Sei sulla pagina 1di 53



i. Parents & guardians

ii. Owners & managers of enterprises

85. Pestano v. Sumayang

(G.R. No. 139875, 4 Dec 2000)

It appears from the records that at around 2:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was his friend Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by [Petitioner] Gregorio Pestao and owned by [Petitioner] Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation (Metro Cebu, for brevity), which had tried to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. Both Ananias Sumayang and Manuel Romagos were rushed to the hospital in Sogod, where Sumayang was pronounced dead on arrival. Romagos was transferred to the Cebu Doctors Hospital, but he succumbed to his injuries the day after.

Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Gregorio Pestao, [Respondents] Teotimo and Paz Sumayang, as heirs of Ananias Sumayang, filed this civil action for damages against Gregorio Pestao, as driver of the passenger bus that rammed the deceaseds motorcycle, Metro Cebu, as owner and operator of the said bus, and Perla Compania de Seguros, as insurer of Metro Cebu.

To substantiate its defense of bonos pater familias [petitioner] [c]orporation recalled to the witness box Gregorio Pestao who explained how his driving experience and ability were tested by the company before he was hired. He further declared that the management gave regular lectures to drivers and conductors touching on various topics like speeding, parking, loading and treatment of passengers, and that before he took to the road at 2:30 AM of that day he checked together with the mechanic the tires, brake, signal lights as well as the tools to be brought along. He did the same thing before commencing his return trip from Hagnaya, San Remegio later in the day.

The corporation also presented its maintenance supervisor, Agustin Pugeda, Jr., and its manager, Alfonso Corominas, Jr. who corroborated Pestaos testimony that his driving ability was thoroughly tested, and that all drivers underwent periodic lecture on various aspects of safety driving including pertinent traffic regulations. They also confirmed the thorough checkup of every vehicle before it would depart and that the performance of the drivers was being monitored by several inspectors posted at random places along the route.

The lower court found [Petitioner] Pestao to have been negligent in driving the passenger bus that hit the deceased. It was shown that Pestao negligently attempted to overtake the motorcycle at a dangerous speed as they were coming upon a junction in the road, and as the motorcycle was about to turn left towards Tabagon. The court likewise found Metro Cebu directly and primarily liable, along with Pestao, the latters employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as [Petitioner] Metro Cebu failed to present evidence to prove that it had observed x x x [the] diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Nor has Metro Cebu proven that it had exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees and in the maintenance of vehicles.

The CA affirmed respondents liability for the accident and for Sumayangs death. Pestao was negligent when he tried to overtake the victims motorcycle at the Tabagon junction. As a professional driver

operating a public transport vehicle, he should have taken extra precaution to avoid accidents, knowing that it was perilous to overtake at a junction, where adjoining roads had brought about merging and diverging traffic.

The appellate court opined that Metro Cebu had shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and in the supervision of its employees. By allowing the bus to ply its route despite the defective speedometer, said petitioner showed its indifference towards the proper maintenance of its vehicles. Having failed to observe the extraordinary diligence required of public transportation companies, it was held vicariously liable to the victims of the vehicular accident.

Hence, this Petition.


WON Pestao and his employer Perla Compania de Seguros may be held liable for damages



We find no cogent reason to reverse or modify their factual findings. The CA agreed with the trial court that the vehicular collision was caused by Pestaos negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.

Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule. Indeed, the issue of negligence is basically factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages.

Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this instrument been properly functioning.

This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law.

86. Real v. Belo (G.R. No. 146224, 26 Jan 2007)


Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the Philippine Womens University (PWU). Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU. A fire broke out at petitioners Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area, including respondents stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed at petitioners stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondents demand. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipment, as well as the selection and supervision of her employees; that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. Petitioner denied liability on the grounds that the fire was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondent. The RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC but increased the amount of temperate damages awarded to the respondent from P50,000.00 to P80,000.00. The CA issued its Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.


Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result of the fire that razed not only her own food kiosk but also the adjacent foodstalls at the Food Center premises of the Philippine Womens University, including that of the respondent?

Ruling: YES

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent.



On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad was a production manager of Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794 which Abad drove car out of a parking lot. Instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he went against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St

The motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to Vasquez. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.

On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.


W/N Castilex may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.


No. The fifth paragraph of article 2180 states Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. In order for this paragraph to apply, it must be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. Here it was not sufficiently proven that such was the case.

Jurisprudence provides that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.

Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. Traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer.

Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle.

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.

iii. Employers



Zacarias Carticiano was driving the car of his father (Rosendo Carticiano) on his way to home to Imus Cavite. At the same time, Darwin was driving an owner-type jeepney owned by his employer Mario Nuval. When the two vehicles were about to pass one another, Darwin veered his jeep to his left causing a head-on collision with Rosendo's car. Darwin fled the scene. Zacarias suffered injuries that required operation and therapy. Nuval offered compensation for the injuries caused, but plaintiffs refused to accept the amount. Plaintiffs then filed a criminal case against driver Darwin and a civil suit against Nuval for damages. Plaintiffs alleged that the proximate cause of the accident is Darwin’s recklessness in driving Nuval's jeep. They also alleged that Nuval did not exercise due diligence in the supervision of his employee; that defendants should he held liable for damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendants were ordered to pay damages. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision insofar as Darwin was concerned but reversed as it pertained to Nuval. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision in Nuval's case.

Issue: Whether Nuval can be held liable for the negligence of Darwin.

Held: Yes, Nuval failed to prove that Darwin was no longer his employee and that the latter store the keys to the vehicle. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the case at bar showed that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him as driver when the collision occurred. Hence, the trial court was correct in ordering that Nuval was solidarily liable with Darwin for all the damages to which the petitioners were entitled.

89. L.G. Foods v. Pagapong-Agraviador (G.R. No. 158995, 26 Sept. 2006)


Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiesta van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the

was filed against the driver

before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On account

thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.

for damages against the petitioners

as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due


In the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint

accident. An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide

The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under the provision of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. They contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled. Hence, there was a lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs.


Whether the contention of LG Foods is correct and thus, they are not liable.


