Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS

ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO
UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.

NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE,
P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 84583-84.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.

DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO,
LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN,
and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
respondents.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No.
85727.

G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A.
OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL.
NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been
consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons
named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations
filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings,
and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived
of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not
warrant their release on habeas corpus.

and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many

instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for
habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they
are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law.
The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto,
viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by
this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,

I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional
Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January
1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM
mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as
T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
"Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988,
the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of
the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of
habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12
February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had
been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus,
insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly

dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal
case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting
the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission
of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his
arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense
when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated
by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they
were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in
fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed
in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in
the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was
well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts
of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally
in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival
of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing
and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a

rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely

seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof,
or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge
and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by
the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the
early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact
remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law
on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read
to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in
the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether,
if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he
could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil
action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not
inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a
trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that
he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members
of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United
Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents
found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition
and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a
member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents
about the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples
Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a
staff member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member
in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka
Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino
located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPPNPA.

In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and
on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District
(CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the
following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903

(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated
August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated
August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11,
1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled
telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69
Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia
Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They
arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as
military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the
military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the
barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.

j) Voluminous Subversive documents.

The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found
ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive
documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition
for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As
a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the
investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of
the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were
released from custody.

When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the
firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to
the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written
statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the
NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP).

On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after
which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another
information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-150458.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra
arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he
readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he
went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other
members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka
Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken
from him were the following:

An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein
as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.

g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;

h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of
Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo
Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only
the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.

The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or
members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted
or traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or
members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons
earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally
justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license
to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino,
they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for
which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August
1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at
Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The
military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found
them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to
possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were
brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following
articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1)
magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same
caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with
one (1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as
"Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were
forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after
which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were
unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and
void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August
1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return
of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because
there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their
person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and
void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. When a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of
a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person
of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the
time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed
against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:

This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with
Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no
preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused has not
made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is
reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed
against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.

The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim.
On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would
cause the said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been
shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and
bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is
absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the
'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand,
as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch
hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses
pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:

IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified
under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The
record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation
of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house
located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to
be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky
Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of
ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky
Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky
Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera,
on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky
Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and
detained, and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest
without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim
that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military
agents to justify their illegal arrest.

. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,

Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure
conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or
fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth
military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members
of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive
results. to date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino
that other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably
conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some members of the raiding
team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the
raid and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's
residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the
military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary
letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra
admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to
Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino
and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's
place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's information was
true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under
the circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and
search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as

petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to

Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit
Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were
arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to
effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who
provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the
latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written
on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque
and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably,
under the time, place and circumstances of the events in question,
especially considering that at the time of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory
evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were
found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently
visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances,
from which one can reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot,
involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142
of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of
drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual
aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was
sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his
sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When
he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the
warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in
their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to
accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila
where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his
arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal
Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant
of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the
government to give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the
Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23,
1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but
he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila,
at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang
gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya
sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis
supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid

information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the
recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the
submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The
record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola
Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed
to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In
view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought
him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is
strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala,
and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which
had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna are based
upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of
Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of
Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of
Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a
crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment

thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be

perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making
the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an
act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to
believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in
the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102,
Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense
in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon
its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available
after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment, is issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to
enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation
and collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners
point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons
despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas
corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the
courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This,
petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits
lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express
provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by
the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal,

with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and
the better practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as
to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or
before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in
Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every
phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody up
to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny
can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should
henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving
deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate
scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu
vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93239

March 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Fidencio S. Raz for accused-appellant.

II

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, under an Information which reads:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting as a
pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to
another and/or distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and without authority of law have in his possession and control
nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried
marijuana leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of
Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves to a
customer. (Rollo, p. 9)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to
the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the
sale of prohibited drug under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a
fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his
sentence with the period for which he has undergone preventive imprisonment to the
date of promulgation of this judgment. All the items of marijuana confiscated in this
case are declared forfeited in favor of the State. (Rollo, p. 41)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this appeal,
assigning the following as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA,
TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME WERE
TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST
SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY
OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO

GUILTY OF THE SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4,
ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND SENTENCING HIM TO
SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P
20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo,
Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information
gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under
the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of
Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw
appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana
from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street
where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went
back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed
P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat.
Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio
again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with appellant. (pp. 18-19, Ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police
officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to
intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with
Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical
Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which
turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June 19, 1989) When
confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant
(Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police team
was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans
Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of marijuana were sent
to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis.
The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found
positive of marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)

As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without
warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from
such arrest is admissible.

same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to
Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.

We rule in the affirmative.

The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990)
that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it
had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it stated:

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights
granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was
sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that
Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before
March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.
This contention is without merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis
supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning
of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although
at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to
monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a
chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw
Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some
things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio
would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was
caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the

When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would
take place and while positioned at a street comer, they saw appellant Regalado Bati
and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from
them (the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who,
thereafter handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside
the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing
given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their
testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that
took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing
distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed
tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the
appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers
and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence
of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing People v. Agapito, G.R. No.
73786, October 12, 1987)
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that
Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force.
Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years
and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs
in their locality. Hence, it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to
report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However,
because of reliable information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday,
he was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has
been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, et al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991):

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial
court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would
attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was
based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected
syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were
also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China.
But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the
basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints).
Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the
latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the
basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there
existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact
selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule
(Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by
law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that
the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with
the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence.
Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for
testifying could be merely to escape prosecution.
We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:
The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have
been the reason of (sic) his willingness to testify in court against the accused. But

this does not necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. As explained
by Lt. Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers are usually their
customers, especially if as in this case, there is no other direct evidence of the selling
except the testimony of the buyer. We accept this observation as a realistic appraisal
of a situation in which drug users are, and should be employed by law enforcement
authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who are the real felons in our society.
We have observed the demeanor of the witness in court, and found him to be
straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his declarations, so that we are
satisfied as to his intention and disposition to tell the truth (Rollo, p. 40)
Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight
and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked
certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged. that the court below, having
seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their
testimonies (People v. Umali, et al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v.
Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo,
36 SCRA 400 [1970]).
Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public
officers Fulgencio and Seraspi.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive
than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the
presumption being that police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller,
supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986]).
The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that
the items seized were all positive for marijuana.
In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's defense is alibi
which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the
person from whom he bought marijuana.
Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and
cousin distributing handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. The fact, however, remains that it does
not preclude the possibility that he was present in the vicinity as established by his admission
that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to meet Macabante on the street.
It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the
appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988];
and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])

Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed
committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local
police force to apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellants name, together
with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler,
Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was
on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red
and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler.
When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and
waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of
carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands
from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a
small sachet containing the suspected drug. 5

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated
specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his
initials and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents
of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 6

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186529

August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004
finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for
possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said
accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering
dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper
authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his
brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him
were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he
explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in;
forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear;
then brought him to the police station for investigation. 9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment 10 convicting appellant of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. 11

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below,
we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu
seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse,
coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence
which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever
defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis
of his acquittal. 15

Hence, the present appeal.

12

In his brief, appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise
avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the
teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief,
appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent
warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that
it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain

whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. 16
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Said proscription, however, admits
of exceptions, namely:

The appeal is meritorious.

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this
is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case. 13

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the
sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that
although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the
arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely
raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.

5. Customs search;

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi1
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal,
if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in
favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate
that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.14

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.19
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was
caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the

presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet
of shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an
incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede
the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. 21 Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have
to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although
probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.22
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination
of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through
cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to
the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20,
2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white
striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him
and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,
yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. 23 The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta, 25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa"
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana.
Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in
front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to
the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the
contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud
(Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in
the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days,
they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1,
1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be
back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team
of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached
the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana
leaves.29
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more
or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and
usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While
conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the
accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and
informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the
accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his
bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a
delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo
Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as police
officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag
turned out to be marijuana leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was
no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the
criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense.
At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable

ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to
commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not
have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of
shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information"
sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v.
Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35
People v. Valdez,36 and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of
the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances
that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to
commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were
covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. 38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away
with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the
arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise
learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was
an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.39
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his
right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the
trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas, 41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights.
Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure
as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods
by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law

enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means. 42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho
is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of
the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT;
LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE
PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. The
policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the
crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block
which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could
lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could
obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN
MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. The search conducted
on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an

offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest
was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the
person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional
Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for
concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles
found his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT
BAR. There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him
of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the
testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could
have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that
only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it.
That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder
of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act
of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that
she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert,
they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death.
"When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was
moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial
court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. The Solicitor
General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with
our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum;
and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:

indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00
as funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive
imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A.
6425, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a
transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was
charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and
signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused together with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary
investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a
piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting
the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which
directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel
Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and
smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the
house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three
men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo
Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly
seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly
agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in
Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of
R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and
one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about
2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she
witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by
Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and
when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the
three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.

"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor
mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to

At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station
received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital

officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull
caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police
Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the
mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow
block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna
Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three
men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him
to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia
frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped
in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo
and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial
of the two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged
despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence
in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the
dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police
officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were
valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;"

"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of
the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block
which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could
lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could
obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected
one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this
Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape
in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47
U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was
ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be
used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony
of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been
inflicted by one person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete
hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not
absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to
commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his
companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a

piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating
that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption
is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna
Reyes' testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil
indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 136267

July 10, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FIDEL ABRENICA CUBCUBIN, JR., accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on automatic review of the decision, 1 dated October 5, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr.
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about August 26, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed
with an unlicensed homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver, with
no serial number, with intent to kill, acting with treachery and evident premeditation
and taking advantage of the darkness of [the] night, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, assault, attack and shoot with the aforesaid unlicensed
firearm a certain HENRY PECHO PIAMONTE, hitting and inflicting upon the latter
gunshot wounds in the head which caused the latter's instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon trial on the merits ensued.
Eight witnesses were presented by the prosecution: police officers Florentino M. Malinao, Jr.,
Enrico A. Rosal, Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr., and Virgilio L. Pilapil, all of whom belong to the

Cavite City Police Department; National Bureau of Investigation ballistician Isabelo D.

Silvestre, Jr.; NBI Forensic Chemist II Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum; Dr. Regalado D. Sosa, City
Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of Health (DOH) in Cavite
City; and Danet D. Garcellano, a food server at the Sting Cafe in San Antonio, Cavite City.
The testimony of Police Chief Inspector Edwin G. Nemenzo, Chief of the Records, Firearms
and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, was dispensed with in view of his certification, dated October 7, 1997 (Exh. N), 3 that
accused-appellant is not a licensed/registered holder of firearm of any kind and caliber.
The prosecution evidence is to the following effect:
At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City
police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along
Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed
of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded
to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked
on the road. Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene (Exhs. A, A-1,
A-2, and A-3)4 showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. 5 PO3 Rosal testified
that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that accused-appellant and the
victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the
gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene.
Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano,
a food server/waitress in Sting Cafe.6 The other policemen at the police station called up City
Prosecutor Agapito Lu who also proceeded to Sting Cafe. Garcellano told the police
investigators that she had seen accused-appellant arrive at Sting Cafe at about 12:00 midnight
and drink beer; that at about 2:30 a.m., the victim arrived and joined accused-appellant; that
the two stayed in the cafe until 3:30 a.m.; and that she did not know if they left together as she
was serving other customers. Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean, darkcomplexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants. 7
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that
Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce." Armando Plata, who knew
where accused-appellant lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to
accused-appellant's house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen knocked on the
door for about three minutes before it was opened by a man who answered the description
given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be accused-appellant. The police operatives
identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the
shooting near the cemetery. Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal
and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house. 8
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the
brand name "Hanes" (Exh. H)9 and the name "Dhenvher" written in the inner portion of the
shirt's hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he
found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from

it. PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant while he conducted a search. They then took the tshirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked accused-appellant to go with
them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was positively
identified by Danet Garcellano as the victim's companion. The police investigators asked
accused-appellant where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said accused-appellant refused
to tell him where he hid the gun so he sought his (accused-appellant's) permission to go back
to his house to conduct a further search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by
Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded
thereto.10 Inside the house, they saw accused-appellant's 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy,
Jr. found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith
and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial number (Exh. F). He found the
gun loaded with five live bullets (Exhs. M, M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4). PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that
he inscribed his initials "RDE" (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the
use of a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and
PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant in the sala. 11 The .38 caliber gun (Exhs. B, B-1),12
the white "Hanes" t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), 13 and the two spent .38 caliber shells
(Exhs. B-2, B-2-B)14 were all photographed. Accused-appellant was then taken to the police
station, where he was photographed (Exh. B-3)15 along with the things seized from him.
SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division, testified that
on August 26, 1997, the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho Piamonte was forwarded to
him by PO3 Rosal together with the evidence consisting of a bloodstained white "Hanes" tshirt, a .38 revolver with five live ammunitions, and two deformed slugs. After an evaluation
of the evidence, he formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant.
He took blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the NBI for laboratory
examination.16
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of
Health in Cavite City, conducted a postmortem examination of the cadaver and prepared an
autopsy report (Exh. O)17 which showed the following findings:
AUTOPSY REPORT
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
A medium built fair complexioned male adult human body in its cadaveric
state with gunshot wounds . . . described as follows:
= Gunshot wound, 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., oval in shape with powder burns
more on top of the wound to 2.5 cms. elevation/height located at the angle
of the right jaw and/or 5 cms. below the inferior level of the right ear. The
wound has irregular and inverted borders. It is directed inwards fracturing
the lower edge of the angle of the right mandible and the lead slug is

embedded at the right lateral portion of the first (1st) cervical vertebrae
hence extracted.
= Gunshot wound, 1 cm. in d[iameter] with inverted irregular borders
located at the left frontal region 5 cms. above the temporal end of the left
eyebrow. It is directed inwards and downwards fracturing the bone
(frontal) underneath into [the] intracranial cavity.

