Claerhout Doctoral Dissertation

FACULTEIT LETTEREN EN WIJSBEGEERTE
ACADEMIEJAAR 2009-2010
LOSING MY TRADITION
Conversion, Secularism and Religious Freedom in India
Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het verkrijgen van de graad van doctor

in de Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap door
Sarah Claerhout
Promotor: Prof. Dr. Balagangadhara Rao
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
iii
Introduction
Chapter 1: The Debate on Religious Conversion in India
1.1. Populist Preachers and Pedantic Teachers
11
1.2. The Secularism vs. Hindutva Framework
21
1.3. Clusters of Concerns
22
Chapter 2: Gandhi, Conversion and the Equality of Religions:

More Experiments with Truth
33
2.1. Making Sense of Gandhi
34
2.2. What does India need: Tradition or conversion?
36
2.3. Equality of Religions or Functional Symmetry?
64
2.4. Conclusion
69
Chapter 3: Conversion, Religious Freedom and Secularism

in the Constituent Assembly Debates
71
3.1. Conceptual Transplants
72
3.2. Secularism and Religious Freedom
80
3.3. Conversion: From Incomprehension to Irritation
86
3.4. Conversion and Conceptual Transplants
98
3.5. Conclusion
101
Chapter 4: Conversion Legislation in India:

A Doubtful Match between Law and Religion
103
4.1. Propagation as Transmission
104
4.2. Conversion and the Secular State in India
109
4.3. Force, Fraud, Inducement
118
4.4. Conclusion: Clarifying Confusion
123
Chapter 5: The Impossibility of

a Systematic Debate on Religious Conversion?
133
5.1. The Sciences of Conversion?
134
5.2. The Universal Predicament of Conversion
152
5.3. Conclusion: The Conceptual Limits of Change
167
Chapter 6: Two Worlds of Conversion
171
6.1. Premises of the Two Worlds
173
6.2. Ancient Foundations of the Two Worlds
178
6.3. Two Worlds between Europe and India
188
6.4. Conclusion
204
Chapter 7: The Protestant Reformation and

the Corruption of Religion
207
7.1. Conversion before the Reformation
209
7.2. Human Sin and the Corruption of Religion
220
7.3. The Evil Hierarchy of Popes, Priests and Monks
228
7.4. Conclusion
253
Chapter 8: Conversion and the Creation of True Christians
261
8.1. Approximations of Conversion
267
8.2. Conclusion: Post Tenebras Lux
320
Chapter 9: Creating the Conditions of Conversion: Secular Education,

False Religion and Reform in British India
325
9.1. Will the True Heathen Please Stand Up?
328
9.2. Khrishtadharma for the Christians
343
9.3. The earth is either, or is not, an immense plain...
365
9.4. Conclusion
378
Chapter 10: Conclusion
381
Annex 1
389
Glossary
393
Bibliography
399
Acknowledgements
The last six years have been a unique experience for me: I consider myself extremely lucky for having the opportunity to be part of the research group headed
by Prof. S.N. Balagangadhara (Balu), based at Ghent University. These years have
been unique, not only because of the extraordinary dedication to a shared intellectual project that brings our research group together at the beautiful library of the
Research Centre Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, but also because of the challenges
brought about by a mixing-up of the conventional western separations between
work and private life, between teacher and students, between a job and the ambition to change things, between my research and the strength of a joint research
programme.
Most of all the experience has been unique because of our teacher, Prof.
Balu. His never-absent intellectual focus, combined with his exceptionally warm
personality and his profoundly ethical attitude towards other human beings make
it both a pleasure and a privilege to be his student. In another context Gandhi said
the following: If I am accused of being too ambitious, I should plead guilty. If I
am told that my dream can never materialize, I would answer that is possible, and
go my way. I am a seasoned soldier of non-violence, and I have evidence enough to
sustain my faith. Whether, therefore, I have one comrade or more or none, I must
continue my experiment. The determination is what they share. Having such a
teacher is a great fortune. This dissertation would not have materialized without
Prof. Balus research programme and his guidance; neither would it have without the supportin all possible waysof my comrades of the Ghent research
group: Jakob De Roover, Marianne Keppens, Esther Bloch, Raf Gelders, Nele De
Gersem, Sarika Rao, Alexander Naessens, Anne Cardinael and Emanuel Maes.
I would also like to thank the many colleagues, family members and friends,
who helped me enormously by discussing and challenging my research. At times
their challenges frustrated me, had me despair of my research skills or doubt the
significance of my subject and hypotheses; at other times, they made me feel euphoric, inspired me to dream of a revolution in the social sciences and humanities,
or caused me to feel a true researcher. The precise role of such emotions in the
development of scientific research is difficult to pinpoint, but I am certain of one

thing: all these opportunities to discuss parts of my research have pushed me further and made me work harder. A very warm thanks to: Maya Burger, Bert Claerhout, Vivek Dhareshwar, Willem Derde, Rudolf De Smet, Jan Dumolyn, Willem Elias, Lena Georges, Rosalind Hackett, Rajaram Hegde, Sadanand Janekere,
Geoffrey Oddie, Sushil Mittal, Etienne Vermeersch, and all the researchers at the
Centre for the Study of Local Cultures, Kuvempu University, Karnataka, India.
Abbreviations
Ap.
Apology of the Augsburg Confession
BJP
Bharatiya Janata Party
ANF
CA
CAD
Cels.
CW
DND
EPW
Inst.
LCC
The Ante-Nicene Fathers
Augsburg Confession (Confessio Augustana)

Constituent Assembly Debates of India
Contra Celsum, by Origen
The Complete Works of Mahatma Gandhi
De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), by Cicero

Economic and Political Weekly
Institutio Christianae Religionis, by John Calvin

Library of Christian Classics
Loci 1521 Loci Communes Theologici, by Philipp Melanchthon

LW
Luthers Works
NCR
Niyogi Committee Report
NCM
NPNF
RC
SL
ST
National Commission for Minorities

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
De Regno Christi, by Martin Bucer
Selected Writings of Martin Luther, by T.G. Tappert

Summa Theologica, by Thomas Aquinas
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
USCIRF United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
Introduction:
The Research Programme
Comparative Science of Cultures
This doctoral dissertation is not the result of any splendid isolation of mine,
but sprouts entirely from the research programme Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap
(translates roughly as Comparative Science of Cultures). The identification of the
issues involved, the articulation of the problems, as well as the heuristics to start
looking for hypothetical solutions were all generated within the context of this research programme, which has been developed in the course of the last thirty years
by S.N. Balagangadhara. It emerged from a deep dissatisfaction with the current
state of the social sciences and humanities and their descriptions of Europe and
India. The research programme grew out of the simple idea that cultures are
different in different ways. Until today non-Western cultures have primarily been
studied as pale and erring variants of the Western culture, and this situation is in
urgent need of a solid and sustained rethinking and a serious change. The basic
idea of this rethinking is that the Western descriptions of non-western cultures
teach us more about the West than about other cultures. They reflect the Western
experiences of these non-Western cultures. Therefore, the research programme
has a two-fold focus: (1) indentifying the cognitive limits of the Western cultural
experiences in the Wests descriptions of itself and of non-Western cultures and
(2) starting to develop alternative descriptions of the West and of non-Western
cultures. Tentatively spelled out in Balagangadharas seminal position paper We
Shall Not cease from Exploration(1985), the research programme was explicitly
formulated in the book version of his doctoral thesis The Heathen in His Blindness Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of Religion (1994).
The research programme hinges on a range of insights about cultural differences and uses these to formulate research heuristics enabling the growth of
knowledge on both Europe and India. The first is that many of the current socialscientific theories about history, psychology, law, social structures, culture and religion reproduce the Wests self-image in a particular way. These accounts view the
Introduction
secularized West as a unique culture, which has gone through the Renaissance and
Enlightenment so as to liberate itself from religious dogma and attain true liberty,
equality, democracy and rationality. At the same time these social-scientific accounts, when used to describe and understand another culture, like India, tend to
transform this culture into a lesser variant of the West: it is viewed as dominated
by the Hindu religion and its immoral caste systemwhile values like liberty,
equality and rationality still do not seem to get a firm hold on its people.
Reformulated this means that our current social sciences and humanities
theories reflect a particular Western cultural experience as though it were the
universal human experience. Both the theories about the West and those about
India are expressions of how the West experiences itself and India. In this way, our
current theories make all cultures into variations of one model, namely, the basic
structure of Western culture. From this perspective, all cultures are constituted by
a religion, world view or belief system; their traditional practices embody this belief system; their ethics always revolve around moral norms or rules; their society
is founded in a framework of laws; their psychologies are driven by beliefs, desires,
purposes, etc. In other words, theories in different domains of the human sciences
share a number of limitations upon their conceptualizations of human beings and
societies. These limitations are those of the Western cultural experience. They also
constrain the currently dominant descriptions of non-western cultures like India.
The specific problems which the research programme of Comparative Science of Cultures seeks to address, then, are the following: How does one get
beyond these constraints and develop alternative descriptions of the West and
India? How can one conceptualize the Indian traditions in a way which shows
their characteristic contribution to human knowledge, rather than making them
into variants of the three biblical religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam? How
could one make sense of cultural differences and different cultures, if they are not
variations on one single model of religion, society, law, ethics? What makes a difference into a cultural difference, rather than a biological, psychological or social
difference? How does our understanding of human beings and societies change,
once we realize that cultures can differ in different ways? Answers to these questions will necessarily be cross-disciplinary in nature and based on a variety of
heuristics and methodologies.
To address these issues, the research programme takes a unique entry point:
the Western descriptions of India are approached as expressions of the Western culture and its experience of human beings and societies. When a person describes anoth-
Introduction
er human being, the resulting description often tells us more about the describer
than about the described. The same holds good at the level of cultures. If there is
a common conceptual structure to the European descriptions of India, then this
structure reflects a shared and common European culture. The heuristic derived
from this is that, as a scholar, one can use the European descriptions of other
cultures to trace basic patterns and characteristics of the Western culture. That is, we
do not accept these descriptions of India as primarily providing knowledge of the
Indian culture and society, but we identify the limitationscognitive limitson the
Western understanding by studying the way in which the West has viewed India.
Once these cognitive limits are identified and an alternative description of
the West comes into being, we can start developing alternative descriptions of
the Indian culture and its traditions. A serious problem surfaces in this context.
As the scientific descriptions of India have been dominated by the European
scholars and as colonialism has impacted a great deal on the Indian mindsboth
claims will be taken up in the course of this accountthe current descriptions of
the Indian culture and traditions are seriously curtailed.1 They simply do not help
us to understand and analyze Indian society and its issues. Scholarly work on the
Indian religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, etc.), for example, is
increasingly being criticized for its Western European bias and the skewed theories this produces.2 Therefore, we have to be fully aware of the fact that there is
a common conceptual structure underlying the Indian responses to the West as
well. This Indian response was primarily a response on how Europe described India.
Hence, the self-descriptions of India that resulted from this intercultural encounter often exhibit a structure that is rooted in the Western European culture combined with indigenous elements. Knowing this we can start digging for a better
understanding of the Indian traditions and social structures and translate their
insights into the conceptual language of the twenty-first century.
On this problem, see especially Balagangadhara, Bloch and De Roover (2008).

