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G.R.No.150157

THIRDDIVISION

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and


G.R.No.150157
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS

LINES,INC.,
Present:
Petitioners,
YNARESSANTIAGO,J

Chairperson,

AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,

CALLEJO,SR.,and
versus
CHICONAZARIO,JJ.

Promulgated:

MODESTOCALAUNAN,
January25,2007
Respondent.
xx

DECISION

CHICONAZARIO,J.:

[1]
AssailedbeforeUsisthedecision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 55909
[2]
whichaffirmedintotothedecision oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofDagupanCity,Branch
42,inCivilCaseNo.D10086,findingpetitionersMauricioManliclicandPhilippineRabbitBus
Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto
Calaunan.

Thefactualantecedentsareasfollows:

Thevehiclesinvolvedinthiscaseare:(1)PhilippineRabbitBusNo.353withplatenumber
CVD478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic and (2)
ownertypejeepwithplatenumberPER290,ownedbyrespondentModestoCalaunananddriven
byMarceloMendoza.

At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
togetherwithMarceloMendoza,wasonhiswaytoManilafromPangasinanonboardhisowner
typejeep.ThePhilippineRabbitBuswaslikewiseboundforManilafromConcepcion,Tarlac.At
approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan,thetwovehiclescollided.ThefrontrightsideofthePhilippineRabbitBushittherear
leftsideofthejeepcausingthelattertomovetotheshoulderontherightandthenfallonaditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8
metersfrompointofcollision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial
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MedicalCenter.

Byreasonofsuchcollision,acriminalcasewasfiledbeforetheRTCofMalolos,Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684M89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondentfiledacomplaintfordamagesagainstpetitionersManliclicandPRBLIbeforetheRTC
ofDagupanCity,docketedasCivilCaseNo.D10086.Thecriminalcasewastriedaheadofthe
civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
MendozaandFernandoRamos.

Inthecivilcase(nowbeforethisCourt),thepartiesadmittedthefollowing:

1.Thepartiesagreedonthecapacityofthepartiestosueandbesuedaswellasthevenue
andtheidentitiesofthevehiclesinvolved

2.Theidentityofthedriversandthefactthattheyaredulylicensed

3.Thedateandplaceofthevehicularcollision

4.TheextentoftheinjuriessufferedbyplaintiffModestoCalaunanandtheexistenceofthe
medicalcertificate

5.Thatbothvehiclesweregoingtowardsthesouththeprivatejeepbeingaheadofthebus

6.Thattheweatherwasfairandtheroadwaswellpavedandstraight,althoughtherewasa
[3]
ditchontherightsidewherethejeepfellinto.

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
[4]
stenographicnotes(TSNs) of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
FernandoRamosinthecriminalcasebereceivedinevidenceinthecivilcaseinasmuchasthese
witnessesarenotavailabletotestifyinthecivilcase.

Francisco Tuliao testified that his brotherinlaw, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad
sometimeinNovember,1989andhasnotreturnedsincethen.RogelioRamostookthestandand
saidthathisbrother,FernandoRamos,leftforAmman,Jordan,towork.RosaliaMendozatestified
that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she
thoughtherhusbandwenttohishometowninPanique,Tarlac,whenhedidnotreturnafterone
month.Shewenttoherhusbandshometowntolookforhimbutshewasinformedthathedidnot
gothere.

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the
court where Criminal Case No. 684M89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of
[5]
[6]
[7]
respondentCalaunan, MarceloMendoza andFernandoRamos insaidcase,togetherwith
otherdocumentaryevidencemarkedtherein.InsteadoftheBranchClerkofCourt,itwasEnrique
SantosGuevara,CourtInterpreter,whoappearedbeforethecourtandidentifiedtheTSNsofthe
[8]
three aforenamed witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought. Counsel for
respondentwantedtomarkotherTSNsanddocumentsfromthesaidcriminalcasetobeadopted
intheinstantcase,butsincethesamewerenotbroughttothetrialcourt,counselforpetitioners
compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttalevidence.
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For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The
[9]
TSN of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No.
684M89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was
alreadydead.

