ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

RECITATION 1-23-2017

OSP is merely a component of OMB and may only act under the supervision
and control of OMB (Ombudsman vs Valera 471 SCRA 717)
(Ombudsman vs Valera 471 SCRA 717)
Facts:
OMB received several complaints vs Valera (Deputy Comissioner, Office of the
Revenue Collection Monitoring Group, Bureau of Customs) for violation of RA
3019. OMB Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, in the administrative case OMB-CA-0379-J, issued the Order placing respondent Valera under preventive
suspension for six months without pay. Petitioner Special Prosecutor VillaIgnacio anchors his authority to conduct the administrative investigation in
OMB-C-A-03-0379-J on the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 issued by
Ombudsman Marcelo inhibiting himself therefrom and directing petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and stead.
Valera filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition as he sought to nullify the Order of preventive suspension. CA held
that Villa-Ignacio is NOT authorized by law to sign and issue preventivesuspension orders since he is neither the Ombudsman nor one of the Deputy
Ombudsmen based on the ff laws:
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman
Act of 1989, which vests on the Ombudsman and his Deputy the
power to preventively suspend any government officer or employee
under the Ombudsmans authority pending investigation subject to
certain conditions. In relation thereto,
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution stating that the Office of the
Ombudsman is composed of the Ombudsman to be known as the
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy, and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.
As to the delegation by OMB Marcelo, CA said: the Ombudsman, in
issuing that kind of a memorandum, has, wittingly or unwittingly,
permitted the Office of the Special Prosecutor to perform the
administrative adjudicative powers of the Ombudsman not only to
issue preventive suspension but to perform, without qualification,
any and all other administrative adjudicative powers, duties
functions and responsibilities pertaining to the former as provided
under R.A. No. 6770 and the Constitution.
ISSUE: whether petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has the authority to
place respondent Valera under preventive suspension in connection with the
administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman? NO.
HELD:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS MERELY A COMPONENT OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND MAY ONLY ACT UNDER THE SUPERVISION
AND CONTROL AND UPON AUTHORITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN. Section 38(1),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines supervision and
control thus:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to
act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe
standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is
explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular
agencies, the word control shall encompass supervision and control as defined
in this paragraph.

Digests

The power of supervision and control has been likewise explained as follows: In
administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.
Pursuant to its power of supervision and control, the Office of the Ombudsman
is empowered under Section 15(10) of R.A. No. 6770 to:
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such
authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the
powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;
Complementary thereto, Section 11(4)(c) thereof requires the latter to: (c)
[p]erform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman. Hence, under the
foregoing provisions, the Ombudsman may delegate his investigatory function,
including the power to conduct administrative investigation, to the Special
Prosecutor.
SECTION 24 OF R.A. NO 6770, HOWEVER, GRANTS THE POWER TO
PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND ONLY TO THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMEN. It is observed that R.A. No. 6770 has invariably mentioned the
Special Prosecutor alongside the Ombudsman and/or the Deputy Ombudsmen
with respect to the manner of appointment,[34] qualifications,[35] term of
office,grounds for removal from office,[37] prohibitions and disqualifications[38]
and disclosure of relationship requirement.[39] However, with respect to the
grant of the power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes
no mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion is to
withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend. It is a
basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

SUMMARY: Ombudsman Marcelo designated the Special Prosecutor to conduct

the administrative investigation. In the course thereof, petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio found that the preventive suspension of respondent Valera
was warranted under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. However, since under the said
provision only the Ombudsman or his Deputy may exercise the power of preventive
suspension, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa- Ignacio could only recommend to
the Ombudsman or, in this case because of the latters inhibition, to the designated
Deputy Ombudsman to place respondent Valera under preventive suspension.
Stated differently, with respect to the conduct of administrative investigation, the
Special Prosecutors authority, insofar as preventive suspension is concerned, is
akin to that of the PIAB-A, i.e., recommendatory in nature. It bears stressing that
the power to place a public officer or employee under preventive suspension
pending an investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the Deputy
Ombudsmen. Consequently, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had no
authority to issue the March 17, 2004 Order placing respondent Valera under
preventive suspension for six months without pay in connection with the
administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J.

The review as an act of supervision and control by DOJ Secretary over

fiscals finds basis in this doctrine. He may thus affirm, nullify, reverse, or
modify their rulings. Mistakes, abuse or negligence by an admin agency in
the intial steps should be corrected by higher administrative authorities not
directly by the courts

Anyone can train to be a gladiator. What marks you out is having the mindset of a champion

. Manu Bennett

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

RSP has administrative supervision, not control, over CPs and PPs (RSP
Aurillo vs Rabi, 392 SCRA 604).

(RSP Aurillo vs Rabi, 392 SCRA 604).

