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Volume 74
Article 7
Issue 5 Propter Honoris Respectum
6-1-1999
Recommended Citation
Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship by the People, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1605 (1999).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol74/iss5/7
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CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORSHIP BY THE PEOPLE
Frank I. Michelman*
We, the People of the United States, . . . do ordain and establish this
Constitutionfor the United States of America.'
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for
the Establishmentof this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.2
This Constitution, and the Laws... which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... 3
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shallpropose Amendments to this Constitution, or, ... shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, . . . shall be valid ... as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof .... 4
I. CONSTITUTION AS LEGISLATION
16o5
16o6 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL- 74:5
10 For an idea of how complex this legal-recognitional norm is likely to be, see
Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 621
(1987).
161o NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:5
A norm for an agent is a directive that the agent does not feel
rightly free to ignore. It is something saying efficaciously to the agent
that not everything is rightly permitted, that within some range of ac-
tion choices otherwise open to her, at least one ought to be done or
not done. The authority-authorship syndrome is the connection we
draw between two poles of our everyday knowledge of the Constitu-
16 Hans Kelsen for some reason defined "norms" more narrowly, as "the [objec-
tive] meaning of acts of will that are directed toward the conduct of others." HANs
KELSEN, The Function of a Constitution, in EssAYs ON KELSEN 109-11 (Richard Tur &
William Twining eds., 1986). If, following Kelsen, you define "norm" to include only
such directives as agents see issuing from some other agent's "act of will," then it
becomes relatively easy to defeat any claim that the directive contents of regime-fixing
constitutions are eo ipso "norms." All you then need do to defeat it is establish the
possibility of agents taking direction from what they perfectly well know to be inten-
tionlessly grown facts of social practice.
17 For searching analyses of variant usages, see Jules L. Coleman, Negative and
PositivePositivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); Frederick Schauer, ConstitutionalPosi-
tivism, 25 CONN.L. REV. 797 (1993); AnthonyJ. Sebok, Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539 (1997); AnthonyJ. Sebok, MisunderstandingPositivism,
93 MIcH. L. REV. 2054 (1995).
18 See Coleman, supra note 17, at 139.
1999] CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORSHIP
and (b) the moral status of that norm whether in the eyes of an exter-
nal observer of the social order in question or of an internal partici-
pant in it. Legal positivists deny that either the true moral status of a
norm in the sight of an observer or its perceived moral status in the
sight of participants has any necessary bearing on the possibility of the
norm's being made a legal one by social acceptance of it as such. 19
They assert the possibility of a legal system in which there is neither
"external" nor "internal" connection between considerations of the
transcendent morality of a norm and the efficacy of social acceptance
20
to make the norm truly a legal one.
Within legal positivism thus defined, we can detect a smaller
camp of what I will call "legal nonvolitionists." What distinguishes
them is insistence that the foundations of legal orders are and can
only be organically grown facts of social practice, as distinguished
from acts or expressions of anyone's will.2 1 Straightforwardly, a going
legal system is an effectively regulative social practice of reference to
an identifiable collection or system of norms. Some of the norms are
"primary," immediately regarding what is and is not to be done. Some
are "secondary," regarding the modes and means by which primary
norms are determined. Among the secondary norms are "rules of rec-
oguition," among which there logically must be an "ultimate" rule of
recognition, controlling which purported determinations of primary
normative contents, uttered by whom, in what forms and circum-
stances, are to be respected and given effect. 22 Below, I shall some-
times refer to this ultimate rule of recognition as the country's basic
law or law of lawmaking. Whatever you want to call it, legal nonvoli-
tionists point out that it cannot itself consist in the command of any
lawgiver because it supplies the standard by which claims to the status
of lawgiver are verified (or not). Therefore, the legal nonvolitionist
19 What H.L.A. Hart calls "soft" positivism (in contradistinction to "plain-fact pos-
itivism") allows for the possibility of a legal practice, properly so called, in which peo-
ple's judgments of justice or morality do in fact figure into the processes of social
acceptance that constitute the practice as a legal one. See H.LA. HART, Postscript, in
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 247, 250-51 (2d ed. 1994). What unites all legal positivists, on
the definition I am offering here, is insistence that it is nevertheless, in the last analy-
sis, only a fact of acceptance, and not anyone's consideration or judgment of the
moral justifiability of the acceptance, that can and does essentially constitute certain
social practices as legal ones.
