CASE DIGESTS: Ferdinand E.

Marcos

ARTHUR ARCHIE TIU

11380241
For Civil Law Review 1 G03

Table of Contents
Page
Rogelio Roxas and the Golden Buddha Corporation vs Ferdinand E. Marcos
3
Republic of the Philippines vs Maler Foundation
5
WestLB; Ferdinand R. Marcos vs Republic of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Ferdinand Marcos

9
Republic of the Philippines vs Ferdiand E. Marcos and Bernstein
11
Republic vs Ferdinand E. Marcos Et al

13

Benigno S. Aquino vs COMELEC

15
In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation
17
In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of The Writ of Habeas Corpus
19
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs Desierto
21

Roger ROXAS and The Golden Budha Corporation, a foreign corporation, PlaintiffsAppellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
Ferdinand E. MARCOS and Imelda Marcos, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Supreme Court of Hawaii, 969 P.2d 1209 (1998)
Facts:
-

Defendant Appellant Imelda Marcos appeals from the decision of the first circuit court
which entered a judgement in favor of plaintiff Rogelio Roxas and the Golden Buddha
Corporation. The judgement ordered the Marcos Estate to pay damages in the amount of
$22,001,405,000.00
Roxas was a locksmith in Baguio City and an amateur coin collector and treasure hunter.
In 1961, he met Fuchugami who claimed that his father had a map identifying the
location of the legendary Yamashita Treasure which was owned by General Yamashita.
Eusebio Ocubo, claiming to be Yamashitas interpreter during World War 2, told Roxas of
a Golden Buddha Statue, which was kept at a convent near the tunnels. Roxas the
organized a group to search for the treasure,
7 months later, Roxas group broke through the tunnel which container World War 2
weapons and skeletons. There, he discovered a Golden Buddha (approximately 3 feet in
height) and a box containing gold bars. Various people tested the statue and found it to be
made of more than 20k Gold. The Statue had a removable head and inside, he found
several uncut Diamonds.
Roxas attempted twice to contact Judge Marcos to report his find but could not contact
him.
In 1971, at 2:30am, men purporting to be from the Criminal Investigation Group (CIS)
and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) raided Roxas house claiming to have a
search warrant signed by Judge Marcos. They informed him that if he does not open his
door, he will be shot.
The men entered his house accompanied by Oihara, one of the prospective buyers of the
treasure. The men took the Buddha and all the treasures with them.
Roxas went to Judge Marcos and the judge told Roxas that he had no choice because
Ferdinand Marcos ordered the warrant to be issued.
Roxas Traveled to Cabanatuan city and had gone in hiding, he was offered 4 body guards
by the Provincial Governor. Later, the Marcoses offered Roxas 3 million pesos but he
refused.
During Trial, Roxas was presented a Buddha but testified that it was not the same. Later,
on May 18, 1971, he was captured and tortured by some men who told him to go by the
presidents offer.

After the Revolution in 1986, He filed claims against the Marcoses and assigned all his
rights to GBC, which his childhood friend, Felix Dacanay, incorporated.

Issue: Was the action for damages proper for the claim of Roxas against the estate of Marcos due
to the stolen treasure?
Held: Yes, However, the Amount for damages is reduced from $ 22 billion to $1.4 million. A new
trial is on the Value of the Golden Buddha should be commenced.
Ratio:
Imelda Argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the Jurys finding that the
Golden Buddha was converted and sold by Ferdinand
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Because the search warrant was never produced at trial, it is difficult to assess whether all
of the foregoing prerequisites were satisfied. However, the jury could reasonably have
inferred that the seizure of the golden buddha and other items was unlawful based on the
following evidence: (1) Roxas's testimony that Judge Pio Marcos had represented to him
that he, Judge Marcos, had issued the warrant on Ferdinand's personal order, rather than
on his own, independent analysis of the presence or absence of probable cause; (2)
Roxas's testimony that he had been coerced into identifying a false buddha that had been
placed in the custody of the clerk of court; and (3) the testimony of Jonsson and Curtis
that they had observed Ferdinand in possession of a golden buddha. These facts, taken as
true, support an inference that the raid on Roxas's home did not constitute a legitimate
governmental seizure of evidence, but was rather a wrongful appropriation of Roxas's
property orchestrated by Ferdinand himself. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in
denying Imelda's motion for a directed verdict, allowing the question to go to the jury,
and denying Imelda's motion for JNOV or for new trial.
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that Roxas "found" the
treasure pursuant to Philippine law.
To recover on its claim for conversion, plaintiff must prove that Roger Roxas had a right
under Philippine law to possess whatever treasure he found. In this regard you are
instructed that[,] under Philippine law[,] hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land
on which it is found. Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the land of another, or
of the government, or any of its subdivisions, the finder is entitled to one-half of the
treasure so long as the discovery was by chance or by good luck. You are further
instructed that if the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the
treasure.
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We hold that Roxas' deposition testimony contained sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that he "found" the treasure "by chance or by luck." Accordingly, there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict concerning Ferdinand's liability for
conversion.
4

