Chapter 8 Soren Kierkegaard: Faith as Subjectivity Religious existentialism begs withthe work of a Danish thinker, Soren ‘ierkegard (1813-1855), who remains its most powerful and provocative representative. He is also the most exasperating one. Many of bis works were writen peudonymously. What is more e id not contrive only one Or (vo fitious authors of hs works; he came up witha numberof them and scholars have had a field day'in characterizing these imaginary authors and insisting that Kierkegaard cannot be undetsiood apart from them? However, find a belliant and consistent view of Christianity ruining through his writiaas despite the diferent pseulonymous authors to which they ae attributed ** ‘Kierkegaard is also exasperating stylistically. Long stretches of his \srtng areas trgi as anything in philosophy and theology, and Lam, of Course, fully aware that these elds are notorious for this characteris. ‘The opening passge of Sickness Unto Death isa god example: ‘The sli elation whic rts iets ova si, o i tha nthe ‘elton ht he eatin rls tos slfthe self 9! he lain ba thatthe relation elites Buell os owe se ‘Yet he could also writ briianly often ina way that pereesto the heart of religions exporiznce, Consier the fist of hi Four searing predes a Abraham's sacrifice of Tsaae. He begins with the verse: “And God tempted Abraham and said unto him, Take Isa thine only son, whom thou lovest and get thee into the land of Moriah and offer hr there fr 8 burnt fering upon the mountain which I wil show thee” (Kierkegaard's version of Gen. 22:1, 2). Kierkegiard then wites about the strained Silence of the journey. Abraham finally resolves 1 tell Issac about the rmeaing of their dreadful mission but he can seaecly bring Mimself 10 {formulate i. Even if he did, he realizes that Isaac would not understand bin Finally in desperation Abraham decides to soerifie Isae’s image of him in onder to preserve the chi’ ah He sized Tae bythe throat, thew i othe ground and si “Stupid ‘boy dost thou the soppose thi Tam thy father? [aan late. Dot hoe ppoce that this i Gods idl? No, ils wy dese” Then sane trembled and cred out in is err, "O Godin heaven, have compassion upon me, God of Abraham, ave compassion upon me if Ihave m0 father pon cath be Thoa my fathe?™ But Abraham in alow voice sid 10 Heel, "0 lod a sven I thank ‘Thee. Afterall i beter for hin 1 bollve iar Tam 2 monster, rather than he shold tow ai a Tee." Kierkegnard was the most Christ entered thinker in Chistian history. He us not mich interested in the question of the existence of God but focused obsessively on the central teaching of Chistian faith, ‘namely, that God entered hums flesh nthe person of Jess of Nazareth, “He was a great preacher and much of his wring consist of imaginative mneditations on the poignance of Govl's earthly career. One of his tmast powerful sermons relates toa passage in the Gospel of John: “And fi be lifted up from the earth, will draw all to mysct™ (ohn 12°32). Kierkegaard compares Christ to a poor man who knows that he will oe ay be ich and thinks tht "when {have become the chest of the rch, al will eek after me.” In saying this he not only knows that those who ‘now reject him wil then eurry favor with him, bor that when they do so, they wil forget both his former poverty and ther rejection. And knowing this hei able—uhile hei sil poor—to love them Kierlepaant's Christeenteted Iieraure is an incredible tour de force. Christianity is fsighted with the weight of middleclass conformity, fand a great number of his works were devoted to portraying the ulifying influence of the aincteemthcentary equivalent of chutch Suppers and sunday schools. Yet is owa fresh and suenvows interpreta tio of Christian teachings made them scem as challenging and aven turous a5 daring works of at tke Jackson Polluek’s action patios le ws le to impress Christinns hecavse of his powerful insights ino the msstery of God in Christ. He has been able (0 exert a profound“we nexus eesrnmausn fasluence on comtemporary Western culture (which is no longer predomi ‘nantly Christian) because he was a penetrating psychologist. He was especially elfective on the problems involved in Becoming an authentic self. Kierkegaard can be approached from many angles. An obvious one the theological tis both fascinating and instructive to see what be does swith uri stan themes like grace and freedom, sin, the author e Bible, and above al, the Incarnation. My approach is somewhat ‘use [update his thinking to show its relevance tothe challenge of ‘contemporary empiricism. Itis, however, appropriate to do so because his influence on contemporary religious thought stems from his capacity to help religious thinkers mect the challenges of our own time, rather than the challenges that were current in his day. KIERKEGAARD'S STRATEGY Kierkegaard’ stratcay as a religious thinker is to stress the absurdity of, Christianity but to claim, nevertheless, that it ean be passionately and validly affirmed. As he sees it, the faith hinges on the claim that God centered history in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. He insists that i is ‘absurd because God, in his view, is changeless and Jesus of Nazareth ike ‘any other human being, changed in the course of time (see p. 157). He insists thatthe biggest mistake a Christan thinker can make fs 10 ty t0 avoid the derision of sceptics by trying to show the plausibility of this, Claim. In doing 50, the theologian necessarily alters i, so that what he ‘defends is no longer Christianity * Instead, Kierkegaard recommends the following reply tothe jeering scepte: “Honored sir, you speak lke a fool; (of course itis absurd, as it ought t0 be, [yet] in spite ofall objections, Which T have thought through myself in far more terrible shape than anyone else could bring them home to me... Uhave deliberately chosen to believe the improbable,” As we shall sce, Kierkegaard carried out this stratogy tothe fullest extent. He was able to bring oat the objections to Christianity even more forcefully than atheists. Vetat the same time he ‘affirmed is truth, which was bound to make sceptics wonder whether they were missing the point.2® The key to understanding his strategy isto Fealize that he stressed its absurdity atthe objective level while alfirming its truth atthe subjective one; I call ita two-level theory of truth Subjectivity Transposed into a ‘key ‘The heart of Kierkegaard's approach 16 the two-level theory of tuth i expressed in a definition of tulh which must rank ss ome of the axklest definitions of anything in any type of literature: “an objective ‘uncertaimty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth, atainable for an existing individual