Sei sulla pagina 1di 36

Chapter

4 1 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

The Unfairness of Party Financing


(Thursday 31 October, 1997)

I had intended my first piece in this column to be on The Year 2000 but
changed my mind after attending (from the Speakers Gallery, of course) a
session of a parliamentary committee that considered amendments to the 1992
Political Parties (Finance) Act in light of the recent High Court judgment that
Section Three of the Act, requiring a minimum threshold of 15 seats for party
entitlement to public funding, was unconstitutional.
The constitutionally articulate Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa introduced the changes which lowered the
minimum threshold down to five percent of the total votes cast for a political
party in a general election starting from 1995. What was intriguing for me
was the ensuing debate or accolades in support of the motion.
Speaker after speaker stood up and praised the minister and our
government for heeding the High Court decision. This shows separation of
powers at work in our country, said one speaker. We are the most democratic
country in Africa, said another, in self-praise. One even said: Its healthy to
have an opposition, but decried that the only opposition we have is within
the party.
I couldt have believed my ears, but for my eyes which saw the phony
posturing. It was as if to say: If only the High Court had told us a lot sooner!
It was patronisingly sarcastic. I could see Harare South MP Margaret Dongo
about to jump up and beat somebody but her diminutive physique told her she
must confine herself to shouting and harassing them with points of order for
the intermittent lack of a quorum.
But there is a caveat to the ZANU PF generosity. Noticing that the party
ran uncontested in 55 of the 120 contestable constituencies, the minister put
a rider that all the voters on the voters rolls for those constituencies should be
allotted to the uncontested parties, leaving the opposition with an even leaner
slice, if any. Predictably, Dongo opposed the five percent threshold as too
high, preferring every vote cast for a party to be factored in.
Three weeks earlier I had phoned Douglas Mwonzora, the UP (United
Parties) lawyer, congratulating him on winning the High Court decision. He
modestly said: Not to mention it, Professor, adding: Anybody who would

4
The Unfairness of Party Financing 5

have taken this case could have won it. It wasnt a difficult case to argue. A 15-
seat threshold is grossly unfair, even in the eyes of ZANU PF itself, let alone in
the eyes of the bench.
So, why didnt somebody take this case earlier? The long and short of it is
no one thought of it. Did the unanimous judges not know the practice was
unconstitutional? Did they have to wait until Mwonzora brought the UP case?
Apparently, yes. This is one case in which the law is an ass. In the public
interest, our judiciary review ought to include constant review of the
constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.
The unfairness of party financing goes back 17 years, when the Ministry
of Political Affairs was created. Robert Mugabe, then prime minister, did not
hide the task for this ministry: it was to enhance the hegemony of his ZANU
PF party. This ministry lasted from 1980 to 1992, dishing monies averaging
about $52 million annually, a 12-year total of $624 million, exclusively to
ZANU (PF). No wonder the party is so popular! Responding mainly to IMF
(International Monetary Fund) and World Bank conditionalities, the Political
Parties (Finance) Act was promulgated in 1992. It was acceptable
internationally because, in principle, it purported to have funds made available
to any political party that satisfied the conceivably reachable minimum
threshold of 15 seats. If this Act could be successfully challenged, the legality
of the earlier Political Affairs ministry could have been equally challenged,
on even more convincing grounds, for it was openly intended to finance only
the ZANU PF party.
Maybe Mwonzora was still in law school. However, as he says, anybody
could have challenged and won the case. Then the blame must lie with the rest
of us, not ZANU PF, that we are underlings. Really, zvimwe ndezvimwe (this is
ridiculous). In so many words, all the seven ZANU PF MPs, even the minister,
seemed to be saying: Wapusa, wapusa (Let sleeping dogs lie)! Even
Mwonzoras modest reply to my congratulatory gesture confirms this.
Anybody can surely successfully challenge the fairness of the rider that
all the votes in the uncontested constituencies should go to the uncontested
candidates. A fair distribution would be to base the turnout in uncontested
constituencies on the average turnout in contested constituencies. More
importantly, voter turnout was at its lowest in all constituencies in the 1995
general election, averaging about 54 percent.
Yet the minister would allot 100 percent to the 55 uncontested
constituencies. This means 46 percent of the budgeted money goes to ZANU
PF before the proportional allocation! I dont see the learned bench agreeing
6 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

with the minister. In fact, they are probably waiting for someone, anyone, to
approach the bench.
Accordingly, ZANU PF can spare itself further embarrassment for being
greedy and mean-spirited. Idyaiwo navamwe. Kuomera ndiko kunei? (Eat with
others. Theres no need to be stingy). But wapusa, wapusa. The opposition
has to be switched on. Thank you Mwonzora.
The Elusive 2
Chapter Promised Land 7

The Elusive Promised Land


(Thursday 6 November, 1997)

I had intended my second piece on this column to be on the Year 2000,


but there are more current issues of concern to the public such as the
unresolved land question and the war veterans compensation. Some will
even say the most current issue is the military coup that almost happened
last week next door. But that was in Zambia, not Zimbabwe. Further, it failed,
thereby setting a good and not bad precedent. Moreover, it couldnt happen
here, Your Excellency, for reasons I might explain in a subsequent contribution.
But for now, the land question.
The dust of the countryside tour has now settled, and we can see clearly now
that the land question remains unanswered. We are told that committees
have been set up because British Prime Minister Tony Blair was unaware of
our hunger for land. Its up to the British to compensate their cousins, said
President Robert Mugabe, with a touch of race, before he left for the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. I had been visiting my
brother, opposition leader the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, on the evening
of October 17-the week of the tour. For a change, Ndaba said something
complimentary about the man whose government took his Churu farm some
four years ago.
Mas, did you watch tonights news?, he asked. I am afraid I did not.
What happened?, I asked. Mugabe ataura zvandifadza chaizvo (Mugabe
said something that pleased me very much). He couldnt have put it better in
any other language except in Shona, he said, with some admiration of
sorts. He said: Vana Rhodes havana kuuya muno nembeu yevhu (Rhodes
and his people did not come here with soil seed). I could see that VaMugabe
had aroused in my brother the vana vevhu (son of the soil) spirit of the
1950s and early 1960s.
I said Amen! but withheld what I was amening about. It was that at
least the two nationalists still agreed on something; not that I agreed with
them on the land question. I believe that those who are asking the land
question are asking the wrong question: rather they should be asking the
factory question. It is true that Rhodes and his people did not bring soil
seed, not even an ounce of British soil. But the point is that they came here

7
8 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

and occupied 390 737 square kilometres of land inhabited by about 350 000
peasant farmers in 1890. Today there are nearly 12 million of us on the
same acreage. It has not increased an inch since Rhodes.
I am told by population specialist Dr Marvellous Mhloyi that by the year
2020, this inelastic acreage will be occupied by about 24 million people, 75
percent of them still peasants. By the time my sons reach retirement age
Zimbabwes population will be approaching 52 million this on the same
acreage that Rhodes found in 1890. Did Vision 2020 miss these very
basic projections?
A policy of solving the land question by continually parcelling out land is
both short-sighted and uninformed. Land is a finite resource - there is so
much of it and no more. Our population is infinite, and we are very fertile
people!
We need to radically change our orientation and approach to the land
issue. Instead of continually politicising the land issue, we need to economise
the land. The thesis that the liberation struggle was for land is basically
incorrect.
Most people took part in the struggle, not for a piece of land in Chipinge,
Wedza or Lalapansi, but for a good life in Salisbury. Peasant life is damned
hard, if the truth be told. This is why we are in Harare, including the chefs
(more so!). Those who are not in Harare or in Harare-like communities it
is for lack of opportunity, not their desire to till the soil in the countryside.
As I see it, Dr Bernard Chidzeros idea of growth points was, and still
is, the key to our future, in that its focus was on the creation of local industries
the factories. This idea and approach must be revitalised as the countrys
key development strategy.
If land must be acquired, it must be with this purpose in mind. Also, if
people must be resettled, it must be for this purpose, not for peasant farming.
Accordingly, a grand plan to reclaim and revitalise the unproductive communal
land for commercial farming should be the focus of a forward-looking Vision
2030 land policy. It is large-scale commercial farming that must feed industry,
in whatever fashion food and raw materials. This is the sense in which
industrialisation elsewhere was based on agriculture. The view that small-
scale peasant farming could be the basis of an industrial development plan is
simply obscene. Peasants are a class in exit; growth points would speed
up their exit. The answer for most of our people is in more factories, not the
elusive promised land.
My hunch is that the British, and whomsoever, will not give us money to
The Elusive Promised Land 9

buy our land from their cousins for resettling our peasants. But they
might encourage their nationals to invest in the said growth points. Any
confiscatory rhetoric makes capital reluctant to invest, even indigenous capital,
for fear of being confiscated some day.
Chapter
10 3 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

