Allado vs. Diokno, G.R. No.
113630 May 5, 1994 After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto
Facts:
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a
discharged Philippine Constabulary named
Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement
implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and
Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law
Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He
accused them as the brains behind the alleged
kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van
Twest, a German national. Based on that confession
of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge
Roberto Barrios of the RTC of Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), armed with the search
warrant issued separately raided the dwellings of
police officers who were also pointed by Umbal as
the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and
ammunitions were found in the raid including Van
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and
their other co-defendants were charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions,
carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder,
and usurpation of authority. Their case was
referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the
case.
Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant
of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned
the issued warrants of arrests. They claim that
Judge Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion
and in excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of
probable cause for him to issue the warrants. They
further contend that the judge did not personally
determine the admissibility and sufficiency of the
evidence where the investigation was based from.
Issue: Whether or not a warrant of arrest without
bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for
lack of probable cause even if the accused was not
in the custody of the court.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding in the case on the
ground of lack of probable cause. As with other
earlier cases resolved by the high court, the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative
relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no
requirement that the accused be in the custody of
the law. Various reliefs can be granted by the
1
Supreme Court to accused even if they are not in In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted
the custody of the law.
PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November
1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all
the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again
went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to
February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to

reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight.
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
decision for him to remain grounded until such time
vs.
that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an
weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
international flight steward who was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a
airline company.
repeated refusal to report for weight check would be
The proper weight for a man of his height and body
dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight
weight check dates, which he did not report to.
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a
Administration Manual of PAL.
Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists

2
that he is being discriminated as those similarly
situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by
PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight,
and considering the utmost leniency extended to him
which spanned a period covering a total of almost five
(5) years, his services were considered terminated
effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL
are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight
did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus,
petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly
failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only
invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result
of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to
no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep
the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates
against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That
he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992
clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight
given the proper attitude, determination, and self-
discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he
issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight
which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.
3
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
easily availed the assistance of the company physician,
per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when
placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service.
His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless
voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness
basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing or
controlling his actions. This element runs through all
just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered
voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found
in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the
bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it
is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory
job performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it
has committed itself to safely transport its passengers.
In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew
who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of
PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
discipline upon its employees.
4

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the
weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of
the employee as an act of social justice or based on
equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and
other consolidated petitions), November
3, 2008
VELASCO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as
it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for
public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary
schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutors
office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories
or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others,
two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used
and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.
Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to
the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a
random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
5
drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the III. THE RULING
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which [The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870
xxx xxx xxx and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office 36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently
with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec.
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress
a mandatory drug test.
CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution candidates for senator in addition to those laid down
No. 6486. by the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUES In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA

1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a
law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 unconstitutional?
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose
an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and be
voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these

6
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary
enlarge the Constitution. and tertiary schools

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of
as, unconstitutional.
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented
applied the following principles: (1) schools and their
by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard
the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with
like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if the health and well-being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
just, and non-discriminatory.
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be educational institutions to require, as a condition for
of little value if one cannot assume office for non- admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
compliance with the drug-testing requirement. regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is
not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs
(f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

7
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees
of public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been
held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at
issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-
testing policy for employeesand students for that matter
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and
informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it
may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In
this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop
for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees
and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency
in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of
the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to
a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative.
For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them
under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug
use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be
tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected
to random drug test as contained in the companys work
rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much
as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the
mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure
8
shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test
and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as
possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall
be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH)
to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by
the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be
on the need to know basis; that the drug test result and
the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by
the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law
to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement
is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable
and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that
it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at
all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before
the prosecutors office with a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and
1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of
RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In
the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to
the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
9
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815
drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons vs.
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled Respondent
before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
FACTS:
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
bodily searched and after which a firearm with live
violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not
been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso

was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in
the boarding house of his children. They pointed their
guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the
room as the raiding team went back inside, searched
and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of
the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The
firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry
Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.

10
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a
revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing
the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a
letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the
firearm and ammunition has merit and valid
HELD/DECISION:
1. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and
seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested
lawfully may be searched so that the officer may
remove any weapons that the accused may be
used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare
of the officers and to make sure that the arrest
will happen. This is also to find evidence that
otherwise can be destroyed by the accused.
Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or any weapons either on the person or
within the area of his immediate control. Based
on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner
did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed
outside the room where the gun was found;
therefore the room where the gun was found
could not be in his immediate control. Incidental
searches without a warrant states that officers
are permitted to seize any weapon that they can
inadvertently found during the arrest under the
plain view doctrine. However, the firearm was
not found accidentally but was actually searched
and therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search
was illegal, a violation of Velorosos right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the
evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and
cannot be used against him.
Human Rights Law Case Digest: Philippine Blooming
Mills Employment Organization V. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human
Rights, Human Right is superior to property rights,
Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional
right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free
expression, rights of free assembly and rights of petition
11

FACTS:
March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered
that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a
valid exercise of their constitutional right of freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality
of Pasig at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 to be
participated in by the workers in the first, second and
third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm
respectively)
March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2
meetings in the morning and afternoon where PBMEO
confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. That Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to
report for work the following morning shall be dismissed
for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company:
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969
The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO
answered that there is no violation since they gave prior
notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for
strike against the company.
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers directly
responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for
reconsideration dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD:
YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and
reinstate the petitioners.
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement
of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
12
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general
principles.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well
as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people
The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs
as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,
the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can
never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying
day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of
which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be
illegal picketing or strike
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer
loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees
from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And
to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against
the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is
13
unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a
day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the
day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to
a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support.
Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary
hoping that their demonstration would bring about the
desired relief from police abuses. But management was
adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy
of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right
to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration
and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a
denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee
is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of
Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace
Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to
effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-
being."
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as
the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the
exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when
exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would
be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest
between an employer and its laborer, the latter
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the
financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
services
14
 enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered
no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason
to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations
rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an
accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require."
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA
849 (1967)
J. Fernando
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for
the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to
be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers
of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that
hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar because it would
impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first
class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
there was also the requirement that the guests
would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They
claimed this to be violative of due process for being
vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and
required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners
also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the
hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic
cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the
ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
15
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.
However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case
was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts,
the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due
process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It has a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite
to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrase.
16
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of
liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement
the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting
duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality
as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v
Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal
information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what
they omit but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."
17
MORFE V MUTUC
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND
ASSOCIATES DECEMBER 29, 2011 SALN
Declaratory relief (Appeal)
Date of Promulgation: January 31, 1968
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)
Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive
Secretary) et al.
Facts:
The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
Every public officer within 30 days after its
approval or after his assumption of office
and within the month of January of every
year thereafter, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare
and file with the head of the office to which
he belongs, a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year.
Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the
periodical submission within the month of
January of every other year thereafter of their
sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is
violative of due process as an oppressive exercise
of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban
against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination.
Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
Acceptance of public position = voluntary
assumption of obligation
Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable
measure of insuring the interest of general
welfare in honest and clean public service
and is therefore a legitimate exercise of
police power.
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement
exceeds the permissible limit of the police power
and is thus offensive to the due process clause
Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public
officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power; 2.
Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the
right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable
18
search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.
Ruling: Decision reversed.
Ratio:
1. Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was
a reasonable requirement for employment so a
public officer can make of record his assets and
liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did
not present evidence to rebut the presumption of
validity.
If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
the most rights of property, the permissible scope
of regulatory measure is wider. (Ermita-Malate
Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided
by the Due Process Clause
inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society (Justice
Malcolm)
The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men
and things within the limits of its domain
(Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of
rights)
Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the
extension of police power to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life can
invoke the protection of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied
upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
property. Therefore he could also use due process
to strike down what he considers as an
infringement of his liberty.
Under the Constitution, the challenged provision
is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The standard for due process is
REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression.
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions
and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of
public service with its ever-present temptation to
heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as
19
 arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that 1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
imposed upon public officials and employees to file
The constitutional guarantee against
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
unreasonable search and seizure does not give
every two years after having done so upon
freedom from testimonial compulsion.
assuming officeThere was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power. 1. Right against self-incrimination