Afterall, if we bring the subjective-objective contrast t0 bear on questions relating to truth, we generally associate truth with ‘objectivity. We urge a person who is shouting and totally immersed in his, ‘own point of view to be objective. The idea's to disengage him from his Subjective bias so that truth may be served. Furthermore, we do not usually think of truth as something that admits of degrees. A Statement i either tue or false, or we may fad that one element of itis true and ‘another false. Again we may find ourselves unable to determine is truth fF falsity. What we find absurd is the suggestion that we should use ccompatstives and superlatives with regard to uth, as in true, truer, {tuest. Yel thats what Kietkegsard’s phrase “the highest ruth” suggests. Kierkegnard's view of truth seems caventric. A clue to its meaning that modifies its strangeness is his remark that "the above definition of truth is an equivalent expression for faith. It is, in other words, efiniton of truth that reflects Kierkegaard’s understanding of what is involved in the Christian faith. Nevertheless, iis not merely a contrived efintion that is designed 19 make the Christian faith look good. propose, therefore, to present its broader applications by means of the ‘concept of an existential decision that I elaborated in relation to William James. Then, Iwill show how Kierkegaard applies it to Christianity. ‘An Objective Uncertainty Kierkegsard's definition of truth be- gins with the phrase “an objective uncertainty.” He aimed some of his best stitial shafts atthe objective temper, which makes itall the more important to realize that, like James, he thins that objectivity i fine—in its place. Yet it is a grave mistake to apply the objective approach to ‘moral and religous issues that are beyond its scope. Thus, in a capsule Statement of the two-level theory of truth Kierkegaard vwites: all hhonor to the pursuits of science... . But the ethical is and remains the Righest task for every imag belag =! Kierkeguaed warvs scistnis end ‘others who are overly impressed with its objective techniques, that Science is only effective withia its proper limits ‘The mosest an retiring scientist oes not bring contusion ita lie; he is oricilly absorbed in his lovieas occupation. But when,om the ether hand, ‘tumultuous seit seeks to invade the sphere of the exten, and there proceeds to confuse he ei hei prinipe of the whol then he ‘Rin sient maith! love, seen Hs stands dy to diver himKierkegaard is far more extreme than James in stressing the limits of science; he seems 0 think that all moral and religious issues are far beyond the scope of objectivity Objective As noted earlier, the existentilists' contrast between objectivity and subjectivity is rooted in Kent's distinction between the theoretical thinking of the detached observer and the thisking of the participant who must decide and act Kierkegaardrefers otexplicily in ‘writing about “the objective tendeney, which proposes to make everyone fan observer. ..."°% There's nothing wrong with being an observer in and of itself: but itis wrong if one merely observes when one ought 10 Participate. Kierkegaard regards the objective tendency 2s appropriate 10 Judgments which the positivists were later to characterize as analytic. "1a the ease ofa mathematical proposition the objectivity is given, but for this season the truth of such a proposition is also an indifferent tath."=8 What Kierkegaard sought was a truth that was far from indiferent. “The thing is toad a ruth which fs true for me to find the ea fr which Tena live and die ‘Kierkegaard’ originality as well as his satirical gifts come into play fas he discusses the other kind of truth that the positivists allowed flor—the synthetic or factual. His analysis pivots oa the point that people in general are aware of the capacity of subjectivity to lead to prejudice C:Whatever is mine is best") and delusion ("L am Napoleon”). In the ‘effort to avoid these perils of subjectivity they take refuge in objectivity by sticking to “the facts and nothing but the facts." When this attitude is applied to such deeply personal matters as honesty and rust becomes & {orm of madness that isthe objective equivalent of subjective delusion, "To make the point, Kierkogaard tells the story of madman who.esceped from an insane asylum and headed for his home town. Suddenly the ‘thought strikes him: “When you come to town you will he recognized, and you will at once be brought back here again; hence, you need to prepare Yourself fully 1 convince everyone, by the objective truth of what jou ‘ay, that alls inorder as far as your sanity is concerned.” As he worries bout the problem he spots a bal, picks it up, and putt inthe tal pocket Of his coat. At every step he takes the ball and hits—what Kierkegaard ‘euphemistcaly refers to as—his hind parts, and each time he does s0, be turns to the person nearest him and snys: "Bang the earth iy round?" “The madness, as Kierkegaard observes is notin the statement taken in itself. The madness les in the individual's thinking that he can live authentically. oF even sancly, by confining himsell to the worl of objective tabs. Uncertain In one of the most philesiphically sophisticated chip OREN WemAEAARD: FAITH AS SuBIECTNTY we ters in is voluminous literature, Kierkegaard anticipated much of what the positvisis were later to say about necessity. He insisied that necessity iS function of logical considerations alone. Therefore, only (Gehat the positivises were to call) analytic statements could be objectively certain. All statements of fact (Kierkegaard was dealing specifically wit historical statements) are only more or less probable. OF course, i only ‘analytic statements are objectively certain, t follows that “objectively lincertain” becomes an umbrella word which covers a wide range of diverse statements. Statements about the existence of God are, by this, Standard, objectively uncertain, but so are such straightforward state- ‘ments of fact as “This page is white.” However, this is less compromising than it seems because Kierkegaant's point is not fo call attention t0 objective uncertainty in and of itself. He tries to link it to “an appropria- tion process of the most passionate invandness"—a process that authen= tic individuals experience when they are in the midst of existential Aecisions. ‘Kierkegaard, as we have seen, thinks that people who imagine that ‘they can approach existential decisions from the objective standpoint are just as mad ae people who suffer from subjective delusions. The way 10 ‘appreciate this lak bewveen the objective uncertainty thats iavolved in fan existential decision and the appropriation