The Ugly Head of Tribalism Sighted Again


(Thursday 13 November, 1997)

Once again the ugly head of tribalism has been sighted; once again it is
blamed on the wrong causes; and once again the wrong medicine is being
prescribed for a cure the proposed renaming of the eight provinces. Such a
move will further fan the supposed tribalism rather than eliminate it. Could
this move be a deliberate calculation, or be out of ignorance?
Those who are inclined to conspiracy theories suggest that, by activating
or reactivating tribalisms ugly head, the ruling party hopes to then claim
that it is the only party capable of dealing with such a problem at this point in
time, thereby gaining another lease in office. Daniel Arap Moi and his Kenya
African National Union have used this trick in Kenya.
On the other hand, there are those who say ZANU PF party is genuinely
looking for a cure of the tribalism ailment, and sincerely believes it has found
this cure in renaming the provinces. I will, for now, give the ZANU PF leadership
the benefit of the doubt, and accept that it is sincere. But it is sincerely mistaken.
Accordingly, it should be forgiven, because, in my sons favourite biblical phrase,
they know not what they do. Nor am I going to proffer, at least not for now,
what I think is the solution to the problem of tribalism. But suffice to say I
believe that, properly handled, the ugly head of tribalism is beautiful.
But for now, let us follow the logic of the suggested approach in the hope of
shedding some light where it is dark.
I am from Chipinge, but I have lived in Harare for 22 years and have no
intentions of relocating. If I dont go to Heroes Acre, put my remains at
Warren Hills, not Chipinge! I love Harare. Harare has been good to me. In
chiZezuru, Harare means one who does not sleep. The name comes from a
Zezuru chieftain who resided in the Kopje area; the man couldnt sleep,
guarding his domain from enemy attacks. I love both the sound and connotation
of the name Harare, particularly the r sound, ra...re, dont you? However,
I might consider relocating if Harare changes its name to City One, or the
letters of the alphabet A,B,C .., or some such presumed tribally neutral
nomenclature.
In this context, Bulawayo would change to what? To City Two or City
B, I suppose. All our cities changing names because of their supposed tribal

10
The Ugly Head of Tribalism Sighted Again 11

connotations! Already one senses tension creeping in over the numerical ranking
and alphabetical order just suggested! What would the neutral names for Gutu,
Chinhoyi, Buhera, Tsholotsho, Lalapansi, etc, be, including the Zvimba
district? What would we rename our already renamed streets to make them
tribally innocuous? The Robert Gabriel Mugabe Highway would probably
become Highway One. Zvigotisvitsepi? (And where would this lead us?)
Indeed, such logic would get us to the very name of our country Zimbabwe! It
is decidedly Shona. If the logic that names are the cause of tribalism be
accepted, shall we then concoct a tribally neutral name for the country? What
shall that be? Moreover, Masvingo in chiKaranga means ruins, the
Zimbabwe Ruins. So what, if it is? Does Masvingo province cease being
where Zimbabwe got its name because it is renamed Southern province?
Shona or Karanga, the names Zimbabwe and Masvingo are as fair names
as any; sound them, they both become the mouth. But above all, they connote
a past that we are proud of.
Indeed, the nomenclatural logic would take us to our very names, for we all
have tribal names; they betray what tribe we are, even the white tribe. Do we
also need to acquire tribally neutral names in the new nomenclatural
dispensation? What would the new Sithole be? Sitholensky, I suppose! But
the Polish might object, raising the ugly head of racism once again.
Yet others have even suggested that we should encourage cross-marriages
and cross-breeding of names for our children such that a typically Manyika
name such as Tonderayi could be used by families in Masvingo, Matabeleland,
etc, and the name Thokozile could be as common in Mashonaland as the
name Nyasha would also be in Ndebele families. That way, goes the joke,
there is a possibility of one day having in Mash West a Robert Zvobgo and
in Masvingo an Eddison Mugabe!. In this scenario, the president of Zimbabwe
might have been President Zvobgo from Mash West. But would President
Robert Zvobgo be any different from President Eddison Mugabe, I wonder?
There is a change of name, to be sure!
What I am trying to say is that it is in our behaviour and attitude towards
each other and towards the different regions that we should focus our attention
not in changing the names of provinces, districts, streets, towns or ourselves.
If people in a particular region feel cheated from the independence dividend
they will not stop feeling that way merely because their province is now called
Western, Eastern, Southern, or whatever. I dont want to quote the Nigerian
experience, it is too far. Zambia next door tried the geographical nomenclature
and failed. How is it possible that we now hope to cure the same ailment with
12 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

the same failed medicine? Might the reasoning be that ours will succeed because
it is home-grown? How preposterous!
The following story will suffice: On leaving Harares Machipisa Tavern at
night, a drunken man dropped his dollar coin on the way to his house.
MuSamaria Akanaka (a Good Samaritan) came by and tried to help him look
for it. After some time in vain, the Good Sam decided to ask: Where did you
drop the coin? Over there, said the drunken man, pointing in the dark.
But why are you looking for it here? he asked. The man looked at the street
lamp and said: But this is where there is light!
Changing the names of provinces could be where there is light, but the
solution to tribalism, like the coin, is elsewhere. Self-indulgence, corruption
and preoccupation with trivia are signs of a ruling class tired of ruling. Asi
maneta nokutonga? Selidhiniwe ngokubusa? (Are you tired of ruling?). Leave
the names alone please!
Chapter 4 are More Equal than Others
Some Comrades 13

Some Comrades Are More Equal Than


Others
(Thursday 20 November, 1997)

By the way, I also qualify for the fund. I am trained and deadly lethal
zvamunondiona kudai (as you see me)! But I am not applying till the whole
question of participation in the liberation struggle is properly settled. But then,
again, if it is properly settled there will be no need for applying. A genuine
thank you will be good enough because the fight for freedom is priceless; its
reward is freedom itself. But lets leave such philosophical concerns for, perhaps,
a later contribution.
For now, I disagree with those who say mujibhas and chimbwidos (male
and female war collaborators) should be excluded from the fund, or given
secondary priority. Nor should the contribution of the former political restrictees,
detainees and prisoners be secondary.
Putting primacy in being militarily trained is missing a fundamental point
about the Zimbabwe liberation war, a guerrilla war. If the truth be told, the
liberation war would not have been won without the mujibhas and chimbwidos.
We would still be in Dar-es-Salaam, Maputo, Botswana and Lusaka, no matter
how many years of military training we received.
In fact, no guerrilla war is successful without the participation of war
collaborators. This is universally true. They are the eyes, ears as well as the
muscle of all guerrilla wars in that, literally, on their backs and shoulders are
carried the heavy weapons and supplies that are used by the trained men
and women. In fact, this was the fatal mistake of the military disaster that was
the Sinoia Battle in 1966, and many failed battles until 1969 when the
ZANU Dare reChimurenga, under the leadership of the late Herbert Chitepo,
suspended operations to review the failed militaristic approach and adopted a
more political approach that involved local communities in the war. Two years
after, in 1972, the Rhodesians were fighting a new type of war, the type that,
to borrow Edgar Tekeres favourite phrase, they didnt have a ghost of a
chance of winning.
The conveyor belts (the mujibhas and chimbwidos) between the community
and the militarily trained had now been built. Without this link, the war couldnt