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Since none of the witness could testify on the purity of the Gold, the Court made a
determination on the weight based on the size of the Golden Buddha and adjudged it to
be worth $1.3 million only.

Republic of the Philippines

v
Maler Foundation
2013 SGCA 66, December 30, 2013 (Singapore)
Facts:
- There are three appeals against the decision of a high court judge in Singapore
determining entitlement to the sums of $16.8m and 4.2m (funds) held in WestLB AG of
Singapore.
- The Appellants in the case are the plaintiffs in the human rights case against Ferdinand E
Marcos in the Court of Hawaii compromising 9539 citizens of the Philippines and their
heirs. In December 1995, they had obtained a final judgement in the sum of
$1,964,005,859.90 against the Marcos Estate.
- The other Appellants are various foundations, including the Maler Foundation, which
were named as account holders of certain sums of money that has been held in Swiss
banks.
- On April 7, 1986, the SolGen of the Philippines sought assistance from the Swiss
authorities for mutual assistance on criminal matters of the Marcoses. They accepted the
request and issued freezing orders on various banks held in the name of the foundations.
The said funds in the accounts were later transferred to PNB to be held in escrow and
placed part of the deposit in WestLB AG
- The Supreme Court of the Philippines later ordered the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits in
favor of the Republic. In the State of Hawaii, there was also a judgement for more than
$1billion against the Marcos Estate.
- There then arose competing claims to the funds by PNB, the Human Rights Victims, and
the Foundations. West LB AG entered into an interpleader proceeding to determine
entitlement over the Funds.
- The Republic argues that under the Act of the State doctrine, Singapore should give effect
to the acts adopted by the republic. The Human Rights victims claim that there was an
assignment in the Swiss Deposits to the Human Rights victims
Issue: Who has the rights over the Swiss deposits?
Held: PNB hold the rights over the Deposits
Ratio:
The classic enunciation of the act of state doctrine was premised on sovereign states possessing
absolute sovereign powers with respect to acts within their territorial boundaries that should not
be questioned by a foreign court, and [t]he near universal rule of international law is that
sovereignty, both legislative and adjudicative, is territorial, that is to say it may be exercised only
in relation to persons and things within the territory of the state (per Lord Millett in Socit
Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Cie Internationale de Navigation and others [2004] 1 AC 260 at [80]).
We are unable to accept that the invocation of governmental interest, in the form of the public

