-0ARE WE ALONE? ROUGH CUT CONT.

BIOTERRORISM : THE TRUTH

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-1BIOTERRORISM : THE TRUTH

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 00 05

Agents of fear, bioweapons are banned and outlawed by

international treaty, yet for decades they've been a military and
terrorist threat. Rogue nations around the world have been
developing their military biological capability. Extremist terror
groups have been caught experimenting with germs. But in the
wake of September 11th, the threat of a major biological terrorist
attack became real and immediate. Just over a weak later, that
threat was executed with the delivery of anthrax through the US
postal system. Bioterrorism had arrived. But how serious is the
threat of bioweapons? How can we defend against it, and how
could be deal with the outcome if the worst were to happen?
ASTON
BIOTERRORISM
THE TRUTH
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 01 40

Invisible, silent, deadly. Biological weapons operate by stealth,

killing their victims without warning, no bomb, no explosion.
The principle is simple: take a bacteria or virus and use it to
infect the enemy. Any disease from 'flu to ebola, measles to
salmonella, could in theory be used. The more dangerous the
disease, the more deadly the weapon.

-2-

JOHN DOESBURG
10 02 15

Biological warfare agents are strategic in nature. They will kill

Caption
General John Doesburg
US Army Chemical &
Biological Defense
Command

or incapacitate anywhere from hundreds to thousands to tens of

thousands, depending on their employment. You can't see them,
you can't feel them, you can't touch them. There's terror
associated also with just the threat of use of biological warfare
agents.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 02 39

But biological weapons are not new or necessarily sophisticated.

The idea of using deadly viruses or bacteria to attack the enemy
has been with us for centuries. In the Middle Ages, the bodies
of Plague victims were catapulted into besieged cities to infect
the people inside.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 03 03

There are two sorts of weapon, there is a non-contagious and

Caption
John Eldridge
Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Defence
Analyst
Jane's Information
Group

there is a contagious. The difference really is down to whether a

person who's been infected with the organism can transmit it to
somebody else.

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 03 20

Highly contagious and highly lethal, Plague is still considered a

good germ weapon today. Its effects on the body can kill within
48 hours. Another contagious killer, smallpox is perhaps the
most feared bioweapon of all. One of the most lethal diseases in
history, up to 50% of its victims die. With smallpox, you can be
within six feet of a group of people and you can infect all of
them, so it's highly infective and that's through your breath, so
the organisms are being transmitted out of your breath to other

-3-

people who then breath them in. With an infectious weapon like
smallpox, the number of casualties is in theory almost limitless.
Medical reports estimate an outbreak in the US could kill up to
a million people in three months. Until recent events, this was
not an option thought likely or even possible.
JOHN ELDRIDGE
10 04 20

This is a new kind of terrorism, and we've seen this obviously

with the events of September 11th. These people are anxious, or
their aim is to kill Americans it seems, therefore it probably
makes it more likely that they could consider using an infectious
weapon rather than a weapon like anthrax, which isn't
infectious.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 04 45

But they'd be taking a big risk. Infectious germs are impossible

to control. Spreading globally, they could eventually spread
back to the terrorists themselves, and their own people. For this
reason, non-infectious diseases that can be targeted more
precisely, are more typically seen as ideal bioweapons, like
botulism. This most poisonous of toxins causes paralysis,
respiratory failure and frequently death. And then there's
anthrax.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 05 02

It's a naturally occurring disease which is endemic in large parts

of the world. It's a disease that affects people that deal with
hides and skins and tanners and sheep-shearers and people like
that, but it's not easily ingested into the lung, and there are very,
very few cases of pulmonary anthrax death. What's different

-4-

about anthrax as a bioweapon is that it's been machined in a way

which makes it go down into the lungs and create a disease
inside the lungs, which is almost invariably fatal.
NARRATOR (OOV)
10 05 57

There are many fatal diseases, but anthrax is special as a

bioweapon because the germs do not die easily. Most bacterian
viruses die in strong sunlight or cold temperatures and become
ineffective within hours of being dispersed into the air. Anthrax
is the exception. Its spores are remarkably tough. It's possible
to make strands that can survive up to 40 years. As a result, the
release of a large quantity can contaminate a location for a
generation.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 06 34

You only have to look at the degree of horror and panic that it's
causing amongst the population to see that even threatening a
bioweapon can have its use to a terrorist. The whole population
becomes extremely uneasy and they don't know where things
are going to pop up next.

10 06 56

START FILM CLIP

Caption
What you should
know about
biological warfare

RADIO NEWSREADER
Good morning, here's the news. Civil defence headquarters
announced today that the sharp increase in the number of cases
of illness during the few days have led authorities to suspect that
a biological warfare attack may have taken place.

