DISCIPNARY COUNSEL .

LAURENCE PARNOFF
(SC 19535)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarena, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and
Robinson, Js.*

A7ged Se---OebeSed Dece 80,0 6

Adam P. MueZZo, COunSel, legal services, With

Whom were ]lL. Odrasqu, Chief disciplinary
COunSel, and, On the brief, Su27e B. StOfor the

appeant (Plainti).

7teS Wecm7m, With whom, On the bhef,

WaS Pu! E Pobbocfor the appellee (defendant).
 ()

ESPINOSA, J. In this appeal, We are aSked to decide

Whether an aOmey Who knowingly appropriated client
funds, but did not intend to do so wrongly, knowingly
misappropriatedthose funds and is therefore suect

to mandatory disbaIment PurSuant tO Practice Book

247A.1 The plalff, Disciplinary Counsel, apPeals
from the judgment of the Appellate Court, Which
armed the judgment of the trial court repnanding
the defendant, Laurence Pamoff; rather than disbarTing
pursuant to 2-47A. DbscbCouleZ v. P-
nq158 Com. App. 454, 482, 119 A.3d 621 (2015).
The plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly
interpreted 247A to mandate disbarment only if an

aOmey apPrOPriates client funds knowingly and with

the wrongful intent to steal them. Regardless of the
defendants intent, the plaintclaims, the defendants

lmowledge that the funds he appropated were dis-

Puted is sucieto disbar him. We conclude that 2-

47A mandates disbarment only when an aOmey misap-

PrOPhates a clients funds both knowingly and inten-

tionally-mat is, When an attomey steals from his or

her client. Accordingly, We arm the judgmerLt Of the

Appellate Court.

This disciplinary action originates fi.om a twelve year

Old fee dispute that resulted in several actions and vari-
OuS apPeals. The facts and procedural history underly-
ing these actions are set forth in substaial detail in
DtscaE/ Couseb v. PmqSuPra, 158 Com. App.
454, DcL7ty Couleb v. PQSuperior Court,

judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-12-6031943-

S (September 19, 2013), PQv Ie, 139 Com
App. 147, 57 A.3d 349 (2012), Cert. denied, 307 Com.
956, 59 A3d l192 (2013), and Pqv. Mooeg, 132
Corm. App. 512, 35 A.3d 283 (2011). We sunmarizethose
facts and the relevant proceduralstory reected in

the record that are necessary to an understanding of

the present case.

Darcy Yullle had been empIoyed by Bridgeport Hospi-

tal alOSPital) ua work-relatedury led to her temri-
nation. DcCou Sel v. PmQSuPra, 158
Com. App. 457. In 1996, Yuille retained Attomey Laura
Mooney to represent her before the WorkersCompen-
sation Corrmission on a claim for benefits in comection
With her iuries. f)yfv. Moo, Supra, 132 Com.
App. 514. Dung Mooneys representation of Yui11e,
Mooney observed bad falth conduct by the hospital in
its handling of the workerscompensation claim. Id

Mooneyempted to refer Yuilles acOn againS=he

hospital, Which claimed that the hospital had handled
Yuilles workerscompensation claim in bad falth, tO

the defendant. Id., 514 n.2. After the defenda`failed

to provide a timely response,Mooney decided to

undertake the action hersein addition to undertaking

Yues workerscompensation claim. Id. The defendant
eventually contacted Mooney and Mooney referred
Yue to the defendant for a separate claim against the
hospital alleging wrongfdischarge. Id.

In 1998, after Mooney brought the bad faith action,

Yullle also retained the defendant to represent her in
a bad falth and wrongfldischarge action agalnst the

hospital. Id., 515. Mooney wastially unaware of the

defendants representation of Y1e in the bad fth and

wrongful discharge action because Mooney believed
that he was merely retained to pursue the wrongful
discharge claim. Id., 514-15. In retaining the defendant,
Yuille entered into an agreement that provided the
defendant with a contingency fee of 40 percent of gross
receipts from the claim. DscU CouSeZ v. P-

Qsupra, 158 Com. App. 457. On Yunes behthe

defendaut commenced the action against the hospital
in November, 1998. PmQv. Moo"eg, SuPra, 132 Com.
App. 515.

