Association of

Law Enforcement Intelligence Units

Trust, Integrity and Communication

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the
Denver, Colorado Police Department
Intelligence Unit

Conducted by the
Association of

Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU)

November 18-19, 2015

An International Law Enforcement Intelligence Network

Providing leadership and promoting professionalism in the criminal intelligence community since 1956

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

This report makes references to criminal intelligence files and other information that may be
confidential under state or federal law, regulations, or rules. Recipients of this report are
encouraged to consult with legal counsel before releasing any information from the report.
Findings and recommendations contained herein reflect the views of the auditors who performed
this work on behalf of the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU), and not of
any other organization or agency. The information is provided to the Denver Police Department
for its sole use and benefit.

Table of Contents
FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT ......................................................................................................................... 0
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................... 2
Purpose ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
Audit Authority and Qualification ............................................................................................................. 2
Scope ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
Methodology............................................................................................................................................. 3
Report ....................................................................................................................................................... 4
Limitations ................................................................................................................................................ 5
OBSERVATIONS OF THE AUDITORS - KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................... 5
Staffing and Structure of the DPD Investigative Support Division............................................................ 5
Physical Facilities....................................................................................................................................... 6
Training ..................................................................................................................................................... 7
Intelligence Unit Practices ........................................................................................................................ 8
Criminal Intelligence Files (Data Collection, Categorization, Maintenance and Dissemination)............ 13
Previous Audit Issues .............................................................................................................................. 19
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 21
This audit reflects an evaluation of the nascent stages of the Departments implementation of an
entirely new operational, investigative and intelligence records management and analysis system, to wit,
ACISS. The first unit within the Department to utilize the system is the Intelligence Unit. Various
issues/findings throughout this audit report suggest that a follow-up training for the Intelligence Unit be
included as part of the audit process. The function of the audit process is not only to determine
compliance with DPD Policy 118.03 but also to facilitate that process. While no flagrant disregard for or
intentional violations of the Policy are evidenced by the Intelligence Units implementation of the new
ACISS system, it is the auditors opinion that training for the Intelligence Unit personnel specific to the
1

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________
issues noted within this audit is essential to maintain full and effective compliance with DPD policy and
related regulations and best practices. ...................................................................................................... 21
Background of LEIU Auditors ...................................................................................................................... 22

BACKGROUND
Purpose
The purpose of this audit was to examine the Denver, Colorado Police Department's Intelligence
Unit (I.U.), a unit within the Denver Police Department (the Department, or DPD), for
compliance with DPD Policy 118.03. This is the fifteenth audit and the eleventh audit conducted
by the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU).

Audit Authority and Qualification

DPD 118.03 establishes internal controls and proper oversight for the collection, retention,
dissemination, and disposition of criminal intelligence to conform to privacy interests and
constitutional rights. Paragraph (11) a of the Policy requires audits of the implementation of the
Policy by an independent agency. The DPD has selected LEIU to conduct this, the fifteenth
audit.
Founded in 1956, LEIU is the oldest and largest association of law enforcement intelligence
units in the United States. LEIU first developed the LEIU Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines
in the 1970s to promote professionalism, provide protection of citizens' privacy, and provide
guidance to its member law enforcement agencies when collecting information in the pursuit of
preventing and solving crimes. Civil liberties groups, citizens, and government and police
officials have agreed that the professional standards embodied by the LEIU Criminal Intelligence
File Guidelines are the appropriate standard for collecting, maintaining, and disseminating
criminal intelligence information in a manner that protects privacy, civil liberties, and civil
rights.
Members of the LEIU Executive Board selected an audit team of three LEIU auditors to perform
this audit on behalf of LEIU. The three LEIU auditors each have extensive background and
training in intelligence unit operations and law enforcement administration. All three LEIU
auditors participating in this fifteenth audit have received training in and personally conducted
criminal intelligence system audits; and all three of the auditors have participated in at least three
previous audits of DPDs Intelligence Unit. As required by paragraph (11) b of the Policy, all of
the persons conducting this audit on behalf of LEIU are familiar with the policies referenced in
Paragraph (3) b of the Policy including:

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

1. The guidelines in Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 - Criminal Intelligence

Systems Operating Policies, along with policy clarifications provided by the U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs - Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the
Office of General Counsel (commonly, "28 CFR Part 23");
2. The Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units LEIU Criminal Intelligence
File Guidelines (also known as the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit Guidelines");
3. Best practices of intelligence unit policies from multiple law enforcement agencies.

Scope
Paragraph (11) a of the Policy requires the auditor to review data collection, categorization,
maintenance, dissemination, and Intelligence Unit practices, as well as training procedures, to
verify compliance with established rules and policies. The auditors were also tasked with
reviewing issues identified in previous audits to determine if compliance or operational issues
remain.

Methodology
The audit process included both a pre-audit review of materials and an on-site audit. Prior to the
site visit for the fifteenth audit, the LEIU auditors conducted a review of important background
materials. This review included:
1. Denver Police Department Operations Manual Policies 118.00 - 118.03 inclusive (all
Rev. 6-15) which contain the current policies governing the collection, retention,
dissemination, and disposition of criminal intelligence and matters related thereto,
including constitutional rights and civil liberties.1
2. Denver Police Department Operations Manual Policies 307.00 through 307.15 inclusive
(Rev. 7-08), which contain the current policies governing the Departments use of
confidential informants and matters related thereto.
3. Litigation documents related to previous operations of the Departments Intelligence
Unit.
4. Previous Audit Reports of the Denver Police Department conducted by LEIU.
5. The Denver Police Department organizational chart (Revised 7/31/2015).
6. Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit Directive 12-01(Date - October 22, 2012 by
Commander Mark Fleecs) which supersedes and replaced the Departments previous
Directive that governed intelligence functions related to investigations and information
gathering operations related to expressive activity.
1

Each of these sections had been updated since the last previous audit by LEIU in 2014.