process that Kierkegaard ‘regards as integral to it ist focus on his own examples, The best known is his treatment of the story of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac ‘The interpretation i especially revealing because Kierkegaard wrote Pear ‘and Trembling out of his anguish over having sacrificed the love of his fiancée, Regina Olsens! He was, ultimately, convinced that an intease land enduring love for a woman would fatally qualify the absoluteness of his love for God. And only God is worthy of boing loved “with all one's heart with all one's soul and with all one’s might” (Deut. 6:5). Kierke> ‘ganrd obeyed his inner voice with respect to Regina, but he did so knowing that his decision was objectively uncertain, There was no way of| knowing before the decision, atthe time of making it, or afterwards— ‘whether or not it was the right thing to do, That is why, forhis reNections fon the subject, he took his tle from St, Paul: "You must work out your ‘own Salvation in fear and trembling” (Phil 2:12). Appropriation Process Kierkesaard's sense of what is involved in existential decisions comes through cleary in his approach tothe Bible He satirized the Sunday school approach that treats the Bible asa set of| nice stories like Aesop's fables and points up the moral for children. in the ease of Abraham's aborted sacrifice of Isaac, the moral i that we ke Abraham, shoukt be sulin 1 offer the most precious thing we have 10 Go Ry contust, Kierkessund wants ws to appropriate it by Klenifying19 reuiious SxsTemALSN with Abraham at the moment that he receives the divine command. We «an then experience the numinous dread that permeates the story because Wwe realize that at that point Abraham did not know that Isaac's ife would be spared. ‘Kierkegaar’s dramatic probe of the inner tensions whieh Abraham ‘experiences reflects Kierkegaard’s understanding of the Chistian faith in its relation to morality.* Yer it also expresses his understanding of “the man alone," the existing individual, sweating outa decision tht involves ‘the meaning of bis life. In the context of Kierkegaard's use ofthe phrase "an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness” Lam more concerned with his understanding of existential decisions than with his ‘iowa of the relation between religion and ethics. Kierkegaard explored the dread iavolved in Abraham's situation. In doing so, he came up with his most controversial category, "the teleologi- cal suspension ofthe ethical." Briefly stated, it means that in the name ff a higher principle, namely, the direct relation to God, an existing individual has the right to suspend what he himself regards as valid moral obligations and to pesform acts that would otherwise be immoral. The pplication to Abraham is obvious. Kierkegrard was certain that Abra- hham regarded the taking of a child's life outrageously immoral. Tn response to his I-You relation to God, Abraham is willing to suspend ethical considerations and to take the life of his chil. Kierkegaard’ study is an effort to justify Abrakam’s course of action, indeed, to show that it Sets the standard for authentic human existence as well as for religious faith, Inthe context of Fear and Trembling where Kierkegaard speaks of the ethical, it becomes clear that he refers not t0 what we think of as moral issues but to any principle (moral, religious, or otherwise) by means of which an individual ean justify his actions to his society. In other ‘words, a principle that is universally accepted. This is made clear by Kierkegaard’s contrast of Abraham Wwith three other fathers who were galled pon to scrfce one of thir children: Agamemnon, Jeptha, and Tn the case of Agamemnon, the Greek fleet is ready to set sil for ‘Troy to restore Helen to Menelaus and to punish the Trojans. Ithas been assembled with great effort, and it seems to be frustrated at the outset because there is no wind. Agamertnon appeals ta the Oracle fora wor. “The dreadful command is that his daughter, Iphepenia, must be sacrificed. Jeptha, an Isracite leader, vows that if God gives him the vitory over the ‘Ammonites, he will sacrifice the fist one to confront him on his flare 10 his Tand, expecting, of course, that will be an anima His prayer is ‘ranted anu on his return his daughter, who fis hear the goo evs, ums OREM WERKE: FAH AS SUBIECTIATY 181 ‘out to greet him. She must be sacrificed. Brutus is a Roman judge, A. Conspiracy is uncovered: the penalty for participation is death. Among the conspirators is Brutus’ son and his father must condemn him. Ta all three cases fathers sacrifice that which is most presious tp them, and in each case the father has a universally accepted principle to ‘which he ean appeal. In fac, the principles invalved are so important to their societies that their contemporaries want the fathers to sacrifice theit children, If Agamemnon were to refuse to sactiice Iphegenia, he would Tose his role as leader ofthe Greek forces, Because, by failing to obey the Oracle, he would prevent the wind from coming and the fleet from sailing. In the case of Jeptha a failure to full his oath would bring rerimina- tions from the lacie, They would be sure that his broken oath would bring God's curse upon them, Brutus, s a judge, must apply the principle of justice to his own son or he would be branded as corrupt. Within the ramework oftheir eulures or societies all thee fathers hhave a priciple whichis universal In the case of Agamemnon itis “obey the Oracle"; in the ease of Jeptha itis “ull the vow" in the case of Brutus itis “decide justly without regard for personal involvement.” Abraham, by contrast, does not actin the name of a generally accepted principle which provides him with communal support. As Kierkegnard presents the story (although it is not accurate in terms of what we know fabout Abraham's time and setting), Abraham is, from the standpoint of his community, a murderer." For this reason, the inner tensions involved in Abraham's existential decision about sacrificing Tsaac are far greater than those that the other fathers experience as they contemplate the sacrifice of their children. ‘Abraham—in trying to do the right thing—had to appropriate the meaning. of God's wil in fear and trembling. People of subsequent {Eenerations who read the Bible have to do the same thing if they are 10 ‘understand biblical faith Kierkegaard's purpose in Fear and Trembling to dramatize the nature of Christian faith, but itis also caleulated to communicate a sense of the passionate inwardness involved in existential decisions Passionate Inwardness. The lisk between Kierkegaart’s inter- pretation of Abraham a5 the man alone, ready o take the extreme