1. Right to privacy We are not aware of any constitutional provision

designed to protect a mans conduct from judicial
Right to be let alone
inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
It cannot be said that the challenged
1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
statutory provision calls for disclosure of
information which infringes on the right of a Only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for
person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the
declaring a statute invalid.
rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute
goes very far in precluding assent to an objection
of such character. This is not to say that a public
officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize 7, 2007
that in subjecting him to such a further
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, J. Corona
including the statement of the amounts of
Facts:
personal and family expenses, and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
year, there is no unconstitutional of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and
Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No.
intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
8027 reclassified the area described therein from
sphere. industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to

20
cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell
and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an
MOU which only scaled down the property covered by
the depots and did not stop their operations. In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six months
starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to
implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents defense is
that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the
MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more
of a guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court-
mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the
performance of the act and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to
be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to
compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable
or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the
right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will
not issue. When a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are
interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest. Petitioners
are citizens of manila and thus have
a direct interest in the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty,
as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city,
he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on
the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
21
might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have
not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to
obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the
terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance
No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
PANDACAN OIL DEPOT MUST GO: SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA CASE DIGEST
(Just the other day, the Supreme Court affirmed the
authority of Manila City to issue and enforce an
Ordinance reclassifying certain areas within the city.
The reclassification adversely affected the oil
companies, which are now forced to relocate their oil
terminals in Pandacan. This is a digest ofSocial
Justice Society vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13
February 2008. Other procedural issues are not
discussed.)
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of
Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in
2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under the reclassification to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-
called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies
(the brief history of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is
here).
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They
agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the
MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only
for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which
period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7
March 2007 Decision. The SC ruled that respondent
had the ministerial duty under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city, including
Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC promulgated its
Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell) (the oil companies) and the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE,
22
sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of
the decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE
allowed in the interest of justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not
originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. While the motions to intervene
respectively filed by the oil companies and the DOE
were filed out of time, these motions were granted
because they presented novel issues and arguments.
DOEs intervention was also allowed considering
the transcendental importance of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal
Ordinance No. 8027
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that
where a statute of later date clearly reveals the
intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on
the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so
declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is:
where the provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the
latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is: if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate
to repeal the earlier law. The oil companies argue that
the situation here falls under the first category.
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an
irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances.
However, there was no legislative purpose to repeal
Ordinance No. 8027. There is no conflict since both
ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to
shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed
residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119). While it
is true that both ordinances relate to the same subject
matter, i.e., classification of the land use of the area
where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no
intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at
reasonable construction must be made to reconcile the
ordinances so that both can be given effect.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory
construction that a subsequent general law does not
repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it
clearly appears that the legislature has intended by
the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier
special law. The special law must be taken as intended
to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the
general act or provision. Ordinance No. 8027 is a
special law since it deals specifically with a certain
area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area)
whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a
general law as it covers the entire city of Manila.
Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027
23
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie
against respondent in consideration of the separation
of powers of the executive and judiciary. However,
while it is true that Courts will not interfere by
mandamus proceedings with the legislative or
executive departments of the government in the
legitimate exercise of its powers, there is an exception
to enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to
be performed by some officer thereof. A writ of
mandamus is the power to compel the
performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or
station.
The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel
respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, which was
to seek relief from the President of the Philippines
through the Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the
Presidents power of supervision over local
government units. This suggested process, however,
would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently
injurious to the interests of the local government unit
(LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought to
be protected. A party need not go first to the DILG in
order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance.
Besides, the resort to an original action for mandamus
before the SC is undeniably allowed by the
Constitution.
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy and (6)
must not be unreasonable. There is no showing that
the Ordinance is unconstitutional.
The City of Manila has the power to enact
Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police
power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. This
power flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex(the welfare of the people is the supreme
law).
While police power rests primarily with the national
legislature, such power may be delegated. Section 16
of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise
police power through their respective legislative
bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
24
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Specifically,
the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land
within the jurisdiction of the city.
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a
legitimate exercise of police power
As with the State, local governments may be
considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure
because there is a concurrence of lawful subject and
lawful method. It was enacted for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health,
public safety and general welfare of the residents
of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the
Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the
ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to
life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila
and not just of a particular class. The depot is
perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
western interests which means that it is a terrorist
target. As long as it there is such a target in their
midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
became necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the
legislative authority to determine not only what the
interests of the public require but also what measures
are necessary for the protection of such interests.
Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare. However, the
interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And
to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used
to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must
have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the
enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the
area where the depot is situated from industrial to
commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local
city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning,
the continued operation of the businesses of the oil
companies in their present location will no longer be
permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the
25
police power itself and is exercised for the protection
and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently,
the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the
power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or
confiscatory which amounts to taking without
compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is
unfair and oppressive as it does not only regulate but
also absolutely prohibits them from conducting
operations in the City of Manila. However, the oil
companies are not prohibited from doing business in
other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila
merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses
and industries in the zones it established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is
unfair and oppressive because they have invested
billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced closure
will result in huge losses in income and tremendous
costs in constructing new facilities. This argument has
no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a
limitation on or restriction of property interests to
promote public welfare which involves no compensable
taking. Compensation is necessary only when the
states power of eminent domain is exercised. In
eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied
to some public purpose. Property condemned under
the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is
noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose
and, consequently, is not compensable. The restriction
imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from
danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or
abatement of a noxious use which interferes with
paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the
use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or
interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and
other businesses situated in the affected area remain
theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be
applied to other profitable uses permitted in the
commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and
discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance
has discriminated against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan
area is congested with buildings and residences that
do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire
Code and Health and Sanitation Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does
not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally
to all members of the same class. The law may treat
and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
26
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the
ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic
devastation that will result from a terrorist attack.
Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a
high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire
or explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing
compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion
in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial
distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which
provides for the cessation of the operations of these
terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is
germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The
classification is not limited to the conditions existing
when the ordinance was enacted but to future
conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable
to all businesses and industries in the area it
delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA
7638 and RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance
No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it contravenes RA
7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene
existing statutes enacted by Congress. However, a
brief survey of decisions where the police power
measure of the LGU clashed with national laws shows
that the common dominator is that the national laws
were clearly and expressly in conflict with the
ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The
inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room
for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited
merely gave DOE general powers to establish and
administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization,
conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy
resources and to encourage certain practices
in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and
are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction,
ensure continuous supply of petroleum products.
These powers can be exercised without emasculating
the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these
ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal
power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning
ordinances for the general welfare of its constituents,
it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter.
Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the
Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt
must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and
zealously protected under the Constitution. An entire
article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted
to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs.
The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to
ensure the autonomy of local governments as
mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing
how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and
DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact
ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to
reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control
over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOEs
assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of the
27
Constitution confines the Presidents power over
LGUs to one of general supervision. Consequently, the
Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot
exercise the power of control over them. The President
and his or her alter egos, the department heads,
cannot interfere with the activities of local
governments, so long as they act within the scope of
their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute
its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the
sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the
wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they
are acting within the parameters of the Constitution
and the law.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to
comply with RA 7924 and EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of
LGUs are required to be submitted to the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and
if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan
physical framework plan and regulations, it shall
endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e)
of RA 7924 and Section 1 of E.O. 72. They argue that
because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this
review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA
the authority to review land use plans and zoning
ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only
found in its implementing rules which made a
reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to
comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance
No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be
one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which
reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to
prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist
attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly
formulated as the Manila [CLUP] and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs are the ordinances which
should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its
metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by
the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national
guidelines and policies. Moreover, even assuming that
the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are
necessary, the oil companies did not present any
evidence to show that these were not complied with. In
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of
an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be
upheld in the absence of proof showing that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed.
Conclusion
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their
right to property. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based
on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise
of police power clashes with a few individuals right
to property, the former should prevail.
Both law and jurisprudence support the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027.
Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its
enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair
to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders
28
who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and
control their own destiny and preserve their lives and
safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech,
warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to
provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation
of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The
enforcement of a decision, specially one with far-
reaching consequences, should always be within the
bounds of reason, in accordance with a comprehensive
and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame
that complies with the letter and spirit of our
resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no
choice but to obey the law.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY
THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted
two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message IBASURA RH Law referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either
(Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-
RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing
of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
Team Patay, while those who voted against it form
Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin
was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.
29
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its
reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Courts power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the
principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first
before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate
expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for
the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is
a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of
petitioners right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message
are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does
not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There
is no political question. It can be acted upon by this
court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never
precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose
the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction,
the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer
to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted
within such limits.
A political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of
the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the
utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt
that a political question brings.
30
SECOND ISSUE: No. party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
The Court held that the argument on
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case.
this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the The Court held that every citizens
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is expression with political consequences enjoys a high
the prerequisite that something had by then been degree of protection.
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
Moreover, the respondents argument that
case, organ of government before a court may come
the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners
into the picture.
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
given the message and their medium, had water.
understandable relevance especially during the
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of
influence the success or failure of the named
the election offense against petitioners is already an
candidates and political parties, this does not
actionable infringement of this right. The impending
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for
petitioners speech.
consideration by any candidate, political party, or
In the context of this case, exhaustion of party-list group.
their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
By interpreting the law, it is clear that
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
freedom of speech.
messages are covered.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
Political speech refers to speech both intended and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had
received as a contribution to public deliberation about
the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the
some issue, fostering informed and civic minded
Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
has been defined as speech that does no more than
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political

