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Introduction to Law
Professor: Atty. Estrellita C. Panulaya
Student: Evangeline P. Omadto
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
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Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from
any interpretation. Respondent's position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a.
[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue
hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b.
[Antonio] shall have visitation rights 28 at least twice a week, and may only take
the children out upon the written consent of [Grande];
c.
The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of
70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
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understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
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disclaim its obligation to accept private respondent's BANKARD credit card without
violating the equitable principle of estoppel.
Petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have used in the same situation and as such petitioner is guilty of
negligence. In this connection, we quote with approval the following observations of the
respondent Court.
of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) to restore, partially or completely, the
exemptions withdrawn or revised. The FIRB issued Resolution 10-85 restoring the duty
and tax exemptions privileges of NAPOCOR for period 11 June 1984- 30 June 1985.
Resolution 1-86 restored such exemption indefinitely effective July 1, 1985.
EO 93 withdrew the exemption. FIRB issued Resolution 17-87 restoring NAPOCORs
exemption .Since 1976, oil firms never paid excise or specific and ad valorem taxes for
petroleum products sold and delivered to NAPOCOR. Oil companies started to pay
specific and ad valorem taxes on their sales of oil products to NAPOCOR only in 1984.
Issue:
Whether or not the NAPOCOR is no longer subject to tax exemption from indirect
tax when PD 938 stated the exemption in general term.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner contends that P.D. No. 938 repealed the indirect tax exemption of
NPC as the phrase "all forms of taxes etc.," in its section 10, amending Section 13, R.A.
No. 6395, as amended by P.D. No. 380, does not expressly include "indirect taxes
(Indirect Tax - tax is imposed upon goods BEFORE reaching the consumer who
ultimately pays for it, not as a tax, but as a part of the purchase price. E.g. the internal
revenue indirect taxes (specific tax, percentage taxes, (VAT) and the tariff and customs
indirect taxes (import duties, special import tax and other dues).
Supreme Court ruled that NPC laws show that it has been the lawmaker's
intention that the NPC was to be completely tax exempt from all forms of taxes direct
and indirect. And when the NPC was authorized to contract with the IBRD for foreign
financing, any loans obtained were to be completely tax exempt.
After the NPC was authorized to borrow from other sources of funds aside
issuance of bonds it was again specifically exempted from all types of taxes "to
facilitate payment of its indebtedness." Even when the ceilings for domestic and foreign
borrowings were periodically increased, the tax exemption privileges of the NPC were
maintained.
NPC's tax exemption from real estate taxes was, however, specifically withdrawn
by Rep. Act No. 987 but the exemption was, however, restored by R.A. No. 6395. In fact
P.D. No. 380 added phrase "directly or indirectly" to said Section 13(d).
Furthermore SC held that both presidential decrees were made by the same
person, it would have been very easy for him to retain the same or similar language
used in P.D. No. 380 P.D. No. 938 if his intention were to preserve the indirect tax
exemption of NPC. One common theme in all these laws is that the NPC must be
enable to pay its indebtedness 56 which, as of P.D. No. 938, was P12 Billion in total
domestic indebtedness, at any one time, and U$4 Billion in total foreign loans at any
one time. The NPC must be and has to be exempt from all forms of taxes if this goal is
to be achieved.
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Y-I LEISURE PHILIPPINES, INC., YATS INTERNATIONAL LTD. AND Y-I CLUBS AND
RESORTS, INC., Petitioners, v. JAMES YU, Respondent.
G.R. No. 207161, September 08, 2015
Facts:
James Yu was a businessman, interested in purchasing golf and country club shares
from Mt. Arayat Development Co., Inc. (MADCI) which was a real estate development
corporation. MADCI offered for sale shares of a golf and country club located in the
vicinity of Mt. Arayat in Arayat, Pampanga, for the price of P550.00 per share. Relying
on the representation of MADCI's brokers and sales agents, Yu bought 500 golf and 150
country club shares for a total price of P650,000.00 which he paid by installment. Upon
full payment of the shares to MADCI, Yu visited the supposed site of the golf and
country club and discovered that it was non-existent.
Yu filed with the RTC a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages
with prayer for preliminary attachment against MADCI and its president Rogelio Sangil
(Sangil) to recover his payment. In his transactions with MADCI, Yu alleged that he
dealt with Sangil, who used MADCI's corporate personality to defraud him.
