Chapter 68 Edited 5-5-08

<LRH>Chapter Number (sentence case)
<RRH>Book Title (all caps)
<CN>CHAPTER
68
<CT>DesignESIGN ofOF IndianNDIAN
PressurizedRESSURIZED HeavyEAVY WaterATER
ReactorEACTOR ComponentsOMPONENTS
<CA>H.S. Kushwaha, K.K. Vaze, and K.B. Dixit
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2 March 11, 2008
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<H1>68.1 INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Power Program in India at present is based mainly on a series of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs).
Starting from Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, comprising of two units of 200 MWeMWe Canadian- designed PHWRs in 1973,
the program has come a long way with 15 PHWR units (which includes two 2 units of 540 MWe PHWRs) in operation and 3 units
under construction. Narora Atomic Power Station commissioned in 1991 marked major indigenization and standardization of
PHWR designs. The current design plans include 700 MWeMWe capacity units. The choice of PHWRs in the current stage of
India's Nuclear nuclear Power power Program program is based on long-term objectives to be achieved in the available uranium
resources and industrial infrastructure. These reactors use natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as moderator and coolant. The
nuclear power stations in India are generally planned as twin-unit modules, sharing common facilities such as service building,
control building, turbine building, spent fuel storage bay, etcand so on.
The Indian PHWR design has evolved through a series of improvements over the years in progressive projects. Such
improvements have been driven by, among others, evolution in technology, feedback from experience in India and abroad,
including lessons learnt from incidents and their precursors, evolving regulatory requirements, and cost considerations. Valuable
experience gained in design, manufacture, construction, operation, maintenance, and safety regulation has enabled continual
evolution, improvement, and refinement in the PHWR concept in a progressive manner.
In Indian PHWRs, the design, fabrication, testing, and inspection of all mechanical components basically follow the
requirements of appropriate Sections sections of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PV Code).
. Other international codes used are: (1) Canadian Code CAN/CSA N285.4-05 and IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-02 for ISI, and (2)
French Code RCC-G for containment design. This chapter first provides a general overview of the Indian PHWR design and its
evolution. The design approach, material selection, and fabrication practices are described for major components such as the
calandria, headers, steam generators, and piping. Details are provided of the development and the use of leak-before-break (LBB)
criterion to eliminate the need for installation of pipe whip restraints. Results of experiments conducted to determine load-
carrying capacity of cracked pipes and the results of fatigue crack growth rate tests in support of LBB criteria are discussed. As a
further example of the research and development work conducted in India related to nuclear power plant applications, the
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development of a modified B2 stress index (used in NB-3600- type stress analyses) for pipe elbows and curved pipes and,
quantification of additional safety factors to account cyclic tearing in LBB assessment , is are discussed.
<H1>68.2 INDIAN PHWR
<H2>68.2.1 Introduction to Indian PHWR [1]
The first PHWRs at Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #1 and 2 and Madras Atomic Power Station #1 and 2 were of Canadian
design (based on Douglas Point). When design work for the third PHWR station, Narora Atomic Power Station #1 and 2, was taken
up in the early 1970s, major modifications were incorporated with the objectives of upgrading the designs in line with the
internationally evolving safety standards, and to cater to the seismic loading. Narora Atomic Power Station design was the first
opportunity to apply India's operating experience with PHWRs, including aspects such as ease of maintenance, in-service
inspection (ISI) requirements, improved constructability, increased availability, and standardization of the unit. Some of the new
designs incorporated in In Narora Atomic Power Station, some of the new designs were incorporated with the objective to serve as
stepping stones for the design of subsequent larger 540 MWe PHWR.
Some of the significant design improvements made in Narora Atomic Power Station included adoption of an integral calandria
(reactor vessel) and end shields assembly, two independent fast acting reactor shutdown systems, a high- pressure Emergency Core
Cooling System, and a double containment with suppression pool.
Subsequent to Narora Atomic Power Station, Kakrapar Atomic Power Station #1 and 2, Kaiga Atomic Power Station #1 and 2 ,
and Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #3 and 4 saw further improvements leading to standardizations in design and layout for
220 MWe PHWRs. Table- 68.1 lists the design features of Indian standard 220 MWeMWe PHWR.
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TableTABLE- 68.1: Design featuresDESIGN FEATURES: IPHWR 220 MWe MWe [1]
Design data
A. General
(i) Rated output thermal 756 MWt
(ii) Rated output electrical 220 MWe
(iii) Fuel Natural UO2
(iv) Moderator and reflector Heavy water
(v) Coolant Heavy water
(vi) Type Horizontal pressure tube
B. Reactor
(i) Calandria shell Horizontal stepped cylinder welded to extensions of end shield
(ii) Calandria shell material SS-304L
(iii) End shields Cylindrical box- type structure integral with calandria shell
(iv) End shield material SS-304L
(v) Calandria tubes
(a) Quantity 306
(b) Material Zircaloy-2
(vi) Coolant tubes
(a) Quantity 306
(b) Material Zirconium2.5% niobium alloy
C. Steam generators
(i) No. of steam generators 4
(ii) Type Vertical U- tube with integral steam drum (mushroom-shaped)
(iii) Material Incoloy-800
(iv) Steam pressure 3.923 MPa
(v) No. of tubes per SG 1834
(vi) Total steam flow to turbine 370 kg/s
(vii) Steam temperature 251 C
(viii) Maximum moisture content 0.25%
<H2>68.2.2 Description IPHWR
The reactor consists of a low-pressure horizontal reactor vessel (calandria) containing heavy water moderator at near ambient
pressure and temperature. The calandria (Fig. 68. 1) is pierced by a large number (306 in 220 MWe and 392 in 540 MWe PHWR) of
coolant tubes, which contain the fuel bundles, and through which pressurized heavy water coolant circulates. The calandria houses
all reactivity and reactor shutoff devices in the low-pressure, low- temperature environment.
The calandria is housed in a steel- lined vault filled with light water which that serves as shielding as well as provides cooling
to the calandria.
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1. Calandria Shellshell 11. Main Shell shell
2. Over Pressure pressure Relief relief Assemblyassembly
Devicedevice(OPRD) 12. Tube Sheet sheet F/M Sideside
3. Shut Down down system #1 13. Tube Sheet sheet Calcal.
4. Shut Down down system #1 Sideside
5. Moderator Inletinlet 14. Lattice Tubetube
6. Moderator Outletoutlet 15. End Shield- shield Support
7. Vent Pipepipe support Plateplate
8. Coolant Channel channel 16. End Shield shield Cooling
Assemblyassembly ccooling Inlet inlet Pipespipes
9. End Shieldshield 17. End Fitting fitting
10. End Shield shield Support support Assemblyassembly
Structure structure assembly 18. Feeder Pipespipes
assy 19. Outer Shellshell
20. Support Luglug
Fig.FIG. 68. 1 Integral INTEGRAL assembly
ASSEMBLY of OF Calandria CALANDRIA And AND
End END Shield SHIELD (CUTCUT-Away View Of
ReactorAWAY VIEW OF REACTOR) [1]
TYPE SETTER
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED FILE FOR 'PHOTO
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READY black & white PICTURE OF THIS FIGURE 1
THAT SHOULD BE INSERTED HERE". A suitable
enlarged size of this figure may be inserted at this
location of the chapter to make it legible for readers.
The Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system uses heavy water under forced circulation in a figure-of-eight loop. Figures 68. 2
and 68.3 show the schematic of the system.
The main circuit of 220 MWe units has four branches on each side.
Fig. 2 PHWR simplified flow diagram [1]FIG. 68. 2
PHWR SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM [1]
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Fig. 3 Perspective view of steam generator and
PHT system [1]
FIG. 68.3 PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF STEAM
GENERATOR AND PHT SYSTEM [1]
TYPE SETTER:
location of the chapter to make it legible for readers
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For the latest 220 MWe units, PHT System system is valveless. Elimination of these valves along with general reduction in the
number of components has helped to decongest the layout in the pump room, facilitating better maintenance approachability, less
maintenance, and lesser manrem.
The primary heat transport system pressure control in 220 MWe units is based on the feed and bleed bleed concept. During
normal operation, the average pressure of both outlet headers is controlled at a set pressure of 8.53 MPa to keep the system
solid,, i.e.that is, no bulk boiling is permitted. Operational transients such as turbine trip, load rejection, boiler feed pump trip,
reactor power setback, etc.and so on, cause swell swell or shrinkage. The feed or bleed control valves actuate to counter
these swells/shrinkages. Though the system is solid there is some finite compressibility of the system, which keeps the pressure
changes within a fairly narrow band. The feed is provided by two feed control valves located on the discharge side of primary
pressurizing pumps, which take suction from storage tank. Two bleed control valves are connected to reactor inlet header. The hot
bleed is depressurized, cooled and returned back to storage tank via purification system.
In 540 MWe PHWR, a pressurizer has been introduced for primary heat transport system pressure control, while feed and
bleed is retained for inventory control.
Fig. 4 Containment Building [1]
FIG. 68. 4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING [1]
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TYPE SETTER:
Current Indian PHWRs use a double containment principle. The annular space between the primary and secondary
containment envelopes is provided with a purging arrangement to maintain a negative pressure in the space. This arrangement
significantly reduces the ground- level releases to the environment during accidents involving radioactivity release into the primary
containment. Fig.ure 68. 4 shows the schematic of containment.
The containment structures are made of concrete. The primary containment is a pre-stressed concrete structure, consisting of a
perimeter wall topped by a pre-stressed concrete dome. The outer or secondary containment is a reinforced concrete cylindrical
wall topped by a reinforced concrete dome. The primary containment uses epoxy coating as liner on the inner surface for enhanced
leak-tightness and ease while decontamination. Because of the use of double containment, incorporation of a steel liner is not
considered necessary.
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<H2>68.2.3 Design CodesDESIGN CODES
The design, fabrication, testing and inspection of all mechanical components are as per the appropriate sections of ASME
ASME B&PV CodeBoiler & Pressure Vessel Code [2, 3].
The design philosophy of the containment structure is based on limit state concept where the response of the structure under
load combinations pertaining to both limit state of serviceability and limit state of strength are is checked. The various limit states
specified in the French code Code RCC-G [4] along with the supporting documents BPEL [5] and BAEL [6] are adopted for
designing the structural elements of the inner and outer containment structures.
<H2>68.2.4 Regulatory Structure [7]
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is the national authority to ensure safety of Nuclear nuclear Power power
Plantsplants (NPPs). AERB fulfills its mission by stipulating and enforcing rules and regulations concerned with nuclear and
radiological safety. AERB has developed safety documents that lay down requirements for meeting safety criteria for activities
related to nuclear energy and provide guidance on methods for fulfilling the requirements.
Safety documents published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regulatory bodies of other countries are
appropriately used as reference material for the purpose.
Safety Codes establish objectives and set minimum requirements that have to be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for
safety in nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety Guides provide guidelines and indicate methods for implementing specific
requirements as prescribed in the codes, .
As on date, AERB has published 5 Safety Codes and 45 Safety Guides concerning various aspects of NPPs and 51 other safety
support documents. Several other documents are under various stages of preparation. All these safety documents are being
extensively utilized in developing designs, operating procedures and in regulation activities including safety reviews by AERB. A
short list of documents related to NPPs is given belowin Table 68.2.
For design of mechanical components such as vessels, pumps, and piping, use of appropriate ASME Codes is permitted.
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Table 2: Partial List of regulatory documents related to NPPs [7]TABLE 68.2 PARTIAL LIST OF REGULATORY
DOCUMENTS RELATED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS [7]
S.
Title of Safety Document
noNo.
Code of practice on quality assurance for safety in

1.
Nuclear nuclear Power power Plantsplants
Code of practice on design for safety in Pressurized
2. pressurized Heavy heavy Water water Reactorreactor-
based Nuclear nuclear Power power Plantsplants

Code of practice on safety in Nuclear nuclear Power
3.
power Plant plant Operationoperation
Code of practice on safety in Nuclear nuclear Power
4.
power Plant plant siting
5. Code of regulation of nuclear and radiation facilities
Safety classification and seismic categorization of
6.
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)
Design basis events for Pressurized pressurized Heavy
7.
heavy Water water Reactorsreactors
8. Primary Heat heat Transport transport system
Loss of coolant accident analysis for Pressurized
9.
pressurized Heavy heavy Water water Reactorsreactors
Safety guide for quality assurance in the design of
10.
Nuclear nuclear Power power Plantsplants
Safety Guide guide for seismic studies and design basis
11. ground motion for Nuclear nuclear Power power Plant
plant sites
Civil engineering structures important to safety of
12.
nuclear facilities
Design of concrete structures important to safety of
13.
nuclear facilities
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S.
Title of Safety Document
noNo.
Design, fabrication, and erection of steel structures