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

7. Denver Police Department Operations Manual policies 104.55 (Rev. 6-15) through
104.56 (rev. 5-2011) inclusive which contain current policies regarding operational
planning of tactical, overt, and covert operations including plain clothes and undercover
activities, and deconfliction policies.
8. Training records of personnel assigned to the Intelligence Unit.
9. The Intelligence Unit Mission Statement.
The on-site portion of the audit took place at the Denver Police Department headquarters, 1331
Cherokee Street, Denver, CO 80204, November 18-19, 2015. The audit activities included:
1. A brief meeting with Chief of Police Robert White and Deputy Chief of Operations
David Quinones.
2. An inspection of the Intelligence Bureau offices.
3. Interviews2 and/or discussions with:

Captain Steven W. Carter (Investigative Support Division Attach)

Intelligence Bureau Commander, Lieutenant William Mitchell

Intelligence Unit Supervisor, Sergeant Brad Lenderink

Intelligence Unit detectives

4. Review of the newly implemented ACISS integrated information management system,

particularly the records comprising the intelligence files.
5. Preliminary Audit Findings Meeting with Deputy Chief Quinones.

Report
Paragraph (11) c of the Policy states that the auditor is to prepare a written report that is to be
provided to the Intelligence Unit Commander, the Chief of Police, the City Attorney, and the
Office of the Independent Monitor. This is the fifteenth audit report covering the time period
from the completion of the fourteenth Audit (November 18, 2014), until the date of completion
of the fifteenth Audit (November 19, 2015). The LEIU auditors who conducted the site visit
have prepared this report.

Unavailable for interview were Investigative Support Division Commander Marcus Fountain (who at the time of
the last audit was the lieutenant serving as commander of the Intelligence Bureau) and
, the
Intelligence Units analyst.

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Limitations
There are limitations to this audit.

First, DPD personnel contacted were completely cooperative with this audit and provided
unrestricted access to all intelligence files upon request. While the auditors did not detect
any anomalies or other indications that any intelligence related files were not disclosed to
the audit team, the audit report necessarily reflects only those records that were identified
to the auditors by DPD personnel.

Second, the site visit covered a period of two days, which limited the observations made
to those particular dates.

Third, the data, analyses and conclusions in this report are based in part on information
provided verbally by personnel assigned to the Investigative Support Division. The audit
team attempted to corroborate that information whenever possible.

Finally, although the auditors are familiar with 28 CFR Part 23, the LEIU Criminal
Intelligence File Guidelines, and best practices of intelligence unit policies from multiple
law enforcement agencies as required by Paragraph (11) b of the Policy, and one auditor
reviewed Colorado State Constitutional, statutory, and case law pertinent to law
enforcement maintenance of intelligence records, there may be other state and local
regulations that may affect the operations and files of the Investigative Support Division
including the Intelligence Unit. The auditors did not review every state or local
law/ordinance which might affect the Intelligence Unit. The audit team queried various
Investigative Support Division personnel they indicated that they were unaware of other
state or local regulations that would affect the Departments intelligence function.

OBSERVATIONS OF THE AUDITORS - KEY FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS
Subject to the methodology used, and the scope and limitations described earlier in this
document, the following key findings are provided:

Staffing and Structure of the DPD Investigative Support Division

The structure and staffing of the Department have remained relatively stable since the last
previous audit by LEIU in November 2014, with the exception of assignment shifts among
Commanders.3 The intelligence function remains within the span of control of the Deputy Chief
of Operations, David Quinones. Directly below the Deputy Chief of Operations is the head of
3

See Attachment A DPD Organization Chart on the last page of this Audit Report.

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

the Investigative Support Division, Commander Marcus Fountain to whom reports the
Intelligence Bureau Commander, Lieutenant William Mitchell.4 The Intelligence Unit
supervisor, Sergeant Brad Lenderink, reports directly to the Lieutenant (who also oversees the
Executive Security Unit, the Metro Auto Theft Task Force (MATT), the School Violence Unit,
the Internet Predator Unit and DPD personnel assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF). This structure has been in place now for several years. Although there is a new Bureau
Commander, historical knowledge of the Intelligence Unit remains within the Division. The
immediate past intelligence Bureau Lieutenant, Marcus Fountain, was promoted and now serves
as the Investigative Support Division Commander. Other functions within the chain of command
of the Investigative Support Division are: Vice/Drug Bureau, Vice/Drug Task Force Bureau,
Special Investigations Bureau, the Gang Bureau and liaison with the Colorado Information
Analysis Center (CIAC).
At the time of the audit the Intelligence Bureau staff comprised one (1) Lieutenant; one (1)
detective assigned to the Internet Predator Unit who is also a member of the Internet Crimes
Against Children (ICAC) and the Innocent Images Task Forces; one (1) Detective Sergeant and
two (2) detectives who are assigned to the Metro Auto Theft Task Force (MATT). The
Intelligence Unit personnel are: One (1) Detective Sergeant supervisor; three (3) fully dedicated
intelligence detectives; one (1) intelligence detective with additional school violence duties; two
(2) detectives assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)5; and one (1) fully dedicated
analyst. Since the last audit the resources of the Intelligence Unit have remained the same
including the intelligence analyst position. The personnel assigned to those positions also remain
substantially the same with the exception of the Intelligence Bureau Commander. At the time of
the audit Lieutenant Mitchell had been in the I.U. about three months. It was also noted that the
Intelligence Analyst dedicated to the I.U.,
, was on maternity leave and was to
return on December 1, 2015. In her absence the I.U. has been supported by an analyst from the
Gang Bureau who is present in the I.U. twice a week.