[10]
Respondentfurthermarked,amongotherdocuments,asrebuttalevidence,theTSNs
of
the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No.
684M89.

Thedisagreementarisesfromthequestion:Whoistobeheldliableforthecollision?

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is
resoluteinsayingitwastheformerwhocausedthesmashup.

Theversionsofthepartiesaresummarizedbythetrialcourtasfollows:

The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took
place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70
kilometersperhourontheslowlaneoftheexpresswaywhenthePhilippineRabbitBusovertook
thejeepandintheprocessofovertakingthejeep,thePhilippineRabbitBushittherearofthejeep
ontheleftside.AtthetimethePhilippineRabbitBushitthejeep,itwasabouttoovertakethejeep.
Inotherwords,thePhilippineRabbitBuswasstillatthebackofthejeepwhenthejeepwashit.
FernandoRamoscorroboratedthetestimonyoftheplaintiffandMarceloMendoza.Hesaidthathe
wasonanotherjeepfollowingthePhilippineRabbitBusandthejeepofplaintiffwhentheincident
tookplace.He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was
followedbythePhilippineRabbitBuswhichwasrunningveryfast.Thebusalsoovertookthejeep
inwhichhewasriding.Afterthat,heheardaloudsound.Hesawthejeepoftheplaintiffswerved
totherightonagrassyportionoftheroad.ThePhilippineRabbitBusstoppedandtheyovertook
the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was
bumpedbythePhilippineRabbitbusfrombehind.

BothMauricioManliclicandhisdriver,OscarBuanadmittedthatthePhilippineRabbitBus
bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was
abouttogototheleftlanetoovertakethejeep,thelatterjeepswervedtotheleftbecauseitwasto
overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the
mannerhowthecollisiontookplacewascorrect,wouldbedeterminativeofwhobetweenthetwo
[11]
driverswasnegligentintheoperationoftheirrespectivevehicles.]

PetitionerPRBLImaintainedthatitobservedandexercisedthediligenceofagoodfatherof
afamilyintheselectionandsupervisionofitsemployee,specificallypetitionerManliclic.

On22July1996,thetrialcourtrendereditsdecisioninfavorofrespondentCalaunanand
againstpetitionersManliclicandPRBLI.Thedispositiveportionofitsdecisionreads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as
actualdamagesforthetowingaswellastherepairandthematerialsusedfortherepairofthejeep
in question P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and

P15,000.00asattorneysfees,includingappearancefeesofthelawyer.In addition, the defendants


[12]
arealsotopaycosts.

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[13]
PetitionersappealedthedecisionviaNoticeofAppealtotheCourtofAppeals.

Inadecisiondated28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
[14]
decisionofthetrialcourt,affirmeditinallrespects.

PetitionersarenowbeforeusbywayofpetitionforreviewassailingthedecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.Theyassignaserrorsthefollowing:

I
THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDONAQUESTIONOFLAWINAFFIRMINGTHETRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER
DOCUMENTSPRESENTEDINTHECRIMINALCASE.

II

THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDONAQUESTIONOFLAWINAFFIRMINGTHETRIAL
COURTSRELIANCEONTHEVERSIONOFTHERESPONDENTONHOWTHEACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLYOCCURRED.

III

THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDONAQUESTIONOFLAWINAFFIRMINGTHETRIAL
COURTSUNFAIRDISREGARDOFHEREINPETITIONERPRBLsDEFENSEOFEXERCISE
OFDUEDILIGENCEINTHESELECTIONANDSUPERVISIONOFITSEMPLOYEES.

IV

THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDONAQUESTIONOFLAWINAFFIRMINGTHETRIAL
COURTSQUESTIONABLEAWARDOFDAMAGESANDATTORNEYSFEE.

WiththepassingawayofrespondentCalaunanduringthependencyofthisappealwiththisCourt,
we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate
Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan,
[15]
MarkoCalaunanandLiwaywayCalaunan.

[16]
IntheirReplytorespondentsComment,petitionersinformedthisCourtofaDecision
of
[17]
the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge
of Reckless Imprudence
ResultinginDamagetoPropertywithPhysicalInjuriesattachingtheretoaphotocopythereof.