10 07 10

END FILM CLIP

NARRATOR (OOV)

10 07 10

50 years ago, in the early years of the Cold War, fear of

biological warfare led the US Government to make public

-5-

information films about the potential threat from bioweapons.

And it wasn't until the mid-90's, just six years before the events
of September 11th, that there was the first hard evidence that
terrorists were planning to use bioweapons. March 20th, 1995,
Tokyo. 5,000 people are injured, 12 killed, after breathing in a
toxin seeping from food packages planted on a subway by a
Japanese religious cult, the Aum Shinrikyo. This attach was
chemical, for the group had invested substantial resources into
developing bioweapons, even travelling to Zaire during an
outbreak of ebola fever to collect germs. If weaponised, this
virus would be devastating. It has no cure. 90% of victims in
Africa haemorrhage to death. The cult attempted to use
botulism and anthrax on more than eight occasions, and none of
the attacks resulted in deaths, but the potential was there, a
potential that has now been executed by others in the US.
RICHARD FALKENRATH
10 08 43

It's absolutely clear that their blatant capacity to produce and

Caption
Dr. Richard Falkenrath
US Department of
Defense adviser

use bioweapons is increasing. It's also evident that terrorist

groups are becoming more inclined to commit indiscriminate
acts of mass violence than they have in the past.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 09 04

In a new age of bioterrorism, the major cities of the West are

particularly under threat. But how easy is it for a terrorist to go
about making a bioweapon? Although the idea of using deadly
germs as weapons has been around for centuries, turning them
into usable weapons is not easy, and for terrorists operating in
secret, it's more difficult still. The terrorist faces two central
questions: how to obtain the right germs, and then how then to

-6-

deliver them to the target population?

LARRY WAYNE HARRIS
10 09 48

Yes, I'd like to place an order here to 0-0-6-8 dash 5-6-2, that'll
be your sineapastas ??? Bombay strain.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 10 00

There are 470 germ banks across 60 countries. Access is

restricted, but a former member of a white supremacist group,
Larry Harris, showed how easily an extremist could obtain
deadly germs. Posing as a medical researcher, he contacted a
lab.
LARRY WAYNE HARRIS

10 10 16

I ordered three vials of bubonic plague, and basically I get a

Caption
Larry Wayne Harris

catalogue off the shelf, read through, call them up, give them a
charge-card number and they send it to me, plain and simple.
TRADER

10 10 26

Yes, that is your sinia ???, that is correct.

LARRY WAYNE HARRIS

10 10 33

As far as a person getting into the biological business, you'd

need nothing more than a very small laboratory. If you look at
the size of this room, it's probably 10 x 12, and I have
everything here necessary. I could easily work with plague,
anthrax, cholera, typhoid, brucellosis, tularaemia, it's very easy
to obtain.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 10 58

Harris's only mistake was to pursue one of his orders too

eagerly. The police were called in by the supplier of microorganisms, the American Type and Culture Collection. In the
United States it's not illegal to possess lethal bacteria, so all
Harris could be convicted of was mail fraud. During the trial, he
claimed he was making vaccines to protect himself and his

-7-

family. For civilians, though, making germ weapons is not as

simple as Harris makes out. Growing the bugs and keeping
them alive might be easy, but they then need to be delivered into
the bloodstream of the enemy. To do this, they must be the right
sized particle to stay in the air, and after being inhaled, to get
through the mucous membranes in human lungs.
PAUL TAYLOR
10 11 51

The first stage is relatively straightforward. Any micro-biologist

Caption
Paul Taylor
Chemical & Biological
Defence, Porton Down

with a little bit of access to non-specialised equipment can

manufacturer biological warfare agents at home or in a very
rudimentary laboratory, but that's not the end of story. They'd
need to get into a form whereby it can get inside the lungs, it
can be inhaled and it can then cause the damage, and that's the
tricky part.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 12 18

Tricky maybe, but that's what the terrorists who sent the anthrax
letters in the United States succeeded in doing. Some of the
envelopes contained weapons-grade anthrax, milled to the
precise size to be inhaled and lodge in the lungs, 1 - 5 microns,
small enough to be breathed in and big enough not to be
breathed out. It has also been chemically treated to help
suspend it in the air. Those who died are likely to have breathed
in the deadly spores, possibly by sniffing the powder out of
curiosity. Other victims contracted the less malevolent skin
form of anthrax. Fatal in less than 20% of cases, it's usually
controlled and treated with antibiotics. Obtaining the germs is
for the terrorist only the first stage in preparing a usable

-8-

weapon. Underground extremist groups have made videos

supposedly showing how bioweapons can be made given the
initial ingredients.
FILM CLIP
MAN
10 13 18

First I'm going to put on a glove, because any of this moisture

that gets on your hands, that is extremely poisonous, so we
don't wanna get that on the hands, at least not on your hands.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 13 31

The video makes out that elementary protection will be

10 13 39

sufficient to avoid contamination.

