Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. P-13-3132
June 4, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL,
SARAN GANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from the letter dated March 15, 2011 of Executive Judge Jaime L.
Infante (Judge Infante) of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, "Branch 38. (RTC),
addressed to complainant the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), inquiring about the
employment status of respondent Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court Interpreter III of the said RTC
since August 3, 1993. In the aforementioned letter, Judge Infante informed the OCA that despite
Ampong's dismissal from service by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which dismissal was
affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received any official information or directive from the OCA on
the matter. As such, Ampong remains employed in the RTC and has been continuously receiving all
her monthly salary, benefits, allowances, and the like.
1

The Facts
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having
impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on
behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to
having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a resolution dismissing her from
service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional
Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground
that when the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as
such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her. Ampongs motion was later
denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).
3

On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampongs petition and affirmed her dismissal from service on
the ground that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her and,
thus, she is estopped from assailing the same. Similarly, on August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc
denied her petition for review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal from service in G.R. No.
167916, entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No.
11" (August 26, 2008 Decision).
5

Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA, which did not
receive any official directive regarding Ampongs dismissal, continued to release her salaries and
allowances. However, in view of Judge Infantes letter notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO

issued a Memorandum dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had
started to withhold Ampongs salaries and allowances.
7

In her Comment dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in G.R.
No. 167916 despite its finality because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its
enforcement. Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any jurisdiction
over the case against her.
9

10

11

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Memorandum dated March 27, 2013,the OCA recommended that Ampong be found guilty of
Dishonesty for impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be dismissed from the service on the ground that she no
longer possesses the appropriate eligibility required for her position, with forfeiture of retirement and
other benefits except accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment
in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution.
12

13

The OCA found that Ampongs act of impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service
Eligibility Examination for Teachers for and on behalf of another person indeed constitutes
dishonesty, a grave offense which carries the corresponding penalty of dismissal from service. It
added that the fact that the offense was not connected with her office or was committed prior to her
appointment in the judiciary does not in any way exonerate her from administrative liability as an
employee of the court.
14

Further, the OCA found that Ampongs appointment as Court Interpreter III did not divest the CSC of
its inherent power to discipline employees from all branches and agencies of the government in
order to protect the integrity of the civil service. Consequently, the CSC could validly impose the
administrative penalty of dismissal against her, which carries with it that of cancellation of civil
service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in
the government service, unless otherwise provided. In this relation, the OCA emphasized that the
CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong of her civil service eligibility and, hence, could no longer hold
the position of Court Interpreter III.
15

The Issue Before the Court

The issue raised for the Courts resolution is whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from her
employment as Court Interpreter III of the RTC.
The Courts Ruling
The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.
As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court had already held Ampong
administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service
Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of Decir, viz.:
The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the
procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the
commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous
act which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination." [Ampong] impersonated Decir

in the PBET exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing a
deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." [Ampongs] dishonest act as a
civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that [Ampong] should
not have been appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating
that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may, [Ampongs] present status as
a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she deserves. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).
16

Notably, the Court also addressed Ampongs misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the same case,
viz.:
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control,
supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the right
to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a
judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that impersonating an examinee of a civil
service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial employee
under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.
A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton, involving judicial employees who also
impersonated civil service examinees. As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary charges
before the OCA because respondents were judicial employees. Finding respondents guilty of
dishonesty and meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that "respondents machinations
reflect their dishonesty and lack of integrity, rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public
servants and employees of the judiciary."
1wphi1

Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service
Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the offense
before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public
school teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service
examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in
place of another person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil
service-supervised examination.

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the
administrative reach of the Supreme Court.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court,
regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary. (Emphases in the original; citations omitted)
17

Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law," Ampong could no
longer seek the August 26, 2008 Decisions modification and reversal. Consequently, the penalty of
dismissal from service on account of Ampongs Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. In
line with Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be
made to similarly suffer the same.
18

19

To clarify, however, despite Ampongs dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she should
nevertheless been titled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the aforementioned
provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of the same. It is a standing rule that
despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that
they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may
not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal.
20

It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty
and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing. The image of a court of
justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the
good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent
standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
21

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the dismissal of respondent Sarah P. Ampong, Court
Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38, on the ground of
Dishonesty. Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits are forfeited except accrued leave credits,
and she is perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality,
including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution,
effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNAE
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 187689