14.
important to safety of nuclear facilities
Design, fabrication, and erection of embedded parts and
15.
penetrations important to safety of nuclear facilities
<H1>68.3 DESIGN OF INDIAN PRESSURISED PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTOR
COMPONETNSCOMPONENTS
<H2>68.3.1 Calandria- end End shield Shield assembly Assembly
The calandria- end shield assembly consists of calandria vessel with main shell and small shell connected by an annular plate.
The vessel houses 306 coolant tubes, reactivity mechanisms, and shutdown assemblies. At the two ends, the calandria vessel is
connected with end shields. The end shields limit the radiation dose in the fuelling machine vaults adjoining the calandria vault.
They also support and locate the calandria tubes and primary coolant channel assemblies in which the fuel resides. In the original
design of end shield (Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #1 and 2 and Madras Atomic Power Station #1), the end-shield material of
construction was 3.5% Ni-steel. However, it was found that Nil nil Ductility ductility Transition transition Temperature
temperature (NDTT) crossed the operating temperature within a short period of operation. While the stability of the end shields in
this condition is assessed in detail; from the second unit of Madras Atomic Power Station onwards, the end- shield material has
been changed to SS-304L, which is resistant to radiation embrittlement due to fast neutrons.
In the current design (Narora Atomic Power Station onwards) (Fig. 68.1), the calandria and two end shields constitute an
integral assembly, supported from the reactor vault walls, unlike earlier designs wherein the calandria and end shields were
separately suspended by support rods. This design allows common tube sheet between calandria and end shield. It also simplifies
alignment requirement between calandria tubes and end- shield lattice tubes, and is more suited to conditions at seismic site.
<H2>68.3.2 Main PHT System Components:
As described in section Section 1.0, the main PHT system consists of steam generators, Primary primary circulating pumps,
pressurizer (for 540 MWeMWe PHWR), headers, feeders, and interconnecting piping.
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68.3.2.1Steam Generator:
<H3>68.3.2.1 Steam Generator The Steam steam Generator generator (SG) design is of mushroom type. This design has
the advantage of a single integral unit with provisions of manholes on primary head to enable in-service inspection (ISI) of the
tubes. Four identical steam generators transfer heat from the heavy water reactor coolant on the primary side to the ordinary feed
water on the secondary side. The steam generators consist of an integral inverted vertical U-tube bundle in shell. Moisture
separators and driers are housed in the upper end of the shell.
The primary side of the steam generator consists of primary head, the primary side of the tube sheet and the primary side of the
tube bundle. A partition plate separates the inlet half of the primary head from the outlet half. The U-tubes are welded to the
primary side of the cladded carbon steel tube sheet and rolled into the tube sheet. The steam generator primary shell and head are
made of low alloy steel.
The secondary side of the steam generators consists of the shell, moisture separators and driers, the tube bundle shroud, the
secondary side of the tube sheet, the secondary side of the tube bundle, and tube support egg-crate grids. Low alloy carbon steel is
the principal material of construction.
The SG tubes are of 19-mm outer diameter (OD) and incoloy-800 material. The 19- mm tubes, when compared to 16-mm
tubes of 220 MWeMWe PHWR SG, offer advantages in ease of fabrication, reduction in manufacturing time and lower D 2O side
pressure drop. The shell of SG is provided with a man-way. Secondary side of the tube sheet is provided with suitable holes to
blow off and remove concentration of impurity in the secondary side water.
Both primary and secondary sides of the steam generators are designed and manufactured to the requirements of the ASME B&PV
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, subsection Subsection NB, Class-1 components.
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68.3.2.2Primary Coolant Pumps
<H3>68.3.2.2 Primary Coolant Pumps The primary coolant pumps (PCP) are vertical, single stage, single suction, double
discharge, centrifugal pumps. Each pump is driven by a vertically, totally enclosed, air and water cooled, squirrel cage induction
motor.
A spacer type rigid coupling connects the pump shaft to the motor shaft. Each motor is supplied with a single piece flywheel
so that the total rotational energy of pump motor unit prolongs the operation of the pump after loss of motor power and the rate of
flow approximately matches the power run down following a reactor trip.
The pump has capability to operate without external injection (gland coolant external injection) but with process water
available from high pressureHP cooler. During hot standby condition when the pumps are unavailable, high pressureHP coolers
which are located at an elevation higher than the seal location provide necessary thermosyphon flow to ensure that temperature in
seal areas do not increase.
The pump casing design is in accordance with the requirements for class-1 components of ASME B&PVBoiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section III.
Primary circulating pump motor unit is a vertical assembly, with dead weight being supported at two locations; 80% on two
spring hangers located on boiler room floor and 20% on pump room floor through straight pipe piece attached to suction elbow. To
reduce stresses in heavy water pipes under operating conditions, sliding support has been provided at the bottom of pump suction
elbow. To mitigate large displacements of pump motor unit under earthquake, two horizontal snubbers each of 100 Te safe
shutdown earthquake (SSE) rating have been provided at pump motor C.G. location in two mutually perpendicular directions. The
pump bottom support is designed to resist vertical loads during the earthquake.
68.3.2.3 Pressurizer
<H3>68.3.2.3 Pressurizer In 500 MWeMWe PHWRs pressurizer is incorporated into the PHT main circuit to reduce
onerous demand on feed and bleed system to control inventory and pressure of the system. In these reactors, feed and bleed system
mainly acts as inventory control system and back-up for pressure control when pressurizer is not available. Pressurizer is connected
to Reactor Outlet Header (ROH) of each loop through one common isolation valve and two isolating valves, one for each loop. The
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flow path is from ROH to steam generator to Primary Circulating Pump and then to Reactor Inlet Header (RIH). Pressurizer is
located in the pump room.
The heat transport medium is kept in a pressurized liquid state by a pressurizer (surge tank) backed- up by control valves,
which feed or bleed heavy water from the system including pressurizer.
Pressurizers are fabricated and machined from carbon steel forgings with non integral nozzles for piping connections. The
forgings of the vessel conform to SA 508 Cl.3 and in- house specification, and are made from vacuum degassed, Electro Slag
Remelted (ESR), killed fine grained steel. The forgings are delivered in normalized heat- treated and fully machined condition.
The in- house specification imposes special requirements on chemical composition and notch toughness for these forgings.
Pressurizer is in accordance with the requirements for Class-1 components of ASME B&PV Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,
Section III, (Subsection NB).
Headers
<H3>68.3.2.4 Headers In 540- MWeMWe reactor there are four outlet headers, two in each loop of PHT main circuit.
Each outlet header receives flow from 98 outlet feeders and directs the flow to the steam generator via two inlet pipes. There are
also four inlet headers, two in each loop of PHT main circuit. Each inlet header receives flow from the Primary primary Coolant
coolant Pump pump and distributes the flow to 98 inlet feeders.
Headers in 540- MWeMWe PHWR are machined from single- piece carbon steel forgings with integral nozzles for feeders
and other piping connections, and the ends are closed by ellipsoidal caps. The single- piece forgings are made from the material
conforming to SA 350 LF2 and in- house specification. Also, these are made from vacuum degassed; , Bohler Electro Slag hot
topping process (BEST), killed, fine grained steel forgings and are delivered in normalized heat- treated and fully machined
condition. The in- house specification imposes special requirements on chemical composition and notch toughness for these
forgings. Reactor headers are designed to meet the requirements for Class-1 components of ASME B&PVBoiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section- III, Subsection NB.
In principle the reactor outlet headers are floating assemblies and govern the design/behavior of the rest of the circuit. Each
outlet header is mainly suspended through two steam generator inlet (SGI) lines connected to SGs inlet nozzle and resting on
sliding guide supports. Each of the reactor inlet headers is suspended through two pump discharge lines (PDL) connected to
discharge nozzles of main circulating pump.
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To reduce large displacement due to inertial loading under earthquake, two snubbers each of 200 KN capacities have been
provided at each outlet header.
<H2>68.3.3 Feeders
There are total of 784 feeders in all, 392 at each end of the reactor, in 540- MWeMWe PHWR. The 392 feeders at each end of
the reactor run from the fuel channels vertically up the face of the reactor and there after horizontally across and above the fuelling
machine area to the reactor headers.
In order to achieve uniform outlet temperature, the feeders range in four sizes, viz. namely, 80-mm Nominal Bore (NB), 65-
mm NB, 50- mm NB, and 40- mm NB. These are inside diameter (I.D).- controlled pipes.
The feeders are of seamless carbon steel pipes conforming to SA 333 Gr.6 material and in accordance with the requirements
for Class-1 components of the ASME B&PV Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section- III, Subsection NB.
The feeder pipes are arranged in banks, with a maximum of ten 10 feeders in a bank. The feeders are connected to end fittings
by high- pressure pipe couplings at lower end and are welded to header stubs at upper end. On the basis of analytical studies
carried out on feeders, it is observed that maximum stress occurs, in general, either at elbow after the coupling or at the pipe bend
location near header end. Thus, to take care of higher seismic load, the elbows at these ends have been strengthened by increasing
the wall thickness.
Piping<H2>68.3.4 Piping
All of the piping in the main primary heat transport system is of seamless carbon steel, ASME SA 333 Gr. 6, and designed and
fabricated in accordance with ASME B&PV Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Subsection NB requirements. SA 333
Gr.6 seamless carbon steel pipes are intended even for the low- temperature application and have been preferred over SA 106 Gr. B
piping used in NAPP and earlier reactors because of inherent fracture toughness property.
In all standardized 220- MWeMWe and 540- MWe PHWRs, the three important segments of PHT piping are running from
ROH to SG inlet nozzle; SG outlet nozzle to suction nozzle of PCP, and from discharge nozzle of PCP to RIH. The dead weight of
outlet header, feeders, and heavy water SG inlet pipes would cause undue large moments on SG inlet nozzle because of off-set
between SG and outlet header along N-S axis. To reduce these moments, sliding guide supports resisting vertical loads have been
incorporated in heavy water pipes connecting outlet header to SG inlet nozzles.
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68.3.4.1 Design Philosophy
<H3>68.3.4.1 Design Philosophy All the components of Main main PHT System system are categorized as class Class I
components and hence have been designed in accordance with ASME Section III, Division. I NB. Detailed design by analysis
approach has been adopted for all class Class I components. All the components have been designed for six sets of conditions.
These six service levels and the loads considered for each of them are summarized below:
Design Conditions
Design Conditions Internal pressure + Dead Weight weight (cold flooded)
Level A Service Loadings (Normal Operation)
Level A Service Loadings (Normal Operation) Internal Pressure pressure + Thermal Loads loads + Operating
Cyclescycles.
Level B Service Loadings (Up-set Condition)
Level B Service Loadings (Up-set Condition) Internal Pressure pressure + Thermal Loads loads + operation basis
earthquake (OBE) (inertial) + OBE (Seismic anchor movement) loads + operating cycles. Operation basis earthquake OBE inertial
and OBE seismic anchor movement loads have been combined on absolute sum basis.
Level C Service Loadings (Emergency Condition)
Level C Service Loadings (Emergency Condition) Internal Pressure pressure + Dead Weight weight
Level D Service Loadings (Faulted Condition)
Level D Service Loadings (Faulted Condition) Internal pressure + Dead weight + SSE Inertial Loadload.
Test Conditions
Test Conditions Test pressure + Dead Weight weight
<H2>68.3.5 Coolant Channel Assembly
Coolant channel assemblies house the fuel bundles and contain the hot pressurized heavy water coolant flowing through them.
Each coolant channel assembly consists of a Zr-2.5% Nb coolant tube, two martensitic stainless steel end fittings one each at
either end, and associated hardware. The coolant tube is rolled to end fittings at both ends. Each coolant tube is thermally isolated
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from cold heavy water present in the calandria vessel by a seamless- / or- seam- welded concentric Zircaloy-4 calandria tube,
which is rolled into the tube sheet of the end shield assembly at both ends.
Calandria tube envelops coolant tube forming an annulus space between the two tubes. Calandria tubes are manufactured out
of Zircaloy-4 material either by seamless route involving hot extrusion and cold pilgering or by seam welding cylindrically formed
tubes from strips. Both types of tubes would meet the specified longitudinal and transverse mechanical properties such as ultimate
tensile strength (UTS), yield strength (YS), and % Elongationelongation percentage. Calandria tubes are vacuum annealed to
minimize residual stresses.
Coolant tubes which that are the most important structural components in the reactor core are manufactured from Zr-2.5% Nb
alloy. Coolant tube is attached at either end to a stainless steel (type AISI-403 modified) end fitting by a roll- expanded joint. These
joints are of zero- clearance type and this feature helps in controlling the residual stresses in the joint region to a low level,
providing necessary safe-guard from delayed hydride cracking of coolant tube.
Coolant tubes are seamless tubes produced by hot extrusion and cold pilgering followed by stress relieving (autoclaving) in a
steam atmosphere. The ends of the coolant tubes require special finishing operations to obtain stringent dimensional control
necessary for zero- clearance rolled joints. The inlet and outlet end of coolant tube is roll expanded to end fittings made of
martensitic stainless steel (type 403 modified) solid forgings. End Fitting fitting is an open- ended tubular body of approximately
164 mm outside diameter and 2516 mm length. It has an integral side opening (feeder hub) to which the feeder pipe is attached.
Although zirconium alloys are not ASME Code approved materials, attempts have been made to follow all the requirements of
the ASME code Code for each component. Rolled joints are also not covered by ASME Code. However, detailed development
work and evaluation have been carried out to qualify these joints for reactor application and to establish that these joints satisfy all
design requirements.
68.3.5.1 Calandria Tube
<H3>68.3.5.1 Calandria Tube The ends of calandria tubes are joined with calandria side tube sheet of end shield
assembly by means of a special type of rolled joint called sandwich rolled joint. This joint is developed for a thin tube and low-
pressure conditions. If the calandria tube is directly rolled into a plain or grooved tube sheet, the joint would not develop the
required seating pressure and hence the required leak tightness. Due to this limitation, a sandwich type of joint is adopted where
calandria tube is squeezed (sandwiched) between an inner- landed sleeve insert of stainless steel type Type 410 in a full annealed
condition and the outer stainless steel tube sheet. The ends of the calandria tubes are flared to a larger diameter to accommodate
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the landed sleeve insert and to provide design clearances between the coolant and calandria tubes anywhere along the channel axis.
Joint configuration with PIWR (percentage insert wall reduction) of 6.5 to 7.5 is selected after development work. Calandria tube
rolled joints have a minimum pullout load of 31 metric tons and a leak tightness of 3 x 10-6 cc cm3per /sec.
During normal operation, calandria tubes are subjected to a temperature of 75 o C, and maximum external pressure of 1.45
Kg/cm2, corresponding to the lower most row of calandria tubes in the calandria vessel (hydrostatic head of 0.85 Kg/cm 2 +
moderator helium cover gas pressure of 0.6 Kg/cm 2) . In addition, calandria tube is subjected to (i) Garter garter spring loads, (ii)
Buoyancy force, (iii) Direct direct pressure load on the tube sheets causing a tensile loading on all tubes, and iv) Stresses stresses
due to differential thermal expansion of calandria tubes and calandria shell.
Calandria Tube Collapse Pressure
Calandria Tube Collapse Pressure. The calandria tubes are designed on the basis of neutron economy and collapse due to
external pressure. The wall thickness is set at a minimum value, satisfying the requirement of stability against collapse pressure.
The design also caters for postulated accident conditions where overpressure of the calandria vessel is assumed. Calandria tube
collapse pressure works out to be 2.85 Kg/cm2.
68.3.5.2 Coolant Tube.
<H3>68.3.5.2 Coolant Tube The temperatures and pressures at the inlet and the outlet considered in design are as follows:
Coolant tube inlet pressure 124.18 Kg/ cm2
Coolant tube inlet temperature 260 o C
Coolant tube outlet pressure 115.82 Kg/cm2
Coolant tube outlet temperature 304 o C
Since the pressure and temperature vary along the length of the coolant tube, the design condition is established by evaluating
stresses at several locations along the length to determine which location requires the largest wall thickness. Minimum required
coolant tube wall thickness calculated on this basis works out to 4.3 mm, inclusive of corrosion and wear allowance of 0.2 mm,
with critical section of the tube being the inlet end.
Coolant tubes are designed in accordance with the intent of ASME Section III, Subsection NB requirements. As per ASME
codeCode, design stress intensity for coolant tubes should be the lowest of:
(a) 1/3 of the specified minimum ultimate tensile strength (UTS) at room temperature.,
(b) 1/3 of the UTS at temperature.,
21 March 11, 2008