START FILM CLIP
MAN
Now you need the face mask on at this point, because you don't
wanna snuff up any of the powder up your nose, 'cos that would
be really bad after a while. Now, you really have some lethal
stuff here.

10 13 55

END FILM CLIP

NARRATOR (OOV)

10 13 55

In military research institutes, technicians operate with rather

more sophisticated equipment.
RICHARD FALKENRATH

10 14 05

It's clear any terrorist that considers producing and using

biological weapons are going to put themselves at some
considerable personal risk, and we believe that weighs fairly
heavily in their calculations. These are very dangerous
organisms.

-9-

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 14 21

The terrorists behind the anthrax attacks will need to have taken
great care in handling their high-grade anthrax germs. Like
motes of dust, anthrax spores hang suspended in the air, so the
terrorist would need to seal up doors and windows to stop a
draught spreading the germs. Even so, spores would remain on
any surfaces in the room, including on their own protective
clothing.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 14 51

They could have taken simple precautions like wearing a

respirator and some kind of protective clothing which could
then be burnt or buried afterwards.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 15 01

The germs themselves would of course be kept in a sealed

container, but as soon as it was opened, the invisible spores
would begin to disperse into the air. Even if great care was
taken transferring the anthrax powder, all surfaces in the room
would become infected and would remain so, unless treated, for
many years. Licking the envelope would not be advisable. As
far as possible, the external surfaces of the envelope would be
cleaned of spores, for spores left on the envelope can be
transferred to everything it comes into contact with. Even
posting the envelope is not as straightforward as it seems.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 16 05

In order to carry the anthrax around, the envelopes would have

to be in some kind of sealed container, because an envelope
itself isn't obviously airtight, and it'll act like a bellows as it's
handled, and the dust will go in and out.
NARRATOR (OOV)

- 10 -

Walking to the mail box in a gas mask would hardly be a

10 16 22
credible strategy for a terrorist, so there would be a risk as the
envelopes were posted. Despite its simplicity, sending anthrax
through the post has turned out to be a means of delivery that
creates widespread disruption, concern and fear. The impact of
bioweapons depends on more than the choice of germ. The
means of delivery is equally and perhaps even more critical.
Finding the most effective way to deliver the germs has
perplexed military scientists ever since germ warfare research
began. Back in days following World War Two when the British
and the Americans ran biological warfare programmes, they
invested considerable resources trying to solve the problems of
delivery. And in the spirit of good old-fashioned, espionage,
FBI men carried out covert operations at train stations and
terminals, dispersing clouds of bacteria to see how far the germs
would travel. Using harmless strains, they pretended they were
deadly plague or anthrax. They set up detection centres around
the city to pick up the presence of the bacteria in the air, to
gauge how many people would be affected, depending on what
delivery system was used.
TERRY TAYLOR
10 17 51

There were many trials carried out in both the UK and the

Caption
Colonel Terry Taylor
Ministry of Defence
1997-2000

United States, and a certain amount of co-operation on seeing

the effects of biological agents delivered by a number of
different means, be it unorthodox means, you know, sabotagetype means from unconventional, maybe an aerosol generator in

- 11 -

the back of a truck, or on a boat off-shore.

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 18 13

While the FBI worked under cover, the British were trying to
find the most effective way to use germs in a military situation.
On an island off the coast of Scotland, they used sheep to test
the effectiveness of various means of delivery. They developed
bombs and spray delivery systems which could disperse it in the
air. The experiments showed that enough of the bugs could
survive in the outside air or after a bomb explosion to cause
many casualties. Some 50 years later, the Island of Grunyard???
remains too dangerous for human habitation. But there was a
fundamental problem: you couldn't control who would be
infected. One change in the wind direction could mean your
own troops were killed by mistake, or that a civilian population
living nearby was wiped out, leaving enemy troops unscathed.
RICHARD FALKENRATH

10 19 07

Well, the key reason that the United States and Great Britain
gave up their biological warfare capabilities is that they didn't
think they were very useful. The military commanders didn't
really see a contingency in which they'd ever want to use these
things. They were hard to predict, hard to control, the
adversary could retaliate with nuclear weapons.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 19 29

But for the terrorist, the problems of delivery are very different.
Less precision is required but the system must allow the terrorist
to deliver the weapons secretly and provide safety for the
terrorists themselves. Infecting the water supplies is a
possibility, but most bioweapon germs are killed by water, and in

- 12 -

any case, large quantities would be required. More potent and

more deadly is airborne delivery, so that as with everyday
diseases, people are infected just by breathing in.
JOHN ELDRIDGE
10 20 08

For the terrorists, it doesn't have to be terribly sophisticated.