In 2002, the defendant entered into an agreement

with the hospital on Yuilles behalf to submit her clalm
to binding aoitraon. DbscU CounseZ v Pmq
supra, 158 Com. App. 457. After leaming of the
impending aoitration proceeding-and discovering the

ovehapping representationMooneyed an appear-

ance in the action against the hospital, Which the defen-
dant had commenced, and appeared at the arbitration
proceeding, OVer the objection of the hospital. Id. Yui11e
was awarded approximately $1.1 mon as a rest of
the binding arbitration proceeding Id., 458.

August, 2004, Shoy after the aritration award,

Yuille questioned the defendants fee agreement, Claim-

ing that the 40 percent contingency fee was excessive

because it vi.01ated General Statutes 52-251c (b),2 con-
necticuts fee cap statute, and that a portion of the
defendant,s fee should have been allocated to Mooney.
Id. , 458-60. After receiving the defendants cIosing state-

ment indicating that his fee anouuted to $438,413.17,

Yue authorized the defendant to take $125,000 toward
his fee, and to place the remainder of the 40 percent
fee in escrow umtiley cod agree on a resolution. Id.,

458. After tulg $125,000 toward his fee, the defendant

made various disbursements in cormection with the
:bitration, Placing $313,413.17-the remainder of the

disputed 40 perceut contingency fee-into a certificate

Of deposit accouIut (CD) with Chase Bank as escrow,
and paying Y1e the balance of the award. Id., 460.

The defendant and Yuille were unable to resoIvee

fee dispute, and, in January, 2005, the defendant filed

an action agatnst Ye for breacn of contract, uust
enrichment, and bad faith Id. The defendant alsoed
a separate action against Mooney for, amOng Oer

Claims, tOrtious interference with his agreemewith

Yue. Id., 459.

The cases against Mooney and Yuille were conso

dated and tried to aJury. Id., 461. On May 20, 2010, the
jury remed a verdict for the defendant against Yue
on the defendants breach of contract claims, and
against the defendant on all other claims. Id The court

rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, and

awarded the defendant a total of $252,044.27 for com-
PenSatOry danages, interest, and punitive danages.

The defendamt nOted Chase Bank not to renew the

CD holding the disputed funds, CauSing it to mature. The
defendant then transferred the funds into his personal
Savings account. Id., 462. This redemption occurred on
Jy 26, 2010, apPrOXimately five and one-half years
after the funds had been placed into escrow. At the
time of the transfer, the CD account contained
$363,960.87.d.

DuIg the appeal from the judgment of the thal

COurt, Yuille discovered that the defendant was no
Ionger holding the funds in escrow, anded a grievance
agairst him, aeging that he had violated the Res of
Professional Conduct by transferring and commingling
the funds. Id., 456, 468. A reviewing commiee ofe
Statewide Ghevance Commiee subsequeny found by
clear and coIwincmg evi.dence that the defendahad
Violated rule l.15 co of the Res of Professional Con-

duct.3 Id., 456-57. In order to determine what disciplin-

ary action shod be taken, the reviewing committee
directed the plaintiff toe a presentmeut wI the
Superior Court pursuant to Practice Book 247A.
Id., 457.

Dung the preserment before the trial court, the

defendant testified that he believed he was entitled to

the funds because Yuille had no interest in them other
than to pay Mooneys legal fee. Id., 475. Yle had testi-
fied, aS Part Of her special defense during the breach
of contract action, that if the defendant resoIved mat-
ters with Mooney by paying Mooney a portion of the
fee, Yui11e wod then be willing to give the defendant
his fee.4 Id., 461. At the presentment, the defendant
testied that these statements indicated that Yes
Oy interest in the escrowed funds was to pay Mooney
and, therefore, Yui11e had waived any challenge she had
to the disputed funds. Id., 475. Further, the defendant
testified that he believed he was entitled to the ftds

because Yuille did not pursue a counterclaim or

intervermg complaint sucient to ene her to ar-

mave relief in the breach of contract action, and her

SPeCial defense sinarly did not entitle her to arma-

tive relief. Accordingly, the defendant claimed that
because he believed Yutle had no interest in the fuds

otheran to pay Mooney, he was entitled to the funds

and he was therefore jused in hawhg them moved to
his personal account. Notwithstanding the defendants

tesnony regarding his suective belief as to his enti

emem to the funds, the plaintiargued that the defen-

dant violated nlle l.15 (D of the Res of Professional
Conduct and also was suect to mandatory disbarment
because he Imowinglysappropriated client funds in
violation of Practice Book 247A. Id., 463.