31
propose a commercial transaction. The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers
to restrictions based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved
at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test,
respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered
by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-
candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not
affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the
tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right
to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as
an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement
of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a
restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizens private property. Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines
relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
32
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence
and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the governments favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the
government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.
1-UTAK V. COMELEC
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK),
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
PONENTE: Reyes
TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech,
posting of campaign materials on PUV and public
terminals, captive-audience doctrine
DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic
and fundamental right in any democracy. It includes
not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge
others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to
express ones preference for a candidate is likewise
part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus,
any governmental restriction on the right to convince
others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy
presumption of invalidity.
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
33
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the
May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which
enumerates the prohibited forms of election
propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.
During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or
propaganda material outside
of authorized common poster areas, in public places,
or in private properties without the consent of the
owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection
(f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys,
trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals,
such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers,
train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g)
shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility
franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of
the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an
election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as
regards the application of REsolution No. 9615
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation
to Section 7(f), vis--vis privately owned public utility
vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner
then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed provisions and allow
private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
election campaign materials on their vehicles and
transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No.
13-0214, which denied the petitioners request to
reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and
(6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
are constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of
Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior
restraints on speech
34
 Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on
the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in
their property, and convince others to agree with
them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No.
9615, posting an election campaign material during an
election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries
with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility
franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for
an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior
restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a
result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively
inhibited from expressing their preferences
under the pain of indictment for an election
offense and the revocation of their franchise or
permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election
campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral
regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which
is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech,
or one that merely controls the time, place or manner,
and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally
permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech,
provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 are content-neutral regulations since they
merely control the place where election campaign
materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is
still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not
within the constitutionally delegated power of
the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity
to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or
permit to operate and not the ownership per se
of PUVs and transport terminals.
35
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the circumstances in which the communication
constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory cannot be avoided.
powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is
worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only
in the guise of censorship, which undertakes
grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
over the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
speech on the ground that they are more offensive
permits for the operation, inter alia, of transportation
than others. Such selective restrictions have been
and other public utilities. The COMELECs
upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy
constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and
of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either
regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of
impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or
PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise
auditor to avoid exposure.
or permit to operate the same.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed
9615 are not within the constitutionally
captive audience may avoid exposure to the
delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or
otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under
regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
transportation utilities. The posting of election
9615 is not justified under the captive-audience
campaign material on vehicles used for public
doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled
transport or on transport terminals is not only
to read the election campaign materials posted on
a form of political expression, but also an act of
PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable
ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or
of declining to receive the messages contained in the
permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
posted election campaign materials since they may
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. simply avert their eyes if they find the same
9615 are not justified under the captive- unbearably intrusive.
audience doctrine.
Lehmans case not applicable
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to
listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape
restrict the posting of election campaign materials on
from intrusive speech, the speech can be
PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of
restricted. The captive-audience doctrine
Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme
recognizes that a listener has a right not to be
Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government,
exposed to an unwanted message in
which prohibits political advertisements on