13
14 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

have been won, notwithstanding the three months minimum training. Everyone
who took part in and experienced the war knows this to be true.
Conventional wars depend largely on the superiority of weaponry and trained
personnel, man for man, and woman for woman. In guerrilla warfare, its a
different ball game. Simple people, but with a lot of common sense, have won
wars on their bare feet. We saw it in the Chinese revolution; we saw it in
Vietnam; we saw it in Mozambique; we saw it in Angola; we saw it in Namibia;
and we saw it here in Zimbabwe. With their crude hoes, the war collaborators
dug holes and planted the lethal zvimbambaira (potatoes/landmines)! They
observed enemy troop movements, drinking and resting habits, for that surgical
ambush. These are the men and women who, today, we must either forget -
or consider later when there is nothing left for them in the fund! One appreciates
the argument that to include the mujibhas and chimbwidos in the fund opens
up a Pandoras Box. Indeed, the liberation war, in one way or another,
involved many more people than combatants, mujibhas and chimbwidos. In
fact, the war involved the entire nation.
So, do we reward everybody? Why not? But the problem is: We are too
poor to reward everybody. That is the crux of the matter. We are a poor
country. But I would have thought the best reward for everybody was to have
achieved majority rule. That should have settled the matter. In fact, it is the
differential treatment that might open up the Pandoras Box.
Former detainees, etc, have organised themselves as a pressure group; the
mujibhas and chimbwidos are organising themselves into a pressure group
(and they have a case!); victims of protected villages (keeps); Gukurahundi
victims; widows of heroes; etc - until we become a nation of pressure groups!
Maybe we should! It pays, if the victory of the War Veterans Association is
anything to go by! Basically, we are witnessing the politics of poverty amid
plenty, apparently plenty for the political class. My contention is that, if it was
a shared poverty, it would not generate so much tension. But poverty in
Zimbabwe is characterised by two tendencies: Vamwe havana chokudya;
vamwe vanotengerwa dzimota mbiri mbiri, yemu Harare neyeruzevha.
Dzigoti ngadzidhure motokari dzacho! (Some dont have anything to eat;
others have two cars bought for them, one for use in Harare and the other for
the rural areas. All expensive cars!) Such differentials are bad enough even if
the cars were bought with personal money; but they are bought with public
funds from an overtaxed citizenry.
I maintain that the outcome of the political war now being waged against
the forgetful political class will be decided by which side (between the war
Some Comrades are More Equal than Others 15

veterans and the political class) does not forget the mujibhas and chimbwidos
and, indeed, which side does not forget the people. This forgetfulness, to me,
is the fundamental cause of the current strife between the political class and
the war veterans. Most people in this country (not only the veterans) are having
it rough; they are hurting; they feel cheated over the independence dividend.
If the country was prosperous, tese tichidya tichiguta (all of us with enough to
eat), there would not be this Hunzvi this and Hunzvi that!
So, the bottom line is this. The war veterans should look at the total picture.
Their plight is the plight of the common people who have been left out of the
independence dividend. If they (veterans) feel that they alone have been
singled out for the raw deal by the forgetful political class, that perception is
wrong. On the other hand, if the political class thinks Chenjerai Hunzvi haanzvi
(is naughty) and is telling and organising the former combatants to do the
wrong things to them, that perception is equally mistaken. Remember that,
only yesterday, Ian Smith was ruling over the most peaceful African in the
world but for Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and the
communists!
Some time in 1987, the then perceptive Prime Minister Robert Mugabe,
observing the restlessness of the masses, once said: The people feel betrayed.
They are after our blood. The answer was the Sandura Commission (which
probed a motor vehicle scandal involving senior politicians). In 1997, 10 years
after, the masses are again restless. Is President Mugabe still as perceptive?
What could the masses be after this time? Which part of our body, I wonder?
Is the Chidyausiku Commission the answer? Maybe, maybe not.
How can history repeat itself so soon and so readily? The white ruling
class, in pomp and splendour, went on with its life of plenty, oblivious of the
fact that we also wanted to share in the good life. As long as the poverty in
our country is not shared between the people and their leaders, the people
shall demand a share in the conspicuous wealth that the post-independence
ruling class now enjoys. Moreover, the people shall expect a lift (at least in
the other car) going to the communal lands. Otherwise the two vehicles risk
being burned.
I am not inciting anything. I am only recalling what happened in similar
circumstances in the past. The hope is that we correct something that has
gone fundamentally wrong with the revolution and in our society before we
are overtaken by events. The present Animal Farm philosophy that all
comrades are equal, but some comrades are more equal than others will no
longer do.
Chapter
16 5 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

The Fight for Freedom has no Price


(Thursday 27 November, 1997)

There is no doubt in my mind that most of those who have been rewarded the
most in our country made the least sacrifice during the liberation struggle and
they are neither the former combatants nor liberation war collaborators. I can
name them one by one, but what is the use? Munovaziva. Liyabazi. (You know
them). I honesty dont begrudge them, and I think no one should. They are
lucky. Thats all. Even nature is unfair. But we should, as a people, take exception
to a situation where those who have been lucky and are in positions of public
responsibility neglect the welfare of the majority in pursuit of selfish interests.
There should be a qualitative difference for the better between minority white
settler rule and black majority rule. Otherwise there is no justification for the
suffering and sacrifice during the struggle.
More importantly, as I wrote in this column last week, in the liberation war
such we as fought, too many sacrificed too much that any system of material
rewards would not make any sense and a genuine thank you, as we took
good care of the maimed and destitute, would have been the more appropriate
course of action for our nation. This would be an obligation, not a reward. You
cant reward a freedom fighter; you can reward mercenaries; the fight for
freedom is priceless; the reward to a freedom fighter is freedom itself. The
only reward for a freedom fighter is not abusing what he or she fought for.
In our context, where many really suffered and sacrificed a lot, any reward
system would be divisive and should not be attempted. In fact, it should be
stopped. It leads nowhere but to conflict where brother hates brother; sister
hates sister; and comrade hates comrade. Even the chefs will begin to suspect
each others intentions. Zvokupanana mari izvi (This thing of giving each other
money) is simply not on; its leading us to common ruin.
A wrong way of doing the right thing ends in wrong results. I believe that
we have made a mistake in the way we have handled the issue of liberation
heroes and war veterans. We have made two basic mistakes. First, by treating
liberation heroes and war veterans as a party concern, we have reduced their
national significance. Secondly, the manner in which the decision to reward
former combatants was made is fundamentally wrong and must be corrected.

16
The Fight for Freedom has no Price 17

On the first concern, I understand applicants for the fund were being asked
whether they were still active members of the party, which cell or branch
they belonged to, and all sorts of questions, during the vetting exercise. The
practice elsewhere where war veterans are taken seriously: they dont ask
whether you are a Republican or Democrat, in the case of the United Sates;
Conservative or Labour, in the case of Great Britain; Christian Democratic
Union member or Social Democrat, in the case of Germany; etc, as well as
minor parties in between. Moreover, the vetting of war veterans in these
countries is confined to a non-partisan bureaucracy and not to party officials
at party district offices.
In our case, what should have been a national issue was turned into a party
affair. The vetting should have been done by the Zimbabwe National Army
(ZNA) through the Ministry of Defence, not the party. The party (all the parties,
for that matter) should only have assisted the ZNA and the Ministry of Defence
in the vetting process when invited to so. We want to believe the ministry has
the more accurate records of former combatants on all sides. The British officers
who were tasked to create the ZNA must have been given three fairly accurate
lists by the former Rhodesian, ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders in 1980.
The ministry should also have an accurate list of names of those in these
three military outfits who were absorbed into the national army, as well as
those who were demobilised. In fact, the ministry does have these records. Ko
pati yabvanepizve? (Why does the party come in?). This vetting 17 years later
at party offices, asking improper questions, was improper. It cannot escape
being abused.
For the veterans themselves, what happens when ZANU PF is no longer
in power, and another party has taken over? What prevents that party from
having another round of vetting? Even if ZANU PF were to stay in power for
another 17 years, liberation war veterans are not ZANU PF war veterans;
they are veterans of the national liberation struggle.
Moreover, many young men and women took part in the struggle because
of its national character, not its party character. That they were directed by
ZANU PF does not necessarily make them members of that party. Even if they
were, the people on whose behalf they fought were not all ZANU PF; certainly
not now. Let us disabuse ourselves of the anachronistic idea that the party,
any party, is the nation. The nation cannot be equated to a party. Party cadres
are of necessity very few. Moreover, most people dont belong to parties; they
have seasonal political preferences.
18 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

