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"Apparitional" redirects here. For the 2013 film, see Apparitional (film).
In parapsychology, an apparitional experience is an anomalous, quasi-perceptual
experience. It is characterized by the apparent perception of either a living be
ing or an inanimate object without there being any material stimulus for such a
perception. The person experiencing the apparition is awake, excluding dream vis
ions from consideration.
In scientific or academic discussion, the term "apparitional experience" is to b
e preferred to the term "ghost" in respect of the following points:
The term ghost implies that some element of the human being survives death and,
at least under certain circumstances, can make itself perceptible to living huma
n beings. There are other competing explanations of apparitional experiences.
Firsthand accounts of apparitional experiences differ in many respects from thei
r fictional counterparts in literary or traditional ghost stories and films (see
below).
The content of apparitional experiences includes living beings, both human and a
nimal, and even inanimate objects.
History of the concept[edit]
Attempts to apply modern scientific or investigative standards to the study of a
pparitional experiences began with the work of Edmund Gurney, Frederic W. H. Mye
rs and Frank Podmore,[2] who were leading figures in the early years of the Soci
ety for Psychical Research (founded in 1882). Their motive, as with most of the
early work of the Society,[3] was to provide evidence for human survival after d
eath. For this reason they had a particular interest in what are known as crisis
cases . These are cases in which a person has a quasi-perceptual experience of som
eone at a distance at the time of that person s death or other crisis. If the temp
oral coincidence of the crisis and the distant apparitional experience cannot be
explained by any conventional means, then the presumption is made that some as
yet unknown form of communication, such as telepathy (a term coined by Myers[4])
has taken place.
While the extent to which the work of Gurney and his colleagues succeeded in pro
viding evidence for either telepathy or survival of death is still controversial
, the large collection of firsthand written accounts which resulted from their p
ainstaking methods still constitutes a body of valuable data concerning the phen
omenology of hallucinations in the sane.
A notable later discussion of apparitional experiences was that of G. N. M. Tyrr
ell,[5] also a leading member of the Society for Psychical Research of his day.
Tyrrell accepted the hallucinatory character of the experience, pointing out tha
t it is virtually unknown for firsthand accounts to claim that apparitional figu
res leave any of the normal physical effects, such as footprints in snow, that o
ne would expect of a real person.[6] However, Tyrrell develops the idea that the
apparition may be a way for the unconscious part of the mind to bring to consci
ousness information that has been paranormally acquired
in crisis cases, for exa
mple. He introduces an evocative metaphor of a mental stage-carpenter ,[7] behind t
he scenes in the unconscious part of the mind, and constructing the quasi-percep
tual experience that eventually appears on the stage of consciousness, so that i
t embodies paranormal information in a symbolic way, a person drowning at a dist
ance appearing soaked in water, for example.
The study and discussion of apparitions developed in a different direction in th
e 1970s, with the work of Celia Green and Charles McCreery.[8] They were not pri
marily interested in the question of whether apparitions could shed any light on
the existence or otherwise of telepathy, or in the survival question; instead t
hey were concerned to analyse a large number of cases with a view to providing a
ight say that the subject is aware of sense-data or images which happen not to c
orrespond to, or represent, the external world in the normal way.
The philosophical implications of hallucinatory experiences in the sane are disc
ussed by McCreery.[25] He argues that they provide empirical support for the the
ory of representationalism rather than direct realism.
See also[edit]