CASE NUMBER 20: MAPP VS OHIO

Facts. Three Cleveland police officers arrived at the petitioners residence pursuant to
information that a bombing suspect was hiding out there and that paraphernalia regarding the
bombing was hidden there. The officers knocked and asked to enter, but the petitioner refused
to admit them without a search warrant after speaking with her attorney. The officers left and
returned approximately three hours later with what purported to be a search warrant. When the
petitioner failed to answer the door, the officers forcibly entered the residence. The petitioners
attorney arrived and was not permitted to see the petitioner or to enter the residence. The
petitioner demanded to see the search warrant and when presented, she grabbed it and placed
it in her shirt. Police struggled with the petitioner and eventually recovered the warrant. The
petitioner was then placed under arrest for being belligerent and taken to her bedroom on the
second floor of the residence. The officers then co
nducted a widespread search of the residence wherein obscene materials were found in a trunk
in the basement. The petitioner was ultimately convicted of possessing these materials.

Issue. Whether evidence discovered during a search and seizure conducted in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution shall be admissible in a State court?
Held. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) filed the majority opinion. No, the exclusionary rule applies
to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendments search and seizure clause in all
State prosecutions. Since the Fourth Amendments right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the same sanction of exclusion is also enforceable against them. The purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter illegally obtaining evidence and to compel respect for the
constitutional guarantee in the only effective manner. Otherwise, a State, by admitting illegally
obtained evidence, disobeys the Constitution that it has sworn to uphold. A federal prosecutor
may make no use of illegally obtained evidence, but a State prosecutor across the street may,
although he supposedly is operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same
Amendment. If the criminal is to go free, then it must be the law that sets him fr
ee. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.

CASE NUMBER 21: ABEL VS US

Facts. Respondent was charged with robbing a bank with two other men. One of the men, Ehle,
testified at Respondents trial to implicate him in the robbery. Respondent then called Mills to
testify that while in prison, Ehle confided to him that he would falsely implicate Respondent in
order to receive favorable treatment. To rebut the credibility of Mills, Ehle was called back to the
stand to testify that he, Mills and Respondent belonged to an Aryan gang that swore to perjure
themselves to help a fellow gang member. The trial court allowed the testimony, and
Respondent was convicted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, citing the prejudicial
nature of the testimony.

Issue. The issue is whether prejudicial testimony that implicates Respondent with a prison gang
is admissible because it is probative to the bias of a witness.
 Held. The prejudicial testimony is admissible because it is highly probative of the bias of
Respondents witness. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not directly address impeachment for
bias, but the history of the Rules Advisory Committee mention bias as a concern that is
encompassed by the Rules.
Discussion. Whether evidence is too prejudicial or not relevant enough varies case-by-case. In
this instance the testimony was considered very relevant and was able to override the
prejudicial tone that implicated Respondent with a prison gang. The Court will often refer to
common-law prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in order to justify the scope of their
interpretations, as they did here to allow impeachment for bias.

CASE NUMBER 22: MONCADO VS PEOPLES COURT

Hilario Moncado v. Peoples Court
G.R. No. L-824, January 14, 1948

FACTS: In an ejectment case filed before the justice of the peace court of Guijulngan, Negros Oriental, after trial
in the absence of the defendants, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Court of First Instance then
sent notice by registered mail posted on September 8, 1939 the notice of receipt of appealed case and
the period for pleading. Defendants were informed of such mail by the postmaster but the same was not
claimed, CFI of Negros Oriental, upon motion of plaintiff, ordered defendants to vacate the land and to
pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of PHP 18 as damages, plus costs. Defendants appealed
the decision claiming that their failure to get notice from post office was due to ignorance and that they
were not served with copy of plaintiffs motion for default.
CFI denied defendants motion on June 19, 1940.

ISSUE: Was defendants failure to get notice valid and excusable?

RULING: No, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendants are not entitled to a service of copy of the motion
that they are in default except when they file a motion to set aside the order of default, in which event they
are entitled to notice of all further proceedings (Rule 27, Section 9, Rules of Court). Second, failure to get
notice was not excusable neglect as claimed by defendants. Indeed, a notice, is deemed served if
delivered by registered mail and claimed within 5 days from first notice of postmaster (Rule 27, Section 8,
Rules of Court).
Appealed order affirmed.

CASE NUMBER 23: NOLASCO VS PANO

Nolasco, et al vs. Pao

G.R. No. L-69803
October 8, 1985

Facts:
The present case was subject for resolution.

Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal,
annulling the decision of respondent Judge Pao, and that the seizure of the items
by virtue of the warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as
evidence in the Subversive Documents case. However the Court held that
the items were to be retained in case it would be used as evidence in a
separate criminal case pending before the Special Military Commission No.1,
returning the rest which are determined irrelevant by petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the
properties seized. One of the petitioners also assailed the respondents claim that the
search was incidental to her arrest for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:
Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a
separate criminal case.

Held:
The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void. It was held
that the warrant was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also orders the absolute exclusion of
all illegally obtained evidence: Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sec. 4[2]).

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be
used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs.
Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).
Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general
warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest

The Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.

CASE NUMBER 24: OLMSTEAD VS US

Facts. Various individuals were convicted of liquor related crimes, including conspiracy. The
operation grossed a substantial amount of money. The leading conspirator and the general
manager of the business was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the Petitioner). The main office
of the business was in Seattle and there were three telephones in the office, each on a different
line. There were also telephones in an office the Petitioner had in his own home, at the home of
his associates and various other places in Seattle. A lot of communication occurred between
Seattle and Vancouver, British Columbia.
The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and extent was
largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators by four federal
prohibition officers. Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the
residences of four of the [suspects] and those leading from the chief office. The insertions were
made without trespass upon any property of the defendants. They were made in the basement
of the large office building. The taps from house lines were made in the streets near the
houses.
Various conversations were taped and testified to by government witnesses.

Issue. [W]hether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the
defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments[?]
Held. The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching.
There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that
only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. By the invention of the
telephone 50 years ago, and its application for the purpose of extending communications, one
can talk with another at a far distant place. The language of the amendment cannot be extended
and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the defendants
house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are the
highways along which they are stretched.
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus
depart from the common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a policy by
attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable view is
that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to
project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house, and messages
while passing over them, are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those
who intercepted the projected voices were not in the house of either party to the conversation.
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our attention
hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, unless there has
been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible
material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage for the purpose of
making a seizure. [The court thought], therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not
amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, [t]he common-law rule is that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
illegality of the means by which it was obtained.
A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical
conduct by government officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity
than has been known heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by Congress, those
who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the
exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution would be
violated by admitting it.

CASE NUMBER 25: PAPA VS MAGO

CASE NUMBER 26: PENDON VS CA

Facts: Based on the application and joint deposition, a search warrant was issued against Siao and the same
complaint was filed against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner contends that the application for
the search warrant and the joint deposition of witnesses failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the Constitution
on the ground that probable cause was not personally determined.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the said warrant is valid.

Held: No, Probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce before the issuance of a search warrant.

CASE NUMBER 27: PEOPLE VS AMINUDIN

FACTS

The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their

informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for
him in the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank
after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he
was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue:

Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach

and seizure is violated

Ruling:

The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
the rules of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a
crime was about to be committed or had just been committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it

is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival
was certain. And from the information they have received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance
of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine
on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.

The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not

law enforcement agents.

ACQUITTED

CASE NUMBER 28: PEOPLE VS BARROS

CASE NUMBER 29: PEOPLE VS CUIZON

Facts: In the case at bar, it was not established that an offense has been committed and the arresting officers has
personal knowledge of facts that the accused-appellant had committed a crime since his warrantless arrest was
based on suspicion that he committed a crime. Accused-appellant questions the validity of the warrantless search
made at his residence subsequent to his warrantless arrest. Accused-appellant contends that the shabu seized is
inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search subsequent to his warrantless arrest is valid.

Held: No. There are instances where a search without a warrant may be conducted. However, where a person is
searched without a warrant and under circumstances other than those which justifies a warrantless arrest, a mere
suspicion that a crime has been committed, the search made and as well his arrest is illegal.

CASE NUMBER 30: PEOPLE VS DAMASO

Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of
subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure conducted at his house at night time when he was not
around, on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person without the owners presence is valid.

Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused-appellant without his knowledge is a violation of the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.

CASE NUMBER 31: PEOPLE VS DE GRACIA

CASE NUMBER 32: PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO

Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly
methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which
 authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an entrapment was planned that led
to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalias
and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the
only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalias therein. The seizure of the firearms
was unconstitutional.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

CASE NUMBER 33: PEOPLE VS DICHOSO

Facts: A search warrant of marijuana and shabu in appellants residence was issued after probable cause was
personally determined by the judge after examination of the applicant. Appellant contends that the search warrant is a
general warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated, and the search conducted was
unconstitutional and the items obtained inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible.
Held: No. The search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it particularizes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized and specifies the offense involved. Items seized are admissible.

