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S&TIS/11602
PAGE
3.0
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................................................................... 3
3.0.1
3.0.2
3.0.3
3.0.4
3.0.5
3.0.6
3.0.7
Purpose ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
Team ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Timing ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Requirements ................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Preparation ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Documentation .............................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Method .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
3.1
CONTINUOUS PROCESSES................................................................................................................................................ 7
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
BUILDINGS ................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
3.11
3.12
3.13
INTRODUCTION
3.0.1
Purpose
The purpose of Hazard Study 3 is to review the design and/or procedures to identify any hazards or
obstacles to operability which could arise, particularly through deviations from the design intent. In the
case of process plant, this will be based on the study of firm Engineering Line Diagrams and outline
operating procedures and outline commissioning procedures. The consequences of deviations are
identified and, where necessary, appropriate corrective actions initiated.
The study also provides an opportunity to review potential maintenance and quality problems.
Key aspects include:
(a)
A detailed, systematic study of the design and outline operating and maintenance procedures
to identify the consequences of deviation from design intent.
(b)
Consideration of transient operating conditions during start-up, shutdown, plant upsets and
emergencies.
(c)
The main justification for the detailed and time consuming studies is the elimination of potential
hazards. This approach should ensure that projects are commissioned promptly and safely and that
the need for late changes is minimised. However, very important and valuable spin-offs can result
from questioning operational and maintenance considerations such as routine testing and maintenance
of equipment. The Hazard Study team should record any decisions taken on the depth of study (i.e.,
the statement 'no hazard' does not mean 'no problem').
The techniques described in this part of the Guide are searching and exhaustive. Where there are
significant hazards, e.g., on new designs and on those handling hazardous materials, the techniques
need to be applied rigorously and thoroughly. It should also be recognised that the repetitive
application of the techniques in places where there are no hazards can lead to much wasted effort and
divert scarce resources away from real problems. It is therefore necessary to apply care both in cases
where there are no significant hazards and also in cases where the design has already been subjected
to a detailed, well recorded series of hazard studies. In the latter case, a thorough consideration of the
implications of all changes, making reference to the records of the earlier studies may provide the
necessary assurance of safety. It is important in these cases that the records are updated to provide
full hazard documentation for the system being studied
The ICI Hazard Study 3 is the "HAZOP" technique as referred to in US Federal Legislation on Major
Hazard Plants, OSHA 29CFR Part 1910 and specified in the AIChE, Centre for Chemical Process
Safety "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures".
3.0.2
Team
The team composition should be agreed by the Hazard Study Leader and the Project Manager. The
normal composition of the team is:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
For studies on existing plants, the study team should include operators or maintainers where
appropriate.
Part 3 - Hazard Study 3
Page 3
S&TIS/11602
In addition an Occupational Hygienist and/or an Environmental Specialist may join the team where
agreed at Hazard Study 1.
3.0.3
Timing
Process Hazard Study 3 is best carried out when firm Engineering Line Diagrams with outline
operating, commissioning, maintenance and test procedures are available. Hazard Study 2 for the
relevant section with its actions/recommendations should be complete as far as is practicable.
PES Hazard Study 3 is best carried out when the PES system design is at an advanced stage but not
necessarily complete. Most major design decisions should have been taken. The status of the process
Hazard Study 3 is not significant.
3.0.4
Requirements
For the Hazard Study 3 of Batch and Continuous processes the following should be available if
applicable:
(a)
(b)
Outline operating, commissioning, maintenance and test procedures in so far as these are not
obvious from the design.
(c)
(d)
Classification of the 'type' and 'grading' of alarm and trip systems; for a suitable standard see
EDG.CEE.02.75.
(e)
Area electrical classification drawings where zoned areas have been identified.
(f)
(g)
List of vessels and pipework to be registered as requiring periodic inspection, for a suitable
standard see EDP.WOR.05.14.
(h)
List of Critical Machine Systems, for a suitable standard (see GEP 5, EDP.MAC.66.02 and
EDG.MAC.24.01).
(j)
Specifications.
(2)
Configuration diagrams.
(3)
(4)
System manuals will be useful. The responsibility for input/output card allocation checks and line for
line software (sequence) checks lies with the respective designing engineer and not with the Hazard
Study 3. The Hazard Study 3 should verify that these responsibilities have been accepted and
performed.
There needs to be adequate availability of team members, recognising practical limitations (e.g.
meetings should be less than 3 hours duration/day and there should be less than 3/week on a regular
basis).