On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
[18]
[19]
[20]
respondentCalaunan,
MarceloMendoza
andFernandoRamos
shouldnotbeadmitted
inevidenceforfailureofrespondenttocomplywiththerequisitesofSection47,Rule130ofthe
RulesofCourt.

[21]
For Section 47, Rule 130
to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
witnessisdeadorunabletotestify(b)histestimonyordepositionwasgiveninaformercaseor
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same
interests (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on
differentcausesofaction(d)theissuetestifiedtobythewitnessintheformertrialisthesame
issueinvolvedinthepresentcaseand(e)theadversepartyhadanopportunitytocrossexamine
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[22]
thewitnessintheformercase.

Admittedly,respondentfailedtoshowtheconcurrenceofalltherequisitessetforthbythe
Rulesforatestimonygiveninaformercaseorproceedingtobeadmissibleasanexceptiontothe
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684M89, had no
opportunity to crossexamine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed
exclusivelyagainstpetitionerManliclic,petitionerPRBLIsemployee.Thecasesdealingwiththe
subsidiaryliabilityofemployersuniformlydeclarethat,strictlyspeaking,theyarenotpartiesto
[23]
thecriminalcasesinstitutedagainsttheiremployees.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimoniesofthethreewitnessesarestilladmissibleonthegroundthatpetitionerPRBLIfailedto
objectontheiradmissibility.

It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
righttoobjectismerelyaprivilegewhichthepartymaywaive.Thus, a failure to except to the
evidencebecauseitdoesnotconformtothestatuteisawaiveroftheprovisionsofthelaw.Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on
account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to
[24]
provethefactsthereinasserted.
Hearsayevidencealonemaybeinsufficienttoestablishafact
inasuitbut,whennoobjectionismadethereto,itis,likeanyotherevidence,tobeconsideredand
[25]
giventheimportanceitdeserves.

Inthecaseatbar,petitionerPRBLIdidnotobjecttotheTSNscontainingthetestimoniesof
respondentCalaunan,MarceloMendozaandFernandoRamosinthecriminalcasewhenthesame
wereofferedinevidenceinthetrialcourt.Infact,theTSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and
[26]
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.
Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in
evidencetheTSNcontainingthetestimonyofDonatoGanibaninthecriminalcase.If petitioner
PRBLIarguesthattheTSNsofthetestimoniesofplaintiffswitnessesinthecriminalcaseshould
not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
whichwasgiveninthecriminalcase?ItappearsthatpetitionerPRBLIwantstohaveitscakeand
eatittoo.ItcannotarguethattheTSNsofthetestimoniesofthewitnessesoftheadversepartyin
thecriminalcaseshouldnotbeadmittedandatthesametimeinsistthattheTSNofthetestimony
ofthewitnessfortheaccusedbeadmittedinitsfavor.Todisallowadmissioninevidenceofthe
TSNsofthetestimoniesofCalaunan,MarceloMendozaandFernandoRamosinthecriminalcase
andtoadmittheTSNofthetestimonyofGanibanwouldbeunfair.

WedonotsubscribetopetitionerPRBLIsargumentthatitwillbedenieddueprocesswhen
theTSNsofthetestimoniesofCalaunan,MarceloMendozaandFernandoRamosinthecriminal
casearetobeadmittedinthecivilcase.ItistoolateforpetitionerPRBLItoraisedenialofdue
processinrelationtoSection47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,asagroundforobjectingtothe
admissibilityoftheTSNs.Forfailuretoobjectatthepropertime,itwaiveditsrighttoobjectthat
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theTSNsdidnotcomplywithSection47.

[27]
InMangiov.CourtofAppeals,
thisCourt,throughAssociateJusticeReynatoS.Puno,
[28]
admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein
petitionersassertionthathewouldbedenieddueprocess.InadmittingtheTSN,theCourtruled
thattheraisingofdenialofdueprocessinrelationtoSection47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,
asagroundforobjectingtotheadmissibilityoftheTSNwasbelatedlydone.Insodoing,therein
petitionerwaivedhisrighttoobjectbasedonsaidground.