Physical Facilities
There were no changes in the physical space which houses the Intelligence Unit since the last
audit.
4

Captain Steven Carter, who was the attach to the Investigative Support Division Commander at the time of the
audit, was literally a number of days from his retirement. One of Captain Carters primary responsibilities over the
previous year has been overseeing the implementation of the newly acquired ACISS integrated information
management system, including the intelligence files and related records. Captain Carter is intimately familiar with
the functioning of the Intelligence Unit; he was the head of the Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) which was
superseded by the current Investigative Support Division and he was instrumental in the selection process for a
replacement of the obsolete Orion automated records system previously used by the Intelligence Unit. The
Attach position will cease with Captain Carters retirement.
5
While under the supervision of the ISD chain of command, these two positions report directly to the Deputy
Chief. Their activities are coordinated by the FBI and are considered operational rather than intelligence. The JTTF
detectives do not complete reports for inclusion in the intelligence files and they do not have access to the
Intelligence Unit database; therefore, this audit did not examine the activities of the two detectives assigned to the
JTTF.

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

There is sufficient room within the Intelligence Unit workspace for all staff to comfortably
access and sit at their desks and work, and for reasonable storage of files, equipment, and various
accessories. The file cabinets, desks, chairs, and other general office equipment are consistent
with standard police department outfitting. The Intelligence Unit continues to have access to
digital voice recorders, laptop computers, and other technical equipment available to the
Investigative Support Division.

Training
Paragraph 11(a) of the Policy requires the auditor to review training procedures of the
Intelligence Unit. Paragraph (10) of the Policy requires that all officers assigned to the
Intelligence Bureau receive training regarding DPD 118.03 and in addition must receive annual
update training regarding that section including any recent court decisions and best practices
regarding criminal intelligence information. Further, it is implicit in the Policy that training
regarding compliance with the mandates of 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23, Criminal
Intelligence Systems Policies is also required.6 Training pursuant to the Policy must be
documented in the officers training records.7
The Audit Team was provided the training records of all I.U. sworn personnel and reviewed
them prior to the site visit. Training was also included as a topic throughout staff interviews and
discussions during the onsite review. Training records for the officers assigned to the I.U.
indicated the following: (1) Each officer had attended at least one class within the previous 12
months that covered the tenets of 28 CFR, Part 238; (2) four of six officers had had formal
training within the past 14 months on the new ACISS integrated information management
6

See Denver Police Department Operations Manual (DPD) sections 118.03 (1) and (2).
See DPD 118.03 (10) a.
8
The training in each instance had been provided by institutions generally acknowledged in the greater law
enforcement community as reputable, competent and knowledgeable trainers in the area of applying proper
criminal intelligence standards and practices to law enforcement activities. Also, most of the I.U. officers had
attended at least two such classes within the past 14 months.
7

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

system, through which the Denver Police Departments intelligence files are maintained 9; three
of six officers had had undercover officer training within the past 12 months 10; and finally, three
of six officers had attended the LEIU National Training Conference within the past 12 months
which provided a wide variety of intelligence related training including all the tenets set forth in
the Policy.
Among all the I.U. officers training records there are no entries indicating training has been
received specifically regarding DPD Policy 118.03. Notwithstanding the lack of documentation,
each officer indicated through interviews and discussions that as a result of ongoing duties within
the I.U. he had received informal training regarding the protocols and standards set forth in the
Policy and knows what the rules are. It appears likely that the officers of the I.U. are receiving
sufficient information to comply with the standards set forth in the Policy. However, the Policy
requires documentation of annual training covering specific topics, and the Lieutenant stated that
he will schedule training for I.U. detectives specifically on DPD 118.03 to assure compliance
with the requirement.
Recommendation 1
It is recommended that formal training be developed for officers in the I.U. specifically on DPD
118.03 and that such training is made available such that it can reasonably be attended by I.U.
officers within the yearly dictates of the Policy. Further that such training is formally logged in
the officers training records. Because the Policy is relatively brief, an online training that could
be accessed at any time as opposed to a one time in person instructor training (or a combination
of the two) could facilitate achieving the goal of full compliance with the mandates of the Policy
regarding training.11

Intelligence Unit Practices

Paragraph 11(a) of the Policy requires the auditor to review DPD Intelligence Unit practices.
Those practices should be informed by the purpose, policy and goals set forth in DPD 118.03 and
therefore logically involve the planning collection, retention, dissemination, and disposition of
criminal intelligence in conformance with the privacy interests and constitutional rights of
individuals, groups, associations or other legal entities.
The Policy also indicates that
Intelligence Unit practices should facilitate the exchange of criminal intelligence information in
9

Training was provided by ACISS Systems, the company that developed and maintains the product; such training
would likely include compliance with various standards related to collection, retention, dissemination, and
disposition of criminal intelligence in conformance with the privacy interests and constitutional rights of
individuals, groups, associations or other legal entities (a requirement of the Policy See DPD 118.03 (1)).
10
Undercover operations training for intelligence officers would likely touch on the standards for collection of
intelligence data, particularly with regard to protecting civil liberties, privacy and Constitutional rights. During
interviews and discussions the officers confirmed that the training included some of those issues. One of the
officers, who did not attend the undercover operations training, had received training within the past 12 months in
Criminal Intelligence Sharing which included protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
11
Lt. Mitchell has informed the auditors that within less than a week of the onsite portion of this audit, unit-wide
training pertaining to DPD Policy 118.03 was completed by the I.U.