There needs to be a plan for review meetings (for actions and recommendations raised).
3.0.5
Preparation
For maximum effectiveness and efficiency, meetings should take place in a comfortable room with
adequate light, ventilation and quietness, etc.
Where team members are new to Hazard Studies, the attitude of team members to questioning of their
design by an 'outsider' may be very negative. The need for some training before the first meeting, or
at the beginning of the first meeting, needs to be considered. A video is available from ICI Engineering
Technology Process Safety Section.
Prior to the meeting, the Hazard Study Leader should verify with the Project Manager that the
documentation is available and at a suitable stage of development. Ideally, the information will be
circulated to the Hazard Study Team at least a week in advance.
3.0.6
Documentation
Documentation, in the form of the record of the Hazard Study meetings, and supporting documents
together with evidence of the completion of all actions should be filed in the Project Safety, Health and
Environment Dossier (SHED - STD/F/01022). It is important that the marked up Engineering Line
Diagrams, or a good copy, micro-fiche or 35 mm photographic slides of the material, are also retained
in the SHE Dossier (SHED) together with the Hazard Study records.
It may be necessary for hazard assessments to be carried out as actions from Hazard Study 2 or 3.
Such assessments should be issued as separate documents and included in the Safety, Health &
Environment Dossier.
Documentation should include records of the equipment studied, the causes of deviations from design
intent considered, and the effects of potential hazards identified. These should be recorded on
standard forms (see STD/F/01015) and STD/F/01017).
In most cases, where hazards or operability problems are exposed in the detailed systematic
examination, measures will have been taken in the design to prevent or correct unwanted events.
These will include such things as conformance with Codes of Practice, selection of appropriate
equipment, alarms/trips, procedures, etc. These should be acknowledged on the relevant forms.
However, the Hazard Study 3 is likely to raise detailed questions which typically may address the
feasibility of routine proof testing, the problems of maintaining specific items of equipment, the role
and responsibilities of people, etc. Such questions in many cases can not be resolved in the Hazard
Study Meetings and actions/recommendations will need to be recorded and allocated to nominated
persons - not necessarily members of the Hazard Study Team. Such actions/recommendations will
need to be reviewed as part of the hazard study process.
Common to each record form are definitions of Project No., Drawing No. (and Revision No.), team
members, date and meeting No.s. This key information is important for future information retrieval.
Often overlooked is the need to retain a copy of the Engineering Line Diagram which was studied.
Such an oversight can lead to confusion in future years when attempts are made to correlate the
Hazard Study notes to current drawings which, through subsequent revisions, no longer accurately
match the original design.
Method
It is important that the whole team understands the process being studied if each member is to make
an effective contribution to the meeting. A few minutes needs to be allowed for this activity at the start
of the meeting.
Then the Hazard Study Leader will use his experience to guide the team to select the best starting
point for each study. The normal systematic approach on chemical plants is to examine firstly the
process lines into a vessel, then the process lines out of a vessel and finally the vessel.
Ensure everyone understands what is being discussed. Much fruitless work can be avoided if each
team member is kept aware of the exact item being discussed. This can require special attention
during a long series of concentrated Hazard Studies.
Ascertain the design basis. The Process Design Engineer will normally know the basis for the design
being studied, although there may be areas where experts in Control Engineering, etc., may be more
appropriate to provide this information to the team. Earlier Hazard Study work may also be referred to
as part of this design basis. A written summary should be available for reference and for inclusion in
the Hazard Study report/notes.
Explore the possibilities and capture ideas. The Hazard Study Leader needs to encourage the team in
thinking about the possible ways that deviations can occur and the possible outcomes. Sometimes an
idea will be brought out which would be more appropriate at a later stage of the study. This idea
should be noted for use later. However, it is important to filter out real concerns from trivia. The
Hazard Study Leader needs to draw the discussion together to decide whether or not problems need
further action or whether the discussion needs to be recorded. This should be done with the
involvement of the whole team.
It is important that ideas are not ignored or rejected without due consideration, since the contributor
may lose interest and take a less active role in the meeting.
Regulate the progress and control the width of thinking. The Hazard Study Leader needs to exercise
some control over the speed of progress of the team. There are times when progress needs to be
speeded up because over-detailed thinking, or consideration of design changes is taking too much of
the time. There are also times when the team is keen to move along quickly and the Hazard Study
Leader needs to restrain progress if significant items could be missed.