No. The complaint did not aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency. The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. However, it is clear from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their cause of action against the petitioners. Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies which the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant who cannot ask for the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action or lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Hence, LG Foods’s contention is not correct and they are held liable.

Medical negligence/malpractice

90. Ramos v. CA [G.R. No. 124354 April 11, 2002 (R) December 29, 1999 (D)]


Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was referred to Dr. Hosaka for an operation to remove a stone from her gallbladder at De Los Santos Medical Center. Dr. Hosaka recommended Dr. Gutierrez to be their anesthesiologist. Ramos requested that her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, be allowed to accompany her in the operating room. Ramos was prepped early for the operation which was scheduled at 9:00am but Dr. Hosaka arrived at 12:10pm. At about 12:15 pm, Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez complaining that it was difficult to intubate the patient and noticed bluish discoloration of Ramos’ nail beds. Another doctor was called to intubate the patient and several medical interventions were implemented to treat the patient’s condition. Ramos stayed in the ICU for a month and was released four months later. She had been in comatose since the operation until her death. The RTC ruled in favor of Ramos but the decision was reversed by the CA. The SC, in its 1999 decision, applying the control test, held that an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their consultants and, therefore, DLSMC is solidarily liable with Dr. Hosaka.


WON DLSMC is an employer of Dr. Hosaka and therefore, solidarily liable.


No. There is no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is no showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment.

91. Flores vs Pineda (G.R. No. 158996 Nov. 14 , 2008)


Teresita Pineda consulted Dr. Flores because she was experiencing general body weakness , loss of appetite , frequent urination , thirst and on and off vaginal bleeding. On her follow-up check up , Dr. Flores suspected that Teresita may be suffering from diabetes. The following week, she was admitted to the hospital and Dr. Flores ordered for an on-call D&C to be performed by his wife Dr. Felicisima Flores. Prior to the operation , the laboratory results are not yet complete. The day after the operation, the complete lab results came in and confirmed that Teresita is suffering from Diabetes Mellittus Type II. Medication came in too late as Teresita was already confined in the ICU and died 6 days later. The family instituted an action for damages against Spouses Flores. The RTC ruled in their favor and granted the award of damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.


WON Spouses Flores are liable for medical negligence.


Yes. Medical Negligence is a wrong committed by a medical professional that has caused bodily harm to or death of a patient. There are 4 elements involved namely ; duty , breach , injury and proximate cause. In this case, Dr. Flores already suspected that Teresita might be suffering from diabetes during her follow-up check up. A reasonably prudent health care provider would know that diabetes and its complication were foreseeable harm that should have been taken into consideration rather than doing the D&c to ascertain the cause of vaginal bleeding. D&C was merely an elective procedure, not an emergency case. Also, there is no record that insulin was administered prior and during the operation. Spouses Flores failed , as medical professionals , to comply with their duty to observe the standard of care to be given to diabetic patients undergoing surgery. This breach of duty was the proximate cause of Teresita’s death making the spouses liable for damages.

92. Professional Services v. Natividad G.R. Nos. 126297 31 Jan 2007 (D), 11 Feb 2008 (R1); and 2 Feb 2010 (R2, en banc)


Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) was held solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for the injuries suffered by Natividad when Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes neglected to remove from her body two gauzes which were used in the surgery they performed on her. On appeal, the CA absolved Dr. Fuentes but affirmed the liability of Dr. Ampil and PSI, subject to the right of PSI to claim reimbursement from Dr. Ampil. On petition for review, the SC affirmed the CA decision. The SC premised the direct liability of PSI to the Aganas on the following: (1) For the purposes of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their consultants; and (2) PSI created the public impression that Dr. Ampil was its agent by accrediting Dr. Ampil and advertising his qualifications. Thus, under the doctrine of apparent authority, PSI was liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.


Whether PSI is liable to the Aganas


Yes, not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority. The Supreme Court still employs the control test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between hospital and doctor. Here, there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and the details of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of Natividad. Consequently, PSI cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the principle of respondeat superior.

There is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the patient (Natividad) that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. Based on Enrique’s testimony, the decision made by Enrique for Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil was significantly influenced by the impression that Dr. Ampil was a staff member of Medical City General Hospital, and that said hospital was well known and prominent. Enrique looked upon Dr. Ampil not as independent of but as integrally related to Medical City.

93. Li v. Soliman (GR 165279 June 07, 2011, en banc)


On July 7, 1993, respondents’ 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering from a high-grade cancer of the bone. On august 18,1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. She died on September 1, 1993. Respondents brought the cadaver to the PNP crim laboratory at camp crame for a post-mortem examination. The report issued by the institution was different from the certificate of death issued by SLMC as to cause of death. Respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard for Angelica's safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of chemotherapy drugs which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelica's untimely demise. Respondent's claim that they were assured that Angelica would recover with a 95% chance and were assured that the side effects were only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Respondent's claimed that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects. The trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and emplyed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs. The CA concurred with the trial court's finding that there was no negligence committed but found that petitioner failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy. She was found negligent. Petitioner assails the CA in finding her guilty of negligence in not explaining all the possible side effects, she emphasized that she was not negligent in the procedures.


Whether petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose the side effects


Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents. One thing to consider is that of the nature of the disease itself. Each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. Also as a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness.