step of Killing his oven child, nd to other existential decisions that are not so sharply immoral in characteris found in is statement that". for the “animal the herd defines the norm." He means thatthe ideal Guernsey at Teast from the hunaa standpoint isthe typical Guernsey, just asthe ideal pool 1 he typical poate; they ace not Supposed To deviate Crow the formal characteristics of the species182 neuaious Bxsreausie By contrast, Kierkegnard’s human ideal is the individusl, the luntypical person. ‘The best examples of unususl individuals are creative tenses, The human race advances on their backs because they venture ‘onto uncharted waters. Kierkegaard obviously had ao use for responsible committee members. His sense for creative individuality under ff the observations in Fear and Trembling in which the particular as being higher than the universal. “The tragic hero [Agamemnon Jeptha, Brutus] renounces himself in order to express the universal, the knight of faith (Abrakam] renounces the universal in order to become the individual % Kierkegaard does not want the ereative in dividual to ignore the universal. He must not, for example, be infetior to the demands of morality. He ought to be superior 1 them, but 10 do so, he must fist attain the level of acknowledging and obeying them, "For faith {Abraham's venture in being sling to sacrifioe Isaac}. the particular is higher than the universalyet ia such a way, be it observed, that the «individual, after having beea inthe universal [thas after having internalize its demands] now as the particular isolates himself as higher than the universal” Kierkegaard’s thinking is orginal but strained. Against generations of faithful believers and of theologians, he insists that Abeaham is, fo the moral standpoint, murderer, yet he then proceeds (9 claim that from the standpoint of faith Abraham rises above the universal, which, i this case, is represented by moral standards, Kierkegaard reconciles the tW0 judgments by claiming that in relation o his role as father the universal ‘Obligation on Abraham is to love Isaac, ".... when God requires [that ‘Abraham sacrifice) Isaac, he [Abraham] must love him if possible even, ‘mone dearly {than other fathers love their sons) and only on this condition ‘can he sacrifice hin for in fact its this love for Issac which = makes ice fas distinet from @ murder)" Tike a creative genius goes beyond the universal, and is therefore unable to communicate the basis of his aetion to other human ‘beings who are oriented to the common standards of their day. "The lists and dead. is that, humanly speaking, he is entirely unable 10 ake himself intcigibl."9* For ths veason, creative works often repsl the artistic establishments of a given era. The Impressionists raised storm in the field of painting, and Stravinsky's The Rite of Spring provoked a riot at its frst performance in Pars ‘One of the things we mean in calling a person a genius is that their work causes us to revise our standards of merit in given field. Yet until this sort of recognition is fortheoming. geniuses experience wrifying tensions. They are subjectively certain of the meri of their work or they wouldn't present i 10 the public, yet there procedures that ean support this subjective certainty. After all, one ofthe {things we mean by “creative” in this context i thatthe ents breaks with established standards. We have seen that generally accepted standards ‘which enable us to produce widespread agreement iy judging individual ceases is one of the important meanings of “objective” (See pp. 92f). Having insisted that Abraham is—ftom the standpoint of the ‘universal ethical—a murderer, Kierkegaard thea reflects on Abraiaon's stats as the "father of faith” He breaks with the conventional Abraham ff Sunday sehool piety and paints an Abraham whose faith was charac- terized by fear and vembling. He then claims (in effect) that just as posterity vindieates the breakthroughs of a ercative genius like Suavin- ‘Sky by responding positively tothe dissonances of The Rite of Spring. so too Kierkegaard wants posterity t9 vindicate Ais Abraham, the Knight of faith, by responding positively to the sk of faith. Kierkegaard. has sothing but scora for people who admire creative individuals, whether in art, morality, or religion, but who admire them in a conventional way, ‘This safe; it involves going along withthe judgments of posterity while overioaking the anxiety and dread that the creative individual experiences ‘before he hus achieved acceptance. ‘As I sec it although Kievkcpaard himself ever puts it this way, the creative genius—at the moment of producing a masterwork but before receiving. recognition from seciety~—provides the model for Kierke- gaard’s “passionate inwardness.” This is a use of the phase that is independent of Christian faith and relates to Kierkegaard’: efforts 0 define authentic human existence. It is, however, also relevant t0 bis, ‘understanding of faith, as with Abraham ‘Truth and the Existing Individual An existential decision is one which must be made with considerable risk because there no way of fbjectvely determining the right thing to Jo. The reasoning behind James’ Statement that an issue of this kind “cannot be decided om intellectual rounds” has already beon discussed (see pp. 1391). The point underios Kierkegaard’ statement that “the objective accent falls om what is said the subjective necent on hoWw it is suid." By the word "what Kierke™ sad refers 10 the content of a statement, for example, ia the synthetic Statement “This page is white,” the content is the color of the page. ‘Whenever an isue can be dealt with objectively, we want to know what ‘bas been determined, Existential decisions, as we have seen, involve issues that cannot be settled by objective procedures. Kierkegaard insists that in Abraham's Teac, there ix no objective content thal can be portant mater fs Use “haw"™—the way in which theindividual handles himself i relation to the decison. Kierkegaard bas a standard of existential authenticity. although he never speed it out in ‘lstint terms. His treatment of Abraham suggests that an existential ‘decision is authentic when itis made with awareness of its objective “uncertainty snd with willingness to take the risk of going against objective standards, ‘An Elaboration of Kierkegaard's Definition of Truth We are now in position 10 reassess Kierkegaard’ seemingly perverse deinition of truth as subjectivity. 1 wil present it with comments that summarize the previous discussion. “An objective unceriainty.” A live, momentovs, and forced option ‘where there fs no possibilty of sting the issue by ebjective procedures Such as the a priori used ia mathematics or the observations used for ‘checking on the ruth of synthetic statement. “Held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness.* An existential dosision is one where you arbitrarily cut of further research on the fue ad devide in fear and wembling to do what you think i right. You know that you have no objective way of verifying ‘Or contirming the fat that it isthe right decision. The atitude involved is like the inner tension experienced by a creative genius whose work is before the public, but whose merits have not yet been recognized. “Is the rah" Obviously Kierkegaard does not mean the truth of the ‘correspondence theory of truth,” which can be iustrated by stating “This page is white,” verifying it objectively by looking atthe page, and thea saying, “The statement is true.” Kierkegaard's use of “cuth” is rather like the use of truth in the phrase “the moment of truth.” “The highest truth." Objective truths like those of analytic and syntheti statements are important and indispensable—at their own eve. Objective procedures are inadequate where we face existential decisions in which our roles as participants are eruial, Truths which ate forged by ‘means of existential decisions are higher thon objective truths because they deal with more important isues. They do not, however, conllict with truths whieh have been objectively determined. Wainable for the existing individual.” ‘The existing individual ‘cannot avoid existential decisions because he fs constantly confronting foteed options regarding momentous iesucs like marriage, choice of career, and those arisiag out of politics, economics, aesthetics, and Feligion Since he eannot know in objective terms what the right decision imight be, everything depend= on the way he holes insell i comming to the decision. tn fear and trembling be aust Lake ihe sisk of sting agaunst the od Shortly after presenting his definition of wuth, Kierkegaard, as noted, adds: ". .. the above definition of truth isan equivalent expression for fath,"* 1 wil now present his application of hs view of subjectivity to Christan faith Moving from the Existential HOW to the Cheistian WHAT. In dealing with Otto's view of religious experience I noted that there is something contrived about it. His central category of divination is custom tailored forthe job of getting knowledge of God who is “wholly othee™: it has ao applications outside the sphore of eligious experience. By contrast, Kierkegaard’ views of subjectivity are wide ranging in thei applications. They tll us a great deal about what is involved in trying to ‘become an authentic individual, Nevertheless, tis important to realize that Kietkegaard’s view of truth as subjectivity is derived from his ‘analysis of Christian faith, and his own concern for this category is primarily oriented to Christianity. The “objective uncertainty” ap- proprated in passionate inwardness isthe central Christian teaching that God entered human lsh in the person of esus of Nazareth who, 28 The Criss fully divine as well as fully burn “The analysis of truth as subjectivity implies that when dealing with ‘an existential decision which eannot be handled objectively, any what will do, as long. you have an authentic how. In other words, ivimplies that as long as you believe with passionate iawardness, any belief that has not bbeen objectively falsified is legitimate. Jean Paul Sartre carried existen- tiaism to this consisteat extreme. At times Kierkegaard seemed 10 hheading in that diection, asin his comparison of the Christian and the worshiper of hols: 1 one who lives i the midst of Christendom goes up tthe house of God, the house of the true God, with the tue conception of God im his ‘enowiedge, and prays, bat prays i a false spirit; a one who lives ia an Sdolatrous community prays with the ene passion ofthe infinite lthoush Ins ajas sont upon the image ofan iol here le the most truths The one prays in uth lo God though he worships an dol the other pray’ falsely 1 the true God, and hence worships Infact an Mol Kierkegaard, who defines faith as subjectivity, clearly favors the wor shiper of idols who prays with the passio ofthe infinite. He seems to be saying that i is better to believe a falsehood in the right way than to believe the truth ina false spi. ‘When we think about i, this contrast i, ia Kierkessardian terms, Jimpossile: Since he hs define oth truth and Faith a subjectivity. he not, by his own sandaed eile to tak about tte conception of Gadthat can somehow be affirmed independently of the subjectivity of the ‘worshiper. The inconsistency is revealing. What Kierkegaard is tually Tecommending is that we believe a specific “what,” that is, Christian teachings, including the objective, that is, independent, existence of God, ‘but with the right “how,” that i, in an authentically subjective way. ‘Kierkogaard tried to splice authentic faith and Christian truth by linking two questions that absorbed him all his if: (1) What does it mean to be an authentic individual? and (2) What does itmean to be a genuine (Christian? Ultimately, he thought that they amounted to the same thing. ‘The Central Christian Paradox: Jesus Chvist Is Full God and Full Man Kierkegaard wrote thousands of pages about Christianity ‘They might all be taken as an extended sermon oa the statement inthe Prologue to the Gospel of John: “The word was made Mesh and dwelt fmong is. Kierkegnard ll but said as much. “If the contemporary {generation thats, contemporary with Jesus of Nazareth] had let nothing tehind them but these words: We have believed tat a such an such & ‘year God appeared among us in the humble figure of servant, that he lived and taught in our community, and finally died would have been ‘nore than enough" Ry this he meant hat & would have Been more than Cnough to offend objective reason and to gst people to take Christianity serious ‘Kisikegaad’s obsession with the claim that God entered the feshof Jesus of Navareth isnot eccentric It ithe contra tem ofthe rational creeds of Christendom, isthe point where Chvistanity decisively parted Company withthe parent faith of Judaism. It was made explct Gy the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 431. The assembled bishops af the Church destred that Jonus Christ had two complete natures, One fully divin and one fully human, mysteriously united in one person whichis the Second Person ofthe Tiny. This dagma is not confined to aay one church has been accepted by the churches of Eastern Orthodoxy, BY the Roman Catholic Chureh and by most Protestant denominations. ‘iertcgaard regarded tis central Christan teaching as objectively uncertain and even abaurd =” Yat, iis hard i communiete