policy of mutual judicial assistance in enforcing foreign confiscation orders, creates an exception
to the territoriality or lex situs rule.
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As the Human Rights Victims seemed to be saying that the formulation of their claim to the
Funds did not involve any assertion that they had obtained proprietary rights to the Funds at the
time the Chinn Assignment was executed, then in the context of the present Interpleader
Proceedings, their claim would be seriously undermined. The only question that the court is
concerned with in an interpleader proceeding is the resolution of adverse claims to the res that
forms the subject matter of the interpleader, and the entitlement must be founded on a title or
proprietary interest: see the decision of this court in Tay Yok Swee v United Overseas Bank and
others [1994] 2 SLR(R) 36 at [12][15], followed in Thahir Kartika Ratna v PT Pertambangan
Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR(R) 312 at [14][16]; Singapore Civil
Procedure 2013 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2013) at para 17/1/6. Interpleader proceedings are not
concerned with a relative in personam entitlement to property, or an oblique jus ad rem in the
form of a right relating to another persons right to the property.
While the Human Rights Victims chose to frame their cause of action based on a hierarchy of
relative entitlement to the Funds, we consider that the defining element of the claims of all the
parties to the Interpleader Proceedings is the question of title to property the correct
characterisation of the substance of the issue before this court is the effect of the Chinn
Assignment on the title to the Swiss Deposits at the time that the judicial assignment allegedly
took place, and this falls most appropriately within a proprietary rubric. The common law does
not recognise a distinction between a right of property as between the assignor and assignee and
a right of property as between the assignee and the rest of the world, and we consider that the
Human Rights Victims characterisation of the issue as one relating to the first-tier relationship is
hardly adequate. If the Human Rights Victims contention was that a different characterisation of
the proprietary issue ought to apply to the transfer of property in relation to the present matter as
only the assignor and assignee are involved in the appeals, we were not referred to any authority
that supported this proposition (see the rejection of a similar argument in Glencore International
AG v Metro Trading International Inc (formerly Metro Bunkering and Trading Co) (No 2) [2001]
CLC 1732 at [30]) and nor do we think that this is the correct characterisation of the issue before
us, which involves competing assertions of entitlement to property by parties other than the
assignor and assignee.
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PNB is the legal owner is premised on the simple fact that PNB was the named holder of the
accounts in which the Funds were deposited, and in the absence of any party who has
successfully asserted an entitlement to the Funds, the Funds should be returned to PNB as legal
owners, restoring the status quo prior to the commencement of the Interpleader Proceedings. In
other words, PNBs pre-existing legal title to the Funds arose prior to, and independently of, the
Forfeiture Judgment, and PNBs claim does not require this court to give effect to RA 1379. It is
as depositee.

WestLB; Ferdinand R. Marcos

V
Republic of the Philippines
GR 189434 and GR 189505, April 25, 2012
Facts:
- These are 2 consolidated petitions on the Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
- On December 17, 1991, The PCGG filed a petition for Forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan against the Marcoses.
- The PCGG also sought the declaration of the Swiss bank acoounts totaling 356 million
dollars and 2 treasury notes worth 30 million dollars as ill-gotten wealth. The Swiss
accounts were deposited in Escrow with PNB.
- On October 18, 1996, the respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on the
pleadings pertaining to the 356 million dollars. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion
because there was a compromise agreement. Petitioner Imelda claims that she was not a
party to the compromise agreements and that she owns 90% of the funds.
- On September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and declared that the
swiss accounts were forfeited in favor of the state.
- On January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its ruling. The republic filed a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
- On July 16, 2004, The Republic filed another motion for partial summary judgement
against ARELMA and the Sandiganbayan granted the motion on April 2, 2009.
- On October 22, 2009, Ferdinand R. Marcos filed an instant petition on Rule 45
questioning the said decision.
Issue: Whether the forfeiture proceeding with the Sandiganbayan is criminal in nature? In which
case a summary judgement is prohibited.
Held:
Cabal declared that forfeiture cases partake of a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the
right against self-incrimination is applicable to the proceedings, i.e., in which the owner of the
property to be forfeited is relieved from the compulsory production of his books and papers:
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or
imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings
are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or
rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment.
xxx xxx xxx
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings
in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be
arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects,
however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of
criminal proceedings for all the purposes of * * * that portion of the Fifth Amendment which
8

declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the
laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited.
xxx xxx xxx
As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to
take the stand as a witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the
commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or
remedial in nature.
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Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that arises from
the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based solely on a statute that safeguards
the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. Executive Order No. 14 (E.O.
No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former
President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of forfeiture suits that will proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file
independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
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As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are civil in nature, it follows that Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court on Summary Judgment may be applied to the present case. This is consistent with our
ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision upholding the summary judgment rendered by the
Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which are subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture as
the Arelma assets.