94. Aquino v. Heirs of Calayag

(Gr. No. 158461, August 22, 2012)


Raymunda was the wife of Rodrigo Calayag. Raymunda was pregnant and when she experienced bleeding and labor pains Rodrigo brought her to St. Michael’s Clinic Dr. Unite told them that she has to have a caesarean section and must be transferred to SHH. SHH was operated and owned by Dr. Reyes. There, Dr. Unite delivered a stillborn 8 month old baby Few minutes after giving birth, the operating team noticed that Raymunda had become cyanotic (turning blue or purple). Suddenly, her vital signs were gone but after a few minutes the team was able to revive her. Raymunda was in comatose. Hence, they sought the Dr. Farinas’ opinion. Dr. Farinas found out that Raymunda suffered a cardiac arrest during the operation. Raymunda was moved to MCM where a neurologist examined her. The neurologist, Dr. Libarnes found her to in vegetative state (absence of responsiveness and awareness) Dr. Unite removed the stitches of Raymunda’s surgical wound. Later that day, the wound split open causing her intestines to jut out. Raymunda never regained consciousness. Hence, Rodrigo brought her home since the doctors could no longer do anything to improve her condition. Rodrigo then filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Unite, Aquino and Reyes. Rodrigo claimed that Dr. Unite and Aquino failed to exercise the diligence required for operating on Raymunda. As for Dr. Reyes, that he was negligent in supervising the wor of Dr. Unite and Aquino RTC: The three doctors are liable CA: Affirmed


1. Whether or not Dr. Unite and Dr. Aquino acted negligently in handling Raymunda’s operation, resulting in her death.

2. Whether or not Dr. Reyes is liable, as the hospital owner, for the negligence of Dr. Unite and Dr. Aquino.


The cause of action against the doctors in these cases is commonly known as medical malpractice. It is a form of negligence which consists in the physician or surgeon's failure to apply to his practice that degree of care and skill that the profession generally and ordinarily employs under similar conditions and circumstances. In these cases, the court always seeks guidance from expert testimonies. To prove that there is medical malpractice the plaintiff must establish the following:

(a) Duty; (b) breach; (c) injury; and (4)proximate causation. The evidence should show that the physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done; and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.

According to Dr. Libarnes(neurologist) an anesthetic accident during Raymunda’s caesarean section

causes a cardiorespiratory arrest that deprived her brain of oxygen. The damage could have been averted if the doctors immediately detected and resuscitated her on time.

Dr. Aquino gave Raymunda a high spinal anesthesia instead of a low or mid-spinal anaesthesia. The record on the operation shows that the attending doctors did not know that Raymunda had a cardiac-arrest. Such act itself is already considered malpractice.

No evidence has been presented that raymunda suffered her fate because of defective hospital facilities or poor staff support of surgeons. Hence, Dr. Reyes cannot be held to be liable. Nor would the doctrine of ostensible agency or doctrine of apparent authority make Dr. Reyes liable to Raymunda's heirs for her death. Two factors must be present under this doctrine: 1) the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the person claimed to be negligent was its agent or employee; and 2) the patient relied on such belief.

Therefore, Dr. Aquino and Unite are liable for damages.

iv. State

v. Teachers/heads of establishments

See liability of drivers and owners/employers under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 10586 or An Act Penalizing Persons Driving under the Influence of Alcohol, Dangerous Drugs and other Similar Substances



i. Possessors/Users of animals (Article 2183)

ii. Owners of motor vehicles (Article 2184)

95. Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr. v. CA (G.R. No.128607, January 31, 2000)


The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co- petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corp. along the National Highway in Bataan.

The van of respondent BULLETIN was coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of collision were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN.

The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died.

Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and its insurer the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company.

The RTC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. The RTC ordered the BULLETIN and Angeles to pay Claudia G. Reyes, jointly and severally and dismissed the cases against the petitioners. The CA reversed the decision and instead ordered Petitioners to pay Claudia G Reyes.


• W/N CA erred in finding Mallari Jr. negligent and holding him liable.


NO. CA is correct.

The Petitioners testimony proves that in fact they were negligent in driving the jeepney.

CA correctly found, based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities which were not disputed by petitioners, that the collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules.

The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching, or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left-hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.

Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees.

SC denied the Petition and affirmed the CA decision.

iii. Manufacturers & Processors (Article 2187)

96. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS v. CA (G.R. No. 110295, October 18, 1993)


Herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner with the RTC alleging that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; that some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles; that when she went over her stock of softdrinks, she discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; that she brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of DOH for examination and she was subsequently informed that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" that as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted and not long after that she had to lose shop; and that she became jobless and destitute.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint which was granted by the trial court. CA annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. Hence, this present petition.

Petitioner insists that the primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts.


WON RTC correctly dismissed the complaint of private respondent



CA's conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."

The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

iv. Municipal corporations (Article 2189)

See Section 24 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160)

98. Jimenez vs. City of Manila 150 SCRA 511 May 29, 1987


Plaintiff Jimenez together with his neighbors went to Sta. Ana public market. At the time, the market was flooded with knee-deep rainwater. Jimenez stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the flood causing a rusty nail inside the uncovered opening to pierce the left leg of Jimenez. After being assisted home, he felt ill and developed fever and despite medicine, his left leg swelled with great pain. He was rushed to the Hospital and was confined for 20 days. His injury prevented him from attending to his business. As a result he hired the services of Valdez to supervise his business. Jimenez sued for damages against the City of Manila and the AIC under whose administration the public market had been placed by virtue of a Management Contract. The Trial court dismissed the complaint but was reversed by the appellate court upon appeal. The appellate court ordered AIC to pay Jimenez actual, and moral damages.


Whether appellate court erred in not ruling that the City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with AIC.


YES. Art. 2189 of the Civil code, Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, and other public works under their control or supervision. And in the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana market despite the contract with AIC, remained under the control of the City. The contract itself is clear that the City of Manila retains supervision and control over the said market. The city of Manila is therefore liable for damages under Art. 2189 and as tortfeasor under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code.

99. GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN GR No. 61516 March 21, 1989


Petitioner Florentina Guilatco fell into a manhole located on the sidewalk of Perez Blvd., a road under the control and supervision of respondent City of Dagupan. Petitioner fractured her leg and had to be hospitalized, operated on and confined for 16 days. She thereafter filed a civil action for the recovery of damages against the respondent city. Respondent contended that it is not its city, but the Ministry of Public Highways that has control and supervision over such road, hence no liability should attach to it. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner Guilatco. The CA however ruled in favor of the respondent city on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that the city had control and supervision over Perez Blvd.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent City of Dagupan has control and supervision over Perez Blvd.


Respondent City of Dagupan has control and supervision of Perez Blvd and therefore cannot be excused from liability. The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians form the defective condition of roads is expressed in Article 2189 of the Civil Code which provides:

“Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision.” It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or streey. In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, Article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from “defective streets, public buildings and other public works.”

