No.

10, 1986

PEACE RESEARCHER
CHER
P.O. BOX 19683,
CHRISTCHURCH

ANTARCTIC HERCUlES - READY fOR WAR ',1!����;�j,;,���,'5;\';'

AIRFORCE AGREEMENTS - ALLIES KEEP I<lWIS I N TH E DARI{

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT DlSINFORMATION

 THE DEEP FREEZE SKI-PLANES
MILITARY OR CIVILIAN?
by Bob Leonard
Ownership of the ski-equipped Hercules aircraft
was shifted from the US Navy to the civilian National
Science Foundation bet ween about 1975 and 1979.
Civilian funds now support all aspects of Hercules
operation. However, the Navy still retains a high
degree of control over the aircraft including the
provision of home�base facilities and all flight crews,
and fust priority for use during a military crisis. We
have yet to determine why the title transfers were
made but Qur ongoing research has revealed some
disturbing facts.
The LC-130 Hercules aircraft have been the work­
horse of Operation Deep Freeze for many years. They
are specially equipped with retractable skis enabling
them to be used on runways of either snow or
tannac. According t o both the National Science
Foundation (NSF) and the Navy the Deep Freeze
Bercules are now owned by the NSF. "Ownership of
the last LC-130 aircraft was transferred to the NSF
(from the Navy) during 1979". (J) This transfer of
ownership was a significant step involving the US
Congress, Department of Defense and the NSF.
Therefore, as a preliminary probe into the complex­
itie s of Bereules operation we addressed the following
questions to both the NSF (2) and the Navy (3):
1) When were the aircraft purchased by the NSF
and what was the purchase amount paid by the
Foundation to the Navy?
2) Why does the Foundation use the Navy to fly
the LC- 130s thus requiring special training of flight
crews? Why not use the Air Force since they have
hundreds of C-130s and, presumably, plenty of
trained crews?
3) What agency pays for the training of the Navy
flight crews?
4) Are any aspects of the LC-130 operations put
up for competitive bid by the NSF?
WHY THE TITLE CHANGE?
Neither the Navy nor the NSF would respond to
the questions. Our interest and concern lie in the fact
that the Navy owned and operated the aircraft for the
entire perlod of their Deep Freeze use prior to the
title transfers. But except for title, nothing else seems
to have changed. The Hercules aircraft appear to have
undergone a 'cosmetic' change of ownership, a
process which, ironically, is bringing into sharper
focus what amounts to civilian agency support of
military aircraft. But until our questions are answered
by the US Government we must speculate on the
reasons for the change of ownership.
An obvious reason is that NSF title might be
expected to give the Hercules a lower military profile.
Personnel at Operation Deep Freeze sometimes get
quite upset when the Hercules are referred to as
'Navy' aircraft. But confusion over ownership still
persists more often than not in J!ledia reports. Thus,
2
the lengthy and presumably costly attempt to create
a more civilinn illwge ror Dcep Frceze (if that',') whnt
it was all about) seems 10 have been somethillg of a
failure.
Another possible motive is that civilian ownership
of the Hereules allows the Navy to get round the
politically sticky poHcy of "neither confirm nor
deny" which is said to apply to all military vehicles
with respect to the carriage of nuclear weapons.(4)
However, the Air Force does not seem to try to
enforce the policy for certain of its Starlifters at
Christchurch Airport. Despite the so-called universal
policy for military ships and planes, the policy
apparently does not apply to the Starlifters going to
the Ice. [t would obviously be difficult to enforce
such a policy because these planes regularly cany
civilian scientists and support personnel. And the
cargoes to and from the Ice are handled by New
Zealand civilians who must have free access to the
Starliflers as well as the Hercules. But the MAC
channel fljghts to and from Pine Gap, Nurrungar and
North West Cape in Australia' are definitely covered
by the nuclear weapons policy. The American
military must have something to hi.de in those Star­
lifters. This is a prime example of the selective
political use of the "neither confirm nor deny" policy
by the American government to confound resistance
to nuclear weapons transit and deployment in allied
countries. (5)
We can be certain that the NCND policy would be
applied to the 'civilian' Hercules if they were to revert
to official military use in a c risis.
DOD-NSF CO-OPERATION
The Hercules are home-based at Pt Mugu Naval Air
Station (Pacific Missile Test Center), California in the
off-season for approximately 6 months, Major main­
tenance and crew training are said to occupy those
months.The Navy pilot.s must be specially trained to
fly Hercules (The US Navy has very few Hereules of
its own), to handle the ski equipment and to cope
with the dangerous Antarctic conditions. Just how
the training is accomplished in the hot, dry Californ­
ian summer is an unanswe re d question.
A Memorandum of Agreement between the US
Department of Defense and the National Science
Foundation (NSF) was revised in late 1985. (6) It
spells out the elements of co-operation between the
two agencies for the US An tarctic Program, including
aircraft operations. The ski-Hercules aircraft are
assigned by the NSF to the Navy, apparently on a
permanent basis. A special Navy squadron (VXE-6)
is responsible for their operation. If the NSF staff
want to use their own planes during the non­
Antarctic season they must file a request with the
Navy at least 30 days in advance.
In a state of declared war or national emergency,
 all resources of the VXE-6 squadron, including the
NSF Bercules, shift to the Navy for military use.