(c) 2/3 of the specified minimum yield strength (YS) at room temperature., and
(d) 2/3 of the yield strength (YS) at temperature.
Out of Of the above criteria, the governing quantity deciding coolant tube design stress is the 1/3 UTS at operating
temperature.
Neutron- irradiation- enhanced creep deformation is one of the important factors deciding the life of coolant tube in PHWRs.
Based on the present level of understanding, the coolant tube is estimated to undergo a diametric creep strain of the order of 3%
and an axial elongation of 2.5% during the life of the reactor. The potential life limiting concerns due to creep are as follows:
(a) Diametral expansion causing bypass of coolant flow around the fuel bundles, and
(b) Relative sag between coolant tube and calandria tube causing possible contact.
Corrosion and Hydriding
Corrosion and Hydriding. Zr-2.5% Nb alloy has good corrosion resistance in high temperature water as long as oxygen
content is held extremely low. The predicted corrosion rate is expected to be about 0.1 mm over the operating life of the reactor. A
corrosion and wear allowance of 0.2 mm is provided on the coolant tube. More over, finished tubes are autoclaved in steam
atmosphere at 400 oC for 24 hours to form a protective layer on the tube surface. The presence of 1% oxygen in the circulating
annulus gas monitoring system helps in maintaining a constant oxide layer thickness at the tube O.D.
The more complex part of the corrosion reaction is the absorption of hydrogen evolved in the oxidation reaction of heavy
water with zirconium. Hydrogen is evolved in this reaction and a portion of this hydrogen is absorbed by the zirconium alloy ; and
this phenomenon is termed hydrogen pick-up by the alloy. If the hydrogen concentration in the tube exceeds the solubility limit,
then it precipitates as zirconium hydrides.
The solid solubility of hydrogen in zirconium alloys is very low below 150 o C. Hence, more zirconium hydrides will be
present at lower temperatures. Hydrogen when in solid solution in zirconium alloys can be driven in directions of thermal stress
and concentration gradients. Hydrogen in excess of solubility limits precipitates as zirconium hydrides. As zirconium hydrides are
brittle, this can lead to failure of coolant tube by initiation and propagation of a crack in the radial axial plane due to phenomenon
of delayed hydride cracking. Delayed hydride cracking is the process of formation of hydrides and their cracking aided by the
presence of tensile hoop stress (including residual stress) and defects in the tube.
22 March 11, 2008

Following remedial measures have been implemented in the design of a coolant tube against embrittlement effects and
hydriding:
(1) Zero- clearance rolled joints, which will significantly reduce the tensile residual stresses in the neighbourhood of rolled joint
region.
(2) Stringent Inspection And and Quality quality Controlcontrol, consisting of both, Angle angle beam and normal beam
ultrasonic examinations as well as a supplementary eddy current examination.
(3) Control of Impurities impurities, like such as Hydrogen hydrogen, Chlorine chlorine, Phosphorous phosphorous, and Carbon
carbon.
(4) Autoclaving of Coolant coolant Tubetube that which produces hard adherent oxide layer of about 1 mmicron thick on the
tubes, which acts as a barrier for hydrogen ingress from annulus gas side.
(5) Addition of Oxygen oxygen in the annulus gas to avoid deterioration of the oxide film.
(6) Avoidance of cold pressurization to improve the flaw tolerance at low system temperatures.
Leak-Before-Break Methodology
Leak-Before-Break Methodology. Achieving leak before break depends on the difference between the time available to
detect a leaking crack and time required to detect a leaking crack. The time available to detect a leak is estimated from:
Time available Ta Ta (in hours) is given by
(C 7W )
Ta
2V
where C is the critical crack length (CCL), 7 W is the leakage size crack and V is the delayed hydrogen cracking velocity in the
axial direction.
During service, CCL reduces and the DHC velocity increases and the time available to detect a leaking crack decreases. If
hydrides are present and a defect does initiate DHC, then the time available to detect the leak would be in the range of 11 to 12
hrs. Thus, a sensitive leak detection system called annulus gas monitoring system is implemented in the design which that enables
leak detection and safe shut down in less than 5 hours.
68.3.5.3 End Fittings.
23 March 11, 2008

<H3>68.3.5.3 End Fittings End fittings are manufactured out of AISI-403 (modified) stainless steel. Coolant coolant tube and
end fittings are connected by means of a rolled joint. To have a leak tight rolled joint at all temperatures , end fittings has need to
have coefficient of thermal expansion as close as possible to that of the coolant tube. End Fittings fittings also require comparable
values of mechanical properties like such as hardness with respect to coolant tube and liner tube for rolled joint integrity. AISI-403
(modified) material can be heat treated to attain the required mechanical properties.
Results of fast neutron irradiation damage on AISI 403 material at 304 o C shows that there is a change of NDTT (nil ductility
transition temperature) from 40 o C to about 100 o C during the life of the reactor. The presence of trace elements such as copper,
vanadium, antimony, aluminium, and arsenic can increase the shift in NDTT. Hence, these trace elements are controlled to the
extent possible in the end- fitting material. Presence of trace elements such as copper, vanadium, antimony, aluminium, and arsenic
are controlled to a maximum of 1450 ppm out of which copper alone is controlled to a maximum of 600 ppm.
End- fitting material is specified with the following impact properties:
Longitudinal: 2.8 Kg/.m (min) at 20 o C
Transverse: 2.1 Kg/.m (min) at 66 o C
<H1>68.4 DEVIATIONS FROM ASME CODE
All the Indian PHWR components are, in general, designed, fabricated, commissioned, and tested as per the ASME code Code
requirements. However, there are some areas in PHWRs where deviation from the ASME Code requirements is unavoidable due to
the basic design of the reactor. Still, in such areas, the basic intent of the ASME Code is maintained. The following are such areas:
<H2>68.4.1 CALANDRIACalandria
68.4.1.1 Material of Calandria Tubes:
<H3>68.4.1.1 Material of Calandria Tubes Material of calandria tubes is Zircaloy-2/ Zircaloy-4. This material has not been
approved by ASME Code Section III as Class I material. Since the calandria tubes are present in reactor core, due to neutron
economy, choice of material for calandria tubes is restricted to Zirconium alloys. ASME B&PVBoiler & Pressure Vessel Code,
Section. III has been developed for PWRs and boiling water reactors (BWRs) designed and built in the United States. These
reactors do not have calandria tubes. For heavy water reactors, calandria tubes are inherently present, and thus this violation of
code is unavoidable. However, the design, manufacturing, and inspection follow Section III, Class I philosophy.
24 March 11, 2008

68.4.1.2 Rolled Joints between Calandria Tubes and Calandria Side Tube Sheets:
<H3>68.4.1.2 Rolled Joints Between Calandria Tubes and Calandria Side Tube Sheets This type of joint is not approved
by ASME Code Section III for Class I components. The reason for using this type of joint is that Zircaloy-2 cannot be easily
welded to stainless steel. This violation of code also takes place due to presence of calandria tubes and thus is unavoidable.
However, this joint has been so developed that its pull out strength is at least equal to tensile strength of calandria tube. Moreover,
this joint is so designed that it is not falling on boundary of heavy water-light water. Moreover, this joint has been experimentally
proven satisfactory for strength and leak-tightness requirements.
68.4.1.3 Use of Rupture Disc for Over Pressure Relief:
<H3>68.4.1.3 Use of Rupture Disc for Overpressure Relief Over-pressure in calandria develops when rupture of a coolant
channel occurs in calandria vessel. During this condition, primary coolant which that operates at high temperature and high
pressure, gets liberated in moderator which that operates at low temperature and pressure. This results in pressurization of calandria
vessel. Four relief pipes having diameter of 500 mm are provided on calandria vessel for relieving the pressure. The ends of these
pipes are closed by rupture disc assemblies. In case of a coolant channel rupture in calandria, these rupture discs break open and
over-pressures in calandria are restricted.
The use of rupture discs as the primary pressure relief device is not allowed by ASME B&PVBoiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Section III, Sub-section NB. As per this Ssub-section, the rupture disc may be used in conjunction with safety valves. However, for
the accident condition described above, the flow rate required for the pressure relief is so large that use of safety valves is not
adequate.
It may be mentioned here that the reactors which that are mainly addressed by ASME code Code are light water reactors
(LWRs). In these reactors, the functions of moderator and coolant are performed by the same fluid. There are no coolant channels
in these reactors, so that the type of accident which that is being considered for PHWR calandria, is not relevant for these reactors.
Over-pressures in the reactor vessels of these reactors occur mainly due to system transients, and these can be relieved using safety
valves and thus the use of rupture disc is not necessary in these reactors.
Normal operating pressure of the Helium helium cover gas which that is at the top of the calandria is low, i.e.that is, 0.3
kg/cm2 (g). There is a relief valve in the system, which opens when the system pressure rises above 0.5 kg/cm 2 (g). This relief
25 March 11, 2008