first wound which showed that the victim was shot point-blank. The second slug was also
embedded at the front lobe of the brain.19 Dr. Sosa indicated in the Certificate of Death (Exh.
Q) that the victim died of "shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple
gunshot wounds."20
Upon written request (Exh. C)21 of Prosecutor Lu, the NBI conducted a ballistics examination
to determine whether the two slugs taken from the body of the victim were fired from the
firearm recovered from accused-appellant.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:
= Presence of circular complete fracture, 0.8 cm. in d[iameter] at the left
frontal region.
= The left frontal lobe of the brain is perforated and the frontal lobe is
enveloped with liquid and clotted blood.
= The lead slug is found at the inner surface of the left frontal lobe.
= The right mandibular region was incised near the gunshot wound and the
area is severely hematomatous and explored until a lead slug [was] found
at the 1st cervical vertebrae at the right side.
= Stomach contains liquid and little rice and with alcoholic (beer) smell.
= Other internal organs are significantly normal.
Slugs extracted:
1. 0.6 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug with one end is markedly deformed. The
length of the slug is 1.6 cms.
Note: One diagonal incised line was marked on the slug.
2. A 0.7 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug . . . roundly/ovally deformed [on] one
end. The length of the slug is 1.8 cm.
Note: Two diagonal incised lines [were] marked on the said slug.
Dr. Sosa testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds (Exh. R), 18 the first one
located on the right jaw below the ear while the second wound located at the left temporal side
above the left eyebrow. The slug from the first gunshot wound remained at the base of the
neck, near the spinal column. There were powder burns, called "tatooing," surrounding the

Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., an NBI ballistician, conducted on September 10, 1997 a comparative
examination of the two "evidence bullets," marked as "HPP-1" (Exh. E) and "HPP-2" (Exh. E1), which had been recovered from the victim's head and the three "test bullets" (Exhs. G, G-1,
G-2) fired from the seized .38 caliber firearm. The tests showed that the "evidence bullets"
were fired from the subject firearm.22 The empty shells from the three "test bullets" fired were
duly marked (Exhs. G-3, G-4, G-5). No photographs were taken. Silvestre's findings were
confirmed by four other NBI ballisticians: Chief Ballistician Rogelio Munar, Supervising
Ballistician Ernie Magtibay, Senior Ballistician Elmer Pieded, and, Flor Landicho, another
ballistician. The two .38 caliber empty shells recovered from accused-appellant were no longer
examined.23
Prosecutor Lu also made a written request (Exh. J)24 for a laboratory examination of the
bloodstains on the white "Hanes" t-shirt of accused-appellant to determine whether such were
identical to the blood of the victim.
Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, NBI Forensic Chemist II, testified that on September 26, 1997, she
conducted three kinds of laboratory examinations, namely, (a) benzidine test, to determine the
presence of blood; (b) precipitin test, to determine if the bloodstains came from human or
animal blood; and (c) ABO grouping test, to determine the blood group. When tested and
matched together, the bloodstained white "Hanes" t-shirt and the blood sample of the victim
yielded positive results for human blood belonging to blood type "O" (Exh. K). 25
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself, his son Jhumar, and his sister
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua.
Accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. testified that he enlisted in the Philippine
Constabulary as a soldier in 1974 but was discharged in 1977 for being AWOL. He said he left
for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a driver and came back in 1979. He was later employed
as a driver by a friend, who owned a junk shop in Cavite City. He admitted knowing the victim
whom he addressed as "Kuya." Accused-appellant testified that from 10:00 in the evening to
12:00 midnight of August 25, 1997, he and some friends played a card game called "tong-its"
on Molina Street, Cavite City. Afterwards, he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he had some
drinks while waiting for food to be served. Henry Piamonte, a tricycle driver, arrived and had
drinks with him. After a while, the victim left as a passenger was waiting to be given a ride.
The victim came back to the restaurant before 1:00 a.m. and had another bottle of beer with

accused-appellant. At about 1:30 a.m., the victim again left to transport another passenger.
After that, the victim did not come back anymore. 26
Accused-appellant said he left Sting Cafe at about 2:00 a.m. and took a tricycle home to 1151
Garcia Extension, San Antonio, Cavite City. He was sleeping on the sofa in his bedroom when
he was awakened by the arrival of three policemen, two of them he recognized as SPO1
Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Estoy, Jr., who pointed their guns at him and told him to lie face down.
He said he was handcuffed while the policemen searched his room, turning the sala set upside
down and opening the cabinets. His son, Jhumar, stood beside him. Before leaving, the
policemen took from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son Denver. Accusedappellant said that he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he was afraid
they would maltreat him. He denied the claim of the policemen that the white t-shirt had blood
stains. He claimed that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest
when they took him into custody. Nor did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain
silent and to be assisted by counsel. He also said that he was made to stay in a police patrol car
for almost two hours before he was brought inside the police station. He denied owning the .38
caliber revolver presented to him by Prosecutor Lu and SPO4 Pilapil or that the same had been
recovered from his house. He also denied the prosecution's claim that he was taken to the
Sting Cafe where he was allegedly identified by Danet Garcellano as the person last seen with
the victim before the latter was killed.27
Jhumar Cubcubin, son of accused-appellant, testified that at about 4:00 in the morning of
August 26, 1997, he was sleeping on the second floor of the house when he was roused from
his sleep by loud knocks on the door. When he opened the door, he saw three policemen who
were looking for his father. He told them that his father was not around, but he was shoved
away. They proceeded upstairs to the room of his father where they took from the clothes
stand a white "Hanes" t-shirt belonging to his brother Denver. They put his father in a police
patrol car waiting outside. Jhumar immediately went to his aunt, Yolanda Cubcubin Padua,
and reported to her what had happened. He went back to the house and saw some policemen
still conducting a search. As the policemen were about to leave, a van with some other
policemen on board arrived. They asked him where the water container was located. They
went inside the house and, when they came out, one of them announced that he had found a
gun, which was then photographed. Jhumar said that while his father was inside the police
patrol car, his aunt was arguing with the policemen. At that instance, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. spread
the t-shirt and told Jhumar's aunt "Eto, puro dugo damit niya," although the t-shirt had no
bloodstains. He said that he and his father never gave permission to the policemen to search
their house.28
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, accused-appellant's sister, testified that at about 5:30 in the morning
of August 26, 1997, she was told by her nephew, Jhumar, that accused-appellant had been
apprehended by some policemen. She and Jhumar then went to the police patrol car where she
saw her brother in handcuffs. She said she protested to the policemen that there was no
evidence that accused-appellant had killed the victim. Yolanda said she saw the confiscated
white Hanes t-shirt, but she claimed the same did not have any bloodstain on it. She went back

to her house to call up her mother in Gen. Trias, Cavite to let her know what had happened.
She then went out to see accused-appellant and saw Jhumar, who told her that some policemen
were searching accused-appellant's house and found a gun. 29
On October 5, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
murder. It based its finding on circumstantial evidence, to wit: (1) That Danet Garcellano, a
waitress at the Sting Cafe, saw accused-appellant arrive at about 12:00 midnight of August 25,
1997 and drink beer, while the victim arrived at about 2:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997 and joined
accused-appellant in drinking beer at the bar. She said that she served them beer and they
stayed for about an hour, that the two later had an argument as accused-appellant wanted to
have two more bottles of beer which the victim paid for, and that at about 3:30 a.m., the victim
and accused-appellant left and boarded the victim's tricycle; (2) That PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. testified that they saw the lifeless body of the victim, with bullet wounds on his
head, slumped on the handle of his tricycle, that the crime scene was about 50 meters away
from the house of accused-appellant, and that when they were told by an unidentified tricycle
driver that the victim and accused-appellant were seen leaving the Sting Cafe together, they
went to Sting Cafe and interviewed Danet Garcellano who described the appearance of the
victim's companion. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver who knew accused-appellant as
the person being described by Garcellano, accompanied the policemen to the house of
accused-appellant; (3) That after SPO1 Malinao, Jr. was allowed to enter the house, he found a
white "Hanes" t-shirt with bloodstains on it and also recovered two spent .38 caliber shells; (4)
That when accused-appellant was taken to the Sting Cafe, he was positively identified by
Danet Garcellano as the victim's companion moments prior to his death; (5) That when the
investigators returned to the house of accused-appellant, PO3 Estoy, Jr. found a .38 caliber
revolver placed on top of a plastic water container located outside the bathroom; (6) That
laboratory examination conducted by the forensic chemist, Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, showed
that the bloodstains on the white "Hanes" t-shirt were human blood, type "O," which matched
the blood type of the victim; and (7) That per ballistic examination of NBI ballistician, Isabelo
D. Silvestre, Jr., the two slugs recovered from the head of the victim were fired from the .38
caliber revolver seized from accused-appellant's house.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's alibi, giving full credence to the testimonies of
Danet Garcellano and the police investigators whom it found to have no motive to falsely
implicate accused-appellant. It admitted the prosecution evidence consisting of the white
"Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 caliber revolver, on the ground that these items
had been seized as incident to a lawful arrest. It ruled that since Dr. Sosa testified that the
victim was shot point-blank while on his tricycle and was not in a position to see the assailant,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present, not to mention that the victim was
unarmed and thus totally defenseless. The trial court theorized that while the victim was on his
tricycle, the assailant went around and shot him on the left temple. It held that the use of an
unlicensed firearm in killing the victim constituted an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the
trial court found accused-appellant guilty of murder and accordingly imposed on him the
penalty of death. Hence, this appeal.

On April 18, 2000, the Court received a letter, dated April 5, 2000, 30 from Victoria Abrenica
Dulce, mother of accused-appellant, with an attached affidavit of desistance entitled
"Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Uurong," dated November 14, 1997,31 executed by Marilou B.
Piamonte, widow of the victim, stating that accused-appellant had been mistakenly identified
as the assailant, and, by reason thereof, sought the dismissal of the criminal case against him.
In her letter, Dulce said that the affidavit of desistance was supposed to be submitted to the
trial court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, but, for unknown
reasons, the same was not done by accused-appellant's counsel. This affidavit of desistance,
however, not being formally offered before the trial court, has no probative value.

Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man
had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw
accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress
at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, darkcomplexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle
driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano
fitted accused-appellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where accused-appellant
lived and accompanied them to accused-appellant's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others.

We now consider accused-appellant's assignment of errors.

In an analogous case,33 the police was informed that the accused was involved in subversive
activities. On the basis of this information, the police arrested the accused and, in the course of
the arrest, allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and some subversive materials from the
latter. This Court held that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge since their
information came entirely from an informant. It was pointed out that at the time of his arrest,
the accused was not in possession of the firearm nor engaged in subversive activities. His
arrest without a warrant could not be justified under 5(b).

First. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26, 1997 without a
warrant, was illegal. On this point, Rule 113, 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another."
Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender
has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has
been held that "'personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." 32
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed.
The question, therefore, is whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We
hold that there was none. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that
accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from
which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on
what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San

In another case,34 the accused, in a case of robbery with rape, were arrested solely on the basis
of the identification given by one of the victims. This Court held the arrest to be illegal for
lack of personal knowledge of the arresting officers. More recently, in Posadas v.
Ombudsman,35 this Court, in declaring the arrest without warrant of two University of the
Philippines students to be illegal, held:
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The
arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are
the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement.
The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been
committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that [the
students] were probably guilty.
....
[T]he NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest [the students] four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might
indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were
the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
Indeed, at the time [the victim] was killed, these [NBI] agents were nowhere near
the scene of the crime. When [the NBI agents] attempted to arrest [the students], the
latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create
the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, [they], under

the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an
end to the violence on the campus.
Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused-appellant
to be guilty of the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber
revolver, and two spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time accused-appellant was
arrested, he was not doing anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came
after his arrest. Moreover, as will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized from
accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a
warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on
November 11, 1997. It is true that on August 28, 1997, he filed a petition for reinvestigation in
which he alleged that he had been illegally detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest.
In its order, dated September 9, 1997, the trial court granted his motion and ordered the City
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation and submit his findings within thirty (30)
days thereof.36 On October 7, 1997, City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu moved for the resetting of
accused-appellant's arraignment from October 8, 1997 to the first week of November, 1997 on
the ground that the findings on the laboratory and ballistics examinations had not yet been
received from the NBI.37 Accused-appellant did not object to the arraignment. The City
Prosecutor's request was, therefore, granted and the arraignment was reset to November 11,
1997.38 Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the information on the ground that his arrest
was illegal and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person. Instead, on
November 11, 1997, at the scheduled arraignment, accused-appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.39 On the same day, the trial court issued an order
stating that, as a result of accused-appellant's arraignment, his motion for preliminary
investigation had become moot and academic and, accordingly, set the case for trial. 40
Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest. 41
Second. Accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the
arresting police officers to search his house and, therefore, the "Hanes" t-shirt, the two spent
slugs, and the .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence.
The prosecution, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of
his house.
To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may
be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There
must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. A mere failure on the
part of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. For
as Justice Laurel explained in Pasion Vda de Garcia v. Locsin,42 "As the constitutional
guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is

not consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration or regard for the supremacy
of the law."
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who
conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the
accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. It is noteworthy that the
testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal, on the search
show laborious effort to emphasize that accused-appellant gave them permission to search his
house. At every turn, even when they were not being asked, they said the search was made
with the consent of the accused. As Shakespeare would put it, "the lady doth protest too much,
methinks." Indeed, not only does accused-appellant stoutly deny that he ever consented to the
search of his dwelling but the prosecution has not shown any good reason why accusedappellant might have agreed to the search.
The prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming
the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid
arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure
is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evidence or from using the weapon
against his captor. It is clear that the warrantless search in this case cannot be justified on this
ground. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accused-appellant's
immediate control. In fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun only after
going back to the house of accused-appellant.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine. As this
Court held in People v. Musa:43
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they

have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]
Here, the search of accused-appellant's house was illegal and, consequently, the things
obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white "Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and
the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot be said that the .38
caliber gun was discovered through inadvertence. After bringing accused-appellant to the
Sting Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the
victim's companion, the arresting officers allegedly asked accused-appellant where he hid the
gun used in killing the victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when accused-appellant
refused to answer, he sought accused-appellant's permission to go back to his house and there
found the .38 caliber revolver on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus,
the gun was purposely sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it.
Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white "Hanes" t-shirt placed on top of the
divider "in plain view" as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would
lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to
what SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not "bloodied" which could have directed his
attention to take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the t-shirt (Exh. B-2), it is not
visible that there were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt (Exh. H) merely had some small specks
of blood at its lower portion.
Third. There is no evidence to link accused-appellant directly to the crime. Danet Garcellano
said that accused-appellant arrived at about midnight of August 25, 1997; that the victim
joined him at about 2:30 a.m.; and that although both left the Sting Cafe at about 3:30 a.m.,
she really did not know if they left together. Thus, Danet testified:
PROSECUTOR LU:
....
Q

But did you see Henry Piamonte actually leave the Sting Cafe?

When Henry Piamonte left the Sting Cafe, Henry boarded a tricycle, Sir.

How about Cubcubin, how did he leave the Sting Cafe?

He followed Henry, Sir.

How did he follow Henry, on foot, on board a vehicle or what?

A
I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served the other customers
inside.44
....
On cross-examination, Danet said:
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q

When he left, he left alone?

I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served inside.

Are you saying to us that you did not see him when he left?

A
No, Sir, what I know is that he and Cubcubin were together because of the two
bottles of beer which were paid by Piamonte inside, Sir.
....
ATTY. BAYBAY:

Were they together when they left Sting Cafe or they left one after the other?

The accused Fidel Cubcubin left Sting Cafe at 3:30?

A
When they were already bringing along with them the two bottles of beer, they
talked and afterwards, I already left them and I served the other customers.

Yes, Sir.

Q
Now, how could you be sure of the time when you were serving other people
at that time?

Did you actually see Henry Piamonte leave the Sting Cafe?

A
They were about to leave already at that time because they were already
bringing with them the two bottles of beer, Sir.

That is only my estimation, Sir.

You only estimated?

Yes, Sir.

And, what was the basis of your estimation?

Because at that time there were only few customers in that place, Sir.

So, you are not really sure what time Fidel Cubcubin left?

Yes, Sir.

You also did not see him leave?

No, Sir.45

In People v. Gallarde,46 it was explained that positive identification refers essentially to proof
of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the
crime. This constitutes direct evidence. Or, he may not have actually seen the crime
committed, but is nevertheless able to identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of the
crime, as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting
an unbroken chain, leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of
the crime to the exclusion of all others.
This rule, however, cannot be applied in the present case because Danet Garcellano did not
actually see accused-appellant and the victim leave the Sting Cafe together. There is thus
serious doubt as to whether accused-appellant was really the last person seen with the victim.
Her testimony is insufficient to place accused-appellant in the scene of the crime so as to form
part of the chain of circumstantial evidence to show that accused-appellant committed the
crime. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond
reasonable doubt.47
Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant testified that he could not have killed the victim because the latter was his
friend whom he considered his "kuya" or elder brother.48 There is no showing that the killing
of the victim was by reason of a supposed altercation they had as to who would pay for the
two bottles of beer ordered while they were at the Sting Cafe. The beer was later paid for by
the victim. Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or words that may express the motive or
from which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred. 49

Rule 133, 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires the concurrence of the following in
order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the case at bar, there are serious doubts as to whether the crime was committed by accusedappellant in view of the following: (1) As already stated, Danet Garcellano, a waitress at the
Sting Cafe, did not actually see accused-appellant and the victim leaving the cafe together at
about 3:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997; (2) PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that when
they arrived at the scene of the crime, they were informed by a tricycle driver that the victim
and the accused-appellant had earlier left the Sting Cafe together, but the tricycle driver was
not presented to confirm this fact; (3) SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that the white "Hanes" t-shirt
was "bloodied," but the evidence shows that it had some bloodstains only on its lower portion
(Exh. H), while the photograph of the t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), supposedly taken at
the time of the search, shows that it had no bloodstains and this discrepancy was not explained
by SPO1 Malinao, Jr.; (4) The fact that the t-shirt was tested positive for type "O" blood does
not necessarily mean that the bloodstains came from the victim who also had a type "O"
blood; (5) Accused-appellant was never given a paraffin test to determine if he was positive
for gunpowder nitrates; (8) The .38 caliber gun allegedly found in his house was not examined
for the possible presence of accused-appellant's fingerprints; and (9) The allegation that the
gun was placed on top of a water container in accused-appellant's house is unbelievable as it is
improbable that accused-appellant could be so careless as to leave the fatal weapon there when
he could have hidden it or thrown it away.
Nor can we rest easy on the prosecution's claim as to where the two empty shells and the tshirt were allegedly found. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that these were placed beside the white
"Hanes" t-shirt and fell when he took the shirt. On direct examination, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q

What else did you tell Cubcubin at that time?

A
We asked him to allow us to go inside the house and he let us go inside the
house, then after entering the same, while we were in the sala near the kitchen we
saw the white Hanes t-shirt there, Sir, that was near the kitchen.
Q
Where exactly was the white t-shirt placed at that time when you saw the
same?
A
Because after entering the house you will see the entire portion of that house
and there is a table there and that t-shirt was placed on the table.

Was that t-shirt visible from the front door of the house?

Yes, Sir.

A
It was immediately in front of the door because the house has no divider
anymore, Sir.
Q

And that t-shirt was immediately near the door, on the floor?

Yes, Sir.

What did you do after that, when you saw the t-shirt there?

I asked his permission so that I could take a look at the t-shirt, Sir.

Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?

A
Before I got the t-shirt, I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the
t-shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after getting the tshirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was with blood
stains.
Q

This white t-shirt, can you tell us the brand of the t-shirt?

And you said, you looked at it?

Hanes, Sir.

Yes, Sir.

When you said, you looked at it, how did you look at it?

I spread it out in front of him, Sir.

Q
it?

And when you spread it out in front of him, did you ask him whose t-shirt is

I asked him if that t-shirt belongs to him, Sir.

Q
How about the blood spot or blood stains, can you tell us how many, if you
can remember?
A
We were in a hurry, I did not count the blood stains anymore but there were
blood stains on the t-shirt, Sir.
Q
How about these 2 empty shells that fell when you lifted the t-shirt, can you
describe to us these 2 empty shells?
A

Empty shells of .38 cal. bullets, Sir.

What did he say?

What did you do with the empty shells?

According to him, the t-shirt does not belong to him, Sir.

I got the t-shirt as well as the 2 empty shells and I showed them to him, Sir.50

You also testified that you found two empty shells?

Yes, Sir.

Where did you find these two empty shells?

From the bedroom upstairs, Sir.

Bedroom upstairs?

Yes, Sir.

You mean, it is a two-storey house?

However, on cross-examination, he said he found the empty shells on top of a cabinet

(tokador) in the bedroom on the second floor of the house. Thus, he testified:
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q

Where was this t-shirt again when you first saw it?

In the kitchen area, Sir.

Where in the kitchen area, on the floor or on the wall?

Yes, Sir, there is a bedroom upstairs.

You found it when you went up?

A
While Fidel Cubcubin was just beside me, Sir, I got the t-shirt, I spread it out
and nothing fell yet at that time, then I asked him about the firearm that he used.
....

A
I first asked his permission to look around inside the house, Sir, because I was
asking him also about the whereabouts of the firearm he had.

Do you remember having been asked this particular question:

And he allowed you?

"Q

He allowed me, sir.

And when you went upstairs, you found the two empty shells?

A
Before I got the t-shirt I even asked his permission for me to be able
to get the t-shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission to get the same,
after getting the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and I
saw the t-shirt was with blood stains."

Yes, Sir, they were placed on their tokador on a place where there is a curtain.

Q
In your previous testimony and this is found on page 41 of the TSN, you
stated that you got the t-shirt and when you lifted the t-shirt, two empty shells fell
off?
A
After finding the two empty shells for a .38 caliber, Sir, I placed them together
with the t-shirt.
Q
What you are telling us now is that you went upstairs, you found two empty
shells and you put them together with the t-shirt, that is what you are telling us now?
A
After finding and taking a look at the t-shirt, I put it on the original place
where it was, Sir, and after finding the two empty shells, it so happened that the
investigator was behind me so after that, I showed to him the t-shirt as well as the
empty shells.51
....
Q
Also in your previous testimony, you got the t-shirt and you asked the
permission to get the t-shirt, after getting the t-shirt, there were 2 empty shells which
fell. The question is, do you remember that this happened?
A
These two empty shells which I recovered upstairs, sir, I placed them on top of
the t-shirt.
Q

Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?

Yes, Sir, I remember it.

I am just referring to two empty shells that fell, which you said, is that true?

A
Yes, Sir, there were empty shells that fell, but I first placed them on top of the
t-shirt because I was planning to wrap these empty shells in the t-shirt.
Q
You also testified here on page 40 that the t-shirt was visible from the front
door of the house, is that true?
A

Yes, Sir.

And you were referring to the time that you entered the house?

Yes, Sir.

Q
it?

And that was the time that you lift[ed] the t-shirt when you saw it and you got

A
What I said before was that, I got the t-shirt, I lifted it, after that, I placed it on
its original place, Sir, and I asked him about the firearm but he was not commenting
anything on that, so I asked permission from him to go upstairs to look around.
Q
When you said you placed that from the place where you found it, how did
you put it on the place where you found it?

You said, when you got the t-shirt, something fell, in your direct testimony?
A
I placed it there the way I saw it before, the way it was previously placed
there, Sir, because I was planning to bring the t-shirt. 52

Thus, caught in his own contradiction, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. prevaricated but in the process
committed more contradictions. He said he found the empty shells on top of the tokador on the
second floor of the house, brought them downstairs, and then placed them on the t-shirt. When
he got the t-shirt, the empty shells fell on the floor. But how could he have gotten the shells
from the second floor if, according to him, he found them by accident when they fell from the
t-shirt which he found immediately after entering accused-appellant's house and before going
up to the second storey? It is also noteworthy that whereas at first SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said he
found the t-shirt placed on the table near the kitchen, he later said he found it on the floor.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding
accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder, is REVERSED
and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to
report to the Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, YnaresSantiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad on official business.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 128285

November 27, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO PLANA alias "CATONG" EDGARDO PERAYRA, RENE SALDEVEA and
RICHARD BANDAY, defendant-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas
City in Criminal Case No. 4659 finding accused-appellants Antonio Plana, Edgardo Perayra,
Rene Saldevea and Richard Banday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of Death.
The Information filed against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the morning of September 23, 1994, at Brgy. Cubi,
Dumarao, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused
did, then and there, wilfully and feloniously, and by conspiring and helping one
another, gang-up and have carnal knowledge of HELEN PIROTE [should read
Helen Perote] against her will, and, thereafter, by means of cruelty which augmented
her suffering, did, then and there, strike, mangle and stab said HELEN PIROTE
several times with both blunt and sharp-edged weapons thereby inflicting upon her
serious multiple wounds causing massive hemorrhage which resulted to [sic] her
death.1
At their arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution
presented as its witnesses Dr. Ricardo Betita, Jr., Felix Lagud, Rene Bustamante, Antonio
Mendoza, Amalia Rafael, Linda Perote and Romeo de la Torre Diaz. Their testimonies, taken
together, establish that:

On September 26, 1994, the victim, Helen Perote, was found dead by her brother and the
police in Brgy. Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. The body was in prone position and was already in an
advance state of decomposition. Per the post mortem examination conducted by Dr. Ricardo
Betita, Rural Health Officer of Cuartero, Capiz, the victim sustained the following injuries:
1. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left anterior chest.
2. Avulsion with irregular edges wound 8x12 cm middle chest area.
3. Avulsion of the nose and upper lip portion/area.
4. Clean edges wound or stab wound 2x5 cm epigastric area.
5. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left hypogastric area.

by a hard object or that the victim fell with her face hitting the ground. Wound No. 4 was a
stab wound located at the upper part of the abdomen. It was seven (7) centimeters deep and
was probably caused by a knife or a bladed instrument. Wound No. 5 was a stab wound
located at the left side above the pubis area. Wound No. 6 was a stab wound located above the
pubis area also. It was seven (7) to ten (10) centimeters deep. The urinary bladder and the
uterus could have been hit by this wound. Wound No. 7 was a stab wound and located at the
right scapular area of the body. With a depth of seven (7) centimeters, the wound hit the lungs
of the victim. Wound No. 8 was a stab wound and located at the upper back portion. It could
have affected the spinal cord causing paralysis. Wound No. 9 was a fatal stab would located at
the left posterior back level of the 8th rib. The wound could have affected the spinal cord, the
lungs and the abdominal "aorta." Wound No. 10 was located at the left lumbar area which
could have hit the kidney of the victim. Wound No. 11 was located at the middle low back
area. Wound No. 12 was located at the middle portion of the back just above the right lumbar
area. Wound No. 13 was located near the anus. The wound was inflicted with the victim facing
downward or the assailant was at the back of the victim. Finally, Entry No. 14 was the
laceration on the hymen of the victim's sexual organ. 3

6. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm hypogastric area.

7. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left posterior upper back.
8. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm mid upper portion of the back.
9. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left posterior back level of 8th ribs.
10. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left back level of left lumbar area.
11. Clean edges wound 2x5 cm middle low back area.
12. Clean edges wound 2x5 cm right low back area at level of lumbar area.
13. Clean edges wound 2x5 cm left gluteal area near the anus.
14. Vagina: Introitus can easily insert 2 fingers/Hymen with laceration 3 and 9
o'clock (old laceration) and on the state of decomposition.
The most probable cause of death was massive hemorrhage or blood loss secondary
to multiple stab wound[s].2
When he took the witness stand, Dr. Betita described the fourteen (14) wounds inflicted on the
victim as follows: Wound No. 1 was located just above the left breast of the victim. It was
seven (7) to nine (9) centimeters deep. It was a fatal wound as it hit the heart of the victim.
Wound No. 2 was located in the middle chest area of the victim. Wound No. 3 was an avulsion
on the nose and upper lip. There was also a missing tooth. The wound could have been caused

According to Dr. Betita, the victim died more than seventy-two (72) hours already before the
police authorities found her body.4
On September 23, 1994, or three (3) days before the victim's body was found, at around 10:30
in the morning, Felix Lagud was walking at the feeder road in Barangay Cobe, Dumarao,
Capiz. He just came from his farm in Alipasyawan, Dumarao and was on his way home to
Poblacion Ilawod. A movement at about fifty meters to his left side caught his attention. He
saw three persons who seemed to be wrestling. He came nearer so he would be able to see
them more clearly. From about a distance of twenty (20) meters, he saw the three men holding
a girl while another man was on top of her. The girl was being raped and she was later stabbed.
Frightened that the assailants would see him, Lagud ran away. He intended to go straight home
but when he passed by the house of Porferio Haguisan, the latter invited him for a "milagrosa."
Lagud obliged and stayed at the house of his "kumpare" until 2:00 in the morning. 5
On September 26, 1994, while he was in Ungon Ilaya, Lagud heard that a girl was found dead
in Barangay Cobe. It was the same place where, three days earlier, he saw the four men gang
up on the girl. He wanted to go to the place but he was told that the foul smell coming from
the decomposed body already permeated the place. He later learned that the deceased was
Helen Perote.6
In his affidavit,7 as well as in his testimony in court, Lagud identified accused-appellants
Plana, Perayra and Saldevea as the three men who were holding the girl while their fourth
companion was raping her. At the time of the incident, he did not yet recognize the fourth man
who was on top of the girl. However, when he saw accused-appellants at the municipal hall
where they were brought when they were arrested on September 26, 1994, he identified the
fourth man to be accused-appellant Banday.8

Rene Bustamante corroborated in part the testimony of Lagud. Between 10:30 to 11:00 in the
morning of September 23, 1994, Bustamante was looking for his carabao. He found it near the
fishpond owned by accused-appellant Saldevea in Barangay Cobe. Bustamante was tugging
the carabao when he heard the sound of men laughing. When he looked back, he saw accusedappellant Saldevea, who was then shirtless, pull up his pants. Accused-appellant Saldevea
were with three other men. They were washing their hands on the fishpond. Bustamante
recognized one of them to be accused-appellant Perayra. Bustamante proceeded to his home in
Barangay Ungon, Ilaya, Dumarao, Capiz.9
On September 25, 1994, Bustamante was in their house with his wife and children. His
mother-in-law, Linda Perote, arrived looking for her daughter Helen. The wife of Bustamante
is the older sister of Helen. They learned that Helen had been missing since September 23,
1994. She was supposed to go to the house of her other sister, Susan, but she (Helen) never
reached the latter's place. They began to search for her. On September 26, 1994, they found
her lifeless body with no clothes on but her panty. There were already maggots infesting her
body. Bustamante confirmed in open court that accused-appellants were the men that he saw
on September 23, 1994 near the place where the body of Helen was found. 10
Antonio Mendoza, barangay captain of Barangay Hambad, Dumarao, Capiz and storeowner,
narrated during the hearing that on September 23, 1994, at past 8:00 in the morning, accusedappellants arrived at his store. They bought two bottles of ESQ whisky and proceeded to drink
the liquor. Accused-appellants were drinking in Mendoza's store until almost 10:00 in the
morning. Thereafter, they left bringing with them the one-half full bottle of whisky that they
did not consume.11
Two days after that incident, on September 25, 1994, Porferio Haguisan and members of the
Regional Security of the Armed Forces (RSAF) came to see Mendoza to ask him if he saw
accused-appellants. Mendoza told them that accused-appellants were in his store in the
morning of September 23, 1994. Haguisan and the police left. The following day, Mendoza
heard that Helen's body was found dead near the fishpond owned by the brother of accusedappellant Saldevea. The place is approximately 500 meters away from Mendoza's store. 12
The last person who talked with the victim was her older sister Amalia Rafael. In the morning
of September 23, 1994, Helen went to see Amalia to tell her that they were going to have a
"milagrosa" in the house of their other sister, Susan. Amalia instructed Helen to go ahead.
Helen then left to proceed to Susan's house. Going there, Helen would usually pass by the
railway track and the feeder road. After Helen left, Amalia followed her to their sister's house.
Amalia took the same route passing by the railway track and feeder road. On her way, Amalia
met accused-appellants on the feeder road near the fishpond. At the time, she only knew
accused-appellants Plana and Perayra. She noticed that the four men were not wearing any
shirts but only their denim pants. They were obviously drunk as their faces were red and they
walked in a zigzag manner. Amalia saw that accused-appellant Plana had a knife tucked in his
waist.13

There were already many people when Amalia arrived at Susan's house. However, Helen was
nowhere to be found. Amalia did not stay long there as she only got food. On September 25,
1994, while she was working in the ricefield, their mother, Linda, came. She told Amalia that
Helen had not come home. They then went to see Helen's classmates to ask them if they knew
where she went. All they knew is that she went to a "milagrosa." On September 26, 1994, they
found the body of Helen near the fishpond of accused-appellant Saldevea in Barangay Cobe,
Dumarao, Capiz. Helen was then only eighteen years old. 14
The Chief of Police of Dumarao Police Station, Romeo dela Torre Diaz, received report of
Helen's disappearance in the afternoon of September 25, 1994. Later in the evening, he
granted clearance to the 601st Mobile Force Company to conduct the search. The following
day, upon hearing that the body of Helen was already found, Diaz went to the station of the
601st Mobile Force Company. Accused-appellants, who were already there, were turned over
to him for investigation. Thereafter, Diaz went to the place where Helen's body was found in
Barangay Cobe.15
Linda Perote, the victim's mother, described on the witness stand the shock, grief and anguish
that she felt upon learning of her daughter's death. She averred that the family spent almost
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for Helen's wake and burial. 16
Upon the other hand, accused-appellants interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Their
account of their activities on that fateful day of September 23, 1994 is as follows:
At around 7:30 in the morning, accused-appellants had "lomi" in the eatery owned by Eddie
Pendon. After eating, they accompanied accused-appellant Saldevea to the public market to
buy fish. From the public market, they all boarded a tricycle to go to Barangay Bugnay. When
they alighted the tricycle, they may barangay captain Tony Mendoza. Mendoza boarded the
tricycle while accused-appellants proceeded to Mendoza's store. Accused-appellants bought
two bottles of whisky from the store. They drank the liquor at said store until past 10:00 in the
morning.17
Thereafter, accused-appellants Plana and Banday had to leave behind accused-appellants
Saldevea and Perayra to go to the house of Plana's aunt and uncle, Vicente and Felomina
Docutan. They reached the house of the Docutans at around 10:30 in the morning. It only took
them a couple of minutes to get there by foot. Accused-appellants Plana and Banday were
tasked to cook the chicken for the celebration that night. Also at the house of the Docutan
couple was Nolan Obena. Accused-appellants Plana and Banday stayed there until 9:00 in the
evening. Accused-appellant Banday slept over at the house of accused-appellant Plana since
he (accused-appellant Banday) lived quite far.18
For their part, after accused-appellants Plana and Banday left the store, accused-appellants
Perayra and Saldevea proceeded to the house of the latter's sister-in-law, Monina Saldevea.
Accused-appellant Saldevea cooked the fish that they earlier bought in the public market.
They then had lunch and after eating, they slept. Accused-appellant Perayra slept until 4:00 in

the afternoon. Accused-appellant Saldevea woke up earlier and was soon outside the house
plowing the field. Accused-appellant Perayra went home at 4:30 in the afternoon. 19
To buttress their defense of denial and alibi, accused-appellants further accounted for their
activities on the days subsequent to September 23, 1994. Accused-appellant Plana claimed that
he spent the day gathering wood on September 24, 1994. The following day, he just stayed at
their house but in the afternoon, he played basketball with accused-appellant Perayra and their
friends. Later in the evening, at about 11:00, certain members of the RSAF came to the house
of accused-appellant Plana. Accused-appellant Perayra was still there because he slept over at
said house. The RSAF questioned them if they saw a girl named Helen Perote. They answered
no. Accused-appellants Plana and Perayra then accompanied the law enforcers to see a certain
"Lando." The authorities inquired from Lando if there was a woman who boarded his "bering"
transportation. Lando answered in the negative. Accused-appellants Plana and Perayra were
then instructed by the police to go to the police detachment. Since it was already late, accusedappellants Plana and Perayra asked if they could just go there in the morning of the following
day.20
Accused-appellant Perayra averred that he stayed at his house the whole day of September 24,
1994. The following day, he went to the house of accused-appellant Plana in the afternoon.
They agreed to meet later in the evening at the wake in the house of the Igaras family. They
left the wake at 10:00 in the evening. Accused-appellant Perayra decided to spend the night at
the house of accuse-appellant Plana. At 11:00 in the evening, they were awakened by the
brother of accused-appellant Plana. They were informed that members of the RSAF were
outside the house looking for them. Accused-appellant Perayra was brought in front of the
house while accused-appellant Plana was brought at the back. Accused-appellant Perayra was
asked of his whereabouts on September 23, 1994.21
Accused-appellant Banday recounted that he left the house of accused-appellant Plana early
morning of September 24, 1994. He slept there the night before after they had dinner at the
house of the Docutans. He never left his house on September 24 and 25, 1994. On September
26, 1994, he received word that the police chief wanted to ask him questions. He thus went to
the police detachment as instructed. He did not see the other accused-appellants when he
arrived at the detachment. The authorities began interrogating him. They wanted him to
confess to the killing and raping of Helen. When he refused, they punched him. Later in the
afternoon, the four accused-appellants were brought to the municipal hall in Dumarao, Capiz.
They were placed under detention there.22
Aside from accused-appellants, the defense presented other witnesses, namely, Julia
Barrientos, Nolan Obena, Igleserio Farinas, Rolando Naelgas and Monina Saldevea.
Barrientos tried to refute the allegation of prosecution witness Felix Lagud that he saw
accused-appellants rape and stab Helen in Barangay Cobe. Barrientos testified that on
September 23, 1994, at 10:00 in the morning, on her way to the public market, she saw Lagud
sitting on the bench outside his house. Lagud was then selling "amakan," hence, he could not
have seen what he claimed he saw.23