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

on-going investigations or prosecution of serious criminal activity, and provide analysis of

organized crime, including identification and/or projection of major changes in crime trends. 12
Ad hoc assistance to other DPD Bureaus continues to be the major influence on Intelligence Unit
activities. The form of such assistance is broad and

. The I.U. also responds to

executive and command staff directives to assist in particular investigations and occasionally
assists the Executive Protection Unit. Through these activities the Intelligence Unit collects,
retains and facilitates the exchange of criminal intelligence information in on-going
investigations. However, the effect of such multi-faceted influence on the daily activities of the
I.U. is a lessening of the I.U.s ability to plan daily activities and focus on long range Unit goals.
It also impedes fulfilling the mandates of DPD 118.03 regarding providing analysis of organized
crime, particularly identification and/or projection of major changes in crime trends.

12

See DPD 118.03 (1), (3) and (4).

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Effective collection of intelligence data at times requires the use of confidential informants.
Currently, use of confidential informants is not part of the practices of the I.U. but it is
anticipated that that will change in the near future. To support proper management of such
activity, a Deputy City Attorney has been identified to be the liaison for the I.U.
The previous audit recommended that the Intelligence Unit Analyst be tasked with identifying
potential intelligence products that she is capable of producing for DPD SID, in order that the
SID Supervisory staff could review those proposed products to determine the benefits to DPD.
That audit also reiterated an earlier recommendation that the Intelligence Unit should be tasked
with producing specific analytical criminal intelligence products for dissemination to the Chief
of Police and Department Commanders. While the Intelligence Analyst,
, was
not available for interview it is apparent from interviews with I.U. personnel that, as noted in
Comment 1 of the last previous audit, competing demands for the analysts services among
executive staff and other sectors of the Department reportedly continue to limit her ability to
provide criminal intelligence analysis products, such as strategic intelligence products that might
help determine long-term organizational objectives and to contribute to discussions of policy,
resource allocation, and strategy, including the extent and impact of major organized criminal
groups on the City of Denver, or tactical intelligence to support case specific needs. Lieutenant
Mitchell indicated that the position would benefit from more direction and have better defined
duties to minimize the pull in different directions; to that end he intends to develop a protocol for
the Intelligence Analyst position.
The Intelligence Unit continues to produce only a limited number of processed analytical
criminal intelligence products for the Department, e.g.,

15

At the time of the onsite portion of the audit, the Department was still working on a social media policy. Several
weeks thereafter Lieutenant Mitchell notified the auditors that a social media policy had been adopted by the
Department and he provided the auditors a copy of the policy (DPD Operations Manual section 110.06). Because
the Departments Social Media Policy was not in effect during the time covered by the audit, this report does not
discuss it beyond this footnote.

10

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Recommendation 2
It is recommended that the Intelligence Analyst and the officers assigned to the I.U. are provided
training regarding the production of intelligence products to facilitate strategic planning by the
command and executive staffs of the Department.
Recommendation 3
The Audit Team reiterates the previous recommendation that the Intelligence Unit Analyst be
tasked with identifying potential intelligence products that she is capable of producing for DPD
SID, in order that the SID Supervisory staff can review those proposed products to determine the
benefits to DPD and that the Intelligence Unit should be tasked with producing specific

11

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

analytical criminal intelligence products for dissemination to the Chief of Police, Department
Commanders and other DPD personnel.

Recommendation 4
While understanding the limitations of personnel resources within the Department, it is
recommended that the Department do all that it reasonably can to narrow the span of control
over the intelligence analysts assignments, including continuing the work of Lt. Mitchell in
reviewing and modifying an appropriate job description, control of workload and chain of
command responsibility.
Recommendation 5
It is recommended that a meeting be held with the I.U. detectives, Sergeant and Lieutenant to
identify confusing areas regarding the application of Intelligence Unit Directive 12-01, clarify
specific issues of field work and use of social media in relation to their intelligence duties that is
supported by development of a social media policy; and thereafter meet with the Deputy City
Attorney Liaison to develop suggested interpretations and/or modifications of Intelligence Unit
Directive 12-01 to assist in its application.
Recommendation 6
It is recommended that the I.U. Supervisor (Sergeant), the Intelligence Bureau Commander
(Lieutenant) and the Investigative Support Division Commander review Intelligence Unit
Directive 12-01 in detail and determine the most practical way to provide the officers of the I.U.
with training that will clarify their understanding of and responsibilities pursuant to Intelligence
Unit Directive 12-01; further that those three supervisors ensure that such training is
implemented as soon as is practicable and be conducted annually.
Recommendation 7