As long as you can create somewhere in the area of the spray
particles that are the right size to get into your lungs amongst
the range of sizes of particles, then you're obviously beginning
to succeed, and most common spraying equipment could
probably be used for that.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 20 33

With the right germ and the appropriate conditions, many

people, perhaps thousands, could be infected in a single night.
Location is important. The terrorist would need to release the
germ from a place where it could drift into a significant number
of people. Enclosed spaces such as a subway or a major office
building are one possibility. The release of the weapon would
need to take place in seclusion, so the terrorist could change
into protective clothing and operate the spray undisturbed. It
would also need to take place at a site that could not afterwards
be identified and linked to the terrorist. Crop dusters are
theoretically possible, but for the germs to reach the public, the
plane would need to fly very low, hardly inconspicuous or
practical in cities. From the top of a high building is a more
likely option. You'd have to make sure the wind was blowing in
the right direction, as the germs might be carried upwards and

10 21 56

away from the people below. The terrorist might generate a

more lethal result simply using a spray from the window of a

- 13 -

car. A major bio-attack would require much larger quantities

that can be delivered with a hand-sprayer, which in turn raises
the likelihood of being discovered. Nevertheless, it is estimated
that 100 kilograms of anthrax delivered over Washington DC
could in theory result in more than 130,000 deaths. There can
be no doubt that the threat of a serious biological attack is upon
us, but where did the storm clouds gather, and why now?
During the Cold War, the military in the US and Britain had
failed to develop delivery systems. Possibly as a result, in 1972
an international treaty was signed with the Soviets agreeing to
ban further research and destroy stockpiles of deadly agents.
A biological threat appeared to be over, but bio-warfare went
underground. Some nations continued researching and
experimenting with bioweapons, so that today some 15
countries have suspected bio-warfare programs, including Syria,
North Korea, Libya and China, along with Iran and Iraq.
ERIC HENSCHAL
10 23 23

There's been a proliferation of technology, and that concerns us

Caption
Major Eric Henschal
US Army Institute of
Infectious Diseases

the most, in that the knowledge about how to deliver the agents,
which is the most critical part, may now be available to
adversaries of the United States.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 23 45

One of these adversaries is Iraq, a regime that has not flinched

from using chemical weapons on Kurdish villagers, and a
country which has for more than a decade been developing and
stockpiling biological agents. We now know that just before the
1990 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's scientists worked on several
delivery systems. They simulated biological attacks using a

- 14 -

crop-dusting plane, and tried to develop a remote-controlleld

MIG figher capable of dropping biological agents. Anthrax was
also loaded on to missiles, and at least 200 aerial anthrax bombs
manufactured. The missiles were intended to detonate on
impact, scattering the deadly spores into the air. The threat of
the use of these weapons was apparent throughout the Gulf War.
RICHARD FALKENRATH
10 24 40

If Saddam had fired one of his anthrax-equipped Scud missiles,

we really don't know what the effects would be. What we do
know is that's not a terribly sophisticated design and it is
certainly not something that the US military would regard as an
effective delivery system. But even if it didn't kill very many
people, there's a possibility the political that it would have had
on the target area, and the panic it would have caused in the
population, I think would have been very significant indeed.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 25 10

When the war with Iraq was over, a UN inspections team,

UNSCOM, entered the country to find out just what their germ
weapon programme consisted of.
FILM CLIP
MAN

10 25 23

You take your hand off my inspector now.

NARRATOR (OOV)

10 25 27

The Iraqis denied possessing biological weapons, let alone the

10 25 32

means to manufacture them.