Republic of the Philippines

V
Sandiganbayan, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Romualdez Marcos
GR 152154, July 15, 2003
Facts:
- On December 17, 1991, PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan
against the Marcoses.
- In the case, petitioner sought to declare $356 million as ill gotten wealth and was
previously held by 5 groups namely: Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, XandyWintrop foundation, Trinidad- Rayby-Palmy Foundations, Rosalys-Aguamina
Foundation, and the Maler Foundation.
- On December 28, 1993, a general agreement was executed between the Marcos Children
and the PCGG Chairman Gunigundo for a settlement of the assests. The Marcos children
filed a motion for the approval of the agreements on December 7, 1995.
- On August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the district attorney of Switzerland a request for
the immediate transfer of funds to PNB. The request was granted
- On October 18, 1996, the Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgement on the
pleadings. Respondent Immelda Marcos filed her opposition over the petition.
- On November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied the said motion
- On December 10, 1997, the Swiss Supreme Court upheld the request of the transfer of
funds to be held in escrow to PNB
- On May 26, 1998, Imelda filed a manifestation that she was not a party for approval of
the compromise agreement and claims that she owns 90% of the funds.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents raised a genuine issue of fact which would negate the
summary judgement?
Held: No
Ratio:
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation
contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were
stock answers like they have no sufficient knowledge or they could not recall because it
happened a long time ago, and, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired, without
stating the basis of such assertions.
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10

On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However,
she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of
acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other
respondents that the funds were lawfully acquired without detailing how exactly these funds
were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the
funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can
prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired
legitimately by the Marcos family.
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Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by
simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in
the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have
positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged

11

Republic of the Philippines

V
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Ralph Bernstein, et al.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), Nov. 26, 1986
Facts:
-

This is an appeal from a preliminary injunction case in favor of the republic of the
Philippines on May 2, 1986.
Five properties were involved in the case all located in New York city.
The appellants are the corporations holding title to the properties including defendants
Ferdiand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos who are the beneficial owners of the properties.
The original complaint was filed on March 2, 1986 with the Supreme Court of the State
of New York
The complaint alleged that Ferdiand E Marcos now resides in Hawaii with Imelda and
allegedly doing business in New York thru his agents. It also alleged that Marcos was
involved in widespread and systematic theft of funds and properties belonging to the
republic.
The district court granted the relief prayed for and issued a preliminary injunction on
May 2, 1986

Issue: Whether or not the beneficiaries of the New York Properties are the Marcos family?
Held: Yes
Ratio:
Perhaps as significant pieces of evidence as any, however, were two documents
discovered in Manila in Malacanang Palace after the departure of the Marcoses. These
documents, which Bernstein authenticated before the Solarz Committee, were declarations of
trust executed by Bernstein on April 4 and April 5, 1982, at the direction of Gapud. The April 4
declaration set Bernstein up as a trustee for the benefit of President Ferdinand E. Marcos with
respect to all matters relating to Lastura Corporation; the April 5 declaration deleted Marcos's
name and inserted Beneficio Investment, Inc., a Panamanian corporation.
Bernstein stated that there did not seem to be any distinction as to ownership between any
of the four Manhattan properties. He thought the use of off-shore corporations and bearer shares
routine, for tax purposes; he initially had a power of attorney to act on behalf of the three
Panamanian corporations that owned Voloby and for a while held their shares of stock. Gapud,
according to Bernstein, represented "the principals," though no one ever mentioned names;
Bernstein's impression was that he represented the Marcos family. Moreover, early on, when
Mrs. Tantoco first took Bernstein to meet with Mrs. Marcos she referred to her as the "principal."
Bernstein also met in Geneva in March 1985 with Ron Zamora, a counsel to President Marcos,
who told him that "the principal" had decided to sell the four Manhattan properties. Bernstein
12

sought to have the first chance to buy them since the Bernsteins had been involved with the
properties for such a long time.
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Overall, the evidence of ownership of the Bernstein properties is strong, if not