Petitionerscontendthatthedocumentsinthecriminalcaseshouldnothavebeenadmitted
intheinstantcivilcasebecauseSection47ofRule130refersonlytotestimonyordeposition.We
find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and
deposition,itdoesnotmeanthatdocumentsfromaformercaseorproceedingcannotbeadmitted.
Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
admitted.Accordingly,theyshallbegiventhesameweightasthattowhichthetestimonymaybe
[29]
entitled.

Onthesecondassignederror,petitionerscontendthattheversionofpetitionerManliclicas
to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their
contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the
chargeofRecklessImprudenceResultinginDamagetoPropertywithPhysicalInjuries.

ToberesolvedbytheCourtistheeffectofpetitionerManliclicsacquittalinthecivilcase.

Fromthecomplaint,itcanbegatheredthatthecivilcasefordamageswasonearisingfrom,
[30]
or based on, quasidelict.
Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless
imprudenceincausingthecollision,whilepetitionerPRBLIwassuedforitsfailuretoexercisethe
diligenceofagoodfatherintheselectionandsupervisionofitsemployees,particularlypetitioner
Manliclic.Theallegationsread:

4.ThatsometimeonJuly12,1988ataround6:20A.M.plaintiffwasonboardtheabove
describedmotorvehicletravellingatamoderatespeedalongtheNorthLuzonExpresswayheading
SouthtowardsManilatogetherwithMARCELOMENDOZA,whowasthendrivingthesame

5.Thatapproximatelyatkilometer40oftheNorthLuzonExpressWay,theabovedescribed
motorvehiclewassuddenlybumpedfrombehindbyaPhilippineRabbitBuswithBodyNo.353
andwithplateNo.CVD478thenbeingdrivenbyoneMauricioManliclicofSanJose,Concepcion,
Tarlac,whowasthentravellingrecklesslyataveryfastspeedandhadapparentlylostcontrolofhis
vehicle

6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the abovedescribed motor vehicle was
forcedofftheNorthLuzonExpressWaytowardstherightsidewhereitfellonitsdriverssideona
ditch, and that as a consequence, the abovedescribed motor vehicle which maybe valued at
EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be
presentedduringthepretrialandtrialofthiscase

7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which
compoundedplaintiffsfrailphysicalconditionandrequiredhishospitalizationfromJuly12,1988
up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex A and
madeanintegralparthereof

8.Thatthevehicularcollisionresultinginthetotalwreckageoftheabovedescribedmotor
vehicleaswellasbodily(sic)sustainedbyplaintiff,wassolelyduetotherecklessimprudenceof
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vehicleaswellasbodily(sic)sustainedbyplaintiff,wassolelyduetotherecklessimprudenceof
the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast
speedwithoutdueregardorobservanceofexistingtrafficrulesandregulations

9.ThatdefendantPhilippineRabbitBusLineCorporationfailedtoexercisethediligenceof
[31]
agoodfatherof(sic)familyintheselectionandsupervisionofitsdriversxxx

CanManliclicstillbeheldliableforthecollisionandbefoundnegligentnotwithstanding
thedeclarationoftheCourtofAppealsthattherewasanabsenceofnegligenceonhispart?

InexoneratingpetitionerManliclicinthecriminalcase,theCourtofAppealssaid:

To the following findings of the court aquo, to wit: that accusedappellant was negligent
whenthebushewasdrivingbumpedthejeepfrombehindthattheproximatecauseoftheaccident
washishavingdriventhebusatagreatspeedwhilecloselyfollowingthejeepxxx

Wedonotagree.

TheswervingofCalaunansjeepwhenittriedtoovertakethevehicleinfrontofitwasbeyondthe
controlofaccusedappellant.

xxxx

Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accusedappellant cannot be held liable for


RecklessImprudenceResultinginDamagetoPropertywithPhysicalInjuriesasdefinedinArticle
[32]
365oftheRevisedPenalCode.

FromtheforegoingdeclarationoftheCourtofAppeals,itappearsthatpetitionerManliclic
was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
whichreads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinctionproceedsfromadeclarationinafinaljudgmentthatthefactfromwhichthecivilmight
arisedidnotexist.