valve has a capacity of 2348 standard lpm, which is sufficient to take care of changes in volume of moderator due to swelling or
other minor causes. The rupture disc set pressure is 1.4 kg/cm 2 (g), which is not close to the relief valve setting.
So, the OPRDs come into action only when there is an accident involving coolant tube rupture. The size of opening is such
that one OPRD is sufficient to relieve the pressure in calandria in case of coolant tube rupture accident. For redundancy, four
identical rupture discs have been provided for each calandria.
The sample rupture disks are tested in shop for burst pressure & and cycle testing. The accepted range of burst pressure is 1.26
kg/ cm2 to 1.40 kg/ cm2 (g).
<H2>68.4.2 END SHIELDSEnd Shields
68.4.2.1 Tri-Junction Welds:
<H3>68.4.2.1 Tri-Junction Welds The design of end shield meets all requirements of ASME Code Section III, Class 2 in all
respects except for inspection of joint among lattice tubes, baffle plates, and calandria side tube sheet. However, ultrasonic
technique has been developed for this purpose. In addition to ultrasonic examination, dye penetrant (DP) examinations are carried
out after each welding pass. Mock-up weld passes are carried out everyday before start of welding to ensure good quality. These
mock-ups are sectioned and inspected if found necessary.
68.4.2.2 Monitoring of Intermetallic Joint (Diaphragm Plates):
<H3>68.4.2.2 Monitoring of Intermetallic Joint (Diaphragm Plates) Diaphragm plates are provided in the calandria side
tube sheet and the fuelling machine tube sheet. The diaphragm plates have lower thickness compared to the tube sheets to provide
the flexibility required to allow thermal expansion of the calandria tubes. There are weld joints between the diaphragm plates and
the tube sheets. Total thermal neutron flux at this joint is 1.08 E11 n/cm 2/sec. This is not expected to cause embrittlement of the
material over a period of 30 FPY. Stress analysis shows that stress level in this zone is very low. Quality control procedure assures
no defect in this joint (100% radiography in addition to root pass D. P.). Thus, no failure is expected during service. The water
level in expansion tank and makeup rate are monitored continuously.
<H2>68.4.3 COOLANT CHANNEL COMPONENTSCoolant Channel Components
Material of Coolant Tubes: . Zirconium - Niobium alloy has not been used as a material for the pressure- retaining components
in LWRs. Here also, the intent of ASME Code is followed in the design, manufacture, inspection, and testing of the tubes.
26 March 11, 2008

Rolled Joint between Between Coolant Tubes and End Fittings: . The reasons for using rolled joint here are same as those for
the joint between calandria tube and the calandria tube sheet.
Material of End Fitting: . Material of end fittings is Martensitic martensitic stainless steel AISI 403 (modified), hardened and
tempered. The essential elements of modification are: (i) controlled range of C and Cr to achieve consistent mechanical properties
with same heat treatment parameters and (ii) low level of residuals to reduce the shift in ductile to brittle transition temperature due
to irradiation.
This material has been approved by ASME, vide Code Case No. N-4-11 (approval date 13.7.81), as a pipe material, where the
toughness requirement as per NB-2332 applies. Accordingly, this material is required to exhibit a lateral expansion (LE) of 25 mils
(0.65 mm) minimum in a Cv test conducted at lowest service temperature (LST).
A series of tests were conducted jointly by Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) and Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research
(IGCAR) to obtain data on this aspect of unirradiated end fitting material. From the results, it is clear that this material is capable
of meeting this code requirement at temperatures above 60 C. Nil ductility transition NDT temperature of this material in
unirradiated condition corresponding to 15 ft. lb. absorbed energy in Cv test is 40 C. The shift in NDTT temperature due to
irradiation effect gets saturated at a fluence of about 6.5E19 n/ cm2. The maximum shift is about 55 C. Further, a test was
conducted at low temperature to simulate radiation damage, in which an artificially produced ([electrical discharge machining
(EDM)] notch defect
in the highly stressed rolled joint area was extended by fatigue and the end fitting was tested up to burst. The end fitting could
withstand nearly three3 times the design pressure.
Therefore, end- fitting material is safe for all conditions of reactor operations, as it always operates at 265 CC. However, as a
precaution, hydro-test during manufacture and at pre-commissioning stage is conducted at a minimum temperature of 65 C and
also cold pressurisation pressurization is prohibited in the reactor, where during start-up, pressurisation pressurization starts at a
temperature of 130 C.
Inspection of End Fittings: . There are some areas of end fitting (at the top of the nozzle and some portion of side) which that are
not covered by bi-directional ultrasonic examination during manufacture. At these places only straight beam technique is used.
<H2>68.4.4 INACCESSIBILITY FOR IN-SERVICE INSPECTIONInaccessibility for In-Service Inspection
27 March 11, 2008

The reactor components like such as end shields and calandria are not accessible to periodic ISI. However, during design and
fabrication stage, all precautions are taken to see that no regular ISI is needed for this component. Stress analysis for all the
components has been done as required by the code.
<H1>68.5 Seismic Qualification, Leak-before-break, ISI, Containment DesignSEISMIC
QUALIFICATION, LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK, ISI, CONTAINMENT DESIGN
<H2>68.5.1 Seismic Qualification
The various structures, systems, and components in NPP are classified into three categories [8]. Category I systems are those
whose failure could lead to release of activity into containment or in the environment (e.g., reactor containment structure, PHT
system etc.and so on) and are designed for S1 (equivalent to OBE)- and S2 (equivalent to SSE)- level earthquakes [9]. Category II
structures (e.g., waste management building) are designed for S2- level earthquake and category Category III structures (e.g.,
turbine building, turbo-generator and so onetc.) are designed for earthquake resistance as per national practice [10].
Due to the numerical difficulties associated with use of plate/shell elements for complex geometries, the present practice is to
carry out separate analysis for the entire reactor building using 3D stick model, in which the inner containment (IC) is modeled
using a separate 3D stick connected to the Reactor reactor Building building raft. In this method, the structure is modeled using 3D
beam properties based on strain energy equivalence between 3D finite element model and 3D beam model. Lateral torsional
coupling and the effect of flexibility of floors, offset, and partial support of walls is are accounted for. In this method, the beams are
located at shear centers [11, 12] and the masses ate located at mass centers with a rigid link joining the two (Fig. 68. 5). Beam
models are used for obtaining the global seismic responses.
These are finally applied on the 3D finite element model for evaluating the design stresses. The seismic analysis model was
supplemented by an axi-symmetric model to evaluate the stresses at the shell/dome interface. In the current design being carried
out for 700 MWeMWe project, the seismic forces on the containment structure will be computed from a detailed 3D FE model
developed using beam/shell/solid elements.
For aspects such as soil-structure interaction, decoupling criteria, and damping in concrete structures; , guidelines of ASCE
are followed. The application of the decoupling criteria has resulted in a model of the Reactor reactor Containment containment
Building building, which includes beam elements representing calandria vault, calandria, and the end shields.
28 March 11, 2008

The application of the decoupling criterion to the complex structure such as containment structure is not straight forward.
Modifications have been suggested [13] that make the criteria applicable to the complex structure such as reactor containment
structure. This criterion is also not applicable for multi-connected equipment. A new criterion [14, 15] was developed that can be
used for checking the decoupling requirement of multi-connected equipment.
FigFIG. 68.5 Beam Model of PHWR

Building [12] BEAM MODEL OF PHWR
BUILDING Building
[12]BBBBBBBBBuilding [12]Building [12]
Building [12]
Beam Model of PHWR Building [12]
TYPE SETTER:
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED FILE FOR 'PHOTO READY black & white PICTURE OF THIS FIGURE 5 THAT SHOULD
BE INSERTED HERE". A suitable enlarged size of this figure may be inserted at this location of the chapter to make it
legible for readers.
29 March 11, 2008

For damping in piping, higher values such as the PVRC damping [16], as shown in Fig. 68. 6, are also used.
Fig. 6FIG. 68.6 Frequency Dependent Damping Values
(ASME Code Case N 411-1)FREQUENCY DEPENDENT DAMPING VALUES
(ASME CODE CASE N 411-1)
The floor- mounted equipment and piping are analysed analyzed using floor response spectra. For this purpose, time history of
the floor motion is generated by performing a time history analysis of the RCB. The resulting spectra are broadened + 15% for
use in equipment design.
For active equipment, such as electrical relays, switches, contacts, shut-off rod drives etc.and others, whose functioning solely
depends on the actuation of some parts within them, it is necessary to demonstrate their operability during an earthquake event by
testing on shake table. In addition, the equipment must withstand the effects of a number of OBEs prior to the SSE. The
procedures given in (IEEE-344, 1987) for the assessment of integrity and operability are adopted for testing. For heavy equipment
such as primary heat transport pumps, it is acceptable to qualify by detailed finite element analysis wherein the bearing stiffness,
gap between the casing and the impeller, and so on,etc. must be considered in a mathematical model.
<H2>68.5.2 IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PHILOSOPHY
In-Service Inspection Philosophy
As an integral part of quality assurance during operation, a periodic programme of in-service inspection has been instituted to
cover all critical items important to safety [17]. This programme has been formulated on the basis of guidelines given in IAEA
30 March 11, 2008

Safety Guide 50-SG-02 entitled In-service Inspection for Nuclear Power Plants [18] and the Canadian code Code CAN/CSA
N285.4-05 and 8-05 [19, 20].
In formulating this programme, the following special characteristics of PHWRs have been taken into consideration:
Use of a large number of coolant channel assemblies (306 nos. for 235 MWeMWe unit and 392 nos. for 500 MWe MWe
unit) in place of a reactor pressure vessel and leading to a multi-component primary cooling system.
Use of a variety of material requiring different kinds of examination techniques.
Strict requirements in limiting leakage of primary coolant from the point of view of safety and economy.
On-power refueling, which reduces the frequency of outages.
Examples of the components and methods of examination normally considered for the ISI programme are listed in Table
68.3.
The inspection areas and degree of inspection required for each system or component is are determined by the inspection
category, which in turn is based on two factors: stress intensity (SI) ratio (R s) and fatigue usage factor. There are three levels of
stress intensity, namely, high (2/3), medium, and low (1/3).
Calculated SI
SI Ratio (Rs) =
Allowable SI
Similarly, there are three levels of fatigue usage factor, viz. namely, low (0.01), medium, and high (0.1). Based on
different combinations of stress intensity ratio and fatigue usage factor, four levels of inspection categories A, B, C1 , and C2 in the
decreasing degree of examination requirements have been arrived at (Fig. 68.7).
31 March 11, 2008

TABLE 68.3: COMPONENTS AND METHODS OF EXAMINATION [17]
Items to be Examined Methods

Vessel and piping Visual, volumetric, and
Integrativeintegrative
Pump and valve
- weld Visual, volumetric, and
- interior surface Integrativeintegrative
Visual and surface (If if material is
subjected to stress corrosion or
erosion)
Support
- weld Visual, surface, and volumetric
- others Visual
Rotating Visual, surface, and volumetric
Machinerymachinery
Mechanical
Couplingscouplings
- Boltbolt Visual, surface, volumetric, and
- Studstud integrative
- Nutnut
All components
- Corrosioncorrosion UT Thickness gauging
- Erosionerosion
Heat
Exchangersexchangers/S
steam Generator Visual, surface, and volumetric
generator VolumetricVisual, surface and
- Shellshell volumetric
- Tubetube Volumetric
32 March 11, 2008

Items to be Examined Methods
Coolant Tubetube PT-CT Gap, Garter Spring spring
Locationlocation,
Volumetricvolumetric,
Dimensional dimensional, and
Hydrogen hydrogen Pickpick-up

Feeder pipe Visual, Feeder feeder Gapgap,
Volumetric volumetric, and
Thicknessthickness
Inspection category A requires examination of all welded points and adjacent base metal. Category B requires examination of
at least 1/3one-third of the inspection areas. For Category C1, no examination is required if the metal is ductile and creep resistant
and the effects of neutron irradiation are not significant. For category C2, no examination is required. The inspection methods are
of non-destructive type like such as visual, dye penetrant, ultrasonic, radiography, acoustic emission, and hydro and leak testing.
The procedures adopted are generally in conformance with ASME Section V and XI Codes.
The results of the Ppre-Service service Inspection inspection (PSI) of the components prior to the start of operation of the
plant establish the base line data required for comparison during subsequent ISI. This examination is carried out using the same
methods and techniques and types of inspection instruments as those, which are planned to be used for in-service inspection. In
the case of many components and systems, the inspection data collected during manufacture serve s as baseline data. PSI is
performed either:
(a) After after the hydrostatic pressure test but before start up of the reactor; or
(b) Before before the hydrostatic pressure test provided that a confirmatory examination is performed after the
component hydrostatic pressure test and the results indicate no significant change.
Low Medium High
Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue
Factor Factor Factor
33 March 11, 2008