This is a significant change to the wording in the old
1975 agreement regarding military use, In a 1983-
dated version of the old agreement, the relevant
sectioll read: "The NSF grants the designated DOD/
DMD Commander the right to uUlise the NSF aircraft
[or military missions when not being utilised by the
NSF, lundergojng standard depot level maintenance
(SDLM) or being utilised for training missions. The
D OD/DMD will reimburse the NSF for such missions
in accordance with Tab A to this appendix." (7)
That l.:liallgc is sigllificulIl for twu n;a�Olls: Firs!,
it raises military missions from a general third priority
category In the 1975 agreement (after Alltarctic
training and NSF missions) to first priority under
crisis situations. Second, it gives somewhat clearer
definitioll to the term 'military mission' by apparent­
ly confining such use of the NSF aircraft to
emergellCY situations as requested by the Secretary of
the Navy and approved by the National Security
Council or higher authority. (6) Nevertheless, the
suspicion remains that the NSF Hercules are used by
the Navy for military missions while based at Pt Mugu
during the off-sea50n. We would like to see document­
ation to prove that maintenance and training occupy
an entire 6-month period of every year for six (or
eight) aircraft. (8)
THE MILITARY BENEFITS OF NSF DOLLARS
It is informative to look at recent statements
about a wrecked Hercules that has lain for over 15
years on the Antarctic coast due south of Tasmania.
It belonged to the Navy at the time of the crash and
still does. If this i s to be recovered and rehabilitated,
the NSF will have to pay for it at an estimated cosl of
$18 million. According to a news item in the local
press in mid-1985 (9) the Foundation was seriously
con sidering the salvage because it would save $57
million compared to buying a new plane equipped
with skis. What is most revealing is that although the
recovery and rehabilitation of the plane would give
the NSF another workhorse for the Ice at a low price,
it would also give the Navy another military plane for
absolutely nothing.
. That peculiar situation of the damaged Hercules
illustrates OUr central concern. The skj-Hercules can
be fairly described as military contingency assets
under the gujse of civilian-owned research aircraft.
All expenses of their ownership, operation and
maintenance are borne by the civilian NSF. But the
planes are ready for mililary use in a crisis and
constantly under the thumb of the Navy year-round
at no cost to the military. The ski-Hercules together
with the Military Airlift Command Starlifters (10)
represent a long-standing and continuing military
presence in New Zealand and the Antarctic. That
presence and the US.Navy and Air Force base in
Christchurch would have been difficult, if not
impossible, to. develop and maintain in the South
Pacific were it not for special provisions in the
Antarctic Treaty for military logistic support. This
serious loophole in the Treaty is hardly noticed by
New Zealanders, let alone questioned.
This quite deliberate loophole is most likely
intended to be obscured by the arrangement described
above whereby the ski-Hercules ahcraft are now
3
technically owned by the NSF, but are effectively
military aircraft in a military crisis. The bottom line
is Harewood's vulnerability to a potential American
military take-over in certain circulllstances. Global
alerts of American military forces during internationai
crises have included the Harewood base. The Middle
East crisis in October 1973 was a case in point. ( 1 1)
Although seemingly remote from current world flash
points, New Zealand stands ready as a backup for US
military contingencies if needed.
References:
(1 ) Correspondence, US Navy, 19 September 1985.
(2) Correspondence, NSF, 18 August 1985.
(3) Correspondence, US Navy, 2 October 1985.
(4) Correspondence,US Information Service, 23 June 1983.
(5) Arkin, \V.M. 1985. "Contingency Overseas Deployments
of Nuclear Weapons" A Report. Institute for Policy
Studies. Washington,nc.
(6) Memorandum of Agreement between the Dept. of
Defence and National Science Foundation, "Operational and
Logistic Support for the U.S. Antarctic Program",3 October
1985.
(7) MOA between the DOD and NSF, "Logistic Support
and LC-130 Aircraft Operation for Antarctic Program,
7 October 1983.
(8) The exact number of LC-130s in existence is not clear.
Records from Pt Mugu NAS list eight VXE-6 squadron air­
craft. An NSF public-information booklet lists only seven.
The DODjNSF agreement (ref 6) refers to title transfer for
only six planes which agrees with the total reported by the
manufacturer, Lockheed-Georgia Co., to be in Antarctic
service (plus four used for the DEW line in Greenland).
(9) 'The Star',June 20,1985.
( l 0) See 'Peace Researcher' No. 7,1985.
(11) 'Time' magazine, November 5, 1973: Correspondence,
Norman Kirk, January 28, 1974; S.D. Sagan. 1985. "Nuclear
Alerts and Crisis Managernent". 'InternaL Security', 9(4): 122.
Nuclear protection
B
RITAIN'S Royal Air Force may equip
fighter pilots with goggles that turn opaque
in a fraction of a second. The idea is to protect
pilot's eyes from the flash of a nuclear explosion.
Until recently, the only protection the pilot')
have had has been to wear a patch over one eye.
After the flash, the pilot tears ofT the patch, and
keeps flying with hiS good eye.
A ceramic material called PLZT is making
this heroic procedure obsolete. It is a poly­
crystalline structure of lead lanthanum zironate
titana1e, a material with electra-optical pro­
perties. PLZT is normally transparent. But a
strong electrical field will align the light-carrying
pathways of the crystals along the field. To
someone looking at right angles to the direction
of charge, the material appears opaque.