36
government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
advertising space on the buses was not a public forum,
pointing out that advertisement space on government-
run buses, although incidental to the provision of
public transportation, is a part of commercial
venture. In the same way that other commercial
ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising
from the general public, the citys transit system has
the discretion on the type of advertising that may be
displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended
for PUVs owned by the city government; the city
government, as owner of the buses, had the right to
decide which type of advertisements would be placed
on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of
the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in
choosing the types of advertisements that would be
placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the
choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals
on the advertisements that may be posted on their
properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay
the duty, to refuse political advertisements on their
buses. Considering that what were involved were
facilities owned by the city government, impartiality,
or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the
instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport
terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason
to suppress their political views by proscribing the
posting of election campaign materials on their
properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport
terminals from posting election campaign
materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but
also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic
principles on which this government was founded is
that of the equality of right, which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited
to existing conditions and applies equally to the
members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible
since it is not based on substantial distinction and is
not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction
exists between PUVs and transport terminals
and private vehicles and other properties in that
the former, to be considered as such, needs to
secure from the government either a franchise
or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed
out earlier, the prohibition imposed under
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV
and transport terminals; the prohibition does
not in any manner affect the franchise or permit
to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial
distinction between owners of PUVs and transport
37
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
properties. As already explained, the ownership of
PUVs and transport terminals, though made available
for use by the public, remains private. If owners of
private vehicles and other properties are
allowed to express their political ideas and
opinion by posting election campaign materials
on their properties, there is no cogent reason to
deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. In terms of ownership,
the distinction between owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and properties is merely superficial.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are
made available for use by the public is likewise
not substantial justification to set them apart
from private vehicles and other properties.
Admittedly, any election campaign material that would
be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be
seen by many people. However, election campaign
materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial
establishments, would also be seen by many people.
Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs
and transport terminals in the prohibition against
posting of election campaign materials.
Summary
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech
clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are
not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC
issue and are not necessary to further the objective of
ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the
candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free
speech clause, but are also violative of the equal
protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction
between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to
advertise ones political candidacy is clearly a
significant part of our freedom of expression. A
restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is
a violation of the most valuable feature of the
democratic way of life.
Qua Chee Gan v. The Deportation
Board | Barrera, J
FACTS
Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee
Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim
Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King were
charged before the Deportation Board with
having purchased $130,000.00 without the
necessary licensing from the Central Bank and
having clandestinely remitted the same to Hong
Kong.
After the filing of the deportation charges, a
warrant of arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan,
et al. pending investigation.
38
 They were granted provisional liberty upon their
filing of a surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash
bond for P10,000.00.
Qua Chee Gan, et al. filed a joint motion to
dismiss the charges on the ground, among
others, that such charges are not legal grounds
for deportation ad that the Board has not
jurisdiction over such charges. The motion to
dismiss was denied.
Qua Chee Gan, et al. then filed a petition for
habeas corpus and/or prohibition.
TIRAL COURT: Upheld the validity of the
delegation by the President to the Deportation
Board the power to conduct investigations for
the purpose of determining whether the stay of
an alien in this country would be injurious to the
security, welfare and interest of the State.
o The court also sustained the power of the
deportation Board to issue warrant of
arrest and fix bonds for the alien's
temporary release pending investigation
on the theory that the power to arrest and
fix the amount of the bond of the arrested
alien is essential to and complement the
power to deport aliens.
ISSUES/HELD
[1] WoN the President has the power to deport
aliens and if such power is validly delegated to
the Deportation Board. YES.
[2] WoN the authority to deport aliens includes
the power to order the arrest of such aliens.
YES. BUT only when there is already an ORDER
OF DEPORTATION.
RATIO
[1]
Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the
Commissioner of Immigration the power to
effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after
previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners, but such power was not
intended to be delimited to the Immigration
Commissioner as Sec. 69 of the Administrative
Code, although not expressly conferring such
power, lays down the procedure for such
deportation proceedings for the President.
Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable
alien may be effected in 2 ways:
o By order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code, and
o By the Commissioner of Immigration,
upon recommendation by the Board of
39
 Commissioners, under Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613.
And although the charges against Qua Chee Gan
are not enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of
profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S.
dollars, in violation of the Central Bank
regulations, which is tantamount to economic
sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the
provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section
37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
[2]
Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien
charged in deportation proceedings shall file a
bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in
order to secure their appearance.
o However, the same did not authorize the
arrest of the alien pending investigation.
It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was
authorized motu proprio or upon the filing
of formal charges by the Special
Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the
warrant for the arrest of the alien complained
of and to hold him under detention during the
investigation unless he files a bond for his
provisional release in such amount and under
such conditions as may be prescribed by the
Chairman of the Board.
However, Section 69 of the Revised
DISPOSITIVE
Administrative Code, upon whose authority
the President's power to deport is predicated,
does NOT provide for the exercise of the
power to arrest.
Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure
in his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of
the Constitution: ...no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce...
Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the
requirement "to be determined by the judge"
to any public officer who may be
authorized by the Legislature to make such
determination, and thereafter issue the
warrant of arrest.
Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is
necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation is valid only when there is
already an order of deportation.
o However, during the investigation, it is
not indispensable that the alien be
arrested.
o It is enough that a bond be required to
insure the appearance of the alien during
the investigation, as was authorized in
EO69.
40
 Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers
the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest
upon the filing of formal charges against an
alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the
conditions for the temporary release of said
aliens, is declared illegal.
The order of arrest issued by the respondent
Deportation Board is declared null and void and
the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest,
decreed cancelled.
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162
SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN
1988]
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners
are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey,
52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van
Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago
issued Mission Orders to the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended
petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report
read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two
young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two
naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in
the after Mission Report read that two children
of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care
and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime
now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls
of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys
and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien
pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988
after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for
self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence,
another charged not for pedophile but working with NO
VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation
proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation
proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against
petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised
Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special
Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail
was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners
filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court
heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to
41
arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of
existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was
unreasonable searches and seizures by CIDagents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be
granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the
Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of
the state to promote and protect the physical, moral,
spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest
of petitioners was based on the probable cause
determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and
seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore
the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported
by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three exceptions to this rule.
1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a
moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In
view of the foregoing, the searchdone was incidental
to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a
waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore,
the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas
corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has
become legal, although such confinement was illegal
at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the
Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in
relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code.
Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested
and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a
ground for deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and never
construed as a punishment but a preventive measure.
Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly
in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is
essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State
and done under the authority of the sovereign power.
It a police measure against the undesirable aliens
whose continued presence in the country is found to
be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the
people.
42
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his
naturalization, he applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport
expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he
signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun
Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu,
in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the
Court en banc. The Court en banc denied the petition.
When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acts constitute
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not
left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior
status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport and represented himself as
such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person
has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be
heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this
Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to
look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a
commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient.
Board of Commissioners V. De La Rosa
43
197 SCRA 863 Civil Law Preliminary Title Conflict
of Laws Foreign Laws; How Proven Proof of Foreign
Laws Processual Presumption
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a
native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian
testified that he has 5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve
year old minor arrived in Manila and sought admission
as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the
board of special inquiry. However, the Secretary of
Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all
decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to
review all cases where entry was allowed among which
was that of William Gatchalian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in
China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the
absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws
on a particular subject are presumed to be the same
as those of the Philippines. This is known as Processual
Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of
Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a
presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine
law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore,
William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his
father is a Filipino citizen.
G.R. No. L-20119 June 30, 1967
CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P.
MORFE and FIRST MUTUAL SAVING
AND LOAN ORGANIZATION,
INC., respondents.
Natalio M. Balboa, F. E. Evangelista
and Mariano Abaya for petitioner.
Halili, Bolinao, Bolinao and Associates
for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, with preliminary injunction, against an order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the petitioner filing an injunction
bond in the amount of P3,000.00, let a writ of
preliminary preventive and/or mandatory injunction
issue, restraining the respondents, their agents or
representatives, from further searching the premises
and properties and from taking custody of the various
documents and papers of the petitioner corporation,
whether in its main office or in any of its branches; and
ordering the respondent Central Bank and/or its co-
respondents to return to the petitioner within five (5)
days from service on respondents of the writ of
preventive and/or mandatory injunction, all the books,
44
documents, and papers so far seized from the
petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid search
warrant.1wph1.t
Upon the filing of the petition herein and of the
requisite bond, we issued, on August 14, 1962, a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining and prohibiting
respondents herein from enforcing the order above
quoted.
The main respondent in this case, the First Mutual
Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. hereinafter
referred to as the Organization is a registered non-
stock corporation, the main purpose of which,
according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated
February 14, 1961, is "to encourage . . . and
implement savings and thrift among its members, and
to extend financial assistance in the form of loans," to
them. The Organization has three (3) classes of
"members,"1 namely: (a) founder members who
originally joined the organization and have signed the
pre-incorporation papers with the exclusive right to
vote and be voted for ; (b) participating members
with "no right to vote or be voted for" to which
category all other members belong; except
(c) honorary members, so made by the board of
trustees, "at the exclusive discretion" thereof due
to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in the
propagation" of the objectives of the Organization
without any pecuniary expenses on the part of said
honorary members.
On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the
Central Bank of the Philippines hereinafter referred
to as the Bank rendered an opinion to the effect that
the Organization and others of similar nature are
banking institutions, falling within the purview of the
Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the
Bank caused to be published in the newspapers the
following:
ANNOUNCEMENT
To correct any wrong impression which recent
newspaper reports on "savings and loan associations"
may have created in the minds of the public and other
interested parties, as well as to answer numerous
inquiries from the public, the Central Bank of the
Philippines wishes to announce that all "savings and
loan associations" now in operation and other
organizations using different corporate names, but
engaged in operations similar in nature to said
"associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE
MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE
PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS
NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR
FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General
Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage
in the "lending of funds obtained from the public
through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds,
securities or obligations of any kind" without authority
from the Monetary Board. Their activities and
operations are not supervised by the Superintendent
of Banks and persons dealing with such institutions do
so at their risk.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
45
Moreover, on April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank II. BOOKS OF FINAL ENTRY
directed the coordination of "the investigation and
(1) General Ledger
gathering of evidence on the activities of the savings
and loan associations which are operating contrary to (2) Individual Deposits and Loans Ledgers
law." Soon thereafter, or on May 18, 1962, a member
of the intelligence division of the Bank filed with the (3) Other Subsidiary Ledgers
Municipal Court of Manila a verified application for a III. OTHER ACCOUNTING RECORDS
search warrant against the Organization, alleging that
"after close observation and personal investigation, (1) Application for Membership
the premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" in
(2) Signature Card
which the offices of the Organization were housed
"are being used unlawfully," because said Organization (3) Deposit Slip
is illegally engaged in banking activities, "by receiving
deposits of money for deposit, disbursement, (4) Passbook Slip
safekeeping or otherwise or transacts the business of a (5) Withdrawal Slip
savings and mortgage bank and/or building and loan
association . . . without having first complied with the (6) Tellers Daily Deposit Report
provisions of Republic Act No. 337" and that the (7) Application for Loan Credit Statement
articles, papers, or effects enumerated in a list
attached to said application, as Annex A thereof. 3 are (8) Credit Report
kept in said premises, and "being used or intended to
(9) Solicitor's Report
be used in the commission of a felony, to wit: violation
of Sections 2 and 6 of Republic Act No. 337." 4 Said (10) Promissory Note
articles, papers or effects are described in the
aforementioned Annex A, as follows: (11) I n d o r s e m e n t