START FILM CLIP
MAN
I don't touch him.
MAN

10 25 33

You're touching me. You touch me once more

- 15 -

END FILM CLIP

10 25 36
TERRY TAYLOR
10 25 37

They wouldn't admit to a programme, and they even showed a

Caption
Colonal Terry Taylor
UNSCOM Inspector

group of journalists around their main production plant in early

1995 where they were saying, 'Here is a single cell protein
plant,' that's something which produces an additive for animal
foods to improve its qualities, 'and also this is a bio-pesticide
plant,' and a key person in the programme was showing these
journalists round saying these are perfectly innocent places.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 26 04

Just four months later, after an Iraqi defector confirmed the

UN's suspicions, Iraq was forced to admit that these supposed
pesticide plants were in fact producing anthrax and other germ
agents. The UN destroyed the factories it found, but when in
1998 Iraq blocked further inspections, Britain and America
launched air strikes against suspected weapon sites. Their aim
was to destroy Iraq's biological capability once and for all. But
bombs can only destroy known targets.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 26 51

It's almost certain, I think, that Saddam Hussein's programme

Caption
John Eldridge
Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Defence
Analyst, Jane's
Information Group

will have continued after the departure of UNSCOM from Iraq,

and they will have gone underground, beyond the eyes of
surveying satellites.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 27 03

It is thought that Iraq still has stockpiles of botulism, camel pox

and anthrax. It's even rumoured they might have got their hands
on smallpox, for it now appears that Iraq's bio-weapon

- 16 -

programme may have been able to plunder the expertise of the

most advanced biological programme in the world, that of the
former Soviet Union. Russian failure to fully back the UN's
actions has fuelled these suspicions.
JOHN ELDRIDGE
10 27 33

There was a great reticence by Russia to involve itself too much

in UNSCOM and one of the signals there is possibly that it
could have fingerprinted the bio-weapon technology that exists
in Iraq back to what is now Russia.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 27 50

Prior to the signing of the 1972 treaty, the former Soviet Union
is thought to have had the most advanced biological weapons in
the world, with the most expert scientists. A cheap alternative
option to the nuclear arms race, it was identified by the Russians
as an area in which their scientific expertise could give them the
upper hand. It was an advantage they were not prepared to
abandon. Despite signing the treaty in 1972, suspicion grew
that the Russians had not really given up their programme.
Then, in 1992, Dr. Ken Alibek, a key Russian scientist, defected.
Western governments discovered the truth. In the 20 years
since the signing of the treaty banning biological research,
Russia had secretly developed new biological agents and built
up a huge germ warfare arsenal.
KEN ALIBEK

10 28 46

Any possible agent, biological agent, it could be valuable for

tests and applying in future biological weapons, would be tested,
would be developed and would be turned into weapons.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 29 05

Alibek worked at the Stepnogorsk Plant in the desolate region

- 17 -

of Kazakstan. We now know that at this and other sites, the

Russians worked on all aspects of biological weapons. They
made organisms that survived better and dispersed more
effectively, and it is thought that they perfected ways of
delivering the agents at long range, for example loading them on
to missiles.
TERRY TAYLOR
10 29 29

The Russians were working away on all this and had a range of
agents that could be put in mainly missiles. They saw it as a
strategic weapon. If you look at the time when they accelerated
their development, they really pushed in, and I think that the
scale of their programme, I think they had 25,000 scientists
working on it at some stage, and millions of dollars worth of
money being poured into it, this was in the early 80's, at the time
of the Star Wars, and it's clear from evidence that we now know
that this was a technology where they thought, 'We have the
edge, we must develop this, this'll be a big surprise.' Of course
they were absolutely right.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 30 16

But this edge had an impact they were unlikely to predict, for
the Russian programme created an army of scientists with
unique knowledge of biological weapon technology. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the programme has been
dismantled, leaving the scientists without jobs.
KEN ALIBEK

10 30 23

My colleagues, a lot of them now are unemployed and they've

got nothing in many cases, just to feed their families, their
children. Some of them sell flowers in streets, very good,

- 18 -

perfect scientists, and many of them are very angry now because
of the situation in Russia, and now if for example they received
a proposal to do something for Iraq, Iran, I cannot exclude they
would do this.
JOHN ELDRIDGE
10 31 00

They may well have taken their expertise and possibly their
equipment and their knowledge into places like Iraq or possibly
North Korea, so it's quite possible I think that Iraq had a lot of
help in her bio-programme and may still have help as well.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 31 18

It is the recent and secret history of biological weapon research

that makes the current threat of bio-terrorism so serious. A
Russian bio-weapon programme developing new germs and new
means of delivery, this knowledge has now almost certainly
passed to other nations, and these nations including Iraq may
either be involved in instigating terrorism directly or indirectly
funding terrorists. So what can be done? How can nations
defend themselves, faced with the threat of a major bio-weapon
attack? On the military front, US and Western forces have been
in a race to develop defences to the new bio-weapon threat.
During the 1990's, destroyers like the SS Mitcher were
equipped with bio-weapon defences.
FILM CLIP
MAN

10 32 29

Mitcher, this is the operating deck. We have a cloud 1500 yars

off the port bow, set
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 32 40