The Sandia company in the US alr ea dy makes
visors from PLZT for bomber crews. A light
sensor detects the beginning of the flash, and
triggers a pulse of up to t 000 volts across the
crew's visors.
PLZT has a very hi�h resistance, so hardly any
current flows. The vIsors darken in about onc
thousandth of a second.
The British company P!essey has developed
PLZT goggles that fit under a standard flying
helmet. Plessey's engineers demonstrate the
goggles with a photographic flash gun. The
observer is aware of the flash, but when the
goggles turn clear again, in less than a second,
vision is normal. 0

A LLIED AGENCIES VETO
DISCLOSURE
OF AIR FORCE AGREEMENTS
A Committee of four high-ranking officers from
four nations meets annually to approve air force
agreements designed to make it possible to operate
out of each other's countries in the early stages of a
war.
With headquarters in Washington, teams of work�
ing parties draw up new commitments in such fields
as aircraft annaments air navigation and weapon
direction, airfields and airfield facilities. 'PEACE
RESEARCHER' has requested that details of New
Zealand's commitments within the 'Air Standard­
isation Coordinating Committee' be made public.
But representatives of the other four member nations
have said no.
THE AIR STANDARDISATION COORDINAT­
ING COMMITTEE - A REPORT - by Keith Burgess.
No is the answer.After more than a year the New
Zealand Ministry of Defence has responded to
'PEACE RESEARCHER's' request for information
about the 'Air Standardisation Coordinating
Committee' (ASCC), an allied arrangement respons­
ible for developing agreements, known as Air
Standards, amongst the air forces of the member
nations.
The arrangement is important because, as an
official document about the ASCC describes, Air
Standards are intended to ' 'enable essential support
facilities to be made available for aircraft of the
ASCC air forces" and "to enable . . . logistic support
to be available in the early stages of a future war".
'PEACE RESEARCHER', wanting to know the
exact nature of New Zealand's commitments
through the arrangement, wrote to the NZ MoD in
March 1985 requesting specific information on the
ASCC. We requested:
* Copies Or full descriptions of the prOVisions of the
Air Standards in which New Zealand plays a part
* A list of Working Parties (WPs), both active and
stand-by, in which New Zealand participates
* (2) The ASCC is a service-ta-service arrangement
Copies of Annual Reports of the ASCC for 1982 &
1983
* Copy of the RAND Corporation study of the
ASCC commissioned by the United States Air
Force, and
* A list of manuals, reports and other documents
related to the ASCC.
In December 1985, some nine months later,
4
'PEACE RESEARCHER' still had not received a
repJy and so made nil a ppeal to tIle Chief Ombuds-
* AUSTRAllA * CANADA * NEW ZEALAND *
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man. A senior officer of the Office of the Ombudsman
prompted the Ministry and in March of this year
'PEACE RESEARCHER' finally received a reply.
The content of the reply was, to say the least,
disappointing.
Representatjves of the other four member nations
(the United States, Canada, Australia & Britain)
have effectjvely vetoed disclosure of information
relating to New Zealand's commitments within the
ASCC arrangement.
The NZ MoD has advised 'PEACE RESEARCHER'
that ' 'the other four Inember nations . . . will not
give their consent to the release of any of the Air
Standards . . . Nor are they prepared to agree to the
release of any of the other ASCC documents.' .
'PEACE RESEARCHER' has a number of con­
cerns about the response by the New Zealand
Ministry of Defence and about the nature of the Air
Standardisation Coordinating Committee itself. These
are:
(I) The level of secrecy that sUJTounds the arrange­
ment including New Zealand's entry into the
arrangement without public announcement. The
secrecy prevents an opportunity for the New Zealand
public to evaluate the worth and risks of being part of
such a collective arrangement and its commitments.
Cas distinct from the NZ military) responsible for
decision�making concerned with the access of allied
forces to New Zealand facilities such as airfields,
communication systems etc. These agreements are
negotiated at a defence establishment committee
level. According to official documents on the ASCC,
the ASCC derives policy direction from the ASCC
Members who are general rank officers of the United
States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and
the air element of the Canadian forces. New Zealand's
Member is the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.
(3) The New Zealand public has had to wait, for
more than a year, [or a response from overse�ls
military agencies before a decision could be made
about the availability of official information. There
is no mention in the New Zealand Ministry of
Defence response of its own positjon on the release of
information about the ASCC. Clearly, these overseas
military agendes made the £1nal decision on the
availability of" information about the ASCC and (hc
op il ) i, oll of our allies is rated higher tllall New
Zealanders' right to official information concerning
their own defence and security.
(4) Finally, the subject of the secret agreements
themselves is of concern since they relate to making
New Zealand facilities available to allied air forces in
a wartime environmen t in a nuclear age. These agree­
ments cover a wide field of subiects including aircraft
armaments, air navigation and weapon direction, and
airfield and airfield facilities.
While 'PEACE RESEARCHER' has received none
of the documents requested, which would have
provided insights into the nature and extent of New
Zealand's military arrangements, a basic description
of the 'Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee',
its purpose and make-up is known.
The 'Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee',
according to the official history of the organisation,
originated in 1947 when it was agreed that the air
forces of the United States, United Kingdom and
Canada should have a capability to conduct
combined operations. In addition, it was agreed that
the air forces should be able to provide each other
with certain essential services.