overwhelming, no evidence has been offered to refute it, and the Bernstein brief on appeal fails
to challenge the conclusion that the Marcoses are in fact the beneficial owners of the Manhattan
properties.
Glockhurst Corp., N.V., is on slightly different footing. It argues that there is no competent
evidence that the Marcoses beneficially owned Glockhurst or 200 Madison Avenue. Yet, their
brief concedes that Glockhurst is owned by the very same Panamanian corporations that own
Herald Center Ltd. Thus, whoever owns Herald Center by way of the Panamanian corporations
also owns Glockhurst. As noted above, the August 9, 1983, memorandum to the "Beneficial
Owners of Canadian, Voloby, Nyland, and Glockhurst" indicates the cash flow from the three
properties, the Crown Building, 40 Wall Street, and Herald Center, "before the acquisition of
Madison ... [which is] to be achieved purely through borrowing (by Canadian and Glockhurst),"
with subsequent cash flow after the acquisition of Madison also set forth. In addition, Joseph
Bernstein testified that approximately $20 million of the proceeds of a mortgage taken on the
Crown Building were transferred from Canadian Land to Glockhurst at the direction of Mrs.
Tantoco for the purpose of buying 200 Madison Avenue. He also testified that Mrs. Tantoco
indicated in a meeting at 66th Street by way of explanation to Mrs. Marcos that the four
properties constituted "a balanced portfolio in the four corners of town." Before the Solarz
Committee Bernstein testified that Mrs. Marcos would probably not have been at the so-called
Barry Knox meetings in 1984 if she had not been an owner of 200 Madison Avenue. He also
stated that 200 Madison Avenue was one of the four properties that Ron Zamora mentioned in
Geneva in March 1985 as possibly being put up for sale by the "principal." We note that it also
appears from the supplemental appendix (which would need appropriate authentication and
introduction into evidence on any hearing on a final injunction) that apparently $4.3 million was
paid to Glockhurst from trust accounts in Manila managed by Rolando Gapud. The records of
this payment conform to a document in the handwriting of Imelda Marcos's personal secretary,
Fe Gimenez, showing payments of $5.5 million to Tantoco, $9.5 million to Voloby, $6 million to
Floirendo, and $4.3 million to "Blackhurst" on November 4, 1983, for a total of $25.3 million.

13

Republic of the Philippines

V
Ferdinand E Marcos., Et al
665 F.Supp. 793, February 11, 1987
Facts:
- The Central Bank of the Philippines brought suit in the District court of Hawaii against
former president Marcos to recover certain gold and currency allegedly brought by
Marcos to Honolulu in violation of Philippine currency laws.
- Marcos filed a counterclaim to enjoin the Central Bank from locating and seizing his
assets
- On August 20, 1986, Solgen Ordonez was in San Francisco to deliver a speech in
commemoration of the third anniversary of the assassination of Benigno Aquino. While
He was in San Francisco, Ordonez was served a subpoena by the agents of Marcos
requiring him to appear for a deposition and to bring certain legal documents concerning
proceedings in the US.
- On August 22, 1986, the Philippine Embassy sent a letter to the US state Department
invoking diplomatic immunity on behalf of Ordonez. The US attorney then filed a motion
to quash the subpoena and presented the letters discussed in the case.
Issue: Whether or not the Solicitor General may invoke diplomatic immunity when he was
served a subpoena in the US?
Held: Yes
Ratio:
The central issue in this motion is whether the letter from the State Department constitutes
certification of Ordonez' diplomatic status. Although the letter does not expressly certify
Ordonez as a diplomat, when read in light of the circumstances surrounding this subpoena and
with regard to the letter from the Philippine Embassy, there is sufficient evidence for the Court to
find that the State Department evinced a clear intent to grant diplomatic status to Ordonez. The
State Department's letter, issued the same day as the Philippine request, refers to the Embassy's
request for diplomatic immunity as a request for "immunity"; this careless lack of specificity by
the State Department is repeated throughout their letter. Yet, the State Department's does state
that Ordonez was here in this country as a "representative" of the Philippine government, that he
was here to perform "official functions," and that the "Department believes that it would be
appropriate to recognize and allow the immunity" of Ordonez. The letter of the Embassy
specifically requested diplomatic immunity, and in response to that request the State Department
agreed and drafted the appropriate letter. See Suggestion of Immunity, Exhibits B and C.
Despite the carelessness of the State Department's letter, in light of all the evidence submitted,
this Court finds that the State Department has provided the Court with a letter certifying Ordonez
14

as a diplomatic agent and requesting diplomatic immunity on his behalf. Out of respect for the
foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch, this Court finds that Ordonez is entitled to
diplomatic immunity.