It is important to encourage the team, and a little light-heartedness and a break for refreshment can
help to maintain concentration. The original hazard study procedure, developed in the early 1970s for
examining Engineering Line Diagrams with the aid of a guide diagram, has now been developed and
extended from continuous chemical processes to batch processes, selected operating and
3.1
CONTINUOUS PROCESSES
Studies of continuous chemical processes are carried out in a series of meetings where Engineering
Line Diagrams are examined, line by line, vessel by vessel, using a list of guidewords to stimulate the
Hazard Study team's consideration of all conceivable deviations from design intent.
The detailed examination of cause and effect of deviations in both normal and abnormal plant
operation is designed to minimise problems at commissioning and start-up, and to ensure continued
safe and reliable operation of the plant. This systematic study of design detail should identify areas of
concern which can, if necessary, be resolved outside the hazard study meeting.
The list of guidewords in Figure 3.1 is worked through systematically by the team of mixed disciplines,
led by the trained Hazard Study Leader. The process lines and vessels examined are marked on the
Engineering Line Diagram and listed on the record form, (see STD/F/01015). The Hazard Study Leader
is responsible for ensuring the Hazard Study records are of a satisfactory quality. Should the cause
and effect of a deviation (e.g., low flow) cause no hazard, environmental, health, operability or quality
problems then no comment may be needed in the summary on the standard form. It will be assumed
that 'deviations' excluded from the standard list of guidewords have been considered but dismissed
and their exclusion from the form summary is not an oversight, but in the interest of brevity and team
efficiency.
Continuous processes also entail discontinuous operations (e.g., start up, controlled shutdown,
emergency shutdown). These should be treated in a similar fashion as batch processes.
Should potential problems be identified, then a record of the preventative or corrective measures
designed to minimise the likelihood and consequences should be specified. Any further action should
be noted and progressed outside the meeting. Where extensive discussions are held, these should
also be recorded even if they have not lead to identification of a hazard.
Should the Hazard Study 3 call into question the fundamental rationale of the hazard control measures
agreed at Hazard Study 2, then it is the responsibility of the Project Manager (or nominee) to ensure
that the Hazard Study 2 report is updated. In some countries this may be a legal requirement (e.g.
OSHA, SEVESO directive).
3.2
BATCH PROCESSES
The general characteristics of batch plants as compared with continuous plants are as follows:
(a)
The status of the various parts of the plants are changing cyclically with respect to time, and
therefore a line diagram alone gives a very incomplete picture.
(b)
The processes are usually multistage and the individual units multipurpose. For example, in a
chemical reactor the process steps could involve:
(i)
charge solvent;
(ii)
charge reactants;
(iii)
heat to reaction temperature;
(iv)
add final components at controlled rate;
(v)
cool down products to discharge temperature;
(vi)
discharge.
(c)
Batch plants are often multiproduct and reaction units usually have to be cleaned out and
modified when changing from one product to another.
(d)
From the comments above it will be clear that there can be several 'norms' for batch plants.
At the very least there will be two:
(1)
(2)
This is in contrast to a continuous plant where, when in steady state operation, a fixed 'norm'
in terms of flow, pressure, temperature etc. can be defined for each and every part of the
plant.
(e)
Operators may take part in some of the process activities such as charging material from
drums or removing product from filters. Even well trained and well-motivated operators will
make occasional mistakes.
During the study the question should be asked "How often will an operator make a mistake?" and not
"If an operator makes a mistake ...". If the consequences are serious the possibility of error should be
designed out.
For the purpose of the hazard study, in addition to the Engineering Line Diagram, which describes the
plant, it will be necessary to know the sequence of process operations. This can be in a variety of
forms, usually a process summary (such as a batch master print-out), but could be a logic diagram, dot
chart or sequence flow chart. With complicated or proprietary items of equipment a considerable
amount of preparatory work may be necessary before the study.
The approach usually adopted in a hazard and operability study of a batch process is to apply the guide
words initially (see Figure 3.2) to each step of the process. Applied to a vessel such as a reactor this
would lead to the examination of various lines which could then be marked off on the line diagram as
having been examined.
Other lines not identified with a normal process step (e.g., relief lines, vents, etc.), would then be
examined before moving on to the next major item of equipment.
The detailed sequence of the examination is shown in Figure 3.3.
FIGURE 3.1
S&TIS/11602
FIGURE 3.2
Guide Word
NO
(NOT
NONE)
Meaning
Example of Deviation
MORE OF
LESS OF
REVERSE
SOONER/LATER
THAN
OTHER (THAN)
Back-flow or back-pressure
Heat rather than cool
FIGURE 3.3
BEGINNING
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
When all the lines have been examined, consider whether there are additional factors, e.g., computer
failure
or services failure, which could affect the whole plant.