The original document of the ASCC (our copy is
undated) reads, "air forces should be able to tJght
together in certain theatres. In particular, it should
be possible in the early stages of a future war for the
air force of onc country to be able to operate from
the bases of another counlry before the arrival of
their stores and equipment. This means that, as far as
possible, the three air forces should be able to use
each other's airfields and base organisations)
DA TED iH IS TWLf,,{t ;..'fN n [ l)/l, V or /,;f,.j /l.C/I,
SfG.A.'LLl 0:,/ l!LH ...!. LP OF 7Ife:
communications, operaUonal procedure, navigational
aids, bombs and ammunition". (our emphasis).
The Royal New Zealand Air Force became a
signatory, without public announcement, in 1965.
The objectives of the ASCC, says the document, is
to achieve sufficient standardisation among the air
forces of the ASCC nations to ensure that in the
cond.uct of combined operations there will be a
minimum of operational material and technical
obstacles to full cooperation and to enablc essential
support facl1jtics and logistic support to be provided
(he ;drcraft or !he olher ASCC air forces.
The attainment or [lie ASCC objectives is primar­
jly achieved by the negotiation at a service-to-service
level of formal agreements, known as Air Standards,
among member nations. These agreements which
cover a wide field of operational and technical
subjects include:
* airborne electronics systems
* aircraft armaments
*
air navigation and weapon direction
*
airfields and airfield facilWes
It is primarHy these Air Standards, and associated
Working Parties, that are of interest But these agree­
ments, and much else about the 'Air Standardisation
Coordinating Committee' will, by the collective
decision making of aWed agencies, remain secret. It is
known however, from a thorough readiIlg of released
documents about the ASCC.ihat the structure of the
ASCC is compJex and hierarchical with an overseeing
secretariat and headquarters based in Washington. It
is known also that the ASCC has links to other allied
arrangemellts such as the 'NATO Military Agency for
Standardisation (MAS) and the ABCA Armies
Organisation. This much information helps us to see
the 'Air StandardisaUon Coordinating Committee'
for what it is, another strand in the Western web
administered from Washington.
Sources; Notes issued by the !\SCC Management
Committee, Washington. Copy of the Memorandum
for Record on Standardisation Procedures. Corres­
pondence with the NZ Min,islry of Defence.
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 MILITARY B UREAUCRACY,
DISINFORMATlON AND EVASION:
THE BLACK BIRCH SYNDROME
by Dennis Small
However competent the people in our armed
services or the Defence and Foreign Affairs Depart­
ments may be they are human like the rest of us and
can be the victims of illusions, false assumptions,
mistaken interpretations, biased or distorted view­
points or just straight�forward factua! errors.Ccrtninly
the lrulh is always problematic and only a free
exchange of information can help reduce the chances
of serious policy mistakes. This is all the more
important and urgent when the nuclear warfighting
infrastructure continues to spread worldwide, draw�
ing small and nominally independent nations like
New Zealand into its maw. (1)
To quote William Arkin (who has been called the
'
United State s leading nuclear weapons expert) and
his assistant, Richard Fieldhouse: "The tentacles of
the nuclear infrastucture are so obscure that most
countries, even non-nuclear countries where facilities
are located, do not understand their own contribu­
tion to the arms race". (2) Indeed, Arkin's and
Fieldhouse's research indicates that the so-called
nuclear deterrent is growing too complicated to
control.
Definitions of national security derived in the past
do not necessarily have the same import in the
present or immediate future. 'Peace Rese�rcher'
believes that the concept of national security should
be constantly open to critical scrutiny and the
application of new knowledge and information. Yet
it has often proved very difficult for us and fellow
New Zealanders to get adequate information from
our own Defence Department despite repeated
requests under the Official Information Act and even
appeals to the Obudsman.
Official Silence
Far too much information is currently suppressed
which should be made available in a democracy.An
example of obviously unnecessary secrecy is the
official silence associated with the Radford-Collins
Agreement despite the fact that information relating
to this agreement is openly available in Australia,
another signatory nation, This particular agreement
has had a very significant impact upon our defence
posture and yet remains shrouded in secrecy, It
evidently commits us, as does the ANZUS-MARSAR
Agreement, to participation as a junior partner in an
allied system of maritime surveillance and nuclear
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). (3)
Independent support for 'Peace Researcher's inter­
pretation of the prime significance of the Radford­
Collins agreement for New Zealand comes from a
most interesting quarter. Ironically enough,
Thomas�Durrell Young, an academic named as a
member of a pro-ANZUS think tank headed by ex­
CIA Deputy Director Dr Ray Cline, places a similar
emphasis on the Radford-Collins Agreement.( 4) He
too indicates the far-reaching implication of this
agreement for New Zealand.
The people of New Zealand are entitled to a
6
general understanding of the telms of the agreements
into which the Government enters in their name,
Military agreements with foreign powers can pro­
foundly affect our sovereignty and, therefore, the
exact extent of our commitments should be made
clear. What sort of obligations does New Zealand
have to meet in relation to the other partners? For
insLlllcc, docs the agreement require Sllllp!y exchange
of intelligence or 'arc our airfields and porls to be
open to foreign military aircraft and ships?
The Case of Black Birch
If our Defence Department has remained silent or
evasive on many important issues, its track record of
what it has said publicly on nuclear issues in recent
years also gives us little cause for comfort. The case
history to date of the Black Birch affair is illustrative
and revealing of Departmental policy.It is now well
documented.