hs absurdity to peopl reared in a Christan environment They are 3 accustomed 10 {hiking of Jesus as the Godman that they do not even find this ean ‘od. That is oehy Kierkepaard wrote that itis easier to become 8 Christian when f am not a Christan than 1 become.a Christan when 1 fm one..." He meant that itis dificult to gets person who ws baptized ai birth and broveMt op thinking of Jesus Christ the Goan to appreciate the incredible character ofthis teaching The objective absimty of the central Christsn elim is that it solices that which objective ramon declares 4 be unmplceabe, namely the divine and the humaa, It is beyond the pl the standpoint of both Hebraic religion and Greek philosophy. Kierkegaard focused on the philosophical problems. God is infiite, necessary, and eternal, whereas hhuman existence is characterized by the opposite qualities, Human beings are finite, contingent (they are the Sorts of things that might or might not exis), and temporal (ee pp. 275). Ibis, therefore, inconceivable that they Should merge. To understand why itis inconceivable it will be Best tO focus on the last pair of contrasting terms: eteral-emporal ‘Kierkegaard wrote: “The eternal truth has come into being in time: this is the paradox." Kierkegaard frequently used the term “paradox, He often alternated it with “absurd, so that W. V. Quine's definition of “paradox,” will serve nicely for Kierkegaard’s uses". m paradox just any conctusio tht at rt sounds absurd but hat hasan argument to ‘To appreciate the full absurdity ofthe claim that “the eternal truth has come into bein in time" think of a mathematical trath ike Two plas three equals five." I is similar to what Kierkegaard calls “eternal truth” because it is time-invariant, meaning, itis not affected by time. It isnot, for example, true when we are young, but false as we get older. It id not bbecome treat any point in time, and it will not become false at any point in time. Of course, people become aware of time-invariant truths at diferent times. 4 child at some specific time i life becomes aware of the teuth of “Two plus three equals five.” That is quite another matter from aiming that the statement self becomes tre at some moment in time. It is ridiculous to say that “on Jly 4 1864, in Washington, D.C, it became the ease that “Two plus three equals five ‘The central paradox of the Christian faith, which Kierkegaard calls the absolute paradox, is that God entered the flesh of Jesus of Nazareth God, being eternal, is time-invariant in radical contrast to the sease in Which human beings vary in time. They come into being at some point in time, they grow and change in other ways with the passage of time, and then they cease to be. To say that Jesus Christ was fall God and fll man {he formula of the Counel of Chalcedon, not merely of Kierkegaard) is to affirm of the same being that he is simultaneously A (Gime-invariant) and not A (not time-invariant), which seems to be a fat contradic: tion, Kierkegaard expressed his sense ofits absurdity by writing: “The news of the day as the beginning {in time] of eternity! If God had permitted himself ro be born in an inn, wrapped in swaddiing clothes, and Tad in a manger, could the contradiction have been grester!?"** ‘Tho Assault on Apologetics: Objective Props Are Rejected Looking at the intllectial history of Christendom, Kierkegaard as fouled by one muijor enterprise, apologetics, which may be call the1 Reuaious exsreNmALN inellestual defense of the faith. Ii the theological activity of external relations; the theoreticians of the Chutch try to make is claims good by defending them against the criticisms of nonbelievers. “It one,” Kierke- guard wrote, “were to describe the whole orthodox apologetic effort in a Single sentence, but also with estegorial precision, one might say that it has the intent to make Christianity plausible. To this, one might add that, iH this were to suczeed, then this effort would have the wonial fate thai precisely on the day of its triumph it would have lost everything and entirely quashed Christianity." ‘Kierkegaard tore into the traditional apologetic moves with He regarded them as objective props that theologians used in an effort 10 ‘make belief easier. Ho said that anyone who tried to come to God by objective moves was like the foreigner who asked an Englishman if the oad he was oa led to London. The Englishman replied that it did. Yet the foreigner never reached London hecatse the Englishman neglected t tell, him that he sas headed in the wrong direction. © ‘Apologstics, as far as Kierkegaard was concerned, dealt with the right subject inthe wrong way. Ic ollered proofs for the existence of God Gee Part Four) and objectively valid reasons for believing in the {incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth.** Kierkegaard comes alive when hie demolishes apologetic efforts to show the plasty of the central Christian claim that Jesus Christ was full God and full man. Part of bis demolition was based on his understanding of the limitations of histocical judgments. Since this topic wll be treated at length the next chapter in comaestion with the work of Redolf Beltmann, (who was stronaly influenced by Kierkegaard), Iwill not develop it here. Instead, wll focus fon Kierkegnard's sense of the incompatibility between historical jude- ‘ments about human beings and the Christian afirmation of faith in Jesus Christ as full God as well as fll mas. ‘The Limits of Observation with Regard to the God-Man Kierkegaard scores his most effective points against the objective ap. proach to Christianity by dealing with Christians who believe that their ‘doubts are rooted in their remoteness from the figure of Jess. They thik that if they could have witnessed his mighty acts they would be incapable (of doubt fa attacking this postion, Kierkegaard bypasses the question of ‘whether the biblical accounts of the miracles or amy oiler details of the New Testament are valid when judged by the standart of critical historical research® He proposes that we assume Tor the sake of argument that each detail Gok place exactly 2s reported. I follows that thousands of Jesus’ contemporuries witnessed miracles ike the feeling of 5,000 people with five loaves an! fv lish (Mark @S-44), Yet these ‘REN KAMECAARO: FAT AS SUBUEETVETY 18 ‘multitudes did not say: “This maa is God." Indeed, even his own disciples failed to draw this conclusion so that immediately after the event the Evangelist comments: "... they did not understand shout the loaves” (Mark 6:52). The central Christian affirmation is, according to Kietke: ‘gard, aot a function of observations. It is a matter of believing the ‘objectively absurd and this