There are different kinds of debates going on, most notably the debate on the notion of religion in
the context of the Indian culture, also known as the debate on the colonial construction of Hinduism. See Dalmia and von Stietencron (1995), Frykenberg (1989, 1993), King (1999a, 1999b), Oddie
(2006), Pennington (2005), Sugirtharajah (2003), Viswanathan (2003). The debate revolves around
the idea that religion and Hinduism in modern descriptions of India are peculiar and this peculiarity
is expressed in terms like construction, creation, imagining, invention, manufacturing and
making. For an assessment of the debate in which both views are expressed, see Bloch, Keppens
and Hegde (2010).
1
2
Introduction
Theme of the Dissertation

Our account begins and ends in India, but the middle part will consist of an
analysis of European history and ideas. At first sight this might seem a strange
journey but in fact the essay as a whole argues why one is compelled to go via the
West if one wants to understand certain contemporary debates in the Indian culture and society.
The problem this essay addresses is misleadingly simple at first glance: in the
Indian society there is a clash going on about religious conversion and two groups
have a conflicting experience of this problem. The experiences of both groups run
parallel though: they feel threatened in the most vital aspects of their traditions;
they feel cornered, endangered and pestered; and they feel that a most important
freedom is under attack. One group has this experience because of the attempts to
curb the freedom of religion and prohibit the freedom to convert; the other group
because of the attempts to reinforce the freedom to convert as a necessary part of
the freedom of religion.
Experiences cannot be denied. If one has an experience one can try to explain it, but an experience is what it is: an experience. Both standpoints are uttered
not just by some individuals or marginal groups, but by large portions of the Indian population. If we look at other places in South Asia (like Nepal, Sri Lanka)
we observe that similar dynamics are emerging. Therefore, we need to elucidate
this state of affairs by also explaining why these two groups have such conflicting
experiences.
Formulated on the highest level of abstraction, the main aim of this study
is to substantiatein an intellectually sound and systematic waythe idea that
the Western Christian framework of experiencing and interpreting the human
world has spread and reproduced itself in other parts of the world. Formulated
in a more down-to-earth kind of way, it will be argued that the dominant range
of ideas and values which have spread since the Protestant Reformation and are
today considered as human, universally applicable, scientific, and secular
(in the sense of free of religion or religiously neutral) and rational are, in fact,
deeply Christian. These ideas are disseminated as though they are human and universal, because of a process of Christian secularizationwhich entails the spread
of its religious framework in a disguised form. This process of secularization always interacts with the explicit process of Christian conversion or proselytization,
whereby this religion is spread in an explicit way. We will explore how this double
Introduction
dynamic of religion, conversion and secularization,3 has impacted on a completely

different culture, namely India.
So what?, if ideas and frameworks have a Christian origin? What is important about this fact? In contrast to the introduction and spread of scientific
categories, like species, genes, molecules, or numberswhich have all been
successfully disseminated worldwide, the introduction of Western notions of religion, freedom, secularism, etc. has been problematic and poses serious challenges for non-Western cultures. In this study, we will show how the process of
making both the people in the West and other people in the world accept and
internalize such ideas as human and universal turns out to be a long process that
involves a form of violence. We are able to prove on strong grounds that the continued conversion of minds has caused unprecedented problems to the Indian
culture and society.
The contemporary debate on religious conversion and the freedom of religion in India offers a situation where the Western framework is at work in
another culture. The aim of our analysis is not simply to provide an overview and
present the arguments pro and contra conversion. The incompatibility of the different understandings of freedom of religion and the related concepts of freedom,
religion, interference, coercion, change, true conversion, etc. indicate that
something more important is at stake. Not only do the opposing parties hold different views on the nature of religion, but also of what it means to be human and
to build a human society.
The debate on conversion in the twentieth and twenty-first century is taken
as a starting point to explore these ideas. But we had to work within a range of
constraints determining the actual content of this essay. To avoid the risk of studying too broadly the Western culture and the Indian culture we had to make
decisions about foci and case studies. The research itself, of course, dictated where
to look and besides the obvious focus on (1) the debates on religious conversion
in India since the nineteenth century up till today the main focus came to lie on
(2) the process of conversion and how this took shape in the West in the Protestant Reformation and on its link with (3) processes of change of societies and
individuals.
The dynamics have been identified and elaborately described in Balagangadhara (1994).
Introduction
Structure of the Dissertation

India is the focus of the first six chapters. We will explore the problems underlying
the debate on religious conversion and the conceptual difficulties related to the
use of the terms conversion, religion and secularism. Chapter 1 could be described as a long introduction into the topic. It reveals the remarkable features of
the Indian clash on religious conversion and challenges the current explanations
of this clash within the secularism vs. Hindutva framework. The following three
chapters explore this problem in detail by each taking up a specific landmark case
in the conversion debates and offering alternative ways of looking at the issues. In
chapter 2, Gandhis views on conversion are central; chapter 3 looks at the debates
on secularism, religious freedom and conversion in the Constituent Assembly Debates; and in chapter 4, the more recent anti-conversion laws are analyzed.
Before bringing the different strands together, we look at the way in which
a series of authors in the social sciences and humanities have attempted to account for the clash over religious conversion in India. Hence, chapter 5 raises
the question: How have these authors come to terms with the inconsistencies
and conceptual difficulties that we identified in the previous four chapters? Next,
chapter 6 shows that there are two mutually exclusive perspectives on the question
of conversion: one perspective is shared by secularists and Christians; the other by
followers of the Hindu traditions and the pagan Roman traditions. The currently
dominant historical, political and ethical analyses of the clash over conversion in
India privilege the former perspective, while they ignore or dismiss the latter.
To come to a better understanding of the Indian debates, we have to find out
the basic structure of the phenomenon of conversion. This brings us to chapters
7 and 8, which develop a hypothesis on the process of conversion in the Western
Christian tradition. Here, conversion is a life-encompassing process whereby believers become true Christians. This process has propelled the growth and dynamic of the Christian religion for centuries. We have singled out a specific time
frame, the era of the early Protestant Reformation, because something peculiar
happened to the process of conversion during this period. While the process of
spiritual conversion had before been the privilege of monks and priests, it now
became the process that each and every believer had to go through. This proved
to be a decisive move for the expansion of Christianity in the ages to come. This
development will be central in these chapters: the Protestant Reformation is here
analyzed in terms of the dynamic of the monasticization of daily life, which
Introduction
was propelled by the universalization of the individual process of conversion. The