Inspiteofsaidruling,petitionerManlicliccanstillbeheldliableforthemishap.Theafore
quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil
actionarisingfromquasidelictorculpaaquiliana.Theextinctionofcivilliabilityreferredtoin
Par.(e)ofSection3,Rule111[nowSection2(b)ofRule111],refersexclusivelytocivilliability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
consideredasaquasidelictonlyandnotasacrimeisnotextinguishedevenbyadeclarationin
thecriminalcasethatthecriminalactchargedhasnothappenedorhasnotbeencommittedbythe
[33]
accused.

AquasidelictorculpaaquilianaisaseparatelegalinstitutionundertheCivilCodewitha
substantivityallitsown,andindividualitythatisentirelyapartandindependentfromadelictor
crimeadistinctionexistsbetweenthecivilliabilityarisingfromacrimeandtheresponsibilityfor
quasidelictsorculpaextracontractual.Thesamenegligencecausingdamagesmayproducecivil
liabilityarisingfromacrimeunderthePenalCode,orcreateanactionforquasidelictsorculpa
[34]
extracontractualundertheCivilCode.
Itisnowsettledthatacquittaloftheaccused,evenif
basedonafindingthatheisnotguilty,doesnotcarrywithittheextinctionofthecivilliability
[35]
basedonquasidelict.
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Inotherwords,ifanaccusedisacquittedbasedonreasonabledoubtonhisguilt,hiscivil
liabilityarisingfromthecrimemaybeprovedbypreponderanceofevidenceonly.However,ifan
accusedisacquittedonthebasisthathewasnottheauthoroftheactoromissioncomplainedof
(orthatthereisdeclarationinafinaljudgmentthatthefactfromwhichthecivilmightarisedid
notexist),saidacquittalclosesthedoortocivilliabilitybasedonthecrimeorexdelicto. In this
second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delictoisnotpossible.Inthiscase,acivilaction,ifany,maybeinstitutedongroundsotherthan
thedelictcomplainedof.

As regards civil liability arising from quasidelict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguishedbyanacquittal,whetheritbeongroundofreasonabledoubtorthataccusedwasnot
theauthoroftheactoromissioncomplainedof(orthatthereisdeclarationinafinaljudgmentthat
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from
faultornegligenceinaquasidelictisentirelyseparateanddistinctfromthecivilliabilityarising
[36]
from negligence under the Penal Code.
An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
[37]
entirelyirrelevantinthecivilcase
basedonquasidelictorculpaaquiliana.

Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to
disregard that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of
overtakingrespondentsjeep,thelatter,withoutwarning,suddenlyswervedtotheleft(fast)lanein
ordertoovertakeanotherjeepaheadofit,thuscausingthecollision.

Asageneralrule,questionsoffactmaynotberaisedinapetitionforreview.Thefactual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
[38]
conclusiveontheSupremeCourt.
Notbeingatrieroffacts,thisCourtwillnotallowareview
thereofunless:

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture (2) the
inferencemadeismanifestly mistaken (3) there is grave abuse of discretion(4)thejudgmentis
based on a misapprehension of facts (5) the findings of fact are conflicting (6) the Court of
Appealswentbeyondtheissuesofthecaseanditsfindingsarecontrarytotheadmissionsofboth
appellantandappellees(7)thefindingsoffactoftheCourtofAppealsarecontrarytothoseofthe
trialcourt(8)saidfindingsoffactareconclusionswithoutcitationofspecificevidenceonwhich
they are based (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefsarenotdisputedbytherespondentsand(10)thefindingsoffactoftheCourtofAppealsare
[39]
premisedonthesupposedabsenceofevidenceandcontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord.

Aftergoingovertheevidenceonrecord,wedonotfindanyoftheexceptionsthatwould
warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as
affirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,thatitwaspetitionerManliclicwhowasnegligentindrivingthe
PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the
respondent,thetrialcourthasthissay:

x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct,
would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respectivevehicle.