100. Q.C Government v. Dacara G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2015

Facts: Upon hitting into a pile of earth or street diggings, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government, Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.’s car turned turtle and suffered extensive damage. Also, Dacara Jr. Allegedly sustained bodilyinjuries. Fulgencio Dacara, Sr. filed a complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon after the indemnification sought from the city government, yielded negative results. Defendants claim that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid the accident and contended that the fault is with the driver. The RTC ruled against defendants. The CA agreed with RTC’s finding that petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.

Issues: 1.) Whether Quezon City government was negligent 2.) Whether Quezon City government is liable for moral and exemplary damages

Held: 1.) Yes. That the negligence of the Quezon City government was the proximate cause of the accident was discussed in the lower court. Also, it is a factual issue that this court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgement by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. The unanimity of the RTC and CA’s ascertainment of the fact that Quezon City government’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars this court from supplanting their findings and substituting it. The lower court found based on the policeman’s report that no signs were found at the scene. 2.) No for moral damages, yes for exemplary damages. The following are the requisites to award moral damages: an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, a culpable act or omission factually established, a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury, and the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. No other evidence was presented was presented to prove Dacara Jr.’s bare assertion of physical injury; thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages. It was ruled by lower courts that Quezon City government committed gross negligence due to its failure to show the modicum of responsibility; thus, it is liable for exemplary damages.

v. Building proprietors (Article 2190-2191, 2193)


101. De Roy v CA

A firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop

occupied by the family of the private respondents, injuring the respondents and killing Marissa Bernal. Respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop because it was close to the weakened wall but they failed to do so. RTC found petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages

to respondents.


Are the petitioners liable for the damages resulting from the collapse of the firewall?


Yes. under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure

is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of

necessary repairs. In this case the petitioners are the owners of the building which collapsed. The wall

was weakened and yet there were no repairs undertaken by the petitioners or any other measure to prevent collapse. Hence, they are liable.


Engineers/Architects/Contractors (Articles 2192 & 1723)




102. Lanuzo v. Ping (100 SCRA 205)

In the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, he rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of P300.00. Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. The defendants moved to dismiss which was denied by the lower court.The trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor. Upon elevation by the defendants, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure questions of law.


Whether appellants can be held jointly and solidarity liable for damages.


YES. For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary. What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil Code) is that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary. But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.

103. GELISAN V. ALDAY (154 SCRA 388)

FACTS: Gelisan is the owner of a freight truck. He entered into a contract with Roberto Espiritu under which Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer provided the loads shall not exceed 200 sacks and it was agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him. The truck was taken by a driver of Espiritu on the day the loss of the goods occurred. Benito Alday is the trucking operator who had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corp. to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. He then met Espiritu at the gate and the latter offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper for a consideration. The offer was accepted by Alday and he instructed his checker to let Espiritu haul the fertilizer. The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts; Espiritu, however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. Alday was compelled to pay the value of the bags of fertilizer to Atlas Fertilizer Corp. He then filed an action for the recovery of damages suffered by him thru the criminal acts committed against him.

ISSUE: Whether Gelisan shall be held liable for the acts of Espiritu.

RULING: Yes. The registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. The claim of the petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained because the lease contract had not been approved by the Public Service Commission.




Catalina Pascua and her companions boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Mangune and Carreon and driven by Manalo bound for Pangasinan.


While on the road, the right wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in unbalanced position.


Manalo stepped on the break and the jeepney eventually stopped but it invaded and blocked the opposite lane of the road.


Meanwhile, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by delos Reyes bumped the jeepney from behind as a result three passengers died while the others sustained physical injuries.


A criminal complaint for multiple homicide against the two drives were filed. However, the Court dismissed the case of delos Reyes for lack of probable cause.


Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having appealed, he served his sentence.


Complaints for recovery were filed by the heir of Pascua. In all cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.


Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. Filriters was also impleaded.


As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.


On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent.


The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted to ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and Carreon for damages due their passengers, this Court renders judgment against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and severally with said defendants (Mangune and Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs.


On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendant, Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,


On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes negligent. Another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to pay the former jointly and severally damages in amounts awarded


Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?


Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test concluded that delos Reyes was negligent. We reiterate that "the principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other

driver was likewise guilty of negligence We find that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice. In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.



Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX). PASUDECO furnished the PNCC with a copy of the Memorandum of Agreement. One day, Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc., was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane. Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC. They alleged that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car. The court declared PASUDECO and PNCC jointly and solidarily liable.


Whether PASUDECO and PCC are indeed solidarily liable.


Yes. In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties. Thus, with PASUDECOs and the petitioners successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.

106. Chan v. Iglesia ni Cristo (G.R. No. 160283, 14 Oct 2005)


Chan owned a gasoline station which supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. Thus, he hired Dioscoro “Ely” Yoro to construct the same. As the diggings were made, Iglesia ni Cristo informed Chan that the diggings traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to them and that it affected the chapel’s foundation. Thus they filed against Chan a case to which the RTC held that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged Chan and Yoro solidarily liable to Iglesia ni Cristo to which Chan appealed claiming that based on the MOA between Yoro and Chan, Yoro would bear any damage incurred during the digging.


WON Chan is solidarily liable with Yoro.


Yes. The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.

107. People of the Philippines v. Petrus Yau (G.R. No. 208170 August 20 , 2014)


Alastair Olingsawan , an American lawyer and businessman hailed a taxicab from Makati Shangrila Hotel. The taxi was driven by Petrus Yao. While traveling , Alastair became groggy and lost consciousness. He woke up handcuffed and chained in the house of Petrus and his wife Susana. Petrus demanded a ransom money of 600,000 dollars for the release of Alastair. After 22 days of captivity , Alastair was rescued by the PNP. Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. The RTC convicted Petrus as principal of the crime and Susana as an accomplice. Both of them are ordered to pay jointly and severally actual , moral and exemplary damages to Alastair. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.


WON Petrus and Susana are solidarily liable for the payment of damages


No. Jurisprudence provides that the difference in the nature and degree in participation between the principal and the accomplice must be taken into account in determining their liabilities. The entire amount of civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liablilty, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Petrus , as principal should be liable for the 2/3 of the total amount of the damages and Susana should pay the remaining 1/3.