September 7, 2010

CLARITA J. CARBONEL, Petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated November 24, 2008 and Resolution2 dated April
29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101599.
Petitioner Clarita J. Carbonel was an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Makati City. She was formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of
Official Documents by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO IV).
The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as affirmed by the CA, established the following facts:
On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer
Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because
she lost the original copy of her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred
to as certificate of rating).3 Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification slip. The Examination
Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioners personal and physical appearance was
entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to the application form and the picture
seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form was different from
that appearing on the verification slip.4 Because of these discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of
the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation.
In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement 5 before Atty. Rosalinda
S.M. Gepigon, admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she accepted the proposal of a certain
Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional
Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of P10,000.00.
Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS Career Service Professional
Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the
certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner,
however, misplaced the certificate of rating. This prompted her to secure another copy from the
CSCRO IV.
Hence, the formal charge against petitioner.
Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her
Answer,6 traversed the charges against her. She explained that after filling up the application form for
the civil service examination, she asked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She, however,

admitted that she failed to take the examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother. Thus,
when she received a certificate of eligibility despite her failure to take the test, she was anxious to
know the mystery behind it. She claimed that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the
certificate of rating but to check the veracity of the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the
use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her inasmuch as the same
was made without the assistance of counsel.
After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25, 2002 Decision No.
0200797 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official
documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed
on her. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November 14, 2003. 8
Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed9 the same for having been filed almost three years from
receipt of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioners explanation that
she failed to timely appeal the case because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that
notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the other members of the law firm, petitioners counsel of
record, could have timely appealed the decision.10 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
in Resolution No. 07204911 dated November 5, 2007.
Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November 24, 2008, the CA rendered the
assailed decision affirming the decisions and resolutions of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on April 29, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I
SERIOUS ERROR OF FACT AND LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS
COMMITTED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION DATED NOVEMBER
24, 2008 BECAUSE PETITIONERS FINDING OF GUILT WAS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON HER
UNSWORN STATEMENT THAT SHE ADMITTED THE OFFENSES CHARGED AND WITHOUT
THE ASSISTANCE OF A COUNSEL.
II
THE CONCLUSION AND FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION
THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS LOST THRU HER OWN FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE WAS
PREMISED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.12
The petition is without merit.
It is undisputed that petitioner appealed the CSCRO IVs decision almost three years from receipt
thereof. Undoubtedly, the appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period when the decision
had long become final and executory. As held in Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission, 13 citing
Talento v. Escalada, Jr.14

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory.
Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and
beyond the power of the Courts review. Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes
final and executory, it becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest.
Such decision or order can no loner be disturbed or re-opened no matter how erroneous it may have
been.
This notwithstanding, on petition before the CA, the appellate court reviewed the case and disposed
of it on the merits, not on pure technicality.
To accentuate the abject poverty of petitioners arguments, we discuss hereunder the issues she
raised.
Petitioner faults the CSCs finding because it was based solely on her uncounselled admission taken
during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated
because she was not afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken.
It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioners uncounselled
statements and, partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document. 15
1avvphi1

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation.16 Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. 17
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity
to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel.18 The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.19
As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to
justify her dismissal.20 We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no
compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CSC and the CA. The written admission of
petitioner is replete with details that could have been known only to her.21 Besides, petitioners
written statement was not the only basis of her dismissal from the service. Records show that the
CSCRO IVs conclusion was reached after consideration of all the documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted by the parties during the formal investigation.
Now, on petitioners liability and penalty.
It has been established that petitioner accepted Navarros proposal for the latter to obtain for
petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and
in consideration of the amount ofP10,000.00. Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to
take the CATS Career Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down
payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave
the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating that
prompted her to secure another copy from the CSCRO IV. The CSCRO IV noticed that petitioners

personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to
the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on
the same application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. Clearly, petitioner
falsely represented that she took the civil service examination when in fact someone else took the
examination for her.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1991, provides:
An act which includes the procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving
of assistance to ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion,
impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service
examination, has been categorized as a grave offense of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.22
It must be stressed that dishonesty is a serious offense, which reflects on the persons character and
exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue, and integrity. Its immense
debilitating effect on the government service cannot be overemphasized. 23 If a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The government
cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit
acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other
than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain
influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression, and dishonesty
less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. 24
Under the Civil Service Rules, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal which carries
the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits (except leave
credits), and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 25
In Civil Service Commission v. Dasco,26 Bartolata v. Julaton,27 and Civil Service Commission v. Sta.
Ana,28 we found the respondents-employees therein guilty of dishonesty when they misrepresented
that they took the Civil Service Examination when in fact someone else took the examination for
them. Because of such dishonesty, the employees were dismissed from government service.
We find no reason to deviate from these previous rulings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated November 24, 2008 and Resolution dated April 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101599
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

 Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact,

or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It is also understood to imply a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack
of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence.
Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person
accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only on the facts or
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed, but also the state of mind at the
time the offense is committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the
purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning
he could have had at that moment. (Wooden v. CSC, G.R. 152884, September 30,
2005; Millena v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127797, January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA
126).
In Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution 06-0538, issued on April 4, 2006,
dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of
integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray and intent to violate the
truth.
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS)
promulgated on November 8, 2011, by the CSC, administrative offenses are
classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and
effects on the government service.

Thus, under Section 46, Rule 10 of RRACCS, serious dishonesty is a grave

offense punishable by dismissal from the service. less serious dishonesty, while
considered also as a grave offense, is punishable by suspension of six months and
one day to one year for the first offense and dismissal from the service for the
second offense. Finally, simple dishonesty is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense; six months
and one day to one year for the second offense; and dismissal for the third offense.

This column should not be taken as a legal advice applicable to any case as each
case is unique and should be construed in light of the attending circumstances
surrounding such particular case.