Therefore, as an interest group, the Liberation War Veterans Association


is making a mistake by identifying itself as a ZANU PF outfit. By being partisan,
they are sacrificing long-term interests for short-term gains. As a national
association, they should position and conduct themselves in such a way that
they can protect the interests of their membership regardless of which party is
in power. Essentially, the Liberation War Veterans Association should be a
national rather than party outfit. War veterans in most countries have a national,
not party, outlook and character. The prevailing thinking that assumes that
ZANU PF is in power permanently is very narrow and short-sighted indeed.
The second point concerns the manner in which the decision to pay out
the $50 000 lump sum and $2 000 monthly pension was made. Even if the
fiscus had the money, wasnt this undertaking supposed to be taken to the
Zimbabwe Parliament for debate and authorisation? Moreover, I understand
the President is the patron of the Liberation War Veterans Association. Did
the association not take advantage of this relationship in striking this deal?
What happens to us in the Zimbabwe Political Science Association and other
associations which dont have His Excellency as patron? Invite him to be patron?
For every association in the country? Maybe the President should stay out of
local associations until he is a private citizen.
But more fundamentally, one has the feeling that the President acted, or is
acting, under duress from this association. If this is true, then both the President
and the Liberation War Veterans Association must do some soul-searching,
and we, as citizens of this country, must do even more. What we, as a people,
suffered and sacrificed for is too precious. It cant be left to the President and
the Liberation War Veterans Association alone.
Chapter 6 Abandoned the People
War Vets have 19

War Vets have Abandoned the People


(Thursday 4 December, 1997)

I am somewhat a philosopher in that I believe that philosophical truths, or


principles, or values, should guide our actions as much as possible, either as
individuals or communities and as a nation. Not to say I am oblivious of the
reality of selfish interests. Of course, I am aware of self-interests. But I believe
that self-interests should not be sought in isolation from community and national
interests. In pursuit of self-interests, we are losing collective values and goals
that guided us in the past, values and goals in pursuit of which many of our
dear ones lost leg and limb and their very lives. Unless we begin to question
ourselves, in the spirit of self-criticism and in the hope of doing better, we risk
losing what we fought for. A nation which does not periodically subject itself to
a critical appraisal of its cherished principles and values runs the risk of
destroying itself. Without principles and values we are without character and
integrity as a people.
Zimbabwe is on the brink of losing national integrity. Once we lose it
completely, regaining it could take quite some time. There is in our country
today a growing and disconcerting feeling that there is too much mazvake
mazvake (individualism). There is a wild chase after individual and group
interests that we no longer know who we are and where we are going. I
recently overheard a fellow citizen lament: We have suddenly become a nation
of mercenaries. If nobody will say it, I will say it. Take the former liberation
war veterans, for example. They are fighting for themselves as a group, and
not for anybody else. They know full well that the average man and woman in
our country is also suffering. But, like the political class, the former freedom
fighters have abandoned the people for sectional interests.
They, as freedom fighters in the 1970s, fought with and for the people;
today, there is nothing in their programme for the people, absolutely nothing
at all. Its like they are fighting for inclusion in the political class. They have
forgotten the rest of the people. Do the veterans intend to address the needs
of the common people after they get their piece of the pie, I wonder? They
are literally forcing the President and Parliament to raise taxes on an already
overtaxed people in order for them to gain as a section of society when they
should have been fighting for a decrease in the tax burden on the people. It is

19
20 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

this moral deficit that is most disturbing. The cost to the President and his
party of this public insensitivity has yet to come.
My contention is that, they too (like the political class) are losing sight of
the plight of the rest of the people. These are concerns we should put forward
to them, if they still care. As a people we should never forget what we went
through together. This is how we build a nation.
But the more important philosophical question is: Does Zimbabwe have
any cherished values or ideals anymore as a nation? What are they? The
leadership of our country once had a leadership code against which it wanted
the people of this country and the world at large to judge them.
What happened to that leadership code? When he got worried about
corruption in the top echelons of the ruling party and government in the
1980s, President Robert Mugabe once wearily asked: If gold can rust, what
will iron do? Ikozvino VaMugabe vangoti mwiro-o-o! (Today Mugabe is dead
silent!).
The leadership code has long fizzled out; it has been forgotten. We no
longer hear similar concerns with cherished values. Could it be that we no
longer have them? Do our leaders care any more? If the comrades have joined
them, who else is left? Or the new and beautiful ones will have to be born? Is
anything the matter? Do you as citizens care? What are you saying? Or muri
kuti: Tingaiteyi zvedu isu vanaMarweyi!? (Or, you are saying: What can
Nobodies like us do?). Start complaining to the President and your MPs; it is
good for our country. After all they still want your vote.
When we were socialists we seemed preoccupied with values and ideals,
notwithstanding our shortcomings. We at least had a vision, though a very
mistaken one. But since market forces took hold of us, we seem to have
forgotten everything and everybody but ourselves as individuals. The vision
has become focused on ourselves as individuals. We have become possessed
with self-interest that it has become pathological.
But the ideology of market forces has its leadership code, too. The problem
is that, in the excitement of our newly found ideology, socialists such as we
were, we have not taken the trouble to grasp the capitalist leadership code.
As a result we are moving in all sorts of directions, doing and saying all sorts of
things that are even harmful to our interests.
I suggest we revisit the leadership code with a view to setting a new code of
conduct and guiding principles in the new capitalist dispensation. And I doubt
if it would be substantially different from the previous leadership code in its
demand for public accountability. In fact, there would be no difference. Let us
War Vets have Abandoned the People 21

be governed by principles that are publicly known once more. It is my contention


that the leadership code would work today, given the new market forces
ideology. There is today in our country a frightening and widening public
trust gap between the leadership and the people which, if left unarrested,
could have disastrous consequences. Public trust between the leaders and the
people glues a nation together; in its absence things begin to fall apart. This is
what happened in many countries in Africa, including the former Zaire, where
Mobutu Sese Seko drained the ficus maintaining himself and those he thought
would keep him in power permanently. Moreover, let us not forget that Mobutu
himself was manipulated by a narrow clique and comrades around him to
common ruin. We cant blame Mobutu alone. He is also a victim of those
around him. Let us heed that lesson.
But what many an African leader forgets is that it is only the people who
can permanently keep a leader in power, and often, in their wise wisdom,
the people would not keep a leader in power permanently. Kutonga madzoro
(Governance is taking turns). There is need to restore public trust in the political
leadership. Does it still have the capacity and energy for self-renewal and
rejuvenation, or has it run its course? Is the country due for a new leadership,
inside the party or outside it? These are the questions we, as a people, have to
be asking ourselves. We have an obligation to ask and answer them for ourselves
and for posterity.
It appears that what was gold has turned to iron and rusted. Or were we
mistaken that it was gold? I believe it was gold, but that gold has rusted. This is
the price for staying in power too long. Ultimately, even gold rusts.
Chapter
22 7 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

Collapse of ZANU PFs Authoritarian Rule


(Thursday 11 December, 1997)

Some will be disappointed in that they would have expected me to comment


on the ZANU PF event of last weekend in Mutare. But I think the only significant
thing that happened in Mutare was the stopping of the unpopular and unfair
war veterans levy. Stopping it was tactically very prudent, although it was
equally very sloppy to have let things go that far (I dont mean going as far as
Mutare!). Let us watch how the government will source the money from other
sources. Maybe our government will discover, in the process, a formula that
could also alleviate the plight of the majority of our citizens who are also
suffering.
Today, I decided, instead, to write about a larger process in which this
event is a part the process of the erosion of authoritarianism. I think this
would be more helpful for appreciating imminent change in our society today.
This is the first of a three-part contribution.
In a seminal essay, the distinguished scholar of democratic transitions Alfred
Stepan has suggested that we should focus less on the final collapse of
authoritarian regimes than on the incremental process of authoritarian erosion
and the oppositions contribution to it. More specifically, says Stepan, there
are five groups whose dynamic relationships must be understood in an
authoritarian regime and its transition to democracy. These are:

The core supporters of the regime;


Those in charge of the coercive apparatus that maintains the regime
in power;
The regimes passive supporters;
The regimes active opponents; and
The regimes passive opponents.

