CIV

Compilation
of Supreme Court Rulings

Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order 209)
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
OVERVIEW
This document is a compilation of issues and rulings by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines involving the Family Code of the Philippines.

Submitted by: 4-B (1st Semester, SY 2014-2015)
Submitted to: Atty. Marciano G. Delson

School of Law, San Beda College Alabang

Compilation of Supreme Court Rulings
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Family Code of the Philippines
Case List
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

MARRIAGE
1. Ninal vs. Bayado
2. Garcia vs. Recio
3. Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos
4. Van Dorn vs. Ronillo
5. Pilapil vs Somera
6. Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis
7. Republic vs Iyoy
8. Republic vs. Orbecido
9. Llorente vs. CA

VOID MARRIAGE
10. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
11. Republic vs. Molina
12. Marcos vs. Marcos
13. Buenaventura vs. CA
14. Bobis vs. Bobis
15. Morigo vs. People
16. Gomez vs. Lipana
17. Ninal vs. Bayadog
18. Villanueva vs. CA
19. Santos vs. CA
20. Republic vs. CA
21. Hernandez vs. CA
22. Dedel vs. CA
23. Lam vs. Chua
24. Mallion vs. Alcantara
25. Carating-Siayngo vs. Siayngo
26. Navarro vs. Cecilio-Navarro
27. Antonio vs. Reyes
28. Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
29. Landicho vs. Relova
30. Donato vs. Luna
31. Wegel vs. Siempo-Dy
32. Domingo vs. CA
33. Beltran vs. People
34. Mercado vs. Tan
35. Republic vs. Nolasco
36. Armas vs. Calisterio
37. Manuel vs. People
38. Morigo vs. People
San Beda College, Alabang School of Law

By: 4TH year, section B (SY 2014-2015)
Professor: Atty. Marciano G. Delson
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39. Tenebro vs. CA

40. Carino vs. Carino
41. Ty vs. CA

VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
42. Sarao vs. Guevarra
43. Bucat vs. Bucat
44. Aquino vs. Delizo
45. Tuason vs. CA
46. Corpus vs. Orchotorena
47. Cervantes vs. Fajardo
48. Republic vs. Iyoy
49. Espiritu vs. CA
50. Mangonon vs. CA
51. Anaya vs. Palaroan

LEGAL SEPARATION
52. Francisco vs. Tayao
53. Gaudionco vs. Hon. Penaranda
54. Ong vs. Ong
55. Republic vs. Iyoy
56. Gines vs. Bugayong
57. Lapuz vs Eufemio
58. Cervantes vs. Fajardo
59. Espiritu vs. CA

OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
60. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
61. Arroya vs. Vasquez


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Case # 1
Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Topic Formal Requisites of Marriage
Issue 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration
of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
Ruling The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage
license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an
affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because
from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit,
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
By ALCARAZ, John Victor J.

Case # 2
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Grace Garcia v. Rederick Recio

366 SCRA 437, October 2, 2002
Foreign Marriages
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso
facto capacitated him to remarry.
The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based
on the records, the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry Garcia.
Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare her marriage null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under
Australian law he was really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of
the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal
principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of
the Civil Code.
ALTARES, PHILIP WILLIAM C.

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Case # 3
San Luis vs Sagalongos

GR No. 134029, February 6, 2007
Topic Marriage
Issue Is a Filipino, divorced by his alien spouse abroad, validly remarry
under the Civil Code, considering that the marriage was solemnized
before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988?
Ruling The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
Thus: In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both
from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature
of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
By ARCILLA, Marianne Rose M.

Case # 4
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985. Melencio-Herrera, J.
Topic Divorce
Issue Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
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respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is

a Filipino citizen.
Ruling The Supreme Court held that, It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

By BACURIO, Maica Elaine T.

Case # 5
Imelda Manalaysay vs. Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

GR no. 80116, June 30, 1989
Topic Capacity of the Ex-Husband to Sue
Issue Whether or not the ex-husband has legal standing to commence an
adultery case against his ex-wife
Ruling In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except
on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the
offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be
such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to
make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the
state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending
spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this
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case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural
policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the
status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja
Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial
court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property
and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the
plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his
pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
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offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

By Bautista, Anna Margarita P.

Case # 6
Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis

G.R. No. 133743, February 06, 2007
Topic (Bigamy/ Void Marriage)
During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos father) contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December
14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter,
at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed
that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.