CASE NUMBER 34: PEOPLE VS EVARISTO

Facts: Peace officers while patrol, heard burst of gunfire and proceeded to investigate in the house of appellant where
they were given permission to enter accidentally discovering the firearms in the latters possession. Accused-appellant
found guilty of illegal possession of firearms contends that the seizure of the evidence is inadmissible because it was
not authorized by a valid warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in an accidental discovery of the evidence is admissible.
Held: Yes, the firearms seized was valid and lawful for being incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense was committed in
the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant.

CASE NUMBER 35: PEOPLE VS EXALA

THE FACTS

A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in

Cavite City for routine inspection. With Bocalan were his co-accused Fernandez and Exala. Pfc.
Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were
 firearms inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang proceeded to inspect the vehicle by
beaming a flashlight inside. He then noticed a black leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide and 2
feet long with its sides bulging. When he asked what it contained, there was deadening silence from
the 3 accused. Nobody answered. Instead, they suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang
ordered the bag opened, which was found out to contain marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter
prosecuted and convicted of illegal transportation of marijuana. Accused Bocalan appealed and
questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana as evidence against him since it was
seized without a valid search warrant.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible in evidence
against the accused?

RULING: 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A MILITARY

OR POLICE CHECKPOINT, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN UPHELD, IS ONE OF
THE INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT PRIOR ARREST
OR WARRANT. There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a
warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this
Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and
answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that either the
motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the
commission of an offense. However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away
with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and
belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
The case before Us is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police
checkpoint.

CASE NUMBER 36: PEOPLE VS GERENTE

PEOPLE

VS.

GERENTE
G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10 1993

FACTS:
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with FredoEchigoren and Totoy
Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant. She overheard
the three mentalking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente
carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace . Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing as
follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and
Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place
behind the house of Gerente.

Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.
 Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took
place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.
They were informed by Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the
three men who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to
come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant
and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. Only the
appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren, are still at large.

Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against
him for Violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for Murder. The trial court
convicted him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite
the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
The appealed decision was affirmed.

ARREST
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they
found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

SEARCH and SEIZURE

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident
to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first

CASE NUMBER 37: PEOPLE VS INTING

PEOPLE

VS.

GERENTE
G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10 1993

FACTS:
 Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with FredoEchigoren and Totoy
Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant. She overheard
the three mentalking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente
carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace . Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing as
follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and
Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place
behind the house of Gerente.

Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.

Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took
place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.
They were informed by Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the
three men who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to
come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant
and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. Only the
appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren, are still at large.

Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against
him for Violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for Murder. The trial court
convicted him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite
the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
The appealed decision was affirmed.

ARREST
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they
found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

SEARCH and SEIZURE

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident
to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first
CASE NUMBER 38: PEOPLE VS MARTI
Facts:
The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with
them four gift wrapped packages to be sent in Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress, Anita
Reyes (not related to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if he could examine and expect
the packages however appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no longer insisted. Before
delivery of appellants box to the bureau of Customs and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes,
proprietor and husband of Anita, following standard procedure opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting laboratory examination sample he extracted from the
cellophane. Therefore, job and three NBI agents and a photographer went to the Reyes office at
Ermita. Job brought out the box in which appellants packages were places and in the presence
of the NBI agents, open the top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and took out the cellophane
wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves are found inside the cellophane.

Issue:
Whether or not there is violation of appellants constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search. Records of the
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job who made search and inspection of the said packages.
Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Job as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Custom or Post. If the
search is made upon the request of law enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured
first if it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made in the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purpose, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of the police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individual as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may only invoked against
the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise by the sovereign authority.

CASE NUMBER 39: PEOPLE VS MUSA\

Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged
in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by
NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa.
The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of
Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his
position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa
the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected
it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the
living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped
away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a
cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They
asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it
and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be
admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in
the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the
object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They
arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for
other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana
inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
object.

Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally
and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution.

CASE NUMBER 40: PEOPLE VS OMAWENG

People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]
Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts:
In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC Command put up
a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc.They
stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., theyflagged
down a cream-colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion andheaded
towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and had no passengers.The
Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which Omawengacceded
to. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially
covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of thevehicle. They
asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng consented to.When they
opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of different sizescontaining
pulverized substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after

sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter boarded the
vehiclesand proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters.
The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at
CampDangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance
containedin the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish
or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with
the MTCBontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-
affidavitsdespite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had
waived hisright to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against Omaweng,
ordered theelevation of the case to the proper court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the
ProvincialFiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with the
violation of Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case
713). After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered
a plea of not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the
prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did not present any evidence other than portions of
the JointClarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses
JosephLayong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its
Judgmentconvicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article
II of RA6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right
againstunreasonable searches and seizures.
Held:
Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of
hisConstitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior
consentto the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling
bag. Thetestimony of the PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or
rebutted byOmaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right
againstunreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents
to haveit made in his person or premises. He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to
besecure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
madeeither expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41 packages of drugs
werefound, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure.

