11/8/2016 LicarosvsLicaros:150656:April29,2003:J.

Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision

FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.150656.April29,2003]

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZLICAROS, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS,

respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO,J.:

TheCase

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] to annul the Decision[2] dated 9 August 2001 of the
CourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.58487,aswellastheResolutiondated23October2001denying
the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition to annul the following
decisions[3]renderedbyBranch143oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMakati:

(1)TheDecisiondated27December1990[4]grantingthedissolutionoftheconjugalpartnershipofgainsofthe
spousesAbelardoB.LicarosandMargaritaRomualdezLicaros

(2)TheDecisiondated8November1991[5]declaringthemarriagebetweenthesamespousesnullandvoid.

TheFacts

TheantecedentfactsasfoundbytheCourtofAppealsareasfollows:

xxxAbelardoLicaros(Abelardo,forshort)andMargaritaRomualdezLicaros(Margarita,hereafter)were
lawfullymarriedonDecember15,1968.OutofthismaritalunionwerebornMariaConcepcionandAbelardo,
Jr.Ironically,maritaldifferences,squabblesandirreconcilableconflictstranspiredbetweenthespouses,such
thatsometimein1979,theyagreedtoseparatefrombedandboard.

In1982,MargaritaleftfortheUnitedStatesandthere,tosettledownwithhertwo(2)children.IntheUnited
States,onApril26,1989,MargaritaappliedfordivorcebeforetheSuperiorCourtofCalifornia,CountyofSan
Mateo(Annex1,Rejoinder,pp.164165)whereshemanifestedthatshedoesnotdesirecounselingatthattime
(Quotation,p.166,Rollo).OnAugust6,1990,Margaritawasgrantedthedecreeofdivorce(Annex2,Answer,
p.108,Rollo)togetherwithadistributionofpropertiesbetweenherandAbelardo(pp.167168,Rollo).

Notlongafter,onAugust17,1990,AbelardoandMargaritaexecutedanAgreementofSeparationofProperties
(pp.6064,Rollo).ThiswasfollowedupbyapetitionfiledonAugust21,1990beforetheRegionalTrialCourt
ofMakatiforthedissolutionoftheconjugalpartnershipofgainsofthespousesandfortheapprovalofthe
agreementofseparationoftheirproperties.ThiswasdocketedasSpecialProceedingNo.2551.OnDecember
27,1990,adecisionwasissuedgrantingthepetitionandapprovingtheseparationofpropertyagreement.

Forhispart,onJune24,1991,AbelardocommencedCivilCaseNo.911757,forthedeclarationofnullityof
hismarriagewithMargarita,basedonpsychologicalincapacityundertheNewFamilyCode.AsMargaritawas
thenresidingat96MulberryLane,Atherton,California,U.S.A.,Abelardoinitiallymovedthatsummonsbe
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150656.htm 1/7
11/8/2016 LicarosvsLicaros:150656:April29,2003:J.Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision

servedthroughtheInternationalExpressCourierService.Thecourtaquodeniedthemotion.Instead,itordered
thatsummonsbeservedbypublicationinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationonceaweekforthree(3)
consecutiveweeks,atthesametimefurnishingrespondentacopyoftheorder,aswellasthecorresponding
summonsandacopyofthepetitionatthegivenaddressintheUnitedStatesthroughtheDepartmentofForeign
Affairs,allattheexpenseofAbelardo.Respondentwasgivensixty(60)daysafterpublicationtofilea
responsivepleading.

OnJuly15,1991,ProcessServer,MaximoB.DelaRosa,submittedhisOfficersReturnquotedhereunder:

OFFICERSRETURN

THISISTOCERTIFYthatonJuly3,1991,Ihaveservedacopyofsummonsandcomplaintwithannexes
togetherwithorderdatedJune28,1991issuedbytheCourtintheaboveentitledcaseupondefendantMargarita
RomualdezLicarosc/oDFA.(sentbyMail)thruPatG.MartinesreceivingClerkofDepartmentofForeign
AffairsapersonauthorizedtoreceivethiskindofprocesswhoacknowledgedthereceiptthereofatADBBldg.,
RoxasBlvd.,PasayCity,MetroManila.(p.40,Rollo)

Asrequiredbylaw,thecasewasreferredtoTrialProsecutorBruselas,Jr.tofindoutanypossiblecollusion
betweenthepartiesinthecase.Thereafter,withthenegativereportofcollusion,Abelardowasallowedto
presenthisevidenceexparte.OnNovember8,1991,theDecision(AnnexA,Petition)washandeddownin
CivilCaseNo.911757declaringthemarriagebetweenAbelardoandMargaritanullandvoid.

