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Caunca v. Salazar
GR NO. L-2690, January 01, 1949
FACTS:
Estelita Flores, who is an orphan and illiterate, is working to Julia Salazar, in which the latter is
running the Far Eastern Employment Bureau. Estrelita wanted to leave the house of Julia Salazar and to
go along with her cousin Bartolome Caunca, but Julia Salazar (resp) and Estrella Justro (resp) did not
allow Estrelita to leave without paying first the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other
transportation expenses of Estelita from Buruanga to Manila.
Estrelita did not leave the house of Julia Salazar despite the fact that no physical force has been
used against her. Bartolome testified that Estrelita did not leave the house because the respondents
opposed about it. Moreover, due to Estrelitas low mentality and social superiority, the respondents have
successfully deprived Estelita of her personal liberty and of the freedom to go with her cousin.
From this, Bartolome, in behalf of Estrelita Flores, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
WON an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
RULING:
No. An employment agency has no right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave.
In this case, Estelita is restrained of her personal liberty and not free to go with her cousin at her
will.
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee has
no power to curtail the freedom of movement of said employee. The fact that power to control said
freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for
jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a
fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business
enterprise.
A maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she has not yet paid the amount
advanced for her transportation from the province, by an employment agency which was then effectively
detaining her because of the moral duress extended on her.
The individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
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but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that:
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The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by,
in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights,
the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with
respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men
are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women
domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or
20
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment.
From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided
by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic
policy to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making
authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
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of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed
Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not
mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as
manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government.
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not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as
a controlling economic way of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
1. The SC held that the said section does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. Moreover, the
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude.
Ricardo Silverio (pet) was charged in violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities
Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
After more than two (2) years after the filing of the information, People of the Philippines
(resp) filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport and to issue a hold-departure Order
against Silverio (pet) on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary
Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
RTC then issued an order directing the DFA to cancel the passport or to deny his
application and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Silverio from leaving the country.
Such order was based on the RTCs finding that Silverio has not been arraigned and
never appeared in court on the scheduled date of his arraignment, and Silverio has been
going out of the country without the court's knowledge and permission.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently
erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a
pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be
impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national
security, public safety or public health."
ISSUE:
1. WON the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a
pending Motion to Quash the Information
2. Won the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on
grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health.
RULING:
1. No. The scheduled arraignments can be held.
Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is
apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several
arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's nonappearance. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of
arrest had been issued against him due to his failure to appear at scheduled
arraignments.The Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than
enough consideration. The limit had long been reached.
The SC held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself
available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his
right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
country or, if abroad, compelled to return. "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without
the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of
the Court where the case is pending.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be
provided by law.
It should not be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions
thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been
issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed
to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an
accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED.
Justo Lukban, the Mayir of Manila, ordered for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute
The women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. They also
planned to send these women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers.
In pursuant to the order of Mayor Lukban and Anton Hohmann (chief of police), the police,
hustled 170 women into patrol wagons without the opportunity to collect their belongings, and
without the knowledge that they will be destined in Mindanao for life. They were deprived to give
their consent to the deportation.
The relatives and friends of the deportees, through their attorney, filed an application
for habeas corpus alleging the certain facts and that the women were illegally restrained of their
liberty by Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, and by certain unknown parties.
The writ was made returnable before the full court.
Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and
prayed that the writ should not be granted because:
1. the petitioners were not proper parties;
2. the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of
Mindanao and Sulu;
3. the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control;
4. their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.
In open court, the fiscal admitted that these women had been sent out of Manila without their
consent.
The court awarded the writ and directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales
(governor of the province of Davao) and Feliciano Yigo (an hacendero of Davao) to bring those
women before the court.
However, only seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense and testifies
before the court.
The fiscal reasoned that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish
to return to Manila.
Respondents Sales alleged that it was impossible for them to follow the order of the Supreme
Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the
Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers.
No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which function to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. This is the motive in issuing the writ
of habeas corpus.
If the mayor and the chief of police could deport the women, they must have the means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great