Our Defence Department has consistently denied
claims that the Black Birch astronomical facility is
part of the US nuclear infrastructure.Yet there is
much evidence in fact that the information on star
positions and motions obtained from Black Birch will
be used for the guidance of nuclear ballistic missiles.
This evidence even includes a specific reference to
the major military research funct ion of Black Birch in
an official US government document (5). It is amusing
that a US embassy spokesman, in commenting on this
reference, said that nothing could be read into". , ' a
simple case of bureaucratic language". (6) Since our
Defence Department accepted this American explana­
tion the obvious lesson for us would seem to be to
treat with great care any official communication from
the New Zealand or American defence bureaucracies,
Various damning evidence has accumulated over
the years on the military role of Black Birch.(7) It
was reported in 'The Dominion' in January 1982 that
a radio report from Washington stated that the Black
Birch project was receiving military funding and was
regarded in the US as a military instaIlation. (8)
According to the US Senate Construction Appropria­
tions for 1982, the US Naval Observatory· would
obtain the location of stars in the sou them hemisphere
". . . with the increased accuracy that is required for
military purposes", The American State Department
confIrmed that Naval observatory work was funded
in the military budget ". . and justilled on
military grounds'),
A few days later, 'The Dominion' quoted from a
public information pamphlet prepared by the US
Naval Observatory for visitors: "Availability of such
observations soon is important for many Department
of Defense users, particularly strategic systems, Since
there are 110 nations in the southern hemisphere that
provide such accurate positions, mission requirements
m ake it imperative for the Naval Observatory to make
these observations. "(9)
Despite these official statements, the then Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Mr Cooper, stated that he was
satisfied with the contradictory American explanation
about the strictly civilian purpose of Black Birch. (! 0)
However, Mr Cooper nearly gave the game away. He mappillg or the stellar system. While tlle US Navy wa�
said that the facllity was not intended for military a leader in such research it " . . . would not be doing
objectives but primarily for civilian scientific use, basic research for nothing," said Dr Ball. He added
!--le thus acknowledged at least some military function that the Trident submarine-launched missile would
for the facility and, indeed, publicly recognized the be guided by a stellar navigation system.
fact that " .. . military as well as non�mjJitary users Other highly regarded nuclear war authorities have
may well eventually benefit from it". (IO) confirmed Dr Ball's assessment. Arkin and Ficldhouse
Still later in 1983, the then Minister of Defence, have reported that the Black Birch facility is part of
Mr Thomson, made another revelation to the effect the American nuclear illfrastructure. (] 4) Again,
that ". . . two tiny US military projects (an apparent there were the usual denials. Both the American
reference to Mt John and Black Birch) were not in director of the Black Birch Observatory, Mr Dennis
any way important enough" to be nuclear targets/1!) Robinson, and the NZ Secretary of Defence, Mr
Peace researchers have !lever claimed these lwo Dcnis McLcan, discounted litis rcport. ( 14) Mr McLean
facilities were nuclear targets but the claim of said that the research findings of Black Birch would
military functions was neatly confirmed by the be available to everyone as part of an international
minister. programme of astronomical research.
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Military Role is Clear

In a recent statement of the Defence Department's This statement, of course, neatly sidesteps the real
position on nuclear issues - An Assessment of the issues. The data from Black Birch will be available to
Nuclear Threat lo New Zealand - the military role of the Americans for use first before eventual publica­
Black Birch is again denied. (I 2) But in the six pages tion, and, indeed, some crHical data will remain
of its statement the Department approvingly quotes classified for SLBM targeting.( is) The provision of
twice in other contexts Dr Deslllond Ball, whom the these particular data gathered in the South Pacific
Department cites as a recognized authority on nuclear obviously fits the requirements of American strategic
issues, Dr Ball is the Head of the Strategic and submadnes given the US deployment pattern in the
Defence Studies Centre at the AustraHan National Pacific. Although the data, as our Defence Depart�
University. Such authorities can be wrong, but there men t says, wm be of no immedia te military use
is ironic humour in the fact that in April 1981 Dr " . in the sense of 'real time' targeting value" ( 12),
Ball suggested that information gathered at Black the eventually analysed findings will be of the
Birch could have military uses. (!3) Dr Ball said that a accuracy needed for first strike and other nuclear�
lot of US Navy research for navigation and also for war-fighting strategies, The self-justificatory tone
targeting of missiles was concerned with be tter used by the Defence Department in this regard, (Le.,
7
 its denial that the data will be of immediate military
use) indicates further semantic game-playing on the
part of the Department and a generally defensive
position on American facilities in New Zealand.
and 'Star Wars', too
In addition to submarines, there will be other users
of the Black Birch data. The findings will be useful
for the latest round in the arms race - the Reagan
AdministraUon's destabilizing 'Star Wars' programme.
As Dr Patricia Lewis, a member of SANA and an
Auckland physicist, has said, "Black Birch is not just
part 01 the nuclear infrastructure, It is part or the
'Star Wars' infrastructurc."( l6)
Interestingly, Arkin and Fieldhouse demonstrate
how Black Birch is not the only US Naval Observatory
military research program to share information with
the Russians. They document a really bizarre link in
the nuclear infrastructure. Observations collected by
photographic zenith tube instruments add to know­
ledge of the "the rotational attitude and sp,in-axis
orientation of the Earth with respect to a stellar
reference system".(l7) This knowledge has " ... a
wide range of applications, including geodesy, satellite
navigation and weapons delivery ... ". In 1984 the
US Naval Observatory noted that its own observations
H• • : have routinely been sent, and are still being sent
to the Bureau Internationale de l'Heure for averaging
with similar data from 75 other observatories, 40 of
which are located in communist countries", Such are
the complex ramifications today of the global
nuclear infrastructure - a multi-headed octopus with
intricately entangled tentacles!