Almostnine(9)yearslater,onApril28,2000,thepetitionatbenchwascommencedwhenMargaritareceiveda
letterdatedNovember18,1991fromacertainAtty.AngeloQ.Valenciainformingherthatshenolongerhasthe
righttousethefamilynameLicarosinasmuchashermarriagetoAbelardohadalreadybeenjudiciallydissolved
bytheRegionalTrialCourtofMakationNovember8,1991.Asseveratingtohaveimmediatelymadesome
verificationsandfindingtheinformationgiventobetrue,petitionercommencedtheinstantpetitiononthe
followinggrounds:

(A)THEREWASEXTRINSICFRAUDINTHEPREPARATIONANDFILINGBYABELARDOOF
THEPETITIONFORDISSOLUTIONOFTHECONJUGALPARTNERSHIPOFGAINSAND
ITSANNEX,THEAGREEMENTOFSEPARATIONOFPROPERTIES.

(B)THETRIALCOURTLACKEDJURISDICTIONTOHEARANDDECIDETHEPETITION
FORDECLARATIONOFNULLITYOFMARRIAGE. [6]

TheRulingoftheCourtofAppeals

The Court of Appeals debunked the claim of Margarita that there was extrinsic fraud in the
preparationandfilingbyAbelardoofthePetitionforDissolutionofConjugalPartnershipofGainsand
itsannex,theAgreementofSeparationofProperties.TheCourtofAppealsstated:

xxx,theextrinsicfraudalludedtoconsistsofAbelardocoercingMargaritaintosigningthepetitiontodissolve
theirconjugalpartnershipofgainstogetherwiththeagreementofseparationofproperties,bythreateningtocut
offallfinancialandmaterialsupportoftheirchildrenthenstillstudyingintheUnitedStatesthatpetitionerhad
nohanddirectlyorindirectlyinthepreparationofthepetitionandagreementofseparationofpropertiesthat
petitionernevermetthecounselforthepetitioner,northenotarypublicwhonotarizedthedeedand,petitioner
neverreceivedanynoticeofthependencyofthepetitionnoracopyofthedecision.

Antithetically,ameticulousperusalofthecontroversialpetition(AnnexB1)andtheagreementofseparationof
properties(pp.6064,Rollo)readilyshowsthatthesameweresignedbythepetitionerontheproperspaceafter
theprayerandontheportionfortheverificationofthepetition.Thesameistruewiththeagreementof
separationofproperties.WhatisstrikingtonoteisthatonAugust6,1990,MargaritaappearedbeforeAmadoP.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150656.htm 2/7
11/8/2016 LicarosvsLicaros:150656:April29,2003:J.Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision

Cortez,ConsuloftheRepublicofthePhilippinesattheSanFrancisco,California,UnitedStatesConsulate
Office,toaffirmandacknowledgebeforesaidofficialthatsheexecutedtheagreementofseparationof
propertiesofherownfreewillanddeed,afterbeinginformedofthecontentsthereof.Andyet,thereisno
showingthatAbelardowaswithheratthePhilippineConsulateOfficeinconfirmingtheseparationofproperty
agreement.Moreover,onpage2ofthesameagreement,itisspecificallystatedthatsuchpropertyseparation
documentshallbesubjecttoapprovallateronbythepropercourtofcompetentjurisdiction.Theclearimportof
thisisthattheagreementmusthavetobesubmittedbeforethepropercourtforapproval,whichexplainsand
confirmspetitionerssignatureonthepetitionfiledincourt.

