DDD

G.R. No.
L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.
LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court
of Paraaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C.
QUILATAN, respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA,
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor
J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V.
Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both
for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and
Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4,
1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that
"the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be
allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be
well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in
court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of
the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a
lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed
separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and
Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal
Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law
students of the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal
Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate
appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein
respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said

petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.
Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers,
among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979
and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of Section
34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on
November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining
respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from
conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the
Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs.
Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila on
November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by
said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
states:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of
a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or
by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party to an action is
authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior
courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney.
However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can
be aided only by an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is
empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done
by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provide:
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All

criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal
action. Unless the offended party has waived the civil
action or expressly reserved the right to institute it
separately from the criminal action, and subject to the
provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene,
personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the
offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is
subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no
less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval
of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation
in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in
the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court,
the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through
reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in
the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or
friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The
permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as
private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to
disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not,
in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that
the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the
case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a nonlawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case
before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to
appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial
fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque,
petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the
civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the
civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said
complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of
the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of
his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16,
1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of
petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant
petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent
judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of
petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan.
Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana,
Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They
have no business appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a
party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of the
Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases
Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a
criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an
offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil
liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority
only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific
provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section
34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74
SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15
specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated

August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private
prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases. Orders set aside.

prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases. Orders set aside.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana,

Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur
Separate Opinions
Separate Opinions

prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases.
De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concurs with the dissent of Assoc. Justice
Herrera.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003]
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H.

MEDIODEA,
12th
Municipal
Circuit
Trial
Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -without having to resign from their posts -- conduct their own litigation in
person as well as appear for and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or
defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects
the employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint[1] dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda

Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In the Complaint, the judge
was charged with gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct
for failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in
Civil Case No. 252.[2]
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC
of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an
action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary injunction, temporary
restraining order (TRO) and damages[3]covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala,
Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge
Tito Gustilo designated respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order[4] dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the
defendants in the civil case to show cause why the preliminary injunction
should not be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing
on
September
21,
2001,
but
defendants
therein
filed
a
Manifestation[5] on September 17, 2001, praying that they be given an
additional period of ten days to file an answer. After the September 21 hearing,
respondent reset the hearing to September 28, 2001.[6] Meanwhile, the
defendants filed their Opposition[7]to complainants prayer for preliminary
injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after
the defendants lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on
behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.[8] Respondent gave the
defendants ten days[9] to file a motion to disqualify complainant from appearing
as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her opposition thereto.
In his Order[10] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the
defendants Motion[11]to disqualify complainant from appearing on behalf of
and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions [12] praying for judgment to be
rendered on the civil case. In an Order[13] dated October 19, 2001, respondent
denied complainants Motions because of the pending hearing for the issuance
of a restraining order and an injunction. He likewise denied the defendants
Motion for extension of time to file an answer. [14] Complainant did not ask for
a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment[15] on the Complaint, respondent contends that
complainant filed a Petition for his inhibition after filing two administrative
cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of administrative charges
against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In
the exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify
themselves. It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil
Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the
14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be
attributed to him, considering that he was mandated by law and the rules of
procedure to pass upon every motion presented before him. [16] Besides,
complainant allegedly failed to present evidence necessary for the immediate
resolution of her prayer for preliminary injunction. [17] Moreover, she
supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to question the
validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on
the case.[18]
Respondent likewise refutes complainants assertion that she appeared
as counsel on her own behalf because she could not afford the services of a
lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without basis, since her compensation and
other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to pay for the services
of counsel.[19] He further alleges that she did not secure authority from this
Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence
every time she appeared in court.[20]
Evaluation and Recommendation of the

Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction prayed for in the Complaint should first be resolved before judgment
should be rendered in the principal action. However, it opined that the prayer
for preliminary injunction should have been decided within 30 days from the
filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction and the
principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months
had already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in
the amount of P1,000 with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future
would be dealt with more severely.[21]
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore
undertook another round of investigation, the subject of which was
complainants appearance in court as counsel for herself and on behalf of her
co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must
devote their full time to government service to ensure the efficient and speedy
administration of justice. Although they are not absolutely prohibited from
engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with prior

approval of this Court. The OCA added that [e]ngaging in any private
business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is
tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office. [22]
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the
amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel without authority from this Court,
with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with
more severely. The OCA also recommended that she be directed to file her
application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared in court to
litigate her case.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify
the penalty to conform to the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals
sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.[23] These actions are summary in nature, because they involve the
disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as promptly as
possible.[24] Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules
on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities
of ordinary actions.[25] Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that
may cause unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided. [26] The actions
for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to provide expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved. Both are time procedures designed to bring immediate
relief.[27]
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible
entry, parties are entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions
or proceedings prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
an agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act or acts. [28] It may
also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is
known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.[29] Since this remedy is granted

prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and
respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved
before the main case of forcible entry is decided.
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Often have we ruled
that their inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency.[32] To avoid sanction, they should ask this
Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary

Injunction within 30 days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear
command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule

on every motion, he cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of
the rule that cases should be decided within the prescribed period. This Court
notes with concern the plethora of motions and pleadings filed in this case,
which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet,
even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for
forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main case
remained unresolved.
Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or
unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present
a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court
shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the
word shall to evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the
belief of respondent that since there was a prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would have to wait until
after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If
that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary
injunction is merely a provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it
should lend itself to the summary nature of the main case. This is the very
reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary injunction in a
forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary
injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the
speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed
party from further damage during the pendency of the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to
decide, promptly and judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their
courts.[30] To a large extent, the publics faith and confidence in the judicial
system is boosted by the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and
undermined by any delay thereof.[31]Judges are thus enjoined to decide cases
with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of the courts business
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for

deciding cases, judges should at all times remain in full control of the
proceedings in their sala.[33] They should not be at the mercy of the whims of
lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters convenience that should be the
primordial consideration, but the administration of justice.[34]
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly
and to decide cases within the required period. They are called upon to
observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial
functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting
Judge Doronila:[35]
We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the
clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership
has launched an all-out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket
congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to
observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial
functions and duties.[36]
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when
a municipal trial court is called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules
of Summary Procedure.As eloquently put by Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking
for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:[37]
x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court
judge, more than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of
how that trust is carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the
judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that influences it than the
prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts.[38]
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions against erring judges. Given the facts
of this case, a fine of P10,000 is appropriate pursuant to current
jurisprudence[39] and Rule 140.[40]
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined
in the amount of P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation or
profession without prior approval of the Court. The Office of the Court
Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for herself and on behalf
of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of malfeasance
in office.
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a

lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.[46] (Citations omitted)
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or
habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she
demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as
referring to the members of such a vocation.[47] In turn, vocation is defined as
a persons regular calling or business; ones occupation or profession.[48]
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or

profession when she appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary
implication was that she was in the practice of law. We clarify. A partys right
to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court provides:
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their
own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally
cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does
not remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to selfrepresentation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one
administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion of the Courts
ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod[49] regarding the extent of the practice of law.
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared

on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot
be completely exonerated. Representing oneself is different from appearing
on behalf of someone else.
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do

everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its
termination.[41] When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
practice
law;
otherwise,
ignorance
would
be
unjustifiably
rewarded.[42]Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and
defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be
in the practice of law.[43] One does not practice law by acting for himself any
more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.[44]
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the
exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by
acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise
to others.[45] Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to
the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or
of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court

will not apply when a person is already appearing for another party. Obviously,
because she was already defending the rights of another person when she
appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely
protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give
complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she
and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing
the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the peoples faith
and confidence in the judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time
complainant appeared in court, that she appeared for her own sister, and that
there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we should be reminded that
everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of
justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility.[50]Given these circumstances,
the penalty of reprimand[51] is sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct,
act or omission that falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially
on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it
will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees
in order not to diminish the peoples faith in our justice system. But when the
charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee
from any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes, [52] and that
serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.[53]
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby
found GUILTY of gross inefficiency in failing to observe
the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the amount
of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar
act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda
Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf
of a co-plaintiff without court authority and is likewise warned that a future
similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.It
was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002 [1]and
July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which
denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party
litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily
inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
(Chairman),
JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
and
Carpio-Morales,
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his

appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
Petitioner,
year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court[3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.
- versus JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Public Respondent.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure
a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,