I. BOOKS OF ORIGINAL ENTRY (12) Co-makers' Statements

(1) General Journal (13) Chattel Mortgage Contracts

(2) Columnar Journal or Cash Book (14) Real Estate Mortgage Contracts

(a) Cash Receipts Journal or Cash Receipt Book (15) Trial Balance

(b) Cash Disbursements Journal or Cash Disbursement (16) Minutes Book Board of Directors
Book

46
IV. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(1) Income and Expenses Statements
(2) Balance Sheet or Statement of Assets and
Liabilities
V. OTHERS
(1) Articles of Incorporation
(2) By-Laws
(3) Prospectus, Brochures Etc.
(4) And other documents and articles which are being
used or intended to be used in unauthorized banking
activities and operations contrary to law.
Upon the filing of said application, on May 18, 1962,
Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the said municipal
court, issued the warrant above referred
to,5 commanding the search of the aforesaid premises
at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of
the foregoing articles, there being "good and sufficient
reasons to believe" upon examination, under oath, of a
detective of the Manila Police Department and said
intelligence officer of the Bank that the Organization
has under its control, in the address given, the
aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the
offense adverted to above or intended to be used as
means for the commission of said off offense.
Forthwith, or on the same date, the Organization
commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, an original action for "certiorari,
prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said
municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police
Department, and the Bank, to annul the
aforementioned search warrant, upon the ground that,
in issuing the same, the municipal court had acted
"with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction
and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said
search warrant is a roving commission general in its
terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word 'and others' in the
search warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search
and seizure of documents which have no relation
whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c)
"no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a
criminal case against a corporation . . ."
The Organization, likewise, prayed that, pending
hearing of the case on the merits, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued ex parte restraining the
aforementioned search and seizure, or, in the
alternative, if the acts complained of have been
partially performed, that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be forthwith issued ex parte,
ordering the preservation of the status quo of the
parties, as well as the immediate return to the
Organization of the documents and papers so far
seized under, the search warrant in question. After due
hearing, on the petition for said injunction, respondent,
Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the
branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila to which
said Case No. 50409 had been assigned, issued, on
July 2, 1962, the order complained of.
Within the period stated in said order, the Bank moved
for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied on
47
August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in
the Supreme Court, the present action, against Judge
Morfe and the Organization, alleging that respondent
Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order in
question.
At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken
by the Bank, in causing the aforementioned search to
be made and the articles above listed to be seized,
was predicated upon the theory that the Organization
was illegally engaged in banking by receiving
money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or
otherwise, or transacting the business of a savings and
mortgage bank and/or building and loan association,
without first complying with the provisions of R.A. No.
337, and that the order complained of assumes that
the Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said
Act.6 Yet respondent Judge found the searches and,
seizures in question to be unreasonable, through the
following process of reasoning: the deposition given in
support of the application for a search warrant states
that the deponent personally knows that the premises
of the Organization, at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue,
Manila,7 were being used unlawfully for banking and
purposes. Respondent judge deduce, from this
premise, that the deponent " knows specific banking
transactions of the petitioner with specific persons,"
and, then concluded that said deponent ". . . could
have, if he really knew of actual violation of the law,
applied for a warrant to search and seize only books"
or records:
covering the specific purportedly illegal banking
transactions of the petitioner with specific persons who
are the supposed victims of said illegal banking
transactions according to his knowledge. To authorize
and seize all the records listed in Annex A to said
application for search warrant, without reference to
specific alleged victims of the purported illegal banking
transactions, would be to harass the petitioner, and its
officers with a roving commission or fishing expedition
for evidence which could be discovered by normal
intelligence operations or inspections (not seizure) of
books and records pursuant to Section 4 of Republic
Act No 337 . . ."
The concern thus shown by respondent judge for the
civil liberty involved is, certainly, in line with the
function of courts, as ramparts of justice and liberty
and deserves the greatest encouragement and
warmest commendation. It lives up to the highest
traditions of the Philippine Bench, which underlies the
people's faith in and adherence to the Rule of Law and
the democratic principle in this part of the World.
At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid the
Constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures seeks to forestall, not purely
abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete
ones. Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature
of things, a condition dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case, in much the
same way as the question whether or not "probable
cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light
of the conditions obtaining in given situations.
48
Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear
from the order complained of whether respondent
Judge opined that the above mentioned statement of
the deponent to the effect that the Organization was
engaged in the transactions mentioned in his
deposition deserved of credence or not. Obviously,
however, a mere disagreement with Judge Cancino,
who issued the warrant, on the credibility of said
statement, would not justify the conclusion that said
municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess
of jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, the failure of the
witness to mention particular individuals does not
necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge
of specific illegal transactions of the Organization, for
the witness might be acquainted with specific
transactions, even if the names of the individuals
concerned were unknown to him.
Again, the aforementioned order would seem to
assume that an illegal banking transaction, of the kind
contemplated in the contested action of the officers of
the Bank, must always connote the existence of a
"victim." If this term is used to denote a party whose
interests have been actually injured, then the
assumption is not necessarily justified. The law
requiring compliance with certain requirements before
anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks to
protect the public against actual, as well as potential,
injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting
the use of warrants to papers or effects which cannot
be secured otherwise.
The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might,
perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed to the
Organization consisted of isolated transactions, distinct
and different from the type of business in which it is
generally engaged. In such case, it may be necessary
to specify or identify the parties involved in said
isolated transactions, so that the search and seizure be
limited to the records pertinent thereto. Such,
however, is not the situation confronting us. The
records suggest clearly that the transactions objected
to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the
business of the Organization. Indeed,
the main purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is
"to extend financial assistance, in the form of loans, to
its members," with funds deposited by them.
It is true, that such funds are referred to in the
Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws as their
"savings." and that the depositors thereof are
designated as "members," but, even a cursory
examination of said documents will readily show that
anybody can be a depositor and thus be a
"participating member." In other words, the
Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" for
deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent
by the Organization. Moreover, the power to so dispose
of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of
the "founder members," and "participating members"
are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for,
their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to
those which the board of trustees may, in its
discretion, determine from time to time. As a
consequence, the "membership" of the "participating
members" is purely nominal in nature. This situation is
49
fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which
Republic Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting
compliance with the requirements of said Act, before
the transactions in question could be undertaken.
It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization
does not seriously contest the main facts, upon which
the action of the Bank is based. The principal issue
raised by the Organization is predicated upon the
theory that the aforementioned transactions of the
Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term
is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied,
however, in the light of the circumstance obtaining in
this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was
probable cause that the Organization had violated
Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the
warrant in question, and that, accordingly, and in line
with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33),
the search and seizure complained of have not been
proven to be unreasonable.
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated July 2,
1962, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued in compliance therewith are hereby annulled,
and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on August 14, 1962, accordingly, made
permanent, with costs against respondent First Mutual
Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. It is so ordered.
Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of
42 search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation
to search persons and premises of several personal properties
due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures
were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner
and in the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null
and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a
petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from
being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against
the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects
found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the
legality of the search and seizure in both premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in
the residences but not those done in the corporation's
premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second
situation since a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or
interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office
they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been
50
impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely
personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party.
The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st
group of documents, papers, and things seized from the
offices and the premises).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case
Digest
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send
packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and
ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually
convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment.
Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the
package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample
of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of
the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and
found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre
Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a
quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence
acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against
him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private
individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner
Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will
be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in
the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure
proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision issued
on June 9, 1980 which affirmed the decision of the California
Supreme Court in a case that arose out of a free speech dispute