Inmain,Weseenoindicationnorshowingofcoercionorfraudfromthesefacts,whichcouldverywellbe
consideredasextrinsicorcollateralfraudtojustifyapetitionunderRule47.Fromallindications,thepretended
coerceddocumentswereratherfreelyandvoluntarilyexecutedbythepartiesthereinknowingfullywellthe
importsthereof.ThisconclusionfindsmoreweightifWeconsiderthefactthattheseparationofpropertywas
fullyimplementedandenforced,whenapparentlybothpartiescorrespondinglyreceivedtheproperties
respectivelyassignedtoeachofthemunderthesaiddocument.[7]

TheCourtofAppealsalsorejectedMargaritasclaimthatthetrialcourtlackedjurisdictiontohear
anddecidethePetitionforDeclarationofNullityofMarriageforimproperserviceofsummonsonher.
The case involves the marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. The
CourtofAppealsruledthatinsuchanactionthepurposeofserviceofsummonsisnottovestthetrial
court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but only to comply with due process. The
Court of Appeals concluded that any irregularity in the service of summons involves due process
which does not destroy the trial courts jurisdiction over the res which is the parties marital status.
Neither does such irregularity invalidate the judgment rendered in the case. Thus, the Court of
Appealsdismissedthepetitionforannulmentofjudgment,statingthat:

Atbar,thecaseinvolvesthepersonal(marital)statusoftheplaintiffandthedefendant.Thisstatusistheres
overwhichthePhilippinecourthasacquiredjurisdiction.ThisisalsothekindofactionwhichtheSupreme
CourthadruledthatserviceofsummonsmaybeservedextraterritoriallyunderSection15(formerlySection17)
ofRule14andwheresuchserviceofsummonsisnotforthepurposeofvestingthetrialcourtwithjurisdiction
overthepersonofthedefendantbutonlyforthepurposeofcomplyingwiththerequirementsoffairplayand
dueprocess.Afortiori,thecourtaquohadproperlyacquiredjurisdictionoverthepersonofhereinpetitioner
defendantwhensummonswasservedbypublicationandacopyofthesummons,thecomplaintwithannexes,
togetherwiththeOrderofJune28,1991,wasservedtothedefendantthroughtheDepartmentofForeign
Affairsbyregisteredmailanddulyreceivedbysaidofficetotopitall.Suchmodewasuponinstructionand
lawfulorderofthecourtandcouldevenbetreatedasanyothermannerthecourtmaydeemsufficient.[8]

Hence,theinstantpetition.

TheIssues

TheissuesraisedbyMargaritaarerestatedasfollows:

I.WhetherMargaritawasvalidlyservedwithsummonsinthecasefordeclarationofnullityofhermarriage
withAbelardo

II.WhethertherewasextrinsicfraudinthepreparationandfilingbyAbelardoofthePetitionforDissolutionof
theConjugalPartnershipofGainsanditsannex,theAgreementofSeparationofProperties.

TheCourtsRuling

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150656.htm 3/7
11/8/2016 LicarosvsLicaros:150656:April29,2003:J.Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision

Thepetitionisbereftofmerit.
FirstIssue:ValidityoftheServiceofSummonsonMargarita
Margaritainsiststhatthetrialcourtneveracquiredjurisdictionoverherpersoninthepetitionfor
declarationofnullityofmarriagesinceshewasnevervalidlyservedwithsummons.Neitherdidshe
appearincourttosubmitvoluntarilytoitsjurisdiction.
Ontheotherhand,Abelardoarguesthatjurisdictionoverthepersonofanonresidentdefendant
in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear
factual finding that there was proper summons by publication effected through the Department of
Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court. Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the
decisiondeclaringthemarriageanullity.
Summonsisawritbywhichthedefendantisnotifiedoftheactionbroughtagainsthim.Serviceof
suchwritisthemeansbywhichthecourtacquiresjurisdictionoverhisperson.[9]
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine
courtscannottryanycaseagainsthimbecauseoftheimpossibilityofacquiringjurisdictionoverhis
personunlesshevoluntarilyappearsincourt.Butwhenthecaseisoneofactionsinremorquasiin
remenumeratedinSection15,[10]Rule14oftheRulesofCourt,Philippinecourtshavejurisdictionto
hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and
jurisdictionoverthepersonofthenonresidentdefendantisnotessential.[11]
Actionsinpersonam[12]andactionsinremorquasiinremdifferinthatactionsinpersonam are
directedagainstspecificpersonsandseekpersonaljudgments.Ontheotherhand,actionsinremor
quasiinremaredirectedagainstthethingorpropertyorstatusofapersonandseekjudgmentswith
respecttheretoasagainstthewholeworld.[13]
AtthetimeAbelardofiledthepetitionfornullityofthemarriagein1991,Margaritawasresidingin
the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court
consideredMargaritaanonresidentdefendantwhoisnotfoundinthePhilippines.Sincethepetition
affectsthepersonalstatusoftheplaintiff,thetrialcourtauthorizedextraterritorialserviceofsummons
underSection15,Rule14oftheRulesofCourt.Thetermpersonalstatusincludesfamilyrelations,
particularlytherelationsbetweenhusbandandwife.[14]
UnderSection15ofRule14,adefendantwhoisanonresidentandisnotfoundinthecountry
maybeservedwithsummonsbyextraterritorialserviceinfourinstances:(1)whentheactionaffects
thepersonalstatusoftheplaintiff(2)whentheactionrelatesto,orthesubjectofwhichisproperty
withinthePhilippines,inwhichthedefendanthasorclaimsalienorinterest,actualorcontingent(3)
whenthereliefdemandedconsists,whollyorinpart,inexcludingthedefendantfromanyinterestin
propertylocatedinthePhilippinesor(4)whenthepropertyofthedefendanthasbeenattachedwithin
thePhilippines.
Intheseinstances,extraterritorialserviceofsummonsmaybeeffectedunderanyofthreemodes:
(1)bypersonalserviceoutofthecountry,withleaveofcourt(2)bypublicationandsendingacopyof
the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, also
withleaveofcourtor(3)byanyothermeansthejudgemayconsidersufficient.
Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be
effectedonMargaritainthefollowingmanner:

xxx,serviceofSummonsbywayofpublicationinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationonceaweekforthree(3)
consecutiveweeks,atthesametime,furnishingrespondentcopyofthisOrderaswellasthecorresponding
SummonsandcopyofthepetitionathergivenaddressatNo.96MulberryLane,Atherton,California,U.S.A.,
thrutheDepartmentofForeignAffairs,allattheexpenseofpetitioner.[15](Emphasisours)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150656.htm 4/7
11/8/2016 LicarosvsLicaros:150656:April29,2003:J.Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision

Thetrialcourtsprescribedmodeofextraterritorialservicedoesnotfallunderthefirstorsecondmode
specifiedinSection15ofRule14,butunderthethirdmode.Thisreferstoanyothermeansthatthe
judgemayconsidersufficient.
The Process Servers Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summons addressed to Margarita
together with the complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs
withacknowledgmentofreceipt.TheProcessServerscertificateofserviceofsummonsisprimafacie
evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate.[16] Before proceeding to declare the marriage
betweenMargaritaandAbelardonullandvoid,thetrialcourtstatedinitsDecisiondated8November
1991 that compliance with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e) (sic) been duly established.
We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule.
After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of
summonsunderthethirdmodeofextraterritorialservicepursuanttoSection15ofRule14.
SecondIssue:ValidityoftheJudgmentDissolvingthe
ConjugalPartnershipofGains
MargaritaclaimsthatAbelardocoercedherintosigningthePetitionforDissolutionoftheConjugal
PartnershipofGains(Petition)anditsannex,theAgreementofSeparationofProperties(Agreement).
AbelardoallegedlythreatenedtocutoffallfinancialandmaterialsupporttotheirchildrenifMargarita
didnotsignthedocuments.
ThetrialcourtdidnotfindanythingamissinthePetitionandAgreementthatAbelardofiled,and
thusthetrialcourtapprovedthesame.TheCourtofAppealsnotedthatameticulousperusalofthe
PetitionandAgreementreadilyshowsthatMargaritasignedthesameontheproperspaceafterthe
prayerandontheportionfortheverificationofthepetition.TheCourtofAppealsobservedfurtherthat
on 6 August 1990, Margarita appeared before Consul Amado Cortez in the Philippine Consulate
Office in San Francisco, California, to affirm that she executed the Agreement of her own free will.
There was no showing that Abelardo was at that time with her at the Philippine Consulate Office.
AbelardosecuredjudicialapprovaloftheAgreementasspecificallyrequiredintheAgreement.
TheCourtisboundbythefactualfindingsofthetrialandappellatecourtsthatthepartiesfreely
andvoluntarilyexecutedthedocumentsandthatthereisnoshowingofcoercionorfraud.Asarule,in
anappealbycertiorariunderRule45,theCourtdoesnotpassuponquestionsoffactasthefactual
findingsofthetrialandappellatecourtsarebindingontheCourt.TheCourtisnotatrieroffacts.The
Court will not examine the evidence introduced by the parties below to determine if the trial and
appellatecourtscorrectlyassessedandevaluatedtheevidenceonrecord.[17]
The due and regular execution of an instrument acknowledged before an officer authorized to
administer oaths cannot be overthrown by bare allegations of coercion but only by clear and
convincingproof.[18]Apersonacknowledginganinstrumentbeforeanofficerauthorizedtoadminister
oathsacknowledgesthathefreelyandvoluntarilyexecutedtheinstrument,givingrisetoaprimafacie
presumptionofsuchfact.
Intheinstantcase,MargaritaacknowledgedtheAgreementbeforeConsulCortez.Thecertificate
of acknowledgment signed by Consul Cortez states that Margarita personally appeared before him
andacknowledgedbeforemethatSHEexecutedthesameofherownfreewillanddeed.[19]Thus,
there is a prima facie presumption that Margarita freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement.
Margaritahasfailedtorebutthisprimafaciepresumptionwithclearandconvincingproofofcoercion
onthepartofAbelardo.
Adocumentacknowledgedbeforeanotarypublicisprimafacieevidenceofthedueandregular
executionofthedocument.[20]Anotarizeddocumenthasinitsfavorthepresumptionofregularityinits
execution,andtocontradictthesame,theremustbeevidencethatisclear,convincingandmorethan
merelypreponderant.[21]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150656.htm 5/7
11/8/2016 LicarosvsLicaros:150656:April29,2003:J.Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 58487 dismissing the
petitiontoannuljudgmentisAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Vitug,YnaresSantiago,andAzcuna,JJ.,concur.