Inthisregard,itshouldbenotedthatinthestatementofMauricioManliclic(Exh.15)given
tothePhilippineRabbitInvestigatorCVCabadingnomentionwasmadebyhimaboutthefactthat
thedriverofthejeepwasovertakinganotherjeepwhenthecollisiontookplace.Theallegationthat
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thedriverofthejeepwasovertakinganotherjeepwhenthecollisiontookplace.Theallegationthat
another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim.
Case No. 684M89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court.
Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could
explainwhyheshouldnotbeheldresponsiblefortheincident.Hisattempttoveerawayfromthe
truthwasalsoapparentwhenitwouldbeconsideredthatinhisstatementgiventothePhilippine
RabbitInvestigatorCVCabading(Exh.15),heallegedthatthePhilippineRabbitBusbumpedthe
jeepofCalaunanwhilethePhilippineRabbitBuswasbehindthesaidjeep.Inhistestimonybefore
theRegionalTrialCourtinMalolos,BulacanaswellasinthisCourt,heallegedthatthePhilippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how
thecollisionbetweenthejeepandthebustookplaceshouldbetakenwithcaution.Itmightbetrue
thatinthestatementofOscarBuangiventothePhilippineRabbitInvestigatorCVCabading,itwas
mentionedbytheformerthatthejeepofplaintiffwasintheactofovertakinganotherjeepwhenthe
collisionbetweenthelatterjeepandthePhilippineRabbitBustookplace.But the fact, however,
thathisstatementwasgivenonJuly15,1988,onedayafterMauricioManliclicgavehisstatement
shouldnotescapeattention.Theonedaydifferencebetweenthegivingofthetwostatementswould
besignificantenoughtoentertainthepossibilityofOscarBuanhavingreceivedlegaladvisebefore
giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic
himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989,
(Exh.14),theunreliabilityofthestatementofOscarBuan(Exh.13)giventoCVCabadingrearits
uglyheadwhenhedidnotmentioninsaidaffidavitthatthejeepofCalaunanwastryingtoovertake
another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took
place.

xxxx

Ifonewouldbelievethetestimonyofthedefendant,MauricioManliclic,andhisconductor,
Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the
collisiontookplace,thepointofcollisiononthejeepshouldhavebeensomewhatontheleftside
thereofratherthanonitsrear.Furthermore,thejeepshouldhavefallenontheroaditselfratherthan
having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was
[40]
runningveryfastastestifiedtobyRamoswhichwasnotcontrovertedbythedefendants.

HavingruledthatitwaspetitionerManliclicsnegligencethatcausedthesmashup,therearisesthe
juristantumpresumptionthattheemployerisnegligent,rebuttableonlybyproofofobservanceof
[41]
[42]
the diligence of a good father of a family.
Under Article 2180
of the New Civil Code,
whenaninjuryiscausedbythenegligenceoftheemployee,thereinstantlyarisesapresumption
oflawthattherewasnegligenceonthepartofthemasteroremployereitherintheselectionofthe
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate it is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore,itisincumbentupontheprivaterespondentstoprovethattheyexercisedthediligence
[43]
ofagoodfatherofafamilyintheselectionandsupervisionoftheiremployee.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligenceintheselectionandsupervisionofitsemployees,particularlypetitionerManliclic.Inthe
matterofselection,itshowedthescreeningprocessthatpetitionerManliclicunderwentbeforehe
becamearegulardriver.Astotheexerciseofduediligenceinthesupervisionofitsemployees,it
argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercisedtherequiredduediligenceinthesupervisionofitsemployees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to


theirqualifications,experienceandservicerecords.Inthesupervisionofemployees,theemployer
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinarymeasuresforthebreachthereof.Tofendoffvicariousliability,employersmustsubmit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was
[44]
incumbentonthem.

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incumbentonthem.