The first group is composed of the civilian supporters, who have a siege
mentality. They will see opposition as a clear and present danger to their
interests, however these are defined. This group will actively support repressive
measures against the opposition.

22
Collapse of ZANU PFs Authoritarian Rule 23

The second group, the military and security officers, will tend to strongly
identify the interests of their organisations with those of the political regime.
They may even conclude that national security positively requires that they run
the government. Stepans third group, the passive supporters, is the more
numerous and will submit to authoritarian hegemony under the weight of the
first two groups.
Constituting the middle classes, they will remain quiescent and pliable,
and may even be used by a cohesive and self-confident authoritarianism
during its heydays.
The remaining two groups belong to the regimes detractors the opposition.
Among these, the activists will be very small and virtually paralysed and
demobilised by the massive coercive force the regime is willing to use against
them. Most in the first three groups, particularly the third, shun association
with activist members of the opposition. These opposition members are often
avoided by their friends in the third group who often go the other direction to
avoid eye contact on the street or in the supermarket!
Once the fear that bolsters the regime begins (for whatever reason) to
subside, however, all the groups listed above will be found thinking and acting
differently. The core group will start to fragment. There will be frequent cracks
in elite cohesion, some breaking permanently. Others will decide that the
perpetuation of authoritarianism is not in their interest and will go over to the
opposition. Such a shift signals a new-found appreciation of democracy as a
peaceful and predictable method for settling social and political conflicts.
Given the decisions among core supporters to withdraw their support, the
military and police resolve, too, may weaken. Some among them will then
come to suspect that continued military support of an increasingly despised
regime (as in Ceausescus Romania or Mobutus Zaire) may be inimical to the
interests of the military and police as national institutions, or it just doesnt
make sense any more.
Even the securitate outfits (those who are paid to get angry on behalf of
the president) begin to lose some of the earlier enthusiasm. Their loyalty begins
to be shared between the president and opposition personalities inside as well
as outside the presidents party. Thus, classified political information begins to
leak and soon it floods the political market place, creating somewhat conditions
of equal access.
At these signs of weakening among the forces of authoritarianism, most of
the passive supporters will quickly shift to passive opposition. It may also be
expected that parts of key groups such as the clergy and the intellectuals
24 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

generally will place themselves under the banner of active opposition. They
dont have to avoid anyone on the streets and supermarkets! In fact, they
might even provoke conversation about mamiriro ezvinhu, umumo wezinto,
(the state of affairs).
With their ranks bolstered by growing defections from authoritarianism,
the active regime opponents will find their days of paralysis at an end. The
passive opposition will multiply as people no longer fear savage repression.
Passive opponents will also lose their passivity and coalesce and expand to the
point where the idea of redemocratisation wrests hegemony away from
authoritarianism.
Finally, and more importantly, Stepan suggests that authoritarian regimes
are more likely to collapse under the strain of conflicts and contradictions that
are purely internal to the regime itself, though exacerbated by an opposition
that offers itself as the democratic successor regime.
The question is: Does this make any sense for Zimbabwe? Is authoritarianism
in Zimbabwe eroding? How are the five groups behaving? Have the regimes
core supporters withdrawn their support? I would say they have; what do the
incredible levels of apathy since the 1990 elections indicate? With the
exception of Gukurahundi (Fifth Brigade) excesses during the establishment
and consolidation of authoritarianism in the 1980s, the Zimbabwe military
has remained aloof in domestic politics, preoccupied with politics in the
international arena as directed by the Prince. They havent suffered
unacceptable losses in their international expeditions (at least not yet!).
The police have been in sporadic running battles with civil society since the
late 1980s but their conduct since the 1990s indicates that this institution is
becoming more professional and even-handed in partisan politics
(notwithstanding Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuris latest warning to
the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions to call off a planned national strike
that took place nevertheless!). Those who are paid to get angry on behalf of
the President (the CIO Central Intelligence Organisation) are also becoming
less angry. At least they are more discrete about how they go about doing
their secret work. In the 1980s takaona nhamo nokuratidzwa macards from
the Prime Ministers or Presidentss Office kuti titye, nomumabhawa,
nomumabhawa! (We had it hard being shown cards . . . so that we get frightened,
even in pubs!). Today, even the opposition can boast of contacts in the CIO!
After serving its purpose, ZANU PFs authoritarianism is eroding. It has run its
course. This is as it should be.
Next week we look at the opposition. What are its prospects? Is the
opposition ready to take over?
The Tasks of8Democratic Opposition
Chapter 25

The Tasks of Democratic Opposition


(Thursday 18 December, 1997)

Besides the dynamic relationship among the five groups in an authoritarian


regime (see Public Eye, December 11), Stepans seminal essay outlined five
tasks for the opposition in eroding an authoritarian regime: a) resisting
integration into the regime; b) guarding zones of autonomy against it; c) disputing
its legitimacy; d) raising the cost of authoritarian rule; and e) creating a credible
democratic alternative. The more effective the regimes control of the polity
the less the opposition is able to carry out these five tasks. This normally
occurs during the heydays of authoritarian rule. But once the regimes elite
cohesion begins to crack, its grip on the polity also weakens.
Resistance to integration is the sine qua non for an opposition to an
authoritarian regime. If the cadre of the active opposition allows itself or is
forced to be effectively demobilised and co-opted into authoritarian structures
and institutions, the active opposition for the time being at least - will cease
to exist. On the other hand if the active opposition guards zones of autonomy
by maintaining some independent institutional existence, it will remain able
to carry out its other functions.
Main opposition in Zimbabwe at, and immediately after, independence
came mainly from whites and PF-ZAPU who together initially had a total of
40 seats in the then 100-member Parliament. By the use of the carrot
(reconciliation), the stick (gukurahundi) and constitutional manipulation (mainly
Constitutional Amendment No 7 of 1987), ZANU PF gained and maintained
hegemony for the better part of the 1980s. Both the whites and PF-ZAPU
were co-opted and integrated into the ZANU PF regime, thus losing some
of their independent institutional existence.
Only ZANU Ndonga was able to persistently resist integration and guard
its zones of autonomy in Chipinge, although many of its middle classes and
intellectuals were co-opted into the ZANU PF regime. But my view is that, had
the stick (gukurahundi) been used there as it was in Matabeleland, the Ndau
people would also have failed to guard their zone of autonomy. Moreover, the
ZANU PF regime did not try the carrot method and with enough savvy, and in
the manner applied to the PF-ZAPU leadership.

25
26 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

It is common knowledge, however, that many in the white communities


and among the Ndebele and, alas, even among the Shona, never quite accepted
integration and co-option into the ZANU PF authoritarian institutional
structures. Moreover, total elimination of all opposition requires extremely
effective mobilisation and the full integration of all institutions and social groups
into the structures of a regime. This is a project of surpassing difficulty at
which no modern authoritarian government has ever succeeded, from Hitler
to Stalin, or from Ceausescu to Mengistu, let alone countries with even less
capacity. Even if total integration and co-option were to be achieved, it can
only be temporary because authoritarianism is a pathology against which
humankind has a tendency to always rebel.
Initially, the ZANU PF regime had enlisted the ZCTU (Zimbabwe Congress
of Trade Unions) and other civil society organisations into its authoritarian
structures or induced them into giving the regime acquiescent support,
particularly with the patriotic excitement of independence. But progressively,
we see a reclaim of independent existence and jealous guarding of zones of
autonomy and, more importantly, the questioning of the legitimacy of the
ZANU PF regime itself. We also see the proliferation of infiltrated political
parties and the rise of the independent candidates phenomenon typified by
Margaret Dongo who created and is hawkishly guarding zonal autonomy in
the Harare South constituency as she harasses ZANU PF hegemony in
neighbouring areas. These formations and civil society in general are saying
ZANU PF rule is no longer legitimate.
More importantly, civil society, in the absence of a strong takeover political
party, has been raising the cost of the ZANU PF authoritarian rule. Witness
the anti-corruption demonstrations by students that began in the late 1980s;
the ZimRights protest march in November 1995; the unprecedented two-
week-long civil service strike of September 1996; and, ultimately, the nationwide
demonstration of December 9 1997 in which the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
joined hands in questioning the legitimacy of practices and policies that had
run out of hand. This was truly the mother of all demonstrations! Even
Home Affairs Minister Dumiso Dabengwa was quoted (although he later denied
it) as praising the people for shaking those who are in the corridors of power
as long as they did this peacefully! Yet Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri
and others saw this mother of all demonstrations differently, as the work of
white employers bent on mischief against the state for designating their land.
Another incipient rupture in intra-elite cohesion? I wonder!
The Tasks of Democratic Opposition 27