Obena corroborated the alibi of accused-appellants Plana and Banday that from 10:30 in the
morning to 8:00 in the evening of September 23, 1994, they were at the house of the Docutan
couple.24 Farinas, a basket vendor, said during his testimony that he saw accused-appellant
Plana and his two companions at around 10:30 in the morning of that fateful day. They passed
by the house of Ronie Saldevea, brother of accused-appellant Saldevea, where Farinas was
buying baskets. He (Farinas) even had a short conversation with accused-appellant Plana.
Farinas saw accused-appellant Plana and his companions head towards Barangay Cobe. 25
Naelgas corroborated the testimony of Obena. Naelgas saw Obena when the latter bought
baskets from Ronie. He (Naelgas) affirmed that accused-appellants Plana and Banday passed
by the house of Ronie. They came from the direction of the nearby high school and went down
the hill going to Barangay Cobe.26
Monina Saldevea, sister-in-law of accused-appellant Saldevea, corroborated the alibi of
accused-appellants Saldevea and Perayra. She attested that on September 23, 1994, accusedappellants Saldevea and Perayra arrived at her house at 10:30 in the morning. They had their
lunch there. Accused-appellant Saldevea helped prepare the same. Accused-appellant Perayra
stayed at the house of Monina until 4:30 in the afternoon when he went home. On the other
hand, accused-appellant Saldevea did not leave the house until September 25, 1994. The
following day, he went to the detachment after he was informed by accused-appellant Perayra
that the authorities wanted to investigate them for the death of Helen Perote. 27 Edith Perayra,
mother of accused-appellant Perayra, averred that in the morning of September 23, 1994, her
son asked permission from her to go to the public market. He told her that he was going there
with accused-appellant Saldevea. When he got home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he told his
mother that he ate lunch at the house of Monina Saldevea with accused-appellant Saldevea.
Accused-appellant Perayra did not leave their house except to buy cigarettes in the afternoon
of September 25, 1994. The following day, at 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant Perayra
reported to the police detachment after he learned that the authorities wanted to ask him
questions. At the detachment, he was surprised to learn that he was one of the suspects in the
rape-slaying of Helen. Accused-appellants were all brought to the municipal hall in Dumarao,
Capiz where they were detained.28
Lagud was called again to the witness stand by the prosecution to rebut the testimony of Julia
Barrientos, witness for the defense. Lagud admitted that he knows Barrientos but denied
seeing her on September 23, 1994. According to Lagud, Barrientos' claim that she saw him
selling "amakan" on that date is not true because he had already stopped said business in
1992.29
On November 23, 1996, after due trial, a judgment was rendered by the trial court finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. The
trial court imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the
trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ANTONIO PLANA, EDGARDO PERAYRA,
RENE SALDEVEA and RICHARD BANDAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the complex crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and punished under Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, judgment is hereby
rendered sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and, likewise,
ordering them to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim, Helen Perote,
twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as actual damages and fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil liability.

and substance which would have affected the result of the case. The trial court is in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. 32
In this case, the trial court correctly gave credence to the positive identification of accusedappellants as the assailants of Helen by Felix Lagud. His testimony was straightforward, direct
and consistent:

SO ORDERED.30
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
In their appeal brief, accused-appellants assail their conviction alleging that the trial court
committed the following errors:
a. The trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of alibi/denial put up by the
appellants they had nothing to do with the commission of the crime as their
testimonies and their witnesses, individually and collectively taken together, showed
with clarity and beyond doubt they were not at the scene of the crime and did not
commit the offenses charged.
b. The trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of the police authorities in
detaining appellants without benefit of Court filed information nor judicial order of
detention as well as violation of their constitutional rights during their so-called
custodial invitation and interrogation.
c. The trial court erred in not appreciating the inconsistencies and inherent
weaknesses/improbabilities of the testimonies of prosecution's witness which
showed tons of doubt of appellant's guilt entitling them to acquittal. 31
Accused-appellants vigorously deny that they committed the rape and killing of Helen. They
maintain that their testimonies, taken together with that of the other defense witnesses, show
that they were not at the scene of the crime. In other words, they fault the trial court for not
giving credence to their defense of alibi. Corollarily, they point out the alleged inconsistencies
and improbabilities in the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. Accused-appellants
likewise denounce as violative of their constitutional rights their detention without, at the time,
a judicial order or an information filed in court.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court is constrained to affirm the
judgment of conviction of accused-appellants.
The first and last issues raised by accused-appellants shall be addressed jointly as they both
involve the assessment of the witnesses' credibility. It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction
that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled
to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in absence of any clear showing that
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight

Q
Mr. Lagud, where were you at about 10:30 o'clock in the morning on
September 23, 1994?
A

I was walking at the feeder road of barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz.

Where were you headed to?

Going home to Poblacion Ilawod.

And this Poblacion Ilawod is also of Dumarao, Capiz?

Yes, sir.

Where have you been?

I came from Alipasyawan, Dumarao, Capiz, visiting my farm.

This Alipasyawan is also of Dumarao, Capiz?

Yes, sir.

Q
While walking in barangay road of Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz, was
there anything unusual that attracted or called your attention?
A

Yes, ma'm.

What was the unusual incident that called your attention?

I saw that as if there were wrestling.

Q
On which part of the barangay road where you were walking that you saw
there seems to be wrestling persons?

On my left side.

Witness may answer.

Q
Now, how far were you from the very spot where you saw there seems to be
wrestling persons?

A
These three (3) persons I have already known them because we have gone
together in a drinking session and I also passed by Cobe.

50 meters. About 50 meters.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

Now, when you saw this what did you do?

Q
Now, if these (3) persons are inside the courtroom, will you please go down
from the witness stand and tap the should of these three (3)?

I came near so that I could see it clearly.

How near did you approached that spot, Mr. Witness?

ATTY. BARRERA:
I request as he taps each of them he should mention the name.
A

About twenty (20) meters.

Q
Now, upon reaching that distance from the spot where you said you saw
persons who seems to be wrestling what did you see?
A
I saw three (3) persons holding the one who is being raped and one person
was on the top of the girl.

A
(Witness came down from the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of
Antonio Plana, next as Rene Saldevea and another persons he named as Edgardo
Perayra.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CONTINUING:
Q

Q
Now, did you recognized these three (3) persons whom you saw were
holding the victim?
A

Yes, sir.

Who were these three (3) persons holding still the victim?

Antonio Plana, Edgardo Perayra and Rene Saldevea.

Q
Now, before that incident that you saw have you already known these three
(3) persons you have identified who have been holding the girl, one of them was
actually raping

Now, what else did you see?

A
The first, at first I saw the three persons holding the victim and the other one
is on top of the victim. Later, I saw that the one who is on top of the girl raised his
hand and stabbed the victim.
Q
Now, what happened after you saw that the one on top of the victim stabbed
the victim?
A

Because I was afraid, I ran away because they might also see me.

Now, where did you proceed after you got frightened of what you saw?

Going home to Poblacion Ilawod, Dumarao, Capiz.

Were you able to immediately go home?

ATTY. BARRERA:
I object to the term actual raping. There is still no proof that there was any
rape, was holding the girl only. He has not yet given testimony involving
rape.
COURT:

A
I was not able to go home because when I passed by the house of Porferio
Haguisan, he saw me and he invited me because it was their Milagrosa.
Q

How long did you stay in the house of your Compare Porferio?

I stayed there long. I went home already 2:00 o'clock.

xxx

xxx

Q
And did you know who this fourth man was when you went to the Municipal
Hall?

xxx
A

Yes, sir, Richard Banday.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q
Now, what did you do when you heard that a person was found there a dead
person was found in that very place where you saw the accused on September 23,
1994, holding and raping?
A
I went to the Municipal Hall because I also heard that the accused were
apprehended and I went there and I saw and recognized them.

Q
If he is inside the courtroom will you please go down from the witness stand
and tap the shoulder of Richard Banday?
A
(Witness went down from the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of a
person who, when asked answered his name as Richard Banday). 33
Lagud remained unwavering and consistent even when he was under the grueling crossexamination by accused-appellants' counsel:

COURT:
ATTY. BARRERA:
Q
You mean to tell us Mr. Witness that on September 26, 1994, when the dead
body was found in the feeder road of Cobe, you went to the Municipal Hall because
the accused was arrested, is that what you mean?

Q
At that distance of 50 meters as you said from the place where you saw
persons as if wrestling there was no obstruction to your view?

Yes, sir.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

There were grasses and trees not so tall.

What time have you gone to the Municipal Hall?

Q
Now, would you agree with me that the place, I withdraw that. The place
where you were and the area where you saw persons as if wrestling which is the
elevated portion?

Noon time.

Now, who was the dead person that was found in that spot?

Helen Perote.

Q
So, your portion being elevated you would agree with me that you can see
the place where there are persons appearing to be wrestling because it was at the
lower portion am I correct?

When this victim was still alive, have you any occasion to know her?

Yes, I know her.

Q
How were you able to identify the three (3) persons, namely, Plana, Saldevea
and Perayra?

Q
Now, how about the fourth man who was on top of the girl and whom you
saw also stabbed the girl on the morning of September 23, 1994, did you recognize
him?
A
On that incident I do not know him but when I saw him at the Municipal Hall
I know him because they were also together.

On the place where I was.

Not so clear because there were grasses and that is why I went near.

When I came near that is the time that I recognized them.

Q
Now, you said that you came nearer to the place where persons were
wrestling and you said you were 20 meters from them but when measured it was
actually 12 meters. The question is, why did you approach the place where you saw
persons wrestling?

A
I went near so that it would be clear to me and I can recognize and confirm as
to what they are doing.
Q
You want to tell the Court that it was out of curiosity that you approached the
area where you saw persons appearing to be wrestling?
A

Yes, that is what I plan.

You were not afraid instead you were curious isn't it?

Q
Now, 12 meters distance from the place where you were sitting up to the
place where you pointed at is the area where you identified the accused holding and
another one on top of the person lying, there was no obstruction from the area from
the place where you were to the area where you saw?
A

I was afraid that is why when I went near I also crouched.

Q
Just answer my question. Were you afraid or you were curious that is why
you approached the place where persons appeared to be wrestling.
COURT:
Compaero, if you have any correction just make a manifestation, just
make it formal.
ATTY. BARRERA:
I am sorry, your honor.
COURT:

Just for curiosity sake.

ATTY. BARRERA:
Q
Now, at a distance of 12 meters you recognized three (3) persons holding the
arms and leg of the one lying and another person on top of the woman lying is that
it?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And at that distance of 12 meters you identified the three persons as the
herein accused, Plana, Perayra, and Saldevea whom you met according to you for
three times at the store of Antonio Mendoza, is that correct?

It was clear because it was near.

Q
As a matter of fact the only vegetation you can find in the premises from
where you were meters away from the area where you saw what you are telling this
Court as green grass?
A

Yes, sir. Short grasses.

Q
And you identified only three persons holding not the one lying, you said it
was Plana, Perayra and Saldevea, and you do not know the person on top of the
person lying, who was covered on top by a man, was he a man or a woman?
A

I think it was a girl because I heard voices like that of a woman.

Q
You think it was a girl. At a distance of 12 meters and you said it was clear to
your view can you not identify the person lying and covered by one on top of as a
woman?
A

Proceed.

Yes, sir.

It is not clear because it was covered by a person on top.

Q
Definitely, you told the Court you do not know who was the person on top of
the one lying, am I correct at that very moment?
A

Yes, sir.,

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Your honor, the translation is I did not yet know him.
ATTY. BARRERA:
Q

What part of his body that person who was on top you saw?

From his head to his back.

You did not see his face?

You mean to tell us that he was naked throughout?

No, sir.

His pants was lowered down.

What was he actually doing when you saw him for the first time?

Was he naked up?

He was on top of the girl.

Yes, sir.

At that distance can you see his organ?

I cannot see but as if he is trying to force because his back was also moving.

So actually you did not see his organ that he was trying to have it penetrated?

No, sir.

Did you see the organ of that woman lying down?

No, sir.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
There is a continuation, your honor, he said "naga".
A

He was on top of the girl and he was

COURT:
He was what? You say it?
A

He is forcing that his will penetrate.

What was that he wanted to have it penetrated?

ATTY. BARRERA:

His organ.

Q
Now, so, did the man on top of that woman person lying whom you said
was a girl had her pants you said lowered up to where?

Q
Did the Court get you right that you said you saw you set properly. Make
it of record that witness has been uneasy when being cross-examined. Don't make
any undesirable you sit properly. Now, did the Court get you right that the man
whom you saw at the top of the person lying was turning his back towards you?
A

I saw his head and back and he was not on the back view but side view.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
May I interpret. And his back was not actually against me but he was
somewhat side view position upon me.

Up to about his knees.

Q
And the woman at the time you said the man was trying to force his organ
penetrate that of a person lying was that person lying struggling or what was that
person lying doing?
A

She was struggling and she was held by three persons.

Q
Alright, tell us, you identified Antonio Plana what was he holding at that
moment you said you saw?

COURT:

The right foot of the girl.

Did he have his clothes on when he was on top of the person lying?

How about Perayra?

No, sir.

On the left foot.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

I am trying to clarify what was it moaning, crying or saying something

vocal.

I think not, foot, it is the leg (witness indicating a little above the ankle).
A

Crying.

You did not hear any word being uttered?

The words was (sic) not clear.

Left lower part of the leg.

ATTY. BARRERA:
Q

And Rene Saldevea, what part was he holding, if any according to you?

A
Two (2) hands (witness raising his two hands above his head closed
together).

Q
Now, the person lying (who is) whose pleading you heard was she moving or
was she moving her body or any part of her body?
A

Q
And at that position as you described none of the four (4) persons including
the three you identified covered the mouth of the person lying?
A

I cannot tell because I cannot see.

She was moving but she was held by three persons.

Q
Now, you said that the person on top of that woman lying has his pants
lowered up to his knee, on the other hand, the person lying did you see if she was
totally naked or she had something on or you have not seen it?

Q
You mean at a distance of 12 meters you cannot see if the mouth of the
person lying was covered or not?

A
On his top was naked but her pants was lowered on the left leg. The pants
was already taken on the right leg, the pants was not taken off.

I cannot see because she was covered by the person lying on top of her.

You have not heard any sound or voice emanating from the person lying?

A
As to her body she was naked but only the pants on the right side was not
taken off.

I heard voices but it was not clear.

Now, that voices you heard what were the nature of those voices?

As if pleading.