Multipurpose lines will have more than one 'normal' state and each should be examined.
(ii)
Services, e.g. heating/cooling systems, can be examined in detail at the heating/cooling step
or can be 'mopped up' before the process sequence moves on to another vessel.
(iii)
The omission of one or more steps in the process is not uncommon and the consequences of
such possible maloperations need to be examined.
(iv)
In batch processes Quantity is a critical parameter. More of quantity should always address
the possibility of a double charge, which is a common error.
(v)
For many process steps only the first Guide Word (NO/NOT) will be relevant. If the operation
is to "check vessel empty", then it either is or isn't (though various causes may be identified
for the not-empty condition).
(vi)
In multiproduct plants, the first and last batches of a campaign are different and need to be
treated as such.
(b)
(c)
(d)
The effect of agitation failure and temperature deviation needs to be considered at each step in the
process.
Lastly, it is worth stressing that a deviation in one part of a batch process sequence, or at a particular
time, may not necessarily result in a hazard at that time or place, but may manifest itself elsewhere or
later.
On batch processes it may be more appropriate to examine the various stages in the process, from
approval of the recipe through the batch cycle to discharge and decontamination.
3.3
In "all-in" reactions, all reactants are charged and reaction is completed by subjecting the
mixture to an appropriate temperature/pressure programme. Control may be lost if cooling
fails during an exothermic phase or if the effects of scale-up are not taken into account.
(b)
In "progressive addition" reactions, a key reactant is charged under conditions which will
ensure rapid consumption. Accumulation due to inappropriate temperature, poor mixing or
other reasons is a common cause of hazard.
The latter technique is preferred, where practicable, for potentially hazardous batch reactions.
3.4
3.5
FIGURE 3.4
Purpose
Deviation
What if omitted?
What else?
As well/instead?
When?
Why then?
Earlier/later?
Where?
Why there?
Elsewhere?
How?
How much?
More/less?
How fast?
Faster/slower
How often?
More/less often?
Who?
Why them?
Someone else?
3.6
(b)
Multi-channel cards have a number of different failure modes which should all be identified.
The allocation of signals to cards should be a joint Control/Electrical and Process activity.
(c)
The DCS system software is beyond the scope of this study. It is recommended that a
statement about the suppliers Quality design system and their internal or external auditing is
obtained.
(d)
The features of one suppliers DCS or PLC may be similar so information should be sought
from previous studies. This can mean that there is no need to invite a representative from the
manufacturer to the study.
(e)
There will be many power supplies, most of which will be duplicated for reliability. All failures
should be alarmed in a way that the operator will be aware.
(f)
All identified system failures will probably be alarmed to the operator by a message. These
messages are likely to be infrequent and not immediately understandable. How will the
operator respond to these error messages, who will he contact, and what level of training will
they have been given?
(g)
PES systems can easily produce an overload of alarms. In the event of a plant upset, the
operator may be faced with hundreds of alarms and miss a critical alarm in a sea of trivia.
Alarms should be prioritised.
Recording may be on a conventional Hazard Study 3 record form (STD/F/01015), or on the specific
FMEA form (STD/F/01017).
Advanced Control Systems can be studied using these techniques but such a study will not address the
control actions that an ACS is capable of taking.
The guidewords in Figure 3.7 have been used on some projects to prompt detailed consideration of the
failure modes of modern PLC type control systems and, whilst capable of further refinement, the
approach does encourage a structured examination of each key unit in the control loop (e.g. DP cell,
P/I, controller/computer, I/P, control valve). Many new instruments contain PLCs (DP cells, density
meters, controllers etc.) and their failure modes can be very different from conventional instruments
(e.g., loss of input can default, such that automatic control reverts to manual without any audible
alarm). Such novel failure mechanisms can only be revealed by lateral consideration of cause/effect
deviations in input/output circuitry and software programs. In particular, the wider implications of
dependency or common mode failure should be addressed.
3.7
3.8
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
On electrical systems, a one line diagram or a block diagram representation should be examined
systematically to identify novel failure mechanisms only revealed by creative thinking about
cause/effect deviations in input/output circuitry and software programming.