Recommendation 8

12

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Criminal Intelligence Files (Data Collection, Categorization, Maintenance and

Dissemination)
Paragraph (11) a of the Policy requires the auditor to review data collection, categorization,
maintenance, and dissemination. A wide variety of factors were reviewed with respect to
compliance with the Policy. These included, but were not limited to data collection;
categorization (including use of temporary and "permanent" criminal intelligence file
categorizations); file content; regular assessment of all records; data storage and maintenance;
dissemination of information and intelligence; and purging.18 In addition to scrutiny of the
Intelligence Unit criminal intelligence files, the audit team engaged in interviews and various
discussions with Investigative Support Division staff including the Intelligence Unit personnel,
regarding the above noted subject areas; physical layout and procedural activities were also
visually reviewed.
At the time of the audit, the Intelligence Units criminal intelligence data system comprised only
the ACISS system. The auditors were informed that the previous systems records have been
completely purged and the previous system has been fully and permanently decommissioned.19
The current system, ACISS, as described in the company website, provides:
fully integrated information management and analysis solutions for the
organization and dissemination of the vast amounts of information
collected and utilized by law enforcement and other investigative
organizations. ACISS integrates all types of investigative information
such as addresses, vehicles, subjects, telephones, financial information,
and physical evidence in a security conscious, friendly web based
environment. ACISS not only automates the electronic organization of the
entire investigation, but also enables users to identify links within a case
or between multiple cases that would not otherwise have been realized.
ACISS guides and documents the entire investigative process from a tip or
lead to case closure and is fully 28CFR Part 23 compliant.20
Access to the intelligence files in the ACISS system was facilitated via Lieutenant Mitchell or
Sgt. Lenderink. The audit team looked at all files of every named person and organization in the
intelligence database. Each file was reviewed for confirmation of reasonable suspicion / criminal
18

To ensure confidentiality the number of existing intelligence files is not disclosed as part of this report; however,
the number is known to the auditors and DPD authorized personnel.
19
Orion, the previous system, is obsolete and suffered from system defects or malfunctions which affected the
integrity of the intelligence files stored within. In 2014 the Department replaced the Orion system with the ACISS
system. However, at the time of the last LEIU audit (November 2014) the Orion system had not been completely
decommissioned and its files had not been purged. Thus the auditors reviewed the files of both systems in 2014.
20
ACISS Systems. (2015). Investigative Software Solutions. Retrieved from https://www.aciss.com/

13

FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

predicate as well as for meeting retention criteria. None of the files had been maintained beyond
the 5 year limitation for retention.21 Approval for entry into the system was noted in each file as
by the I.U. sergeant or IU lieutenant or in some cases the approval was not designated.
Following is a categorical discussion of DPD Intelligence Units criminal intelligence file
system.
Segregation
While ACISS has the capability of being accessed by multiple units across the Department, at the
time of the audit, the data entered into and maintained within the Intelligence Units records were
accessible only by the Intelligence Unit. Lieutenant Mitchell and Captain Carter informed the
auditors that there is an ongoing data migration from the Departments current records
management system, Versadex, to the ACISS system. Both Captain Carter and Lieutenant
Mitchell stated that the ACISS system has the ability to control access to the Intelligence Units
records within the ACISS system and that only I.U. personnel have access to Intelligence Unit
records. They indicated further that even after the full migration of data from Versadex to
ACISS and Department-wide implementation of ACISS use, the security of the I.U.s
intelligence records within the ACISS system will remain inviolable from the rest of the
Department. Because the ACISS system was not operational Department-wide it was not
possible to test that premise.
An aspect of the Intelligence Units file system facilitated via ACISS is a Tips & Tasks module,
which according to the ACISS website is designed specifically for managing criminal incidents
involving large numbers of leads and personnel. Tips & Tasks can be used on a daily basis to
manage information from tip lines and for assignment and follow-up on investigative tasks that
result from tip lines.22 It is unclear as to whether the data maintained by the I.U. in the Tips &
Tasks module will be accessible by the rest of the Department when ACISS is implemented
Department-wide. The I.U.s Tips & Tasks module comprises a variety of incidents including
felony and misdemeanor conduct, suspicious activities, potential security threats and arrests. At
least one of the records observed in the Tips & Tasks module was also observed as a permanent
file in the IUs Intelligence Files.
As noted in the last previous Audit Report, to the extent that criminal intelligence data is
integrated among the larger investigative and general report data, a risk of unintentional
violations of DPD Policy and 28 CFR Part 23 is greatly increased. Criminal intelligence data
carries with it significant overhead requirements not present in general investigative or report
information including purging, source and content reliability determinations, dissemination and
release criteria, audit trails, and public disclosure requirements.