Protestant Reformers initiated a full-blown cultural revolution by developing a
new description of medieval society and religion in Europe as degenerated and
corrupt and by presenting inner spiritual conversion as the solution to this corruption and the responsibility of each believer.
The last two chapters are the most tentative, because they aim to bring together different strands of our hypothesis on conversion and sketch some of its
implications for different fields of study. In chapter 9, we will travel back to India,
but this time we visit the nineteenth-century colonial period. The chapter explores how missionaries and colonial officials attempted to create the conditions
for conversion in India by educating the Indian natives according to certain
schemes. Colonialism was an educational project that presented itself in terms of
the need for secular education in India. However, this project of secular education reproduced some of the cognitive assumptions and schemes of the Reformation theology of conversion. On the one hand, the British developed a socialscientific description of Indian society and Hindu religion that presupposed this
theological framework; on the other hand, they explicitly presented secular education as an attempt to give the Indians the modes of reasoning and the scientific
knowledge needed to respond to the call of the Christian God. Finally, chapter
10 provides a provisional sketch of some broader conclusions and implications of
my research. The guiding question here is: Given the concerns and puzzles of the
wider research programme, where has this dissertation brought us?
Chapter 1
The Debate on
Religious Conversion in India
Religious conversion is one of the most volatile and sensitive social issues in
India today. In her 2009 report on the state of freedom of religion in India, special
rapporteur of the United Nations, Asma Jahangir points out that the laws and
bills on religious conversion in several Indian states should be reconsidered since
they raise serious human rights concerns, in particular due to the use of discriminatory provisions and vague or overbroad terminology (UNHRC 2009a, 22). In
the summary of the cases transmitted to the governments and replies received,
she regrets that the Indian government did not send a reply concerning these
allegations (UNHRC 2009b, 14-16). In its 2009 report, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, decided to put India on its watch
list of countries requiring close monitoring on religious freedom issues for 2009.
Conversion and the anti-conversion legislations featured prominently in the report as one of the crucial issues the government should better respond to (USCIRF 2009). In March 2008, the Indian National Commission for Minorities
(NCM)1 had already announced that it would set up a committee to investigate
the anti-conversion laws in India. It desired to investigate whether or not these
form a violation of the Indian constitution and its guarantees of freedom of religion.2 In the meanwhile, the attempts of a number of Indian State Governments
to pass anti-conversion legislation continue unabated.
The NCM is an official body of the Government of India. Its mission is to evaluate the progress
of minority communities in India in order to safeguard the secular values of equality and nondiscrimination of the State. More information on the tasks and activities of this body can be found
on the website: http://www.ncm.nic.in.
2
The Indian Constitution (1949), Article 25, guarantees that all persons are equally entitled to
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. However,
1
10
Chapter 1
This situation is not new. For a long time, India has been struggling with the
issue of religious conversion. Forced conversions, protests and petitions against
missionary activities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, hostility towards
converts, introduction of anti-conversion legislation, violent conflicts related to
missionary activities, claims of pseudo-conversion, the emergence of Hindu reconversion movements, etc. have all taken place in India. If we look at the last
two centuries, we can roughly say that especially the conversion of Hindus (and
other Indian traditions) to Christianity and the conversion practices of Christian
missionaries are in the eye of the storm. In fact, this is quite remarkable if we keep
in mind that the Christians form only a very small minority of the Indian population: 2.3% of Indias population is Christian as compared to 80.5% Hindus and
13.4% Muslims, according to the official census data 2001.3
Though conversions to Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism have also stirred
debates, they do so in a different way. Conversions to Buddhism are generally
discussed in relation to the conversion of Dr. Ambedkar to Buddhism in 1956
and the related conversions of certain groups of untouchablesalso referred to as
the neo-Buddhist movement (see Brekke 2003; Fitzgerald 1997; Gokhale 1986;
Miller 1967; Shastree 1996; Tartakov 2003; Queen 1993, 1996). As such this
movement was primarily understood as one of social revolt or political strategy
( Jaffrelot 2005, 119-142; Queen 1996). Conversion to Islam is most often dealt
with as a historical issue and is closely related to the question whether the Indian
Muslims were originally Hindus or not. In the early 20th century, fear of forced
conversions to Islam was still alive.4 Even today, such fears are expressed. Much
of the literature is related to a famous case of mass conversion to Islam in 1981
in the village of Meenakshipuram (Ali Khan 1991; Chatterji 1981; Kalam 1989;
Mathew 1982; Rizvi 1991; Wright 1982, 1983). But while the (forced) conversions of Hindus to Islam under Mogul rule are generally seen as violence done in
the past, conversions to Christianity are seen as a major threat of today.
Also conversion within Hinduism drew the attention of observers and ignited some debate, especially related to the shuddhi movements of the Arya Samaj at
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 20th century. Increasingly, the
since then, different Indian States have enacted Freedom of Religion Acts, which aim to prevent
religious conversion, see chapter 4.
3
For the figures see the census data online: http://www.censusindia.gov.in.
4
Before the 1930s and also towards the end of his life, Gandhis ideas on conversion are mainly
focused on the Hindu fears about forced conversion by Muslims. We will go deeper into this issue
in chapter 2, which analyses Gandhis use of the concepts of religion and conversion.
The Debate on Religious Conversion in India
11
contemporary re-conversion attempts and movements of some Hindu nationalist

movements are also included in the debate on religious conversion (ClmentinOjha 1994; Clmentin-Ojha, C. and M. Gaborieau 1994; Hardiman 2007; Jaffrelot 1994; Jordens 1991). These reconversion movements, however, are closely
related to the problem of Christian conversion because they present themselves
as a response to them.
Thus, the problem of conversion in India is not limited to the relation between Hindus and Christians, but also involves other communities in the Indian
society. However, as we will argue in this chapter, the debate between Hindus
and Christians has given shape to the framework of the Indian discussions on
religious conversion. If the aim is to understand what is at stake in this debate, we
need to grasp some of the important patterns in the long history of interaction
between the western culture, with its Christian origins, and the Indian culture.
There is urgency to these questions as well. The tensions are increasing today
and are no longer restricted to India alone. In recent years, a similar enmity towards the proselytizing activities of Christians has surfaced on the isle of Sri Lanka and in other Asian countries (Matthews 2007; Owens 2006, 2007). Especially
after the many missionary efforts in the aftermath of Tsunami relief, religious
conversion has been before Sri Lankan Parliament on at least four occasions in
2005-2006, indicating how serious a political issue it has become (Matthews
2007, 457). Specifying the importance of this debate in the Sri Lankan context,
Matthews says that: Although the various bills to proscribe conversions are not
headline news due to the recent return to armed hostilities, the topic remains
fresh and crucial for informed discussion concerning Sri Lankan public policy on
matters of religion (ibid.).5
1.1. Populist Preachers and Pedantic Teachers