Issue Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.
Ruling The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
InGarcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
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pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof
of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

By BAUTISTA, Buenavista Mae M.

Case # 7
Republic of the Philippines vs. Crasus L. Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
Topic Article 26 of the Family Code
Issue Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in this case was validly
obtained by the alien spouse.
Ruling As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or
her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen
since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity,
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even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and
even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
By BRAGADO, Cassandra I.

Case # 8
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

GR. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 472 SCRA 114
Foreign Marriages (Art 26)
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family
Code .
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.

BRUSOLA, JOHNSTON R.

San Beda College, Alabang School of Law 10
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Case # 9
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
345 SCRA 592. G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000.
Divorce (Art. 26(2), FC)
Whether divorce obtained in California by a naturalized American
Citizen against a Filipino spouse is valid and recognized in the
Philippines
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when
he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to
the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
CABAL, Billie Kristel D.G.

Case # 10
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997
Topic
Issue Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage
Ruling The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court
of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching
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and Gina on May 22, 1988. The Supreme Court held that the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and
the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and
fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared
less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist
has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that
brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens
the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family.
By CALVEZ

Case # 11
Republic vs Molina
GR No.108763 February 13 1997
Topic Void Marriage Psychological Incapacity
Issue Whether pr not the marriage is void baswd on psychological
incapacity
Ruling The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains
valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing
of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would
not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did
not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely
showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and
had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence
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nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison

showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility
which is not considered as psychological incapacity. The following are
the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set
forth in this case: burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the
plaintiff root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically
inclined such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the
marriage such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in
complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage such
incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate
Court or the Catholic Church must be respected court shall order the
prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.
By CASABUENA, April R.

Case # 12
Marcos vs. Marcos

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
Topic Void Marriages
Issue Psychological Incapacity
Ruling The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead
to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the
behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years.
It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus,
his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
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to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no

evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that
he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
By CASIQUIN, Rica Ysabelle L.

Case # 13
NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA

SINGH BUENAVENTURA
G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005
Topic Psychological Incapacity (Art. 36, Family Code)
Issue
1.) WON moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees may be
awarded on account of psychological incapacity (the non-
performance of marital obligations)
2.) WON co-ownership is applicable to the valid marriage
Ruling 1.) The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 of the
Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be
recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be
noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss
or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence
done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that
the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully
and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to
stand on.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties
null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to
psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article
36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
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disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to

give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting
moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of
psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and
with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and
yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have
been adduced in this case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume
and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for
the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private
respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a
willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral
damages was without basis in law and in fact.

Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the
grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides
that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.

With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
the trial court explained, thus:

Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an
award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled
the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect
her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable
that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary
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damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs of

litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce
his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the
annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling
the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on
petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a
mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the
obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys
fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral
and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.

2.) Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may
be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case
a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable
and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were
found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been
acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by
the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties
appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in
common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should,
therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

*WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8,
1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested
in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving
respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far
East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in
Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is
sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains
By CELERIAN, Adhara Kaye G.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Case # 14
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
BOBIS vs. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
Void Marriages; Prejudicial Question
Whether or not a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is required before any party can remarry, despite the first
marriage being a void one?
YES. In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without
first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs
a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again;
otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that,
without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase
the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.|
The Supreme Court upheld petitioner's contention and reversed and
set aside the order of the trial court suspending the criminal
proceeding on the ground of prejudicial question. The Court ruled that
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of
celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of the law is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage. Whether or not respondent's first marriage was void for lack
of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted, and any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. A decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge for bigamy
against respondent. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
CRUZ, Chanine Mae P.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Case # 15
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,respondent.
G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004
Void marriages (no marriage ceremony)
Whether or not there should be a declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage in the present case.
No, The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan.In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage
was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into
a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration
is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void.
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was
actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where
a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to
a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held
that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that
we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good
faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision,
dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September
25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt
has not been proven with moral certainty. SO ORDERED
CUENCA, Pamela

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Case # 16
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Gomez v. Lipana
G.R. No. L-23214, June 30, 1970
Void Marriage
w/n the second marriage is void?
Where the marriage contracted is bigamous and null and void for being
in violation of Sec. 29 of the Marriage Law, Act 3613, which became
effective on December 4, 1929, the marriage is subject to collateral
attack in the intestate proceedings instituted by the judicial
administratrix for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the conjugal
property.
Section 30 on annullable marriages cannot be relied upon in the
instant case where a second marriage was contracted while the first
was valid and subsisting for the controlling statute is Section 29 of Act
3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law, which became
effective on December 4, 1929.