between the Pruneyard Shopping Center in Campbell, California,
and several local high school students (who wished to solicit
signatures for a petition against United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 3379).[1]
Case[
51
In American constitutional law, this case is famous for its role in
establishing two important rules:
under the California Constitution, individuals may
peacefully exercise their right to free speech in parts
of private shopping centers regularly held open to the public,
subject to reasonable regulations adopted by the shopping
centers
under the U.S. Constitution, states can provide their
citizens with broader rights in their constitutions than under
the federal Constitution, so long as those rights do not
infringe on any federal constitutional rights
This holding was possible because California's constitution
contains an affirmative right of free speech which has been
liberally construed by the Supreme Court of California, while the
federal constitution's First Amendment contains only
a negative command to Congress to not abridge the freedom of
speech. This distinction was significant because the U.S.
Supreme Court had already held that under the federal First
Amendment, there was no implied right of free speech within a
private shopping center.[2] The Pruneyard case, therefore, raised
the question of whether an implied right of free speech could
arise under a state constitution without conflicting with the federal
Constitution. In answering yes to that question, the Court rejected
the shopping center's argument that California's broader free
speech right amounted to a "taking" of the shopping center under
federal constitutional law.
A typical "Please Do Not Contribute" sign at a California shopping center.
Footnote two of the decision quotes the relevant portions of
the California Constitution, which states in Article 1, 2
Every perso
and Article 1, 3
[P]eople ha
The vote to uphold the California decision was unanimous,
although four justices disagreed with part of the reasoning in
Justice William Rehnquist's opinion for the majority.
Justices Thurgood Marshall, Byron White, and Lewis Powell filed
separate concurring opinions. Justice Harry Blackmun filed a brief
"statement" indicating that he was joining in all of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion except for one sentence.
Because of the Pruneyard case, people who visit shopping
centers in California may regularly encounter people seeking
money or attention for various causes, including charitable
solicitations, qualifying petitions for amendments to the state
constitution, voter registration drives, and sometimes a beggar. In
turn, many shopping centers have posted signs to explain that
they do not endorse the views of people exercising their right to
free speech, and that if patrons do not give them money, the
speakers will go away.
Subsequent developments[edit]
Although 39 other states have free speech clauses in their
constitutions that look like California's indeed, California
borrowed its clause from a similar one in the New York
52
Constitution at least 13 of those states have declined to follow
California in extending the right of free speech into private
shopping centers.[3] In refusing to follow Pruneyard, the state
supreme courts of New York and Wisconsin both attacked it as an
unprincipled and whimsical decision.[4] In 2003, the European
Court of Human Rights also considered and refused to
follow Pruneyard, in a United Kingdom case.[5] Only New
Jersey, Colorado, and Massachusetts have followed California,
albeit with some reservations. In a 2000 decision, Puerto Rico (a
U.S. territory) also adopted Pruneyard's right of free speech,
although the case was complicated by the presence of a branch
office of a government agency (Puerto Rico Telephone, since
privatized) in the shopping center (the Mayagez Mall).[6] Some
commentators have suggested the Pruneyard rule could be
applied to speech on the Internet, including speech activities
in virtual worlds, like Linden Labs' Second Life, although the
courts have not addressed this theory.[7]
In the decades since Pruneyard was decided, the Supreme Court
of California has become much more conservative, especially
after three liberal justices (including Chief Justice Rose Bird) were
removed by the electorate in 1986 for their opposition to
the death penalty.[8]
In the 2001 Golden Gateway decision, a 43 majority of the Court
significantly narrowed Pruneyard by holding for a variety of
reasons that California's free speech right does not apply to
private apartment complexes yet they also refused to
overrule Pruneyard.[9] Thus, California's right of free speech in
private shopping centers still survives.
The shopping center industry strongly "detests"
the Pruneyard decision since it has resulted in numerous test
cases by protesters in California and elsewhere trying to find the
boundaries of the Pruneyard rule.[10] Shopping centers have
regularly imposed restrictions on unwanted solicitors and
appealed the resulting legal cases in the hope of convincing the
California judiciary that Pruneyard should be overturned, or at
least limited.[10] Since Golden Gateway, decisions by the
intermediate Courts of Appeal have generally limited the scope of
the Pruneyard rule to the facts of the original case. For example,
starting in 1997, the parking lots of many Costco warehouse
club stores in California became sites of conflict involving a large
number of political activist groups who had gradually become
aware of their rights under Pruneyard. In 1998, Costco's
management imposed several restrictions, including a complete
ban on soliciting at stand-alone stores, a rule that no group or
person could use Costco premises for free speech more than 5
days out of any 30, and the complete exclusion of solicitors on
the 34 busiest days of the year.
In 2002, these restrictions were upheld as reasonable by the
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, and the Supreme
Court of California denied review.[11] Costco's stand-alone stores
lacked the social congregation attributes of the multi-tenant
shopping center at issue in Pruneyard. As for the restrictions on
the stores in shopping centers, they were held to be reasonable
because Costco had developed a strong factual record at trial
which proved that hordes of unwanted solicitors had significantly
interfered with its business operations they had damaged its
reputation, obstructed access to its stores, and traumatized
Costco employees.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of California confronted
the Pruneyard decision once more, in the context of a complex
labor dispute involving San Diego's Fashion Valley Mall and
the San Diego Union-Tribune. On December 24, 2007, a 4-3
majority of a sharply divided court once again refused to
overrule Pruneyard, and instead, ruled that under the California
Constitution, a union's right of free speech in a shopping center
includes the right to hand out leaflets urging patrons
to boycott one of the shopping center's tenants.[12]Justice Ming
Chin, in his dissent joined by Justices Marvin Baxter and Carol
Corrigan, expressed his sympathy with several of the most
common critiques of the Pruneyard decision:
"Pruneyard was wrong when decided. In the nearly three decades
that have since elapsed, jurisdictions throughout the nation have
overwhelmingly rejected it. We should no longer ignore this tide of
history. The time has come for us to forthrightly
53
overrule Pruneyard and rejoin the rest of the nation in this
important area of the law. Private property should be treated as
private property, not as a public free speech zone."[13]
In the aftermath of the Fashion Valley case, the California Courts
of Appeal briefly began to apply Pruneyard more broadly. In 2010,
the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District, in an opinion
authored by then-Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye (now Chief Justice
of California), held that it is unconstitutional under Pruneyard for
shopping mall giant Westfield Group to promulgate rules
discriminating in favor of commercial speech in its malls and
against noncommercial speech.[14] The plaintiff had been detained
by Westfield security after attempting to discuss the principles of
his Christian faith with strangers at the Westfield Galleria at
Roseville.
In 2011, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District
disagreed with the Fourth Appellate District's analysis of blackout
days in the Costco case, and held that it was unreasonable
for Westside Pavilion to prohibit animal rights protesters from
protesting on certain blackout days and to require them to protest
out of aural and visual range of the targeted tenant (an alleged
retailer for puppy mills).[15]
On December 27, 2012, the Supreme Court of California
reaffirmed Pruneyard but narrowed its applicability to the facts of
the original case.[16] The entire court concurred in Associate
Justice Joyce Kennard's holding that Pruneyard applies only to
"common areas" of shopping centers that are designed and
furnished to encourage shoppers to linger, congregate, relax, or
converse at leisure, but does not apply to any other open portions
of shopping centers merely intended to facilitate the efficient
movement of shoppers in and out of tenants, including concrete
aprons and sidewalks which shoppers simply walk across as they
move between parking lots and big-box stores. In other words,
the court effectively immunized most (but not all) strip malls and
shopping centers from Pruneyard, except for those with areas
analogous to public gathering areas such as plazas, atriums,
or food courts. Miriam Vogel, a former Court of Appeal justice who
argued for the shopping center tenant (Kroger subsidiary Ralphs),
characterized the decision "a great victory for retailers as far as
putting another nail in the Pruneyard coffin."[17] However, the
decision was not a complete loss for free speech advocates, as
the court separately upheld the right of a union to protest on the
employer's premises under the state Moscone Act by a 6-1
majority (the majority, though, was badly split as to why).
Serrano vs. NLRC / ISETANN - GR No.
117040 Case Digest
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann
Department Store as the head of Security Checker. In
1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann phased out
its entire security section and engaged the services of
an independent security agency. Petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor
arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish
that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or
minimize losses to its business; that private
respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner;
that private respondent failed to use reasonable
standards in selecting employees whose employment
would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and
ordered petitioner to be given separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security
agency by the private respondent to replace its current
54
security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the Facts: CASA Montessori International opened an
employees classed under the latter. account with BPI, with CASAs President as one of
its authorized signatories. It discovered that 9 of its
checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D.
RULING:
Santos whose name turned out to be fictitious, and
An employers good faith in implementing a
was used by a certain Yabut, CASAs external auditor.
redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by
He voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature
the availment of the services of an independent
and encashed the checks.
contractor to replace the services of the terminated
employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent
RTC granted the Complaint for Collection with
proof that management acted in a malicious or
Damages against BPI ordering to reinstate the amount
arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
in the account, with interest. CA took account of
exercise of judgment by an employer.
CASAs contributory negligence and apportioned the
loss between CASA and BPI, and ordred Yabut to
If termination of employment is not for any of the
reimburse both.
cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee
should be reinstated and paid backwages. To contend
BPI contends that the monthly statements it issues to
that even if the termination is for a just cause, the
its clients contain a notice worded as follows: If no
employee concerned should be reinstated and paid
error is reported in 10 days, account will be correct
backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding
and as such, it should be considered a waiver.
another ground for considering dismissal illegal.
Issue:Whether or not waiver or estoppel results from
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any
failure to report the error in the bank statement
of the causes mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance
with that article, he should not be reinstated but must
Held: Such notice cannot be considered a waiver,
be paid backwages from the time his employment was
even if CASA failed to report the error. Neither is it
terminated until it is determined that the termination
estopped from questioning the mistake after the lapse
of employment is for a just cause because the failure
of the ten-day period.
to hear him before he is dismissed renders the
termination without legal effect.
This notice is a simple confirmation or "circularization"
BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G. R. No. -- in accounting parlance -- that requests client-
149454 & 149507, May 28, 2004 depositors to affirm theaccuracy of items recorded by
the banks. Its purpose is to obtain from the depositors