108. People v. Montesclaros (607 Phil. 296, 329 16 June 2009)


Ida and her 13-year-old daughter, ABC, rented a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. One afternoon, Ida and Tampus were drinking beer in the house. They forced ABC to drink beer and after consuming three and a half glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. While lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to have sexual intercourse with her. Ida agreed. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep. When she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina. When her mother arrived home, she kept on crying but Ida ignored her. ABC filed a Complaint against Tampus and Ida. The trial court convicted Tampus of rape as principal while appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice. Both were ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party the sum of P50,000.


Whether Ida should be solidarily liable for the civil indemnity considering that she is only an accomplice


No. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes.


Exceptionally, liability is created even where there may have been no fault or negligence.

i. Possessors/Users of animals (Article 2183)

109. Vestil v. IAC, 179 SCRA 47


On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Months later the Uys sued for damages alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as possessors of the dog that eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. The CFI of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The CA found the Vestils responsible under Art. 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog since they were in possession of the house and the dog.


Whether the Vestils are responsible for the damage caused by the dog.


While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred.

Article 2183 of the Civil Code provides that: "The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage."


Manufacturers & Processors (Art. 2187)

iii. Head of Family (Art. 2193)




110. Velayo v. Shell (100 Phil 168)

Cali is corporation and its fuel needs are being satisfied by Shell According to Shell, Cali still has an unpaid balance of 175 thousand pesos Cali informally convened a lunch meeting with all its creditors, there it was announced that CALI was in the state of insolvency and had to stop operation. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for accounts. They agreed that no case should be filed yet as they are still trying to create a plan on how to pay their creditors. Cali also added that in case a suit is filed against it, it will submit itself to voluntary insolvency proceedings. The creditors were not able to have an understanding as to the preference. Hence, a working committee was formed on this matter. The working committee is also tasked to supervise the supervision of the properties of CALI Fitzgerald (Credit Manager of Shell) was appointed as one of the members of the committee. Shell effected a credit transfer against CALI to American Corporation Shell Oil Company. The American Corporation then filed a case against CALI in California for the collection of the assigned credit attaching CALI’s C-54 airplane. Upon knowledge of such, the National Airports Corp. also filed a case and CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. Velayo was then appointed as the assignee in the proceedings. Velayo then instituted a case against Shell to restrain Shell from prosecuting in California. Velayo petition was denied by the court. Hence, he confined his action to the recovery of damages against shell. Which the court also dismissed.



Whether or not Shell was taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane.


Shell upon learning that it cannot obtain the full amount of the credit owed by CALI, it made an assignment to its sister American corporation. There are damaging effects of said assignment.

The telegraphic transfer at the back of CALI perceptive act of Shell to be able to collect all of its credit. The transfer of credit will only be justified it Mr. Fitzgerald if he was not part of the working committee and informed the others during the meeting that he had no authority to bind his principal.

Shell took advantage of its knowledge that an insolvency proceeding will be instituted by CALI in case the creditors will not be able to come up with an agreement. It also had known the probability that no agreement will be reached, hence it made the transfer for its own good.

Art 19.

hence it made the transfer for its own good. Art 19. Any person must, in the

Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with

justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. (NCC)


Art. 21.

morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (NCC)

policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (NCC) Any person who wilfully causes loss or

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to

“A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a wilful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.”

Sec. 37. Embezzlement, etc. — If any person, before the assignment is made, having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or disposes of any of the moneys, goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property so embezzled or disposed of, to be recovered for the benefit of the insolvent's estate. (Insolvency Law)

Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in badfaith and with betrayal of confidence.

Wherefore, Shell must pay CALI double the amount of CALI’s airplane at the time Shell’s credit is transferred to its sister corporation in U.S.A.


111. Hermosisima vs. CA| Concepcion (G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960)


Complainant is a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, dated petitioner Francisco Hermosisima who was almost 10 years younger than her. They were considered as engaged although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.

In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter when one evening, after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot.

In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child Chris Hermosisima was born on July 17, 1954.

Subsequently however, petitioner married Romanita Perez and did not fulfill his promise of marriage to the Petitioner.

Soledad then filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, as well as for support of said child and moral damages from breach of promise to marry.

Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter but denied having ever promised to marry complainant.


Whether or not moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry.

Whether or not petitioner is morally guilty of seduction.


Breach of promise to marry is not actionable.

• It is the clear and manifest intent of Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry.

Petitioner is not guilty of seduction

• The “seduction” contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code as one of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is the crime punished as such in Articles 337 & 338 of the Revised Penal Code.

The provision in the RTC contemplates a situation where a woman, who was an insurance agent and former high school teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10 years older than the man,

“overwhelmed by her love” for the man, had intimate relations with him, because she “wanted to bind” him “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy,” it cannot be said that he is morally guilty of seduction.

112. PONCE v. LEGASPI (208 SCRA 377)


The present case stemmed from the filing before SC of a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Valentino Legaspi by petitioner Erlinda Ponce.

At the time of the filing of the disbarment proceedings, petitioner Ponce, together with her husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). While, forty eight 48% of L'NOR's stocks was owned by the spouses Edward and Norma Porter.

According to the complaint while respondent is the legal counsel of the aforecited corporation, there occurred certain fraudulent manipulations, anomalous management and prejudicial operations by certain officers of said corporation, namely: Edward and Norma Porter and Zenaida Manaloto, Director, who caused great damage and prejudice; that said spouses Porter, together with Manaloto, facilitated, assisted and aided by herein respondent Legaspi, incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc., which they control with stockholdings and whose line of business is in direct competition with L'NOR; that YRASPORT likewise availed of and used the office space, equipment, personnel, funds, other physical facilities, and goodwill of L'NOR while competing at the same time against and causing the latter great damage and irreparable injury; that in view of the aforesaid illegal manipulations, illicit schemes, palpable frauds and estafa committed by the spouses Porter with Manaloto, Ponce requested respondent Legaspi to take and pursue appropriate local steps and seasonable actions in order to protect the paramount interest of L'NOR of which he is the legal counsel by retainer, but the latter, without any valid excuse whatsoever, refused to do so, although he is still collecting his monthly retainer; that on account of the refusal, complainant was forced to retain the services of another counsel and that, in opposition to the same, respondent Legaspi appeared as legal counsel and attorney of Edward Porter and his confederates; that in the Criminal Case filed against Edward Porter for Estafa, respondent Legaspi likewise appeared as counsel for Porter despite the fact that he is the legal counsel of L'NOR which is the prejudiced party and for whose benefit the criminal case was really being prosecuted.