There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to
Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married
Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the
conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The defendant has not
discharged the burden to prove that he comes under the exceptions; no
evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed,
he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first,
and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered
dead or was believed by him to be so.|
CUERDO, Winnie Anne S.

Case # 17
Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Topic Void marriage
Issue What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license
Ruling In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot
be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at
least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent,
only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
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was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the

nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
By DELA FUENTE, Rafael Kenneth M.

Case # 18
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Villanueva v. CA,
505 SCRA 56
Void Marriages
Whether or not there really was fraud in obtaining Orlys consent to
marry Lilia
No. It is obvious that Orly seeks to annul his marriage because of a
pending bigamy case filed by Lilia. Also, Orlys contentions were not
concretely established, taki8ng in consideration that he is a security
guard who is knowledgeable of self-defense. His allegations that he
never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is a lie. Also, it
took him four years to file an action, which only supports Lilias
contention that he freely cohabitated with her.
DEONA, Neil

Case # 19
Leouel Santos vs. CA and Julia Bedia-Santos

GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Topic Psychological incapacity
Issue WON annulment grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code should be
granted?
Ruling NO.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.

The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
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extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending
on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate
nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
By Dumalanta, Kristine Draei V.

Case # 20
Republic vs Court of Appeals and Molina

268 SCRA 198
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Topic Void Marriages/Psychological Incapacity

Issue Whether or not opposing and conflicting personalities is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
Ruling The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.

By FERNANDEZ, Deonnalynne G.

Case # 21
Hernandez v. CA
G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999
Topic Void Marriage
Issue Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Ruling Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
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lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,

they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner
failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private
respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed
out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was
not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. Petitioner says that at
the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive
to work for his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's
condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and
defeating the very objectives of marriage. However, private
respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as
the appellate court held.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish
the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if
any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner.

By FUCOY, Nicandro II S.

Case # 22
Medel vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
Topic Void Marriages - Art. 36
Issue Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent wife, clinically
evaluated as a manifestation of Anti-Social Personality Disorder fall
within the term psychological incapacity?
Ruling The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which

defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual
infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to
or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the
records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in
church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not
by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due
to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. However, we
pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos that Article 36 is not to be equated
with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring
a marriage void.
By GLORIA, Nadine Alessandra S.

Case # 23
Jose Lam vs. Adriana Chua

G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004
Topic Void Marriage
Issue Whether the marriage between Adriana and Jose should be declared
null and void for being bigamous.
Ruling Yes. The marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for
being bigamous.
The only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological
incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child.
Adriana presented, formally offered her evidence in support of the
petition and submitted the case for decision as of May 12, 1994. But on
a motion to re-open filed by her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the
case for reception of evidence on July 6, 1994 and subsequently
allowed Adriana to present evidence of two previous marriages
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contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the marriage

between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It is
only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed
support for John Paul when she testified in open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the
admission of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for nullity
of the marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose
to that of existence of previous marriages of Jose with two different
women with an additional claim for support of the child. Such
substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with the
trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made by Adriana except
the insertion of the handwritten phrase And for respondent to
support the child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may
deem just and reasonable found at the ultimate paragraph of the
petition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to
show that petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the
petition of Adriana.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana
and Jose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the
Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond
its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for
reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he
filed in the Court of Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise the
issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render
judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were not
alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped
from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the
Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for
being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional
question may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an
exception where estoppel has supervened.
By GUILLARTE, Desserie Marie L.

Case # 24
Oscar P. Mallion vs. Editha Alcantara

G.R No. 141528 October 31, 2006
Topic DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
Issue Thus, a previous final judgement denying a petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity barred a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
license?
Ruling Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of
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marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for

declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage
license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not
fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor
would it be barred by the principle of res judicata. Res judicata is
defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a
final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in
all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit."

This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2)
the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification
of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of
the public tranquility and happiness. Res judicata in this sense requires
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is
final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits;
and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. Based on this test,
petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on
separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first
petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the
present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a
marriage license.