G.R.No.150157

[45]
InMetroManilaTransitCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,
itwasexplainedthat:

Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of
suitablerulesandregulationsfortheguidanceofemployeesandtheissuanceofproperinstructions
intendedfortheprotectionofthepublicandpersonswithwhomtheemployerhasrelationsthrough
hisoritsemployeesandtheimpositionofnecessarydisciplinarymeasuresuponemployeesincase
ofbreachorasmaybewarrantedtoensuretheperformanceofactsindispensabletothebusinessof
and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
throughdependablesupervisorswhoshouldregularlyreportontheirsupervisoryfunctions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemedsufficientandplausible,itisnotenoughtoemptilyinvoketheexistenceofsaidcompany
guidelinesandpoliciesonhiringandsupervision.Asthenegligenceoftheemployeegivesriseto
thepresumptionofnegligenceonthepartoftheemployer,thelatterhastheburdenofprovingthat
ithasbeendiligentnotonlyintheselectionofemployeesbutalsointheactualsupervisionoftheir
work.Themereallegationoftheexistenceofhiringproceduresandsupervisorypolicies,without
anythingmore,isdecidedlynotsufficienttoovercomesuchpresumption.

Weemphaticallyreiterateourholding,asawarningtoallemployers,thattheformulationofvarious
companypoliciesonsafetywithoutshowingthattheywerebeingcompliedwithisnotsufficientto
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon
petitionertoshowthatinrecruitingandemployingtheerringdrivertherecruitmentproceduresand
companypoliciesonefficiencyandsafetywerefollowed.xxx.

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a
familyintheselectionbutnotinthesupervisionofitsemployees.Itexpoundedasfollows:

Fromtheevidenceofthedefendants,itseemsthatthePhilippineRabbitBusLineshasaverygood
procedureofrecruitingitsdriveraswellasinthemaintenanceofitsvehicles.Thereisnoevidencethough
thatitisasgoodinthesupervisionofitspersonnel.Therehasbeennoiotaofevidenceintroducedbyitthat
therearerulespromulgatedbythebuscompanyregardingthesafeoperationofitsvehicleandintheway
itsdrivershouldmanageandoperatethevehiclesassignedtothem.Thereisnoshowingthatsomebodyin
thebuscompanyhasbeenemployedtooverseehowitsdrivershouldbehavewhileoperatingtheirvehicles
withoutcourtingincidentssimilartothehereincase.Inregardtosupervision,itisnotdifficulttoobserve
that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made
responsiblefortheactsofitsemployees,particularlythedriverinvolvedinthiscase.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner
Manliclic.Samedoesnotcomplywiththeguidelinessetforthinthecasesabovementioned.The
presenceoftheinvestigatorsaftertheaccidentisnotenoughsupervision.Regularsupervisionof
employees,thatis,priortoanyaccident,shouldhavebeenshownandestablished.This,petitioner
failedtodo.Thelackofsupervisioncanfurtherbeseenbythefactthatthereisonlyonesetof
manualcontainingtherulesandregulationsforallthedriversofPRBLI.

[46]
Howthencanallthe

driversofpetitionerPRBLIknowandbecontinuallyinformedoftherulesandregulationswhen
onlyonemanualisbeinglenttoallthedrivers?

Forfailuretoadduceproofthatitexercisedthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilyinthe
selectionandsupervisionofitsemployees,petitionerPRBLIisheldsolidarilyresponsibleforthe
damagescausedbypetitionerManliclicsnegligence.

We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of
P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and
[47]
repairofhisjeep.
Asregardstheawardsformoralandexemplarydamages,same,underthe

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repairofhisjeep.

G.R.No.150157

Asregardstheawardsformoralandexemplarydamages,same,underthe

circumstances,mustbemodified.TheP100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages


[48]
must be reduced to P50,000.00.
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
[49]
correction for the public good.
The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be
[50]
loweredtoP50,000.00.
TheawardofP15,000.00forattorneysfeesandexpensesoflitigation
[51]
isinorderandauthorizedbylaw.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONthat(1)theawardofmoraldamagesshallbereducedtoP50,000.00and(2)
theawardofexemplarydamagesshallbeloweredtoP50,000.00.Costsagainstpetitioners.

SOORDERED.