The trial court found by clear and convincing evi-

denceat the defendant violated nlle l.15 (D of the
Res of Professional Conduct by failing to maintain

the disputed fee in escrow and that his ``belief that

Yuille wod be satisfied once Mooney was paid was
erroneous and unreasonable given the totality of the
circumstances.Despite this vi.olation, the trial court

also found that the defendant did not knowingly misap-

propriate those funds. Specifically, the trial court found
that the defendants failure to escrowe funds.
Was nOt a reflection of any lack of integrity on his part
and that he did not act wilIly or with intent to deceive
Yue.Essentially, We the defendant appropriated
the flmds knowingly, he had engaged in this conduct

negligey,without decepve intent The trial court

set forth the protracted, lengthy, Very COI-fusing, and

tortured history of the fee dispute,and found that the

defendant,s mistaken belief that Yue had no personal
interest in the funds other than to pay Mooney, meant
the defendant acted unreasonat)ly but not dishonestly

and without an intent to deceive.DcCu

sel v. PQSuPra, 158 Com App. 466. Because the
trial court found that the defendant did not act with
the requisite intent, it detemined that disbarment pur-
suant to Practice Book 247A was not appropriate
and issued a formal reprimand against the defendant.
d., 463-64.

The plainf appealed to the Appellate Court) Which

amed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 482. The
Appellate Court held thate trial court properly inter-

Preted Practice Book 247A, by considering the defen-

dant,s intent because the `OWingrequirement [in

247A] relates to whether the aOmey knows in fact

Lat the property did not belong to hin when it was
misappropriated,,, not merely that an attomey had
knowingly transferred the funds. Id., 468. Ts cered

appeal fonowed. Dc7U Cbm,SeZ v. Pn319

Com. 905, 122 A.3d 1279 (2015).
The plalntiff clalms that Practice Book 247A man-
dates disbarment when an attomey: (1) appropates
client funds; (2) does so knowingly; and (3) does so
knowing no agreement or court order existed regarding
the appropriation of the funds.the plaintiffs view, a
finding regarling the defendants intent is umeCeSSary.

We disagree.

Whether the Appe11ate Gourt correctly mteIPreted a

rule of practice is a question of law over which our
review is plenary. Wsemn V. Asmg, 295 Com.
94, 99, 989 A.2d lO27 (2010). Our interpretation of the
res of practice, like our interpretation of statutes, lS

guided by well established principles regarding legisla-

tive intent. See KSic V. CoLum309 Com. 85, 93,
70 A.3d l (2013) (explaining plain mearing re under
General Statutes 1-2z and seing fth process for

ascertainng legislative intent); See also Cssboer

Lces v. Smh, 265 Co 723, 733-34, 830

A.2d 228 (2003) (he inteIPretive construction of the
rules of practice is to be govemed by the sane pICi-

ples as those regulating statutory interpretation)

As required by 1-2z we begi]"the text of the

re of practice. Practice Book 247A provides:
any disciphary PrOCeeding where there has been a
1ding by ajudge ofthe superior court that a lawyer has
o7tgma)qped a clients funds or other

property held in trust, the discipline for such conduct

shall be disbarment for a minimum of twelve years.

(Emphasis added.)

The phrase knowingly misappropriatedis not

defined in Practice Book 247A or elsewhere in the

res of practice. Because the res of practice do not

provide guidance, We look to related provisions. Re

l.0 (g) of the Res of Professional Conduct define
`` `[k]nowingly as ``denotg] actual knowledge of the

fact in question.We observe that General States

53a3 ofthe Penal Code also oers guidance. Section

53a.3 (12) provides: A person acts `knowinglywi

respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by

a state dening an offense when he is aware that his

conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance

exists .,, A person, therefore, aCtS kmowingly when
he or she has actuaImowledge or awareness of the
nature ofl.e aCt.

The term misappropriatedis not defined in the

res of practice or in any related provisions, thus, m

accordance with General Statutes 1-1 (a), We look to

its common usage.5 ``To ascertain that usage, We look

to the dictionary definition of the term. antemal quotaT

on marks omitted.) Pov.oZ See & Equ-

t Co., 298 Com. 620, 633, 6 A.3d 60 (2010).
Misappropriate is dened as [t]o appropriate t/0O
. To approphateshoeS/ for ones ovuse;
embezzle To use illegally.(Emphasis added.)