Stress Intensity Ratio, RS
High Stress
Intensity
C1 B A
Medium
C1 B B Stress
Intensity
Low Stress
Intensity
C2 C1 C1
1
2/3
1/3
0
0 0.01 0.1 1.0
Fatigue Usage Factor
FIG. 68. 7: DETERMINATION OF INSPECTION CATEGORY [17]
In order to minimize the radiation exposure of inspection personnel and keeping in view the fact that a large number of
components used are identical, a sampling approach has been taken for working out the inspection programme. For identical
welds of identical components, the number of welds to be inspected may be reduced to FA. The value is FA is taken from Fig. 68.8.
34 March 11, 2008

Fig. 8: Inspection Sample for Identical Components/
Welds [17]FIG. 68.8 INSPECTION SAMPLE FOR
IDENTICAL COMPONENTS/ WELDS [17]
The in-service inspection intervals are chosen such that any deterioration occurring in systems and components are is detected well
before any failure takes place. The first inspection is carried out commencing from the end of the first year to the end of the fifth
year after going into commercial operation with the examinations spread as evenly as practicable over the period. The subsequent
in-service inspections are scheduled at intervals of 10 years (Table 68.4).
Table 4: Inspection Schedule for Pressurised Heavy Water ReactorTABLE 68. 4 INSPECTION SCHEDULE FOR
PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTOR
Inspe Inspection period Minimum % Maximum
ction indicated as percentage of percentage
Interv calendar year of examinations of %
al plant service required to be examinati
from completed ons
commencement credited
of operation
1st (5 0-2 16 34
years) 2-5 100 100

2nd 5-8 16 34
(10 8-12 50 67
35 March 11, 2008

years) 12-15 100 100
3rd 15-18 16 34
(10 18-22 50 67
years) 22-25 100 100

4th 25-28 16 34
(10 28-32 50 100
years) 32-35 100 100

Note: Plant life is assumed to be 40 years.
Acceptance standards for visual, surface and volumetric examinations are same as those in ASME Code Sec. XI.
Acceptance Standards for Visual, Surface, and Volumetric Examinations are Same as Those in ASME Code Section XI.
While the components of primary heat transport system do receive the inspection commensurate with their importance, the major
challenges faced by the Indian PHWRs are (i) Life management of coolant channels, and (ii) thinning of feeders and secondary
side piping due to Flow flow Aaccelerated Corrosion corrosion (FAC). These challenges have been successfully met through ISI
and maintenance/replacement strategies. The Coolant coolant channels suffer from degradation due to irradiation creep resulting in
increase in diameter and sag; deuterium pickup resulting from corrosion reaction and leading to loss of fracture toughness. The ISI
programme for coolant channels consists of the following:
(a) Non-destructive examination for flaws including flaws in the rolled joint region.
(b) Channel CT-PT gap, wall thickness, axial elongation, channel sag, etcand so on.
(c) Eddy- current detection for location of garter springs.
(d) Measurement of gap between coolant tube and calandria tube.
(e) Sliver sampling for measurement of hydrogen content.
BARC in-service inspection system (BARCIS) and Sliver sliver sampling scraping tools are some of the important tools developed for ISI of coolant
channels.
Flow accelerated corrosion FAC has become another focused area following some recent incidents. Thickness measurement is
regularly carried out at a large number of locations.
As far as replacement is concerned, India has successfully completed en- masse coolant channel replacement in four reactors
where Zzircalloy-2 pressure tubes were used. Also, feeder replacement has been successfully completed in three reactors.
36 March 11, 2008

<H2>68.5.3 Leak-beforeBefore-breakBreak
Leak-before-break LBB approach has been applied to primary heat transport (PHT) system piping of 500- MWeMWe Indian
PHWR as per NUREG-CR-1061, Vol.3 [21], and IAEA TECDOC-710 [22]. Parallel to these analyses, a comprehensive
Component Integrity Test Program has been initiated to address some of the issues in the fatigue and fracture analyses. These
issues include the transferability of the specimen fracture parameters to the component level, the effect of cyclic/dynamic load (that
may occur during an earthquake) on fracture properties, the effect of system compliance on the load- bearing capacity of piping
components etcand so on. For in-depth understanding of these issues, 70 fatigue/fracture tests have been conducted so far on full-
scale piping components. Apart from these, probabilistic methodology has also been used to address the uncertainty associated with
the input parameters used in the LBB analysis. The present paper discusses the LBB qualification of PHT system piping of 500
MWeMWe Indian PHWR and addresses some of the issues not considered in LBB concepts by above standards.
The LBB concept is basically demonstrated through fracture mechanics analysis that there is negligible chance of catastrophic
break of PHT pipes without giving prior indication of leakage. This involves detailed fracture mechanics studies of different piping
components such as straight pipe, elbow and branch tee. Leak-before-break LBB is ensured by demonstrating three levels of safety
assessment against sudden double- ended guillotine break (DEGB). Level 1 is inherent in the design philosophy of ASME Code
Sec. Section III [2], which is normally followed in piping design. Ductile and tough materials are widely used in nuclear power
plant piping due to their high resistance against non-ductile rupture. The design is done with a well-defined factor of safety on of
code- specified 95% exceedance probability on strength. It does not permit the presence of any defect larger in size than allowed
in ASME Code Section Sec. III for girth welds. The demonstration of Level 2 safety consists of postulating a surface crack mostly
in the weld, which may go undetected during the non-destructive examination. It is then shown that there is insignificant crack
growth of this surface crack during the entire life period of the reactor. In this crack growth study, one should consider all the
possible crack growth mechanisms such as corrosion, erosion, fatigue, creep, flow- induced vibration, etc.and so on, whichever
may be operative for the particular piping system. From the operating experience of various PHWRs, it has been observed that
under the controlled environment of PHT piping system, fatigue is the only crack growth mechanism which cannot be totally ruled
out. Hence, one should perform the fatigue crack growth study of the postulated surface flaw in the PHT pipes. In the Level 3
safety assessment, a through- wall crack is postulated at the maximum stress location with the worst material properties. The size
of the crack is chosen so as to ensure the predicted leakage is detected by the leak monitoring devices. Finally, it is shown that this
crack will withstand the maximum credible load that may act during a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
68.5.3.1 Fatigue crack growth Tests
37 March 11, 2008

<H3>68.5.3.1 Fatigue Crack Growth Tests Fatigue crack growth tests [23] have been conducted on pipes till the crack
depth has reached through-wall. During the tests, crack depth and number of cycles have been recorded. Maximum crack depth and
number of cycles for given stress ratio (R) and initial crack depth in pipes have been shown in Fig. 68.Figure 9. Maximum crack
depth and number of cycles calculated analytically have also been shown in figure Fig. 68.9 and shows a good comparison. Figure
68.10 shows that crack growth in depth direction is more rapid compared to with circumferential direction and the limiting value of
the aspect ratio is between 2.5-and 5. This is essential for verification of Level 2 LBB.
Figure 9: Maximum crack depth vs. number of cycles
for different initial crack depth and R = 0.5 [23]
FIG. 68. 9 MAXIMUM CRACK DEPTH VERSUS
NUMBER OF CYCLES FOR DIFFERENT INITIAL
CRACK DEPTH AND R = 0.5 [23]
TYPE SETTER:
38 March 11, 2008

Figure 10: Variation in aspect ratio with crack growth
for 324 mm outer diameter pipe [23]FIG. 68. 10
VARIATION IN ASPECT RATIO WITH CRACK
GROWTH
FOR 324-MM OUTER DIAMETER PIPE [23]
TYPE SETTER:
39 March 11, 2008

68.5.3.2 The cyclic loading effect on load carrying capacity of piping components
<H3>68.5.3.2 The Cyclic Loading Effect on Load-Carrying Capacity of Piping Components Leak- before- Break break
(LBB) assessment is based primarily on the monotonic fracture tearing instability. The effect of cyclic loading has generally not
been considered in the fracture assessment of nuclear power plant piping. The pipe fracture analysis used in present LBB considers
the seismic loading as a one- time applied load of magnitude equal to peak load at the postulated flaw location during the
earthquake event. The assessment of pipe with flaw (or crack) is based on the monotonic tearing instability or Net Section Collapse
(NSC). There is no explicit consideration of the cyclic damage or the number of applied load cycles during earthquake event.
An experimental and analytical investigation [24] was carried out in by conducting tests on full- scale circumferential through-
wall cracked pipe under reversible cyclic loading conditions. The experiments covers a wide range of pipe sizes (NPS: 6, 8,
12, 16), crack sizes (2 : 60o, 90o, 120o), material (Low low Carbon carbon manganese steel, Stainless stainless steel), crack
location (base, weld), loading mode (load controlled, displacement controlled), and loading parameters (load ratio, load amplitude,
displacement increment etc.). The cyclic test results have been compared with the corresponding monotonic pipe fracture test
results to quantify the damage (loss in load- carrying capacity) due to cyclic loading as a function of number of load cycles, and a
simplified master curve has been generated to include the cyclic tearing damage in LBB assessment. The master curve is a plot of
the cyclic load amplitude (given as % percent of maximum load recorded in corresponding monotonic fracture test) versus number
of load cycles to failure (Nf) and has been as shown in Figure Fig. 68.11. Few available results on similar tests (on 4- pipe,
STS410 Japanese carbon Steelsteel) from literature, of Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Japan [25]
have also been plotted in the master curve and are in good agreement with the results of the present tests series. The curve is
independent of crack sizes as well as pipe sizes since all experiment data lie with in a narrow scatter band.
40 March 11, 2008

This curve gives the load reduction factor as a function of number of load cycles and is applied on the monotonic critical load.
The curve suggests an additional safety factor cc of 4/3 for SSE loading and 3/2 for OBE loading over the monotonic critical
load, for LLB assessment. For an OBE, the factor is relatively higher in view of its higher frequency of occurrence than a SSE.
Fig. 11: Master Curve for Cyclic Tearing Assessment
[24]
FIG. 68.11 MASTER CURVE FOR CYCLIC
TEARING ASSESSMENT [24]
EDITOR:
41 March 11, 2008

Figure 12 Comparison of component and system load
displacement behaviour (Po refers to limit load of un-
cracked component/system)FIG. 68. 12 COMPARISON
OF COMPONENT AND SYSTEM LOAD
DISPLACEMENT BEHAVIOUR (Po REFERS TO
LIMIT LOAD OF UNCRACKED
COMPONENT/SYSTEM)
68.5.3.3 Compliance effect on load carrying capacity of piping components
<H3>68.5.3.3 Compliance Effect on Load Carrying Capacity of Piping Components A phenomenon mitigating
the effect described in the preceding section is the role of system compliance. It means the stiffening effect of the connected piping
on the cracked section is negligible. Moreover, in these analyses the LBB assessment is based on the maximum load, irrespective
of the location at which they are acting. However, in the real situation, the local compliance of the cracked section and the global
residual compliance of the piping system may have significant effect on the load- carrying capacity of the cracked pipe. These
compliance effects must be included while evaluating the safety margins. This is due to the fact that the load acting on the cracked
section changes, during crack growth, due to because of indeterminacy of the piping system. Thus, a purely load-controlled
condition, representing the case of a piping system with infinite compliance, changes into a mixed mode , that is, partly load-
controlled and partly displacement-controlled. As a result the crack section sheds some of the load during the crack growth, and
42 March 11, 2008

this load is picked up by the connecting piping system. The load redistribution may increase safety margin. For simplified fracture
mechanics calculation, an analytical expression is proposed [26, 27] to evaluate actual moment at the cracked section in a 3-D
piping system equation:
L
M u 1 c
Leff
Mc
Lc I
1
Leff I eff Here Mu is the un-cracked moment and Mc is the actual moment at the cracked section. Lc and Ieff
are the length and effective moment of inertia of the equivalent piping element used to simulate crack. The Leff is the
equivalent length of the pipe modeled with fixed- end conditions, which simulates piping system compliance at the crack
element. The I is moment of inertia of the pipe.
Actual tests were performed on reactor grade pipes to validate theoretical studies regarding the effects of system compliance
on fracture integrity. Seven fracture tests have been conducted in which system compliance was simulated by fixed ends and it was
varied in terms of L/R parameters. The main conclusions of this experimental study can be summarized as follows:
Fracture load of a piping system having even very large crack size is very near the collapse load of an un-cracked piping
system (as shown in Figure Fig.68.12), thereby proving that large plastic straining occur at un-cracked ends before the system
collapse.
A large margin was observed between crack initiation load and the maximum load that the piping system has sustained. It is
worth to note noting that in conventional fracture tests (infinite compliance), crack initiation load is usually very near to the
maximum collapse load.
68.5.3.4 LBB Assessment of 500 MWe PHWR Piping;
Fatigue crack growth analysis of 500 MWe TAPP 3 & 4 PHT piping (Level 2)
<H3>68.5.3.4 LBB ASSESSMENT of 500 MWe PHWR PIPING
Fatigue Crack Growth Analysis of 500 MWe TAPP 3&4 PHT Piping (Level 2). A part-through semi-elliptical circumferential
flaw at the inside surface of pipe is postulated. The depth of flaw is conservatively assumed to be 25% of wall thickness of pipe
based on ASME Code Sec.Section III, Appendix G recommendation. The flaw aspect ratio is assumed to be 6 six, that which is
representative of typical flaw found in service. Cyclic loading due to normal operating condition (service Service level Levels A
and B) is considered to calculate the fatigue crack growth. Paris power law as given in ASME Section Sec. XI [3] is used. Table
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68. 5 shows the various transient events and the number of excursions of each event postulated for the entire design life period of
the reactor. It was seen that the fatigue crack growth is very small (original crack depth of 25% increased to 27 %) over the entire
design life period of the reactor.
44 March 11, 2008