While Christian religious leaders lament about the state of religious freedom
in India, Hindus reply by pointing out how Christian conversion practices have
harmed and continue to harm Indian society. Many pamphlets, booklets, and
popularizing articlespublished and distributed by Christian presses or by Hindu
By the end of 2009 the issue of religious conversion was taken up in the Sri Lankan political
agenda once more, resulting in many articles in the media and much discussion between the Buddhists and the Christians. This is reflected in discussions on the internet, on blogs and in newpapers,
see for instance Perera (2009).
5
12
Chapter 1
leadersare along these lines. Certain websites play a sustaining role in spreading
these views.6 As might be expected, their demagogic inclinations and propagandistic aims are omnipresent: they support or oppose the conversion activities of
Christians in India. Both parties work magic with demographic charts and conversion rates; both seem to find cases of atrocities on demand; both show a liking
to citing dubious academic and historical sources; both are often very explicitly
aggressive and incite hatred. Both try to marginalize the other by suggesting that
they are the real fundamentalists or quantits ngligeables in the Indian society.
Christians point their finger at the Hindu nationalist or religious fundamentalist movements as the cause of all disturbances; while many Indians point to the
Christian missionaries as the cause of the contention.
Nevertheless, both groups testify to the fact that the issue of conversion is
important to them. Underneath the rhetoric, some genuine concerns can be discerned. In this section, we will try to bring these to the foreground.
In Defence of Conversion
In May 2006, Pope Benedict XVI became involved in the Indian debate on religious conversion by criticizing India for showing disturbing signs of religious
intolerance.7 In his address to the new Indian ambassador to the Holy See, he
declared that these signs, which have troubled some regions of the nation, including the reprehensible attempt to legislate clearly discriminatory restrictions
on the fundamental right of religious freedom, must be firmly rejected as not only
unconstitutional, but also as contrary to the highest ideals of Indias founding
fathers, who believed in a nation of peaceful coexistence and mutual tolerance
between different religions and ethnic groups (Benedict XVI 2006). While this
sentence has been singled out by the media, the entire passage makes clear that
While browsing the internet for more information on the issue of religious conversion in India,
some websites with polarized views kept getting repeated hits. They devote a lot of attention to
religious conversion in their editorials, blogs, uploaded articles or special reports. Some of these
websites are: http://www.indianchristians.in; http://www.christianitytoday.com; http://www.dalitnetwork.org; http://www.christianpersecutionindie.blogspot.com; http://www.southasianconnection.com. Opposing conversions are the websites: http://www.christianaggression.org; http://www.
hvk.org; http://www.crusadewatch.org; http://www.christianwatchindia.worldpress.com; http://
www.ofbjp.org.
7
Reports of this event were found in different news services and newspapers, Times of India (May
19, 2006), BBC (May 23, 2006), Asia News (May 23, 2006), Tribune (May 23, 2006), Kerknet
Vlaanderen (May 22, 2006).
6
13
the Pope is putting forward a certain interpretation of the minority rights of the
Indian Constitution.8
The Popes comments were not welcomed by the Indian Government. The
ensuing commotion led to a declaration by the Indian Foreign Ministry that India
is a secular and democratic country guaranteeing equality for all religious faiths.
The then President of the BJP, Rajnath Singh, continued the dispute and reportedly defined the Popes comments as unjustified and said that activities that
really go against the secular nature of the nation are conversions, not the laws that
prohibit them. As the BBC further reports (2006), he also wrote to the Pope:
My interference in your religious domain within the Vatican will be unwelcome,
uncalled for and will be treated as interference in your religious management and
administration.
This exchange is not a singular event. Pope John Paul II, in the context of
his 1999 visit to India, uttered similar sentiments. According to the BBC, the
Pope insisted that the Catholic church had a right to continue missionary work
in Asia, saying conversion should be recognised as a human right and that it was
the moral duty of Christians to spread the word of the Gospel throughout Asia
(BBC 1999). He told the 1999 Delhi Interfaith meeting, attended by Hindus,
Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians, Jews and Bahais the following:
No state, no group has the right to control either directly or indirectly a persons
religious convictions...or the respectful appeal of a particular religion to peoples
free conscience...Religious freedom constitutes the very heart of human rights.
Its inviolability is such that individuals must be recognised as having the right to
change their religion if their conscience so demands (ibid.; see also Stanley 1999).
In 2003, the same Pope expressed similar thoughts when the Government of
Tamil Nadu enacted its controversial Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Act. Reportedly, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha stated bluntly that the Pope had
The entire paragraph goes as follows: ...no citizen of India, especially the weak and the underprivileged, should ever have to experience discrimination for any reason, especially based on ethnic
or religious background or social position. The recent re-establishment of the National Integration
Council and the creation this year of the Ministry for Minority Affairs offer practical means of
upholding constitutionally guaranteed equality of all religions and social groups. While protecting
the right of each citizen to profess and practice his or her faith, they also facilitate efforts to build
bridges between minority communities and Indian society as a whole, and thus foster national integration and the participation of all in the countrys development. The disturbing signs of religious
intolerance which have troubled some regions of the nation, including the reprehensible attempt
to legislate clearly discriminatory restrictions on the fundamental right of religious freedom, must
be firmly rejected as not only unconstitutional, but also as contrary to the highest ideals of Indias
founding fathers, who believed in a nation of peaceful coexistence and mutual tolerance between
different religions and ethnic groups (Benedict XVI 2006; italics mine).
8
14
Chapter 1
no business and no authority to comment on this law. The major Indian newspaper The Hindu reports her as saying that [t]he Pope has no authority to talk
about any legislation passed by democratically elected governments in India...
(The Hindu 2003). When a reporter pointed out that the Pope was the supreme
pontiff of the Christian community, the Chief Minister shot back: So what?
Cardinal Diasnewly promoted then from archbishop of Bombay to Prefect
of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples in the Catholic Church
asserts in his reply to the commotion following Pope Benedicts statement in
2006, that the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and
propagate ones religion are part of the Indian constitution and are fundamental
human rights. After stating unambiguously that conversions induced by force or
allurement are considered invalid by the Catholic Church, he urges the Indian
people to accept that any opposition by law or de facto to a genuine conversion, besides being a grave violation of the code of human rights and of the spirit
of the Indian Constitution, is, above all, an unwarranted interference in Gods
unique competence in the matter (Asia News 2006b). He also emphasizes the
Christians good social work in India. By invoking statistical material, he urges the
Indian Hindus not to attack Christians on conversion (Iype 2006):
The Christians in India number only 2.3% of the total population: of these 1.8%
belong to the Catholic Church. Despite being such a tiny minority, the Christians
cater to 20% of all the primary education in the country, 10% of the literacy and
community health care programmes, 25% of the care of the orphans and widows,
and 30% of the care of the handicapped, lepers and AIDS patients. The vast majority of those who avail themselves of these institutions belong to faiths other
than Christian. These institutions are much appreciated by Hindus, Muslims and
persons of other faiths or of no faith at all, who admire the Christians for their
selfless service of the suffering, the marginalised, the illiterate and the downtrodden. The aforementioned group [a tiny politico-religious fractionof the religious majority in India] would do well to examine how much it is doing in favour
of the educational, health and social uplift of the Indian people, and should not
take it amiss that some members of the religious majority in India (and of other
communities as well) feel attracted to follow a religion whose founder, Our Lord
Jesus Christ, told His followers that He had come, not to be served, but to serve
and who commanded them to love one another as He had loved them. The group
can also ask itself why so many persons of other faiths, including even government
officials, insist on their children being educated in so-called convent schools or
on admitting their sick and aged relatives in Catholic hospitals or homes.
15
Joseph DSouza, president of the All India Christian Council and the Dalit Freedom Network, analyses the Gujarat Freedom of Religions Act and in an appeal
to the Asian Human Rights Commission states that the Gujarat government is not
listening to the voice of freedom, democracy and even the Indian constitution
(DSouza 2003). The proposed law is also anti-dalit because a possible way out
of the caste system, namely conversion, is shut off. The arguments pro conversion
and the plea for social mobility are closely interwoven with each other in his arguments. At another place DSouza poses the question: Who ultimately decides the
issue of conversion? In his answer, the universal right to freedom of religion and
the social upward mobility of people surface as the core elements:
According to the Indias Constitution the freedom of religion is given to every
individual Indian citizen. He or she has the freedom to believe and practice the
faith he or she chooses. The freedom of speech enshrined in the Constitution
gives every Indian citizen the right to propagate his faith as long as civil norms
and decency are maintained. In the context of the caste revolt in modern India, a
revolution which began with Mahatma Phule, Ambedkar, and Periyar, there is another logical reason. If our country does not give the Dalits, tribals and the OBCs
(Other Backward Castes) the right to choose their faith, we have effectively imposed permanent slavery of the caste system on them. It was Ambedkar who said
that I was born a Hindu but I will not die a Hindu. In 1956 he fulfilled that
promise with hundreds of thousands of followers. Since then, rightly or wrongly,
the liberation of the oppressed castes is fatefully tied with the choice to convert
out of the religion that imposes the caste system on them. (DSouza 2008)
A new element surfaces here. Conversion is valued also as an act of social protest
against the caste system. Both Christians and secularists see religious conversion
as a means through which many deprived people in India can escape the oppressive caste system and walk the path to empowerment. As a research scholar at
Jawaharlal Nehru University formulated it in The Hindu: Yes, forced conversions
are wrong. (And in some cases the converts have admitted to ridiculous logic of
conversion given to them). But what is worse is forcing masses of people to accept
their humiliating conditions without protest, when they seem to have made the
conscious decision to opt out of the Hindu fold as a form of symbolic protest
(Anant 2002). The fact that groups make use of this alleged route out of caste and
oppression is used as an argument for the freedom of conversion. As a Minister
for Education in the Government of West Bengal, Kanti Biswan, formulated it
in 2002: Five Dalits were recently butchered near a police station in Jhajjar, in
Haryana, by caste Hindus after a dispute over a cow. From Haryana to Karna-
16
Chapter 1
taka and from Rajasthan and Gujarat to Bihar, many such heinous and shameful
instances have taken place even after 55 years of Independence. Numerous case
studies and surveys, along with books by celebrated sociologists, have proved that
the cause of conversion of Dalits to another religion is not force or allurement
but the barbarous and brutal treatment by one section of Hindus against them
(Biswan 2002).
When reading the popular defences of conversion, we see that this task is
generally undertaken by the Christians. Often, the defenders of secularism and
the Indian secular state put across similar arguments. The arguments pro conversion mainly derive from one principle: religious freedom is a universal and inviolable
human right. The right of an individual to convert to another religion, so it is
written in an Editorial of Christianity Today, must be considered a universal human right and should be vigorously defended by Christians and other religious
leaders. No state, church, or institution should stand in the way of an individuals
pursuit of religious truth (Christianity Today 1999, 28). Religious conversion is
understood as an expression of the freedom of conscience and the freedom of
religion. Consequently any limitation on religious conversion is interpreted as a
stain on the Indian secular constitution, on the status of human rights in India
and on Indian democracy.
In short, in the popular media, conversion is defended along two lines: (1)
freedom to convert is an inalienable human right, in its absence, freedom of religion and the freedom of conscience are threatened and (2) freedom to convert is a
means to escape oppression and ills ascribed to the Indian society (poverty, caste,
discrimination, inequality, etc.).
The second concern begs for a historical argument, which demonstrates the
link between the ills of Indian society, on the one hand, and the Hindu religion, on
the other. Only if this link is established could religious conversion be presented
as the solution to a range of societal problems. In terms of logical structure, this
kind of argument is similar to claiming that poverty and inequality in the United
States are intrinsically linked to the Christian society and the social structure this
religion has historically established. Hence, to solve these problems and change
society for the better, one needs to convert to another religion. To understand this
connection, which is postulated and accepted as a trivium in the Indian case, we
need to explore the link between a range of phenomenaHinduism, its alleged
corruption, the caste system, the need for reform and the role of conversion in
reformto help us to understand the second concern. We will not immediately
17
tackle this issue here, but we will do so in the later chapters of this essay (see especially chapter 5). Before looking closely at the first concern, let us look at that
issue through the eyes of the opponents of conversion.
Anti-Conversion Stances
What are the arguments against allowing the freedom to convert? The spokespersons of this position are mainly Hindu, understood in the general sense of the
term. A quote, taken from the preface of a well-known booklet by M.S. Srinivas
Conversion to Christianity: Aggression in India (2000) combines some of the most
persistent objections floating around in India against Christian conversion:
We have three thousand rishis in Hinduism and we feel that Jesus would merit
being added to that revered galaxy. We do not hate Christ or Christians. We leave
them alone. We respect Jesus as the founder of a great religion. We wish all religions well. But we, Hindus, do not want to be interfered with or converted, or our
Indian brothers be tricked into conversion to Christianity. We were born Hindus and
Hinduism has an enviable heritage of over 5000 years and it is aggression if some
other religionists attempt to destroy such a rich heritage. No one has the right to
destroy the worlds heritage. The Catholic-minded Hindu religious spirit indeed
presents the way of peace for human beings of all faiths. If any religion can take
roots and spread only by destroying other heritages/religions and other people, it
is not religion but an instrument of carnage and genocide. If the Westerners do
not show regard to the love of liberty, including freedom of worship, in other parts
of the developing world, it means they are the perpetrators of slavery in the world,
with only lip sympathy for freedom and human rights. To follow the religion of
ones own choice is human right, and the imposition of anothers religion through
conversion business is not human right; it is aggression. We, Hindus, resolve to
work for the freedom of mankind and thereby achieve human rights. (Srinivas
2000, preface; italics mine)
Most of the popular literature opposing religious conversion embroiders further