The ship can be sealed and cleaned if under biological or

chemical attack. But such defences are useless unless those

- 19 -

commanding the ship have advance knowledge that they're

under attack, and airborne germs are an enemy you can't see and
you can't hear. The same problem applies to troops on the
battlefield. Attempts have been made by the Army to develop a
detection system to pick up and identify a biological attack.
FILM CLIP
10 33 15

MAN
Outside temperature is 73.1 degrees, wind direction is at 70
degrees. Liquid samplers are doing
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 33 25

BIDS, biological indiquated detection system, is a mobile

laboratory. It's set up behind front lines where it can check
continuously to see if there's anything suspicious in the
atmosphere. Closely guarded and hidden by camouflage, BIDS
is capable of identifying many germ agents, but currently it takes
an average of 30 minutes to do so, a long wait during which
troops are left dangerously vulnerable.
ERIC HENSCHAL

10 33 55

One of the things I worry about is that we have units exposed,

Caption
Major Eric Henschal
US Army Institute of
Infectious Diseases

and that commander has to wait for that agent identification.

Meanwhile does he have to worry about setting up
decontamination? There are all kinds of issues there, and all the
time while he's trying to make those decisions, that unit maybe
can't do its combat mission, and our adversaries on a battlefield
are going to take advantage of that.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 34 23

BIDS may be a step towards defence from bio-weapon attack,

but it can't stop troops being exposed. Early warning is needed,
technology that may also be useful in the protection of cities.

- 20 -

JOHN DOESBURG
10 34 38

For the United States Army, the long-range biological stand-off

detection system is extremely critical to us because it gives us
the capability to look at at long distances, and to identify that a
man-made cloud is present.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 34 52

The long-range system, called LIDAR, can rapidly detect

unusual clouds but it can't tell what a cloud is made of. It could
be anthrax. It could also be pollen or some other organic
material.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 35 15

So currently these new systems don't provide guaranteed

warning of an attack. In a war situation, significant casualties
would still be likely, and medical teams would face a challenge
to isolate diseased and perhaps contagious soldiers. If there

10 35 35

were many thousands, it would be difficult if not impossible.

START FILM CLIP
MAN
Could you take a air saturation, please?
MAN

10 35 40

97.
MAN

10 35 42

Thank you.

10 35 42

END FILM CLIP

NARRATOR (OOV)

10 35 48

Defence against bio-weapons on the battlefield is difficult, but

defence against a terrorist attack on cities is more difficult still.
In the wake of the anthrax envelope attacks in the US, the
question facing governments is how to improve current

- 21 -

defences. What can be done to prepare for the worst?

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 36 19

The US already has a training programme in place. The Tokyo

subway attacks had alerted them to the dangers and possible
consequences of a terrorist biological attack. A limited civil
defence programme involving emergency services in trials was
instigated.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 36 48

They were aware that the threat existed, but the leap of faith to
fund programs either to provide therapy or prevention, if you
like, to the wider population and to beef up the response
organisations hadn't got into place, and in all Western nations
now, all potential target nations, programs for civil defence and
for immunisation are now being resurrected and being funded.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 37 18

The US has now been running the Domestic Preparedness

Program for several years. A series of training exercises coordinated by the US Army for Police, Fire and Ambulance
Servicees, showing them how to reduce panic and how to
protect themselves from contaminated casualties. Army
commanders in charge of the programme hope it will prepare
emergency services for a large-scale attack.
JOHN DOESBURG

10 37 44

Being aware is a primary piece of being ready. You know, if we

Caption
General John Doesburg
US Army
Chemical & Biological
Defense Command

can make the cities aware and those critical first responders
aware, we can make a bad situation not as bad.

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 37 58

Another part of being ready is ensuring hospitals have the

- 22 -

resources and expertise to cope with a killer epidemic. After the

anthrax attacks, the American surgeon-general called for an
extra $1 billion to get the medical systems in place.
Elsewhere, other governments are also acting, but the task is
substantial. In a confidential document, the British government
warned doctors in the emergency services that in the event of a
biological attack, they should be prepared for the largest number
of civilian casualties ever seen in the UK. Currently hospitals,
surgeries and mortuaries, they said, would be unable to cope.
Moreover, the problems of containing the disease and the
consequences for social order are great, if the attack involved a
contagious agent like smallpox or plague.
JOHN ELDRIDGE
10 38 58

The effects are extremely widespread and the honly way you can
control that is very, very tight control on movements of
population. Now, that's unpopular obviously. If you can
imagine a person that's been infected in their office, at work, and
they're told not to move or to have contact with anybody else, I
think they would be extremely panicky and the whole process of
sane discussion really would begin to break down.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 39 27