RTC ruled that because MADCI did not deny its contractual obligation with Yu, it
must be liable for the return of his payments. The trial court also ruled that Sangil should
be solidarily liable with MADCI because he used the latter as a mere alter ego or
business conduit. In two separate appeals, the parties elevated the case to the CA.
The CA partly granted the appeals and modified the RTC decision by holding YIL
and its companies, YILPI and YICRI, jointly and severally, liable for the satisfaction of
Yu's claim. The CA held that the sale of lands between MADCI and YIL must be upheld
because Yu failed to prove that it was simulated or that fraud was employed.
The CA explained that YIL, YILPI and YICRI could not escape liability by simply
invoking the provision in the MOA that Sangil undertook the responsibility of paying all
the creditors' claims for refund. The provision was, in effect, a novation under Article
1293 of the Civil Code, specifically the substitution of debtors. Considering that Yu, as
creditor of MADCI, had no knowledge of the "change of debtors," the MOA could not
validly take effect against him. Accordingly, MADCI remained to be a debtor of Yu.
Anent Sangil's liability, the CA ruled that he could not use the separate corporate
personality of MADCI as a tool to evade his existing personal obligations under the
MOA.
YIL and its companies, YILPI and YICRI, moved for reconsideration, but their
motion was denied by the CA
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Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in ruling that petitioners YATS group
should be held jointly and severally liable to respondent Yu despite the absence
of fraud in the sale of assets and bad faith on the part of petitioners YATS group.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Upon Yus demand of return of his payment, MADCI could not
return it anymore because all its assets had been transferred. Through the acts of YIL,
MADCI sold all its lands to YILPI and, subsequently to YICRI. Thus, Yu now claims that
the petitioners inherited the obligations of MADCI. On the other hand, the petitioners
counter that they did not assume such liabilities because the transfer of assets was not
committed in fraud of the MADCI's creditors.
Generally, where one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another
corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor, except:
1. Where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts;
2. Where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the
corporations;
3. Where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling
corporation; and
4. Where the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape
liability for such debts.
The Nell Doctrine states the general rule that the transfer of all the assets of a
corporation to another shall not render the latter liable to the liabilities of the transferor. If
any of the above-cited exceptions arepresent, then the transferee corporation shall
assume the liabilities of the transferor.
Jurisprudence has held that in a business-enterprise transfer, the transferee is liable for
the debts and liabilities of his transferor arising from the business enterprise conveyed.
Many of the application of the business-enterprise transfer have been related by the
Court to the application of the piercing doctrine.
While the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all the properties
and assets of a corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the
assignor. The only way the transfer can proceed without prejudice to the creditors is to
hold the assignee liable for the obligations of the assignor. The acquisition by the
assignee of all or substantially all of the assets of the assignor necessarily
includes the assumption of the assignor's liabilities, unless the creditors who did
not consent to the transfer choose to rescind the transfer on the ground of fraud. To
allow an assignor to transfer all its business, properties and assets without the consent
of its creditors and without requiring the assignee to assume the assignor's obligations
will defraud the creditors. The assignment will place the assignor's assets beyond the
reach of its creditors.
Bearing in mind that fraud is not required to apply the business-enterprise transfer, the
next issue to be resolved is whether the petitioners indeed became a continuation of
MADCI's business. Synthesizing Section 40 and the previous rulings of this Court, it is
apparent that the business-enterprise transfer rule applies when two requisites concur:
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(a) the transferor corporation sells all or substantially all of its assets to another entity;
and (b) the transferee corporation continues the business of the transferor corporation.
Both requisites are present in this case.
MADCI was a development company which acquired properties in Magalang,
Pampanga to be developed into a golf course however, was then sold to YILPI, and
then transferred to YICRI. Its sale to the petitioners rendered it incapable of continuing
its intended golf and country club business.
In the present case, the MOA stated that Sangil undertook to redeem MADCI
proprietary shares sold to third persons or settle in full all their claims for refund of
payments. While this free and harmless clause cannot affect respondent as a creditor,
the petitioners may resort to this provision to recover damages in a third-party
complaint. Whether the petitioners would act against Sangil under this provision is their
own option.
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Case Digest in Introduction to Law
Group 3
GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA, AURORA M. BONDOC and RONNIE C.
FERNANDEZ, and their Respective Spouses, petitioners, vs. Spouses ANTONIO C.