American Heritage College Dictionary (4th Ed. 2007)

P. 887. It is clear that, because the defition of misap-

PrOPriate incoIPOrateS the concepts of wrongfuhess,

dishonesty, and embezzlement-all of which genera11y
requlre intenhe term misappropriate inherently

includes an element of intent. Speccally, the term

misappropriateincoIPOrateS an intent to wrongfully

take the property of anothero steal.

The definition of misappropriate is uncannily similar

to the defirition of larceny in General Statutes 53a

l19, Which provides in relevant part that [a] person

commits larceny w.hen,de7tO deprive another
Of property or to appropriate the sane to himseIf or a
third person, he )07uges, Obtains or withholds

SuCh propey from an owner. Larceny includes, but is

not limited to . Embeee. . . Obtaining

PrOPerty byse pee7tSeS. . . 7of services.

. Receiving sobe7t Plpper Library J
. Co7t,)eSof leased property. 7heOf u-
jty service. T7bOf motor fuel (Emphasis
added.) The commissions comment to 53a-119 pro-

vides in relevant part that [t]his deion is

meant to encompass the myriad ways in which property

may be stolen.ComIssion to Revise the Chminal

Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Com. Gen. Stat. Am.

53a-119 (West 2012), COmmission corrment, P. 108.
With respect to the intent element oflarceny, the Appel-
late Court has observed that a] specc intent to
depnve or to misapprophate is an essenal element of
larceny.Se v. Pueg, 46 Com. App. 414, 418, 699
A.2d lO42 (1997).

By contrast, the tem appropriateis deIed as [t]o

take possession of or make use of exclusively for one-

Self, Often without pemssion. American Heritage Col-

lege Dictionary, SuPra, P. 70. The definition of the term

``appropriate,,,ke that of ``Isappropriate) does not

include an inherently wrongful or dishonest intentmd

Certainly is not consistewith the concept of theft. If

the drafters of the nes of practice intended to requre

merely a ``knowingmental state, Without an element

of intent as the plaintiff contends, they wod have used

the word appropriateinstead of the word ``misappro-

Priate.Their decision not to do so is telling An aOr-

ney, therefore, Can be said to knowingly misappropriate
funds when the aOmey: (1) appropriates funds; (2)
does so knowing that a client claims to have an interest
in them nd (3) does so with the intent to steal the
funds or othervise take them wrongfully, dishonestly
Or eg1y.

On the basis of the trial courts factual findings, as

set forth in this opinion, the defendants transfer of

funds constuted an appropriation that he undertook

knowingly. The trial court found, however, that the

long and toOuS PrOCedural history of the paesfee
dispute contributed toe defendants unreasonable
but suecve beliefthat he was enIed to the disputed
funds and no Ionger was required to maintain them in
escrow.6 Put another way, the defendant appropriated
Client funds, did so knowingly, but did not do so wi
any intent to steal the escrowed funds or otherwise
take them wrongfully, dishonestly, Or illegally The
transfer did not constituteeft or larceny. Accordingly,
because the defendant did not intend to steal from
his client he did not act with the intent necessary to
COnStte aSaPPrOpriation and, thereforenot sub-
ject to mandatory disbarment pursuant to Practice
Bk 27A.

The plainticontends that New Jersey case law

shod inform our decision in the present case because

the 2007 commentary to Practice Book 247A states
that 247A is a codification ofe W0 nhe,as
set out in JW5Lson, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d l153
(1979).7 In W0the Supreme Court of New Jersey
deIed `` `misappropriation, asany unauthorized use

bye lavyer of clients, funds entmsted to him, includ-

ing not only stealing) but also unauthohzed temporary

use for the lavyer,s own purpose, Wheer or not he

derives any personal gaih Or benetherefrom.Id, 455

n. 1. Speccally, the plaintiff argues thatis definition,

and the case law that intexpreted it, eSSentiay stand

for the hard lineproposition that any time an attomey

appropriates client funds, the attomeys subjective

belief as to his entitlement to those funds is irrelevant in
determining whether the aOmey COmmitted a knowing
misappropriation. The Appellate Court agreed with the
plaintiffs assertion that mZson and its progeny are
instructive in ierPreting 247A, but distinguished

them from the present case because those cases con-

cemed the related but distinct question of whether an
aOmey,s subjective intent to merely borrow client

funds is a mitigating faCtOr in detemining when manda-

tory disbament is proper. Dc7t/ Comsetw P?L

QSuPra, 158 Com. App. 470-73.