on these themes and questions (e.g. Subramanian 2006). The central argument
against religious conversion in India is that conversion is a (violent) attack on the Indian traditions, culture and society. Conversion violates religious traditions and disrupts families, communities, and society in general. It is conceived of as violence
against the Hindu heritage as Swami Dayananda Saraswati, a very well-known
Vedanta and Sanskrit teacher, put it: Religious conversion destroys centuries-old
communities and incites communal violence. It is violence, and it breeds violence
18
Chapter 1
(Dayananda 1999). Or as a BJP politician formulated it: Conversions comprise

the greatest danger to our society: we cannot allow the demographic profile of
the country to be changed. We will not let Hindus become a minority, as somebody has said they would be by 2060 (Carvalho 2006). The perception that the
Hindu culture and its traditions are endangered by the growth and interference of
Christian conversion is very much present in all the material against conversion.
Christian conversion is linked directly to the destruction of the Indian people,
culture and religion (Srinivas 2000, 35-38).
The argument is that the Hindu traditions do not normally convert and that
the ongoing conversion by Christians might pose a real challenge to its continued existence. Conversions create social tensions, the fear is that the targeted
community feels that it will lose out on its culture and civilisational values, so
the Hindu Vivek Kendra website answers the question What are the objections
to conversion?9 The most serious threat to Hinduism, Srinivas argues, comes
from the evangelical forces of conversion to Christianity. Being inert, the Hindus wrongly assume that peaceful co-existence will solve the problems. This is a
negligent method with dangerous implications. Just like the need to control various foreign businesses Christianity business should also be controlled to prevent
injury to the Indian society.
History and historical facts are also drawn into the debate: the missionary activities of Christians are described as a continuation of British imperialism,
which is described as an attempt to convert India to Christianity. Thus, the foreign hand is a recurring refrain in the arguments against religious conversion. This
danger is most often seen in the context of tribal and dalit conversion because the
Christian missionaries are deemed to have a great influence on these two groups.
In the last ten years, we see this fear very clearly expressed in the support given to
the anti-conversion legislation of different Indian states. As an example, consider
the statement of objects and reasons of the Gujarat Freedom of Religions Act,
2003:
Reports have been received by the Government that conversions from one religion to another are made by use of force or allurement or by fraudulent means.
Bringing in a legislation to prohibit such conversions will act as a deterrent against
anti-social and vested interest groups exploiting the innocent people belonging
to depressed classes and will enable people to practice their own religion freely. It
will also be useful to maintain public order and to nip in the bud the attempts by
certain subversive forces to create social tensions. (Government of Gujarat 2003)
See http://www.hvk.org/Publications/faq/quest7.html.
19
Fear for the destruction of the Hindu culture is the recurrent theme in the populist
literature. It tries to show how British imperialism and the western study of the
Indian culture and religions aim to prove the supremacy of the Western Christian culture and religion, and are thus instruments of conversion. An example in
point is Srinivas interpretation: Most foreign scholarswho pursued study of
Hinduism in the colonial past were motivated only by their mission of conversion
of Hindus to Christianity (Srinivas 2000, 1). Similarly for the role of English
schools he depicts: A network of English schools was established in India with
the view to ensuring the conversion of Hindus to Christianity (ibid., 5).
Additionally, the endangered Hindu culture also comes up in a range of
popular allegations against Christians: dressing up churches as ashrams in order
to have a firmer grip on the Indian populace (ibid., 29); adapting Christ to the Indian mind and tastes in order to make him more appealing to Indians (ibid., 33);
etc. To strengthen this argument, the foreign and western nature of Christianity
is often highlighted, as well as the foreign funding sources of the missionaries.10
A related critique is that conversion is forced upon the Indian people, especially
by alluring them through material gains such as medical care or education. Moreover, the conversion is not real, because it is closely connected to political gains
for the parties involved. Against the Christian defence that real conversion can
never happen through allurement or coercion, the typical response is: The adjective real is the cunning word of saving grace! What about the unreal conversion
to Christianity, which is an everyday reality in India? (Srinivas 2000, 108). Opponents of conversion speak in terms of the misleading Christian recruitment of
Hindus by financial and material enticements thus exploiting innocent people of
the deprived classes. Srinivas also argues along these lines when he points out that
many Hindus embraced Christianity, not on account of any faith but because of
the palliatives or opportunities offered (ibid., 21). He takes recourse to Gandhi
to stress that conversion is not the solution for internal Hindu problems: Gandhiji held the position that the removal of untouchability was a distinctly Hindu
problem, and the Hindus themselves would tackle it, but the Christian missions
created more problems than they were solving by offering conversion as a solution
to untouchability (ibid., 22).
This comes to the fore also in the discussion on the special provisions involving the influx of
foreign funding for missionary activities taken up in the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act
(1976), which was repealed and replaced by the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Bill (2006) by
the Minister of State for Home Affairs Sh. S. Regupathy in 2006.
10
20
Chapter 1
In short, conversion practices cause social disturbance and unrest in the Indian
communities and, hence, in society at large. Furthermore, conversion is fundamentally a subversive power that endangers the foundations of Indian society. Thus, it
gives rise to social tension and puts public order at risk. These arguments against
Christian conversion are wide-spread among many Hindus: Christian conversion
practices force people into accepting a foreign religion; this causes social tensions
in communities confronted with such activities, and it poses a real danger to the
survival of the Hindu, and Indian culture at large.
In contrast with the arguments to promote the freedom to convert, the opponents of conversion display a great variety of concerns. Conversion seems to be
bad for the Indian society for many different reasons: social disturbance and tensions, demographic changes, cultural challenges, etc. However, one shared characteristic comes to the fore: both feel that the core of their respective religious
tradition is at stake in the debate.
When browsing the literature, one gets the impression that India is as far
away from resolving the issue of religious conversion as it was fifty years ago.
Reading the journal, magazine or newspaper articles, the books, the news releases,
the internet blogs and discussion boards, often makes one wonder whether some
kind of short circuit occurs in conceptualising the problems at stake. In spite of
the reasonable clarity of the arguments pro and contra the freedom to convert,
which have remained more or less unchanged throughout the previous century,
the debate has not seen any significant progress. In fact, the positions have become more confusing, vague and all-encompassing. The conversion debate has the
striking property of being boring and extremely repetitive, in the sense that both
sides repeat the same arguments over and over again. The discussions exude an
aura of mutual incomprehension, unease about the topic and resentment towards
the other group. They seem to agree on one thing only: the gap between the different views on conversion is unbridgeable.
So, while neither of the parties appears able to spell out the core problems
concerning conversion, both deem the debate to be of great importance. The challenge for social sciences and humanities scholars, therefore, is to explain the issue
that drives the discussion: why are so many people, either champions or adversaries of conversion, so concerned about this topic? Why do the different groups feel
violated in their most basic religious values and identities? What drives them to
carry on this debate in spite of its obvious barrenness?
21
1.2. The Secularism vs. Hindutva Framework

The secularism-Hindutva account is well-established as the framework within
which to interpret the 20th century debate on religious conversion and the contemporary success of anti-conversion legislation in India. The classical description
of this problem is that the Indian society and its debates about socially relevant
topics are dominated by two opposing camps, the secularists and the Hindu nationalists.
Similarly, in the debate on religious conversion these two parties are active as
supporters and opponents of the freedom to convert. This framework for looking
at the societal problems and debates in India starts off with the common-sense
idea that the country is haunted by tensions between its many different groups,
traditions and practices: between Brahmins and dalits; between this jati and that
jati; between Christians and Hindus; between Hindus and Muslims; between
different Muslim groups; between local groups claiming the same temple; between groups claiming SC/ST (scheduled castes and scheduled tribes) status after
conversion; between the secular scientific temper and traditional superstition, etc.
Such tensions are commonly described and analysed under labels such as the rise
of religious fundamentalism in India, growing religious violence or exploding
communal tensions. This framework implies that two positions are available: (a)
either one is secular, acts free of religious prejudice and is endowed with a rational
mindset (b) or one must still be entangled in the clutches of a religious worldview
and wants the Hindu religion and culture to dominate society.
However, the debate on religious conversion and the wave of anti-conversion
legislation pose a significant challenge to the explanatory force of this framework.
According to the secularism vs. Hindutva framework, two parties dominate and
determine the debate on religious conversion. On the one hand, there are Hindu
nationalist groups that try to strengthen the hold of Hinduism on society. They
are against conversion, because this is understood as a threat to Hindu culture.
On the other hand, we have the secular powers and the Christian groups who aim
to safeguard religious freedom for all Indians and especially for the religious minorities. From within this framework, the tensions related to conversioncases
of violence against Christians and Christian missionaries, and against Hindus
willing to convert; volatility on the part of the Hindu population in matters related to conversion to Christianity; the popularity of anti-conversion legislation
22
Chapter 1
in many of the Indian statesare generally understood as instances of a growing

radicalisation of the Hindus.
We will argue that this framework is too rigid and narrow to grasp the real
issues at stake. While the opponents of conversion are depicted as fundamentalists, indigenists or communalists; those who defend the freedom to convert are
seen as secular, rational, enlightened and modern. But does this framework of
secularism vs. Hindutva help us to understand the Indian situation? Does it allow
us to make sense of the fact that the Freedom of Religion Acts are actually anticonversion bills or is this merely one of those many paradoxes that scholars of
India have to deal with?
Prima facie, both sides in the debate seem to be talking intelligibly about
concepts such as secularism, conversion and freedom of religion; both seem to
have accepted the limits within which conversion can be challengednamely,
when they are fraudulent and forced conversions. The contention in the debate on
conversion seems to revolve around the protection of Hinduism versus the protection of religious minorities in India and about winning and losing adherents of
ones own religion. Especially an examination of the populist literature, as we have
done in the previous sections, could easily reinforce this impression. The patterns
of the populist debate might be seen as evidence for the secularism vs. Hindutva
account. After all, isnt it the Hindu nationalist who stages re-conversions to Hinduism and attacks the Christian missionaries? Hence, the first question we need
to tackle is the following one: if these two groupsthe Christians and the Hindu
nationalistsare the most powerful voices in the populist debate, why deny the
fact that they also set the terms of the debate? We will argue that this is mistaken;
in fact, there is no debate, in the true sense of the word, on religious conversion at all.
These two groups do not set the terms of the debate, but rather reason and act
within limits and constraints established long ago.
1.3. Clusters of Concerns