15

Benigno S. Aquino, JR., Trinidad herrea, Bishop Francisco Claver, S.J., et al

V
Commission on Elections, and National Treasurer
GR. L-40004, January 31, 1975
Facts:
- On January 21, 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed which sought to nullify PD
1366, which called for a referendum for February 27, 1975.
- Respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their comments and the Court resolved
to consider the comment as answer.
- The petition states that Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office not possess
any lawful authority under the 1935 nor the 1973 constitution and therefore has no
authority to issue such proclamations.
- It also challenged the title of the president and is a quo warranto proceeding.
- The petitioners do not claim any right to office nor are they the incumbent Solicitor
General and therefore have no personality to sue. However, the court decided to hear the
case because of its far reaching implications.
Issue: Whether or not the incumbent President Ferdinand E. Marcos has legal title as president,
and therefore has no authority to issue said the presidential decrees?
Held: Yes, President Marcos has legal title and the Presidential Decrees are therefore valid
Ratio:
The next issue is whether he is the incumbent President of the Philippines within the purview of
Section 3 of Article XVII on the transitory provisions of the new or 1973 Constitution. As
heretofore stated, by virtue of his reelection in 1969, the term of President Marcos tinder the
1935 Constitution was to terminate on December 30, 1973. The new Constitution was approved
by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972, still during his incumbency. Being the
only incumbent President of the Philippines at the time of the approval of the new Constitution
by the Constitutional Convention, the Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind except
President Ferdinand E. Marcos who shall initially convene the interim Assembly. It was the
incumbent President Marcos alone who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 on
September 22, 1972 and issued orders and decrees as well as instructions and performed other
acts as President prior to the approval on November 30, 1972 of the new Constitution by the
Constitutional Convention and prior to its ratification on January 17, 1973 by the people.
Consequently, since President Marcos was the only incumbent President at the time, because his
term under the 1935 Constitution has yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the Constitutional
Convention, in approving the new Constitution, had in mind only him when in Section 3(2) of
Article XVII of the new Constitution it provided "that all the proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the
law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of Martial
16

Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by

subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the incumbent President,
or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."
The term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in Section 9 of the same Article XVII
likewise could only refer to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. .
This conclusion is further buttressed by Section 10 of the same Article XVII which provides that
"the incumbent members of the Judiciary may continue in office until they reach the age of 70
years unless sooner replaced in accordance with the preceding section hereof." There can be no
dispute that the phrase "incumbent members of the Judiciary" can only refer to those members of
the Judiciary who were already Justices and Judges of the various courts of the country at the
time the Constitutional Convention approved the new Constitution on November 30, 1972 and
when it was ratified.
Because President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of
the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution, he can "continue to exercise the powers and
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five Constitution and the powers vested in the
President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until he calls upon the interim National
Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise
their legislative powers vested by this Constitution (Sec. 3[l], Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the President is empowered to proclaim martial law. Under the
1973 Constitution, it is the Prime Minister who is vested with such authority (Sec. 12, Art. IX,
1973 Constitution).
WE affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or administrator of martial
law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can promulgate proclamations, orders and
decrees during the period of Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the
Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of
reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as
well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently
threatens all nations including highly developed countries (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship,
1948 Ed., pp. 7, 303; see also Chief Justice Stone's Concurring Opinion in Duncan vs.
Kahanamoku, 327 US 304).
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In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation;