21

This is the first year of official use and entry of non-test data into the ACISS system by the I.U. At the time of the
last audit a year ago, application of the ACISS system by the Department was still in final design and I.U. personnel
were inputting only a small amount of test data for training and evaluation of the system.
22
ACISS Systems. (2015). Lead Management. Retrieved from https://www.aciss.com/

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FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Recommendation 9
It is recommended that once the ACISS System is implemented Department-wide that the ISD
command staff work with I.U. staff, Department information technology personnel (especially
those involved in the implementation and management of ACISS within the Department) and
ACISS Systems representatives to test the system to confirm the security of the I.U. intelligence
data and periodically verify that secure status on an ongoing basis.
Recommendation 10
It is recommended that the function of the Tips & Tasks module utilized by the I.U. be clarified
and based upon that determination, appropriate protocols be put in place consistent with that
function and DPD 118.03, e.g., if a Tips & Tasks entry becomes an Intelligence File, the Tips &
Tasks entry should be purged so there is no reference to the intelligence information; set a purge
process for Tips & Tasks as used by the Intelligence Unit, etc.
Report Management Data vs. Criminal Intelligence Data
Criminal intelligence file systems should not be used to store files that are more appropriately
maintained in standard report management systems (RMS). This is primarily for two reasons:
(1) Because of the inefficient use of resources regarding purging, audit trails, etc., inherent to
criminal intelligence file systems and the potential multiple entries of the same data. (2)
Inclusion of material that does not meet criminal intelligence standards runs the risk of
compromising statutory protection from disclosure of true criminal intelligence files.
Because of the greater protection from public disclosure that intelligence files generally have,
including non-criminal intelligence files in the intelligence file system can also create a
misperception that the inclusion was to prevent legitimate public disclosure. In previous audits, it
has been noted that some of the files in the Orion system were RMS type files not criminal
intelligence files; and such was the case with the test data in the ACISS system during the last
previous audit.23 In the current audit, nearly 52% of the total files in the I.U.s intelligence
records were files comprising information available in DPDs general RMS (e.g., listed in crime,
incident or arrest reports and various investigative files) and/or had no need for the protections
from disclosure accorded intelligence records.24
As in the previous audit, discussions with I.U. staff indicated that the common motivator for
inclusion of RMS and general investigative data is the understandable desire to collect criminal
data for legitimate law enforcement purposes, including pattern analysis, predictive analytics and
investigative leads. Nonetheless, the criminal intelligence files should be reserved for
information that not only meets the criminal predicate and other requirements of 28 CFR and
23

In all such instances the information contained in the Intelligence Unit files was also available to other DPD
personnel a via DPDs RMS systems and to the general public via public records requests or otherwise.
24
Most of those records concerned apparently random acts by various persons pretending to be a police officer.

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An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

DPD 118.03, but also is of a sensitive nature such that it needs the protection of restricted access
and dissemination and that need outweighs the administrative burdens that accompany criminal
intelligence files.
Recommendation 11
It recommended that training for I.U. detectives pertaining to DPD118.03 is developed (See
Recommendation 1, infra) and that the I.U. develop a protocol for the detectives in the I.U. to
facilitate identifying traditional RMS data within information collected by the IU and gleaning
only pertinent portions that are not replicated in the RMS and merit the protections and burdens
of criminal intelligence status for retention in the Intelligence Files.
First Amendment Related Criminal Activity
The Department has a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and arguably a duty, to collect,
collate and analyze information regarding criminal subjects who may be targeting major public
events to commit crimes. However, the First Amendment nature of the event providing the
milieu in which an arrest takes place mandates close scrutiny.
A part of the new ACISS System DPD has been experimenting with is the Tips & Tasks module,
to assist in tracking workloads for the IU detectives. According to DPD, the data produced and
maintained in the Tips & Tasks module by and for the benefit of the IU detectives will be purged
annually.

In light of this, the Tips & Tasks function should be more clearly segregated from the
intelligence files. The auditors note that information in the Tips & Tasks module duplicates
arrest and incident data already in the RMS and appears to provide no useful information not
already available to the I.U. or other personnel.

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An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Criminal Nexus / Suspect Category

During the audit the audit team observed a relatively small percentage of files that involved
traditionally Constitutional suspect categories.27 Two files did not contain sufficient detail to
establish a legitimate basis for inclusion in the intelligence files; one of those files also lacked
sufficient reasonable suspicion that the subject had a criminal nexus. The other file was based on
giving false information to an officer during a traffic stop and did not appear typical for inclusion
in an intelligence file for this type of offense.

27

7%

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An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

.
Despite the existence of the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, inclusion of
information regarding national origin, ethnic background, association with political, religious, or
unpopular noncriminal groups or movements, may create the incorrect perception that inclusion
of the subject in the file may have been motivated by an improper basis. In such cases, a best
practice would be to remove the identifying association, or if relevant to an investigative need,
clearly mark it as non-criminal identifying information, (NCI). There are to be further
discussions among the I.U. staff and chain of command with regard to how such matters should
be handled in the future with corresponding training.
Additional Observations regarding the Criminal Intelligence Files
1.

There were no juvenile files.

2.

There were no temporary or working files pursuant to DPD 118.03(6) (2) and (3).

3.

There were no informant files.28

4.
There were no files indicative of First Amendment undercover operations conducted by
the Intelligence Unit.29
5.
There was no indication that Investigative Support Division Intelligence Unit criminal
intelligence files are being stored anywhere except in the ACISS system criminal intelligence
records contained within the Intelligence Unit.
There was no indication that any intelligence records had been disseminated during the
6.
period of time covered by this audit, i.e., the auditors did not observe dissemination control
and/or audit entries in the system for any of the records reviewed; Lieutenant Mitchell and
Sergeant Lenderink confirmed that no records had been disseminated since the conclusion of the
fourteenth audit except as part of an Intel Bulletin (See page12).
7.
The policies and guidelines for criminal intelligence information for the Denver Police
Department are still embodied in DPD Policy 118.03 which was revised June 2015. DPD Policy
118.03 is compatible with current state and federal guidelines governing intelligence collection
activities and file maintenance, including Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations Part 23, and
national best practices such as the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU)
Criminal Intelligence File guidelines.