Why is the secularism vs. Hindutva framework unable to capture the problem?
A first cluster of issues is related to the question of who is actually involved in the
debate. If it concerns a conflict between secularists and Hindutvavadis, why are
the main players not representatives of these two groups? In fact, the real players
in the debate are Christians (not primarily the secularists, though they take their
23
side) on the one hand, and large sections of the Indian population (not just a small
fraction of Hindu nationalists), on the other.
(1) If we claim that the Christians merely voice the more enlightened secular view and defend the only rational option, i.e. freedom of religion for all religious minorities, this raises even more questions. The fact that the secularists and
the Christians are on the same side needs some further clarification. Is it simply
a coincidence that secularists and Christians put forward very similar claims concerning conversion and freedom of religion or is there a deeper relation between
the Christian and the secular points of view?
If we want to take this problem seriously, rather than ignore it by saying that
this view is indeed the rational and enlightened one, we need to explore this relation between Christian and secular views on conversion and freedom of religion.
This issue will be taken up in the next chapters.
(2) The anti-conversion stance is not limited to the so called Hindu nationalist factions within Indian society. In fact, it is very unfortunate that the
Hindu right has tried to claim a monopoly over this issue, thus immunizing it to
scientific investigation. This tends to happen when an issue is incorporated into
the ideology of a group: outsiders begin to assume that the issue is adequately
explained by referring to the group which has claimed the monopoly. Therefore,
the tension regarding religious conversion in India is often explained by simply
referring to the role of the Hindutvavadis (see also chapter 5).
At a high level of abstraction, the opposition to conversion is made up of
Indians ranging from hardcore Hindutvavadis, radical spokesmen of the Sangh
Parivar, Hindu nationalists, Gandhians, to many Indians belonging to all kinds
of traditions. In fact, there are reasons to believe that the common-sense standpoint of many Indians is one of incomprehension, opposition or even aversion
towards conversion. Many agree that conversion, especially how it is conceived
and organised by missionaries, is an improper practiceeven though, and this is
important, most are also against anti-conversion legislation.
While, these days, the opposition to religious conversion might be hijacked
by the radical fractions of certain Hindu groups, many Indians appear to agree
that there is something improper and somehow threatening about religious conversion; that religious conversion is odd and un-Indian; that there is something
immoral and wrong about the activities of missionaries in tribal areas and their
proselytism among tribal and dalit groups. Projects such as the American Protestant Joshua Project are looked upon with the greatest suspicion and discomfort by
24
Chapter 1
all.11 Many have also pointed out the peculiar fact that not only the BJP, but also
Congress has been pushing in the direction of anti-conversion legislation.12 At
least this indicates that the opposition to conversion is not limited to the fanatic
nationalists, but that it has a broad base in Indian society.
Generally speaking, this broader section of society does not write pamphlets
or take political action against Christians; nor do they support the anti-conversion legislations. Their attitude can best be described as one of incomprehension
and unease regarding the Christian emphasis on the conversion of Indians. It is,
however, difficult to pin down the ideas of these groups, since they do not participate in political or social-scientific debates on the issue. However, their views
are expressed in other forums, such as comments on online articles and internet
blogs.13
In the words of a participant in an internet discussion on the topic: Indeed
this whole notion of conversion seems all wrong to me. What are they converting?
Why cant anyone who wants to practice Christian religion do so without converting? I may be asking stupid questions here, but at this moment, the whole premise
of conversion strikes me as odd. Or, in the words of a certain Shikarishambu (on
31 July 2008): I do not understand why religious conversions where proselytization is involved is not considered as dangerous as racism. After all, it comes from
the belief that my religion/ faith is better than yours. And, you are damned unless
you convert to mine.14 These spontaneous responses are very typical and could
See http://www.joshuaproject.net
Especially in the context of the Himachal Pradesh anti-conversion bill which came into existence
under the rule of a Congress-led government, this discussion came up. See also Anant (2002): In
the aftermath of the Meenakshipuram conversion of February 1981, the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, is reported to have advised the State Governments and Union Territory administrations to enact laws to regulate change of religion on the lines of the existing Acts in Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa and Arunachal Pradesh (The Statesman, Delhi, November 16, 1982). Let us keep in
mind that the ruling party then was not the BJP, but Congress (italics mine).
13
More research than I have been able to do will be needed to get insight into this stance. The internet plays an important role in grasping the general views of people on this issue. But in addition to
studies of the internet debates, this assertion is also based on many conversations I had with Indians
from all walks of life. These conversations occurred in response to talks at academic conferences, at
meetings and conversations during stays in India, or at meetings with NRIs, during stays in the US.
14
This quote comes from the comments on the article in The Economist (2008). The comment was
published on the website of The Economist, www.economist.com. Another example found there
is: Rtadhaman wrote (on 31 July 2008) The articles observations on the state of religious conversions in India is borne out of very minimal knowledge of non-abrahamic religions. The article talks
of spiritual and theological inclinations as the primary motivations for conversion. The evangelical
conversions in India are largely through money for religion, food for religion and survival for religion
campaigns. One, it is unethical and immoral to use desperation for life as a tool for conversion. The
11
12
25
be multiplied indefinitely. The idea that the opposition to conversion is primarily