[1]UnderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.

[2]PennedbyAssociateJusticeConradoM.Vasquez,Jr.,withAssociateJusticesTeodoroP.ReginoandEdgardoP.Cruz
concurring.
[3]PennedbyJudgeSilverioS.Tayao.

[4] Rendered in Special Proceeding No. M2551 entitled In the Matter of the Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of
Spouses Abelardo B. Licaros and Margarita RomualdezLicaros, Spouses Abelardo B. Licaros and Margarita
RomualdezLicaros,Petitioners.
[5] Rendered in Civil Case No. 911757 entitled Abelardo B. Licaros, Petitioner vs. Margarita RomualdezLicaros,
Respondent.
[6]Rollo,pp.5456.

[7]Ibid.,pp.5759.

[8]Ibid.,pp.6364.

[9]CanoGutierrezv.Gutierrez,G.R.No.138584,2October2000,341SCRA670.

[10]FormerlySection17,towit:SEC.17.Extraterritorialservice.Whenthedefendantdoesnotresideandisnotfoundinthe
Philippinesandtheactionaffectsthepersonalstatusoftheplaintifforrelatesto,orthesubjectofwhichisproperty
withinthePhilippines,inwhichthedefendanthasorclaimsalienorinterest,actualorcontingent,orinwhichthe
reliefdemandedconsists,whollyorinpart,inexcludingthedefendantfromanyinteresttherein,orthepropertyof
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippinesbypersonal service as under section 7 or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
placesandforsuchtimeasthecourtmayorder,inwhichcaseacopyofthesummonsandorderofthecourtshall
besentbyregisteredmailtothelastknownaddressofthedefendant,orinanyothermannerthecourtmaydeem
sufficient.Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.Now Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[11]Valmontev.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.108538,22January1996,252SCRA92.

[12]Inanactioninpersonam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served,
substitutedservice,asprovidedinSections7and8ofRule14oftheRulesofCourtisessentialfortheacquisition
bythecourtofjurisdictionoverthepersonofadefendantwhodoesnotvoluntarilysubmithimselftotheauthorityof
thecourt.If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a
Philippineresident,serviceofsummonsmay,byleaveofcourt,bemadebypublicationinaccordancewithSections
17and18ofthesameRule,seeAsiavestLimitedv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.128803,25September1998,296
SCRA538.
[13]Chingv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.59731,11January1990,181SCRA9.

[14]Tenchavezv.Escano,122Phil.752(1965).

[15]Orderdated28June1991,CARollo,p.36.

[16]Madrigalv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.129955,26November1999,319SCRA331.

[17]Concepcionv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.120706,31January2000,324SCRA85.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Rollo,p.131emphasissupplied.

[20]Section30,Rule132Caoiliv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.128325,14September1999,314SCRA345.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150656.htm 6/7
11/8/2016 LicarosvsLicaros:150656:April29,2003:J.Carpio:FirstDivision:Decision
[21]Ibid.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/150656.htm 7/7