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the
marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took
place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage
had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner
is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage
license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and
heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not
only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat
their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that
could have been adjudged in that case. It must be emphasized that a
party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply
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varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of

presenting his case.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A
plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues
existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief
which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be
permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to
recover for the same wrong or injury. A party seeking to enforce a
claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and
prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the
presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to
litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed.

In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action
to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken
and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and
relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action
regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time,
effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from
litigating the same controversy all over again. Therefore, having
expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects
therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage
license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC,
Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
By Franklin Hernandez

Case # 25
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs MANUEL SIAYNGCO

G.R. NO. 158896
Topic Void Marriage
Issue Whether or not Juanita Carating-Siayngco is psychologically
incapacitated.
Ruling As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity
of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar,
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for
him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and
her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her
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inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological

maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist
was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
obligations of marriage.
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia,
on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there
supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly
shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable
not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from
her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of
her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husbands
philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Dr.
Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual
dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing
intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by
respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.
By INTING, Nia B.

Case # 26
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Navarro vs. Cecilio-Navarro

G.R. 162049
Psychological Incapacity (Article 36)
Whether or not difficulty in the performance of marital obligations
constitutes psychological incapacity?
The spouses frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep
with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute
psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and
respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
JOYAS, Edwin Lawrence B.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Case # 27
Topic
Issue
Ruling
Antonio vs. Reyes

Article 36, Psychological incapacity
Whether or not pathological lying constitutes psychological incapacity
YEs. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
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essential to marriage.

The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision.
The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had
exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and
situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and
of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment,
and family background, among others.

It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation,
her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She
practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in
a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal
and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.
However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she
continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive
jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents
condition is incurable.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January
1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family
Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars, before
arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity. Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed
during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"
and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity
must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.
By JUDIT, Tyrone John C.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Case # 28
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
Topic
Issue 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents
failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
2. Whether or not respondent successfully proved Toshios
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Ruling 1. According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family
and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute
psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable
personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and
Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In
proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an
alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should
apply to any person regardless of nationality.

2. We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that
his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a
rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would
have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just
an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse

failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.18
By LANDAGAN, MARIA LITA G.

Case # 29
LANDICHO v. RELOVA
G.R. No. L-22579, February 23, 1968
Topic Void Marriage
Ruling At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27,
1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the
second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on
June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil
action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging
that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in
the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
By MALIGAYA, JOHARIC ATIENZA

Case # 30
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53642
April 15, 1988
Topic Void Marriages (Void for Reason of Public Policy)
Issue Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of
First Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for
annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
question.
Ruling Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner
Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to
the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in
the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist
in the case at bar.
By MANGUBAT, Jan G.

Case # 31
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, .vs THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY
Void marriages
Whether or not the subsequent marriage is valid without judicial
annulment of the first
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this
to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has
yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time
she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel);
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
Maravilla, Jose Cezar N.

Case # 32
Domingo vs CA
G.R. no. 104818 September 17, 1993
Topic Judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Issue Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed
for purposes of remarriage.
Ruling The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the

protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that
his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With
this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final
judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their
properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for
that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the
separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
By MARCAIDA, EDUARDO IV D.

Case # 33
Beltran vs. People

GR 137567 June 20, 2000
Topic
Issue Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked
as a prejudicial question in the case at bar.
Ruling The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the
case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter
pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Article 40
of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The
SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than

remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case for concubinage, the
accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void. With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared
null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement
that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
By MENGUITO, AKM

Case # 34
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Mercado vs. Tan

G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
Void Marriage
Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration
of nullity of the former marriage.
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then,
the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second
marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that
the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge.

MORALES. Jonathan Gil A.

Case # 35
REPUBLIC VS NOLASCO
GR 94053; MARCH 17, 1993
Topic Void Marriage (Presumptive death)
Issue Whether or not Art 41 of the Family Code was a properly applied.
Ruling As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
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consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the

disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search
for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-
founded belief" that she is dead.
n the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in
San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
By MORTEGA, MATTHEW, M.

Case # 36
ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000
Topic Void Marriages (Civil Code)
Issue Whether or not a second marriage, having been contracted during the
regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death?
Ruling YES. According to the Civil Code: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless: "(1) The first marriage was annulled
or dissolved; or "(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court." Under the foregoing
provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from
the rule.|
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by
the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared
null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof
would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
It remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband,
James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more
than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds. The conjugal property of
Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate
another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in
common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should rightly be divided in two equal portions one
portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the
estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased concurring with
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by
right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half.|||
By MURILLO, Angelo L.

