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Truthand Method:
Feminist
TheoryRevisited
Standpoint
Susan
Hekman
Winter 1997
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Hekman
TRUTH
AND METHOD
dominatedfeminist
debate in thepast decade: difference.
Third,feminist
to
of
be
to
two
the
most
standpointtheoryappears
significant
opposed
influencesin recentfeministtheory:postmodernism
and poststructuralism.The Marxistrootsofthetheoryseemto contradictwhatmanydefine
as the antimaterialism
of postmodernism.For all of thesereasons,the
conclusion that feministstandpointtheoryshould be discardedseems
obvious.
I thinkthisconclusionis premature,thatit is a mistaketo writeoff
feminist
standpointtheorytoo quickly.Feministstandpointtheoryraises
a centraland unavoidablequestionforfeminist
theory:How do we justify
claim thatwomenhave been and are oppressed?
thetruthof thefeminist
Feministstandpointtheorywas initiallyformulatedin the contextof
Marxistpolitics.But fromthe outset,feministstandpointtheoristshave
recognizedthat feministpolitics demand a justificationfor the truth
claims of feministtheory,that is, that feministpoliticsare necessarily
epistemological.Throughoutthe theory'sdevelopment,feministstandpointtheorists'quest fortruthand politicshas been shaped bytwo centhatknowledgeis situatedand perspectivaland that
tralunderstandings:
thereare multiplestandpointsfromwhichknowledgeis produced.As the
theoryhas developed,feministstandpointtheoristshave explored,first,
how knowledgecan be situatedyet"true,"and, second,how we can acwithoutobviatingthe possibilityof critiqueand
knowledgedifference
thus a viable feministpolitics. Feministstandpointtheoristshave answeredthesequestionsin a varietyof ways;manyof theseanswershave
In the
reformulated.
thetheoryhas been frequently
been unsatisfactory;
indisan
have
made
theorists
these
course of theirarguments,however,
to
feminist
theory.
pensablecontribution
the beIt is mycontentionthatfeministstandpointtheoryrepresents
shift
thatis
a
of
in
shift
the
of
a
concept knowledge,
paradigm
ginning
What
itself.
also
but
feminist
not
epistemology
theory
transforming only
LorraineCode (1991) calls a "new mappingof the epistemicdomain"
thatcharacterizesfeminist
theoryowes muchto the articulationand defeminist
of
standpointtheory.Finally,I assertthatthistheory
velopment
feminismbecause thequestionsit raises
remainscentralto contemporary
are crucialto thefuturedevelopmentof feminist
theoryand politics.Reof theparameters
feminists
discussion
much
been
has
there
among
cently
I believethatfeminist
of a "politicsof difference."
standpointtheoryhas
laid the groundworkfor such a politicsby initiatingthe discussionof
situatedknowledges.
I. Definingthe feministstandpoint
In an articleoriginallypublishedin Quest in 1975, Nancy Hartsock
wrote: "At bottom feminismis a mode of analysis,a method of ap342
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of thetranscendent
subjectwas implicit
point,just as the deconstruction
in Marx's theoryof the social constructionof consciousness.If material
life structuresconsciousness,if the different
experiencesof different
then
create
different
this
must
hold
fortheoppressedas
realities,
groups
well as the oppressor.Hartsockmightreplythattheoppressed'sconceptionof realityis truebecause it is based on a correctperceptionof material realitywhile that of the oppressoris false because it does not. But
such an argumentbegsthequestionof how a correctperceptionof mateit mustpresupposethis realityas a
rial realityis achieved.Ultimately,
as
the
which
truth
and falsityare defined.Evenin her
standard
by
given,
earlyformulationsof feministstandpointtheoryHartsock is defensive
about the accuracyof the oppressed/women's
conceptionof reality.The
theorymakes her defenseof thisposiincorporationof object-relations
tionevenmoredifficult.
If,as object-relations
theoryclaims,our relations
thenselectingone oftheseperceptions
withothersdefineour perceptions,
of
as "real" is instantly
suspect.But Hartsockalso realizesthecentrality
thispoint.Unlesswomen'sstandpointcan be shownto be truer,a reflection of realityitself,whybotherwithfeminist
analysisat all?