But, veduwe-e-e! For how long shall we continue blaming veganda jena
(white people) for our own mistakes? Were they there when we made a private
deal with the war veterans association to pay them from unauthorised public
funds? I suppose it was the white people who made us defraud the war veterans
fund, in the first place! I suppose it was the white people who opposed the
infamous five percent levy in Parliament, and who again unanimously opposed
it at the ZANU PF consultative meeting in Mutare!? I suppose all employers in
Harare and the rest of this country are white and can still tell us what and what
not to do. We could have stayed in our homes when white people gave us a
day off, with full pay! But we chose otherwise. As for me, I employ two people
whom I told they could take a day off. I myself was on the streets by 9:00 am.
I wasnt told to go there by my white employer, Professor Graham Hill.
Musamupa mhosva mwana wavanhu! (Please dont accuse him in this
connection!). Ndakazviindira ndoga asingazive! (I went there even without his
knowledge!). We dont have to be told by a white man that we are heavily
taxed and that the price of commodities is too high. It is the government that
taxes us.
A mammoth opposition alternative is right around the corner, and could
either come from ZANU PF itself or result from forces outside it. We take a
look at this scenario in the next issue. But for now, I want to plead with our
leaders to please start taking us seriously and stop this racist nonsense you use
at your convenience. Its not funny any more.
Chapter
28 9 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

Creating A Democratic Alternative


(Thursday 8 January, 1998)

Many have lamented the fact that, notwithstanding the proliferation of political
parties in the Zimbabwe polity, particularly since 1990, Zimbabwe lacks a
strong opposition party with a capacity to take over from a beleaguered and
increasingly unpopular ZANU PF.
If the point I was trying to make in the last two contributions in this column
(December 11 and 18 1997) was understood, it should be clear by now why
opposition parties in Zimbabwe have, thus far, been very weak, and also why,
in the erosion of authoritarianism, prospects for a viable takeover opposition
party should now be more than bright. ZANU PF co-opted, castrated and
incapacitated opposition parties by its hitherto intolerant and commandist
behaviour toward its opponents. This authoritarianism has now basically run
its course. By the late 1980s ZANU PF had lost many of its core supporters
into the passive opponents category but which was still scared to identify
with the active opponents of the authoritarian regime.
It is simply not true that there was no opposition party with a coherent and
superior alternative programme to that of ZANU PF. The programmes of all
hitherto opposition parties made perfect democratic sense. It is only that capable
people had been too scared to either offer themselves for leadership in these
opposition parties or to form parties of their own. Moreover, coming up with
a coherently impressive party programme or manifesto should be very simple.
A party can hire a consultant or consulting firm to write a manifesto. To
identify with the active opposition was simply scary in the past. Today, everyone
(even in the ruling party) is positioning himself/herself to be the first to form
the next party! My contention is that the passive opponents of the regime
now constitute the majority and are in the transition to a new active majority.
A viable opposition party is, therefore, around the corner.
The redemocratisation of an authoritarian regime must combine erosion
and construction, advises the eminent scholar of democratic transitions Alfred
Stepan. He further suggests that the opposition should resist the temptation
to prematurely come up with a shadow cabinet or a government-in-
waiting. Instead, it should focus on procedural rather than substantive policy

28
Creating A Democratic Alternative 29

issues, which could divide it. Initially, all that opposition forces should
concentrate on is some kind of broadly agreed-upon formula for the conduct
of democratic contestations. They should concentrate on reaching a consensus
on a democratic constitution and about the electoral law which defines
the rules of the game and not about its results. To the extent that a democratic
constitution and fair democratic procedures would offer guarantees to the former
supporters of the authoritarian regime, such a constitution and procedures
would accord them the possibility of continuing to pursue their interests under
the new institutional arrangements proposed by the opposition. Moreover,
democratic proposals can come from some enlightened members of the regime.
Thus, to the extent that the regimes initial core supporters come to see
democratic contestation as a viable alternative, their fears concerning the costs
of democratic reform will diminish. By the same token, the growing power,
cohesiveness and aggressiveness of the forces of the democratic opposition
will boost the expected cost of repression, including the prospect that it might
ignite a revolutionary upheaval. We saw the potential of this in the December
1997 nationwide protest against unilateral taxation.
Moreover, as already mentioned, the active supporters of the authoritarian
regime and the members of the coercive elite themselves are often the major
agents of change. Crucial decisions favouring democratisation are usually made
by those who had previously been counted among the pillars of the authoritarian
regime, as in the case of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and in our
case, the liberation war veterans challenge, and the seeming awakening of a
once pliant and docile ZANU PF Parliament amid cracks in elite cohesion -
all pointing to the fact that the fight for democracy is everywhere, within and
outside the ruling party.
There will always be those within the authoritarian regime who will dig in
their heels and call for resistance to reform. I dont want to mention names;
you know them, including the Minister of Home Affairs and the Commissioner
of Police! (I mean, they also know the names of those who will dig in their
heels and resist reform!). But digging in is often a blind and futile exercise, ala
Ceausescu, Mengistu, Doe and, recently, Mobutu. Intense pressure from below
by the active opposition that has become the majority is almost always the
initial reason why liberalisation is contemplated. The expected consequences
of resisting such pressure figure heavily in the power struggle within the once
cohesive authoritarian elite and the ranks of its active supporters when they
make their final decision about democratisation or continued repression.
30 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

Historically, those who have opted for continued repression have been swept
away by the democratic storm. We see no valid reason why repression in
Zimbabwe should escape a similar fate.
If they are skilful enough and their timing is right, democratic forces within
the ZANU PF regime itself might capture the support of the emerging anti-
authoritarian majority, retire the old guard, and introduce a new glasnost and
perestroika. A deficit in such skills and foresight in forces from within could
well result in a democratisation led by a counter elite originating from outside
ZANU PF. What is noteworthy in this process, however, is that democracy is
being appreciated on both sides, thus increasing the possibility that we might
end up with viable political parties that are democratic, including ZANU PF
itself.
A crucially and strategically important reason for avoiding premature
shadow cabinets or governments-in-waiting in my view should be in order
to allow time for more talent to surface or emerge for inclusion in such
alternative shadow cabinets. Therefore, a hurried mammoth opposition party
not only risks infiltration by agents of the ruling party but, more importantly,
runs the risk of again attracting and insulating mediocrity in that party and
eventually in power. This to me is the more crucial consideration. The past
teaches us to be wary of this.
Moreover, a combination of democrats from both inside and outside ZANU
PF may well be the source of a more enduring redemocratisation process.
Therein lies the wisdom of not rushing the mammoth opposition party. It
must wait around the corner a while longer. The picture will be clearer as we
approach the elections of the years 2000 and 2002. But can the country wait
three or four more years in its present political and economic crisis? What
political crisis? What economic crisis? Let us discuss these concerns next week.
Chapter 10 Turning Point
1997 Zimbabwes 31

1997 Zimbabwes Turning Point


(Thursday 15 January, 1998)