FACTS:
Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant of arrest and charged in the Office of
the City Prosecutor for (possession of unlicensed firearm). Public Prosecutor
Zenaida Camonical Isidro conducted an inquest investigation of the case and
issued a resolution recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of
probable cause. However, Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Aurillo, Jr. of
Region VIII decided to assume jurisdiction over the case and to order the
conduct of a new PI thereof. Aurillo designated the assistant regional state
prosecutor to conduct the new PI of I.S. No. 95-043. On January 20, 1995, Aurillo
issued another Memorandum Order[3] to the City Prosecutor directing him to
elevate the affidavit of Rodolfo Cabaluna as well as the subject firearm and knife
to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor with the information that it had
taken over the preliminary investigation of the said complaint pursuant to PD
1275 and existing rules.[4] The City Prosecutor of Tacloban complied with the
order of Aurillo and on January 23, 1995, the Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor issued a subpoena notifying Noel Rabi and Margot Villanueva of the
preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 at 9:00 a.m. on February 2, 1995, not
only for violation of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of Violation of Comelec
Resolution No. 2323 (gun banned) [sic], Batas Pambansa Bilang 9 (possession of
deadly weapon) and Malicious Mischief. [5]
Rabi filed with RTC a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction alleging that under the 1987
Revised Administrative Code and PD 1275 as implemented by Department Order
No. 318 of the Department of Justice, a regional state prosecutor was vested
only with administrative supervision over the city prosecutor and had no power
to motu proprio review, revise, or modify the resolution of the city prosecutor on
the latters conduct of a preliminary or inquest investigation of a criminal
complaint filed directly therewith. Rabi contended that by taking over the
preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and conducting a new preliminary
investigation of said case, Aurillo acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Rabi thus prayed that,
pending resolution of his plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, a temporary
restraining order be issued to enjoin Aurillo from proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043.[6]
In answer to the petition, Aurillo alleged that he took over and ordered a new
preliminary investigation by virtue of his prosecutorial powers under PD 1275
vesting on him supervision and control over field prosecution officers in the
region. He averred that such powers included the authority for him to take over
the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043.

ISSUE: Is Aurillo empowered to motu proprio take over and conduct a preliminary
investigation of I.S No. 95-043, after the inquest investigation thereof had
already been terminated and approved by city prosecutor? No.

HELD:
Aurillo acted without authority and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction when he took over motu proprio the PI of I.S. No.
95-043 and ordered a new PI thereof; hence, his actuations were a nullity.
Aurillos reliance on Section 8, paragraph (b) of PD 1275 is misplaced. Said law
provides that a RSP exercises immediate administrative supervision over all
provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities
comprised within his region and prosecutes any case arising within his region. [16]

Digests

The administrative supervision which shall govern the administration

relationship between a department or its equivalent and an agency under its
jurisdiction is limited to the authority of such department to generally oversee
the operation of the agency under it to insure that the same is managed
effectively and economically, without interfering with its day-to-day activities;
and to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of
official functions, including the rectification of violations, abuses or other forms
of maladministration.[17] It bears stressing that in administrative law,
administrative supervision is not synonymous with control. The Court
distinguished supervision from control in Jose Mondano vs. Francisco
Silvosa,[18] thus:
x x x In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. x x x.
Supervision and control, on the other hand, includes the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
todirect the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and
decision of subordinate officials or units. [19]
In Hon. Franklin Drilon, et al. vs. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, et al.,[20] the Court declared
that an officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinates or he may even decide to do it himself. The Court, likewise, decreed
in an avuncular case that control means the power of an official to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter.[21]
In this case, when Aurillo motu proprio took over the preliminary investigation of
I.S. No. 95-043 after the same had already been dismissed by the city prosecutor
and ordered the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the case, he exercised not only administrative supervision but
control over the city prosecutor in the performance of the latters quasijudicial functions .. By doing so, Aurillo nullified the resolution of the inquest
prosecutor as approved by the city prosecutor and deprived Rabi as the
aggrieved party in I.S. 95-043 of his right to file a motion for the reconsideration
of the resolution of the inquest prosecutor under Section 2 of Department
Circular No. 7 of the Department of Justice, as amended by Department Order
No. 223,[22] and if said motion were denied to appeal therefrom to the Secretary
of Justice.
As a practical matter, however, criminal complaints are filed in a proper case for
PI with the municipal trial court or with the office of the city or provincial
prosecutor which has territorial jurisdiction over the offense complained of and
not with the office of the regional state prosecutor. Hence, the office of the RSP
does not conduct any PI or prosecute any criminal case in court at all. The bulk
of the work of the office of the RSP consists of administrative supervision over
city or provincial or city fiscals and their assistants. The Secretary of Justice
thus opted to harness the services of regional state prosecutors and help out in
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases not filed with their
offices. Hence, pursuant to his power under Section 4, Chapter 1, Book IV of the
1987 Revised Administrative Code,[24] and of his power of supervision and
control over RSP and provincial and city prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice
issued Department Order No. 318 authorizing RSP to investigate and/or
prosecute, upon his directives, special criminal cases within the region. [25] In fine,
the duty of the RSP to prosecute or investigate specific criminal cases pursuant