You wanted to tell us that the voice you heard was the crying or moaning or

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Your honor, the witness has already described the nature of the voices as if
pleading.
ATTY. BARRERA:

So that the person lying was not totally naked at the time you saw it?

Q
So at the moment because the upper part of the body had no clothes except
portion of the right leg that still retains the pants you would know that it was a
woman lying on the ground is that it?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And at that point of time while the three accused, Plana, Perayra, and
Saldevea were holding the hands of the girl and the other one on to of her, can you
tell this Court if these four (4) persons while doing those things as you described
were conversing or uttered any word?
A

I heard voices but it was not clear.

You mean you heard voices being made by persons you saw?

Yes, sir.

Q
And you would like to tell the Court that at a distance of 12 meters from
where you were you never heard audibly the words coming from their voices?

I did not notice the words he uttered.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
A

I cannot understand because their voices were low.

Were they laughing?

I have not noticed.

So, you did not notice if they were laughing?

No, sir.

You did not hear if they were shouting at one another?

No, sir.

ATTY. BARRERA:

You did not hear any of them saying go ahead, we follow also?

Q
By the way, how many times (did) you saw that man on top of the woman
stabbed that woman?

No, sir.

Q
Now, and later you said you saw a person on top of that girl pulled a knife
and stabbed that person lying whom you said was a girl is that it?
A

Yes, sir.

Your honor, there is a continuation on the answer, I did not notice if he

uttered any word because immediately I ran away.
ATTY. BARRERA:
Anyway, let it stay in the record.
COURT:
Proceed.

A
That was the first time when he raised his hand and stabbed her then I ran
away.
Q
And so, you did not notice him how many times that person stabbed the
woman?

Q
Considering that that person on top of that victim had dress over and had his
pants on top of his knee how did he stabbed that victim whom you said was a
woman?

No, sir.

At the time she was stabbed did you hear any voice being uttered.

A
I noticed that but I do not know where he get (sic) the knife but I noticed that
he just raised his hand.

I heard as if there was a sound like a moan then I ran away.34

Q
Not one of the three (3) whom you identified gave him the knife except that
you only saw that person on top of that woman all of a sudden having a knife and
stabbing is that it?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
Now, is that person on top of the woman stabbing that woman did you hear
any or uttered by that man stabbing that woman?

The testimony of Lagud positively identifying accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the

dastardly crime was corroborated in its material points by the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution had sufficiently established that accused-appellants
were together and were drinking liquor at the early morning of September 23, 1994; Lagud
saw them along the feeder road in Barangay Cobe raping a girl and later one of them stabbed
her; Bustamante saw them boisterously laughing near the fishpond where the body of Helen
was found; Rafael confirmed that Helen took that route on the way to their sister's house for
the "milagrosa;" Rafael met accused-appellants, who were all drunk, along the feeder road
while she was on her way to her sister's house and; when it was found on September 26, 1994,
Helen's body had already been lifeless for more than seventy-two hours.

In light of the positive identification and the other strong corroborative evidence, the trial
court properly gave scant consideration to accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi.
Alibi is concededly one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases. It cannot prevail over, and
is worthless in the face of, positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused
perpetrated the crime.35
Aside from accused-appellants who expectedly gave self-serving testimonies, the defense
presented other witnesses, mainly relatives of accused-appellants, to establish that they were
not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unfortunately, alibi becomes less
plausible when it is corroborated by friends and relatives who may then not be impartial
witnesses.36 On the other hand, the defense failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against accused-appellants.
Moreover, accused-appellants' defense of alibi cannot be given credence considering that they
themselves admit their proximity to the scene of the crime at the time that it occurred.
Accused-appellants Plana and Banday claimed that they were at the time at the house of
accused-appellant Plana's relatives in Barangay Cobe. Accused-appellants Saldevea and
Perayra insisted that they were then in the house of Monina Saldevea in Barangay Cobe. It
must be noted that the rape and killing of Helen was committed in the feeder road also in
Barangay Cobe.
For alibi to prosper, the following must be established: (a) the presence of accused-appellant in
another place at the time of the commission of the offense and; (b) physical impossibility for
him to be at the scene of the crime.37 Accused-appellants miserably failed to satisfy these
requisites. Considering that they admit that they were all in Barangay Cobe, where Helen was
raped and subsequently killed, it cannot be said that it was physically impossible for them to
have committed the crime.
Accused-appellants tried to discredit Lagud by making much of the fact that he did not
immediately disclose what he witnessed to the authorities. This contention hardly destroys the
testimony of Lagud and his credibility as a witness. As Lagud explained on cross-examination,
he was afraid that accused-appellants would harm him had they known that he saw them
commit the crime.38 Besides, as consistently held by this Court, there is no standard form of
the human behavioral response to a startling or frightful experience and delay in bringing up
the matter to the authorities do not destroy the veracity and credibility of the testimony
offered. The Court takes judicial notice of some people's reluctance to be involved in criminal
trials. Failure to volunteer what one knows to law enforcement officials does not necessarily
impair a witness' credibility.39
In obvious attempt to evade the capital penalty of death, accused-appellants opine that
granting arguendo that they are guilty of any crime, the crime is only murder because the rape
of Helen allegedly had not been sufficiently established. This argument is untenable. The
evidence on record indubitably establish that, while the other accused-appellants forcibly held
Helen, accused-appellant Banday had carnal knowledge of her. Thereafter, they killed her.

Lagud categorically testified on this fact. 40 The findings of the medico-legal corroborate
Lagud's testimony, thus:
Q
In entry No. 14, vagina, introitus can easily insert 2 fingers/Hymen with
lacerations 3 and 9 o'clock (old laceration) and on the state of decomposition. In that
state of decomposition of the victim how were you able to determine the laceration
of the hymen of the said victim?
A
Actually, what I did I asked help from the owner of the Funeral Homes to
spread the thigh of the victim so that I can easily see the inside of the vagina. Upon
opening, I can easily insert my two fingers because of that I tried to spread the
vaginal canal I saw three (3) lacerations, I have also seen blood clotting in that area
but one reason that I can easily insert may two (2) fingers is because the victim was
already in the state of decomposition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
Doctor, you said it could have been caused by the laceration that you found
which is 6x9, in what or what could have caused the vaginal laceration?
A
In the vagina, the laceration in the hymen is caused only by sexual
intercourse. If the female is a virgin, it could have been caused by sexual
intercourse.41
In fine, accused-appellants' guilt for the crime of rape with homicide had been proved beyond
reasonable doubt in this case. Further, the trial court rightly appreciated the existence of
conspiracy among the accused-appellants. Their individual acts, taken as a whole, revealed
that they shared a common design to rape and kill Helen. They acted in unison and
cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective. 42 The principle that the act of one is the
act of all is applicable to accused-appellants in this case.
With respect to the second issue raised by accused-appellants, i.e., they were detained without
judicial order and prior to the filing of the information, suffice it to say, that they already
waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in their arrest. 43 Accused-appellants
respectively entered a plea of "not guilty" at their arraignment. 44 By so pleading, they
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. 45
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
reads:
Art. 335 When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force and intimidation;

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ ., concur.

2. . . .;
3. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Whey by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty

shall be death.
xxx

xxx

xxx
SECOND DIVISION

Accused-appellants' guilt for the crime of rape with homicide having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, the imposition of the penalty of death upon them is warranted. Four
members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the
Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be
accordingly imposed.
However, there is need to modify the damages awarded to the heirs of Helen by the trial court.
In addition to the sum of P25,000.00 as actual damages, the trial court awarded to the heirs of
Helen the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. This amount should be increased in
consonance with prevailing jurisprudence 46 fixing the civil indemnity in cases of rape with
homicide at P100,000.00. The Court, likewise, finds it proper to award the sum of P50,000.00
as moral damages. The award of moral damages may be made to the heirs of the victim in a
criminal proceeding without need of proof. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental or
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the basis for moral damages under the
Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof at trial. 47
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Roxas City finding
accused-appellants Antonio Plana, Edgardo Perayra, Rene Saldevea and Richard Banday,
guilty of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic act No. 7659, and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of Death is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that said accused-appellants are hereby ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the heirs of Helen Perote the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as actual damages.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President upon finality of this
decision for possible exercise of executive clemency in accordance with Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113269

April 10, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
OSCAR CONDE y LUTOC, ALLAN ATIS y ABET and ALEJANDRO PEREZ, JR. y
CARSILLAR, accused,
OSCAR CONDE y LUTOC and ALLAN ATIS y ABET, accused-appellants.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision 1 dated December 15, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129,
Kalookan City finding accused Oscar Conde, Allan Atis and Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the
amount of P50,000.00.
Accused Oscar Conde, Allan Atis and Alejandro Perez, Jr., were arraigned in an Information
which reads:
That, on or about the 25th day of May, 1992 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by
means of threats and intimidation upon the persons of SUKHDEV SINGH Y
DHALNAL and BIANT SINGH Y SIDHU, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, rob and carry away cash of unestimated amount and assorted
merchandise such as umbrellas and beach towels, that on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away the
aforementioned articles, the herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, did

then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill, attack and
stab with bladed weapons upon the persons of SUKHDEV SINGH Y DHALNAL
and BIANT SINGH Y SIDHU on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting
upon said victims serious physical injuries which caused their death on the abovespecified date.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
The accused entered pleas of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Apollo Romero, PO3 Rodencio
Sevillano, and Dr. Gario Gajardo as witnesses.
Apollo Romero, a resident of Santolan Street, Kalookan City, Metro Manila, testified that on
May 25, 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., he was home sitting by the window and drinking coffee
when he saw four men in Santolan Street block the path of two Indian nationals (bombay) on a
motorcycle. One of the men, later identified as Oscar Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians
while his three companions approached and stabbed the Indians. He later identified the other
two assailants as Alejandro Perez, Jr., and Allan Atis. He also saw Allan Atis take the goods 3
which were being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the four men fled
from the crime scene towards Mabolo Street. The fourth assailant remained unidentified.
Romero was about 25 to 35 meters away from the place where the crime was committed. 4
PO3 Rodencio Sevillano, testified that he was assigned with the Intelligence and Investigation
Division (IID) of the PNP, Kalookan City. On May 25, 1992, he was told to investigate the
abovecited incident. On May 30, 1992, the police arrested the three accused. Police recovered
the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the police
station to talk to the accused. These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine
inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's
bag and when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. 5
Dario Gajardo, a doctor employed in the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Station 4, Central
Police District, Quezon City performed the post-mortem examination on the bodies of
Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh. He testified that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory
arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds. Biant Singh sustained stab
wounds on his lower stomach while Sukhdev Singh sustained stab wounds at the back and
right portion of the ribs. 6
The defense presented five witnesses: Alejandro Perez, Jr., Oscar Conde, Allan Atis, Danilo
Acutin and Anita Santos.

Alejandro Perez, Jr. testified that Oscar Conde and Allan Atis were his townmates from
Catbalogan, Samar. According to Perez, on May 25, 1992, at about 7:00 A.M., he went to the
Madrigal Compound at Las Pias, Metro Manila to visit his cousin Danilo and apologize for
not attending his uncle's 40th death anniversary and their fiesta. Upon his arrival they went to
the Pulang Lupa Cemetery and visited the graves of his uncle and their grandfather. From the
cemetery, they went home where they drank some beer until late afternoon. Together with
Oscar Conde and Allan Atis, he was arrested in Tandang Sora, Quezon City on May 30, 1992.
7

Danilo Acutin corroborated Alejandro's testimony. 8

Oscar Conde testified that on May 25, 1992, he was in Barangay Polo Street, Paraaque
mending his fishing net. He was with his wife, Felicidad Macabare; and his uncle, Tancio
Loto. He said the police arrested Alejandro Perez, Jr., Allan Atis, Felicidad Macabare and him
in Tandang Sora, Quezon City on May 30, 1992. 9 (Later reports indicated, however, that
Felicidad was not among those arrested. 10 )
Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked as a construction worker for a certain
Romy Ramos on May 25, 1992. He denied having anything to do with the death of the two
Indian nationals. 11
On December 15, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Oscar Conde y
Lutoc, Allan Atis y Abet and Alejandro Perez, Jr. y Carsillar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined
and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to the Solis ruling. Accordingly, the 3 accused shall each serve the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties under the law.
Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the 3 accused shall be credited with the period of their preventive
detention.
By way of compensatory damages, the accused shall jointly and severally indemnify
the heirs, if any, of deceased SUKHDEV SINGH and BIANT SINGH in the sum of
P50,000.00 for each, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED. 12
The three accused appealed. However, the counsel de parte for accused Alejandro Perez, Jr.,
Atty. Jose M. Marquez, failed to file brief for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his
appeal. The decision of the trial court became final and executory with respect to accused

Alejandro Perez, Jr. 13 Hence the present appeal concerns only appellants Atis and Conde, who
filed their separate briefs.
Atis avers that the trial court erred:
I
. . . IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE CLAIM OF THE
DEFENSE.
II
. . . IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALLAN ATIS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH DOUBLE
HOMICIDE DESPITE [OF] THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. 14
Atis argues that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. He alleges that Apollo Romero only saw him in court. Atis likewise claims that he was
arrested without any warrant of arrest several days after the crime. 15
Oscar Conde avers that the trial court erred in:

The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, filed its appellee's brief only in regard to Oscar
Conde's appeal. According to the OSG, the testimony of Apollo Romero deserves full faith
and credence since the appellants failed to show any improper motive on his part. The same is
true for the testimony of PO3 Sevillano who also enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties. In conclusion, the Solicitor General prays that the
conviction of the appellants be affirmed. Citing People vs. Escandor, 265 SCRA 444, 445
(1996), the OSG stresses that the findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, because the trial court is
in the best position to make an honest determination of the witnesses' behavior and deportment
during trial. 18
In substance, the issues raised by both appellants are (1) Whether or not the identification
made by Apollo Romero deserves credence; (2) Whether or not the arrests of the appellants
were illegal; (3) Whether or not the alleged stolen objects, i.e., the beach towel and umbrella,
can be presented in evidence.
Anent the first issue, we are in agreement with the submission by the Office of the Solicitor
General. First, factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon this Court and its
evaluation regarding the credibility of witnesses are given great weight and respect unless
there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact
or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. 19
Being in a better position to observe the witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defense,
the trial court's appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty and candor deserves the
highest respect. 20

I
. . . NOT HOLDING THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED ILLEGAL
II
. . . ACCORDING THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
APOLLO ROMERO AND PO3 RODENCIO SEVILLANO FULL CREDENCE.
III
. . . HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH DOUBLE (sic) HOMICIDE. 16
Oscar Conde claims that he was illegally arrested by the authorities. He adds that the Indian
Embassy was pressuring the police to solve the murder. He avers that the testimony of Romero
is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He cites the delay of Romero in reporting what he saw,
hence Romero's testimony is unbelievable. Lastly, Conde wants this Court to disregard as
evidence the stolen items and weapons illegally seized by the police. 17

Allan Atis insists that it was impossible for Romero to have identified him since Romero only
saw him inside the court room and that Romero had not seen him before. However, there is
nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non for the positive
identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, that witness must first know the latter
personally. 21 The fact that Romero never saw Atis before the crime was committed does not
detract from the credibility and reliability of Romero's testimony.
Oscar Conde insists that the delay of Romero in reporting the incident makes his testimony
unworthy of credence. It is however well settled in jurisprudence that delay in divulging the
names of perpetrators of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of
the witness and his testimony. 22 Likewise, credibility is not affected by the initial reluctance of
witnesses to volunteer information. 23 It is not uncommon for witnesses to a crime to show
some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case as, in fact, the natural reticence of
most people to get involved is of judicial notice. 24
Romero categorically identified both Oscar Conde and Allan Atis as two of the perpetrators of
the crime. Appellants failed to adduce any improper motive on his part which would motivate
him to implicate them in the said crime. Absent such motive, the testimony of Romero should

be accorded full faith and credence as the testimony of a disinterested party who only wants to
see justice upheld. 25

information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint
of liberty. 32

The two appellants interposed the negative defenses of alibi and denial. But as held in several
cases, these defenses cannot overcome the straightforward testimony and the positive
identification made by a prosecution witness. 26

Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. 33 The warrantless
arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the
conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability. 34

We now turn to the appellants' vehement assertion that they have been illegally arrested. The
records of the case will show that the arrests of the appellants came after the lapse of 5 days
from the time they were seen committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police
were not armed with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without
warrant, namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present in this case. Appellants were merely walking along
Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime
had just been committed. Five days had already passed from the time of the robbery with
homicide. It cannot also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause based on
personal knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo
Romero and certain unnamed informants. The third circumstance is patently not present. The
lapse of five days gave the police more than enough time to conduct surveillance of the
appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, appellants' rights provided in Sec. 2, Art.
III of the Constitution 28 were violated.
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment.
This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. 29 When
the appellants entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any
irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. 30 Any objection, defect, or
irregularity attending their arrests should had been made before they entered their pleas. 31 It is
much too late for appellants to raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the

As for the stolen objects presented in evidence, their seizure is assailed by appellants. We
agree that the warrantless search in the house of a certain Jimmy, based on the confession of
accused Alejandro Perez, Jr., 35 is definitely questionable. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano
categorically stated that they were able to recover the stolen items, i.e., the beach towel and
the umbrella, because of the confession of Alejandro Perez, Jr. who was not assisted by
counsel when he confessed and eventually led the police to the whereabouts of the said items.
36
The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission
without the assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under
Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution. 37
Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree", evidence
illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. 38 Simply put, the objects
confiscated at said house are inadmissible as evidence.
Without the stolen objects as evidence, we are left with only the testimony of Apollo Romero
that he saw Allan Atis take the beach towel and the umbrella. 39 A reading of the said testimony
will indicate that such was not categorical and straightforward, to wit:
Q:

And can you tell us, Mr. Witness, more or less what did Allan Atis did (sic)?

A:

Yes, ma'm.

Q:

What?

A:

He stabbed one of the Indian Nationals at the back.

Q:
Can you still recall with what instrument did Allan Atis used (sic) in
stabbing the Indian National at the back.
A:

I cannot recall anymore, ma'm.

Q:

What about Alejandro Perez, what did he do?

A:
Allan Atis was the one who took the goods being sold by the Indian
Nationals in installment.
Q:
Who took the goods? Will you please identify the person who took the
goods from the Indian Nationals?
A:

The one wearing the white t-shirt.

Atty. Yson
Witness pointed to a person wearing a white t-shirt who when asked
answered by the name of Allan Atis. 40
The identification of Allan Atis by Apollo Romero as the one who took the items was more of
an afterthought and was not even responsive to the question made by the prosecutor. Aside
from this, the ownership of the towel and the umbrella was not even established. In order to
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the
killing itself, otherwise, the crime would only be homicide or murder, as the case may be. 41 In
this case, only the facts and causes of deaths were established with moral certainty. Hence,
there can be no robbery with homicide. The appellants are only liable for two counts of
homicide.
On the other hand, we find in order the search of the bag of Felicidad Macabare, at the time
she was visiting her husband who was a detainee. PO3 Sevillano testified, this search is part of
police standard operating procedure, 42 and is recognized as part of precautionary measures by
the police to safeguard the safety of the detainees as well as the over-all security of the jail
premises. However, the weapons 43 confiscated from Felicidad Macabare, were not formally
offered as evidence by the prosecution, 44 hence probatively valueless. 45
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
129, finding the appellants Oscar Conde and Allan Atis guilty of robbery with homicide is
hereby MODIFIED. They are declared guilty only of two counts of homicide and each is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
for each count of homicide. They are likewise ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY
ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT.
GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO
ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC.
ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 seeks to nullify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 17
September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The
Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by
lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido ("petitioners") on behalf of their
detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines),
Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and
Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who has custody of the
detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya ("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo Reyes and
Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense and National Security Adviser, because they have
command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"),
an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers
disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and
called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after
several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive
devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the
Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the
soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July
2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as
defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued
the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV
("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take
into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood
incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On
12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN
of the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer
the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further
proceedings and decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within
ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision.3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents
to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the
Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.

On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return
of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals
during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the
appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision.

Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:

On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in
accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed
Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the
detainees right to exercise for two hours a day.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE

APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A DECISION

OF THE SUPREME COURT;

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE

CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS DETENTION.5
The Ruling of the Court

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that
the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid
indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to
assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the
appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do
not directly affect the detainees liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the
detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an
abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the
proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the
promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to
exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold
the constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure
No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2)
hours a day.
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue
that the Courts Order had already foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their
petition.
Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the
Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers
detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees release, the Court would not have referred the
hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the
detainees had the Court upheld petitioners cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary
step in the hearing of the petition.6 The respondent must produce the person and explain the
cause of his detention.7 However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on
the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals
to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas
corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention
unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after
hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively
participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from
claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the

cause of detention of a person.8 The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is
being illegally deprived of his liberty.9 If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the
court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the
habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a
writ of error.10 Neither can it substitute for an appeal.11
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is
deprivation of a persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. 12
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The
courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed
and such sentence is void as to the excess.13 Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the
threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the
entire proceedings.14
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees.
Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military
offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP
Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients
any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees right to counsel
and violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA 7438").15 Petitioners claim that the regulated visits
made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the
personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners
further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees right against cruel and unusual
punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with their
visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron
grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees
cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. 16 However, the
fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. 17
RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly
recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to
secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:

Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate
family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by
him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him,
or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the
night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six
(6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee
client "at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night." However, the last paragraph of
the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that "notwithstanding" the provisions
of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power to undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations
governing a detainees confinement must be "reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety
and prevent his escape." Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the
governments objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. The
law grants the detention officer the authority to "undertake such reasonable measures" or
regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective
representation when petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours.
Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees rights entitle them to be released from
detention.
Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render
void the detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees
release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees
right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel,
but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive on the
standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be
reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that
purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless. 19 However,
Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from skeptically questioning challenged
restrictions in detention and prison facilities. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court commanded the courts

to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" in implementing policies to maintain

institutional security.21
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to
make regulations in detention centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his escape." In the present case, the
visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the
legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees
still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is
no impairment of detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients
between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are
regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law
offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent
cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their
clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners
sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined
by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission,22 petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners
themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.

the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. "If the government could confine or
otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence
at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention."
The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in
which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require
administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure
that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to
maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs
reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if
they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had
he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of
the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial
detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees presence
at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a
valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention
and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. 30

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm
or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. 31 Punishment also
requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the
inherent discomforts of confinement.32

Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the
boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive
punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process
of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to live comfortably. 24 The fact
that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably
does not convert those restrictions into punishment.25 It is when the restrictions are arbitrary
and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. 26 Courts will also infer intent to punish
even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction
appears excessive in relation to that purpose. 27 Jail officials are thus not required to use the
least restrictive security measure.28 They must only refrain from implementing a restriction
that appears excessive to the purpose it serves. 29

Block v. Rutherford,33 which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on
contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of
innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet
convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal
conviction.34 Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff
hostage to effect escapes.35 Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in
weapons, drugs, and other contraband.36 The restriction on contact visits was imposed even on
low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and
weapons.37 The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits
was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees. 38

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the
legitimate goal of internal security.39 This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine enunciated
in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should
decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative expertise. 40

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the
"essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at trial." While
this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some
manner, we do not accept respondents argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a
detainees presence at trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their
visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating
the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to

have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The
arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation
regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with
visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention
Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from
passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure
security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and
ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute
punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP
Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt.
Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary
cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of
Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions now
prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees. The Court of
Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention
Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples
Army ("NPA") member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP
Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters
handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing.
Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because
there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the
Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless authorized by law.
The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and
outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison
facility and to avert coordinated escapes. 41 Even in the absence of statutes specifically
allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based
on the principle of "civil deaths."42 Inmates were deemed to have no right to correspond
confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the
right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between the
inmate and his lawyer.43
Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials
received respect.44 The confidential correspondences could not be censored. 45 The
infringement of such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the inmates First
Amendment rights.46 A prisoner has a right to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy,

which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the
administration of the institution.47 Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in
plots that threaten prison security.48
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by
convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono49 recognized
that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in
communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail addressed to public officials, courts
and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for contraband
and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or
read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,50 involving convicted prisoners, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming
mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could not read such mail from
attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from
attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The
prison regulation under challenge provided that (a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read
and inspected, and no exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but
contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of
the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be
from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether
such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail to indicate
contraband.
xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an
attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be
imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the State require any such communications to be
specially marked as originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if
they are to receive special treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison
authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself
and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged are actually
from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this
could in no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill
such communications, since the inmates presence insures that prison officials will not read the
mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent
attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of
Appeals that this should only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a flexible test,

besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule
whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and
perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.51
In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable
expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners
necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is
also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant
rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain
rights, are "justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." The curtailment of
certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of "institutional
needs and objectives" of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security. Of course,
these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of
justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction. 53
The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v.
Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn
noted the considerable jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may be
censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security or discipline.
State v. Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of
opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible
with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure
institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the
prisoners expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered a paramount
interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that "[l]oss of
freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement."
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted
inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally
pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those
who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who are charged with serious
crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a greater risk of escape than
convicted inmates.55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it is impractical to draw a line
between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail
security."
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail
poses a genuine threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope
for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail

officials.58 A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming
mail.59 However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that
prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents
without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer.60 The inspection of
privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. 61
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees
letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters
were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it
serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters
were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials
should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights 62
is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained
or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as
well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of
their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to
infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts
"balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison
administrators."63 The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. 64
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in
committing coup detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.65 The junior officers are
not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed
takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members
of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War. 66

Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf
and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a
better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together
with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend
largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the
military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted
prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions
in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and
prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford
injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane
conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement.67 The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or
duration of confinement.68
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

No pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

G.R. No. 181881

October 18, 2011

BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner,

vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE
GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was
charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal
files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of
misconduct.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224)
filed by petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713
and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and
also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent
CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent
through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang,
Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the
CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents marked "Confidential" are
left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to
Chairperson David.

Concerned Govt employee3

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in
information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation
and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions."4 After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSCROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the
team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo
(Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson Davids
directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services
Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and
Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the
CSC Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:
"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and
LSD per instruction of the Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be
better."
"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair."

The letter-complaint reads:

The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,

"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about
this.
"We cant do anything about it its a directive from chair."
"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint"; "ill send a copy of
the memo via mms"5

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!