Case # 37
MANUEL VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Topic Article 41 of the Family Code, Article 390 of the Civil Code
Issue Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it
ruled that petitioners first wife cannot be legally presumed dead
under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration
of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code
Ruling No. The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as
basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced. The presumption of
death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, is created by
law and arises without necessity of judicial declaration. However,
Article 41, of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, provides that for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Court
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
By ONG, Jennylyn C.

Case # 38
Morigo vs. People

422 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004
Topic Void Marriages- bigamous marriage
Issue Whether the petitioner first marriage between Lucio (petitioner) and
Lucia Barrete was valid therefore making his subsequent marriage
bigamous.
Ruling NO.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from
Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was
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already celebrated. We held therein that:

before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into
a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration
is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void.

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was
actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where
a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to
a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage
By PADILLA. Nastasia Anne C.

Case # 39
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Topic Void Marriage, subsequent void and bigamous marriage and its effects
Issue Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner (Tenebro)
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent,
and prays for his acquittal.
Ruling As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence
of petitioners valid (first) marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage
to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically
void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
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presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper

proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that
the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is
no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage
that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability
for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the
institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals
deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond
between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family
Code into essential and formal. In this case, all the essential and formal
requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. xxx

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals convicting Tenebro with the crime of bigamy.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
(Note: There is a separate opinion by Justice Vitug, please see for recit
purposes, just in case sir asks.)
By Pagkalinawan,RLG

Case # 40
Cario vs Cario
G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001
Topic Void Marriages
Issue Which of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago
S. Cario was valid as basis of his death benefits?
Ruling Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions renders the marriage
void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the
license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable
to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears
no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case,
the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the
issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings
before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt
from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio,
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the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to

respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime/ Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio,
the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
By PARCE, Vienna Olga G.

Case # 41
Ty vs Ca
Gr No. 127406
Topic Void Marriage
Issue WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?
Ruling The previous marriages happened before the enactment of the Family
Code therefore it must be decided based upon Art 83 of the New Civil
Code.

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news
of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
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contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is
necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that
effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,]and People v. Aragon, this Court
held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a
void marriage
But in Odayat v. Amante, The Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was
affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that
there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.
Although the family code Art 40 now requires a judicial
declaration, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice
the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
Court of Appeals,[25] the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there
be impairment of vested rights.
Moreover, the marriage between the parties happened in 1979,
before Wiegel. The first marriage of private respondent being void for
lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration
of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case,
therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to
petitioner is valid.

By PICHAY, Katherine B.

Case # 42
Sarao vs. Guevara
Topic Void Marriage
Issue Whether or not inability to procreate is a ground for annulment of
Marriage
Ruling
Under the marriage law, marriage may be annulled if the party,
was at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the
married state and such incapacity remains incurable. It is generally
held that the meaning of impotency is not the ability to procreate and
not to copulate. The defect must be in copulation, not reproduction
barrenness will not invalidate the marriage.
The defendant is not impotent in this case, removal of parts rendered
her sterile but it by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse.
By Ramos, Cyrill Jason S.

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Case # 43
BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT

72 PHIL 19; 25 April 1941
Topic Void Marriage
Issue Whether or not the marriage is void.
Ruling We see no reason to overturn the original ruling. Indeed, it is
improbable, the allegation of the complainant that the appellant had
not even suspected the gravid state of the defendant, this being, as is
proved in (sic) pregnant [in a] very advanced condition. So there is no
need to estimate the fraud who speaks the appellant. I argued this in
the sense that countries not uncommon to find people tuck developed,
it seems childish to merit our consideration, the more so that the
applicant was freshman right. Marriage is a very sacred institution: it is
the foundation upon which society rests. To cancel, are necessary clear
and convincing evidence. In this case there is no such evidence.
[Full text is in Spanish]
By REYES, Jenny C.

Case # 44
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA DELIZO,
respondent.
Topic Voidable Marriage
Issue Fraud: Concealment of pregnancy
Ruling Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
(Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs.
Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which
was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of
the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that
the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month)
at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot
apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only
more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to
plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy
was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat
as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the
5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is
still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to
the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if
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noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the

abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by
plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to
know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time
of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal
the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of
the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at
five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine,
Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
By Rubio, Mishelle Anne R.