So in the event of an attack, is there anything the public can do

in high-risk countries and cities to protect themselves? In the
weeks following Sept 11th, sales of gas masks and protective
clothing in the US and the UK reached record numbrs.
LIAD SHABABO

10 39 46

We've had a huge increase in inquiries for gas masks, and any

Caption
Liad Shababo

related accessories. People have been calling in in a complete

- 23 -

Army Surplus Retailer

panic, who are literally scared for their lives, coming in, 'We
want a gas mask, we don't care how much it costs, we don't
care where it came from, just want to make sure, we want gas
masks for us, for our kids, for our parents.' They're very
worried about this, 'And any other clothing you have which will
protect us in case this was to happen, we'll pay you for,
regardless of what it costs, and we need it now.'
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 40 16

In gas masks, the filters act as barriers to microscopic particles

such as spores. They might offer some protection, but there are
fundamental drawbacks.
JOHN ELDRIDGE

10 40 28

You would have to be togged up before the event, and the point
about bio-weapons is the fact that they don't have a natural
trigger, you don't know when the event has started, if you like.
It's only when people are falling ill, so you may have your
respirator with you and it may offer you a) very little protection
possibly, and secondly you would need to be wearing it before
the event, not after. So in a sense it's probably not a very wise
investment.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 40 57

So what else can be done? Some of the germs like anthrax can
be treated with antibiotics, if spotted in time, and if there are
enough antibiotics to go round. Hardly surprising, therefore,
that the Canadian Government tried to acquire non-patented
forms of the antibiotic to ensure enough supply. A more
effective solution is vaccination. We don't have vaccines against
plague and botulism but they do exist for anthrax and smallpox.

- 24 -

Currently stockpiles are low. When smallpox was officially

eradicated in 1980, production of the vaccine was almost
stopped. The US currently has 15 million doses. Following the
attack, the government put in an order for a further 300 million.
10 41 50

So, threatened nations can protect themselves by training and

preparing emergency services, by increasing surveillance.
Supplies of antibiotics and vaccines can be made available, and
plans for containment and rapid response put in place. Even so,
a major bio attack would still stretch the most sophisticated set
of defences. It would be a mistake to underestimate the present
bio-weapon threat, but technological developments are making
the future look even more dangerous. Through genetic
engineering, there's now the potential to create new and
unknown diseases, and the potential to solve the problem of
delivery once and for all with weapons that can be precisely
targeted against specific people. At the US Army's biological
research centre, scientists work to develop vaccines to protect
against bio-weapons. Until now, the range of diseases they were
fighting against has been limited, but the new technology of
genetic engineering has radically changed the situation.
VIVIENNE NATHANSON

10 43 15

When you look at current biological weapons, they have many

Caption
Vivienne Nathanson
Professor
British Medical
Association

shortcomings. They may be difficult to absorb. They may only

survive in perfect weather conditions. They may for example be
destroyed by cold or dryness in the atmosphere, so genetic
engineering can be used to make that biological agent, that virus

- 25 -

or that bacteria most resistant, more likely to infect people.

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 43 43

Genetic engineering can improve existing agents, but it can also

create completely new diseases. Inside a virus or bacteria, the
DNA sequences determine how it behaves. It's now possible to
introduce new genes into the DNA and change the nature of the
organism. By mixing and matching the genes, a whole range of
designer diseases could be invented. The breakthroughs in
genetic techniques in the last 20 years have opened the door to a
new era of germ weapons.
RICHARD FALKENRATH

10 44 26

The revolution in the bio-sciences that we've seen since the 70's

Caption
Dr. Richard Falkenrath
US Department of
Defense Adviser

is every bit as profound as the nuclear revolution of 70 years

ago, and could have quite devastating impacts on the future biowarfare and bio-terrorism threat.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 44 43

The greatest concern about the spread of Russian secrets is the

claim that they invented a new generation of untreatable
diseases, genetically altered bugs which can overcome immunity
through vaccination or resist treatment with anti-biotics.
KEN ALIBEK

10 45 02

What is amazing is that genetically altered, antibiotic-resistant

Caption
Dr. Ken Alibek
USSR Biological
Weapons Programme
1987-1992

plague was developed. Genetically altered antibiotic-resistant

anthrax was developed. Genetically altered drug-resistant
glanders (phon) was developed. Genetically altered human ???
anthrax was developed. Of course it's very difficult to say
whether or not this strain would overcome vaccination caused
by American or British vaccines, but the Russians tested this
agent using a Russian vaccine, so-called STI-1 vaccine, and they