TABLE 68. 5 VARIOUS TRANSIENT EVENTS POSTULATED FOR ENTIRE DESIGN LIFE OF 500 MWeMWE TAPP
3&4
Sl. Event No. of cycles
No.
1 Operation basis earthquake (OBE) 50 (5 events, each causing 10
cycles)
2 Heat-up from cold shutdown to hot stand-by 1000
3 Start-up from hot stand-by to full power 3500
4 Power maneuvering 15,000
at full power
Fracture Assessment (Level 3)
Fracture Assessment (Level 3). The fracture assessment of PHT system pipes, with postulated through-wall circumferential and
axial flaws, was carried out using the concept of a two-criteria Failure failure Assessment assessment Diagram diagram (FAD)
[28], which describes the interaction between fracture and collapse and is documented as the R-6 procedure. The results obtained
have been used to qualify Leak leak-Before before-Breakbreak criteria of PHT pipes. The R-6 method was also used to perform
sensitivity analysis for reserve margins with respect to different input parameters such as material properties, material test
temperature, initial crack length etcand so on.
The margins (FL = critical load/applied load) obtained for the different piping segments using R-6 method and accounting for the
cyclic loading effect, range from 1.7-to3.4 against a minimum required value of 2.
68.5.3.5 General Limit Load and B2 Stress Index Equation for Pipe Bends under In Plane Bending
<H3>68.5.3.5 General Limit Load and B2 Stress Index Equation for Pipe Bends under In-Plane Bending The limit
load assessment is essential to prevent the pipe or pipe bends to fail by excessive deformation or collapse. Currently available limit
load equations have a limited range of applicability and do not cover the wide range of bend geometries that are used in power
plant piping. Ideally, the elbow limit load equation should approach straight pipe limit load with increasing pipe bend radius.
Keeping this fact in mind, finite element analyses of around 65 elbows having different geometric parameters were performed. The
45 March 11, 2008

parameters considered were elbow bend radius (rb) to mean radius (R) ratio (2, 3, 6, 9, 12, and 18) and pipe radius (R) to thickness
(t) ratio (5, 7.5, 10, 15, 20, and 30).
One quarter of elbow was modeled using three- dimensional 20 nodded brick elements and elastic perfectly and a plastic
analysis was performed, which included the geometric nonlinearity. The analyses have been carried out for both in-plane closing
and opening bending, and limit load for each case was determined using the twice elastic slope method. A relational study was
performed to understand the dependence of limit load on the R/t, rb/R and elbow characteristic h. The study addressed the
weakening factor (Wf), i.ethat is,. the normalized limit loads (ratio of limit load of elbow to limit load of corresponding pipe). A
simple expression for weakening factor (or limit load) is proposed [29] for closing bending bending, which covers the entire
domain of the parameters and provides a good prediction of limit load for non standard elbows. A margin consistent definition [30]
for B2 index defines it as the ratio of the pipe collapse load to the collapse load of corresponding elbow.
Elbow Pipe 2
M W M W (4 R t )
L f L f o
Limit moment of an equivalent pipe 1 0.2 (68.1)

B = 1
2 Limit moment of the elbow Wf 1.028 0.095 rb / R
h
The Section III of ASME B&PVBoiler and Pressure Vessel Code allows for design by simplified analysis (NB-3600)
using stress indices. The B2 index is used for calculating the primary stress intensity due to bending load.
Using margin consistent definition, the ASME Code Expression expression for B2 can easily deduced as 1.3 3 from the lower
2
0.6 Pipe
bound in-plane limit moment expression for the elbow as 0.8 M L given by Spence and Findlay [31]. However, The ASME
Code has typically defined B2 as 2/3rdtwo-third of C2 index. Thus, the stress index value of 1.3 for B2 in the ASME Code is equal to
2/3 of 1.95. The ASME Code C2 index is based on Dodge and Moore [32] investigations on the stress intensities in curved pipe
under combinations of in-plane, out-of-plane, and torsional moments. He found that a C2 index of 1.95/(h2/3) would conservatively
predict the maximum stress intensity for any resultant moment.
ASME B2 index is found to be in good agreement for extra large bend- radius elbows. However it is very conservative for
standard elbows (rb/R = 2 and 3). Based on these investigations, a new B2 index (Eq. 68.1) is proposed, which eliminates
undesirable conservatism in the present ASME B2 index equation and it can be used for elbows of any bend radius. Following
figure Figure 68.13 shows the conservatism of present B 2 index equation as well as compares the limit load equation with other
literature equations as Caladine [33], Touboul [34], Chattopadhyay [35], and Kim [36].
46 March 11, 2008

Similar equations are also proposed for opening bending, closing, and opening bending for elbow with circumferential
through- wall crack.
Fig. 13: Comparison of FEM and Proposed equation with the literature equations [29]FIG. 68.13 COMPARISON
OF FEM AND PROPOSED EQUATION WITH THE LITERATURE EQUATIONS [29]
Type Setter:
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED FILE FOR 'PHOTO READY black & white PICTURE OF THIS FIGURE 13 THAT SHOULD
BE INSERTED HERE". A suitable enlarged size of this figure may be inserted at this location of the chapter to make it
legible for readers.
<H2>68.5.4 Containment Design
The containment design has evolved from single containment in Rajasthan Atomic Power Station to full double containment in
all the current designs with the provision of openings in the dome of reactor building for erection of steam generator. The design
follows the guidelines of French design Design code Code RCC-G [4].
68.5.4.1 Design against Membrane Stresses
<H3>68.5.4.1 Design Against Membrane Stresses The major loads considered for the design of containment structure are
dead load, prestress loads with appropriate losses, internal pressure on account- postulated design basis accident scenario,
47 March 11, 2008

temperature loads under test, normal operating and design basis accident conditions, environmental loads, viz.namely, seismic
(both operating basis earthquake and safe shut down earthquake) and wind loads. Appropriate live loads under normal operating
condition as well as during construction process are also considered while carrying out the design of containment structure.
The prestress loads which that are imparted on the structure to counter the tensile stresses generated during design basis
accident condition, vary both spatially as well as in time domain on account of short - term and long- term losses. The short-term
losses are due to friction and wobble effect, anchorage draw-in, and elastic shortening of concrete structure due to stage wise
stressing of cables during the process of prestressing. Shrinkage and creep of concrete and relaxation (creep) of prestressing steel
contribute towards the long-term losses of prestress loads.
Finite element analysis is carried out in order to evaluate the membrane forces due to various types of loads , for the inner
containment structure. Normally, the IC structure can be modeled using thick shell elements, which can take care of the shear
deformation. In order to obtain the stresses in the discontinuity areas more accurately due to irregular geometry and also due to the
discrete anchorage forces due tobecause of prestress cable, the IC ring beam is modeled using 8-noded 3D solid brick elements.
The effect of the duct openings and the reinforcing/prestressing steel is accounted for appropriately at the design stage.
The design of the prestressed concrete inner containment structure is checked both under limit state of serviceability as well as
under limit state of strength (also called as ultimate limit state) as per the provisions of RCC-G. It is ensured that a membrane
compressive stress of at least 1 MPa is available under accident condition. Presence of voids in the concrete section due to cable
duct openings led to development of special computer programs for carrying out the design check under limit state of serviceability
and limit state of strength.
The entire inner containment is checked against the requirement of Limit limit State state of Strengthstrength. In general, the load
factor for the permanent loads is 1.35 and that for the variable loads is 1.5.
68.5.4.2 Design against Radial Stress in IC Dome
<H3>68.5.4.2 Design Against Radial Stress in IC Dome The normal stress in the thickness direction, also called as radial
stress, is generated in the inner containment structure due to (i) Curvature effect, in which the curved prestressed cables embedded
inside the concrete exert pressure towards the center of curvature at the bottom of the cable sheath leading to development of radial
stress, (ii) transition Transition effect, arising at locations where the shell thickness changes rapidly within a short distance, and
(iii) Stress concentration effect, in which the in-plane membrane compressive stresses in the IC dome also generate radial tensile
stress around the cable duct openings.
48 March 11, 2008

Normally, the radial stresses in the prestressed concrete inner containment structure are maximum during the construction
period since the prestress forces are maximum. With time, long- term losses take place and thus, the residual prestress is reduced.
In view of this, the design against radial stress is carried out for the loads under construction stage. Working stress method of
design is adopted for this.
In order to control cracking of concrete, the radial stresses are limited to 0.67 times the tensile strength of concrete. The
allowable radial tensile stress is further reduced in order to take into account the effect of membrane compressive stress field. The
radial tensile stress generated due to all the phenomena are considered for limiting the concrete tensile stress except that due to the
effect of stress concentration, since the radial stress generated due to this phenomenon is secondary in nature and is balanced by the
adjacent compressive stress field.
The radial reinforcements in the IC dome are designed to carry the radial tensile force resulting from the curvature effect and
transition effect where the cable spacing is sufficiently large. However, where the cable spacing is close, reinforcements are
provided to take care of the local tensile force due to stress concentration effect also.
A reduced value of permissible stress is considered while designing the reinforcements to limit cracking in the concrete. The
deflection and strains at certain locations in the IC are recorded during proof testing mainly to compare the deflection as well as
strains obtained from analytical study. The strain measurements are also necessary to monitor the development of stresses in the IC
structure at different stages of prestressing during construction.
The strains are measured using vibrating wire strain gauges (VWSG) connected to automatic data-logger at locations covering
the entire IC in order to capture both membrane as well as radial stresses. Based on the recorded data the stresses developed in the
IC are compared with the specified allowable stress limits of the design code RCC-G.
68.5.4.3 Equivalence Study with Respect to ASME, Sec-III, Div-2
<H3>68.5.4.3 Equivalence Study with Respect to ASME Code Section III, Division 2 As discussed in the preceding
sections, the design of containment structures of Indian PHWRs has been based on the methodology evolved considering the
Indian construction practices. The design methodology is mainly based on the principles of the French code Code RCC-G as the
containment system adopted for the Indian PHWRs is a double containment without metallic liner, similar to the one adopted in the
French containments of PWRs. However, an attempt has been made to study the equivalence of the various provisions of design of
primary (Innerinner) containment structure being followed in India with respect to those adopted in various international standards
in order to assess the level of its safety under design basis accident scenario. The study has been carried out to establish the
equivalent partial safety factor for accident pressure (Pa) in factored load combination under limit state of strength. For this
49 March 11, 2008