All in all, New Zealand itself has shown a remark­
able Willingness over the years to assist in research on
'first strike' technologies. The Napier geodetic satellite
terminal (1975-1978) was a New Zealand secret
contribution to improved ICBM accuracy (18) while
projects 'Press' and 'Magnet' (aided by the US Deep
Freeze base at Harewood airport, Christchurch) have
also been concerned with nuclear missile guidance,
Furthermore, ASW research continues towards the
undermining of nuclear deterrence and the enhance­
ment of American first strike plans. At the same time,
New Zealand participates in secret agreements like
the Radford-Collins agreement which commit our
country to actual military action as dictated by
superpower imperatives.
The Black Birch Syndrome
The New Zealand Defence Department has adopted
a public relations approach to the other US bases in
this country which is similar to that taken to the
Black Birch facility. Indeed, the Department denies
that there are any US military bases or strategic
facilities in New Zealand.( 12) It denies the military
role of the US Naval and Air Force facilities at
Harewood which ostensibly provide support only for
civilian Antarctic research under the name Operation
Deep Freeze. This denial persists despite all the
accumulated research t1ndings of the Citizens for the
Demilitarisation of Harewood and others demonstrat­
ing the base's military role.( 19)
In like fashion, the Department has denied
(through various ministers) that Tangimoaria has any­
thing to do with the American ocean surveillance
system and the targeting of nuclear weapons. Again,
its claim flies in the face of much evidence to the
8
contrary - evidence so strong that the Department's
position, especially given its record on issues like
Black Birch, can easily be dismissed as another "simple
case of bureaucratic language".(20) Yet the Depart­
ment bureaucracy itself makes no specific mention of
Tangimoana in its Assessment and thus no direct
denial of this base's targeting role. After all, an
authority often cited by the Department, Dr Ball, an
expert on US bases in 'Australia lis on record as
repeatedly claiming that the Tangimoana base is part
of the American ocean surveillance and nuclear
targeting system. (2 1)
The syndrome of bureancratic denial on Black
Birch and other issues must provoke questions as to
whether, as indicated by Arkin and Fieldhouse, our
defence officials are fully aware of the implicat.ions of
permitting facilities in New Zealand which contribute
to the nuclear arms race.
The Department can at times demonstrate a con­
torted logic, For instance, it seems to trust the Soviet
Union to disregard New Zealand as a potential nuclear
target.Why? Because to target us would be ' illogical
and contrary to its often stated policy'· not to target
non-nuclear weapon counties says the Depart.ment of
Defence.( l 2) Surely, according to the Department's
very own assumptions, is not the Department of
Defence being absurdly naive in respect of our
vulnerability io nuclear targeting? After all on 0ther
occasions, ,it portrays the Soviet Union as a dangerous
threat to New Zealand. When it comes to nuclear
issues the Department's cultivated image of hard­
headed realism can dissolve into sheer wishy-washiness
as its representatives grasp for any argument to
bolster a suspect stance.
Perhaps in the final analysis, we may need to
adopt the maxim of that great American journalist,
LP. Stone, who said, "All governments are liars and
nothing they say should be believed". Let us hope we
are not ddven to that extreme state of distrust of our
democratic instituUons and that the current Labour
Government can extricate Hself from the dubious
legacy left by previous New Zealand governments.
REFERENCES
( l )Arkin, W. and R, Fieldhause.1985, "Nuclear Battle­
fields; Global Links in the Arms Race", Institute for
Policy Studies, Wash. DC.
(2) 'The Press' June 20, 1985.
(3) E.N.D. has available a paper ($1) on the Radford­
Collins agreement, submitted as part of its submission to the
Defence Enquiry, The entire submission is available for $3.
Also see 'Peace Researchers' No. 5 and 7.
(4) Young, Thomas-Durrel!. 1985, "New Zealand's
Dilemm.a". US .Naval Proceedings, August. Young also
emphasIzed the Impact of the Radford-Collins Agreement on
NZ defence posture in a paper presented to the Pacific
Forum/Australian Studies Centre conference in Sydney,
9-13 February 1986, See also his article in 'Pacific Defence
Reporter', March 1986, pp 15-17.
�5) 1982 Financial Ye.ar Military C.onstruction Budget Hear­
mg of the CongressIOnal CommIttee on Appropriations,
Vc!. I, pp 1237-1240.
(6) 'New Zealand Times' Jan . 31, 1982,
(7) A brief history up to mid-1983 is given in "Goyern�
ment Double-think on Black Birch". NZ Nuclear Free Zone
Committee, P.O. Box 18541, Christc1lluch. Catalogue Item
No. 1-44.
(8) 'The Dominion' Jan, 30, 1982.
 (9) 'The Dominion' Feb. 2, 1982,
(10) 'The Star' April 17, 1982.
(11) 'The Star' May 26, 1983.
(12) Disarmament and Arms Control: Report of the Select
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (NZ). 1985. pp
65-70.
(13) 'The Star' April 16, 1981 .