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewas
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision

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G.R.No.150157

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,andtheDivisionChairpersonsAttestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
beforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

[1]
CArollo,pp.191193.
[2]
Records,pp.437456.
[3]
PreTrialOrderRecords,p.143.
[4]
TSNswereadmittedperOrderdated13September1994Records,p.341.
[5]
Exhs.G3toG10(19April1991)andG11toG36(1July1991).
[6]
Exh.D4(5February1993).
[7]
Exh.E4.
[8]
Exhs.AtoH,withsubmarkings.
[9]
Exh.19.
[10]
Exhs.MtoP.
[11]
Rollo,pp.4547.
[12]
Records,p.456.
[13]
Id.at459.
[14]
CArollo,p.193.
[15]
Rollo,pp.5962,88.
[16]
CAG.R.CRNo.19749.
[17]
Crim.CaseNo.684M89.
[18]
Exhs.G3toG10(19April1991)andG11toG36(1July1991).
[19]
Exh.D4(5February1993).
[20]
Exh.E4.
[21]
Sec.47.Testimonyordepositionataformerproceeding.Thetestimonyordepositionofawitnessdeceasedorunableto
testify,giveninaformercaseorproceeding,judicialoradministrative,involvingthesamepartiesandsubjectmatter,
maybegiveninevidenceagainsttheadversepartywhohadtheopportunitytocrossexaminehim.
[22]
Samaliov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.140079,31March2005,454SCRA462,470.
[23]
PhilippineRabbitBusLines,Inc.v.People,G.R.No.147703,14April2004,427SCRA456,471.
[24]
Tisonv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.121027,31July1997,276SCRA582.
[25]
TopWeldManufacturing,Inc.v.ECED,S.A.,G.R.No.44944,9August1985,138SCRA118.
[26]
Records,pp.336337.
[27]
G.R.No.139849,5December2001,371SCRA466,474476.
[28]
NowChiefJustice.
[29]
Peoplev.Martinez,G.R.No.116918,19June1997,274SCRA259,272.
[30]
Art.2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeingfaultornegligence,isobligedtopayforthe

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G.R.No.150157

Art.2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeingfaultornegligence,isobligedtopayforthe
damagedone.Suchfaultornegligence,ifthereisnopreexistingcontractualrelationbetweentheparties,iscalleda
quasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionofthisChapter.
[31]
Records,pp.13.
[32]
Rollo,pp.112114.
[33]
Elcanov.Hill,G.R.No.L24803,26May1977,77SCRA98,106.
[34]
Andamov.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.74761,6November1990,191SCRA195,203204.
[35]
HeirsoftheLateGuaring,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,336Phil.274,279(1997).
[36]
McKeev.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.68102andNo.68103,16July1992,211SCRA517,536.
[37]
Castillov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.48541,21August1989,176SCRA591,598.
[38]
PilipinasShellPetroleumCorporationv.JohnBordmanLtd.OfIloilo,Inc.,G.R.No.159831,14October2005,473SCRA151,
162.
[39]
Sigayav.Mayuga,G.R.No.143254,18August2005,467SCRA341,352353.
[40]
Rollo,pp.4750.
[41]
MetroManilaTransitCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.104408,21June1993,223SCRA521,539.
[42]
Art.2180.The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employersshallbeliableforthedamagescausedbytheiremployeesandhouseholdhelpersactingwithinthescopeoftheir
assignedtasks,eventhoughtheformerarenotengagedinanybusinessorindustry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligenceofagoodfatherofafamilytopreventdamage.
[43]
Dulayv.CourtofAppeals,313Phil.8,23(1995).
[44]
PerlaCompaniadeSeguros,Inc.v.SarangayaIII,G.R.No.147746,25October2005,474SCRA191,202.
[45]
Supranote41at540541.
[46]
TSN,16February1995,pp.2324.
[47]
Exhs.CtoC4andF.Records,pp.232236,288.Article2219(2),CivilCode.
[48]
KapalaranBusLinev.Coronado,G.R.No.85331,25August1989,176SCRA792,803.
[49]
Article2229,CivilCode.
[50]
Tiu v. Arriesgado, G.R. No. 138060, 1 September 2004, 437 SCRA 426, 451 Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,G.R.No.120553,17June1997,273SCRA562,574575.
[51]
Article2208(1),(2)and(5),CivilCode.

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