- 26 -

were able to show that the normal genetically altered strain very
easily overcomes vaccination immunity. This is a real situation.
NARRATOR (OOV)
10 45 52

Designer bugs are concerning, but they still face the problem of
delivery. They could infect the wrong people, but genetic
engineering hasn't stopped there. According to the British
Medical Association, it may soon be possible to target germs so
that they attack only certain people, people with a particular
gene or set of genes, while leaving everyone else unharmed.
TERRY TAYLOR

10 46 19

One hears talk about the development of a kind of ethnic

weapon, a weapon that can be targeted to be effective against a
particular race or group, or group of people. For example there
have been certain developments in South Africa under the old
apartheid regime, where they were thinking along these lines of
targeting, you know, obviously a particular ethnic group.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 46 43

In the mid-80's, the South African government sought out an

ethnically targeted weapon. Testimony given to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission investigating the crimes of
apartheid, revealed the extent of these plans.
DAAN GOOSEN

10 47 00

And this document contained the proposition from someone in

Caption
Dr. Daan Goosen
South African
Bioweapons
Programme

Europe, and this guy says he's got a product, a bacteria, which
has got the possibility of only affecting, making sick and killing
pigmented people. And it was decided that it would be good if
the government had this weapon.
NARRATOR (OOV)

- 27 -

10 47 28

At the time, the technology sought by the regime wasn't

available, but developments in our understanding of DNA and
the human genome, have made it easier to identify the genetic
differences between different peoples and race, and have made
ethnically-targeted weapons a possibility.
VIVIENNE NATHANSON

10 47 51

If you add together a number of different markers for different

populations, you can start to become relatively specific, so for
example the way in which we handle milk lactose is different
between the Asian and Europe populations. If you then add in
blood groups, A, B, O blood groups, very different distributions.
If you also add in height, skin colour and so on, you start to be
able to become specific to your target population.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 48 21

Once genetic markers have been identified, a virus could in

theory look for them on entering the body. It would scan the
DNA of cells looking for the markers. If it finds them, it inserts
itself into the host DNA and starts the process of infection.
Successful genetic targeting is one of the golden prizes of
medicine today. Millions of dollars are being invested in it in the
hope of finding an answer to some of our biggest killer diseases,
but there could well be a cost.
VIVIENNE NATHANSON

10 49 05

The technology that will develop useful new vaccines, new

drugs, in a medical sense is going to be very closely associated
with the technology which could put that same knowledge to
malign use to producing weapons, and therefore the need to put
in place a system of control which will pick up the abuse of this

- 28 -

knowledge is absolutely essential.

NARRATOR (OOV)
10 49 29

An organism that could target specific people would be the

coming-of-age of biological weapons. For the first time, there
would be no risk of infecting the wrong people, removing the
problem of delivery once and for all. More useful than a nuclear
bomb, it would leave land, buildings and your own troops
untouched.
VIVIENNE NATHANSON

10 49 54

Genetic targeting is possible probably within the next 5 - 10

years. The manufacture of relatively specific biological weapons
which are lethal in small volumes will be possible within that
time period, and that we have therefore a very short
opportunity, time-scale, to put in place proper control
mechanisms to make sure these weapons are never developed.
NARRATOR (OOV)

10 50 23

Recent events have made governments more aware than ever of

the power of biological weapons and of the need to get defences
in place. In the immediate future, this means putting more
resources into counter-terrorism, into medical and emergency
services, but it will also mean preparing for the new bioweapons that technology advances are likely to enable, for there
is no way to put the bio-weapon genie back in the bottle. No
treaty, no international agreement will be able to ensure they will
not be developed and used. Nations under threat have only one
choice: to find means to defend the population from terrorist or
military attack. Only buy such means will it be possible for
governments to avoid the type of emergency that has until now

- 29 -

10 51 13

seemed unthinkable.

10 15 20

END CREDITS
CAMERA
MIKE COLES
NEVE CUNNINGHAM
DAVID BARKER
STEVE WHITE
SOUND
IAN MACLAGAN
ROB REED
KEITH RODGERSON
GRAPHICS
BEN JACKSON
MARK HENNESSEY BARRETT
EDITOR
JAMES MILNER-SMITH
RESEARCHERS
PETER CHINN
PATRICK FURLONG
BLYTHE TINKER
SEQUENCE DIRECTOR
COLIN SPECTOR
PRODUCERS
RACHEL ALLEN
RACHEL HERMER
EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS
HILARY LAWSON
SARAH MARRIS

10 51 53

FADE TO BLACK