CASE1

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action

taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am.
Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during
our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important
to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under
our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many
lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice
of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The
practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State
Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such
a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of
both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also
know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not
[be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in
this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically,
so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts,
are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decisionmaking.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation.
The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining
the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the
"big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas
of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice"
in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvardeducated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience
of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with subnational governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often
with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management
of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible
to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used
to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is
not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or
will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction
is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default.
(Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining
their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic
and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry
no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius
and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking
into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a
week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts
of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help
in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away
from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself
with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any
blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 2
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial
Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.
RESOLUTION

10

PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said
resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12,
San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason
was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically
provided for private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed
liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del
Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution
of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the latter accepted cases and
continued practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification on the
following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as
counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and
(3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not
Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be
issued?"[2]
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355.
Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the
revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to clarify whether the
June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be
under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the
obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court.
Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding
clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts order dated August 8, 1989
giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose,
Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession
as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be
allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal
Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend
himself.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in
actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.[3] He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.[4] Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in
any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate
dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355,
including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique,
effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the
trial court for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San Jose, Antique and to the
Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
SO ORDERED.

11

CASE 3
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. [1] While respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa
Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998,
requesting for a certification with regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. [2] On
September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.[3]

12

In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without
prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense
of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private
complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his
appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his
position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization
from the Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating
Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to a powerless family from
the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always
supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga
sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant,
Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his
cousins discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms.
Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest
child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he
felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on
Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular
case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for
humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the
criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the administrative matter to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused
in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the
appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of
Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he
was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself
positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only
lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big
sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his
appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained
his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION

13

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from
the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the
knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any
repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which
prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited,
does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation
of the Rules.Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in
Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a
written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency
of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors.[9]
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18,
1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to
the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of
the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that
any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

14

15

CASE 4
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
[B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999]
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship
fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving
the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing that
Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in Tubao, La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship[1] in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner
in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds
that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of
majority."[2] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may
be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be
made 'upon reaching the age of majority.[3] The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which
had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s.
1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that
an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already
be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's
case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period" and the allowance
of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

16

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official document;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. [4] This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. [5] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. [6] It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity
in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. [7] If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge
under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced
before the effectivity of the new Constitution.[8]
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made.The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. [9] In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.[10] The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.[11] However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,[12] that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of
Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.[13]
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached
the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority.[14]
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of
citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,[15] the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when
he cane of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in
the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.[16]
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the
present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for
electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him.Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out
by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer
on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest
him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.[17]
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[18] where
we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation
in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court we held:
Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

17

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national
of two countries.There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have bean superfluous but
would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?[19]
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life
of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.
[20]
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a
result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

SYNOPSIS
Vicente D. Ching is the legitimate son of spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, Ching was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since birth, he resided in the Philippines. He is also a Certified Public Accountant and
a registered voter of Tubao, La Union. In fact, he was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12
May 1992 synchronized elections. On 17 July 1998, having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University, Baguio
City, he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. He was conditionally admitted to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. On 5 April 1999, the 1998 Bar Examinations were
released and Ching was one of the successful examinees. However, because of the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath and instead, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In compliance therewith, on 27 July
1999, Ching filed a Manifestation with attached Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and Oath of Allegiance dated 15 July 1999.
The Court held that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship was clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing upon reaching the age of majority. Moreover, Ching had offered no reason why he delayed
his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file
the same with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed
over.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; CHILDREN WITH ALIEN FATHER AND FILIPINO MOTHER BORN
BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 MUST ELECT THEIR CITIZENSHIP PURSUANT TO 1935 CONSTITUTION.- When Ching was
born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the
1973 Constitution when it provided that (t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that (t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; 1973 AND 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP HAVE NO
CURATIVE EFFECT.- It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those
covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject
to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625; PRESCRIBES PROCEDURE FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.- C.A. No. 625
which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed
in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may
elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before

18

any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN REASONABLE TIME AFTER ATTAINING AGE OF MAJORITY. However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should
be made within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE TIME; CONSTRUED.- The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. However, we cautioned
in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite: Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner
was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that
said election has not been made upon reaching the age of majority.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT COMPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. - In the present case, Ching, having been born 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority,
Chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in
him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT FAILED TO VALIDLY ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR.- Consequently, we hold
that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the
age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing upon reaching the age of majority. Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSON PRIVILEGED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP HAS ONLY AN INCHOATE RIGHT TO SUCH
CITIZENSHIP.- Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.