Private Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for
Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which
petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed
after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama
yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to
Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant
petition and assigns the following errors:
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to

Inhibit,[4] praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged
I.
that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial
could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pretrial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative
frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.[5]
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN
THE LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic]
CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NONLAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for
II.
inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said
remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said
even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of
the said order.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF
JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS
PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND
CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.[8] In the
same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the
promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements
or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance
In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his

appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the
of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from
trying the case.
two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the
respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order[10] dated
July 31, 2002.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus

and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an

absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will
be directed.[11] A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed
with the Court of Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional
cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed,
may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[13]
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section

34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of
herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of
filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be
resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who
make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law

school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal
clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control
of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself
and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying
petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on
December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule
138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized
schools clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.
concerns before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of
Rule 138, which provides:
138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice

of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be
incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an
individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an
a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that
accused to be heard by himself and counsel,[16] this Court has held that during the trial,
his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar.
the right to counsel cannot be waived.[17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated
The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings
in People v. Holgado,[18] where we declared that even the most intelligent or educated
from commencement to the termination of the litigation.[14]Considering that a party
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and
and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does
procedure as those qualified to practice law,[15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself,
not know how to establish his innocence.
runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore,
Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff
Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
therein.The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal
exercising his right to represent himself.
prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil
case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law
successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case,
student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice
petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the
Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioners claim is
competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident
Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student
to this decision.
may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a
party representing himself.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue

of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by
litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we
virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138
have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We
when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended
should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her
Resolution
and
Order
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when
108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner avers that
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No.
by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of
01-0410 as a party litigant.
arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and
confidence in the respondents impartiality.
No pronouncement as to costs.
We do not agree.
SO ORDERED.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an
administrative case[19] against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt
the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from
the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and
prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in
a particular trial,[20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should
G.R. No. L-1582
TEOFILO PAAR, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO V. BORROMEO ET AL., respondents.
The petitioner in his own behalf.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco
Carreon for respondents.
inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
October 10, 1947
MORAN, C.J.:
Teofilo Paar is charge in Manila with treason before the People's Court, and
prayed that he be assisted in his defense by Andres R. Camasura who is not
a member of the bar. The People's Court denied the petition, hence, this
action for mandamus.
It is clear form these provisions that in Manila where there are many
members of the bar, defendants in the People's Court may be assisted only
by members of the bar.
Petition denied, without costs.
Section 3 and 4 Rule 112 are as follows:

SEC. 3. Duty of court to inform defendant of his right to have
attorney. If the defendant appears without a attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court
must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time
must be allowed for procuring attorney.
SEC. 4. Who may be appointed attorney `de oficio'. The attorney
so employed or assigned must be a duty authorized member of the
Bar. But in provinces where duly authorized members of the bar are
not available, the court may, in its discretion, admit or assign a
person, resident in the province and of good repute for probity and
ability, to aid the defendant in his defense, although the person so
admitted or assigned be not a duly authorized member of the Bar.
Section 29 and 31 of Rule 127 read:
SEC. 29. Attorney for destitute litigants. "A superior court may
assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any
party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is
destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of
counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect
the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so
assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused there
from by the court for sufficient cause shown."
SEC. 31. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.lawphil.net
Paras, Feria, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
MORAN, C.J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Pablo concurs in this decision.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This
is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May
1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent
Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the
said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo
entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial,
the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961,

ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963,
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On
22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963,
filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's
fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning
filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of
the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings
were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by
respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the
backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case,
apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates
............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning
......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis
................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on
the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January
1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted
and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as
respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was considered
submitted for decision without respondent's brief. 3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated

Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467,
27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's
fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral
in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented
by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in
the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees: for the same section adds that
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf
of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted
to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or
defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle
the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24,
Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to
fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the
client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not
one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those

possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules
and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There,
it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the
bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the
great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation
for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not
been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as
an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the
time. 6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated; 7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will
not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law; 9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact
that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to nonrecovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney.
11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be
awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award
of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its
members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that
moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it
being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the
petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award
of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members
because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in
the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic
well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the
union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6,
Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any
person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear
the financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice
of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him
who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as
"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a
serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this
matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken
up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against
the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they
awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin
Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against
respondent Muning.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur.
G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and
BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE,
PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO
BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA, FLORENCIO
SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS,
RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA,
ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO
PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO
TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ,
CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR,
HERNANI SURILLA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS
ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS,
EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and
REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co.,
Inc. seeks to annul the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch
for a retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business
nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision,
Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel
Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in
Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by
petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the supervision of
Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its
completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private
respondents and its other employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner
before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one
(41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum
and sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay.
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.
Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao while
the others were assigned to Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan.
Summonses and notices of preliminary conference were issued and served
on the two engineers and petitioner through Engineer Estacio. The
preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference
of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's
liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and
thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement,
Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner's right to file its position
paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with
their position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position
paper. 2
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another
week to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao denied this request. On June
21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an order granting the complaint and directing
petitioner to pay private respondents' claims. Arbiter Siao held:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases
were filed, and what the complainants might think as to how this
branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings as they are now
restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative or recourse but to
order the respondent to pay the claims of the complainants, subject
of course to the computation of the Fiscal Examiner II of this
Branch pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The
Supreme Court ruled: "Contracts though orally made are binding on
the parties." (Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).
Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that "a court cannot
decide a case without facts either admitted or agreed upon by the
parties or proved by evidence." (Yu Chin Piao v. Lim Tuaco, 33
Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby
ordered to pay the individual claims of the above-named
complainants representing their wage differentials within ten (10)

days from receipt of this order.
The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered to
compute the individual claims of the herein complainants.
SO ORDERED. 3
On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order, thus:
When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June 19,
1990 at 10:00 a.m. respondent thru their representative manifested
that they were willing to pay the claims of the complainants and
promised to pay the same on June 28, 1990 at 10:30 a.m.
However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize
the promise of the respondent, the latter failed to appear without
any valid reason.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent

Commission was rendered without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner claims that:
I
THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN
ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY MAKING
THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS AND
BUT ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND EVIDENCE
CONJECTURE:
Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the

claims of the complainants, we believe that the issues raised herein
have become moot and academic.
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional

right to due process of law when it was adjudged
by the NLRC liable without trial on the merits and
without its knowledge;
WHEREFORE premises considered, the above-entitled cases are

hereby ordered Closed and Terminated, however, the respondent
is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their differential pay and
13th-month pay within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof
based on the employment record on file with the respondent.
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and

unreasonably interpreted the principle that the
NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly
bound by the rules of evidence;
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It
alleged that it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and
Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's appeal
was filed by one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.
In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the
orders of the Arbiters.
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the

NLRC's ruling that petitioner is already in
estoppel to disclaim the authority of its alleged
representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying
merely on private, respondents' unsubstantiated
complaints to hold petitioner liable for damages. 5
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and
respondent Commission are void for the following reasons: (1) there was no
valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the
hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3)

the decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on
unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
They provide:
Sec. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. (a) Notices or
summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be
served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or duly
authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or
by registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented by
counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on
such counsel or authorized representative; provided further that in
cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served
on both the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case
where the parties are so numerous, service shall be made on
counsel and upon such number of complainants as may be
practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with
Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Proof and completeness of service. The return is prima
facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail
is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent. . . .
To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized representative"

or "agent" of parties on whom summons may be served, the provisions of
the Revised Rules of Court may be resorted to. 6
Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic
corporation or partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These
persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know their
responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any legal papers
served on them. 8
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed
and supervised the construction project. 9 According to the Solicitor General
and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan
City and supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he had
sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal
papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other
responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore validly
served on him.
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to
settle the claims of private respondents is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor
arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code
and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3)
exceptions to the rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. . . . .
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be

served personally or by registered mail on the party himself. If the party is
represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent,
summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with
principal address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were
filed in Iligan City and summonses therefor served on Engineer Estacio in
Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and
authorized representative of petitioner.
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor

Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he
shall be made to present written proof that he is properly
authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly
recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a)
he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an
organization or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c) he is
a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they dulyaccredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor
arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the
first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to
ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named corespondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever
statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters
could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to
respondent Commission did not cure Engineer Estacio's representation.
Atty. Abundiente, in the first place, had no authority to appear before the
respondent Commission. The appellants' brief he filed was verified by him,
not by petitioner. 12 Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve into the
merits of Atty. Abundiente's appeal and determine whether Engineer Estacio
was duly authorized to make such promise. It dismissed the appeal on the
ground that notices were served on petitioner and that the latter was
estopped from denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente
were authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could bind
the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent
Commission. Petitioner's liability arose from Engineer Estacio's alleged
promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and
requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of petitioner.
The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly
established by evidence.13 This is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure, viz:
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. Attorneys and other
representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in
all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of
attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise agreement
with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim.
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the
preliminary conference and constituted an offer to settle the case amicably.
The promise to pay could not be presumed to be a single unilateral act,
contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General. 14 A defendant's promise to pay
and settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal obligation from
the plaintiff to withdraw the complaint and discharge the defendant from
liability. 15 In effect, the offer to pay was an offer to compromise the cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability, and
is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. 16 If this rule were
otherwise, no attempt to settle litigation could safely be made. 17 Settlement
of disputes by way of compromise is an accepted and desirable practice in
courts of law and administrative tribunals. 18 In fact, the Labor Code
mandates the labor arbiter to exert all efforts to enable the parties to arrive at
an amicable settlement of the dispute within his jurisdiction on or before the
first hearing. 19
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the decisions of the labor arbiters which were not only based on
unauthorized representations, but were also made in violation of petitioner's
right to due process.
Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. Should
the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in
part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order
stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the
conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their
respective verified position papers
xxx xxx xxx
After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the workers' claims as
promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file
their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision
on the merits without at least requiring private respondents to substantiate
their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file
position papers but petitioner's waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the
premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private
respondents at the scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its
"promise," there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have
prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their position papers.
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters
and respondent Commission, they "shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process." The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiters are
not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be
interpreted so as to dispense with the fundamental and essential right of due
process. 20 And this right is satisfied, at the very least, 'when the parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers. 21 Labor Arbiters Siao and
Palangan erred in dispensing with this requirement.
Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due
process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules
which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just,
expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. 22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set
aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan
City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.
[G.R. No. 146783. July 29, 2002]
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

MAXIMINO GAMIDO; MAXIMINO B. GAMIDO, petitioner,
vs. NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion
J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, who
styles himself as counsel for petitioner Maximino B. Gamido. Two issues were
tendered during the hearing of said motion today, attended by Dela Cruz and
the counsels for respondent led by the Assistant Solicitor General Rodolfo
Urbiztondo, OSG, to wit:
1. Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against
forum-shopping; and
2. Whether or not Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel
for petitioner in this case, considering allegations that he is not
a member of the Philippine Bar.
It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date of February
12, 2001, personally his Motion to Withdraw Petition, and that the Court in its
Resolution dated March 12, 2001, granted the withdrawal of his petition
for habeas corpus, the Court hereby RESOLVES that the instant Motion for
Relief, which was filed without authority of the petitioner and clearly without
merit, should be and is hereby DENIED.
Further, considering representations by the self-styled counsel for
petitioner that he, Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, is a lawyer with a law office bearing
his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, and for this
purpose he used the title of attorney and indicated in his pleadings filed before
this Court an IBP number, which turned out to be spurious, it having been
shown and admitted by him that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar as
certified by the Office of the Bar Confidant, after he was made to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for appearing as counsel in this
case without license to practice law, and although he asked the Court for
forgiveness for the wrong he had done, the Court RESOLVED to declare
ESPIRIDION J. DELA CRUZ GUILTY of indirect contempt of this
Court. WHEREFORE, he is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000) within thirty days from notice hereof, OR
suffer IMPRISONMENT for a period of one month and one day to be served
at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) detention center, Taft Avenue,
Manila, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
(OGCC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the employment
REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO
A. PANES, JR.,
Complainants,
- versus -
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY.

LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN,
ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR.,
AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D.
NADUA,
Respondents.
A.C. No. 8096
of Atty. Ignes.[3] However, controversy later erupted when two (2) different groups,
Present:
herein referred to as the Dela Pea board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the
CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.
On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Pea board filed Civil Case
No. 1793[4] for Injunction and Damages, seeking to annul the appointment of two (2)
directors, Joselito T. Reyes and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with
Promulgated:
July 5, 2010
Director Allan D. Yaphockun whose hostility to the present Board of Directors, the
Dela Pea board, is supposedly of public knowledge.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Pea board also adopted Resolution No.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
009[5]appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo
Mann as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of
Directors, under the direct supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335[1]passed
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case
on July 17, 2008 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
No. 50-24 for Indirect Contempt of Court[6] entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD),
(IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-1953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the
represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V.
disbarment case filed by the complainants against the respondents.
Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil Case No. 1799 for
Injunction and Damages[7] entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented
The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:
herein by its General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J.

