LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Caunca v. Salazar
GR NO. L-2690, January 01, 1949
FACTS:
Estelita Flores, who is an orphan and illiterate, is working to Julia Salazar, in which the latter is
running the Far Eastern Employment Bureau. Estrelita wanted to leave the house of Julia Salazar and to
go along with her cousin Bartolome Caunca, but Julia Salazar (resp) and Estrella Justro (resp) did not
allow Estrelita to leave without paying first the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other
transportation expenses of Estelita from Buruanga to Manila.
Estrelita did not leave the house of Julia Salazar despite the fact that no physical force has been
used against her. Bartolome testified that Estrelita did not leave the house because the respondents
opposed about it. Moreover, due to Estrelitas low mentality and social superiority, the respondents have
successfully deprived Estelita of her personal liberty and of the freedom to go with her cousin.
From this, Bartolome, in behalf of Estrelita Flores, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
WON an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
RULING:
No. An employment agency has no right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave.
In this case, Estelita is restrained of her personal liberty and not free to go with her cousin at her
will.
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee has
no power to curtail the freedom of movement of said employee. The fact that power to control said
freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for
jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a
fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business
enterprise.
A maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she has not yet paid the amount
advanced for her transportation from the province, by an employment agency which was then effectively
detaining her because of the moral duress extended on her.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

On the hypothesis that Estelita is really indebted in the amount of P83.85 is not a valid reason for
the respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with Estelitas desire to leave the house of Julia Salazar
and to live in the residence of his cousin Bartolome. Said indebtedness would not in any way subtract an
iota from Estelitas fundamental right to have a free choice of abode.
Moreover, the fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of Julia
Salazar or in the house of Julia Salazars cousin does not make less real the deprivation of Estelitas
personal freedom which includes the freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to
another, freedom to choose ones residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly
obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who
is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
Therefore, the petition is granted and it is accordingly ordered that Estelita Flores be allowed to
go with her cousin Bartolome Caunca or to any place of her choice, and respondents are ordered not to
impede, obstruct or, in any way, interfere with such freedom of Estelita Flores.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Manotoc v. CA
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986
FACTS:
Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr. (pet), has six pending criminal case for estafa and has a pending
disposition of the case involving the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Securities and Exchange Commission requested the Commissioner of Immigration,
Edmundo Reyes, not to clear Manotoc (pet) for departure due to the pending disposition of the case
involving him. Such request was granted.
Manotoc (pet) filed before each of the trial courts a motion for permission to leave the country on
the ground that his trip to the United States is relative to his business transactions and opportunities.
However, such motion was denied by the court due to lack of urgency to approve such motion.
Moreover, the surety companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they could no
longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was the Court which allowed the accused to go
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court.
Manotoc (pet) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to the Court of Appeals to annul the
orders of denying his leave to travel abroad. However, such petition was also denied due to lack of merit.
Manotoc (pet) filed an instant petition for review on certiorari to the SC contending his right to bail
and that the court and the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty,
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE:
WON a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel.
RULING:
No. A person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have a restricted right
to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond to secure a persons appearance when
needed.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
In People vs. Uy Tuising , the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the
accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said
accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes
will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend
beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts.
Moreover, the SC held that the petitioner cannot used the Shepherd case, because he fails to
satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as
the consent of his surety to the proposed travel .
The SC held that there is no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion
for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
THEREFORE, the petition for review is dismissed.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power"
revolution and forced into exile. In his deathbed, Ferdinand Marcos wanted to return to the Philipppines to
die. But Mrs. Aquino refuse to allow Marcos and his family to return on the Philippines due to the
consequences that his return will served as a threat on the stability of the government and the rising of the
economy.
The petitioners file a petition for mandamus and prohibition to seek the issuance of their travel
documents and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair their liberty of abode or their
right to travel because only a court has the power to do so within the limits prescribed by law and that no
law has authorized her to do so. They also asserted that their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under the international law, specifically, Art. 13 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
Art. 12 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
However, the respondents argued that the issue in this case involves a political question which is
non-justiciable. Moreover, it is for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights based on Sec. 4 and 5 of Art. 2 of the Phil. Constitution. The decision to ban the return of the
Marcoses is due to national security and public safety.
ISSUE:
WON in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Such prohibition
is not an act of grave abuse of discretion.

The individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Petitioners contention that the President has no power to impair their liberty of abode or their
right to travel because only a court has the power to do so within the limits prescribed by law and that no
law has authorized her to do so is not correct.
The resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on
the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary.
The SC held that the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated.
In the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of
the Republic, the President has to consider the principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.].
The President is constrained to consider these basic principles under the constitution in arriving
at a decision on banning the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. More than that, having sworn to defend
and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance the national interest.
The Sc held that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Moreover, as to the extent of review whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
the SC did not agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
There is nothing in the case that precludes our determination thereof on the political question
doctrine.
The SC found there were factual bases that exist for the President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to the documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and
their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws,
cannot shirk from that responsibility.
Moreover, the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has
barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by
the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, the SC cannot ignore the continually increasing burden
imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would
wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse.
WHEREFORE, the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
FACTS:
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) (pet), a firm engaged in the recruitment
of Filipino workers for overseas placement, challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers. They file a petition for certiorari on the ground that such order is a
discrimination against males because it only applies to domestic helpers and females with similar skills.
Moreover, it also violates the right to travel and it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Furthermore, to supplement the petition, they also invoke Section 3, of Article 8, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law." Such order was passed in the absence of prior consultations and it
is in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment informing the Court that the respondent Labor Secretary
lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy,
Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.
ISSUE:
WON Dept. Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid under the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Dept. Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid under the Constitution.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event,
it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power
is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity.

13

In the absence of clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"

14

but it does

not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that:

(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by,
in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights,
the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with
respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men
are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women
domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the
same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice
it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are
borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers"

20

is not an argument for unconstitutionality.

It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment.
From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided
by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic
policy to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making
authority vested in it by the Labor Code.

27

The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because

of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed
Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not
mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as
manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government.

31

Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is

not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as
a controlling economic way of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
FACTS:

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No. 25 has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In pursuant to the
provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, the provincial governor issued
Executive Order No. 2 directing all Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
Petitioners challenge the validity of this Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:

RULING:

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is constitutional.