20 This is a somewhat elaborated version of the "separability thesis" in whatJules
Coleman terms "negative positivism." See Coleman, supra note 17, at 140-43.
21 For example, this is how I understand Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presup-
positions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECmON, supra note 9, at 148-52
(referring to works of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart).
22 H.L.A. HART, Ti-m CONCEPT OF LAw 92, 96 (1961).
161 4 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VCOL. 74:5
23 See Kay, supra note 7. For the contestation, see generally RESPONDING TO IMPER-
FECTION, supra note 9. For Articles VII and V, see the epigraphs to this Article.
24 My usage of "small-c constitution" follows that of Frederick Schauer in
Schauer, supra note 21.
1999] CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORSHIP 1615
25 See HART, supra note 19, at 267 ("[S]urely ... an American judge's reason for
treating the Constitution as a source of law having supremacy over other sources in-
cludes the fact that his judicial colleagues concur in this as their predecessors have
done."). Hart takes the view that conscious acceptance of the recognitional rule or
practice as such need occur only among legal officials, those whose work requires
them to determine whether a given norm is or is not part of the law, and not necessar-
ily among the population at large who need only "obey." See HART, supra note 22, at
110-13. The difference does not matter for any argument I make here.
1616 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:5
30 See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1370 ("[]t is only the present [and
not the past] that can constitute a legal order for a population, and the question of
what [has and should have] the status of law . . . can only be decided non-
historically.").
31 For a recent vivid example of the view that a country's constitution has to con-
tain the country's ultimate rule of recognition, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation,108
RARv. L. REv. 1221, 1246-47 (1995) (speaking of constitutional amendment):
[W]e must look to that Constitution to determine how [the institutions that
it calls into being] are to operate and when their products are to be re-
garded as law.... We can know that something has the binding force of law
only if it complies with the requirements that, as a matter of social fact, we
have agreed must be met when a law is to be made. Pending some upheaval
[of revolutionary magnitude], the only such requirements for our polity are
those that are, for the time being at least, embodied in our Constitution's
text (footnote omitted).
32 See ,ELsEN, supra note 16, at 111.
1618 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:5
ity of a legal order. "Only a norm," offered Kelsen, can ground "the
validity of another norm."33 Therefore, when we regard a legal order
as grounded we must-logically must-be positing a "historically first
constitution," together with a socially prevailing "basic norm" confer-
ring on that first constitution's promulgators the authority to make it
the law by promulgating it and thereby to obligate the country's pos-
terity (assuming the basic norm remains operative for them) to grant
the force of law to everything that has issued from or pursuant to a
34
chain of amending clauses depending on that first constitution.
Just as the "first constitution" and its promulgators are pure ab-
stractions-"transcendental-logical" categories brought to mind by
the prior determination of a thinker to regard his legal order as
"grounded"-so then is the basic norm. Perhaps that is why contem-
porary legal nonvolitionism has turned away from Kelsen's dictum
that only a norm can ground the validity of another norm, offering
instead to block the regress by shifting attention from the space of
norms to the space of facts and specifically to the convenient fact that
a critical mass of the country's inhabitants (or officials) do, as it hap-
pens, intersubjectively concede a regulative force to an actually opera-
tive practice of government that they for some reason or other tend to
identify with (or hypostatize as) a textoid that they call "the
'35
Constitution.
We should be clear, though, that the legal nonvolitionist argu-
ment, cogent as it is, leaves unscathed our knowledge that Americans
do in fact recurrently think of the Constitution as containing the ulti-
mate legal grounding, the law of laws, for the American legal order
and, furthermore, as doing so by virtue of its legislated character.