28

The auditors contemplated reviewing only First Amendment informant files for the purposes of the audit and
none such existed.
29
Lieutenant Mitchell stated that there had been no undercover First Amendment activity this year.

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An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

No criminal intelligence files had been created or maintained on a prohibited basis as set
8.
forth in Paragraph (6) c of the Policy except as noted hereinabove.
9.
There was no information found in the Intelligence Unit files during the audit that would
indicate that First Amendment information had been improperly included in the Intelligence Unit
files except as noted hereinabove.
10.
All criminal intelligence data in the criminal intelligence files appears to have been
reviewed by the Intelligence Unit Supervisor and/or the appropriate Commander as required by
Paragraph (6) a. of the Policy, to ensure that the criminal intelligence data conforms to the Policy
and was not obtained in violation of any applicable Federal, State or local law, ordinance,
Department Policies, or section (6).
11.
The review of the criminal intelligence files indicates that the Intelligence Unit is
collecting or maintaining criminal intelligence information concerning individuals or
organizations only if there is reasonable suspicion (as defined in Paragraph (5) of the Policy) that
the individual or organization is involved in criminal conduct or activity, as set forth in
Paragraph (6) b. 1. of the Policy, and all information contained in the criminal intelligence files
appeared to be relevant to the criminal conduct or activity that was particularly described in the
file, as required by Paragraph (6) b. 1. of the Policy, except as noted hereinabove.
12.
The Department's criminal intelligence files appear to be managed in accordance with the
Policy and within current federal regulations and generally accepted ethical criminal intelligence
file guidelines, except as noted hereinabove.
13.
28 CFR Part 23 allows names and limited data about a person or organization not
reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity, to be included in the criminal
intelligence files if that name or other data aids in the identification or investigation of a criminal
suspect who independently satisfies the reasonable suspicion standard, as long as the name or
other data are clearly marked as "Non-Criminal Identifying Information (NCI)." The audit found
that the Intelligence Unit has a procedure in place and a demonstrated practice of appropriately
labeling names or other data not reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity as noncriminal identifying information (using the NCI designator) throughout its files.

Previous Audit Issues

1. The Audit Team recommended that Analyst
be tasked with identifying potential
intelligence products that she is capable of producing for DPD SID, that the Intelligence
Unit should be tasked with producing specific analytical criminal intelligence products
for dissemination to the Chief of Police and Department Commanders. This remains to
be fulfilled. See Discussion and Recommendation 3, pages 10 - 11.

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An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

2. The Audit Team recommended that the Department conducts an extensive joint training
session on the policy and legal restrictions for all Unit Personnel, to include the
participation of legal advisers, to ensure the entire Unit is calibrated according to the
same understanding of the requirements. A Deputy City Attorney liaison has been
identified and the new Lieutenant has committed to implementing joint training regarding
DPD 118.03 this year.
3. The Audit Team recommended that the ISD set a specific deadline within sixty days of
the last previous audit to ensure that any relevant records of the Orion system were
transferred to the new ACISS system and following which all remaining records of the
Orion system would be destroyed consistent with information technology best practices
for electronic file destruction. As reflected in the computer file system shown to the
Audit team, and verbally represented by DPD staff, this has been done.
4. The Audit Team recommended that as the final design of the ACISS system is
completed, the Criminal Intelligence Files should be clearly segregated on the system and
clearly identifiable for future audit and oversight requirements to maintain compliance
with both DPD policy and 28 CFR Part 23, e.g., audit trails, purging, etc.
Implementation of the ACISS System Department-wide has not yet been completed.
5. The Audit Team recommended culling information from the Intelligence Files that is
available in Department RMS systems, especially material related to First Amendment
activity. That need still exists see pages 15-16.

7. The Audit Team recommended that all test data in the ACISS test phase be deleted within
30 days of the last audit. As reflected in the computer file system shown to the Audit
team, and verbally represented by DPD staff, this has been done.
8. The Audit Team recommended that, as the Department revises Intelligence Unit
Directive 12-01, the DPD also identifies permissible limits of activities for undercover
Department personnel and their agents at First Amendment related events, to include
what activities need prior approval and by whom and when participation in illegal
activity is permissible. Directive 12-01 has yet to be modified and the permissible limits
as described herein have yet to be defined.
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An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Conclusion
This audit reflects an evaluation of the nascent stages of the Departments implementation of an
entirely new operational, investigative and intelligence records management and analysis system,
to wit, ACISS. The first unit within the Department to utilize the system is the Intelligence Unit.
Various issues/findings throughout this audit report suggest that a follow-up training for the
Intelligence Unit be included as part of the audit process. The function of the audit process is not
only to determine compliance with DPD Policy 118.03 but also to facilitate that process. While
no flagrant disregard for or intentional violations of the Policy are evidenced by the Intelligence
Units implementation of the new ACISS system, it is the auditors opinion that training for the
Intelligence Unit personnel specific to the issues noted within this audit is essential to maintain
full and effective compliance with DPD policy and related regulations and best practices.