Agapita Trajano and Archimedes Trajano
V
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imee Marcos-Manotoc
978 F.2d 493, October 21, 1992
Facts:
- After Former President Marcos and Imee Marcos fled to Hawaii in 1986, they were sued
in the federal court by Agapita Trajano for the death of her son, Archimedes in the
Philippines.
- Imee failed to appear and a default judgement was rendered against her. Later, She
contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Statute and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
- In August of 1977, Ferdinand Marcos was President of the Philippines and Archimedes
Trajano was a student of Mapua. On August 31, Trajano went to an open forum and there
he was kidnapped, interrogated, and tortured to death by military intelligence personnel.
- In February of 1986, Marcos et al left the Philippines and arrived in Hawaii, On March
20, 1986, Agapita Trajano filed her complaint under the District Court of Hawaii.
- The court concluded that this violation of fundamental human rights constitutes tort in
violation of the laws on the nation and awarded damaged to her for $4.16 million
Issue: Whether or not Imee Marcos is immune from suits when she left for Hawaii?
Held: no
Ratio:
Marcos-Manotoc argues that the Philippine Military Intelligence is an "instrumentality" of a
foreign state within 1603(b) of the FSIA, and that the tortious acts were brought about by
persons acting pursuant to the authority of Marcos, Marcos-Manotoc, and Ver such that the
liability of Marcos-Manotoc is expressly premised on her authority as a government agent. She
further contends that, regardless of whether she acted within the scope of her employment, she is
entitled to absolute immunity under 16047 because a foreign state and its agents lose
sovereign immunity only for tortious acts occurring in the United States. See McKeel v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 1983) (Congress did not intend to assert jurisdiction
over foreign states for events occurring wholly within their own territory), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
880, 105 S. Ct. 243, 83 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1984). Trajano, on the other hand, argues that under
Chuidian, the FSIA does not immunize acts of individuals which are outside the scope of their
official duties,8 and that the acts of torture and arbitrary killing (which the complaint avers
occurred under Marcos-Manotoc's own authority) cannot be "official acts" within whatever
authority Marcos-Manotoc was given by the Republic of the Philippines.

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In Chuidian, we held that the FSIA covers a foreign official acting in an official capacity, but that
an official is not entitled to immunity for acts which are not committed in an official capacity
(such as selling personal property), and for acts beyond the scope of her authority (for example,
doing something the sovereign has not empowered the official to do). 912 F.2d at 1106. In
McKeel, in construing 1605(a) (5) of the FSIA, which waives immunity for damages against a
foreign state for injury occurring in the United States,9 we found that Congress intended the
FSIA to be consistent with international law--and that the prevailing practice in international law
is "that a state loses its sovereign immunity for tortious acts only where they occur in the
territory of the forum state." 722 F.2d at 588.
Marcos-Manotoc's default makes the application of both cases easy in this case, for she has
admitted acting on her own authority, not on the authority of the Republic of the Philippines.
Under these circumstances, her acts cannot have been taken within any official mandate and
therefore cannot have been acts of an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state within the
meaning of the FSIA. On any view, FSIA coverage under Chuidian is not triggered, and the
statutory limitation to injury occurring in the United States recognized in McKeel is not relevant.
As a matter of law, therefore, the district court did not err in failing to dismiss Marcos-Manotoc
in her individual capacity.
Absent jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, there is no dispute that the
only possible jurisdictional basis for Trajano's action is the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350.
Section 1350 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
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We believe, therefore, that Trajano's suit as an alien for the tort of wrongful death, committed by
military intelligence officials through torture prohibited by the law of nations, is within the
jurisdictional grant of 1350.

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In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Dr. Aurora
Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda De Los Santos,
Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan,
Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Juanito Granada and Tom Vasquez
V
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, General Fabian Ver, General Fidel V. Ramos, and Lt. Col.
Miguel Coronel
GR L-61388, July 19, 1985
Facts:
- There was an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of fourteen
detainees wo were arrested from july 6, 1982 until July 15, 1982. The case was heard on
August 26, 1982.
- All the detainees, except Tom Vasquez, who was temporarily released, were being
detained pursuant to a presidential commitment order, LOI 1211 in relation to PP 2045
issued by President Ferdinand Marcos for violation of PD 885
- Out of the 14 arrested, 9 of them were identified to be members of the Communist party
of the Philippines engaging in subversive activities. At the place they were arrested, they
polic found 1 .38 cal revolver with 8 live bullets, 19 rounds of M16 ammunition, and
PHP 18, 650 believed to be CPP funds.
Issue: Whether the Presidential commitment order and the arrests of the 14 detainees were valid
during the time of Martial Law?
Held: Yes
Ratio:
The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for
any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any
warrant, its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the
legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the
power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the
detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need
therefor in the interest of public safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as
Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to
determining its legality in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This
must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which
the President alone may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State,
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the government and duly constituted authorities. This should be clear beyond doubt in the case of
"invasion," along which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned by the Constitution, which
contingency does not present a legal question on whether there is a violation of the right to
personal liberty when any member of the invading force is captured and detained.
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The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such measure. To be effective,
the occasion for its application on specific individuals should be left to the exclusive and sound
judgment of the President, at least while the exigencies of invasion, rebellion or insurrection
persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter, likewise, which should be left for the sole
determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed forces. The need
for a unified command in such contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-as a basic military
concept in the art of warfare.
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In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part of its power of
legislation to the President. 13 Would it not be as proper and wholly acceptable to lay down the
principle that during such crises, the judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more
trusting of the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same
necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's sole and
unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus on the occasion thereof, should also be beyond judicial review. Arbitrariness, as a ground
for judicial inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but impractical and
unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the courts to contradict the finding of
the President on the existence of the emergency that gives occasion for the exercise of the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing Presidential action on
the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent collision of two jealous powers with
tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in favor of adhering to the more desirable and
long-tested doctrine of "political question" in reference to the power of judicial review. 14
Accordingly, We hold that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the
Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which has the
effect of allowing the Executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses covered by
Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration
of the suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power could have been vested in
Congress, instead of the President, as it was so vested in the United States for which reason,
when President Lincoln himself exercised the power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S.
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this power under the
Constitutional., 15 Incidentally, it seems unimaginable that the judiciary could subject the
suspension, if decreed through congressional action, to the same inquiry as our Supreme Court
did with the act of the President, in the Lansang case, to determine if the Congress acted with
arbitrariness.