SC issued a resolution dismissing the disbarment complaint against Legaspi. Thereafter, Atty. Legaspi filed before the CFI a complaint for damages against the petitioner. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff Atty. Legaspi and against the defendant Ponce. CA affirmed the lower court's judgment. Hence, the present action before SC.


WON Ponce may be held liable for damages arising from malicious mischief



An action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is anchored on the provisions of Article 21, 2217 and 2219 [8] of the New Civil Code. In order, however, for the malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.

The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. SC declared that petitioner had probable

cause in filing the administrative case against Atty. Legaspi. Whether or not the petitioner's perception of these facts and circumstances is actually correct is irrelevant, the only issue being whether or not the petitioner had probable cause in filing the complaint

The petitioner, at the time of her filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent, held substantial stockholdings in L'NOR. She believed that L'NOR was defrauded by its President/General Manager, Edward Porter, and filed a complaint for estafa against the latter. Porter was convicted by the trial court but, upon appeal, was acquitted by the appellate court. It is of no moment now that Porter was acquitted. Apparently, at that time, petitioner Ponce saw a conflict of interest situation. To her mind, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect by virtue of the retainer contract, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice.

Furthermore, Atty. Legaspi did not deny that he aided the Porters in facilitating the incorporation of YRASPORT and that he himself was its corporate secretary. Since the petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.

Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.


114. Security Bank and Trust Co. vs. CA G.R. No. 117009 October 11, 1995


Ferrer was contracted by the SBTC to construct a bldg. in Davao. The contract provided that it be finished within 200 working days. The bldg. was finished upon the stipulated time but additional expenses were incurred which were made known to SBTC and timely demands for the payment of the increased cost were done by Ferrer to SBTC. The latter only recommended that the verified cost is 200,000.00 which is less than the amount reported by Ferrer. SBTC contend that in the contract, should there be any increase in the expenses, the “owner shall equitably make the appropriate adjustment on mutual agreement of both parties.” Ferrer filed for damages and the trial court ruled in his favor, the defendants were ordered to pay. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.


Whether SBTC is liable for damages and payment of the additional expenses.


YES. Art. 22 states that, “Every person who through an act or performance by another or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.” It is not denied that private respondent incurred additional expenses in constructing petitioner’s bldg. due to a drastic and unexpected in construction cost. Hence, to allow petitioner to acquire the constructed bldg. at a price far below its actual cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of Ferrer, such cannot be allowed by law.


115. CRUZ v. NLRC (GR No. 98273 October 28, 1991)


Petitioner Clarita Cruz went to Kuwait pursuant to an employment contract. Although a high school graduate, she agreed to work as a domestic helper in consideration of an attractive salary and vacation leave benefits she could not expect to earn in this country. After completing her 2 year engagement, she was back home in the Philippines. She filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services and its foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya, for underpayment of her salary and non-payment of her vacation leave. She also claimed that she was over charged for her placement fee. She alleged that her foreign employer treated her as a slave and even beat her. In its answer, the private respondent raised the defense of settlement as evidence by the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complainant. On the basis of the affidavit, POEA dismissed the complaint. NLRC affirmed.


Whether the petitioner has waived her right to her salary by virtue of the quitclaim


NO, the petitioner did not waive her right to her salary by virtue of the quitclaim. The court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel. Except for the disputable presumptions invoked by the private respondent, such assistance has not been established against the petitioner's allegation that the "Attorney" Alvarado who supposedly counseled her was not even a lawyer. Indeed, even assuming that such assistance had been duly given, there is still the question of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross disparity between the amount of the settlement and the petitioner's original claim. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner would agree to waive her total claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly settlement of only P2,400.00. And even if she did, the waiver would still be null and void as violative of public policy. This decision demonstrates the tenderness of the court toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.




116. Tenchavez v. Escano G.R. No. L-19671July 26, 1966


Without the knowledge of her parents, Vicenta Escaño secretly married Pastor Tencahvez which was celebrated before a Catholic chaplain. Upon learning of the secret marriage, spouses Escaño sought priestly advice and a re-celebration of the marriage to validate it was suggested. The re-celebration of marriage did not occur upon learning that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Their relationship went sour and Vicenta left for United States where she filed a verified complaint for divorce on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character”. Two months after, a decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court. She married an American and acquired American citizenship. A case for legal separation was initiated by Tenchavez alleging that Vicenta’s parents dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining him and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage. He also asked for one million pesos in damages.


Whether Tenchavez is entitled to damages


Yes. Appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes. The Court awarded P 25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. Her refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity.

The desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages.



117. Javellana v. Tayo

Petitioners are elected officials of a municipal council, respondent is the elected mayor of the municipality. During the regular session of the municipal council on June 1, the Mayor was absent. The six councilors-petitioners were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and went on to do business. This same practice happened again. When the mayor came back he refused to act upon the minutes of the meeting and declared the sessions null and void. Petitioners made demands for payment of their payroll repeatedly. Mayor refused to affix his signature to the payrolls. Councilor Exequiel Golez testified against the Mayor. RTC held that the sessions were valid and legal.


WON an award of moral damage to appellee councilor Golez is proper.


Yes. considering that Golez was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty. Article 27 provides as follows: 'Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.