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An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Background of LEIU Auditors

Keith G. Burt
LEIU Legal Advisor
Deputy District Attorney (Retired)
San Diego County District Attorneys Office
Mr. Burt was a Deputy District Attorney for 34 years - trying complex cases (e.g., multidefendant gang homicides, death penalty and police officer victims) and handling management
and policy matters. He served 14 years as Chief of the Gang Prosecution Division and four years
as Chief Deputy District Attorney, overseeing all special prosecution areas such as Intelligence,
Gangs, Domestic Violence, Narcotics, Child Abuse, Juvenile and Fraud. Mr. Burt also headed
the District Attorneys Juvenile Drug Court program and he has regularly addressed police
officers, prosecutors, probation, educators, and community groups regarding gang investigation
and prosecution (including proper maintenance of gang files), search and seizure, high-tech
crime, identity theft, and other legal and practical aspects of law enforcement and prosecution,
for the National College of District Attorneys, the California Department of Justice, the National
District Attorneys Association, and other entities. He has served on various commissions and as
a policy advisor. He was the Project Director of the Computer And Technology Crime Hightech response team (CATCH), a regional task force of federal, state, and local police and
prosecutors dedicated to investigation and prosecution of high-tech crime and identity theft and
continued as a retired Deputy District Attorney to work on special projects. In 2010, Mr. Burt
conducted gang assessments in several U.S. cities and continues to provide legal training related
to major case investigation teams and AMBER Alert (including Child Abduction Response
Teams). He is currently involved developing training courses for prosecutors and others in the
areas of child abduction and human trafficking. For the past 20 years he has been the Legal
Advisor for the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU).
Mr. Burt received a Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration from United States
International University in 1971, a Juris Doctorate from Loyola University School of Law, 1974,
and a California Community College Teaching Credential in 1979.
SOME CAREER HIGHLIGHTS

National Gang Center Advisory Board 1996-2016

State Prosecutor of the Year, (California District Attorneys Association) 1994
Prosecutor of the Year, San Diego County 1991 and 1995
National College of District Attorneys Lecturer of Merit 1993
Project Director of innovative undercover anti-gang operations yielding the arrest and
conviction of over 400 gang members for crimes ranging from minor drug sales to
homicides 1988-1994
California Governors Public Safety Award 1991.
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FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Charter member California Gang Violence Advisory Committee 1982-1995.

Created San Diego Countys Gang Prosecution Division 1981.
California Department of Justice Organized Crime Bureau Advisory Committee 19962004.
Legal Advisor to LEIU (An International Law Enforcement Intelligence Organization)
1995-present.
Project Director - Computer And Technology Crime High-tech Response Team 2003
2009.

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FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Brian Gray
LEIU Southwestern Zone Chairman
Manager, CCIAU Special Investigations Bureau
Riverside County Sheriffs Department (CA)
Brian Gray has more than 20 years of experience in the field of Crime and Intelligence Analysis.
He has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Criminal Justice and was certified as a Crime and
Intelligence Analyst, by the California Department of Justice and by California State University,
Fullerton. Mr. Gray is currently completing a masters degree in Strategic Intelligence. Mr. Gray
leads one of the most successful law enforcement analytical units in the United States, one of
which successes includes designing and implementing the first Crime Analysis Response Team
(CART) within the United States. The CART Team provides 24-hour, mobile and analytical
support to special operations.
For the Department of Justice/University Certification Program, he teaches, Basic Elements of
Criminal Intelligence, Criminal Intelligence Analysis, Computer Applications for the Crime
and Intelligence Analyst in addition to other courses. Mr. Gray also provides special training for
the Department of Justice, which include Intelligence for Executives and The Basic Elements
of Intelligence.For both the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence
Analysts (IALEIA) and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU), he teaches in the
Foundation of Intelligence Training Program (FIAT).
In higher education, Mr. Gray teaches in the Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Certificate
Program at University of California, Riverside. He teaches both GIS in Crime Analysis and
Practical Approaches for Implementing Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Mr. Gray is a
key instructor for a three-day course, The 3 Cs of Analysis Critical Thinking, Creative
Thinking, and Collaborative Thinking for E-Learning Intelligence, a private consulting firm.
Privately, he has created a series of practical courses for enhancing on-the-job efficiency and
impact titled, Photoshop for Law Enforcement, "Putting Power Back In The Point" and Better
By Design.

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FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Ron Leavell
LEIU Northwestern Zone Chairman
Captain, Seattle Police Department (WA)
Ron Leavell has spent over thirty years in law enforcement, during which time he has served in a
variety of operational, investigative and administrative assignments including six years as the
Commander of the Criminal Intelligence Section for the Seattle Police Department, followed by
planning, implementing and helping lead the Washington State Fusion Center, then serving as a
Commander in the Professional Standards Section before his current assignment as the
Commander overseeing the Homeland Security and Metro Special Response Section. Captain
Leavells service to the public safety community extends to membership on many special project
teams as well as standing committees. This includes current appointment as a law enforcement
representative and Vice Chair of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Advisory
Committee. He has been elected to and a member of the executive board of the Association of
Law Enforcement Intelligence Units as Chairman of the Northwest Zone for several years. He
also is a member of the Major City Chiefs Intelligence Commanders Group, where his work
has emphasized privacy and civil liberties protection. His education includes a Juris Doctorate
from Seattle University and a Masters in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate Schools
Center for Homeland Defense and Security where he completed his masters research and thesis
on creating a national counterterrorism network.

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FIFTEENTH AUDIT REPORT

An Audit of the Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit
November 18-19, 2015
_____________________________________ LEIU, 2015 _____________________________________

Attachment A Denver Police Department Organization Chart

26