purpose, a detailed design check has been carried out for some typical elements located in different regions of Inner inner
Containment containment structure, such as, (i) IC dome thickened area near SG Openingopening, (ii) IC dome general area, (iii)
IC wall Raft raft junction, (iv) IC wall general area, and (v) IC dome springing area under accidental load combination as per the
provisions of various international standards, viz.namely, Canadian Standard, ASME, Section- III, Division- 2 and RCC-G.
Based on the equivalence study, the following conclusions are drawn:
(i) Though the design philosophy and partial safety factors for material and loads, pre-stress loss computation, etc and others
are different in various international standards (such as Canadian, ASME and RCC-G), the design provisions and the
associated design parameters suggested by various International international codes pertaining to design of containment
structure are laid down in such a balanced way that the final design lies in the same range.
(ii) In general, it is noticed that the load combination involving accident pressure along with the design philosophy suggested
in RCC-G is equivalent to the design provisions adopted in the Canadian standard as well as the ASME Code.
<H1>68.6 Organization of Design, Fabrication, Construction, Operation, and ISI of NPPs in India
<H2>68.6.1 Design:
India started its nuclear power programme with two BWRs, which were constructed on turn-key basis by General Electric,
USA in 1969. Later on, India had collaboration with Canada for two 220 MWeMWe PHWRs. First PHWR was designed and
constructed by Canadians. However, during the construction of second reactor, the collaboration ended and India took over the
remaining construction work. Subsequent to the end of collaboration with Canada, India has built 11 x 220 MWe MWe PHWRs
and 2 x 540 MWeMWe PHWRs. Three more 220 MWeMWe PHWRs are in the final stages of completion. Design,
construction and operation of all these reactors are totally done in India. All the PHWRs are being designed, constructed, and
operated by Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), a Government of India Enterprise, under the Department of
Atomic Energy. Civil structures design is by consultants like such as M/s. STUP, Development Consultants Private Limited, Tata
Consulting Engineers, etc.and others and quality assessment is done by NPCIL.
NPCIL has developed a very high expertise in design of small- and medium- sized PHWRs. It has its own R&D facilities
where new and innovative designs are developed and tested. Besides this, NPCIL gets support from its sister concerns like such as
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), and Raja Ramanna Centre for
Advanced Technology (RRCAT) in the field of research and development. It has a strong team of design engineers who look after
all the design aspects starting from conceptual design to detailed structural design and analysis, process design, and electrical, civil,
50 March 11, 2008

and instrumentation design of NPPs. International codes such aslike ASME, IEEE, and RCC, etc and others are followed for
design of nuclear power plants. Further, safety codes and guides issued by IAEA, USNRC, and AERB are also followed.
Design of Fast fast Breeder breeder Reactors reactors (FBRs) is done by IGCAR. They have all the facilities for design,
analysis and R&D of FBRs. FBRs are totally looked after by IGCAR with the help of other sister organizations like such as
BARC, NPCIL, RRCAT etcand others. One Fast fast Breeder breeder Test test Reactor reactor is under operation. One Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor of 500 MWeMWe capacity is under construction by Bhartiya Vidyut Nigam (BHAVINI).
Design and development of thorium- based reactors, including all the engineering, analysis, and related R&D activities, is
done by BARC. A 300- MWeMWe Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is being designed by BARC.
<H2>68.6.2 Fabrication:
India is one of the few countries in the world that has acquired expertise in the entire range of nuclear fuel cycle activities. As
these activities are of special nature and did not form a part of the general industrial domain of the country, Department of Atomic
Energy (DAE) established facilities for carrying them out in a proper phased manner. Over the years, significant efforts were put by
DAE/NPCIL to develop indigenous manufacturing capability to fabricate various equipment / components conforming to stringent
quality standard of nuclear power plants. Indigenous industrial infrastructure for nuclear power plants is well developed. Indian
industry has gained valuable experience and reached a stage of maturity in manufacturing components for these reactors. Indian
industries are fully capable of manufacturing all the components, including large- size components like such as calandria, end-
shields, steam generators, turbine, condenser, etcand others. These Indian industries have developed capabilities to manufacture all
the nuclear as well as secondary side components. All the class Class I, II, and III nuclear components are fabricated, inspected,
and tested as per applicable ASME codesCodes. Raw materials are procured to meet the ASME specifications. Inspection is done
by the Quality Assurance Group of these industries. NPCIL has its own QA Groupgroup, which does the surveillance job at the
shops of manufacturers. Expertise for carrying out all the Non nondestructive examinations has been developed by NPCIL as well
as the manufacturers.
<H2>68.6.3 Construction:
Over the years, India has developed expertise in the construction of Nuclear nuclear Power power Plants plants (NPPs). At
present India is constructing nuclear power plants in less than five years. Advanced project management techniques are being
51 March 11, 2008

followed to cut down the gestation period. Further, the following improvements have been made in the construction methodology
to cut down the gestation period.
Concept of mega packages has been introduced.
Vendors participation in analysis and decision making has been increased.
Integrated action plans are evolved to resolve issues related to design, material, and construction activities.
Targets and expectations are fully defined.
Open top construction, increased mechanization, and parallel civil and mechanical erection are implemented.
Round the clock construction work is practiced.
Use of project management tools, increased use of information technology for prompt decision making and timely mid-
course corrections and revision of construction sequence have been successfully implemented.
There are a large number of civil construction companies in India, which take care of full construction of civil structures.
Prominent amongst them are M/s. Engineering Construction and Contracts (ECC), M/s. Gammon India Ltd., M/s Hindustan
Construction Co., etcand others. In the early reactors, mechanical erection was done by NPCIL. But now there are many
companies which that undertake Engineeringengineering, Procurement procurement, and Construction construction (EPC)
contracts. Now, the construction of NPPs is being carried out through mega packages. On the secondary side, mostly, there are
EPC packages. On the nuclear side, there are PC packages. This has reduced the construction time drastically.
<H2>68.6.4 Operation:
At present India has 2 x 200 MWeMWe BWRs, 13 x 220 MWeMWe PHWRs, and 2 x 540 PHWR NPPs in operation.
All operations are done indigenously by NPCIL. Each twin station unit has around 600 operating manpower, including Operation
and Maintenance (O&M) personnel. At each station, there are four operating crews, one for each operating shift and one extra
crew for exigencies. All the engineers are trained and licensed and their licenses are periodically updated. All the reactors are
operated as per their operating technical specifications, which cover all the operating limits as per IAEA safety standards. The
technical specifications are duly reviewed and approved by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).
NPCIL is a member of World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), CANDU Owners Group (COG) , and International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The peer reviews by expert teams of WANO has been recognized internationally as major tool for
sharing the best practices in operation and performance improvement. Such reviews have been completed for all the reactors. These
52 March 11, 2008

reviews indicate that the condition and performance of stations matched with those at the world level. WANO members regularly
visit our plants and review the operation and safety aspects. In the recent reactors, even pre -operation reviews have been carried
out by WANO before the criticality of newly constructed reactors. Regular seminars / meetings are held among members of COG,
during which the challenges faced in various PHWRs are shared and discussed. This helps in upgrading the safety standards
further.
India has experience of 265 reactor operating years. Till now there has not been any significant event wherein radioactivity is
released to the public domain and no nuclear accident, as defined by International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) of IAEA, has
occurred.
Indian PHWRs have very high availability factor over the entire lifetime. This is made possible by strict scheduled outage for
maintenance and in-service inspections. Biennial shutdown is taken only for 18 to 20 days. All the in-service inspections, and
containment testing, etc.and so on are done within this time. Unscheduled outages have totally reduced and downtime is very much
controlled. On redundant systems, preventive maintenance is performed on power. Radiological protection is enhanced by
choosing Cobalt cobalt-free materials, providing adequate shielding thickness, and by optimized design and layout of components
and systems.
A comprehensive radiological surveillance programme around each NPP is pursued by well- equipped Environmental
environmental Survey survey Laboratorieslaboratories (ESLs). The basic objective of these laboratories is to assess the radiation
doses to the public due to operation of NPPs and to demonstrate the compliance with the applicable regulatory limits set by
national and international authorities.
The Environmental environmental Survey survey Laboratories laboratories (ESL) at site periodically collect and analyse
analyze various environmental matrices, including dietary items such as water, cereals, pulses, meat, fish, milk, eggs etc.and others
for their radioactivity contents. Environmental samples are collected on regular basis from various locations surrounding the
nuclear facility up to a distance of 30 km. The sampling locations are selected on the basis of wind pattern, utilization of
environment, and population clusters around the facility. The type of samples are selected on the basis of potential pathways to
man. Annually about 2500 environmental samples are being collected and analysed analyzed by ESL at each nuclear site. The
samples are analysed analyzed for various biologically important radionuclides. The data thus obtained are processed statistically
and used to evaluate the dose annually to the members of public residing around NPPs.
The well- defined and executed environmental radiological surveillance programme around each nuclear power plant shows
that radioactive contamination is insignificant. It also demonstrates that the NPP releases are well within the prescribed regulatory
53 March 11, 2008

limits. It is observed that the annual radiation doses at the site boundary of the respective nuclear power plant are less than 7 % of
the annual regulatory limit of 1000 Sv during the period of operations. On comparing with the naturally occurring background
radiation of 2400 Sv/year yr, it is almost negligible.
The release of radioactivity to environment from the nuclear power stations is in very small quantities and in any case well
within the limits stipulated by AERB. For monitoring the compliance to the prescribed regulatory requirements, environmental
survey and meteorological laboratories are set up at each plant site. These laboratories analyze samples of food, air, water,and so
on etc. up to an area of 30- km radius from the plant to assure environmental security.
<H2>68.6.5 In- Service Inspection (ISI):
In- Service service Inspection at all the operating plants is carried out periodically as per station ISI program. ISI program is
finalized based Based on ISI documents, ISI program is finalized, which meet the intent of ASME section Section XI. India has
developed all the special tools required for ISI of coolant channels and steam generators. BARCIS and Sliver Sliver sampling
scraping tools are some of the important tools developed for ISI for pressure tubes. Life management of coolant channels, Flow
flow Accelerated accelerated Corrosion corrosion (FAC) mainly on secondary side, and feeder thinning are the major challenges
faced by the Indian PHWRs. These challenges have been successfully met through ISI and maintenance.
India has successfully completed en- masse coolant channel replacement in four reactors where zircalloyZircaloy-2 pressure
tubes were used. All the tools and techniques were developed indigenously. Also, feeder replacement has been successfully
completed in three reactors.
During the evolution of main circuit design, effort has been made at minimizing the weld joints and in turn the in-service
requirement of such joints. This has been achieved by adopting integral forging for the headers with pull out nozzles, main circuit
piping with hockey stick combination for large pipe spools. The Steam steam Generator generator shells have also been specified
as ring forging to eliminate longitudinal joints.
Development of Codes, Guides and Standards
<H2>68.6.6 Development of Codes, Guides, and Standards In order to fulfill its mission of stipulating and enforcing rules and
regulations concerned with nuclear and radiological safety, AERB is in the process of developing codes and guides for various
54 March 11, 2008

aspects of nuclear reactor design. These guides will borrow appropriate elements from ASME, ASCE, ACI, Canadian and French
Codes and incorporate Indias experience in their usage, Indian materials, and construction practices. One such is effort aims at
developing a safety standard for Design of Nuclear Power Plant Containment Structures and is currently in draft stage [37]. This
is based on ASME CodeSec Section III, Div.Division 2 [38], ACI 349 [39], RCC-G [4], CSA-N287.3 [40], and the Indian code
Code IS 456 [41]. Another guide in draft stage is the one for Seismic Qualification of Structures, Systems and Components of
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors [42]. This guide builds on the Indian experience gained during seismic design of reactor
structures and is based on ASCE [43], IEEE [44] JAEG 4601 [45], IAEA NS-G-1.6 [46], and IS 1893 [10].
<H1>68.7 Conclusions
1. Design of Indian PHWRs is based on ASME B&PV code Code Section. III.
2. In those cases where the code rules could not be met in letter, they have been met in spirit by carrying out the required
material characterization and component qualification tests.
3. Indian PHWR programme depends on Leakleak-before-break criterion for eliminating pipe whip restraints. Leak-before-
breakLBB has been demonstrated by carrying out extensive tests on specimens, pipes, and elbows.
4. The tests have demonstrated adequate margins with respect to failure by fracture even when leakage size crack is present.
5. The R&D programme has explored effects of cyclic loading and presence of connected piping on fracture behaviour of
piping.
6. A new B2 index is proposed which eliminates undesirable conservatism in the present ASME B2 index equation and it can
be used for elbows of any bend radius.
7. In-service programme follows a combined philosophy of ASME Code Section. XI and the Canadian Code CSA/N281.5-
05.
8. Design of concrete containment is based on French Ccode RCC-G.
9. In order to avoid a mixture of codes, a need has been felt to write our own codes and a beginning has been made in this
respect. AERB has published 5 Safety Codes and 45 Safety Guides concerning various aspects of NPPs and 51 other
safety support documents. A few others are in various stages of preparation.
<H1>68.8 Acknowledgment ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
55 March 11, 2008