related to the fundamentalist sections of Indian society is factually incorrect. The
fact that some Hindu nationalists groups claim the topic does not give us insight
into the dynamics of the debate and its underlying concerns.
One could of course suggest that this merely indicates the growing radicalisation of the Hindu population of India and that more and more are enthusiastic
about the Hinduization, Sanskritization or Saffronization of the Indian culture. But let us pose the question in a different way: might it be possible that the
softer formulations of the above standpoints tap into something distinctly Indian?
That is to say, the incomprehension towards the practice of conversion might be
real and, hence, the unease with the idea of the freedom to convert might tap
into this real incomprehension. Providing a deeper insight into the incomprehension and aversion that many Indians experience towards the practice of conversion
is part of the challenge we will take up in this essay.
The framework of secularism vs. Hindutva presupposes that both parties are
talking about the same things when they discuss secularism, freedom of religion
and religious conversion. Prima facie, this seems to be the case. But here, we bump
into a second cluster of problems. One gets the impression that there is a certain
kind of agreement on the concepts used and the semantic relations between them.
The Christians agree with the Hindus that forced or fraudulent conversions
are not true conversions and that conversion should be the result of a true personal spiritual quest. The Hindus agree with the Christians on the importance of
the right to freedom of religion. But both groups have used the same arguments
in completely different ways. This becomes manifest at different levels.
(1) At the level of the content and meaning of the debate, there are difficulties in grouping the arguments as pro and contra: what are the two parties debating about? On which points do they differ? Which are the points of agreement?
What would count as a solution to the debate? An analogy with the debate on the
headscarf can be used to illustrate what I mean. In some European countries, this
debate has intermittently emerged during the last decennia. Basically, the debate
revolves around the question whether the headscarf (as a religious symbol) has a
place in the public sphere or not (for example, in schools or in working environsecond is the advent of exclusivity brought in by non-indic systems. Pagans tend to absorb deities as
part of their beliefs unlike the true God v. false God ideas preached by abrahamic faiths. See also
the interesting blog Law and Other Things: A Blog About Indian Law, the Courts, and the Constitution, see http://www.lawandotherthings.blogspot.com/2008/09/conversion-and-christianity.
html. And the blog: Conversion Factors, see http://www.sepiamutiny.com/sepia/archives/002614.
html ; see also Google groups discussions.
26
Chapter 1
ments). Two parties have crystallized on this issue: (a) a group claiming that the
public sphere has to be as neutral as possible and that religious symbols should
be restricted to the private sphere; (b) a group claiming that religious freedom
is a universal human right and extends to the exhibition of religious symbols in
the public arena. It goes without saying that these are extreme positions and that
other middle-range positions exist as well. But the limits within which the debate takes place and the kind of arguments that are relevant are clear: it is about
the relation between the state and religion, about the limits of the neutrality of the
state, and those of the freedom of religion. Both groups agree on this focus and,
hence, all arguments are related to these topics.
Not so for the Indian debate on religious conversion. In this debate, both
groups seem to have different background concerns and have a different understanding of the central issues at stake. The opponents to religious conversion identify a range of issues: from the survival of the Indian culture to the social peace
of the villages; from the purity of a spiritual quest to the foreign education of the
Indians; from the freedom to continue ones tradition without external intrusion
to the role of the Central Government to protect the Indian way of going about
with other cultural and religious groups; from a disgust, non-comprehension or
even indifference towards conversion practices to a concern for safeguarding the
Hindu traditions; from coping with Indias colonial past to India as a new superpower in the world; etc. It is not possible to clearly pinpoint what causes the
manifest distress in this group.
With respect to Christians, in contrast, the issue at stake seems well-defined.
The freedom of religion is understood as the freedom to preach the gospel and
make converts. Every honest believer should be able to follow the religion he or
she thinks is true. Conversion is a universal human right, which is now threatened.
This resonates with one of the most essential ideas in religions like Christianity
and Islam: the freedom of millions of potential believers to come to the true religion. In other words, what is at issue is the liberation and salvation of the Indian
people from the grips of false religion. What seems to be at stake is the survival
and growth of true religion. This group is distressed by the incomprehension that
many Indians show towards these matters. That is to say, the Christian party has
difficulties in grasping the Indian incomprehension towards the importance of
freedom of religion and the freedom to convert.
(2) At the level of terminology, one faces more confusion. Both champions
and adversaries of religious conversion claim to be the defenders of real secular-
27
ism, true conversion and the true freedom of religion. Freedom of religion is
both an argument pro and contra conversion. The secularists say that it is evident
that the freedom of religion of all groups in the Indian society needs to be guaranteed and that this is an inalienable human right, which necessarily includes the
freedom to convert (under the condition that this conversion is free and real
not fraudulent, forced or induced by material gains). The right to freedom of
religion should protect individual human beings and they should be free to follow
their own conscience. If an individual adheres to a particular religion because of
her conscience, she should be able to do so freely.
The adversaries of the freedom to convert put forward the idea that secularism is about equal respect for all religions and that Christians lack this respect
since they believe only their religion to be true and that those of others are false.
Such a respect implies the freedom from external interference in ones traditions
and practices and interference is seen as a proof of disrespect. Viewed from this
perspective, the principle of freedom of religion entails an argument against conversion.
The respective background framework in the two cases is entirely different. The defenders of conversion seem to presuppose that diversity of religions
is a problem and that freedom of religion is there to police this situation. In
this view, freedom of religion protects people. To do so, two conditions must be
fulfilled: individual human beings should be able to follow their conscience and
the spread of different religious doctrines should not be hindered. The opposition
seems to presuppose that diversity of traditions is a natural fact of the human
condition and that freedom of religion is there as a protector of this natural situation. Here, it also has to guarantee two things: that all traditions can flourish and
that traditions do not interfere with each other but show mutual respect. As we
shall see, there are serious problems with each of these views.
For now, it suffices to point out that the situation cannot be understood by
simply saying that the defenders of the right to convert are secular and the true
guardians of the freedom of religion, while the opponents of conversion are antisecular and against the freedom of religion. The matter is not that clear-cut.
A similar argument holds for the use of the term conversion. When we
analyse the way both groups speak about conversion or the change of religion,
we see that they attach a completely different significance to this process. For the
group defending religious conversion, conversion is mainly an individual affair
and has to do with the individual conscience. In this sense, conversion is closely
28
Chapter 1
related to concepts such as God, the soul, the conscience, the individual, spiritual
conversion, etc. For the other group, conversion is about a change of opinion (in
matters of religion) which connotes maturity, knowledge of traditions, reason,
the persons role in a group, community or society, etc. Even though both groups
might make use of the same formulations and wordssuch as true spiritual conversion, conversion to another religionthey seem to refer to different phenomena.
This problem also surfaces in the attempt to make a distinction between
true and false conversion. We mentioned that both parties agree that forced
and fraudulent conversions can never be real or true conversions. If we dig
deeper, it is clear that the statements true conversion and fraudulent conversion
are not unambiguous. The Christians make the distinction between these two on
the basis of Christian theology. Here conversion is equivalent to the free working
of God in the human being. This can only be brought about by God and human
beings cannot add anything significant to this process; even though humans can
preach and teachmore, they must preach and teach the Word of Godconversion itself can never be forced. From this point of view, fraudulent conversion is
a contradictio in terminis. The distinction between true and false conversion can be
made on the basis of a range of theological premises. A long history of theological
debate within Christianity precedes the consensus of today.
For the adversaries of conversion, forced and fraudulent conversion takes
place when conversion is the result of a material incitement and not the end result
of a long spiritual and rational quest. This understanding and experience of conversion derive from Indian notions of change between traditions and result also
from the century-old experience of the activities of the Christian missionaries in
India. These different ways of distinguishing between true and false conversion are
scarcely addressed by current analyses of the debate on religious conversion. The
secularism vs. Hindutva account makes one presuppose that conversion is a universal term, applicable to all changes of religion, and have one commonly shared
reference.
Both these points (concerning the confusing terminology and vague, repetitive debate on conversion) will be dealt with more deeply in the subsequent chapters, namely in our analyses of the views of Gandhi on conversion and equality of
religions, the analyses of the Constituent Assembly Debates and of the contemporary anti-conversion legislation of some Indian states. These debates must help
us to analyse the concepts at stake and help to formulate the problems involved
29
in a clearer way. Only then will we be able to develop interesting hypotheses and
preliminary solutions to the perceived problems.
A third cluster of problems is related to the issue of violence. Within the
secularism vs. Hindutva framework, the violence related to conversion refers primarily to the physical violence resulting from the confrontations between Hindu
nationalist groups trying to extend their grasp to include more and more believers.
Though we see that both groups try to come up with as many atrocity cases as
possible,15 the violence they talk about seems to be of a different kind.
Christians speak of the violence of Hindus persecuting them because they
help the Indian population.16 In the course of the last ten years there have been
many attacks on Christian priests and nuns, who have also been imprisoned under false pretences. Female religious workers have been raped; many have been
assaulted and attacked, or deported and exiled (see Ahmed 2005). The most dramatic instance is undoubtedly the murder of the Christian missionary Graham
Staines and his two young sons who were burnt alive in their car. Such atrocities
cannot be reconciled with the work that missionaries like Staines do in India:
managing schools, helping the sick, preaching the gospel. But apart from physical
violence, the Christians feel oppressed and complain that curbing their right to
preach the Bible is violence. What is the basis of this experience? Preventing the
spreading of the Word of God and banning religious conversion appear to inflict
even more pain than that caused by physical violence.
Conversely, many Indians feel that conversion and the conversion practices
of the missionaries violate the Indian culture and religion. They raise socio-political quandaries in this respect. Not only have Christian missionaries attacked
the foundations of the Indian traditions by teaching people how false, degenerate, corrupt and unethical these traditions are, but they also mislead Indians
and conduct large groups of dalits, tribals and other depressed groups out of the
Hindu fold. Thus, the adversaries of conversion emphasize the link between the
It is not my intention to downplay the cases of real violence. However, I have the impression that
acts of violence are being used (both by Christians and Hindus) in order to attract attention for
their cause and that, using this strategy, they hope to focus on another kind of violence: the alleged
destruction of the Indian traditions for one group and the curbed freedom of religion and conversion for the other group.
16
The yearly International Religious Freedom Reports of the US State Department give a list of
reported violence between religious communities in India, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/index.htm. See also projects like www.christianaggression.com reporting violence done to the Indian
culture and the website of the All Indian Christian Council, www.indianchristians.in, where one can
report attacks against Christians or dalit atrocities by filling in an online form. For reports of attacks
on Christians, see also http://www.releaseinternational.org and http://www.christiantoday.com.
15
30
Chapter 1
good works that the Christians are doinglike building and running hospitals,
providing education to all, striving for equal rights for oppressed people, etc.
and their proselytizing efforts. As a result, this link is used as an argument to curb
all activities of Christians.17
This is a different experience of violence than the one of the Christians. This
experience of violence is not primarily physical, but is experienced in relation to
the conversion practices of the Christians. It is seen as a threat to the survival of
the Indian culture and as a violation of the integrity of the Indian social fabric.
Conversion as an active attempt to disgrace the Indian religions and traditions
and to actively change the Indian people is experienced and described as an act
of violence.
In other words, there are genuine experiences of violence at play, which cannot be reduced to mere threats of physical violence. The Christians experience the
deepest violence in the attempt to ban conversion; while many Indian Hindus
experience violence because of the Christian conversion practices. A good interpretation of the debate of religious conversion in India must be able to account
for both of these experiences of violence. The secularism vs. Hindutva account
cannot do this because it can structure the violence only as a result of a battle between fundamentalist religious views, where each strives to win more adherents.
However, if we want to take the clash in India seriously, we need to be able to account for the particular experiences of violence that these groups testify to. How
is it possible that guaranteeing religious freedom and the freedom to convert are
experienced by one group as violence? Why does banning the freedom to convert
cause the same experience in another group?
To summarize: understanding the Indian debate on religious conversion
from within the framework of secularism vs. Hindutva leaves us with a cluster of
immense problems and concerns related to who is debating, what the debate is
about and what the implications are. The players are not identified, the meaning
of the words remains unclear and it not clear what kind of violence is involved.
Too many elementsempirical facts, consequences, implications, etc.remain
What is entirely unclear, however, is where practicing Christianity ends and where conversion
begins. The Christians themselves use all these goods works as an argument in support of the validity of Christianity as a religion in India. They link conversion with positive socio-political evolutions
in the Indian society. But many Hindu Indians see these good works as a cover for the conversion
practices. The Christians, on the other hand, challenge the Hindus to take up such works themselves
in order to liberate the marginalized groups. Thus they support an understanding of conversion as a
mechanism of liberation and empowerment. Questions about the social situation of the dalits and
so-called oppressed groups are raised within this frame of understanding.
17
31
unexplained and unintelligible if one looks at them through the lenses of this
framework. More and more researchers and social scientists are aware of these
limitations and many have started working towards alternative frameworks to
study such facts within the Indian culture.18 This is the research tradition on
which we will build. Considering the current intellectual impasse, it is necessary
to find alternative ways of exploring the puzzles surrounding the question of conversion.
Where Do We Go From Here?
Why convert? is a question many Indians have posed when confronted with
the conversion practices of Christians and Christian missionaries. It is a question
directed at those trying to convert other peoples to Christianity: Why would you
want to do this? Why invest so much energy in doing this? The question is also
directed to those who are converting to this religion: Why would you forsake your
traditions? What would you gain by changing to a foreign tradition? The origin
of these common sense questions, as we will see, lies in sheer incomprehension
and discomfort towards conversion and the way the Christians have gone about
organising and stimulating them.
We will begin our exploration in the next section by analysing some of the
historical landmarks in the debate on conversion. Not in order to give a chronological and informative overview (though the following might also be that), nor
to sketch all the different standpoints that have been put forward (though many
standpoints will indeed be considered). Our story will be a conceptual one with
a twofold aim. On the one hand, we aim to bring the core common concerns or, if
you will, the underlying problems to the fore by weaving together different debates
on conversion in India. We also want to explore what kinds of distortions occur in
this process (distortion of the meaning of words and distortions of cultural experiences).
First of all, there is the groundbreaking work done by S.N. Balagangadhara. See especially Balagangadhara (1994, 2005), Balagangadhara and De Roover (2007), Balagangadhara and Keppens
(2009). Apart from this research tradition, see the insightful work of Ashis Nandy, especially Nandy
(1983, 1985, 1998, 1999). See also some of the works of T.N. Madan and Partha Chatterjee.
18
Chapter 2
Gandhi, Conversion and the Equality