CASE NUMBER 41: PEOPLE VS TANGLIBEN

Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance

at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a
person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They
confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The
accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations.
The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search
warrant.

Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person
may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession
of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search
warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the
arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the
accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The
police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a
search warrant.

CASE NUMBER 42: PRUDENTE VS DAYRIT

Facts: Based on an information from a verified source that petitioner violated the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, police
officers applied for a search warrant which was subsequently issued by respondent judge. Petitioner assailed the
validity of the search warrant on the ground that there was no probable cause for the issuance of search warrant.
Issue: Whether or not a warrant issued based on verified information to the police is valid.
Held: No. Probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses
and not simply on hearsay.

CASE NUMBER 43: SALAZAR VS ACHOCOSO

FACTS:
A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the complainants PECC Card, it was
further alleged that Salazar did not posses a license to operate as a recruitment agency. POEA through
its Director on Licensing and Regulation, issued a warrant of arrest and seizure against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure is valid?

HELD:

Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may not
exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary
of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process.

CASE NUMBER 44: SIBRON VS NEW YORK

Facts of the case

After following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several
narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned
him. When Martinez said: "You know what I am after," Sibron began reaching into his
pocket. Simultaneously, Martinez thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out
several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to
suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk
search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed
but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related case,
Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit
burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools.
 Question
Do the broad search powers conferred on New York State police officers under the
State's "stop-and-frisk" law violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure
protections?

DECISION
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court began by noting that although states may grant police officers
great latitude in making arrests, all search and seizures are subject to constitutional limitations.
In Sibron's case, the Court noted that officer Martinez never actually heard any of the
conversations between Sibron and the narcotics addicts. As such, the inference that Sibron
engaged in narcotics trafficking merely because he spoke with drug addicts did not constitute
probably cause for a warrantless search. Moreover, Martinez's actions could not be justified as a
self-protective search for weapons since he admitted that he had no reason to suspect Sibron of
concealment. With respect to Peters, the Court upheld his conviction since it flowed from a
lawful stop-and-frisk search. The arresting officer observed Peters prowling furtively in a building
hallway and had to chase him down before capture. Such suspicious conduct justified the
ensuing stop-and-frisk search of Peter's person that, in turn, revealed the incriminating burglar
tools.

CASE NUMBER 45: UMIL VS RAMOS

Umil vs. Ramos

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and
searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that
the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged
with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples Army.

RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the
inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the
arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed
by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise,
it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of
irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free
from error.

CASE NUMBER 46: WEEKS VS US

Facts: A federal marshal entered Ds house without a warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and seized papers that were admitted at Ds trial for lottery crimes. Before trial the
D unsuccessfully sought the return of his papers and argued that they should not be used in
evidence against him.
Issue: When property of the D is seized by federal officers in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, may it be admitted in evidence at the Ds federal trial?

Rule: (Day, J.) The Fourth Amendment must be enforced in federal courts through the exclusion
of evidence seized in violation of its requirements. Unconstitutional seizures should find no
sanction in the judgment of courts. The protection of the Fourth Amendment is of no value if
exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence is not required.

CASE NUMBER 47: WOLF VS COLORADO

Facts. The petitioner was convicted of conspiring to commit abortions in a State court and
appealed. He alleged that his Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from illegal
searches and seizures had been violated and that any evidence obtained as a result of the
illegal search and seizure should have been excluded from trial as a matter of due process. The
conviction was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted by the
United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court).

Issue. Whether a State court conviction for a State offense denies due process protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution because evidence that would have been
excluded in a federal court under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) was admitted?

Held. Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) filed a majority opinion. No, due process is not
denied when evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure is admitted by a State
court for a State offense. Unlike the requirements and restrictions placed by the Bill of Rights
upon federal authorities, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does not subject
criminal justice in the States to certain limitations. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), the Supreme Court held that in a federal prosecution, evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was barred from use. As of the Weeks decision,
twenty-seven states had passed on the Weeks doctrine, but had not left other means of
protection which would be as effective as the federal exclusionary rule. The common law
provides for an action for damages, the officer may have been resisted, and the officer may
have been prosecuted for oppression. Additionally, the Weeks exclusiona
ry rule is a federal court construct that is not found implicitly in the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution nor is a law promulgated by Congress. Congress may easily remove the protection
granted by Weeks by legislative enactment to the contrary. In light of alternatives to the States
and legislative policy, the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to the States.