The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Shri Vivek Bhasin, Shri Rohit Rastogi, Shri P.K. Singh, Shri Suneel K.
Gupta, and Shri Imran Ali Khan of Reactor Safety Division of BARC, and Shri K.P. Dwivedi, Shri A.G. Chhatre, Shri Raghupati
Roy, and Shri Santosh Kumar of Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC).
<H1>68.9 REFERENCES
1 S.S. Bajaj, S.S. and A.R. Gore, A.R., The Indian PHWR, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume Vol. 236, Issues
Nos 7-8, April 2006, Pages pp. 701-722, April 2006.
2 ASME Boiler and & Pressure Vessel Code, Section. III; also,, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995 ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sec. III, Appendix G, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995.
3 ASME Boiler and & Pressure Vessel Code, Section. XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995.
4 RCC-G (English Translation), Vols .-I & II, Design and Construction Rules for Civil Works of PWR Nuclear Islands,
Drawn-up by Electricite De France (EDF), July 1988.
5 BPEL-83 (English Translation), Technical Rules for the Design of Prestressed Concrete Structure using Using the Limit
State Method.
6 BAEL-83 (English Translation), Technical Rules for the Design and Calculation of Reinforced Concrete Structures and
Buildings using Using Limit State Method. 
7 Jaharlal Koley, J., Harikumar, S., Ashraf, S.A.H., Chande, S.K., and Sharma, S.K., et al; Regulatory practices Practices for
nuclear Nuclear power Power plants Plants in India, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume Vol. 236, Issues Nos 7-8,
April 2006, Pages pp. 894-913, April 2006.
8 AERB/SG/D-1,. 2000. Safety classification Classification and seismic Seismic categorization Categorization for pressurized
Pressurized heavy Heavy water Water reactorsReactors,. Atomic Regulatory Board, Mumbai, India, 2000.
9 AERB/SG/S-11,. 1990. Seismic studies Studies and design Design basis Basis ground Ground motion Motion for nuclear
Nuclear power Power plants Plants sitesSites,. Atomic Regulatory Board, Mumbai, India,1990.
10 IS: 1893,. 1984. Criteria for earthquake Earthquake resistance Resistance design Design of structuresStructures. , BIS,
New Delhi., 1984.
56 March 11, 2008

11 Reddy, G.R., Kushwaha, H.S., and Kakodkar, A.; ., Seismic Analysis of Calandria End shield Assembly of 500 MWe
Pressurised Water Reactor, Proc. eedings of ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping conferenceConference. , Vol. 237: , pp.
115-120.(,1992.)
12 G.R. Reddy, G.R., H.S. Kushwaha, H.S., S.C. Mahajan, S.C., S.P. Kelkar, S.P., G.V. and Karandikar; G.V., Development
of 3-D beam Beam model Model for seismic Seismic analysis Analysis of 500 MWeMWe reactor Reactor
buildingBuilding, BARC/1996/I/004, 1996.
13 Reddy, G.R., Vaze, K.K., Kushwaha, H.S., Tandale, J.V., Subramanian, K.V., and Kelkar, S.P.; ., Procedure of Applying
Decoupling Criteria for a Complex Primary and Secondary System, Proc. eedings of ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping
conferenceConference, Vol.. 272-, No.1, pp.: 129-139, (1994).
14 Neelwarne, A., Kushwaha, H.S, and Kakodkar, A.,; Seismic Qualification of Nuclear Equipment under Multiple Support
Excitations, Proceedings. of 11th SMiRT, Japan, 1991.
15 Reddy, G.R., Kohei, S.uzuki, Kushwaha, H.S., and Mahajan, S.C.; ., Decoupling Criteria for Multi-Connected
equipmentEquipment, Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol.120: , pp. 93-98, (1999).
16 ASME Boiler and & Pressure Vessel Code, Code Case N-411-1, Alternative Damping Values for Response Spectra Analysis
of Class 1, 2 and 3 Piping, Section III, Division 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York,
February 20, 1986.
17 AERB Safety Guide AERB/SG/O-2, In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants.
18 IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-02 entitled In-service Service Inspection for Nuclear Power Plants.
19 CAN/CSA N285.4-05, Periodic Inspection of CANDU Nuclear Power Plant Components, Canadian Standard Association,
.2005.
20 CAN/CSA N285.8-05, Technical Requirements for In-Service Evaluation of Zirconium Alloy Pressure Tubes in CANDU
Reactors, Canadian Standard Association, 2005.
21 Report of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe
Breaks, NUREG/CR-1061, Vol.3, 1984.
22 International Atomic Energy Agency, Applicability of Leak-Before-Break Concept, Report of the IAEA Extra budgetary
Budgetary programme Programme on the safety Safety of WWER-440 Model 230 Nuclear Plants, IAEA TECDOC-710,
1993.
57 March 11, 2008

23 P.K. Singh, P.K., K.K. Vaze, K.K., V. Bhasin, V., H.S. Kushwaha, H.S., P. Gandhi, P., and D.S.R. Murthy, D.S.R., Crack
Initiation and Growth Behaviour of Circumferentially Cracked Pipes Under under Cyclic and Monotonic Loading,
International Journal of Pressure Vessel and Piping, Vol. 80, Issue No. 9, pp. 629640, September, 2003., pp. 629-640.
24 Suneel K. Gupta, S.K., Vivek Bhasin, V., K. K. Vaze, K.K., A.K. Ghosh, A.K., and H. S. Kushwaha, H.S., Experimental
Investigations on Effects of Simulated Seismic Loading on LBB Assessment of High Energy Piping ,, ASME-Journal of
Pressure Vessel and Technology, Vol.-129, February 2007.
25 Miura, N., Fujioka, T., Kashima, K., Kanno, S., Hayashi, M., Ishiwata, M., and Gotohm, N., 1994, Low Cycle Fatigue and
Ductile Fracture for Japanese Carbon Steel under Dynamic Loading, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol.153, pp. 57-
69, 1994..
26 Suneel K. Gupta, S.K., V. Bhasin, V., Vaze, K. K., Vaze and H. S. Kushwaha, H.S., Ductile Fracture Assessment of Piping
Systems Including the Compliance Effects , Paper # 1427, SMiRT 16, Washington DC, August 2001 Transactions., Paper #
1427
27 I.A. Khan, I.A., Bhasin, V., Bhasin,Vaze, K.K., Vaze, A.K. Ghosh, and A.K., Kushwaha, H.S., Kushwaha, Significance of
Finite Compliance of a Connected Piping System on Fracture Integrity Assessment, American Society of Engineering
Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference (ASME-PVP-2005), Colorado, USA, July, 2005.
28 Rastogi, R., Bhasin, V., and Kushwaha H. S., Qualification of PHT piping Piping of Indian 500MW PHWR for LBB, using
Using R-6 method , Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, External Report, BARC/1997/E/026, India, 1997.
29 Suneel K. Gupta, S.K., Vivek Bhasin, V., K. K. Vaze, K.K, A.K. Ghosh, A.K., H. S.and Kushwaha, H.S., General Limit
Load and B2 Stress Index Equation for Pipe Bends under In- Plane Bending, Paper # B04/5, SMiRT-19, Toronto, Canada,
August 12-17, 2007, . Paper # B04/5
30 Tan, Y., Experimental and nonlinear Nonlinear FEA Investigation of elbow Elbow leading Leading to a new definition of
the B2 Stress Index, [PhD Thesis, with Vernon C. Matzen], Civil Engg.ineering Department, North Carolina State
University, Raleigh, 2001.
31 Spence, J. and Findley, G. E., (1976). Limit load Load for pipe Pipe bend Bends under inIn-plane Plane bendingBending
Proceedings., of 2nd International Conference on Pressure Vessel Technology, San Antonio, Texas, pp. 393-399,1976.
32 Dodge, W.G. and Moore, S.E., Stress Indices and Flexibility Factors for Moment Loadings on Elbows and Curved Pipes,
Welding Research Council Bulletin No. 179, December 1972.
58 March 11, 2008

33 Caladine, C. R., (1974) Limit analysis Analysis of curved Curved tubesTubes, Journal of Mechanical Engineering
Science, J. Mech. Eng. Sci. vol Vol. 16, pp. 85-87,1974.
34 Touboul, F., Ben Djedidia, M., and Acker, D.,et. al. (1989) Design criteria Criteria for piping Piping component
Component against Against plastic Plastic collapseCollapse: Application to pipe Pipe bend Bend experimentsExperiments,
Proc.,eedings of 6th International Conference on Pressure Vessel Technology, Beijing, China, pp.73-84,1989.
35 Chattopadhyay, J., Tomar, A.K.S., Dutta, B.K., and Kushwaha, H.S., et. al. (2004) Closed form Form collapse Collapse
moment Moment equation Equation of through Through wall Wall circumferentially Circumferentially cracked Cracked
elbows Elbows subjected Subjected to inIn-plane Plane bending Bending momentMoment , ASME Journal. of Pressure
Vessel Technology, Vol.126, pp. 307-317,2004.
36 Kim, Y. J. and Chang, S. O., (2006). Closed form Form plastic Plastic collapse Collapse loads Loads of pipe Pipe bends
Bends under combined Combined pressure Pressure and inIn-plane Plane bendingBending, J. ournal of Engineering
fracture Fracture Mechanics., Article in Press.
37 AERB/SS/CSE-3, Design of Nuclear Power Plant Containment Structures (draft).
38 ASME Code Section III, Div. ision 2.
39 ACI 349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures. (ACI 349)
40 CSA-N287.3-1983,; Design Requirements for Concrete Containment Structures for CANDU Nuclear Power Plant; ,
Canadian Standard Association.
41 IS 456-2000, Plain and Reinforced Concrete - Code of Practice.
42 AERB Safety Guide No. AERB/SG/D-23, Seismic Qualification of Structures, Systems and Components of Pressurised
Heavy Water Reactors (draft).
43 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS,American Society of Civil Engineers, Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related
Nuclear Structures and Commentary; , ASCE 4-98, Virginia, USA, 2000.
44 IEEE, Standard 344-1987, 1987. IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for
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59 March 11, 2008

46 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,International Atomic Energy Agency, Seismic Design and Component
Qualification for Nuclear Power Plants; , IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6, Vienna, Austria, 2003.
60 March 11, 2008

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<LRH>Chapter Number (sentence case)

<RRH>Book Title (all caps)

<CT>DesignESIGN ofOF IndianNDIAN

PressurizedRESSURIZED HeavyEAVY WaterATER

<CA>H.S. Kushwaha, K.K. Vaze, and K.B. Dixit

1 March 11, 2008

evolution, improvement, and refinement in the PHWR concept in a progressive manner.

4 March 11, 2008

<H1>68.2 INDIAN PHWR

<H2>68.2.1 Introduction to Indian PHWR [1]

Cooling System, and a double containment with suppression pool.

5 March 11, 2008

<H2>68.2.2 Description IPHWR

6 March 11, 2008

2. Over Pressure pressure Relief relief Assemblyassembly

Devicedevice(OPRD) 12. Tube Sheet sheet F/M Sideside

3. Shut Down down system #1 13. Tube Sheet sheet Calcal.

4. Shut Down down system #1 Sideside

5. Moderator Inletinlet 14. Lattice Tubetube

6. Moderator Outletoutlet 15. End Shield- shield Support

7. Vent Pipepipe support Plateplate

8. Coolant Channel channel 16. End Shield shield Cooling

Assemblyassembly ccooling Inlet inlet Pipespipes

9. End Shieldshield 17. End Fitting fitting

10. End Shield shield Support support Assemblyassembly

Structure structure assembly 18. Feeder Pipespipes

assy 19. Outer Shellshell

20. Support Luglug

Fig.FIG. 68. 1 Integral INTEGRAL assembly

ASSEMBLY of OF Calandria CALANDRIA And AND

End END Shield SHIELD (CUTCUT-Away View Of

ReactorAWAY VIEW OF REACTOR) [1]

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED FILE FOR 'PHOTO

7 March 11, 2008

THAT SHOULD BE INSERTED HERE". A suitable

enlarged size of this figure may be inserted at this

location of the chapter to make it legible for readers.

and 68.3 show the schematic of the system.

Fig. 2 PHWR simplified flow diagram [1]FIG. 68. 2

PHWR SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM [1]

8 March 11, 2008

PHT system [1]

FIG. 68.3 PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF STEAM

GENERATOR AND PHT SYSTEM [1]

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED FILE FOR 'PHOTO

READY black & white PICTURE OF THIS FIGURE 3

THAT SHOULD BE INSERTED HERE". A suitable

enlarged size of this figure may be inserted at this

location of the chapter to make it legible for readers

9 March 11, 2008

maintenance, and lesser manrem.

bleed is retained for inventory control.

Fig. 4 Containment Building [1]

FIG. 68. 4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING [1]

10 March 11, 2008

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED FILE FOR 'PHOTO

READY black & white PICTURE OF THIS FIGURE 4

THAT SHOULD BE INSERTED HERE". A suitable

enlarged size of this figure may be inserted at this

location of the chapter to make it legible for readers.

containment. Fig.ure 68. 4 shows the schematic of containment.

11 March 11, 2008

ASME B&PV CodeBoiler & Pressure Vessel Code [2, 3].

<H2>68.2.4 Regulatory Structure [7]