As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is
just alright for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused govt employee
having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others
and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office.
He is the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping
many who have pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if
this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and
good office is being tainted.

Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and
that he will just get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff
also reported the presence of the team from CSC main office: "Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa
kuarto natin."6 At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their
task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced
from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The
contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft
pleadings or letters7 in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order 8 dated January

11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation
or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners personal files, Chairperson David
made the following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or
connected with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the
CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note
that most of these draft pleadings are for and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as
respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared
them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and
inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to
discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings
so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice
but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and
certainly against common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had
engaged in this customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved
files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft pleadings
were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he
was the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer of
origin was within his direct control and disposition.9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous lettercomplaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he
"lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a
"fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer,
and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against selfincrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done
while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director
Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives,
friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating
and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against
self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government
property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of
Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership,
including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is
not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal
search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible
as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree."10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07038211 finding prima facie case
against the petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct

Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner was directed to
submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he elects a
formal investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was
likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon receipt of the
resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer)
assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is
beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged
that those files found in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom
he permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his computer out of close association or
friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who
entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioners CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter
being Atty. Solosas client who attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or
bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner.
Petitioner contended that the case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised
in the criminal complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom
petitioner believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of the
preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No. 07051912 dated March 19, 2007,
the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioners
answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order
and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however,
petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel
D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO
IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for disbarment against
Director Buensalida.14

On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal
investigation of the case on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent
Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction. 15 Since he failed to attend the prehearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with
warning that the failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing
conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-parte. 16
Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that the
investigation proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by
the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May
18, 2007 with similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his counsels nonappearance.17 This prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the
respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt. 18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07113419 denying petitioners motion to set
aside the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing
officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the
investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution,
petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then
proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,20 the dispositive part of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A.
Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties, namely, disqualification
to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities
and bar from taking future civil service examinations. 21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioners computer, the
CSC noted the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the
government as employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the computer
assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct
committed by said employee and without the latters consent or participation. The CSC thus
turned to relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of
OConnor v. Ortega22 as authority for the view that government agencies, in their capacity as
employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the
governmental workplace without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant requirement for
search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v.
Mark L. Simons23 which declared that the federal agencys computer use policy foreclosed any
inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court

therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondents legitimate
expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still, the warrantless
search of the employees office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled
to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct
provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional
office in view of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC
employee cannot assert any privacy right to a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that
there was no such administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of
petitioners computer successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in
the workplace as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the
search in its capacity as government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with
an investigation involving work-related misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant
requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence having
been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the charges
of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioners
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution
dismissing him from the service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a
Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution
No. 07180025 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding
no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1)
petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the
CSC after a fact-finding investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima
facie case against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in
petitioners computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on
the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as
government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is
nothing contemptuous in CSCs act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was
no restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal
arguing that
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND

COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN
TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER
2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936,
WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED
PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS
RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM
NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND
EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL
COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING
SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY
INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED
JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING
THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE
INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT
COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE
PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION
14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED
THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH
ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE
III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL
OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO
SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION

ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION

NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED
SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR
URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer
and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a
transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution,27 which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and application
for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the
light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti 29 :
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal
Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. 30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI
agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public
telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a "search and seizure". Because
the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a
personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the

concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy
right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). 32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in
the workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment
rights with regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials,
even as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus "recognized that
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the
1987 case of OConnor v. Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed
by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials
investigating charges of mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual
harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities involving his private patients
under the state medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal items from his
desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically declared that "[i]ndividuals do
not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a
private employer."35 A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two
steps: first, because "some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the
public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable", a court must consider "[t]he operational
realities of the workplace" in order to determine whether an employees Fourth Amendment
rights are implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an
employers intrusion on that expectation "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well
as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances."36
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their
workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like
similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual
office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employees expectation
of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a
private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal
invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other
visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits.
Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others such as fellow employees,
supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public may have frequent access to an
individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that "[c]onstitutional protection against
unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government
has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer," x x x but some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation

of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public
sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must
be addressed on a case-by-case basis.37 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr.
Ortegas Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials
infringed "an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable." Given
the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with
any other employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in his own office
while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored outside his
office, and there being no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable regulation
or policy discouraging employees from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or
file cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy
where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable
expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets. 38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was
reasonable, the OConnor plurality decision discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the
Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the "searchwas not a reasonable
search under the fourth amendment." x x x "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to
searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards
governing such searches[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search
takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness
applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a
particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests
alleged to justify the intrusion." x x x In the case of searches conducted by a public
employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of
privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient
operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter
an employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt
the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant
procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar
with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we
have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business
of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely
incident to the primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a

warrant requirement would conflict with the "common-sense realization that government
offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." x x x

misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the

circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the
intrusion must be reasonable:

xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the
efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services
to the public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have
probable cause before they entered an employees desk for the purpose of finding a file or
piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause,
rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a
search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause
has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of
securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency,
therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for workrelated, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of workrelated employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an
interest substantially different from "the normal need for law enforcement." x x x Public
employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient
manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence,
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases,
public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their
misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In
contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the
criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that
the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a
probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will
be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and
ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement
make theprobable-cause requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, workrelated noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.
A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers
to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions
upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on
the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related

"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must
consider whether theaction was justified at its inception, x x x ; second, one must
determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place," x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be "justified at its
inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is
necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x
x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
nature of the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as
to the character of the search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the
search that was undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the determination of the
justification for the search and seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the
inception of the search and its scope.
In OConnor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless searches
involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing
test under which government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable
expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the
warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement. 40
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees privacy rights in the
workplace. One of these cases involved a government employers search of an office
computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons41 where the defendant Simons, an employee of a
division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing
materials containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not
share with anyone, and a computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on
computer use stating that employees were to use the Internet for official government business
only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically prohibited. The policy also stated
that users shall understand that the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the
users Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the
management of the agencys computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet
activity originating from Simons computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and examination
of Simons computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that were
pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of Simons computer were copied from a
remote work station. Days later, the contractors representative finally entered Simons office,

removed the original hard drive on Simons computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the
original to the agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched
Simons office in the evening when Simons was not around. The search team copied the
contents of Simons computer; computer diskettes found in Simons desk drawer; computer
files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and various documents,
including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these evidence,
arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons
computer and office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant
was valid. It held that the search remains valid under the OConnor exception to the warrant
requirement because evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise
proper administrative inspection. Simons violation of the agencys Internet policy happened
also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity
and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons office was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment standard announced in OConnor because at the inception of the
search, the employer had "reasonable grounds for suspecting" that the hard drive would yield
evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his
Internet access to download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard
drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not excessively
intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not
have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first
prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x
x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons computer did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude
that Simons Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by FBIS retrieval of Simons hard
drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or
fruits of his Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated
that FBIS would "audit, inspect, and/or monitor" employees use of the Internet,
including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages, "as deemed
appropriate." x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they could not reasonably
expect that their Internet activity would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons

subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief
was not objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet
use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer files
Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
office. x x x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted
above, the operational realities of Simons workplace may have diminished his legitimate
privacy expectations. However, there is no evidence in the record of any workplace practices,
procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record,
Simons possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employees supervisor entering the employees
government office and retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had
absolutely no expectation of privacy equipment that the employer knew contained evidence
of crimes committed by the employee in the employees office. This situation may be
contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a government employee were unrelated to his
employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the employers policy
and the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS intrusion into Simons
office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer might engage. x x x 42
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board43 which involved the
constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees
of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy
in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by
the companys work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)

Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar,
we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair,
the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its
inception and scope?

2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the

performance of their respective jobs.

In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employees
relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the
employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his
privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of
the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together.44 Thus, where the
employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept
the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and
items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment. 45

xxxx

We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the
public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like
friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer
which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends,
unknown people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the
PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on
appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector
Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself
alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer." 46 Under this scenario, it can
hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize
as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the
aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of
privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the
use of office computers, as in Simons.

3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given
time.

No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall
not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on
the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and
assign Users to handle the confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything
they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other
computer network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or automated
means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal
property or for the exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR)
has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However, he is
accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their
passwords for access to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be
printed, stored online, or given to others. Users shall be responsible for all
transactions made using their passwords. No User may access the computer system
with another Users password or account.

Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and
may be used only for legitimate business purposes.

13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the
computer system or to encode particular files or messages does not imply that Users
have an expectation of privacy in the material they create or receive on the computer
system. The Civil Service Commission has global passwords that permit access to
all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of whether those

materials have been encoded with a particular Users password. Only members of
the Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.
x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have
no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in determining whether an
employees expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a
workplace privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a
state university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
computer files where the universitys computer policy, the computer user is informed not to
expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is
specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched when the university is
responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee thus cannot
claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university officials conducted a
warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials. 49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioners
computer, we answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of
work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending
cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from
unknown sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office
IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another government agency, "selling" cases and
aiding parties with pending cases, all done during office hours and involved the use of
government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details
sufficient to warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and
divisions involved in the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;

11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV
and its effect on the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office
staff to back up the files in the computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division
(PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x50
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.51 Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of
Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government agencys computer use policy
prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided
that employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency
information systems and technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation
of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found
during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child
pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard drive was first remotely
examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that
he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages
throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to
access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his
computer tower and floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative
investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police department. The
initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well as the subsequent
warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a public employer can
investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place. 52
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its
inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in
the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the
test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the abovediscussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search
in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with
an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted
from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received
recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties
having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the
imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending cases
before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have

shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional
integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less
effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative
justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and
confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if
only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date
that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer
resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to
the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to
encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in
ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer
files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause
requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who
happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In
addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and
the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned
to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its
operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its
employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed
admissible.53
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His
other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section
3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government
workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that
OConnor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal
offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was
justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield
incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government
employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls
under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in
OConnor.

The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila 54 involving a branch clerk
(Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was
consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using office supplies,
equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The
team was able to access Atty. Morales personal computer and print two documents stored in
its hard drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the
RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was seized and
taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to
the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the
Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as
no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive
statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also
charged in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of
gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of
the exacting standards required of every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence
obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA
that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact
the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot
investigation, questioning the validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence,
apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty.
Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the
charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which
involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files
of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government
property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such
relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors
and circumstances under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of
CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are
admissible in the administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the
CSC was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the
service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are
accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds
might conceivably opine otherwise.55
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal
pleadings and documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and
testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the formal investigation. According to the
CSC, these documents were confirmed to be similar or exactly the same content-wise with
those on the case records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the
Commission Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with
the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the explanation given by
petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive actually
belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer
for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the
circumstances. We hold that the CSCs factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject
pleadings and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings
responding to the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to
them such as a petition for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This
indicates that the author thereof knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or
advancement of the interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the
appearance in one of the retrieved documents the phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang
ang bayad mo," lends plausibility to an inference that the preparation or drafting of the legal
pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable motivation. Whoever was responsible for
these documents was simply doing the same for the money a "legal mercenary" selling or
purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the
presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said
computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testified
seeing a written copy of one of the pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the
respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court
of Appeals. The said circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly
undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the
documents were the personal files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano
Solosa, who incidentally served as his counsel of record during the formal investigation of this
case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this
contention of the respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who
testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the
computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in close
proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally knows, was
using the computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the

formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the same constitutes self-serving
evidence unworthy of weight and credence. The same is true with the other supporting
affidavits, which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the
fact that he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him
for official purpose, not only once but several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for
ends not in conformity with the interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a
principal by indispensable cooperationOr at the very least, he should be responsible for
serious misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the
electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line
appearing in one of the documents, "Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," was a
private joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty.
Solosa, and not indicative of anything more sinister. The same is too preposterous to be
believed. Why would such a statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the computer
assigned to the respondent, unless he had something to do with it? 56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous
complaint since Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified
complaint:
Rule II Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be
given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.
However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be
under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the
allegation therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person
complained of may be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to
have been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and
search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the
anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining authoritys own fact-finding investigation and
information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the petitioner who was then directed
to file his comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals 57 --

Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8,
Rule II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be
initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority,
even without being subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining
authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves
scant consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been
issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which the
dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by Chairperson
David in her Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflors previous memo expressing
his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this case. According to
Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by
provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and former
Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw
no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal
use of the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order.58 Moreover, being
an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel
of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSCs
ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified
the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory
penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October
11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered
petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.
On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and
took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and
papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as
nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was
made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as
evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this
petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife,
the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the
trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only
ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use
by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or
gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence,
Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty.
1

Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr.
which it found to be impressed with merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso
Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional
Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-I to J-7.
On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court
on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid
date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence,
during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes
cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally
admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners
admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr.
Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit,
and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound
by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no
more than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the
purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial
court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility
of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the
charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court,

it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and,
therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers
became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is freedom of
3
4
5
6

2
7

communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.