55
a direct corroboration of the correctness of
theiraccount balances with their respective banks.
Every right has subjects -- active and passive. While
the activesubject is entitled to demand its
enforcement, the passive one is duty-bound to suffer
such enforcement. On the one hand, BPI could not
have been an active subject, because it could not have
demanded from CASA a response to its notice. CASA,
on the other hand, could not have been a passive
subject, either, because it had no obligation to
respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to respond.
Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or
asserting, by their own deed or representation,
anything contrary to that established as the truth, in
legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence even make
a juris et de jure presumption that whenever one has,
by ones ownact or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to
be true and to act upon that belief, one cannot -- in
any litigation arising from such act or omission -- be
permitted to falsify that supposed truth.
In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or
representation that misled BPI. The formers omission,
if any, may only be deemed an innocent mistake
oblivious to the procedures and consequences of
periodic audits. Since its conduct was due to such
ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel
will not arise. A person who has no knowledge of or
consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it.
"Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or
doubtful inference x x x." CASA is not barred from
questioning BPIs error even after the lapse of the
period given in the notice.
Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 1
66006 March 14, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are
private corporations incorporated under Philippinelaws,
both engaged in the importation and distribution of
fertilizers, pesticides and agriculturalchemicals. Marcos
issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a
capital recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of
fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate
capital was raised to make PPI financiallyviable.
Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted
thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to
FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution,
FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy.
Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the amount it
remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was
unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an
unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due
process.PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because
itdoes not have a "personal and substantial interest in
the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer
any damage from the imposition because"incidence of
56
the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer company. limitations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to

