mandaluyong, and levied upon the same properties,
with the exception of the baby grand piano and the "Columbia" phonograph which were the
properties of Jose Corominas, Jr. and which had already been sold at public auction November
6, 1961 for P3,305.00, the Regal sewing machine owned by Nati Fresco, the beds found in the
boy's and girl's rooms, a marble dining table and chairs, a stereophonic phonograph and the
G.E. television set. And on the following day, June 8, 1962, respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal
advertised the sale at public auction of the aforementioned properties claimed by herein
petitioner, setting the date thereof for June 16, 1962.
Trinidad Teodoro thereupon filed an original petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals to stop
the scheduled sale. On October 24, 1962 the said Court rendered the decision now under
review, granting the writ prayed for and permanently enjoining respondent provincial sheriff of
Rizal from selling at public auction the properties in question for the satisfaction of the judgment
debt of Jose Corominas, Jr.1wph1.t Corominas to Sonia Lizares constitutes an impediment to a valid marriage between him and
The case for herein petitioner rests on the proposition that the said properties, claimed by
respondent Teodoro to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established between her
and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and consequently may be
levied upon on execution for the satisfaction of the latter's judgment debt. The facts relied upon
in support of this theory of co-ownership are stated in the decision of the court a quo
47 and quoted
by the Court of Appeals, as follows:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On November
29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the
bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . . . On March
26,1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the
Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street, . . . Manila. On
September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe
County, Nevada. U.S.A.
Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted by the
parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her
marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957.
The principal issue here is the applicability of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the situation thus
created. This Article provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through then
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid
under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds
between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their
conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent marriage in
Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void.
While Article 144 speaks, inter alia, of a void marriage without any qualification, the Court of
Appeals declined to apply it in this case on two grounds: (1) the subsisting marriage of
respondent Trinidad Teodoro, which impediment, according to a number of decisions of the
Supreme Court, precludes the establishment of a co-ownership under said article, and (2) the
funds used by said respondent in acquiring the properties in question were "fruits of her
paraphernal investments which accrued before her marriage to Corominas."
The decisions cited under the first ground are Christensen vs. Garcia, 56 O.G. No. 16, p.
3199; Samson vs. Salaysay, 56 O.G. No. 11, p. 2401; and Osmea vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. No.
20, p. 5526. In a proper case, where it may be necessary to do so in order to resolve an
unavoidable issue, the precise scope of the "no impediment to a valid marriage" dictum in said
decisions will undoubtedly deserve closer examination, since it establishes an exception to the
broad terms of Article 144. For one thing, a situation may arise involving a conflict of rights
between a co-ownership under that provision and an existing conjugal partnership formed by a Respondent could, indeed, have filed a third party claim instead as indicated in Rule 39, Section
prior marriage where, for instance, the husband in such marriage lives with another woman and 15.* But then her sister Josefina Teodoro did make such a claim in her behalf after the second
with his salary or wages acquires properties during the extra-marital cohabitation. A ruling would alias writ of execution was issued, but it was ignored and the sheriff proceeded with the levy. In
then be in order to determine which as between the co-ownership and the conjugal any event, a third party claim is not an exclusive remedy: the same rule provides that nothing
partnership could claim ascendancy insofar as the properties are concerned. therein contained "shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by
any proper action.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular properties
involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to We do not deem it to be a reversible error for Trinidad Teodoro not to include the trial Judge as
belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of party-respondent in her petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals. The trial Judge would have
Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal been merely a nominal party anyway, and no substantial rights of petitioner here have been
investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were not prejudiced by the omission.
acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs.
They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the
judgment debt of Corominas. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Several procedural questions have been raised by petitioner. First, that the injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals was improper since it was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; second,
that respondent Trinidad Teodoro having elected to appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, she may not pursue the remedy of injunction as she did in this case; third, that
respondent's petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals failed to state a cause of action;
fourth, that the proper remedy available to respondent was by filing a third-party claim; and
finally, that the trial judge should have been included as party respondent in the petition for
injunction.

As to the first in second points, the fact is that respondent Trinidad Teodoro perfected her appeal
to the Court of Appeals, which found that there were questions of fact involved therein, one of
them being whether the properties in question were acquired before or after her void marriage to
Corominas. In aid of its appellate jurisdiction, therefore, the said Court could issue a writ of
injunction. Of course, what happened here was that before the record on appeal could be filed
(on June 18, 1962) or approved (on September 8, 1962) a third alias writ of execution was
issued by the trial court (on June 2, 1962) and the properties in question were again levied upon MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY VS. TEODORO
by the sheriff and advertised for sale on June 16, 1962. It was impracticable for respondent to
48
first wait for the appeal to be elevated to and docketed in the Court of Appeals and there secure FACTS:
the ancillary remedy of injunction therein. An independent petition for injunction, under the Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On November
circumstances, was not unjustified. 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the
bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . . . On March 26,
1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the
Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street . . . Manila. On
September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe
County, Nevada. U.S.A.

Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted by the
parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her
marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957.
Trinidad questioned the levy on the property since the property in question was her paraphernal
property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal?

RULING:

There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not
valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial
bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their
conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent marriage in
Republic of the Philippines
Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void.
SUPREME COURT
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular properties Manila
involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to
belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of FIRST DIVISION
Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's
paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other
words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership
under Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
vs.
49 HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider
the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
50
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in
favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the Without costs.
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is SO ORDERED.
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy. Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the Van Dorn vs. Romillo
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 139 SCRA 139
794, 799:
FACTS:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen,
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage. therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
ISSUE:
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. HELD:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter 51 should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation
before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent
by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the
end of justice is to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 contends that the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines, as it is contrary to local law
and public policy, therefore he has legal standing to claim said property. On her part, the
petitioner filed for dismissal of the civil case contending that the private respondent is estopped
from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because in the divorce proceedings, by which
the alien spouse is bound, the private respondent agreed that they had no community property.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the
Philippines so the divorce decree has no bearing in the case. Hence this petition
for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not the alien spouse, divorced from the Filipina spouse, has legal standing on the
alleged conjugal assets, in the Philippines?

Ruling:

No. Generally, divorce is not recognized in the Philippines as it is against morals, good customs
and public policy. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which the Philippines may
recognize, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada, USA is valid, thus, in the spirit of comity, it is recognized as also valid in the Philippines.
Hence, the private respondent, as he is bound by the decision of his own coutry's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he has no
legal standing in the Philippine court as husband of the petitioner as the divorce legally dissolved
their marriage. He is further estopped by his own representation before the foreign Court in the
divorce proceedings, from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain the
petitioner to still be legally obligated to the divorced husband is a discrimination against her in
her own country. Hence, it is only just that the petition be granted. The civil case against
petitioner with the RTC was dismissed.

Note: This case was decided before August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect. It
became the basis for the codification of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.

Van Dorn vs J. Romillo Jr. (Richard Upton, private respondent) 139 SCRA 139, G.R. No. L-
68470 (1985)

Facts:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines who married Richard Upton, 52 a citizen of the
United States in Hongkong. After 10 years of marriage and two children, they got divorced in
Nevada, United States of America, where the petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van
Dorn. One year after, Richard Upton filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court Branch 115 in
Pasay City praying to for the accounting of the business, the Galleon Shop, and to be given the
right to manage the business, on the ground that the business is conjugal property. He further

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
Republic of the Philippines property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
SUPREME COURT same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
Manila
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
SECOND DIVISION promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 53 dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction. 4
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually
raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was
assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went
to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No.
87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both
petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension
of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent
judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered
a plea of not guilty. 14 54
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is
without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a
criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized 55 as
possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can
have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in
cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an
offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed
a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the
error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is
decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made56 to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage
was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
(2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
57
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler,
Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January
1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this
case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a
German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,
Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing
the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs.
Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,
considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in
this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison
detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party 58 had ceased
to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed
by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand,
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter a decree of divorce was promulgated. The records show that under German law
said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of
that foreign jurisdiction.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married
to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Issue:
WON the adultery case be sustained even though there has already been a finality of a divorce
decree.
Held:
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for
a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant
to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status
or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, it is deemed admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
Therefore, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
59
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner a Filipina and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
60
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex
loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
61
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He 62 contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50 63
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
"B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52(c) Exhibit "C"
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian)
on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S"
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c)
Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit "5"
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:
Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner
FACTS: though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
Editha on May 18, 1989. official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
Declarations secured in Australia.
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March
3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
Samson. 64 receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 FACTS:

Grace J. Garcia-Recio (2nd mariage) ----- Rederick A. Recio Editha Samson (Wife)

March 1, 1987: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an

Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal

May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
an Australian family court

June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of

Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government

January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j. Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan City. Recio
declared himself as "single" and "Filipino."