(14) 'The Star' and 'The Press' June 18, 1985,
'
(15) The classified data goes into the Dahlgren General
Catalogue maintained by the Dahlgren Naval Weapons
Laboratory. Sce article by CAFCINZ in 'NZ Monthly
Review', April J986.
(16) 'The 1'rc$$' June 19, 1985.
(17) See ref. (1) pp 13-14.
(18) 'Peace Researcher' No. 8, 1985.
(19) Citizens for the Demilitarization of Harewood, P.O .Box
2258, Christchurch. See their newsletter, 'GffBase'. See also
previous 'Peace Researchers', especially Nos. 2 and 7.
(20) Wilkes, Owen. 1984. "Tangimoana: Our Most Important
Base". 'Peacelink' April; Peler Wills. 1985, "Spy vs Spy".
'New Outlook' March/April; J,T. Richelson and D. BalL
1985. "The Tics that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between
the UKUSA Countries". Allen and Unwin, Sydney. pp 77,
194, 209-210, See also previous 'Peace Researchers' describ­
ing the closely related mru:itimc ocean sUJ:veillance and ASW
agreements.
(21) See, for example, 'The Dominion' April 5 , 1984. DrBall
had .earlier . made the claim in a paper to the May 1983
Fore :gn Poh? y S?hool.Co �ference at Otago University. See
also 'The Ties 1hat Bmd (ref. (20) ) for a recent detailed
statement.
WOULD THE US. VIOLATE NUCLEAR fREE ZONES?
Yes according to new information about
secret nuclear weapons deployment plans
In February 1985, a report was released on the
subject of "'Contingency Overseas Deployments of
Nuclear. Weapons". This report by WiHlam Arkin, of
(he Institute for Policy Studies in Washington DC,
revealed that Presidential Authorization had been
given to the US military to deploy nuclear warheads
to eight countries in peacetime. The governments of
those cQuntries,inc1uding Canada, Iceland, the PhHip­
pines and Spain had not been consulted. It is not
surprising that Arkin's revelation caused a storm of
controversy and Vigorous objections from the intend­
ed nuclear host nations.
'Peace Researcher' have obtained a copy of this
important paper and are offering It to our readers
(see our listing of new resources elsewhere in this
issue). This is an important paper for New Zealanders
to read and to publicise widely during this time of
defence debate. The following are some key points
from the paper which are highly relevant to New
Zealand.
9
- " Virtually all of the authorised deployments (0
NEW RESOURCES
AVAILABLE
FROM 'PEACE RESEARCHER'
The following articles are recommended and
available from 'PEACE RESEARCHER' at 10c. per
page plus postage.
'Contingency Overseas Deployments of Nuclear
Weapons: A Report', by William M. Arkin. 20 pages.
'The Soviet Union as a Pacific Military Power' by
.
proml11ent and respected Australian defence analyst
Paul Dibb. 6 pages.
'Australia Bites Off More Than The RAN Can Chew'
by Thomas-Durrell Young. On Australia's commit­
men(s through the Radford-Collins Agreement. 3
pages.
'Nuclear War at Sea' by Desmond Ball of the Austral­
ian National University. An analysis of the current
hjgh risks of nuclear war by accident at sea. 3 1 pages.
these eight nations involve anti-submarine nuclear
depth bombs." This is an extremely important and
relevant fact for New Zealanders to ponder. Our
anti-submarine OriOll aircraft are currently under­
going extensive modernisation with state-of-the-art
electronics and weapons systems. This modernisation
began before the ANZUS row began. Does it involve
electronics and equipment for the delivery of nuclear
depth bombs?
�, The secrecy involved in planning for the deploy­
ment of nuclear warheads without the knowledge of
the host nations has grave implications for New
Zealand's anti-nuclear policies. "Plans to deploy
nuclear weapons in Canada, Iceland and Spain are an
affront to the non-nuclear policies of those
countries." (Arkin, p. 1)
- Nuclear deployment plans revealed in this report
testify to the global scope of US nuclear stra tegy.
Although New Zealand was not listed among the
eight countries in 1985, we can have no confldence
whatsoever that our country is not on such a list
today.

ANZUS 'DOCUMENTS'
REQUESTED
Issue 9 of 'PEACE RESEARCHER' focused on
the many formal arrangements binding the ANZUS
partners, but there exists another set of arrangements
connected directly to the ANZUS Treaty itself. The
1984 Briefing Papers prepared for the in-coming
Minister of Defence describes a series of 'agreed
ANZUS documents' which establish 'policy guide­
lines for planning ANZUS activities and facilitating
combined force interoperabiIity',
The 'documents' relate to agreements on logistic
and equipment matters, operational procedures,
laws of war, tactics and training. 'PEACE
RESEARCHER', to begin with, has requested under
the Official Information Act a listing of these
'agreed documents' for thc period 1951-1965. Time
will tell whether yet another layer of the substance
of ANZUS will remain hidden from public view.
US. REFUSES TO RELEASE
DETAILS ON
1982 MEMORANDUM
When the USS Buchanan was refused entry into
New Zealand ports New Zealand Ministry of Defence
officials were in the midst of negotiating with their
US counterparts annexes to the 1982 Memorandum
of Understanding on Logistic Support. This partic­
ular agreement proved controversial when it
surfaced (some months after New Zealand became a
signatory) because it provided for the refit and
maintenance of US military aircraft during times of
crisis as well as the pre-positioning of U S military
hardware.
