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Cisco LEAP

Client Access Point Radius Server Active Directory

EAPOL-Start
AP Blocks all requests until authentication completes
EAPOL-Request-Identity

Identity RADIUS Access Request

RADIUS Server Authenticates Client


EAPOL (LEAP Server Challenge) LEAP Server Challange

Response Response

Success Message EAP-Success + RADIUS Access Challange

Client Authenticates RADIUS Server


LEAP Client Challange RADIUS (LEAP Client Challenge)

EAPOL (LEAP Client Challenge Response) LEAP Client Response


(Session and Cell Multicast Keys)
Derive Key (Encryption Keys) Derive Key
EAPOL-Key (Cell Multicast Key)

EAPOL-Key (Session ID and Key Length)

Protected Data Session Cisco LEAP Advantages


-Fast, relatively secure roaming with Cisco or compatible clients
WPA or CCKM Key Management
-Uses existing username/password (Active Directory)
Data -Wide range of OS support

Weaknesses
-Susceptible to dictionary attack
-Relies too much on strong, complex passwords for security.
-Number of publically available exploit tools

Replaced by EAP-FAST

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EAP-FAST

Client Access Point Radius Server AD or External Database

Start
AP Blocks all requests until authentication completes
EAP Identity Request

EAP Identity Response Identity

Server Side Authentication - Establish a Secure Tunnel (PAC and TLS)


EAP-FAST Start (A-ID) A-ID

EAP-FAST (TLS Client Hello) PAC-OPAQUE PAC-Opaque

Server_random EAP-FAST (TLS Server Hello) Server_random

TLS Finished

Client Side Authentication Server Authenticates Client


Authentication Authentication Conversions

Optional PAC refrash

EAP Success

Protected Data Session EAP-FAST Advantages RFC 4851


-Supports Windows single sign-on and password expiration
WPA or CCKM Key Management -Wide range of OS support
-Does not require certificates or PKI
Data -Full support for 802.11i, 802.11x, TKIP and AES
-Support for WDS and CCKM
-Resistant to dictionary attacks

Weaknesses
-PAC can be intercepted and used to compromise credentials
-Rouge AP with same SSID could be used to inject a new PAC
which could be used to obtain username and a cleartext
password (EAP-FAST w/GTC) or launch a dictionary attack
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EAP-TLS

Client Access Point Radius Server CA

EAPOL Start
AP Blocks all requests until authentication completes
Identity Request

Identity Response (NAI) Identity (NAI)


EAP-TLS Start

EAP-TLS Advantages RFC 5216


Client Hello
-Provides for very secure exchange of data
Server Hello over public domain
Certificate
Server Key Exchange -Wide range of OS support
Server Request
-Username/Password compromise alone is
Server Hello Complete
not enough to gain access as the client
side private key is still required.

Certificate -Supports session resumption


Client Key Exchange
Derive Certificate Verify Weaknesses
Session Key -Requires the use of client side certificates
Change Cipher Spec
Complete
-More difficult to implement

ChangeCipherSpec
Derive
Complete Session Key

Protected Data Session


WPA Key Management

Data

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PEAP
CA

Client Access Point Radius Server User Database

EAPOL Start
AP Blocks all requests until authentication completes
Identity Request

Identity Response (NAI) Identity (NAI)


EAP-TLS Start

Client Hello
PEAP Advantages
-Provides for a very strong and secure
Server Hello
Derive
authentication mechanism.
Certificate Server/Key Exchange Request
MSK
Server Hello Complete -Wide range of OS support
PEAP
Certificate Client /Key Exchange Certificate Verify -Client side certificates not required
Phase 1
Complete
-Support for Token-Based
Change Cipher Spec authentication or Windows based
Derive
EAP Success MSK authentication via MSCHAPv2

Weaknesses
EAP-Request /EAP-TLV/EAP-Payload-TLV (EAP Request Identity) -Requires more overhead due to
number of message exchanges
Tunneled Identity Response
EAP-Request /EAP-TLV/EAP-Payload-TLV (EAP Request Identity-Type X) -Requires CA for the authenticating
PEAP
Tunneled Response for EAP Type X servers
Phase 2
EAP Type X Exchange
EAP-Request /EAP-TLV/Result-TLV (CryptoBinding)
Derive
CSK Result-TLV Response
Derive
CSK CSK
EAP Success EAP Success

Protected Data Session


WPA Key Management & Data
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