One ofHartsock'smajorclaimsis thatwhilethediscourseoftheruling
class is ideological,that of the oppressedis not: it reflectsthe concrete
realityof theirlives. An importantaspect of thisclaim is her assertion
that the feministstandpointis achieved,not given.The natureof their
analyoppressionis not obvious to all women;it is onlythroughfeminist
sis thatthefeminist
standpointcan be articulated.Whatthiscomesdown
to is that althoughthe feministstandpointis discursively
constituted,
thematerialrealityof women'sliveson whichit is based is not. This imis lostin muchsubsequentfeminist
standpointtheory.
portantdistinction
The beliefthatthestandpoint(s)of womenresiststhediscursiveconstitutionthatdefinesall "partialand perverse"perceptionsof realityis a mathese
standpointtheoristsin the 1980s; it structures
jor themeof feminist
methodforfeminist
to definea distinctive
theorists'efforts
analysis.
The dearest example of thisbeliefis the work of DorothySmith.In
as a Radical CritiqueofSociolherinfluential
essay"Women'sPerspective
the categoriesof sociolbetween
a
contrast
Smith
posits
ogy" (1987b),
call the lifeworld)of
life
the
and
(what
phenomenologists
everyday
ogy
women. She argues that the categoriesof sociology and sociological
For the somethodembodywhat Hartsockcalls "abstractmasculinity."
and
knower
between
as
the
defined
is
separation
objectivity
ciologist,
known,removalfromthe situatednessof knowledge.This methodand
thesecategories,she argues,obviatetheexperienceof women,an experience that is always situated,relational,and engaged.Two conclusions
follow fromthis. First,the livedrealityof women'slivesis absentfrom
the domain of sociology;it is quite literallyinvisibleto the sociologist.
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mustinsiston a world in whichwe are at the centerratherthan the peThe postmoderns,she claims,who want to eliminatethe center,
riphery.
She also claimsthattheydeny
therebydenyus our rightof self-definition.
us the rightto speak the truthabout our subjugation,obviatingthevery
possibilityof knowledgeand truth.Informingall of Hartsock's recent
workis a fundamentaldichotomy:eitherwe havesystemicknowledgeof
thewaytheworldis or we haveno knowledge,no truth,and no politics.
For Hartsock,postmodernism
the second termof thisdichotrepresents
I
could
thattruth,knowledge,and
(1990).
Hartsock,
omy
argue,against
politicsare possiblewithoutan absolutegroundingand thatsome postmodernwritersmake this argumentquite persuasively.
But I would like
to examineHartsock'spositionfroma different
angle. Her fearsforthe
futureof feministanalysisare not unfounded.If,as she realizeswe must,
feminismabandons thefeminist
standpointand, withit,thecorrectview
of reality,thenwe are in dangerof abandoningthe whole pointof feminist analysisand politics:revealingthe oppressionof "women" and arguing for a less repressivesociety.If thereare multiplefeministstandpoints,thentheremustbe multipletruthsand multiplerealities.This is a
difficult
positionforthosewho wantto changetheworldaccordingto a
new image.
I would argue thatHartsockhas definedtheproblemcorrectlybut is
pursuinga solution in the wrong direction.She wants to embracethe
"situatedknowledges"thatHaraway and othershave theorized,but she
cannot accept the logical consequence of this position: that no peris epistemologically
spective/standpoint
privileged.She wantsto retaina
notion of privilegedknowledgethat can accommodate both diversity
and locatedness.But herattemptsto achievethisgoal are not successful.
"Situatedknowledges,"she claims,are "located in a particulartimeand
fromnoplace. They are therefore
partial. They do not see everything
where but theydo see some thingsfromsomewhere."Borrowingpostmodernterminology,
she refersto theknowledgesproducedfromthevarious subjectpositionsof different
womenas "the epistemologiesof these
markedsubjectivities."She thengoes on to argue: "The strugglesthey
representand express,if made self-conscious,can go beyondeffortsat
survivalto recognizethe centrality
of systemicpower relations"(198990, 28-30). What thisformulationrequiresis a sustainedargumentfor
how such systemicknowledgeis possible. But such an argumentis not
forthcoming.