Negotiations on the annexes, which relat� to
co()peration in communications and electronics ,as
well as setting down in detail the 'procedures', were
abandoned following Washington's decision to curtail
defence cooperation with New Zealand.The New
Zealand Ministry of Defence has written to 'PEACE
RESEARCHER' stating that the US Department of
Defence is not prepared to release any of the drafts
that were under discussion. Accordingly, the
NZMoD has invoked, once more, Section 6 of the
Official Information Act. Subject closed - but not
10
forgotten.
364 AGREEMENTS
'PEACE RESEARCHER' has a copy of a list of
some 364 US/Canadian defence arrangements cover­
ing such various subjects as Air Defence, Commun­
ications, Logistics, Maritime Operations, Nuclear
Weapons, Research and Development and Shared(
Leased Bases.
Such arrangements frequently follow an inter­
national pattern with US allies and, beside those
mentioIled bricriy in issue 9 of 'PEACE
RESEARCHER', lhere arc olhers lirai. may have a
direct application to New Zealand. Amongst these
are:
* An Agreement on the Maintenance of USAF
Aircraft
* Agreement on Airlift Operations Required for US
Military Operations
* Exchange of Notes on a request for the US
Defence Mapping Agency to establish geodetic
positions
•
MOU Concerning NAVSTAR Global Positioning
System and;
*
Service-to-Service Agreement on Anti-Submarine
Warfare Operations.
'PEACE RESEARCHER' is following these up
with formal requests for information from the �Z
Ministry of Defence.
The most significant of the 364 agreements
which refer to New Zealand having a mlUtary involve­
ment is an agreement on exchanging intelligence
gathered from efforts in Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) research and development. The agreement,
which came into force on July 24 1 974, is of
indefinite duration and involves also the UK,
Australia and the US.
CORRECTIO N to Issue No. 9, page 8.
The first paragraph under th, heading 'Submarine
Surveillance' should end with the following corrected
sentence: " ... the US Naval Ocean Surveillance
Information System which incorporates a network of
around 40 to 50 high-frequency direction-finding
stations, including the NZ facility at Tangimoana
within the Indo-Pacific sub-system." (J.T. Richelson
and D. Ball, in 'The Ties That Bind' p. 202, give a
figure of some 20 stations for the Indo-Paciflc sub�
system alone. )
 AUSSIE LESSONS
fOR NEW ZEALAND?
OH Iluclear issues Australia has had a sorry record
of bureaucratic sabotage, poliUcally contrived
secrecy and manipulation of the public. In particular
_) alert" in the
one should ask whether its history of disinforrnation
with regard to American bases and facilities has any
lessons for New Zealand? There is certainly plenty to
ponder.
In May 1978 the Australian Minister of Defence
Jlrn Killen, actually admitted that he was not being
kept informed by his own department staff about the
V.S.bases. Amazingly, Australian public servants
were attempting at the time to withhold information
from the democratically elected representatives of the
Australian people.
Indeed, 'ex-CIA agent, Victor Marchetti, suggested
in a television interview that the Australian Intell­
igence Service worked with the CIA in misleading the
Australian Prime Minister. On several occasions the
US has made significant additions to some of their
bases in Australia without the Australian government's
knowledge. Regularly fed disinformation, the
Australian public has been consistently kept in the
dark about the nuclear war�targeting and commun­
ications purposes of the American bases.
Currently, the satellite ground station at Nurrungar
in South Australia is being upgraded to pJay a
crucial role in the Reagan Administration's plans to
fight and "win" a nuclear waf': It is very signifi­
cant that the Australian Parliament was not even
advised about this upgrading. Information about the
upgrading was first learnt from documents on public
record in the V.S.
The Australian Defence Department has even
warned its own government that American bases in
Australia could be used without Australian know­
ledge to initiate and support US action in a Middle
"�E WE GtoNNA SAME wrw wE. HA�O\..e:
How
HANDLE. 11H';,t WOMeN 1CIEI R CnoYE"N r\ EN'L.
?�oT,,:.,.ro�s ?
11
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East crisis. American bases ill Australasia, includ­
ing Deep Freeze in Chrlstchurch were put on "r,cd
1973 Middle East crises without the
knowledge or sanction of the governments concerned.
Late last year after a long history of evasion, the
Australian Federal Government told the Australian
public for the first time that the jOint US-Australian
facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar
have a nuclear war-fighting role. Until then the
government had always stressed the arms control and
verification functions of the bases although it had
also eventually come to admit the fact that the US
bases make the Australian people nuclear targets.
Most recently, the new US naval strategy calling
for a pre-emptive strike against Russian nuclear
ballistic missile submarines at the start of a
conventional war has again made a fool of the
Australian government which had repeatedly denied
any possible role for the bases in US first strike plans
-, . North West Cape could in fact be the relay station
for instructions fro111 the US to its attack hunter­
killer submarines.
Given the dangerously provocative policies of the
US navy in the Pacific and its various scenarios
for a. regional nuclear war as described by visiting
Nautllus Research Centre researchers Peter Hayes and
Lyuba Zarsky, one must assume that Tangimoana,
as part of the US ocean survelllance and targeting
system is deeply implicated in the US programme
for pre-emption and naval nuclear War. New Zealand
must get control of this base for itself and dissociate
us from the nuclear madness of a foreign superpower.
,
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DIG YOUR TOES IN, NEW ZEALANDERS

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