118. Willaware v. Jesichris Mfg (GR 195549, September 03, 2014)

The Facts:

Jesichris Manufacuring Company (Jesichris) claims in its complaint for damages for unfair competition that it is a company involved in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products. Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand is engaged in the manufacture of kitchenware items

made of plastic and metal, has an office with physical proximity to its office, and in view of the fact that some of its employees had transferred to it, Jesichris discovered that Willaware had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material

and colours as Jesichris manufactures and distributes, but at a lower price

in terms of unrealised profits in the amount of P2Million. Willaware, in its defense, denied all the allegations in the complaint except as to the proximity of their office to that of Jesichris, and that some of its employees transferred to Willaware. As an affirmative defense, Willaware posits that there was no unfair competition as the plastic products were mere reproductions of the original parts which merely conform to their original designs and specifications. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favour of Jesichris. It ruled that Willaware clearly invaded the right of Jesichris by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. It enjoined Willaware from continuing its activity, and awarded damages in favor of Jesichris. On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed with modification that RTC decision. Willaware is now before the Supreme Court assailing the RTC and CA decisions.

It thus prayed for damages


Whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.


YES. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage." In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.9

Here, both characteristics are present. In the case at bar, the petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the same products to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be




The United Employees Welfare Association, a union duly registered in the Department of Labor and with members among the employees of the petitioner, entered into an agreement of working conditions with the petitioner pursuant to a settlement concluded in a case of the Court of Industrial Relations. The said agreement was to last for one year. Thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of the said United Employees Welfare Association tendered their resignations from the same union and joined the local chapter of the respondent National Labor Union. There is no evidence that these resignations were made with the approval of petitioner. The president of the respondent union sent a letter to petitioner containing seven demands allegedly on behalf of the members of its local chapter who are employed by the petitioner, to which the latter, through its counsel, answered with another letter stating among other things that the laborers on whose behalf the letter has been written were already affiliated with the United Employees Welfare Association. The respondent union reiterated its demands. In reply, counsel for petitioner sent a letter stating that petitioner could not recognize the alleged local chapter of the respondent union until and after the agreement of May 4, 1950, entered into by the same employees concerned and petitioner is declared null and void by the Court of Industrial Relations. On August 28, 1950, the members of the respondent union struck. On August 31, 1950, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations to declare the strike illegal. On Sept. 8, 1950, the court, through its presiding judge, denied the petitioner’s prayer to declare the strike illegal. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Industrial Relations but the said motion was denied.


WON the order of the Court of Industrial Relations is null or void.


YES. The record shows that the local chapter of the respondent union is composed entirely, except one, of members who made up the total membership of the United Employees Welfare Association, a registered union in the petitioner’s company. To be exact, thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of said association tendered their resignations and joined the local chapter of the respondent union without first securing the approval of their resignations. The new Union then sought to present a seven-point demand of the very same employees to petitioner, which in many respects differs from their previous demand. It is evident that the purpose of their transfer is merely to disregard and circumvent the contract entered into between the same employees and the petitioner on May 4, 1950, knowing full well that that contract was effective for one year, and was entered into with the sanction of the Court of Industrial Relations. If this move were allowed the result would be a subversion of a contract freely entered into without any valid and justifiable reason. Such act cannot be sanctioned in law or in equity as it is in derogation of the principle underlying the freedom of contract and the good faith that should exist in contractual relations. A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of settling labor disputes. That is why it is given personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining agreements.



1. E. Spinner & Co. is a copartnership with head offices in England and India, represented in the Philippines by Wise & Co., a domestic corporation.

2. Defendant is a corporation organized under the Philippine laws, a subsidiary of Neuss Hesslein & Co., Inc., of NY USA, for whom it acts as selling agent in the Philippines.

3. E. Spinner & Co., has long been engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile fabrics, including khaki cloth.

4. Plaintiff began exporting khaki to the Philippines. Among the brands of khaki was the grade “Wigan”.

5. All of the different grades of khaki were marketed by the plaintiff under a common trade-mark duly registered in the Philippines.

6. Plaintiff learned in 1924 that defendant, was selling a brand of khaki in the Philippines with the word “Wigan”.

Issue: Whether the conduct of the defendant would amount to unfair competition. Held: Yes. As stated in section 7 of Act No. 666, a person is guilty of unfair competition who "in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer," etc. The representation that the khaki sold by the defendant is of the kind known to the trade as "Wigan" directly tends to deceive the purchaser and, therefore, constitutes unfair competition as against the plaintiff. It is no doubt true that the adoption of the word "Wigan" by the defendant does not deceive merchants or tailors buying from the defendant. But the person most to be considered in this connection is the consumer, and when the word "Wigan" is found upon a bolt of khaki, the ultimate buyer, or consumer, would naturally be led to suppose that the goods sold under this name is the goods sold by the plaintiff.


121. LIM vs. PONCE DE LEON (G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975)


Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya a Motor Launch named San Rafael. One year later, Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan with corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha alleging that the motor launch was forcibly taken away from him. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Accordingly, on July 6, 1962 upon the order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balacbac, Palawan, seized the motor launch from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI of Palawan a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent.


Whether defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.


Yes. Under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages; and under Article 2219, moral damages may be recovered for Illegal Search. A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefore. Since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure. Defendant-appellees are civilly liable. To be liable under Article 32, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.

122. MHP Garments v. CA, 236 SCRA 227 (G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994)


MHP Garments was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute Boy Scout uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias and was also given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." MHP Garments received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. De Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, together with some Constabulary men, then went to respondent’s stores and without any warrant, seized the boy and girl scouts uniforms. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The respondents paid De Guzman P3,100.00 for the charges to be dropped. The complaint was eventually dismissed and an order to return the seized items was given. However, not all items were returned which prompted private respondents to file for damages. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents and was affirmed by the CA with modifications.


WON MHP Garments is liable.


Yes. We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression as joint tortfeasors. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.

123. ABSCBN v. CA (G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999)


ABSCBN and VIVA executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby VIVA gave ABS an exclusive right to exhibit Viva Films and the right of first refusal to the next 24 films for the TV telecast. Viva submitted a list of the films but ABS rejected the package. During a lunch meeting between the representatives of both companies , another offer was made by Viva which ABS promised to study and make a counter offer. The counter offer was rejected by Viva. Viva subsequently signed a letter of agreement with RBS granting it exclusive rights to air Viva films. ABS filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injuction alleging that there was a perfected contract during the lunch meeting. The writ was granted but was later dissolved after RBS posted bond. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals , the petition was dismissed. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA and ruled that there was no perfected agreement. It ordered ABS to pay damages to RBS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.