A crisis has been defined as a turning point or a time of acute danger. Thus
defined, is Zimbabwe at a turning point and in acute danger? What turning
point, and what danger? Will we survive until the year 2000 and 2002 when
the leaderships mandate is due for renewal? What must be done if we must
survive until then and beyond? These are the concerns of this weeks
contribution.
The year 1997 was Zimbabwes turning point, and it revealed that the
country is in acute danger. This was the year when, in an unprecedented
move, President Robert Mugabe was forced to accede to the demands of
former freedom fighters, a constituency crucial to the survival of his
commandist party; this was the year when, in another unprecedented move,
the Zimbabwe Parliament woke up from 17 years of sublime and shameful
slumber and said no to a chief executive who had privatised the exercise
of public office; this was the year when, in yet another unprecedented move,
the ruling ZANU PF party national assembly unanimously said no to its
president-and-first-secretary who appeared to have lost touch with
grassroots sentiment; this is the year when the land question aroused more
anxieties and the year when the Zimbabwe dollar became Zimkwacha, a
piece of paper, losing nearly 100 percent of its value overnight; and more
significantly, 1997 was the year when the Zimbabwe people, by the
nationwide demonstration against arbitrary taxation, rediscovered their
peoples power. What a year 1997 was! It was, without a doubt, a turning
point.
The country is in acute danger in that it is now being run by a leadership
and party that have lost popular support and therefore no longer have the
legitimacy to continue in office. The people have lost confidence in the
leadership. The mandate the President got from 31 percent of the
participating electorate during the 1996 presidential election is bound to
have appreciably thinned by now if the events of 1997 be considered seriously,
which they must.
The country is now being run by a leadership that has lost international
respect and credibility. There was a time when one could proudly say I am

31
32 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

from Zimbabwe in foreign lands and everybody listened. Today you would
have to say I am from South(ern) Africa to get someones serious attention,
even from fellow Africans who used to hold us in such owe and admiration.
We have become a laughing stock almost overnight. We have to hire help
from Zambia to oversee our airspace because we cant pay our own air
traffic controllers a living wage! There is in the country today a serious school
of thought suggesting that Zimbabwes present woes stem from the fact that
the country is now run by a top and therefore strategic leadership that no
longer has ideas of what it is doing, nor a vision of the future anymore.
Moreover, what vision remains in this leadership is incapable of going beyond
the liberation war. This is a function of static circulation of leadership and of
overstaying in power.
The average age of the top men who make and who have been making
the strategic decisions of the ruling party and for this country over the past
17 years is now 73 years. All mortals get exhausted; they get burned out;
literally, like candles, once they burn out, they need replacing.
Whatever energy remains in the present leadership will increasingly get
less and less, and whatever vision they still possess will become more and
more blurred. The countrys leadership has long reached its level of
incompetence and the process of the law of diminishing returns has
irreversibly been set in motion. According to this law, when human judgment
starts to be erratic it does not improve but worsens with deteriorating age.
Therefore, for this country to regain energy and vision, and go forward,
there is need for leadership rejuvenation. The aged leadership must be
replaced. This is not being unkind to our old Bolsheviks but merely coming
to terms with the reality that awaits us all.
There are three discernible political opinions or suggestions about the
way out of the present confidence crisis. The first is that President Mugabe
should dissolve Parliament and his Cabinet and call for early parliamentary
and presidential elections. We need a parliament and Cabinet with a new
mandate from the people if we are to overcome the current confidence
crisis. Amendments to make the constitution democratic would be an added
advantage and a booster.
The second body of opinion does not see the turning point and the
acute danger or crisis suggested above. Its proponents denounce such
suggestions as preposterous and alarmist. At worst, the suggestions of a
crisis are seen as mischievous, the work of white racists in collaboration
with people who never fought in the liberation war. This view sees things as
1997 Zimbabwes Turning Point 33

business as usual. Lets get to the year 2000 and 2002, and again the best
at the game will win!, says this view.
The third opinion is somewhat akin to the first in that it suggests that both
Parliament and the government should dissolve. The difference, however, is
that this view suggests that both the government and Parliament might have
to be forced to dissolve by the people in the most vulgar manner, as in another
nationwide strike against policies that rob Hunzvi to pay Masipula or is it the
other way round? Seriously, this view sees life in Zimbabwe getting worse and
worse by the day for the common person, who, incidentally, knows about the
second, business as usual, insouciant view. As in the past, civil society would
spearhead such mass action and it would certainly entail demands for a new
and democratic constitution.
Which view makes the most sense? The first scenario probably makes the
most democratic sense, and therefore is not likely to be considered seriously
by the ZANU PF fathers. While the second, insouciant view would be the most
attractive to the ruling party, it might be mellowed by the spectre of the third
scenario democratisation through mass action on the streets.
A fourth scenario might therefore be considered where President Mugabe
announces his early retirement and induces some of his elderly colleagues to
retire with him and leave the reins of power in capable young hands while they
advise the transition from the background. Something akin to the Julius Nyerere
scenario in Tanzania. Such a scenario would be in the interest of both his
party and the country. Moreover, some in the opposition and civil society
could be included in a rejuvenated grand coalition. Further, in this context, a
democratic constitution could still be introduced.
Something needs to be done to revamp the political system and confidence
in it. The second scenario is irresponsible in that it leads to the third, which is
certainly going to lead to what every sane person doesnt wish for this country-
the fifth scenario; that of persons in uniform sorting out our political problems.
And if they do, they have often not returned to the barracks.
We all have a stake in this country. Zano marairanwa.
Chapter
34 11 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

Common Sense is all Thats Needed


(Thursday 22 January, 1998)

I am not an economist, but I am told that you dont have to be one to balance
your payments; just common sense will do it. Neither does one have to be a
political scientist to be a politician, just common sense. In fact, just common
sense will do for about most if not all things in life.
Last weeks front cover story of our ambassadors earning bonanza salaries
(Financial Gazette, December 15) set me thinking of the African debt crisis
predicament and how we could begin to come out of it, if our debtors insist on
repayment, as they should. It is irresponsible not to repay ones debt, particularly
when one could.
Zimbabwe spends US$11 470 628 per annum on foreign missions salaries
alone. The rent could be phenomenal, even at those missions stationed in
Africa itself, given how we like to live in splendour, particularly when hurumende
ichibhadhara (the government is paying!) Presumably these missions facilitate
foreign trade. But this (foreign trade) is always skewed against us, nullifying
this justification for the missions. But most of this trade could be handled (and
more efficiently) by the private sector at no cost to the government. Moreover,
the foreign aid these missions are supposed to solicit for us is often given on
the strength of recommendations from the diplomats of the donor country
here in Harare and not on the basis of negotiating skills or the pleas of our
ambassadors abroad. Therefore, our public relations with foreign governments
for aid should be focused at home rather than in foreign capitals.
Were I President (not that I want to be, Your Excellency - I mean, me
being Your Excellency!), I would put more emphasis on the department of
tourism than on diplomacy in foreign missions. Yet this too could be done
more effectively and efficiently by the private sector at no cost to the
government. I would keep our best diplomats here at home instead of abroad
By here I mean here in Zimbabwe and here in Africa where relations
are debilitating.
That relations between us and the United States, Britain, France, Germany,
or countries outside the continent in general, are smooth is not the result of the
effectiveness of our emissaries to these countries but is a function of the political
maturity of those countries. Yet on the continent, relations are very bad.