What the nonvolitionist argument aims to show is, first, that if you
insist on finding the "ground" of a social practice of positive legal or-
dering, you will have to find it in something that is not itself a vali-
dated law in terms of the system's own ultimate standards of legal
validation, and second, that the only alternative in sight is the sheer
facticity of the social practice whose ground you are seeking-the
33 Id. at 115.
34 See id. at 114-16. On the reduction, for these purposes, of "small-c constitu-
tions" to their amending clauses, see id.; PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMEND-
MENT: A STUDY OF LOGIc, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE (1990).
35 "Textoid," not "text" or "instrument," is used to make allowance both for textu-
ally nonreduced or noncodified (but still institutionally recognizable) constitutions
like the British, as well as for lawyers' knowledge that the political-legal-institutional
Constitution of the United States is not confined to the instrument thus captioned,
but consists also of interpretive and other practices containing and surrounding the
instrument.
1999] CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORSHIP 1619
practice, that is, of sooner or later referring all questions of legal valid-
ity to those particular standards. But full knowledge of a social prac-
tice includes knowledge of how participants in the practice
experience it "from the inside," so to speak,3 6 and the legal nonvoli-
tionist argument neither says nor decides anything about the internal-
experiential dimension of any given society's legal-recognition prac-
tice.3 7 More precisely, the argument does not preclude that the prac-
tice might be one that has this as one of its features: that participants
refer all questions about legal authority and validity to sets of stan-
dards to which, whenever they make such referrals, they attribute the
character of having been intentionally legislated.
The legal nonvolitionist argument accordingly does not contra-
dict the fact of American observance of the authority-authorship syn-
drome-of tracing the Constitution's bindingness on them at least
partly to its reputation-as-legislated-it only makes it intriguing. In
the face of a compelling refutation of the possibility of any essential
tie between the legal force of a country's constitution and attributions
of its authorship, we persist in tying our constitution's authority for
us-"small-c" and "big-C"-to attributions of its authorship.
36 See ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN,MAX Weber 11-14 (1983); PETER WINCH, THE IDEA
OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELAnON TO PHILOSOPHY (Routledge & Kegan Paul eds.,
1958).
37 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 22, at 238-44 ("[T]here is ... nothing in the
project of a descriptive jurisprudence... to preclude a non-participant external ob-
server from describing the ways in which participants view the law from.., an internal
point of view.").
1620 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL- 74:5
A. PopularSovereignty
It would hold, that is, as long as we assume either that "you" are
ascertainably still the same person as the one who ruled before, or else
that what matters is not really being ruled by yourself but only being
ruled by a pod with your name on it. So let us now suppose that
neither of those conditions holds. 'You" are not still ascertainably the
same person as the one who ruled before, and genuine self-rule is
indeed what matters. In that case, the syndrome breaks. Insistence
on this point, I believe, confutes the radical separation of will from
reason that the proposition of popular sovereignty is often taken to
involve-the idea, that is, that a sovereign people is free to legislate to
itself whatever damned law it pleases, just because that is what "sover-
eign" means.
B. The "Generation"Problem
Explanation begins with the opacity of the notion of the will "of
the people" or a decision "by the people." Few who consider the mat-
ter with much seriousness believe that this can plausibly be equated
with a simple tally of votes taken under any conditions whatever, the
41
vote of the majority then standing for the decision of the people.
Among contemporary American constitutional theorists, Bruce
Ackerman is the one who has grappled most seriously with the ques-
tion of what counts as an expression of the legislative will of the peo-
ple. Ackerman quite convincingly maintains that, on any plausible
conception of a people's constitutional will that is morally deserving
of respect, that will (or that "people") can never be corporately or
instantaneously present, but can only be represented by time-ex-
tended courses of political events. 4 2 Sometimes, Ackerman says, a
course of events can disclose the existence of a "mobilized majority" in
favor of major constitutional change-by which he means a clear,
strong, sustained, and committed majority that arises, consolidates,
and persists over a time during which the fundamental, constitutional
matters in questions are publicly controverted at a high level of energy
and concern. 43 Ackerman believes (and in this respect his view is non-
controversial) that such episodes of constitutionally decisive and trans-
formative popular mobilization have been relatively infrequent in
44
American history.
41 See, e.g.,Frank I. Michelman, "Protectingthe People From Themselves, "or How Direct
Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1728-30 (1998).