Other feministstandpointtheoristshave also attemptedto deal with
the challengeof difference
and its implicationsforthe truthclaims of
the feministstandpoint.DorothySmith(1990a, 1990b) getsaround the
fiat:she defines"women'sactually
problemof difference
by definitional
livedexperience"as a categorythatencompassesthediversity
of women's
Winter 1997
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METHOD
lives and activities.She thenopposes thiscategoryto the abstractconcepts of sociological analysis,contrastingthe "ideological" categories
of thesociologistto "what actuallyhappened"-the "primarynarrative"
(1990a, 157). But the method that she derivesfromthis dichotomy
is flawedand incomplete.First,despite the unmistakableinfluenceof
Schutz'swork, Smithdoes not offerany argumentforwhythe located
knowledgeofwomenis superiorto theabstractknowledgeofthesocioloto
gist;thisis assumedto be obvious. Second,despitefrequentreferences
thewomFoucaultand his theoryof discourse,Smithrefusesto identify
discursiveformation.She ofen's standpointas a knowledge-producing
fersa detaileddiscussionof how the sociologist'sdiscursiveformations
of state power.At timesshe comes close to
constitutethe instruments
thatthediscoursethatwomenhavedevelopedabout theirlived
admitting
reality,a discoursethat includesconceptssuch as rape, sexual harassshe shiesawayfrom
is also constituted.But ultimately
ment,and battery,
thisconclusion.Like Hartsock,she continuesto privilegethestandpoint
theknowlof women because she assumesthatwithoutsuch privileging
edge womenclaim loses itsnecessarygrounding.
she
PatriciaHill Collinshas a particularstakein theorizingdifference:
wantsto accountfortheunique standpointof black women.She defines
hergoal, she states,
herproblemin thecontextof theissue of difference:
is to articulatethe unique aspectsof black women'sstandpointwithout
among black women. She tacklesthis problem
denyingthe differences
by claiming,followingHartsock,thatthe black feministstandpointshe
bythe
articulates,althoughrootedin everyday
experiences,is constructed
own
of
her
One
of
the
on
that
theoristswho reflect
goals
experience.
women
that
constiblack
of
the
common
to
define
experiences
theoryis
tutetheiruniquestandpoint(1989; 1990, 208-21). Collinsdeals withthe
issue of the truthstatusof the black feministstandpointin an
difficult
ambiguousway.In an earlyarticleshe claims "objectivity"forthe "outsiderwithin"statusof blackwomen(1986, 15). In hermorerecentwork,
however,Collins retreatsfromthisclaim. In Black FeministThoughtshe
appeals to Donna Haraway'sconceptof standpointas themostvalid and
concludesthat"a Black women'sstandpointis onlyone angleof vision,"
ofHara "partialperspective"(1990, 234). Butdespiteherendorsement
of
full
the
embrace
to
is
Collins
implications
unwilling
away'sposition,
situatedknowledge.She rejectsthe claim thatthe perspectiveof the opwhich
pressedyields "absolute truth,"but she also rejects"relativism,"
she definesas the claim thatall visionsare equal (1990, 235). Her final
She
conceptof objectivity.
positionholds out some hope fora redefined
who develop knowledgeclaimsthatcan acassertsthat black feminists
and whitemasculinistepiscommodatebothblackfeminist
epistemology
the
elusive
to
goal of generatingsotemology"may have founda route
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new paradigmofknowledgeofwhichfeminist
standpointtheoryis a part
involvesrejectingthe definition
of knowledgeand truthas eitheruniversal or relativein favorof a conceptionof all knowledgeas situatedand
discursive.
