Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Cansino vs Valdez
G.R. No. L-2468, July 16, 1906
FACTS:
The decision in this case was announced on the
30th of April, 1906. The grounds of that decision are as
follows:
The case is almost identical with the case of
Valenton vs. Murciano (which resolved the question of
which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into
peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac
in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the
ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not
objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the
judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession,
as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas
and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as
against everyone, including the State; and that the State,
not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.)
Magdalena Cansino, bought the property in
question, as public lands of the State from the Spanish
Government and received a deed therefor on the 27th of
October, 1893. In the former case of Valenton vs. Murciano
, the plaintiffs went into possession of the land in 1860 and
claimed ownership thereof by the extraordinary prescription
of thirty years. In this case some of the defendants testified
that they went into possession in 1862 and they claimed
the ownership of this land by the same extraordinary
prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lands occupied and possessed
by Cansino for almost three decades could ripen into
adverse possession by virtue of extraordinary prescription.
HELD:
In Valenton vs. Murciano, the court decided that
title to lands such as were involved in that case could not
be acquired by prescription while they were the property of
the State. The decision in that case governs and controls
this case and upon its authority judgment in this case was
affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an error in registering the lands
Ruling:
It was held that no error has been committed. Whether
particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than
for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact
and must be established during the trial of the cause.
Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case,
unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private
interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the
particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the
present cause the appellant made no effort to show that
the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been
decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural
than forestry purposes.
Agricultural Land
de Aldecoa vs Insular Government
(G.R. No. 3894. March 12, 1909)
Facts:
Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa applied for the registration of his
title to a parcel of land, situated in the town of Surigao; a
plan and technical description of said parcel was attached
to his application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an
opinion of the examiner of titles opposing the request of the
applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General
objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the
land in question was the property of the Government of the
United States, and is now under the control of the Insular
Government.
Aldecoa, amended his former petition, and relying upon the
provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No.
926, alleged that at the time he requested the registration
of the land in question, comprised in the plan then
submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force,
and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles to
property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land
in question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits
granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be applied to
the inscription of his land.
Issue:
Whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural land, was
converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal
provisions in force regarding Government public lands
Mineral Lands
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Dumyung
(GR No. L-31666, April 20, 1929)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City for annulment of Free Patents Nos.
V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the
corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208,
P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and
false data and informations furnished by the defendants,
Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung
Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents
and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan
Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares,
more or less, and situated in the Municipal District of
Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province.
The Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal
party defendant.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the same
on the ground that they had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were
duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not
guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I,
dismissed the three (3) civil cases because the same were
duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of
Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec.
122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these
properties became the private properties of the defendants,
under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these
titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens
titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R.
No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT
Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants
are now indefeasible and this Court has no power to
disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel
the same.
The records of this case further disclose that the
defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province and
are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of
Mountain Province.
Issue:
Whether or not the Original Certificate of Title of
private respondents were 'indefeasible' simply because
that they were issued pursuant to the registration of the
free patents of the private respondents and whether or not
they are entitled to the benefit of R.A 3872.
Held: No!
Doctrine: A certificate of title is void when it covers
property of the public domain classified as forest or timber
and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots
even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value,
shall be cancelled.
Justice Puno: NO
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The
classification of lands in the public domain
under Sec. 3, Art. XII of the Constitution does
not include ancestral lands nor ancestral
domains. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over
both ancestral lands and ancestral domains; or
(2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act
and the Land Registration Act with respect to
ancestral land only. Both modes presume or
recognise the land as private and not public.
The right of ownership to ancestral domain
under Sec. 7(a) involves lands,bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them
at any time within the domains, not waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and the mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy fisheries, forests
or timbers, wildlife, flora and fauna and other
natural resources enumerated in Sec. 2, Art. XII
of the constitution. Ownership therefore of
natural resources remain with the State.
Small-scale utilisation of resources in Sec. 7(b)
is also allowed under paragraph 3, Sec. 2, Art.
XII of the Constitution.
Finally, the large-scale utilisation of natural
resources in Sec. 57 of RA 8731/IPRA is
allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2,
Art. XII of the Constitution since only priority
rights are given to ICCs/IPs.
However, by including natural resources, Sec.
1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules
goes beyond Sec. 7(a) and therefore
unconstitutional.
Survey Error
1. Republic vs. Peralta, et al., En Banc (G.R. No.
150327, June 18, 2003)
RULING:
It was held that the lands are agricultural. Act No.
926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into
law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26,
1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for
confirmation of his title to the two parcels of land. A person
who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
session and occupation of public agricultural land for a
period of at least ten years prior to July 24, 1904 could
petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had
so possessed and occupied.
*SEC. 54 OF ACT 926
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their
legal successors in right, occupying public lands
i
n
the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles to
such lands
have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine
Islands
for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their
predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said
act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two,
under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war
or force majeure shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government
1.
10