Case # 45
Tuason vs. CA
Topic
Issue NON-INTERFERENCE OF A PROSECUTING ATTORNEY IS NOT FATAL
TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT IF
PETITIONER VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED THE ANNULMENT OF THEIR
MARRIAGE IN THE SAID COURT
Ruling The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage
and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion
exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed
between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.
By SALTING, Jessica J.

Case # 46
Corpus vs Ochotorena
Issue WON the respondent acted with bias and partiality as well as
ignorance of the law.
Ruling Yes. The Court ruled that the respondent judge violated Mrs. Macias
right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules. A
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judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of

acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep
always abreast with law and jurisprudence. When the law or
procedure is so elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals Decision
which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs.
Macias right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the
merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to
Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was
still pending resolution.

The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: After the last
pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to
promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial. Considering
that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias Motion to Dismiss, the
respondent judge should have first resolved the motion and then
waited for Mr. Macias motion to set the case for pre-trial.

What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading or
procedural short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the
respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial
on the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.
By SANSON, Vanna Katrina T. 4B

Case # 47
CERVANTES VS FAJARDO
Topic VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
Issue Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents have
custody over Angelie Ann Cervantes.
Ruling The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are granted
to petitioners, Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes, to whom they properly
belong.

RATIO:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no
mother shall be separated from a child under five
(5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling
reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of
minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and
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moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.

Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-
law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will
not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow
and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon
had also previously given birth to another
child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3)
years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up
with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the
moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon
the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the
minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who
is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married
man, can most likely give her.
Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge
and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption
has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care
and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him.
By Santela, LMC

Case # 48
Republic v. Iyoy
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005.
Issue Whether or not abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent's
wife per se constitute psychological incapacity that would be a ground
for nullity of their marriage.
Ruling NO. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.
Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may have
hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics, behavior, and acts of
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Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect

that is serious or grave, and which has been in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage, and is incurable. Even when the rules have
been relaxed and the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
the totality of evidence presented during trial by respondent Crasus, as
spouse seeking the declaration of nullity of marriage, must still prove
the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity; which, it failed to do so herein.
This Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely's
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the same Code.
By SIAPNO, Lorie Mae P.

Case # 49
ESPIRITU V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 115640, March 15, 1995
Topic Voidable Marriages
Effect of Termination of Marriage
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
Issue Whether or not the custody of the two children should be awarded to
the mother.
Ruling In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the
latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child
under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother
for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best
custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children
were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was
found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the
position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the
crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the
daughter.
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Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to
their father.
By SUSANA, Gladys T.

Case # 50
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children

REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO.
Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Topic Support Pendente Lite
Issue Whether or not IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED
TO GIVE SUPPORT GRANDFATHER DON PACO IS UNDOUBTEDLY
CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT DEMANDED, RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT OF
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE TO
SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.27
Ruling The petition is not meritorious.
Rule
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
61
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action or

proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a
verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party
stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both
parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic
documents in support thereof.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation
to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the
recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder
the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called
upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.34
We are unconvinced. Respondent Franciscos assertion that
petitioner had the means to support her daughters education is belied
by the fact that petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the
USA to secure the loan from the federal government. If petitioner were
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really making enough money abroad, she certainly would not have felt
the need to apply for said loan. The fact that petitioner was compelled
to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough
money to enable her to send her daughters to college by herself.
Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the
circumstances they found themselves in to secure loans under their
names so as not to delay their entrance to college.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and
respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation
to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco.
Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the
next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to
his granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears stressing that
respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns
and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the
majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from
these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real
properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he
owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real
properties here and abroad.41 It having been established that
respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his
granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent
Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
The applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject
provides:
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to
fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a
right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco
could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we
gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship
between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her
twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The
correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings
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of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being. The

photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented
a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however,
are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships
among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for
Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and
claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them.
Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the
Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
By SUVA, Meric S.

Case # 51
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930; November 26, 1970
Voidable Marriage; Grounds; Fraud
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-
marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage?
No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with
another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that
would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated
into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not
assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the
rule or not.
TIBAYAN, Carlo June C.