Vargas. On March 9, 2007, KWD and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation

(GOCC), hired respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1)
year effective April 17, 2006.[2] The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
complaint[8] in Civil Case No. 1799.
Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 079[9] dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had
In his defense,[14] Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly
approved the retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel
represent KWD until April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contracts
of KWD and stated that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired
pre-termination. Atty. Mann also stated that he stopped representing KWD after April
on January 14, 2007.
17, 2007 in deference to the OGCCs stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed
Atty. Manns defense.[15]
In its letter[10] dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gombas
insistence that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17,
On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation [16] before the IBP with the
2007.The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the
following attachments: (1) the transcript of stenographic notes taken on January 28,
contract anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCCs grant of authority to
2008 in Civil Case No. 1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of
private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances; and that
the January 7, 2008 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript
the termination of Atty. Igness contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water
showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD and Ms. Gomba. He also signed
Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of
the notice of appeal.
Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty. Igness services and
requested to hire another counsel.
In his report and recommendation,[17] the Investigating Commissioner recommended

that the charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority,
Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one
complainants filed a disbarment complaint[11] against the respondents before the IBP
(1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 07-
of his contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No.
1953.Complainants alleged that respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case
1799 in February and March 2007.
No. 1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority. They likewise stated in their
position paper[12] that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after the OGCC
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner
had confirmed the expiration of Atty. Igness contract in its April 4, 2007
recommended that they be fined P5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a party
manifestation/motion[13] in Civil Case No. 1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District
without authority to do so, per Santayana v. Alampay.[18] The Investigating
(KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v.
Commissioner found that they failed to secure the conformity of the OGCC and COA
Supreme Investigative and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y.
to their engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
Cabucay.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the
After a careful study of the case and the parties submissions, we find respondents
Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
administratively liable.
Hence, the present petition.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA
conformity if a GOCC hires private lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the
Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing
legal basis of this rule. Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of
the case because respondents had no authority from the OGCC to file the complaints
the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the OGCC which shall act as the principal law
and appear as counsels of KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and
office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9,[19] issued by
Civil Case No. 1796-25. Complainants point out that the retainership contract of Atty.
President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private
Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes,
lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same Section 3
et al. in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April 8, 2008 of the Regional
provides that in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the
Trial Court (RTC) for being filed by one not duly authorized by law; and that the
Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the
authority of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm since
written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment
Resolution No. 009 of the Dela Pea board lacks the conformity of the OGCC.As a
of a private lawyer or law firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel
consequence, according to complainants, respondents are liable for willfully
Corporation,[20] we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire
appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so.
a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the
GOCC must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired
General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written
on April 17, 2007, but he and his fellow respondents stopped representing KWD after
concurrence of the COA must also be secured.
that date. He submits that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without
authority. In their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound similar
In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of
arguments. They also say that their fees were paid from private funds of the members
KWD?
of the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel who might need legal representation, not
from the public coffers of KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann submits similar
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as
arguments.
collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No.
1799.Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as
collaborating counsel. While the 4th Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly
the extremely urgent motion for the immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to
states that he and Atty. Ignes presently stand as KWD legal counsels, there is no proof
the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was compelled to ask him why he seeks the
that the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Naduas engagement as legal counsel or
return of KWD properties if he filed the motion as counsel of Ms. Gomba.When the
collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their
RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said
appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no
that KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the case. Atty. Ignes also
approval from the OGCC and COA.
manifested that they will file a motion for reconsideration of the orders dismissing
Civil Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled that it will not accept
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of
any motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by the
Phividec Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that said private
OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of appeal [23] dated February 28, 2008, in
counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the
Civil Case No. 1799. As the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one
expropriation case in Phividecs behalf considering that the requirements set by
(1) not duly authorized by law, the RTC, in its Order [24] dated April 8, 2008, denied
Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied with.[21] Thus, Resolution No. 009
due course to said notice of appeal.
did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as collaborating
counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pre-termination of his own
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was
retainership contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar,
merely as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself, however, when he said that
Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels.
Ms. Gomba represents KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion
sought the return of the facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority,
filed and argued a motion with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in
after his authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his
Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of
retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume
KWD after his authority as counsel had expired. This fact was not lost on the RTC in
as true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still
denying due course to the notice of appeal.
disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with
the IBP on March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript of stenographic
notes[22] in Civil Case No. 1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued
The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and

deliberately appeared as counsels of KWD without authority. One, respondents have
admitted the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are
Consequently, for respondents willful appearance as counsels of KWD without
aware of our ruling in Phividec.[25] Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full
authority to do so, there is a valid ground to impose disciplinary action against
grasp of our ruling therein that there are indispensable conditions before a GOCC can
them.Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
hire private counsel and that for non-compliance with the requirements set by
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel would have no authority to file a
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
case in behalf of a GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD without
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
complying with what the rule requires. They signed pleadings as counsels of
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
KWD.They presented themselves voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
KWD even if they had no valid authority to do so.
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents authority as counsels of KWD which
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such,
question was actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent
the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and should be
motion to disqualify KWDs counsels[26] dated February 21, 2007 and during the
imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
hearing on February 23, 2007[27] respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
the case on March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency of this case before the IBP, Atty.
member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any
Ignes had to be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an intended
punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the
motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD.
end desired.[28] In Santayana,[29] we imposed a fine of P5,000 on the respondent for

willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent
respondent therein also appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification
of the charge even if they insist that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr.
Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC and COA.
and Mann, as collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of
KWD. To be sure, the facts were clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD without
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of P5,000 on each respondent.
authority, and not merely as counsels of the members of the Dela Pea board and KWD
personnel in their private suits.
On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had
happened after the RTC issued four (4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April 13,
2007 in Civil Case No. 1799.[30] As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4)
orders were nullified by the Court of Appeals.[31] We are compelled to issue a

reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers, like
SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA

PADILLA AGBULOS,
Petitioners,
Present:
respondents, to always show candor and good faith to the courts.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
- versus -
2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No.
07-1953 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar,
G.R. No. 176530
NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and

ELENA G. GARCIA,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
June 16, 2009
Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys
for a party to a case without authority to do so and FINED P5,000 each, payable to
this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY
WARNED that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents personal records in the Office
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision[1] of
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 83994 which
set aside the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed beyond the
Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B.
period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the
Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a
allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties
complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla
had no tenancy relationship.
Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and

damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo
In an Order[2] dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners
Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija,
motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of
DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the CARP, some
Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it
portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there was prima facie showing
appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in
of tenancy. [3]
truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and
a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the
notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the

RTC denied the motion.[4]
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna
Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs).
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal[5] with the RTC, which gave due
course to the same.[6] The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena
G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan,
In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real
Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to receive a communication from the court
parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public,
informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for disposition. She also stated
that they were possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed.
in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether
they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of the plaintiffs was still
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents (plaintiffs) evidence,
in America.[7]
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the
subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants.
On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October 24, 2002
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Branch
87,
is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accordingly, the subject complai
nt is
reinstated and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to
the RTC for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not
agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that
the principal relief sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and
The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural
and substantive grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to

represent such client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this
presumption, thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed
to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that there was no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the parties.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC would show that
she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitangs authority to represent respondents in
Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this
Court:
the case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would
pursue an appeal.
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the

appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the
notice of appeal without respondents knowledge and consent;
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by

the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyers
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to

the appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitangs appellants brief
failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13,
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an
appellants brief; and
first appearance and validates the action taken by him.[10] Implied ratification may
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC

(Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents complaint.[9]
the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing
take various forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention

of benefits flowing therefrom.[11] Respondents silence or lack of remonstration when
of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and

diligence.[12] Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.[13] In light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitangs act of filing the notice of appeal
without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not
commendable.
The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the
x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals

that the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the
nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted
in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare
property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the cancellation
of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the
parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy
under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the
CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latters
entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the findings of
the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in
nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.
jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed before the CA by the
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties.
It is, therefore, essential to establish all the
indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural
respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are
intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the
case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants brief sufficient in form and substance
as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held
that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress,
substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be
allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice
is the core reason for the existence of courts.[16]
lessee.[14]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint.[15]
of Appeals Decision dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.
Respondents complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even
in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the
SO ORDERED.
petitioners. We are in full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this
point:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WILFREDO M. CATU,
Complainant,
Present:
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and
Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his
-versus
appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,
Respondent.
filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an

act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between
RESOLUTION
the litigants as punong barangay.
CORONA, J.:
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected
hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard
thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother,
the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of
Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their
demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them
dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth
in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free
Manila[4] where the parties reside.
because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties
patent injustice against her.
to conciliation meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out,
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBPCBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay,
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.

Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis
supplied)
he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio.
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition

constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing,
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government

service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the
In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. [9] This was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition

under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition
to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent

as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES

ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed

the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713,

GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors,
city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the
Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any
civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the
Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession
even during official hours of work only on occasions
of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned
do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during

their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is,
tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to
the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
all public officials and employees.
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of
or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and
profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]
municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayanare required to hold regular sessions only at least
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities

once a week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their
and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of
professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there
the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and
is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any
the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the
other person or office for any of these purposes.
municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities
and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors,

mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total
or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal

such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice
they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their
their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only
On
the
other
hand,
members
of
the
sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their

professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
twice a month.[16]
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice

his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization
from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior

written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he
entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO

PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD
OF HIS DEPARTMENT
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to
are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is
be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law
to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance
only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.[17]Section
of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Responsibility.
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage

directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities,
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency
of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an
officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any
way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil
service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
therefore SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of six months effective
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
Code of Professional Responsibility:
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD

THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the
and guidance.
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should
act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
SO ORDERED.
of the legal profession.[19]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an

attorney for violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of

professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule
1.01
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
He
is
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
A.M. No. 202 July 22, 1975

RENE P. RAMOS, complainant,
vs.
MOISES R. RADA, respondent.
Indubitably, therefore, Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting
government employees from engaging directly in a private business,
vocation or profession or being connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department. But, indubitably, also, his private business
connection has not resulted in any prejudice to the Government service.
Thus, his violation of the rule the lack of prior permission is a technical
one, and he should be meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty,
which is reprimand.
CASTRO, J.:
Moises R. Rada a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte, Branch II, is charged with a violation of Section 12 of Civil Service
Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government:....
From the respondent Rada's letters of explanation and their annexes, dated
December 16, 1973 and June 27, 1974, respectively, and the letter and its
annexes, dated August 12, 1974, filed by the complainant Rene P. Ramos,
by way of rejoinder to Rada's explanation, undisputed fundamental facts
emerge that justify us in dispensing with a full-blown investigation of this
administrative case.
The respondent Rada receives a monthly salary of P267.75. On December
15, 1972 he was extended an appointment by the Avesco Marketing
Corporation, thru its president, Jimmy Tang, as representative to manage
and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte which were
foreclosed by the corporation. Rada accepted the appointment and
discharged his duties as administrator. The administrative complaint against
Rada was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973. He
requested permission to accept the appointment on October 27, 1973. It is
not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties of the position
of administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as messenger; nor has it
been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require
that his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the Government. Such
being his situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a
productive endeavor to augment his income, and to award a premium for
slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being connected
with a private undertaking outside of office hours and without foreseeable
detriment to the Government service. His connection with Avesco Marketing
Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure a written
permission from the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, who is hereby authorized to grant or revoke such
permission, under such terms and conditions as will safeguard the best
interests of the service, in general, and the court, in particular.
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Moises R. Rada is adjudged guilty of a
technical violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, for which he is
hereby reprimanded. He may however apply, if he so desires, for permission
to resume his business connection with the corporation, in the manner
above indicated.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978

JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the
Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. MR. Malinao
has been appearing in the municipal court of this town for
parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable
information also says he has been appearing in the
municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even
Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we believe. He
makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from
his clients. He competes with attorneys but does not pay
anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped
for a good government. These facts can be checked with
records of those municipal courts.
2 GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. Being
employed in the Court of First Instance he would instigate
persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce.
In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town
involving himself and his men. He incite them telling them
not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has
influence over the judges. Those persons being ignorant
would believe him and so would commit crimes. This act
of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he
is using his supposed influences to urge persons to
commit crimes.
3 CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. Information has it
that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI. Even
he has been out practicing in the municipal courts
sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He
receives salary for those absent days. This can be
checked with time record he has submitted and if he has

any application for leave. He may try to cure it by
submitting application for leave but this should not be
allowed as he has already committed crime.
4 VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL
SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is
prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private
practice any profession or business without permission
from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has
not secured that permission because he should not be
allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were
so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil Service Law
and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the
Commissioner of Civil Service to investigate him on this. If
warranted he should be given the corresponding penalty
as dismissal because we believe he deserve it. (Page 2,
Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above
complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of
Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Judge, Court of
First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the
Honorable Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice,
Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding
endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-complaint of
one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement,
which absence has also been noticed and noted on the
right hand corner of the said first indorsement by the Clerk
of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and
without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent
provision of law, but for respect and courtesy to a
Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any
rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause
was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of
counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality, said assistance has also checked the
miscarriage of justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge,
now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbonoriginal of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon
the attorney of record for the defendants in Civil Case No.
24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for

Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar,
which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as
part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred
the said complaint and answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of
First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for investigation, report and
recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report
pertinent parts of which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena
the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a resident of
Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said
Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the
investigation in connection with his complaint against
Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to
investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto
Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of
Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram,
Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that
according to his docket books the respondent appeared as
counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247
in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave
threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same
accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession of
firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that
the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case No. 39 in
the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix
Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on
December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963
and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the
respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant in civil
case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible

entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears
that the respondent had the following entries in his daily
time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and
September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present
also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime
by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared
before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his daily
time records, he made it appear that on December 15,
1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in his office
although according to the testimony of Judge Miguel
Avestruz he was before his Court on December 15, 1962
as well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to
Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared in his
Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it
appear in his daily time record that he was present with an
undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any
plausible explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time
record as shown by the evidence, he had made it appear
that he was present in his office on December 15, 1962,
February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of
fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram attending to a

case entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for
forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of
Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible
entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that he
be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this
irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section
12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as amended, again the
evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as
counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and
Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil Service
Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact
of the Investigator to be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the
documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the judges
before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent,
apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior
permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations,
falsified his time record of service by making it appear therein that he was
present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal
courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which,
furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the
above findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause
was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason
of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry
the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record
of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question.
Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the
above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular
practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.
court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to
practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed
from his position as interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI,
Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial
branch of the government.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 208290
December 11, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE
CAESAR A. CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-GRULLA,
AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION,
COURT OF TAX APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO
MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review the March 26, 20131 and May 15, 20132 Resolutions of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-285, ordering the dismissal of
the case against the private respondents for violation of Section 36023 in
relation to Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff
and Customs Codeof the Philippines, as amended, on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
The antecedentsas culled from the records:
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent

is grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand
recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him
from the service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any
Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza

Vestidas, Jr.(VestidasJr.)were charged before the CTA under an Information
which reads:
That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the