WON ABSCBN is liable for damages.


NO. The claim of RBS against ABS is not based on contract , quasi-contract , delict of quasi-delict. It is based on the filing of the complaint knowing ABS has no cause of action against RBS. Hence, the claim for damages can only be based on Art. 19 , 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. Abuse of right under these articles require malice or bad faith.

In this case , there is no adequate proof that ABS was inspired by malice or bad faith in filing the complaint for specific performance. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its case after it had undergone serious negotiations with formal submission of a draft contract. If damages resulted form a persons exercise of a right , without malice or bad faith , it is damnun absque injuria.

124. Bricktown v. CA (239 SCRA 126, 12 December 1994)


Petitioner Bricktown Development Corporation executed two Contracts to Sell in favor of respondent Amor Tierra Development Corporation covering 96 residential lots. The contracts provided that the total price shall be paid in installments and should the purchaser fail to pay when due any of the installments, the owner shall grant the purchaser a 60-day grace period within which to pay the amount/s due, and should the purchaser still fail to pay the due amount/s within the 60-day grace period, the purchaser shall have the right to ex-parte cancel or rescind the contract, provided however, that the actual cancellation or rescission shall take effect only after the lapse of 30 days from the date of receipt by the purchaser of the notice of cancellation of the contract.

Respondent corporation was able to pay the first installment partially. In the meanwhile, the parties continued to negotiate for a possible modification of their agreement, although nothing conclusive would appear to have ultimately been arrived at. For continued failure to pay the second installment due, petitioner corporation sent private respondent a Notice of Cancellation of Contract. After 1 year and 11 months, private respondent demanded the refund of its various payments to petitioner corporation. The demand, not having been heeded, private respondent commenced an action. The court declared the contracts rescinded and ordered petitioner corporation to return to the private respondent the amount it had paid to petitioner corporation. The CA affirmed in toto the decision.


Whether the amounts already remitted by respondent corporation under said contracts were rightly forfeited by petitioner corporation


No. While petitioner corporation still acted within its legal right to declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled, it would be unconscionable to likewise sanction the forfeiture by petitioner corporation of payments made to it by respondent corporation. There is reasonable ground to believe that because of the negotiations between the parties, coupled with the fact that the respondent corporation never took actual possession of the properties and the petitioner corporation did not also dispose of the same during the pendency of said negotiations, the respondent corporation was led to believe that the parties may ultimately enter into another agreement in place of the "contracts to sell." The relationship between parties in any contract must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Petitioner corporation did fall well behind that standard. There was, evidently, no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent corporation in suspending payments. On the contrary, the petitioner corporation not only contributed, but had consented to the delay or suspension of payments. It did not give the respondent corporation a categorical answer that their counter-proposals will not materialize.

125. Newsweek v. IAC (142 SCRA 141)


Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental and several individual sugar planters, filed a civil case in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of their reporters. The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by the publication of an article in their weekly news magazine. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss ruling that on its face, it is a valid cause of action; and whether the printed article sued upon is actionable or not is a matter of evidence. Respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders.


Whether private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action


The court agrees with petitioner in that there is a failure to state a cause of action. It is essential in a libel suit for the victim to be identifiable. There is no ground of action unless it is shown that the readers can identify the personality of the individual defamed. It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.

Even though private respondents filed a class suit in representation of all the sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental, the case at bar is not a class suit. We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

126. MVRS Publication v. Islamic Da’wah


Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. is a local federation of Muslim religious organizations and muslim individuals. Islamic Da’wah filed a complaint for damages in behalf of their Muslim members nationwide (class suit) against MVRS. This was due to an article published by MVRS that Muslims do not eat animals especially pigs and that they are treating these animals as sacred and gods. The complaint alleged that the libellous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims. That the article was published out of sheer ignorance. MVRS contended that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion. Trial court dismissed the case. Court of Appeals reversed the decision.


Whether MVRS should be liable for damages.


Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. However, the fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.

In the case at bar, there was no identifiable person who was injured by the article. Hence, the plaintiffs have no individual cause of action, therefore, it cannot file a class suit. There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander the one being, in general, written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is a relational interest since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff. (Justice Puno)

An “Emotional distress” tort action is personal in nature. It is founded on personal attacks to an individual. Such, is not applicable in this case since no individual was indentified in the article. To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:


The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;


The conduct was extreme and outrageous;

and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe

"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society.

"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.

"Severe emotional distress," refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.

An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

Therefore the petition is dismissed.

127. Silahis Int’l Hotel v. Soluta G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006


Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. The latter received several reports of illegal activities within the hotels premises. He asked the security to conduct surveillance. Sometime in January 11, 1988, entered the union office located at the hotel basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was apprised about the suspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana. Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.

Criminal cases were filed against the employees of Silahis but the RTC dismissed the case citing the marijuana leaves are not admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of its confiscation.

Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the Manila RTC a Complaint 12 against petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the case against them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search.

The Manila RTC rendered a decision dated June 2, 1994, holding the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly and severally liable for damages as a result of malicious prosecution and illegal search of the union office.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision. It found herein petitioners et al. civilly liable for damages for violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against illegal search, not for malicious prosecution, set aside the award of actual damages to respondent union, and reduced the award of actual damages to individual respondents to P50,000


Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights?


Yes. The Petition is denied.

Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides: ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not,

must be guarded against. The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. 25 It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

128. RCPI v. VERCHEZ (G.R. No. 164349, January 31, 2006)


Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace immediately hid to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida who was residing at Quezon City reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital."

The telegram was delivered to Zenaida only 25 days later. Editha’s husband Alfonso demanded an explanation from the manager of RCPI who replied that the delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI.

Then, Editha died. Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the RTC of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.


WON RCPI may be held liable for damages



For RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

x x x x

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:

Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:

x x x x

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.

RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

The award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order.