cam be done just as well by a person today a3 it ‘ould by the people who witnessed Jesus" earthly career. Kierkegaard was convinced that itis impossible to have faith in Jesus Christ asthe Godman on the basis of either direct observations or ‘of historial research because thre isan infinite gulf between the divine ‘and the human. ‘The central afimation that “This man is God” can only 'be made in passionate inwardness. From the objective standpoint itis an absurd In Training in Christiasity Kierkesaard communicates his sense of ‘the impossibility of moving ¢rom observations of Jesus of Nazareth to the conclusion “This man is God" by writing of the contrast between physical beings and pure spirits. The sight of an uterly strange track inthe sand ‘may legitimately lead fo the conclusion that the animal who made itis diferent from any animal that has ever been seen. The one conclusion that cannot be drawn is that the truck—no matter how strange it may ‘be—was left bya spirit, because a spirit, by its nature cannot leave tracks. He then applies the point tothe central affirmation of the Christin faith: “But if God exists, and consequently is distinguished by an infinite difference of quality trom all that it means to bea man, then neither can T ‘nor anybody else, besioning with the assumption that He was @ maa [experience the miracles and} arrive in all eterity at the conclusion, “thetefore it was god” Kierkegaard resolutely destroys every effort to qualify the objec: tive absurdity of the central Christian airmation. Indeed, he seems to revel init Instead ofthe objective uncertainty, thre is here a certainty, amely, that objectively tis absurd: and this absurdity, hel fot in the pasion of Inwardness, Is or the absurd isthe objet of th nd the only objec that canbe blived Kierkogaard’s rhetoric might casily lead us to conclude that he alfimed the ceniral Christian teaching of the God-man because it was Absurd. There is a precedent for this in Christin history, Tertalian wrote that “because itis absurd, it to be believed."®" Actually, Kierkegaard ‘i not propose that we appropriate it because it is absurd, but because when rightly nuerstood ths paadox provides cach hurvan being with the hance to realize authentic individshty“The Genuine Christian Is the Authentic Individual One feature of Kierkegaard’s thought is bound to baffle the unwary reader. He stresses the absurdity of Christian faith and yet preaches it ‘with al the power of St.John Chrysosiom, Martin Luther, Jonathan Edwards, rather great preachers of Christendom. He mines the Bible and the theological traditions of Christianity for every insight he ean Bind, and the reader wil not find any traces of doubt in Kierkegaard’ formulations is easy enough to resolve this seeming contradiction. In vehemently rejecting Christan apologetics, Kierkegaard had no intention of cuting himself off from the wealth of Christian teachings. As long as the Cristian fait is understood subjectively and isnot died by a dose of ‘objectivity, Kierkegaard is prepared to affirm it with unparalled passin, In doing so, he linked the paradoxical assertion tha Jess Christ as full, God and full man to the quest for authentic individuality ‘Kierkegaard’ thought was both Christ-centered ard intensely dra- ‘matic. From the objective standpoint he had no way of shoving that God existed, much less that he entered human flesh inthe person of Jesus of Nazareih However, as long as this absence of objective backing for the claim was understood, Kierkegaard felt free toler his imagination explore the workings of the mind of Christ. He reflects on verses of the New Testament like “God was in Christ reconciling the World to himself” Cor. 5:19. He thinks of God in Christ as courting human sinners. He wants them to love him, but this involves a free response to his initiative, God does not want human beings 10 turn to him in the way that sunflowers tura toward the sun, that, of necessity. In seeking the loving response of human beings, God the infinite enters the finite person of Jesus of Nazareth. Kierkegaard uses his powerful dramatic its 10 portray the situation in terms of a king seeking the love of a humble maiden. I shall rework i. “The king, God, woos a humble maiden. Kierkegaard chooses a hhumble maiden as te object of God's love because the New Testament is, directed to ordinary human beings and not to theological geniuses, No Special gifts are required to respond 1 its message. ‘The king, in seeking her love, confronts a problem. If he appeats to hr in his royal regalia, she may respond lovingly, but her love wil not be senuine and it will not be directed to him. It wil ot be genuine because She will be dazzled by the regalia which represents a splendor 50 far bhevond her ordinary experience that her response will aot be free: she will be overwhimed. Furthermore, she will not love him becuse she will be responding to his appearance rather than tothe man Tan for to overcome this dificuly the king isuises Wis asa Servant and confronts her on her own level. This takes care of one part of the problem: aow that she is not overwhelmed by the regalia she can respond freely. Yet, there remains the question of whether or nother love is directed to him. I his disguise i totaly effective, she stil will not love him because he is, afterall, nota servant but the king 7 ‘The implications ofthis parable for Christianity should be obvious. God does not appear in his infinite glory but confronts human beings in the disguise of the servant, Jesus of Nazareth, Yet he eanaot totally hide his true nature or, in Toving Jesus, people would be responding to what ley take fo be a man rather than to Jesus Christ who f fully divine as Wel as fully human. Therefore, the servant Jesus of Nazareth, provides ‘lues to his true nature. Human beings are free to aesept them by making the leap of faith. Balt, as we have seen, involves the appropriation of his objectively absurd belief in passionate invvardness. Those who fail to make the leap may move fa two diferent directions. Both of thm, {rom Kierkeyaard’s standpoint, are misguided because both are objective, Those who fal to respond with subjective faith may either use objective ‘arguments in an effort to prove that Jesus Chris isthe Godman or they ‘may use objective arguments in an effort to prove that Jesus of Nazareth ‘was nothing more than a traveling preacher who repeated many Ceachings that Were current among the Rabbis of his time." Twill now show bow Kierkegaard links penuine Christan faith 10 fauhentic individuality. Kierkegaard thought that every individual is confronted with a challenge. If the ordinary person—lawyer, grocer, doctor, baker, oF