19

CASE 5
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND
FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by
a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as
a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three
(3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory
words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face
of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and
terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word Attorney as they
were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling
in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes
dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by

20

such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a
member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron
S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the
event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the
Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. [8] The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that
he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has
three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character
of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite
good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v.
Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are
not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District
in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in
his private capacity.The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title
attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice
demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would
diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and
made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the
practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

21

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby
SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

22

CASE 6
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION

23

NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into
between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office
here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith,
deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea
that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my
interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope
containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the
addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary
deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously
and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my
will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of
which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from
his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management &
Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming
sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP
loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of
** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint
dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten
words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

24

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to
cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and
coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions
emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation
of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but
only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a
"strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious
of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, [5] Alauya requested the
former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. [6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done
in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature,
fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue
injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00
plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26,"
were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); [8] and as far as he knew, his
subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to
which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." [10] He
claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's
assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa &
Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she
did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit,
it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands,
her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22,
1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no
solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;" and

25

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only
what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic
officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct
and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by,
among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others,
to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate.
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he
exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals,
good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for
most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times,
and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these
salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a
Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. [21] While one who has been
admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those
who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or
other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

26

CASE 7
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]
EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,
tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National
Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured
him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check
which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted
from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused,
Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed. On
June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check. [1] However, his demand
was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the
Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline
de Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and
violation of the Lawyers Oath.[3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot,
Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice. [4] However, it was returned unserved with
the notation Moved.[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar
Street, Pasig City.[6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against her was
served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for the civil
liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing

27

so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a
closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a
violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. [8] Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for
such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a
condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance
of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render
her unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment,[10] because it is
important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates
moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be
disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the
bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12]
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful
character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. [13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for
authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral
fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the
law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she
disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not
be any clearer:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for
doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.
[14]
We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 8
EN BANC
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

28

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight
(8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al
C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family
and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than
accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of
pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991
and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that
the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had
lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma
of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter
to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed
out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from
taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less
than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]

29

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a
parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to
causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the
Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On
the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to
give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he
will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by
the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 9
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband,
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under
scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the
penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,
[3]
this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:

30

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were
married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo,
Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General
Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in
Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in
Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for
immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court
upon respondent.[5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other
administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were
consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth
on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his
children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And
onMarch 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A.
Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the
dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the government service in
1990.However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers
acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976,
complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her
children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma.
Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the
Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys.Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the
Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed
arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena
(Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for
marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution
adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of
IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said
Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of
disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must
also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession

31

after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. [10] The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession,
by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high
standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the
scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this
scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this professional
infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a
source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his
actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. [13] Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct
entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, [15] an attorney-at-law is also invested with public
trust.Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and
confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in
the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16] Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been
compendiously described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the
dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are
intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general
public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom
the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., [19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife. She was
able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated
woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In
another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit
liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint
found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against
him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal
profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be
explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers
oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to
scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute
and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his
name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

32

CASE 10
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO,
Complainant,

versus -

ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P.

VALENCIA,
Respondents.

A.C. No. 6593

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
**
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
______________

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents
Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

33

1.

That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino
Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2.

That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3.
4.

5.

xxxx
That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me
that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of
my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told
me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli
Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
xxxx

6.

That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child,
stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7.

That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence x x x

8.

That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the
prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty.
Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He
claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and
understood his bad boy image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial
problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they
resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial
support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from
college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been
employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with
the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born
before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was
not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of
Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido,
as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained
this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that
Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her.
Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings [6] in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage
Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the
marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the
respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not
committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed
before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9]
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted
to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. [10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
likewise denied this motion.[11]
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her
Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP
Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30,
2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar,
Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P.
Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

34

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No.
XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did
not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under
the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in
the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to
reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his
acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that
no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to
reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.
[14]
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public.[15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; [16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not
material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing
qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were
committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good
moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the
rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19]
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members
of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the
implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have
stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of
withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration,
and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to
disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal
financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22]
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or
multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies
to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that
this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward
respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was
subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second
marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of

35

morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and
dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of
gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the
highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had
romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his
wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia. [26] This
was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage.This
was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without
taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6)
children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido
married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to
marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2)
women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10)
years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed
against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of
his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. [27] As a lawyer, he
violated his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, [29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
[30]
all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he
entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his
petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands
that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession ; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish
motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be
used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession
by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [32] Lawyers are at all times subject to
the watchful public eye and community approbation. [33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny
have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the
circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not
afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to
the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity
or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents
from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the
fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of
the Bar.[35]
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. [36] To have good moral character, a
person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion

36

generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. [37] The
requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of
lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. [38] Each purpose is as important as the
other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido
was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she
was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second
marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer,
a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems,
would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the
other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away
from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was
a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from
the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing
his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of
the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence,
she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of
the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage
transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine
marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to
marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their
marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not
appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman.This, to us, is a clear demonstration of
Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so
corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has
a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his
vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already
mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of
decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty.
Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior
demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of
the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required
of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with
great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal
professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties
pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify
them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after
their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her
character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity
of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

37

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

38