Anyone can train to be a gladiator. What marks you out is having the mindset of a champion

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

to Department Order No. 318 is not an abridgment or curtailment of their duties

or functions under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, but is an additional duty specifically delegated to them by the
Secretary of Justice to enhance the administration of justice.

Protests regarding CARP implementation are under exclusive jurisdiction

of DAR Secretary. The petition for certiorari by Polo Coconut before CA
asserting that the PARO gravely abused his discretion in placing Poli estate
under the CARP will not prosper until all remedies under DARAB Rules have
been exhausted (DAR vs PCPI, 564 SCRA 80)
(DAR vs PCPI, 564 SCRA 80)

FACTS: Polo Coconut Plantation Co Inc (PCPI) sought to convert Polo Estate into
a special economic zone. It applied for the reclassification of its agrilands to
mixed residential, commercial, and industrial lands. Subsequently, DAR through
PARO notified PCPI that a portion of the Polo Estate had been placed under
CARP and a new title was then issued in favor of the beneficiaries. PCPI filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari asserting that DAR acted with GAOD in
placing the Polo estate under CARP asserting that the estate was previously
reclassified as no longer agriland. In their favor, CA found that the Polo estate
was no longer agricultural land when the DAR placed it under the CARP
ISSUE: W/N Recourse to court action is ripe to prosper? No.
HELD: Recourse to court action will not prosper until all remedies have been
exhausted at the administrative level. Protests regarding the implementation of
the CARP fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He
determines whether a tract of land is covered by or exempt from CARP.[20]
Likewise, questions regarding the eligibility of CARP beneficiaries must be
addressed to him. The DAR Secretary decides to whom lands placed under the
CARP shall be distributed.[21]
Before PCPCI filed its petition for certiorari in the CA, it did not file a protest or
opposition questioning the propriety of subjecting the Polo estate to the CARP.
Neither did it assail the eligibility of petitioners-beneficiaries before the DAR
Secretary. There were available administrative remedies under the DARAB Rules
but PCPCI did not avail of them.
Moreover, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
can be availed of only in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[22] Here, recourse to the DAR
Secretary was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law contemplated by Rule 65.

The complaint of Senior Engr. Ortizo for prohibition and injunction should
have been dismissed. He should appeal the reassignment order of RM to
the NIA Administrator and if necessary, to CSC (Corsiga vs Defensor, 391
SCRA 274)

(Corsiga vs Defensor, 391 SCRA 274)

FACTS: Romeo P. Ortizo was the Senior Engineer B in the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) tasked with the duty of assisting the Irrigation
Superintendent in the said station. However, he was reassigned by Eduardo P.
Corsiga, then Regional Irrigation Manager of the NIA, Region VI to Aganan-Sta.
Barbara River Irrigation System. Aggrieved, Ortizo wrote a letter to Corsiga
requesting exemption but the same was denied. This prompted Ortizo to file
before the RTC a complaint for prohibition and injunction with prayer for
issuance of TRO/preliminary injunction.

Digests

Corsiga moved to dismiss the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative

remedies. This motion was denied by RTC. CA affirmed the trial courts
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462 saying that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where the controverted act is patently
illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. Regional Office Memorandum No. 52,
according to the court, was illegal since it violated private respondents
constitutional right to security of tenure. Private respondents original
appointment as Senior Engineer B in the NIA Jalaur River Irrigation System,
Region VI is a permanent one; thus, it entitled him to a security of tenure. He
cannot, therefore, be reassigned to another position that involves a reduction in
rank without his consent.
ISSUE: Does private respondent have a cause of action although his complaint
was filed in the trial court without first exhausting all available administrative
remedies?
HELD:
Being an NIA employee covered by the Civil Service Law, in our view, private
respondent should have first complained to the NIA Administrator, and if
necessary, then appeal to the Civil Service Commission.[17] As ruled in Abe-Abe
vs. Manta, 90 SCRA 524 (1979), if a litigant goes to court without first pursuing
his administrative remedies, his action is premature, and he has no cause of
action to ventilate in court. Hence, petitioner asserts that private respondents
case is not ripe for judicial determination.
Private respondent contends, however, that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not an absolute rule. It has exceptions, namely, (1)
where the issue involved is one of law and cannot be resolved administratively,
(2) where the controverted act is patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive, (3)
where irreparable injury exists, (4) where there is no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy, (5) or where urgent circumstances require judicial intervention.
According to private respondent, the circumstances of the case required him to
urgently act on his reassignment since he might be administratively charged if
he resisted petitioners order, yet, at the same time he could be in estopped to
question the order had he yielded to it without protest.
According to private respondent, petitioner was guilty of bad faith; his real
objective was to assign someone close to him to replace private respondent.
Petitioners action was capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, and discriminatory, said
private respondent since he was the only one, from among the officials or
employees of the same rank, who was reassigned. This discrimination
constituted a grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, against which private respondent said he had no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in law except to institute an action before the regional trial
court.
However, private respondent failed to reckon with the fact that the issue in Civil
Case No. 22462 was not purely a question of law. Certain facts needed to be
resolved first. Did private respondents reassignment involve a reduction in rank?
Private respondent claimed his transfer to a new station violated the rule on
reassignment for he was allegedly transferred to a lower position.[18] But
petitioner had refuted this contention, adding that his order reassigning private
respondent was a lawful exercise of management prerogatives.[19] Also, was
private respondent the only one, among the employees of his rank, who was
reassigned? Private respondent alleged he was singled out, but he did not
present any evidence to prove it. Moreover, there is no convincing evidence of
grave abuse of discretion on petitioners part. Private respondent speculated that
petitioners real intent in reassigning him was to create a vacancy in his position
so that petitioner could appoint someone close to him. This is a mere allegation

Anyone can train to be a gladiator. What marks you out is having the mindset of a champion

. Manu Bennett

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
KC Case
which private respondent failed to substantiate. Official functions are presumed
to be regular unless proven otherwise.[20]
Lastly, private respondent claimed urgency in that he had no other recourse but
to go to court, or he would be charged administratively. However, under Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law, a recourse is available to him by way
of appeal which could be brought to the agency head, with further recourse, if
needed, to the Civil Service Commission. Worth noting, the possibility of an
administrative charge was only speculative on the part of private respondent,
who could avail of administrative remedies already cited.
In sum, Civil Case No. 22462 is not an exception to the general rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals, in our view, committed
reversible error in finding that the trial court did not err nor gravely abused its
discretion for taking jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462.

Extelcom violated the rule on exhaustion of admin remedies when it went

directly to CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition from the NTC Order
without first filing a MR w/I 15 days pursuant to NTC Rules. That the NTC
Order became immediately executory does not mean foreclosure of
remedy of filing MR (Rep vs Extelcom, 373 SCRA 321)

Digests

for reconsideration. Under the NTC Rules, a party adversely affected by a

decision, order, ruling or resolution may within fifteen (15) days file a motion for
reconsideration. That the Order of the NTC became immediately executory does
not mean that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration is foreclosed to
the petitioner. Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation
of evidence and in the exercise of its adjudicative functions. This latitude
includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within its special
competence.
In the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the NTC
which formed the basis for awarding the provisional authority to Bayantel. As
found by the NTC, Bayantel has been granted several provisional and permanent
authorities before to operate various telecommunications services.[51] Indeed,
it was established that Bayantel was the first company to comply with its
obligation to install local exchange lines pursuant to E.O. 109 and R.A. 7925. In
recognition of the same, the provisional authority awarded in favor of Bayantel
to operate Local Exchange Services in Quezon City, Malabon, Valenzuela and the
entire Bicol region was made permanent and a CPCN for the said service was
granted in its favor.

(Rep vs Extelcom, 373 SCRA 321)

FACTS: Bayantel filed an application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience to install, operate, and
maintain Cellular Mobile Tele Service. Bayantel wanted to amend its application.
Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But before
Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an
Order to archive the application in view of the closing out of all available
frequencies after it granted provisional authorities to ISLACOM and GMCR Inc.
Upon revival of the application, Extelcom moved to dismiss arguing that the
revival was filed only after 8 yrs from the original application. The motion to
dismiss by Extelcom was denied prompting it to file a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA seeking the annulment of the Order reviving the
application of Bayantel.
CA granted the certiorari. Bayantel and NTC filed their respective MRs. All MRs
are denied by the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Extelcom violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
when it went directly with CA on a petition for certiorari without first filing an
MR? YES
HELD:
The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention of
the court is fatal to ones cause of action. This rule would not only give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but
would also prevent the unnecessary and premature resort to courts. The general
rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a
motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It also basic that
petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to
certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the
following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is
involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant
immediate or more direct action.

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This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.
Although the Order of the NTC dated May 3, 2000 granting provisional authority
to Bayantel was immediately executory, it did not preclude the filing of a motion

. Manu Bennett