October 22, 1995: Recio and Grace J. Garcia ak.a. Garcia-Recio begun to live
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage

May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided

March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on

the ground of bigamy claiming she only learned of the prior marriage in November,
1997

Recio prayed in his answer that it be dismissed for no cause of action

RTC: marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines

Garcia Recio vs Recio

65 ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven
GR 138322, October 2, 2002

Lessons Applicable: divorce

Laws Applicable: Art. 15 and Art. 26 par. 2 FC

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which 2. authenticated by the seal of his office
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring
the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
Divorces: arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types:

1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained 1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage
abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force
2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." judgment of divorce

3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it

o legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned

o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself

The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or

tribunal of a foreign country

o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

1. an official publication; or

2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
66
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular

officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept; and

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
 G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 193908

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,

vs.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 194075

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D.
Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order 2 of the Regional Trial
Republic of the Philippines Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by
SUPREME COURT 67 petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.
Manila
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
SECOND DIVISION
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto
Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by
talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1st
Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as
follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de
Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife, herein
complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as provided
for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they have
freely entered into on December 18, 1983.
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both the
complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to their
Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between
them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the marriage
between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is
hereby confirmed dissolved.
Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.
68
(signed)
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Presiding Judge3
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr.
(Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in
Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of
their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony
before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos first
marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny,
namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and,
in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum
escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999,
Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of
the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos, to wit:
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended the
petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a)
Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De
Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon
City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and
Pacasums marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and void ab initio;
and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to
their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community
property in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate
succession.
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on
October 25, 2004.
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and disbarment before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Bureau of
Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative
cases were dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision,
Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of the administrative case was still pending
resolution.
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a
second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.4
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor
Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie evidence to
hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.5Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for
Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-12305.6
Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February 2, 2005
resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were temporarily
suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of
Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos motion for reconsideration and
dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.7
Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the City
Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005. 8 Posthaste, Pacasum filed
a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his
criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.9
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a resolution
granting Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005
resolutions of the City Prosecutor.10 Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance
Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively
dated February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice. 11 Unfortunately
for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated
May 17, 2006.12
Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions,69was likewise
denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that
Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose
marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to the
effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage due to
the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is
misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been
terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was entered into by
[Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved
and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the
second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman under the
Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter
or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083.
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on December 28,
1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the validity of the first
marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as
amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic
Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and
also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the
first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second
marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by
Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,] being
governed by PD 1083, x x x.
Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:
"Application
The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband,
Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings shall be
properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:
"Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married in
accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
a) Marriage;
b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
x x x x"
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts or other
courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a] Court is valid,
recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against [Zamoranos]
such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and misconduct before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which were all similar
or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and simple harassment.
In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this
Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of marriage
entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion
to dismiss is hereby granted.
70
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.13
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No.
6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of
Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments.14
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum,
issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against Zamoranos.15
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged.
Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil
Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness
of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her
marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be
dismissed.16
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos Motion to Quash the
Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.17
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the
December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the CA
dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail
the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it
is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim
of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave
abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation
of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It
is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or
issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which
the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an
error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
xxxx
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash
Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e
found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to
[Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the
issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in
upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the
denial of petitioners motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.18
Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of Zamoranos petition for
certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision. However,
upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed
Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No.
193902 to remain.
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made by the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites;
2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio did
not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their marriage
ties; 71
4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings
properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court."
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and
6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083
because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos petition, raises a
quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who
entered into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate factual findings that
Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.19
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power
or authority in law to perform.20
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory
order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.21
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that,
when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to
certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable
verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.22
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is (1) The former judgment or order must be final;
considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a
motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the (2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b)
when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial parties; and
justice";23 (d) to promote public welfare and public policy;24 and (e) when the cases "have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
thereof."25 The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
cause of action.26

Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of
The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to state
jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash.
that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits. The
lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of the Sharia Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who
judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of wed under Islamic rites.
nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a
bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC,
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have
Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and
declared that it was the Sharia Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos divorce
thereof.
from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the
following evidence:
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The provision
reads:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the
marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the
as follows:
marriages among Muslims;

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are believers of
will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam)
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration,
72 or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters
of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate. 3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came
to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the
wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
1083; registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the
Sharia Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim
personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was housed, was
razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office equipments of
the Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may serve.
2. Certification28 issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce
agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit29 executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge
Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce agreement by the
latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;
2. The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan
was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the
First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;
3. The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old Capitol
Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;
4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr.
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his 73 former wife,
Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which
divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that
gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the
court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are
governed by P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the
RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg.
129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and
Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal
prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested
the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court
has jurisdiction over this case.30
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the
CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated
the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully
shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos
and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was
already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of
the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over
the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the
equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the
former shall prevail.
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local
application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be
construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws
expound thereon:
74
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this
Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict
between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general
application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the
sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized "in accordance with" the Muslim
Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision
refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another special
law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision
of the Muslim Code.31
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Article 13. Application.
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines
shall apply.
xxxx
Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.
xxxx
 Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
xxxx
Article 29. By divorcee.
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed
an idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However,
if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after
delivery.
xxxx
Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
Section 1. Nature and Form
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the
marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the
exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may
be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxxx
Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation
of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally
abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations 75 made
during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become
irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall
have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
of cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do
so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).
xxxx
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it
becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78
of this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in
case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or
one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be
dissolved and liquidated.
For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one.
But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two
situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both
parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the
Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.32
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.331avvphi1 G.R. No. 193908