Case # 52
JUANARIA FRANCISCO vs. LOPE TAYAO

G.R. No. L-26435
Topic Separation
Issue Whether or not a wife can secure a divorce from the husband when the
latter has been convicted od adultery and not concubinage
Ruling No.
In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by
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statute. (19 C. J.,36; Benedicto vs. De la Rama [1903], 3 Phil., 34,

reversed by the United States Supreme Court for other reasons). The
grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband. (Villanueva, La Ley de
Divorcio, pp. 27, 46, and 47.) The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710,
is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A
petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb
"only" and the conjunctive "or." The same thought is again emphasized
in section 3 of the Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may
be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case
may be. . . . " Later on comes section 8 providing that "A divorce shall
not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by
final sentence in a criminal action"that is, in relation with section 1
of the same law, by final sentence in a criminal action for adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Act No.
2716, amendatory of article 437 of the Penal Code, adds nothing to the
Divorce Law except as it clarifies the meaning of concubinage.
The undeniable fact remains that the defendant was prosecuted for,
and was convicted of, the crime of adultery and not the crime of
concubinage. The criminal case was instituted on the complaint of the
injured husband. It was not instituted by the injured wife which is
essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage.
By UNAY,Elizabeth A.

Case # 53
Gaudionco vs. Hon. Pearanda

G.R. No. 79284; November 27, 1987.
Topic Legal Separation while Concubinage and Support Cases are Pending
Issue May a case of Legal Separation and Support pendent lite be resolved
pending a case for Concubinage?
Ruling Yes, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil
liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses
and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7
to 108, of the Civil Code."

Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to
be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or
succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged
offense of concubinage.

Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.
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A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this
end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case
was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then
allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation
under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former
law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final
judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been
reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and
the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the
stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his
wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support
pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner
finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he
can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
By VALERA, Carla Angela M.

Case # 54
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Ong vs. Ong

505 SCRA 76
Grounds for Denial of Legal Separation
What does abandonment as a ground for denial of legal separation
mean?
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment
without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established
that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
VENENOSO, Amor G.

Case # 55
Republic vs. Iyoy
Topic Legal Separation
Issue Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish
psychological incapacity.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Ruling Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take

cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before
the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code.
By DONNIE WAYNE VILLARIN

Case # 56
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Gines vs Bugayong
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
Condonation
Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that
may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
MARCAIDA, EDUARDO IV D.

Case # 57
Lapuz vs. Eufemio
Topic
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Issue Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action
involved property rights.
Ruling An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic
and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a
proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.
By Aron Kerr Menguito

Case # 58
Cervantes vs. Fajardo

G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989
Topic Legal Separation
Issue Whether or not respondents can take back their child.
Ruling In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no
mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. 5 In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the
child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to
a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship
with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His
open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the
minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into
an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina
Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another
married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who
eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C.
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Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true

father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor.
Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the
minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother
(herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give
her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is
the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody
of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him. 9
By MORALES. Jonathan Gil A.

Case # 59
ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 115640; MARCH 15, 1995
Topic Legal Separation (Article 62. During the pendency of the action for
legal separation, the provisions of Art 49 shall apply to the custody and
support of the common children)
Issue Whether or not the petitioner has the better right over the custody of
the children.
Ruling Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a
child under 7 years of age not to be separated from the mother,
without considering what the law itself denominates as compelling
reasons or relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In the Unson
III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty
in not awarding custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of
the child "to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had
placed herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of [the
child] who was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now
over 7 years of age. They understand the difference between right and
wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests
would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional
stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing
in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a
position to extend.
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to
another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither
meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over
seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or
immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for
the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become
final.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The
children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent
with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no
longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the
presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or
two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute,
there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant
custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.
By MORTEGA, MATTHEW, M.

Case # 60
GOITIA VS CAMPOS-RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263. November 2, 1916
Topic Obligations between Husband and Wife (Civil Code)
Issue Whether or not the wife can lawfully demand for support from her
husband notwithstanding the fact the she lives away from their family
home
Ruling YES. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is
created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, this option given by law is not
absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate
his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife
was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from
the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
By MURILLO, Angelo L.

Case # 61
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
ARROYO VS VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-17014 AUGUST 11, 1922
Art. 109 of the Civil Code
WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty do
ne by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was infli
cted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravat
ed degree. No sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for t
he separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto s
eparation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must b
e seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming fro
m the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the dom
icile.
When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to
soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they
cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wivesnecessity is
a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes (Evans v.
Evans)
ONG, Jennylyn C.

Compiled by: VALERA, Carla Angela M.


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