whatever—is told of the central Christian claim that Jesus Christ as full God and fall man, he has the option of experiencing ‘authentic inwardess. The catehis that he must respond to this claim in the right way, that is, subjectively. He must recognize the objective bsunity ofthe claim, and, nevertheless, make the leap... - when faith resolves to believe it runs the risk of committing self to an eror, but it nevertheless believes, There is no other road 10 Faith; if ane wishes (0 ‘escape ris itis as if one wanted to know with certainty that he eam sin before going into the water." Kicrkegaatd’s assault on apologetics knocked every objective support out from under this faith. The individual ‘who takes the risk must swim out over 70,000 fathoms of water with ao objective life preserver to buoy him up in the midst of the dreadful insecurity of faith." Kiorkogaard is very explicit about the link between the Fisk of faith and inwardaess For without risk there is a0 faith, and the eeater the risk the grater the faith: the more ebjctive sect the fess inwardnesss andthe Tes sijectiveweuritys he mone profiad the pans aware82 reuoious BesremALi By contrast, Kierkegaard's human ideal is the individusl, the tuntypical person. ‘The best examples of unusual individuals ae creative tenvses. The human race advances on their backs because they venture fnto uncharted waters, Kierkegaard obviously had no use for responsible committee members. His sense for creative individuality underies many ‘of the observations in Fear and Trembling in which Kierkegaard extols the particular as_ being higher than the universal. “The tragic hero [Agamemnon, Jepths, Brutus] renounces himself inorder to express the luniversal, the knight of faith (Abraham) renounces the universal in order to become the individual Kierkegaard dacs not want the ereative n= dividual to ignore the dniversal. He must not, fer example, be inferior to the demands of morality. He ought to be superior to them, but 10 do so, he must first atain the level of acknowledging and obeying them. “For fith {Abraham's venture in being willing to sacrifice Isaac]. the particular is higher than the universal—yet in such a way, be i observed, that the «individual, after having been in the universal [that is, after having internalized its demands} now asthe particular isolates himself as higher than the waivers.” Kierkegaard’ thinking is original but strained. Against generations of faithful believers and of theologians, he insists that Abraham is, fom the moral standpoint, a murderer, yet he then proceeds to claim tha from the standpoint of faith Abraham rises above the universal, which, i this case, is represented by moral standards. Kierkegaard reconciles the to judgments by claiming that in relation to his role a father the universal ‘Obligation on Abraham is to love Isaac.” when God requires [that Abraham sacrifice) Isaac, he [Abraham] must love him if possible even ‘more dearly (than ether fathers Love their sons] and only on this condition can he sacrice him; for in fact iti this love for ae which makes his act a saeriie [as distinct from a murder] "=" Abraham, like u creative genius goes beyond the universal, and is therefore unabie 19 communicate the basis of his action to other human ‘beings who are oriented 10 the common standards of their day. "The lisiress and dread. is that, humanly speaking, he is entirely unable 19 ake himself ineligible." For this reason, creative works often repsl the artistic establishments of a given era. The Impressionists raised a storm in the field of painting, and Stravinsky's The Rite of Spring provoked a rot at its frst performance in Pais ‘One ofthe things we mean in calling a person a genius is that their work causes us to revise our standards of merit ina given fel. Yet until this sort of recognition is forthcoming, kenitses experience terifyin tensions. They are subjectively certain ofthe mort of thei work or they wouldn't present it tothe public, yer there are no objective verification procedures that can support this subjective certainty. After ll,one ofthe things we mean by “creative” in this contexts that the Benius Breaks with established standards. We have seen that generally accepted standards which enable us to produce widespread agreement in judging individual teases is one ofthe important meanings of “objective” (see pp. 92F). Having insisted that Abraham’ is—from the standpoiat of the universal ethical—a murderer, Kierkegaard then relects on Abraham's status as the "father of faith.” He breaks with the coaventional Abraham ff Sunday sehool piety and paints am Abraham whose faith was charac- terized by fear and trembling. He then claims (in effec) that just as posterity vindicates the breakthroughs of a creative genius ike Strain Sky by responding positively to the dissonances of The Rite of Spring, so too Kierkegaard wants posterity to vindicate his Abraham, the knight of faith, by responding positively to the risk of faith. Kierkegaard has nothing but seora for poople wo admire creative individuals, whether in ‘or religion, but who aeimire them in a conventional way. “This is safe ic involves going along with the judgments of posterity while overlooking the anxiety and dread tht the creative individual experionces before he has achieved acceptance. ‘As I sec it although Kierkegaard himself gever puts it this way, the creative genius”at the moment of producing a masterwork but before receiving. recognition from society-—provides the model for Kietke aard’s “passionate inwardness.” This is a use of the phrase that is Independent of Christan faith and relates to Kierkegaand’s elforts ‘define authentic human existence. It is, however, also relevant 10 his ‘understanding of faith, 28 with Abraham ‘Truth and the Existing Individual An existential desision is one which must be made with considerable risk because there is no way of ‘objectively determining the right thing to do. The reasoning behind James” Statement that an issue of this kind “cannot be decided on intellectual rounds” has already been discussed (see pp. 139.) The point underlies Kierkegaard’ statement that “the objective accent falls on what is said the subjective accent on how its said." By the word “what” Kicrke- ssard refers 10 the costent of a statement, for example, in the syathetic Statement “This page is white,” the content is the color of the page. ‘Whenever an issue ean be dealt with objectively, we waat to kuow what thas been determined. Existential decisions, as we have seen, involve issues that cannot be seed by objective procedures. Kierkegaard insists that in Abraham's Uheve fe no objective content that ean be is the “how"™the way in whieh the