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, vs. SAMSON R. PACASUM,
Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was SR., Respondent.
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. G.R. No. 194075

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner, vs. ATTY. MARIETTA D.
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED ZAMORANOS, Respondent.
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-
12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.
Facts:

SO ORDERED.
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the
Decision dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos), thus, affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lanao del Norte for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum,
Sr.

On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto
Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by
talaq. The court held that after evaluating the testimonies of the parties, it is fully convinced that
both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to
their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and
76
between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce. Consequently, the marriage between
Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman was dissolved
by the Sharia Circuit District Court in Isabela, Basilan.

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first nuptial
to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the
Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites and in order to strengthen the ties of
their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony.
Zamoranos and Pacasum were then de facto separated. Pacasum filed cases for the annulment
of their marriage, criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case for disbarment against
Zamoranos. Pacasum contracted a second marriage. The prosecutor found prima facie
evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy but the same was thereafter dismissed upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by Zamboranos.
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice assailing the
dismissal of the complaint for bigamy. The DOJ Secretary granted the petition and reversed the
dismissal. Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent
Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and
(3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest before the Secretary of
Justice. Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice
in a resolution. Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions,
was likewise denied.
decision of the RTC categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the
mootness and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum
and prayed for the dismissal of the case.
The motion to quash and motion for reconsideration filed by Zamoranos was denied. She then
filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the order of the RTC. The CA
dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail
the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information. She now comes to the SC in a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not an appeal is a legally permissible remedy in an order denying a motion to quash.
Held:
No. The Court granted the petition for certiorari and granted the motion to quash filed by
Zamoranos. The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an
interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the lower court rendered a
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper
decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that,
court found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to
marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083,
certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides that
verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
the Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the same. And any
divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and
sufficient divorce proceedings. However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is
considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a
motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the
The court held that the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is
court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b)
hereby granted. The CA and the SC affirmed the dismissal and the same became final and
when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial
77 justice"; (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases "have attracted
The RTC of Iligan, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating criminal case for nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
Bigamy against Zamoranos. thereof." The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.

Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over her person and over the offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of
jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power
or authority in law to perform.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the
RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg.
129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and
Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal
prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested
the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court
has jurisdiction over this case.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the
CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the78
very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated
the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was
already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of
the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over
the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the
equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one.
But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two
situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both
parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the
Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.
One of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of
matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry. It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce
from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and
attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the
crime of Bigamy.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
79
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under 80 the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the
case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to
its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a
foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
81
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe
a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
82
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
83
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 198237 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.


The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid the absurd situation whre the Filipino spouse
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
GR 186571 Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree
Facts

Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the
He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City Family Code provides the direct exception to the rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse
Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he returned to the Philippines he found out that
his wife was having an affair with another man
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the
He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the same was granted court finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to remarry, the courts can declare the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
After two years from the effectivity of the divorce decree, Corpuz found a new Filipina to however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established
love by the decree) whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law

Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the divorce decree on his and Remedy Available to Alien Spouse
Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate

The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien
Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce before the RTC
spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree

RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under
Art. 26(2) of the Family Code
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law
Issue have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence in
favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction the effect of foreign judgment (Please see pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132)
84
Ruling
* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the recording of the divorce decree on
The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art. 26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate as legally improper. No judicial order yet exists
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse recognizing the foreign divorce decree, thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz
and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Corpuz (Please see Art. 407 of the New Civil Code and the Law on Registry of Civil Status -Act
No. 3753)
Corpuz v Sto. Tomas
2010
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Petitioner, GERBERT R. CORPUZ - versus - DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL,Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code 85
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
RULING:
Yes.
The General Rule is that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
BUT - direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.
The case is remanded to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of
the decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention
of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any
legal effect.
Cancellation of the entry in the civil registry requirements:
(1) verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located
(2) civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings
(3) time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August 11,
2010

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian
citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due
to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he
discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought
about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by
the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two
years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to
Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage
certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics
Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there
has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC
denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further
that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26
of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse
obtains a foreign divorce decree.

ISSUE:

86
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:

CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according
87
CONFLICTS (FEB. 6)
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment
and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties,
as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.