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Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans represented by Magtanggol

C. Gunigundo, PCGG Chairman and Orlando C. Salvador, as Consultant, Technical
Working Group of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
V.
Hon. Aniano A. Desierto as Ombudsman, Jose Z. Osias; Pacifico E. Marcos; Eduardo V.
Romualdez; Fernando C. Ordoveza; and Juanito Ordoveza, members of the Board of
Directors of Philippine Seeds Inc; Concerned members of the Development Bank of the
Philippines
GR 130140, October 25, 1999
Facts:
- On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued AO 13 creating the presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding committee with different representatives from different departments to
inventory and identify all behest loans
- On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum order no. 61 directing the
committee to include in its investigation all non-performing loans.
- In the 14th report of the behest loans on July 15, 1993, they reported that Philippine seeds
inc was one of 21 corporations who had behest loans
- President Ramos then directed the committee chairman to proceed with administrative
and judicial actions against the 21 firms.
- On march 2, 196, the committee filed with the ombudsman a sworn complaint against the
directors of PSI for Corrupt practices of public officers.
- The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. However, the
committee claims that the action is imprescriptible since the right to recover ill-gotten
wealth is pursuant to the mandate of Sec. 15 of Article XI of the Constitution which states
that: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Issue: Whether or not the right of the state to recover Ill-gotten wealth has already prescribed?
Held: no
Ratio:
Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and his
cronies accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to recover. Besides,
even assuming ex gratia that the right to file criminal charges against the respondents is
prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the crimes charged,
and not from the date of their commission. The ruling in Dinsay is not applicable to the case at
bar. First, it is a decision of the Court of Appeals; hence, it does not establish a doctrine and can
only have a persuasive value. Second, it involved a prosecution for estafa in that the accused
disposed of his property claiming that it was free from any lien or encumbrance despite the fact
22

that a notice of lis pendens was registered with the Registry of Deeds. The sale, cancellation of
the accused title, and issuance of a new title to the buyer could not have been concealed from the
offended parties or their lawyers because these transactions took place when the civil case
involving the said property and the offended parties was in progress.
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In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries
of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses
with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the OMBUDSMAN that the phrase if the same be not known in Section
2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean lack of knowledge but that the crime is not reasonably
knowable is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the
law, which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for
interpretation but only application.
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The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the
filing of Paredes application because no one could have known about it except Paredes and
Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: it is not
only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land x x x other public
officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and,
therefore, the disposable character thereof (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department
personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands
inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its location and occupancy; (2) the surveyor who
prepared its technical description; (3) the regional director who assessed the application and
determined the land classification; (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent; and
(5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could... have helped discovering that the subject of
the application was non disposable public agricultural land.
There was no showing that Paredes had connived with all the department personnel, who
had a hand in processing and approving the application of Paredes. Consequently, such personnel
could have easily discovered the falsity in Paredes claim and denounced it. It would have been
entirely different if the public officials concerned conspired with him, in which case, they would
have hidden the misdeed to escape culpability.

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