FIGURE 3.5
FIGURE 3.6
Are there any other failure modes which have different effects
FIGURE 3.7
Failure mode
Notes
Transmitters
open circuit
short circuit
frozen signal
drifting signal
noise
F, P, T, L, Q, W
and converters
Smart transmitters
open circuit
short circuit
frozen signal
drifting signal
diagnostics
reconfiguration
single loop
multi loop
single loop
multi loop
single loop
multi loop
open circuit
short circuit
single loop
multi loop
open circuit
short circuit
FIGURE 3.8
Guideword
Notes
Power supply
main supply
individual PSUs
voltage dips
System highways
failure
external links
time delays
Standby system
configuration
failure
low speed
loss of data
timing
Operator displays
no update
system diagnostics
Engineering displays
Ergonomics
Security
passwords
access
Fire
protection
detection
alarms
extinguishing
Environment
dust
chemicals
stability
PES Security
position
water ingress
physical damage
RFI/ESD
Training
operators
maintainers
system keeper
Commissioning
commissioning
testing
Operation
maintenance
modification
back up
operating instructions
of information
FIGURE 3.9
FIGURE 3.10
S&TIS/11602
3.9
Replacing old instrumentation with modern versions (often with inbuilt PLCs).
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
A new source of feedstock which may contain trace constituents new to the process.
It is often instructive to make a comprehensive list of every conceivable factor that may change and
then to consider systematically the possible implications. The hazard study team should be
encouraged to consider, within clearly defined boundaries, changes to:
(1)
HARDWARE
(i)
Equipment.
(2)
SOFTWARE
(i)
Operating Procedure
(ii)
Maintenance Procedure
(iii)
Routine Proof Testing
(ii)
Drawing updates.
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Consideration of new and novel human error event scenarios not previously foreseen with the
old system.
(vi)
Such an approach will focus the hazard study team's attention on the significance of key differences
between the before and after situation - although the basic process/function remains unchanged.
It is also important in these situations to consider the hazards that could arise during the transition, and
to examine the adequacy of emergency procedures/systems. It may be that certain differences are
more significant at different stages of the transition and therefore a systematic examination of key
steps in a phased completion may be necessary.
The hazard study team should decide whether a formal Hazard Study 1 & 2 and/or line-by-line ELD
study could be an added benefit. They should record their reasoning on the Site Modification
Procedure documentation.
3.10
BUILDINGS
In Hazard Study 2, consideration will have been given to the physical layout of buildings and to the
containment of noxious and harmful substances and the 'top events' such as fire, explosion, pollution,
etc., will have been considered. At this later stage in the project it is often useful to use the Hazard
Study 3 techniques (see Figure 3.11) to ensure that there is also a clear understanding of non-SHE
items (e.g. the detailed operating and maintenance aspects) which will be fundamental to the
satisfactory performance of the building. This is of particular importance when considering novel
techniques and/or systems to be incorporated in the project.
Factors worthy of further consideration should be highlighted, judged on the degree of novelty or
uncertainty attached to them, and/or on the impact their non-conformance will have on the final
operation of the project.
These factors should be listed and the Hazard Study Leader should then select the most appropriate
form of study normally selected from the previous methods to examine, for example drains, ventilation
systems, etc.
A separate study, Hazcon, has been developed for construction and demolition activities; for more
details see EDG.CON.50.01.
3.11
DESIGN CHANGES
Following the completion of Hazard Study 3 any modification made to the design, including those
made during the commissioning stage, will need to be controlled. For a suitable procedure see PP.25.
Established change control procedures should be used, the changes being approved by the Project
Manager and Commissioning Manager and referenced in the Project Safety, Health and Environment
Dossier.
3.12
OTHER STUDIES
The engineering function should produce or update area electrical classification drawings where zoned
areas have been identified during the Hazard Study 2 and 3 stages of a project.
The Project Manager should ensure that appropriate links are maintained with the 'Fire Process
Review' panel and arrange for key correspondence to be included in the SHE Dossier.
FIGURE 3.11
3.13
(b)
There is a need to check that the actions/recommendations from the Hazard Study have been
implemented in the way expected and that this has not introduced new hazards.
(c)
(d)
(e)
Some new Hazard Study work is often necessary if significant changes to the design or
operation are involved in the proposed solutions.
(f)
It is usual for the Project Manager to notify the Hazard Study Leader of any significant
changes in the design or operation which have been made subsequent to the Hazard Study 3.
They can then decide whether it is necessary to hold a further Hazard Study meeting to
consider the changes.
(g)
All modifications made to Engineering Line Diagrams after Hazard Study 3 should be formally
recorded and reviewed at the Hazard Study 4 stage. For a suitable procedure see PP.25 'Change Control'