34
Common Sense is all Thats Needed 35

Were I President, I would appoint our best and brightest as emissaries to


Burundi, Somalia, Liberia or Sudan. Do we have ambassadors in these troubled
countries, even minor names? (Not that I want either of these postings, God
forbid!). But, to serve its purpose, diplomacy must be focused on troubled
spots, because those that are whole need not a physician, but those that are
sick.
The Zimbabwe government has four presidents (one retired), 30 ministers,
six ministers of state, 14 deputy ministers, five supreme court judges, 16 high
court judges, eight governors, 17 permanent secretaries, 37 ambassadors,
one CIO (Central Intelligence Organisation) director, two CIO deputy directors,
one police commissioner, one deputy police commissioner, one army
commander, one air vice marshal, eight executives mayors, two vice-chancellors,
38 directors of parastatals, and others I am likely to have missed. Almost all of
these officials have government-owned Mercedes Benz cars.
These luxury cars cost the government approximately US$50 000 (Z$1
million) each; or we have a total of about 193 officials with government luxury
cars at a total cost of US10,158 million or Z$193 million. I understand the
average cost of maintaining these cars is US$10 000 or Z$200 000 each, a
total average maintenance cost of US$1,93 million or Z$38,6 million per
annum. How many schools or factories could the government build in a year
from Mercedes Benz maintenance savings alone? I understand the Cherokee
trucks from America have arrived, and defective at that!
Were I President, I would use my executive powers to order the sale of all
the 193 Mercedes Benz vehicles (except mine, of course!) and build an Institute
for Budgeting and Debt Reduction. The first intake would be my ministers
and permanent secretaries. What would my ministers, etc, drive in? Commuter
buses, of course! But on a serious note, the Toyota Cressida or Mazda 626 is
a comfortable car for any minister who is aware of the economic crisis in the
country. These cars are assembled here. In fact, this was the whole logic behind
Willowvale Motor Industries. Asi makanganwa?! (Have you forgotten?!).
Ambassadors could find a modest equivalent in the countries of their posting.
Moreover, Toyotas and Mazdas can be found in every country; they could be
shipped from Willowvale if that proved cost-effective.
In fact, public transport is often the most preferred and faster form of
transportation in most of these expensive capitals. Take the tube or subway,
Mr Ambassador; get to a station three blocks from Pennsylvania Avenue, then
take a cab, the State Department is only three to five minutes away. Ms Albright
wont know how you got there because you will be coming from an elevator.
36 Zimbabwe's Public Eye: Political Essays

Moreover, she might be sympathetic to your case if she knows your austerity
programme and donate a limo! I would order the embassies be shifted to more
affordable premises. As for the Cherokees, I would substitute them with the
trucks we assemble at Willowvale Motor Industries!
I was unable to find the figures on presidential trips abroad. How many are
they, and what is the cost per month? Common sense would suggest that the
cost is in millions per month. Were I President, I would stop these trips altogether
and concentrate on supervising my government in such a way that the national
insult of the war veterans fund fraud would not have occurred, and the dollar
would not have crashed, landing us into the present calamity.
Unmanaged and unsupervised, inevitably things fall apart. For those matters
that need closer attention, I would send my deputy if the foreign minister could
not handle the issue. Moreover, I would use scheduled commercial flights which
are plentiful and sometimes more reliable and comfortable. For holiday, I would
go to Chipinge! This year I could not go there because times are hard, Mr
President. These trips are costly; no wonder we remain poor and in an ever-
escalating foreign debt.
I am reminded of that song by the Temptations: Papa was a rolling stone
... and when he died, all he left us was alone, and with a loan! We risk leaving
our children the same legacy.
Chapter 12Sound and Fury But ...
Forum Full of 37

Forum Full of Sound and Fury But ...


(January 29, 1998)

This article concerns what transipired at last weeks Great Indaba on the
economy. Those who were there tell me speaker after speaker criticised His
Excellency while he set quietly.
We told him like it is said one participant. We did not pull any punches,
said another. Even the press created the impression that the President was
taken to task. They went to town on him and his ministers, said yet another
observer.
Professor Heneri Dzinotyiweyi chided the President for being out of touch
with what was happening on the ground. What particularly incensed him was
the fact that the President should have made no reference to the nationwide
demonstration of December 9 1997 in his state of the nation address to
parliament while people were being gassed outside the same parliament
building.
But, more important to the theme of the forum, Dzinotyiweyi made a
poignant point regarding the mismanagement of the economy, noting that,
if a company executive erred in the private sector or took decisions that
would go against corporate and public interest, he was immedietly fired. But
nothing is being done to make those in authority in the public sector
accountable, he lamented. The same point was made by other speakers,
particularly from the private sector, who were as concerned as Dzinotyiweyi
with creating a climate conducive for investments.
The colourful Fambainesu Warlord Chakaredza told the President to the
minister's faces: You are surrounded by deadwood! This, to His imperial
Highness, Munhumutapa 111, was the cause of the countrys many woes-
deadwood that surrounds the President.
The policy implications of all this advice is that if only the President could
get rid of erring executives (ministers), the deadwood that surrounds him,
we are home and dry; investor confidence would be restored; the country
would start moving again.
I beg to differ. The perception that the President was told like it is or that
participants pulled no punches is wrong, very wrong. They did not tell the
President like it is and they pulled the relevant punch. Take, for instance,

37
38 The "Public Eye" Political Essays

Dzinotyiweyis key and fundamental criticism about management style and the
consequences to executives who dont perform satisfactorily. What is critically
absent from an otherwise sound and pivotal advice for the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the corporation is what happens when the CEOs chronic
erratic decisions go against corporate and public interest? When nothing is
said in this scenario we are left with the impression that the CEO does not do
wrong, only his executives do, and when they do they should be fired, not
the CEO who hires and manages the erring executives.
May we take it that management science has not yet developed ways
and means of dealing with this type of problem - of a boss who commits costly
errors?! Is it not true that the performance and tone of corporate executives is
set by their boss? More importantly, is it not the case that changing the CEO
often alters the whole performance and outlook of the corporation? I know
the country is not a firm: it is much more than that; this is why we cannot
leave it in the hands of one man to do as he pleases.
Similarly, Chakaredzas deadwood thesis seems to suggest that the
centerpiece in the pile of deadwood is itself freshwood. This is the old
the President is ill-advised thesis which I find hard to believe. I honestly
believe that besides getting angry on behalf of the President, the Central
Intelligence Organization and the ministers give the President (when he is
available and wants it) accurate information and prudent advice most of the
time, otherwise he would fire them. This is precisely why he does not fire
them. They tell him the true facts on the ground and advise him to the
appropriate course of action. It is up to the President to ignore or heed them.
Therefore, Nathan Shamuyarira is right; they are in touch with what is
happening on the ground. The President is not ill-informed but rather he is
well informed. In fact, at times the President does not need anybody to tell
or to show him what is on the ground. He can see it for himself. He could not
have mistaken the demonstrations last December as he was driven to parliament
to have been a crowd just anxious to get a glimpse of his oversised motorcade!
So what am I saying? I am saying that the President knows what is happening
on the ground but chooses to ignore it-until he cannot ignore it anymore, or
until the pressure is such that he cannot afford to ignore it. Ala, the war
veterans. Not until they began demonstrating all over the place, storming party
heardquarters and holding up some chefs, threatening the stability of the party
and country, the President finally heed their plight. He could have cancelled
the state of the nation address or easily included the demonstrations in his
speech had he taken the peoples plight as seriously as he should.
Forum Full of Sound and Fury But ... 39

Up to now, he has not commented on the unprecedent nationwide protest


except to say it was the work of whites. Last week did not have to happen had
we not ignored the signals of the December protest demonstrations in the
manner we did. We ignored what the people were demonstrating about the
high cost of leaving-factor, not simply the five percent war veterans levy. A
little bit of sensitivity and attention would have prevented last weeks shocking
anger and behaviour of the people. In fact, the war veterans issue had been a
dead issue by the time of the December 9 demonstrations. The insouciant
attitude and flippant comments frustrated and angered hungry people. That is
the real force behind the uncharacteristic vandalism and looting of last week,
not tiny Munyaradzi Gwisai and the international socialist organization! By the
way, even the December protest would not have happened had appropriate,
responsive and sensitive steps been taken earlier.
There is a pattern here. Not until the war vets started being rude and life
threatening did somebody noticed them. Not before the people started being
rude and property-threatening did somebody noticed their plight. How long
can we continue like this? It is getting too costly.
But the most revealing aspect of the Great Indaba was when those who
are paid to get embarrassed for the President chased the press away as
participants chided the managers of the state. Not a word of protest was
heard, even from the gurus of transparency who were there! Colleagues, this
meeting should have ended there and then in protest. You should have walked
out when the custodians of transparency in public affairs, the press, were
kicked out.
To the extent then that those who were there did not tell the President that
he was the problem, and they did not take a principled stand on transparency
when the press was kicked out of the discussion (an innocuous discussion at
that!), the forum was full of sound and fury, but signifying nothing.
The President may have sized it to be such. I understand he did not turn up
in the afternoon. The lights that went off are just an excuse. His invited guests
continued pontificating in candle light without their host who the next day was
attending yet another economic forum in Kampala. Typical!
A rolling stone gathers no moss, they say.

Potrebbero piacerti anche