This new paradigmof knowledgenecessarilydefinesa new approach
to politics.Modernistepistemology
definespoliticsin termsofthedichotomies thatinformit. Thus forthe modernist,politicsmustbe grounded
in absolute,universalprinciplesand enacted by politicalagentsdefined
as universalsubjects.Under the new paradigm,politicsis definedas a
local and situatedactivityundertakenbydiscursively
constituted
subjects.
Political resistance,furthermore,
is definedas challengingthe hegemonic discoursethat writesa particularscriptfora certaincategoryof
subjects.Resistanceis effectedby employingotherdiscursiveformations
to oppose thatscript,not by appealingto universalsubjectivity
or absoluteprinciples.
As a way of illustrating
mythesisthata new paradigmis emerging,it
is usefulto look at the threeepistemicpositionsthatHardingdefinesin
her 1986 book. In the course of a decade the distinctionsbetweenthese
categorieshave nearlycollapsed. Feministempiricismhas been radically
redefinedby epistemologists
such as LynnHankinsonNelson and Helen
ofempiricism
froma femLongino.Nelson (1990) providesa redefinition
inistperspective
thatconformsto whatI call thenew paradigmof knowledge. Relyingon theworkof W. V. Quine, Nelson definesan empiricism
in which,as she puts it, the world matters,but scientificcommunities
produceknowledge.Her principalthesisis thatit is not individualsbut
communitieswho know.Nelson'sempiricisminvolvesevidence,but it is
evidencedefinedand constrainedbypublic standards,not data observed
froman Archimedeanpointbya neutralobserver.6
Longinooffersa similar argumentin Scienceas Social Knowledge(1990). She definesherposition as "contextualempiricism,"a view of science in which scientific
is a functionof community
knowledgeis sociallycreatedand objectivity
It
is
that
both
Nelson
and
practices.
significant
Longinorejectwhat they
call "relativism,"
but theydo so by appealingto widelysharedbut communal-that is, constructed-standardsof evidence.
in blurringthe distinctionbeHardingherselfhas been instrumental
tweenfeministstandpointtheoryand feministpostmodernism
withher
advocacyof "a postmodernist
standpointapproach."The principaltheme
of feministstandpointtheory,thatknowledgeis situatedin the material
livesof social actors,has become thedefinitive
characteristic
not onlyof
feminists
influenced
but of feminist
bypostmodernism
theoryas a whole.
The majordistinction
betweenpostmodernism
and standpointtheory,
the
6
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SeealsoHirschmann
1992;andBarOn 1993.
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360
SeeHekman1983,1995.
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can articulate
whichfeminists
a counterhegemonic
discourseand argue
fora lessrepressive
Women
from
society.
speak
multiple
prostandpoints,
Butthisdoesnotprevent
womenfrom
comducingmultiple
knowledges.
inthetwentito workforspecific
ingtogether
politicalgoals."tFeminists
ethcentury
havedoneprecisely
thisandhave,as a consequence,
changed
thelanguagegameofpolitics.And,ultimately,
thisis thepointoffeministtheory.
Departmentof PoliticalScience
University
of Texas at Arlington
References
Bettina.1989. TapestriesofLife: Women'sWork,Women'sConsciousAptheker,
ness and theMeaningof Daily Experience.Amherst:University
of MassachusettsPress.
Bar On, Bat-Ami.1993. "Marginalityand EpistemicPrivilege."In FeministEpistemologies,ed. Linda Alcoffand ElizabethPotter,83-100. New York: Routledge.
In
Bordo, Susan. 1990. "Feminism,Postmodernism,and Gender-Skepticism."
ed. Linda Nicholson, 133-76. New York: RoutFeminism/Postmodernism,
ledge.
Campbell, Richmond. 1994. "The Virtuesof FeministEmpiricism."Hypatia
9(1):90-115.
1991. WhatCanSheKnow?Feminist
andtheConstrucCode,Lorraine.
Theory
.1993. DisputedSubjects:
PoliticsandPhilosoEssaysonPsychoanalysis,
'1 In a similar
Grantassertsthatpoliticalsimilarities
can be cultiargument,
Judith
vatedto helpfeminists
differences
speakacrosssuppressed
(1993,123).
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