42 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 236, 260-62 (1991).
43 See id. at 274-75, 285-88.
44 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
3.999] CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORSHIP 1623
virtue of being the works and acts of the generations whose works and
acts it is. Why so? Why not by virtue of being right (if it is), or by
virtue of being there? Because, Ackerman says, of our commitment as
Americans to be governed by ourselves as a people.
But here's the rub. That commitment leaves us with the problem
of telling when we as a people have spoken law. It gives us need for a
rule of recognition of the people legislating. In Ackerman's view, the
root commitment that raises the need also points to the form of the
only admissible answer to it, which is to draw the rule of recognition
from the actual historical practice of the country. The country came
to treat the semi-lawlessly enacted Constitution of the 1780s as its
highest law, as it did with the semi-lawlessly enacted Reconstruction
amendments, and as it now does (so Ackerman contends and many
adamantly deny) with an undocumented constitutional-legal quasi-en-
actment of the New Deal era. 5 1 The country thus shows to itself what
it counts as a mobilized-majoritarian apparition of the legislating peo-
ple. On this matter, as on others, our task is nothing more nor less
than to listen to ourselves. What could be more in the spirit of de-
mocracy as popular self-rule?
The difficulty is the same as it has ever been (call it "counter-
majoritarian,"5 2 call it "inter-temporal"5 3 ). They-the generations of
the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal-are not in any ob-
vious or self-proving way in unity or unison with us the living. But
given that they are not, for us to submit in any degree to governance
by their say so-including not least their say so regarding rules of rec-
ognition-is for us in that same degree to be not governing ourselves.
What some prior generation did as distinguished from what we might
do is extraneous, it would seem, to our self-government, as long as it
remains agreed that they (then) are not us (now).
States, this rule (most observers think) is Article V.56 It looks like
there is a dimension of political freedom that we both attribute to the
chartering People (represented as the authors and ratifiers of Article
V) and deny to the People as thus chartered, that is, the freedom to
decide the terms and conditions of higher lawmaking. The charterers
('We the People of the United States") seem to stand, then, on a dif-
ferent plane of rulership from the chartered ("our posterity"), as cre-
ators to creatures. How is it possible to construe such an event as one
of the People's self-government?
There are possibility conditions for this, but they are stringent.
For a People to be self-governing means for them to legislate to them-
selves as the self-same (if also the ever-changing) People as those who
legislate. This means that the lawmaking act emanates from a People
whose collective character, or "political identity" (to use Bruce Acker-
man's nice term),57 not only continues through the process of enact-
ment undissolved but also, by the same token, was already established
when the process began. We need to say, then, what it is that we think
confers political identities on empirical human aggregates, identities
of a sort that allow us to check for the sameness of the People who lay
down constitutional law with the People to whom it is laid down.
What do we think this people-constituting, identity-fixing factor could
possibly be? Must it not finally come down to an attitude of expecta-
tion or commitment shared by constituent members of the putative
"capital-P People?" An attitude of expectation of the presence among
them of some substantially contentful normative like-mindedness, or
at the very least of commitment to searching out the possibility of this?
An expectation of, or commitment to, some cultural or dispositional
or experiential commonality from which they can together try to dis-
till some substantially contentful idea of political reason or right?
Something-could it be-along the lines of that constitutional-cul-
58
tural "notion" to which I have previously made reference?
Think about how matters look from the standpoint of the People
on the receiving side of a constitutionally decisive mobilization. As a
56 We noticed in supra note 23 that a minority of theorists hold to the view that
Article V is not correctly construed as setting forth the exclusive procedural avenue to
valid amendments of the Constitution. The minority theorists do not, however, all
suggest that the Constitution, correctly construed, contains no binding amendment
rule at all. Althil Amar says the Constitution's rule is a deliberative majority vote. See
Amar, supra note 29.
57 See AcaEMmAN, supranote 42, at 204. Ackerman writes, it seems to me paradox-
ically, of "an entire People ... break~ing] with its past and construct[ing] a new
political identity for itself." Id.; see also Michelman, supra note 9, at 1325.
58 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
1628 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:5