CHAVEZ and NOEMI MARCOS-CHAVEZ and CARLITA C. CHAVEZ, respondents
G.R. No. 148126. November 10, 2003
This is a petitioned case that was already decided by the Court of Appeals (CA), this
case was said to be stare decisis which means that a judgment reached in one case should be
applied to successive ones in which the facts are substantially identical, even though the parties
may be different. Like cases ought to be decided alike.
Facts:
According to the facts of the CA the respondents owned four parcels of land subdivided
into several blocks. By mere permission of the respondents the petitioners have occupied and
erected their homes, the respondent allowed it but they should, in consideration pay in certain
amount as equity. The petitioners failed to pay the equity from the respondent so the respondent
in return wrote them demand letters that they need to vacate the premises in a span of 30 days,
but petitioners' refused to vacate and remove their houses.
The petitioners said that the respondent does not have power to institute such orders
from the conflicted properties because the equities that they must pay are in accordance of
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). They also claim that they are paying
the said equity however they were not given any receipts and copy of their contract
The petitioners also claim that they are qualified beneficiaries under the RA no. 7279
known as the Urban Development and Housing Act and adding that they were builders of good
faith. Hence, they cannot be summarily evicted unless relocated and that they should be
indemnified for the improvements they constructed. They prayed for declaration that they were
lawful tenants and qualified beneficiaries of RA 7279 and that lots of the respondents be sold to
them.
MTC dismissed the case on the ground that the filing of ejectment case based on the
alleged violation of agreement which has not yet been rescinded is premature and that it is
beyond the competence of the said court. Respondents appealed to RTC but rendered a
decision affirming in toto the MTC judgment.
CA ruled that the petitioners entered with an agreement of equity with the respondent, so
in return they must pay amortization or they will face eviction.
Issue:
Whether or not, the decision of the CA needed to be redefined by the Supreme Court.
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Ruling:
It is ruled that in the findings, the petitioners were in binding contract with the
respondent as regard paying their equity and by not paying it will lead to rescission of the
contract or specific performance but not illegal detainer.
The CA ruling in this case is informative and straight to the point. The petition to review
was granted, the decision of the CA was overturned and the decision of the RTC and MTC was
reinstated.
Questions:
1. What is the contention of the respondents? How about the petitioners?
Based on the admissions of respondents themselves, they entered into an
agreement with petitioners and that respondents alleged that petitioners had
violated the stipulations of their agreement by not paying their equity. Afterwhich,
a formal demand letter was sent to the petitioners to vacate the lots and remove
their house.
2. Did the petitioners have the right over the said lots?
No. Due to their non-payment of equity agreed upon.
3. Is there an existing agreement between the petitioners and the respondents? Express or
implied?
Yes, implied from the words of the respondents.
4. Did the MTC has jurisdiction of the case?
No. It is beyond the competence of MTC. An allegation of a violation of a contract
or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the presentation of competent
evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to that effect. But
certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded, as
such power is vested in the RTC apart from the fact that there was no written
contract to that effect. Under these circumstances, proof of violation of the
provisions of the contract is a condition precedent to resolution or rescission. The
contract can be declared rescinded only when its nature has been clarified and
the eventual violation thereof, if any, has been established. Upon such rescission,
in turn, hinges a pronouncement that the possession of the realty has become
unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not possession but interpretation, enforcement
and/or rescission of the contract -- a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court to hear and determine
5. Did the occupancy of the petitioners a mere tolerance on the part of the respondents?
No. The CA ruled that petitioners possession or occupancy of the subject
premises was by mere tolerance of respondents. Hence, once petitioners failed
to pay the agreed amount as equity, their right to continue occupying the lots was
lost. Contradictory were the statements of the appellate court that, on the one
hand, there was no contract between the parties; and yet, on the other, that
petitioners failed to pay the agreed equity. The fact that the CA found that there
was failure to pay the equity was an indication of an agreement. To be sure,
petitioners possession of the subject premises was not by mere tolerance of
respondents.
6. What is the real issue? What is unlawful detainer or a detainer suit? What is rescission
or specific performance suit?
Whether or not unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve this case.
Unlawful detainer or detainer action or suit is a special court proceeding evicting
someone from the place where they live which usually happens if a tenant stays
after the contract is terminated, cancelled or hos not paid corresponding rent.
Rescission is the revocation, cancellation or repeal of an agreement (in this case)
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