question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.
What is the power of taxation?

RULING:
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct
injury; doctrine of standing is a mereprocedural
technicality which may be waived.The imposition of
the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)
state. While it is true that thepower to tax can be used
as an implement of police power, the primary purpose G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
of the levy was revenuegeneration. If the purpose is
primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the Ponente: NACHURA, J.:
real and substantialpurposes, then the exaction is
properly called a tax.Police power and the power of FACTS
taxation are inherent powers of the State. These
powers are distinct andhave different tests for validity. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and
Police power is the power of the State to enact Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come
legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of
property in order to promote the general welfare, while Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power
the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal
used for public purpose. The main purpose of police Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks
power isthe regulation of a behavior or conduct, while to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional.
taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects"
and"lawful means" tests are used to determine
the validity of a law enacted under the police power.
Thepower of taxation, on the other hand, is

57
Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the
consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents
to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took
effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-
Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment
from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification.
On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, praying that the
proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge
be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF)
managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of
watershed areas. On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order
provisionally approving the computed amount as the share of the
NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification
and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO)
and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a
monthly basis. On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the
Decision. On April 2, 2003, ERC authorized the NPC to draw up to
P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation
Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund
component of the Universal Charge.
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric
Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all
other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective
electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which
sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
1 The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18
of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The
power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such,
the delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional,
giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed
provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to
be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence
leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative
authority.
2 The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine
where the funds collected should be used.
3 The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation
without representation as the consumers were not given a
chance to be heard and represented.
Respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) and Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC,
and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends:
58
 1 Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public
purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the
country's electric power industry.
2 It is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police
power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue
delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the latter
merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the
execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.
3 Universal Charge does not possess the essential
characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to
the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public,
and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users,
unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's
ability to pay.
4 Imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and
confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the
State and it complies with the requirements of due process.
PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount
pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund
components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165.Otherwise,
PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA, which
imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR.
ISSUE
1 Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax
2 Whether or not there is undue delegation of
legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
HELD
1st ISSUE
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers
rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. In
exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA,
the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is
invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the
purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed. From the
aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed
Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the
State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
2nd ISSUE
There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
59
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata
non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This
is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another.
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is
allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety
of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in
their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All
that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate
legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These
requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second
test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated
in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one
(1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all
electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to
be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by
the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover, contrary
to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of
discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is
complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative
power.
2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security
and affordability of the supply of electric power[59] and watershed
rehabilitation and management[60] meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no
undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in
the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all
end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation
without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or
abandoned. Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially
involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from
reviewing the same.
60
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one
that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably,
petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the
EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which
would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and
Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

61