City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza
Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise
respectively, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to
defraud the government, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of
Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to
customs duties,by misdeclaration under Import Entry No. C-181011 and Bill
of Lading No. PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of Customs
(BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing No.
KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690
cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having
customs duties amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One
Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos
(Php100,362) was paid, in violation of the above-captioned law, and to the
prejudice and damage of the Government in the amount of Three Million
Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos
(Php3,240,883).4
In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and VestidasJr.pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the aforementioned charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference
was held on September 5, 2012 followed by thepre-trial on September 13,
2012. Both the prosecution and the defense agreed to adopt the joint
stipulations of facts and issues entered in the course of the preliminary
conference.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented a number of witnesses whoessentially
observed5 the physical examination of Container Van No. KKFU 7195638
conducted6 by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained7 the process of
electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of
the BOC and the alleged misdeclared goods therein.
Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal
Offer of Evidence on December 10, 2012.
On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to
File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled
on January 21, 2013,whichwas grantedby the CTA. Thereafter, they filed
theDemurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012, claimingthat the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
following reasons:
a)The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were
inadmissible incourt;
b)The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were
not presented as evidence; and
c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification of
the two accused as the ones responsible for the supposed misdeclaration.
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the caseagainst Garcia and Vestidas
Jr.in its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to establish
theirguilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the
prosecution showing that the certified true copies of the public documents
offered in evidence against both accused were in fact issued by thelegal
custodians."8 It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whichprovidesthat"when the original of a document is a public record, it
should not generally be removed from the office or place in which it is
kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its contents may be proven using
secondary evidence and such evidence may pertain to the certified true copy
of the original document issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.Hence, the CTA wrotethat the certified true copiesof the public
documents offered in evidence should have been presented in court.
Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed to
comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n
authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original
record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record,
with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody." Considering
that the private documents were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same
became part of public records. Again, the records show that the prosecution
failed to present the certified true copies of thedocuments.
The CTA noted that,in its Opposition to the Demurrer,the prosecution even
admitted that none of their witnesses ever positively identified the accused in
open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were not competently
and properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses.
The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was deniedby the
CTAin its May 15, 2013 Resolution, stressing, among others, that to grant it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.12
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue
Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a
copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of
judgment in the case.
Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of theCTA when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object
evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as
evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively identifythe accused as
responsible forthe misdeclaration of goods.
The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary periodfor the filingthereof under Rule 65. The petition itself
statedthat a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was received by the BOC
two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the
RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013,
when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013
Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case,
considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According toAtty.
Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013
Resolution of the CTA.Thus, it was prayed that the petitionbe given due
course despite its late filing.
This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureis explicit in stating
thatcertiorarishould be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, orderor resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. 13 While
there are recognized exceptions14 to such strict observance, there should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. 15
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the
petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules.Notably, the
records show that the petition was filedonly on August 12, 2013, or almost a
month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this
grave procedural lapse will not only be unfairto the other party, but it will also
sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of
procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not
carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioners failure to
monitor incoming court processes that neededto be addressed by the office.
Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of
an office tasked toeffectively curb smuggling activities which rob the
government of millions of revenue every year.
The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court
to suspectthat the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by
designfrom the start. The failure to present the certified true copies of
documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the
misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and,worse,
the failure to file this petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are
tell-tale signs ofa reluctantand subduedattitude in pursuing the case. This
stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the Courts
vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the
lawyersrepresenting the offices under the executive branchshould be
reminded that theystill remain as officers of the courtfrom whom a high
sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Courtwill not close its eyes
to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the governments goal of
revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar
activities.
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration
with the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a
criminal case and the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Had the
RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would have,
in the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance
with the Rules.
In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this
recourse, the end result would remain the same. While a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must be shown that there was grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process.In this case, a perusal of the challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes

not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its partor denial of
due process.The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner
actively participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of
evidence and opposed the demurrer.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA
have been issued in accordance with the rules on evidence and existing
jurisprudence.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the
Bureau of Customs that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS lawyers should exert every
effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26, 2013
and May 15, 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are AFFIRMED.
The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation
for possible criminal or administrative offenses committed by the Run After
the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group
(RCMG), Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing and handling of the subject
complaint for violations of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the
Secretary of Finance, the Collector of Customs, and the Office of the
Ombudsman for their guidance and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
[A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M.

LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M.
Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust,
and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge of their
duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who
was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman
as provided by law.[1] Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for
the Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646,
27(b),[2]respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result
that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass
(CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates
Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo
Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which
were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other
hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were
in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the
votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant
maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge
that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious
breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the
preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which
the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the
errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake,
oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents

should be held responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the
nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the
election returns was done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which
this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of
the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit.[3] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but
his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated
April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B,
12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against
respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of
R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC
dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a
petition for certiorari filed by complainant,[4] this Court set aside the resolution
and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against
respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of
misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition
on the ground that it was filed late. He contends that a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c)[5] and,
therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not
toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that,
assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate
the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his
motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition
was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has
been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,[6] in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for
reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion
is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a
party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is
made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error
it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation
of the evidence.[7]
On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the
15-day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show
that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner
received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his
motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was
filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office
of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since
copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the
copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999.Hence, it
may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his
receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as
the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the
15-day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on
May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was received by the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only be two days.[8] The delay
may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment
proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare.The sole question for
determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges
as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally
has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.[9] For this reason, laws dealing with double
jeopardy[10] or prescription[11] or with procedure like verification of
pleadings[12] and prejudicial questions[13] have no application to disbarment
proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed
in the interest of justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly
meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even though filed
six,[14] four,[15] and three[16] days late.In this case, the petition is clearly
meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on
the basis of the following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation
of the election returns, because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were
given to them, such had already been accomplished and only needed their
respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of
watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general
public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any
irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in
se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on
the part of respondents.[17]
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings

against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required
to establish liability.[18] As long as the evidence presented by complainant or
that taken judicial notice of by the Court[19] is more convincing and worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, [20] the imposition of
disciplinary sanction is justified.
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive
irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The
only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could
be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the
members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.
This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on
Elections.[21] In rejecting this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted
for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said:
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest
mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The
sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of votes garnered
by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs,
which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the
total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded
the total number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the
May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight
due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. [22]
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in
the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the
subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs [23] but a
systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election
returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in
at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile
exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and,
in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the
Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the
seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly
differ from those indicated in the SoVs. [24]Despite the fact that these
discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts
and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC,
were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves
substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as
true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the

genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied
by the certification which reads:
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . .
[p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these
presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of
____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and
observed by numerous individuals preclude the commission of acts for which
respondents are liable.The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and
CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the
discrepancies therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined
as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official.[25]However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency
on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.[26]
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents
committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By
express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as
lawyers to do no falsehood.
Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private
and in their public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[27] in
which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. It is important
that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled
to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality. .
. .[28]
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were
under greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because
a public office is a public trust.
Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on
the legal profession, in general, and on lawyers in government, in
particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving

no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the
ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this
is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a
long public service.[29] Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the
amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and
Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a
FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-2610
June 16, 1951
CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners,

vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE
LOPEZ, respondents.
D. Ignacio Castillo for petitioners.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan dated September 22, 1947, placing one
Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to
petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same court on August 24,
1939, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to
satisfy the payment of an obligation.
The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano,
Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all
surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother
Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer
in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the power of attorney abovementioned,
Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on
therefore said property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee
the payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of
maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the
mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and
sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served
only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf
and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his
appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf.
After trial, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered
decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300,
with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9,
1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay
the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes
final. The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos
failed to pay the judgment within the period therein specified, on motion of
the plaintiff, the court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged
properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and the
provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The
sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947,
Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a
motion praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This motion was
granted on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners did not heed the order,
they were summoned by the court to explain why they should no be
punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession,
to which they answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of
an action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was
illegal because petitioners were not properly served with summons as
defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners
having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and
threatened to punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to
obey the order. Hence this petition for certiorari.
The issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision
rendered by the lower court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668,
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the
properties in question; and (2) to the validity of the order of the court dated
September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place
respondent Felipa Lopez in possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in

possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgagee.
As regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the
petitioners can not be sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a
collateral attack to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has
become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its
face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought
principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717).
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served
with summons in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service
was cured when the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the
complaint thru their attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in
their behalf in all stages of the case. Since an Attorney Maiquez who
appeared for the petitioners must be presumed to have been authorized by
them when he appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case. The
security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor
to overcome such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is
specially so when, as in the instant case, it is only after the lapse of more
than nine (9) years after the judgment has been rendered that petitioners
thought of challenging the jurisdiction of the court.
The second issue raised by the petitioners is not also taken, for the simple
reason that the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings
is not an execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the
court can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the
statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in
the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). This is the correct
interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. This is a case where the judgment involved is already final
executed, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has
transferred them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their
possession. In the exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the
litigation and save multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why
the court cannot issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser in
the possession of the property.
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a
foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the
purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain
possession. The power of the court to issue a process and place the
purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to
enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action and vexatious
litigation (Rovero de Ortega vs. Natividad, 71 Phil., 340).
It has also been held:
In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto
intervenes and the debtor continues in possession of the real
property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to
put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court)
provides that the confirmation of the sale by judicial decree
operates to divest all the parties to the action of their respective
rights and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal
provision, it is the duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that
the purchaser may be placed in the possession of the property
which he purchased at the public auction sale and become his by
virtue of the final decree confirming the sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61
Phil., 201). Emphasis supplied.
The following American authorities may also be involved in support of the
order of the lower court:
A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in action for the
foreclosure of the mortgage, and having decreed a sale of the
premises, RETAINS its jurisdiction and has authority to put the
purchaser in possession of the property, without compelling him to
resort to an action of law. (27 Cyc., 1937; 42 C. J., 271 and cases
there cited.) (Bold types and emphasis supplied).
. . . It does not appear to consist with sound principle that the court
which has exclusive authority to foreclosure the equity of
redemption of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in interest
before it, and decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not
be able even to put the purchaser into possession against one of
the very parties to the suit, and who is bound by the decree. When
the court has obtained jurisdiction of a case, and has investigated
and decided upon the merits, it is not sufficient for the ends of
justice merely to declare the right without affording the remedy. If it
was to be understood that after a decree and sale mortgaged
premises, the mortgagor, or other party to the suit, or perhaps,
those who have been let into possession by the

mortgagor, pendente lite, could withhold the possession in defiance
of the authority of this court, and compel the purchaser to resort to
a court of law, I apprehend that the delay and expense and
inconvenience of such a course of proceeding would greatly impair
the value and diminish the results of sales under a decree. (See
Notes to Wilson v. Polk, 51 Am. D., 151). (Kershew v. Thompson, 4
Johns, Ch., 609).
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.
TUASON, J., concurring and dissenting:

I am in complete agreement with the majority decision on the two
propositions formulated in the opening paragraph, namely; (1) that the
foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged property was in
accordance with law, and (2) that placing Felipa Lopez in Possession of the
said property was a natural corollary of the first. But the appealed order also
threatens the petitioners with punishment for contempt if they refuse to
vacate the lands. This, to me the most important feature of the order, has
been ignored or brushed aside in the decision. By its sweeping denial of the
petition, this Court sanctions the impending punishment. To this extent, I
dissent.
In the case of U.S. vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil., 183, the Court said:
A writ of execution to sheriff directing him to place a plaintiff in
possession of property held by a defendant and failure or refusal on
the part of the defendant to surrender the property does not
constitute contempt or disobedience to an agent of authority as
defined in art. 252, P.C. It is the duty of the sheriff to place the
proper party in possession. Whether a refusal to deliver the
property to the sheriff on demand would constitute contempt,
quaere.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A person can not be punished because of his alleged disobedience

of an order of court not addressed to him. A writ of execution issued
by a justice of the peace to the sheriff directing the latter to place
the plaintiff in possession of property held by the defendant, is not
an order addressed to the defendant. Such an order must been
addressed to an officer of the court and not to either the plaintiff or
the defendant. The party in possession may have been unwilling to
deliver the land, but such unwillingness does not constitute an act
of disobedience to order of an agent of authorities, as defined by
art. 252, P.C. The disobedience contemplated by said article
consists in the failure or refusal to obey a direct judicial order and
not an order which is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties.
In the case at bar, while the order does direct that the party in
possession shall surrender the property to the proper person, it
does not and could not order his to do so to do. Instead of
executing the judgment himself, the sheriff merely ordered the
defendant to deliver the property. A sheriff has no power to require
any person to perform an act which he himself is bound to perform.
Under such circumstances, disobedience on the part of the person
to whom the sheriff gave such an order does not constitute a crime.
Act 3170, subsequently passed, added a new paragraph to Section 232 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, reading as follows:
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for
contempt:
xxx
xxx
xxx
5. The person defeated in civil action concerning the ownership or

possession of real estate who, after having been evicted by the
sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance with the
judgment rendered, shall enter or attempt to enter upon the same
for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession or
who shall in any manner disturb possession by the person whom
the sheriff placed in possession of said realty.
But the new enactment has not given courts a new power to punish the
recalcitrant loser for contempt before he is evicted. It is only when he
reenters or attempts to reenter after he is punishment. In the case at bar, the
purchaser of the mortgaged property has never been placed in possession
thereof by the sheriff, much less have the present occupants been evicted
therefrom.
The validity of the lower court's order that is the subject of the present
proceeding is not attacked on the ground of lack of authority of the court to
punish for contempt for their refusal to quit lands; but this Court's decision in
keeping silent on this vital point could or would, be construed as a green
light signal for the respondent Judge to proceed with the enforcement of his
said order with all it's intended ramifications.
I do not believe that the petitioners' action is punishable as for contempt on
another ground. Although they were included as parties defendants in the
foreclosure suit, yet the dispositive part of the judgment imposes no duty on
them either to pay the mortgaged debt or to make delivery of the mortgaged
property. As was said in U.S. vs. Ramayrat, supra, "the disobedience
contemplated by Art. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure consist in the failure
or refusal to obey a direct judicial order and not an order which is merely
declaratory of the rights of the parties."
EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 98. July 13, 1953.]
memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the

profession of lawyer, because an agent can not do it; Collecting
rents from the more than one hundred defendants issuing receipts
and signing them as attorney of the plaintiff is to practice the
profession.
2. ID .; ID .; - The fact that the lawyer had not put in his motion
for execution that acted as a lawyer but as agent and employee of
the applicant does not alter the nature of his services which are
certainly professional services of lawyer. Concealing that he acted
as a lawyer and pretending to be only an agent, his situation is
aggravated; It is more guilty that, covered with a mask, he fires at
his enemy than he who does it with his face uncovered and in
public view.
3. ID .; ATTORNEY SUSPENDED THAT ENJOY THE PROFESSION. The suspended lawyer practicing the profession during the period
of suspension must be completely disqualified to practice such
profession in the Philippines with the consequent cancellation of
the certificate issued in his favor as such lawyer.
DECISION
In Case of FELIX Attorney P. David.