In hol(ngat in order to be suhiect to mandatory

disbarment pursuato Practice Book 247A, an attOr-
ney must knowingly and intentionally steal client funds

we rqiect the definition of knowing misappropriation

from W5Lso, Which resembles sthct liability, and the

New Jersey case lawratows from it.e Wo,
supra, 81 N.J. 455 n. 1addition to being inhamonious
with our statory construction of Imowingly misap-

propriated,,, such a standard would impose a severe

purshment-that of mandatory disbament for a mini-
mum of twelve years--On aOmeyS for conduct that
had been undertaken less than intentionally and, fur-
ther, WOd create a rigid ne, rObbing the trial court

of its discretion to fdshion sanctions properly suited to

e offchding aomey)s background, intent, and miti-

gating or aggravating circunstances.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is aLmed

In this opmlOn the other justices concuHed.

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consistmg Of Chief Justice Rogersand Jusces Palmer, Zarena, Eve-

leigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson Although Justices Espinosa and

Robiuson were not present at oral argument, they have read the briefs and

appendices, and have listened to a recording of oral argument prior to

paIticipang in this decision.
*December 30, 2016, the date that this decision was released as a s

opinion, is the operative date for asubstantive and procedural pxpOSeS.

1 Practice Book 247A provides: In any discipIaPrOCeeding where

there has been a fiI-dmg by a judge of the superior court that a lawyer has

owingly misappropriated a cHent,s funds or other property held in trust,

the discIPline for such conduct shall be disbament for a minimun of

twelve years.

Although Practice Book 247Ahas been amended since the events under-

1ying this appeal by the addition of the phrasefor a minimm Of twelve

years,, after the word =disbament,, that anendment has no bearing on the
merits of this appeal. h the interest of simpliciall references to Practice

Book 247A in this opinion are to the version appeang in the 2016 Practice
Book. See DcCsev.mQ158 Com. App. 454, 463 n.2,
119 A.3d 621 (2015).
2 General Statutes 52-251c (b) provides in relevant part: In [a] contih-

gency fee agreement such fee. . shanot exceed an amount equal to a

percentage ofe damages awarded and received by the clalmant or of the

seement amount received by the claimant as follows: (1) Thirty-tee and

one-td per cent of the first three hundred thousand douars; (2) twenty-

five per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; (3) twenty per
cent of the nextuee hundred thousand dollars; (4)een per cent of the

next three hundred thousand dollars; and (5) ten per cent of any anoLt

which exceeds one nlillion two huned thousand dollars.,

Authough 52-25lc has been anended since the events undeying this

appedy see, e.gPublic Acts 2005, No. 05-275, 1; those anendments have
no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the mterest of simplicilWe

refer to the current revision of the statute.

3 Re l, 15 (f) ofthe Rule Of Professional Conduct (2015) provides When

in the course of representation a lavyer is in possession of property in

whch two or more persons (One Ofwhom ma! be the lawyer) claim interests,

the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer unthe dispute is resoived.
The lawyer sha11 promptly distribute a11 portions of the property as to which
the interests are not in dispute.

All references herein to rule l.15 (f) are to the version set foh in the

2015 Practice Book.

4 During trial, Yui11e testified, aS Part Of her special defense, that `he

defendant] would need to resoIve matters with Mooney and that she would
then be willing to give the defendant] his fee; She also testified, When asked

if she was at theial to help Mooney, that she was also trying to get her

own fee dispute resoIved.(Intemal quotation marks oItted.) Dc

CoSeb v, P; supra, 158 Com. App. 461.

6 General States 1-1 (a) provides: the construction of the states,

WOrds and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved

usage of the language; and technicaI words and pases, and such as have

acquired a peculiar and appropriate mearmg in the law, Sha11 be construed

and understood accordingly.
6 The plaintiff also appears to contend that the trial court erredfinding

tha,t the defendant did not demonsate any lack of integrity, and did not

act with any intent to deceive Yuille. To the extent tha=he plainmay

be understood to claim the trial courts findings were clearly erroneous,

Wesaee.
7The 2007 commery to Practice Book 247A provides in relevant

Part: `(The above nlle is a codificaon of the1tsonrule.L Je W0

[supra, 81 N.J. 451], the New Jersey Sxpreme Court aculated a ne that
the universal response m cases of krOWing misappropriation of clients

money should, without exception, be disbarment.