D. Felix P. David in his own representation.
Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and
Attorney General, Mr. Esmeraldo Umali, on behalf of the
Government.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; DEFINED THE TERM "EXERCISE THE
PROFESSION." - To practice the profession of lawyer is to practice
the acts of that profession. The preparation and lodging of motions
requesting the execution of a sentence, the demolition of the
defendants' houses in the case asking the court to order the sheriff
to deliver the amounts collected in the case are acts that form part
of the exercise of the profession of advocacy; The filing and
PAUL M. :
In administrative case No. 35, the defendant was suspended for
malpractice in the exercise of his profession of lawyer for a period
of five years from November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this
suspension in his written report filed on 17 Of March 1951; yet he
continued exercising the profession within the period of the
suspension, November 9, 1949 November 8, 1954.
On February 28, 1950 the Respondent submitted a claim (Exhibit
J) in the cause CA GR No. 4792 -R, Tan Tek Sy v. Maliwanag, not
as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy, but with the following words: "for and
on behalf of Tan Tek Sy"; On January 26, 1951, it was sent by
certified mail notification of the decision in said case (Exhibit G),
confirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; on March
13, 1951 I filed a motion in this court - returned and the record -
calling the issuance of a warrant of execution, which motion is

signed as follows: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph
September 25, 1950, I submitted to the Court of Appeal a

memorandum in reply to that of the appellant, signed as is the
case.
"TEK SO IF
" By (Sgd.) FELIX DAVID P.,
"c / o Atty. Felix P. David,
" Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,
"Saw Mill & Construction Philippines,
" Manila "
the present resorted therefore written not as often practicing
lawyers do, but as an agent Sy Tan Tek.
in the civil case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, the respondent
filed a brief in September 25 1950, calling for an order to demolish
the defendants' homes (Exhibit A), and on October 10, 1950, I
filed a motion asking that the Sheriff of Manila be authorized to
pay "the amount or such other amount as may be collected by the
Sheriff from time to time "(Exhibit B), on November 13, 1950 filed
another motion (Exhibit C) requesting another demolition order,
signing the three briefs, Exhibits A, B and C, as plaintiff's
attorney; Exhibits B to B-34 show that he was receiving payments
of amounts from several defendants as plaintiff's attorney; the
oldest receipt is dated February 12, 1950 and the last on
December 7, 1950.
In defense resorted appeared as attorney says Tan Tek Sy from
the Municipal Court of Manila in 1948; That when he was
suspended he had advised his client to seek another lawyer to
prepare the case to be presented to the Court of Appeal; That
when there were no more than two or three days and his client
could not present it, he himself wrote it and presented it at the
request of his client; That he prepared the plea with the intention
of his client signing it, but since he was in Dagupan and could not
sign it and there was only one day left, then he signed it as
follows: "Felix P. David, For and on behalf of the appellee. " On
"In order," says the respondent, "to show that I did not have the
intention to disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did
not have the knowledge of Tan Tek and even identified myself as
the attorney for the appellee but in good faith, I signed for and on
behalf of the appellee without designating that I am practicing the
attorney-at-law. " cralaw virtua1aw library
do not think this justified the performance of the resorted to
submit the claim and its memorandum on behalf of his client being
suspended in the exercise of their profession; Knowing that he was
suspended, should not have presented them neither as an agent
nor as a lawyer; Was obliged not to continue serving his client
before the Court of Appeal; Had to warn his client that he was
suspended in the exercise of his profession of lawyer and should
advise him to employ another in his place if he wanted to have
representation; Should not contravene the express order of this
Court; He should have known that a non-practicing lawyer can not
be heard by a litigant before a court except before a court of
law. In presenting his plea and memorandum with the words "For
and on behalf of the Appellee" he infringed Article 31 of Rule 127
which provides that "In other courts, a party may conduct its own
litigation either personally or with the assistance of An attorney,
and his appearance shall be made personally or through a duly
authorized member of the Forum. " An agent or a member of the
suspended Forum can not appear for a litigant.
In order to explain the motions in case No. 3655, Malayan Saw
Mill, Inc. v. Tolentino, the respondent states that I am acting in
good faith, that I present them not to disobey the decision of this
Court but to be able to collect its fees. As an officer of the Forum,
the lawyer must comply with the decision of this Court over any
other consideration. We believe that it is not a work of good faith
that, putting its interest in the collection of its fees, exercises the
profession knowing that it was forbidden to exercise it. Even if he
had not filed his motions on exhibits A, B and C and issued
receipts B to B-34 for amounts collected from the defendants, the
defendant could have collected his fees, either claiming directly
from his client, already claiming them according to the article Rule
33 127.
the appeal says that if appeared before March 2, 1950 in case No.
7679 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Juan de la Torre
against Philippine Trust Co., was by request of his brother John's
Torre and also he did not charge fees for his appearance because
he knew that he was suspended in the exercise of the
profession. Even if this appearance were not taken into account,
the respondent can not be saved because he / she has lent the
various professional services already reported.
To practice the profession of lawyer is to practice the acts of that
profession. The preparation and filing of motions requesting the
execution of the sentence, the demolition of the defendants'
houses, asking the court to order the Sheriff to deliver the
amounts collected, are acts that are part of the practice of the
profession of advocacy; The filing and memorandum before the
Court of Appeal is to practice the profession of lawyer, because an
agent can not do it; Collecting rents from the 109 defendants by
issuing 35 receipts and signing them as attorney for the plaintiff, is
to practice the profession.
The fact that he had not put in motion his order to execute
Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, who acted as a lawyer
but as agent and employee of the Philippines Sawmill and
Construction, does not alter the nature of his services which are
certainly Professional lawyer services; But concealing that he acted
as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy and pretending to be only an agent, his
situation is aggravated: it is more guilty that, covered with a
mask, he shoots his enemy than he who does it with his face
uncovered and in plain sight Of the public; Hence the criminal law
imposes more severe penalty in the first case.
The evidence of record shows that the Respondent Felix P. David
practiced as a lawyer intentionally disobeying the decision of the
Court of September 30, 1949, Administrative Case No. 35.
Therefore, it disables to practice the profession of lawyer In the
Philippines, the certificate issued in your favor to exercise the
profession is declared canceled and you are ordered to return it to
the Clerk of this Court.
Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Angelo

Bautista and Labrador, MM., Are satisfied.

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G.R. No.

L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated

I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana,

De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003]

IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H.

The Case and the Facts

A Complaint[1] dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda

Evaluation and Recommendation of the

engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with prior

The Courts Ruling

known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.[29] Since this remedy is granted

However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary

Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule

Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for

interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a

Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or

However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared

This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do

The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his

- versus JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND

In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his

This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus

Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section

prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law

concerns before us.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an

The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings

from commencement to the termination of the litigation.[14]Considering that a party

not know how to establish his innocence.

exercising his right to represent himself.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue

should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed

is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No.

01-0410 as a party litigant.

G.R. No. L-1582

TEOFILO PAAR, petitioner,

October 10, 1947

Section 3 and 4 Rule 112 are as follows:

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961,

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated

representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those