of Religions: More Experiments with Truth
Among other things, Mahatma Gandhi is known for his efforts to cope with
Christian missionaries and their conversion practices. His claims are most frequently invoked in the context of the contemporary debate on religious conversion in India. One cannot read an article in this debate without coming across
this sentence: If I had the power and could legislate, I should certainly stop all
proselytizing (Harijan, May 11, 1935; CW, 67:48). While Gandhi is known for
his pursuit of Hindu-Muslim unity and his respect for Christianity, he also articulated strong reservations against the practice of conversion. In this respect, he
represents many moderate Hindus, who show varying degrees of incomprehension, unease and resentment towards Christian proselytizing.
Gandhis antagonism to conversion has long been familiar to scholars of
religion; yet, little analytical effort has gone into illuminating his perspective.1
Was Gandhi against the exploration and embracing of other religious traditions?
Not at all. Did he oppose all activities of Christian missionaries in India? No, he
even encouraged them to continue their humanitarian work. Did he then reject
the freedom of the individual to change from one religion to another? No, he recognized this freedom. How, then, can we make sense of his objections to religious
conversion?
Gandhis writings on religion have been subject to many interpretations, but these rarely analyze
his viewpoints on conversion. Generally, they focus on his views on the truth and equality of all religions and on the integration of his religion in his public political life: Arnold (2001, 163-185), Baird
(2003, 24-27), Brown (2000, 93-95), Chatterjee (1983), Copley (1993), Gorringe (2003), Jhamb
(2006), Jordens (1987), Oommen (2000), Parel (2006), Seshagiri Rao (1999).
1
34
Chapter 2
2.1. Making Sense of Gandhi

Interpreting Gandhis writings is never an easy task. He said many things and
used many different words to say those things; his vocabulary is often misleading.
Many of his ideas are buried in a porridge of saintly rhetoric, of purity of heart,
as Akeel Bilgrami (2001, 55) puts it. Scholars often connect Gandhis views on
religion to the particulars of his biography (Arnold 2001; Parekh 1997; Tidrick
2006) or they take his words at face value (Seshagiri Rao 1999; Singh and Singh
2004). Only few take up the challenge of explaining the conceptual logic behind
his claims (Bilgrami 2001; Chatterjee 1983; Jordens 1998; Parel 2006).
Yet, any reader of Gandhis writings on religion and conversion confronts
this challenge. These writings consist of ad hoc arguments developed over several
decades and in response to various circumstances. Gandhi uses English-language
terms and ideas in idiosyncratic ways with unusual connotations. Consequently,
one regularly faces prima facie inconsistencies in his claims. For instance, he views
conversion as detestable and fails to understand its rationale, but he also considers
it highly desirable. In one passage, Gandhi states that he regards Christianity as
equally true with his own religion, while he has just announced that he does not
accept the orthodox teaching that Jesus was or is God incarnate in the accepted
sense that he was or is the only son of God (CW, 29:90). The implication is that
the core doctrine of orthodox Christianity is false. We face another paradox, when
Gandhi suggests that one should not intrude on a religion from the outside, but
next tells Christians that they have misunderstood the message of Jesus of Nazareth and should adopt his interpretation of the Bible (CW, 15:159-160).
In spite of such apparent inconsistencies, there is a deeper integrity to Gandhis thought (Bilgrami 2001; Chatterjee 1983; Iyer 1973). This is not visible at
first sight, I would like to suggest, because his use of English-language terms and
concepts is distortive in a particular sense. That is, Gandhi relates notions such as
religion, conversion, faith, truth and equality to each other in unexpected
and unusual ways and thereby distorts their original semantic and conceptual relations.
However, such semantic and conceptual distortions do not occur at random,
but reveal a particular kind of systematicity. Their systematic nature, I propose,
provides a unique access point to the conceptual schemes that lie behind Gandhis
claims and interpretations of English-language terms. Furthermore, these conceptual schemes derive from the background theories of the Indian traditions that
Gandhi, Conversion and the Equality of Religions
35
have shaped his reasoning. Tracking such underlying conceptual schemes, then,
allows one to characterize certain basic structures of these traditions.
This is not to say that Gandhi derived his ideas from western and Indian
philosophy and that one should therefore consult the dual linguistic sources of his
thought (Parel 2000b, 1-3). Rather, the interpretive challenge we face is to uncover the patterns in the semantic distortions in Gandhis use of terms like religion
and conversion and to identify the conceptual logic behind shifts in his ideas.
Once we have circumscribed such patterns, we can begin to develop hypotheses
on the underlying cultural framework expressed in these distortions.
Metaphorically, it helps to think in terms of two layers: at the surface, we
have the layer of Gandhis confusing claims on religion and conversion; underneath this lies a more fundamental conceptual layer that we need to dig up. This
second layer reflects Indian modes of reasoning about the nature of traditions,
the role of reason, changes within and between traditions To a large extent,
Gandhis use of English-language terms is mapped onto the semantic schemes
of this deeper layer. Simultaneously, he adopts typical formulae from Christian
theology and western philosophy. In the surface layer, then, we face a confounding
conceptual blend of East and West (Arnold 2001, 13; Parel 2006, x). Nevertheless, it provides our only access to the deeper layer: we identify the structures of
this layer by theorizing how they are revealed in the semantic distortions of the
surface layer.
If that is the aim, why not move straight to Gandhis writings in Gujarati
and reconstruct this fundamental conceptual framework? It seems more likely
that the systematic nature of his perspective is expressed in his Indian-language
writings. Why travel through his English writings or even translations from Gujarati, when we can directly tap into the original Indian expressions?
The interpreter of Gandhis Gujarati writings confronts an even greater difficulty. The dominant conceptual schemes that we use today to think about issues
of religion have emerged from the western culture and were formulated in European languages. While translating the Gujarati texts, we will inevitably take recourse to these schemes to interpret Gandhis thought on religion and conversion.
We shall then be unaware of the distortion that we as interpreters inflict upon
his thought, because we lack a vantage point to discern such semantic distortions.
In contrast, the English texts provide us with a vantage point that compels us to
recognize the problem of distortion.
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Chapter 2
In this chapter, we will follow this approach to analyze Gandhis writings on

conversion. In the subsequent section, we examine the different contexts in which
he addresses the issue, reveal the difficulties in making sense of his claims and
locate some conceptual confusion. Gradually, one begins to see why the issue of
conversion is of crucial importance to Gandhis thought and actions. In the third
section, we theorize the conceptual framework that is expressed in Gandhis semantic distortions. This leads to new insights into the traditional Indian perspective on religion and the growing opposition to conversion in modern India.
2.2. What does India need: Tradition or conversion?

Before the 1930s and also towards the end of his life, Gandhis ideas on conversion were mainly focused on the Hindu fears about forced conversion by Muslims.
He pointed out that such forced conversions were wrong but also exceptional and
rare: most Muslims did not want to convert the Hindus (see Navajivan September 25, 1921; CW, 24:325; see also CW, 24:341-342). But what preoccupied Gandhi most is the issue of Christian missionaries and conversion. Before the 1920s
he only sporadically addressed this issue and mostly in the context of Christian
mission in India. At a Missionary Conference in Madras (1916), for instance, he
suggested that the Christians have not understood Jesus message of love very
well. He expressed the hope that Christians would continue their humanitarian
work but give up the aim of converting the Indian people. As we will see, this idea
returns very often in Gandhis thoughts.
His understanding of swadeshi was also important in the context of understanding his critique of conversion. In a speech on swadeshi, he pointed out that,
in the context of religion, it meant that one should limit oneself to ones ancestral
religion. The use of ones immediate religious surroundings (i.e. swadeshi in the
context of religion), also entailed the idea that if ones religion is deemed defective, one should purge it of its defects (CW, 15:159-160). People should change
and reform the tradition they belong to. Hinduism was a strong tradition with a
powerful swadeshi spirit underlying it. This, according to Gandhi, explained why
it does not proselytize. Not because it deems itself to be the best of all religions:
By reason of the swadeshi spirit, a Hindu refuses to change his religion not necessarily because he considers it to be the best, but because he knows that he can complement it
by introducing reforms. And what I have said about Hinduism is, I suppose, true of
37
the other great faiths of the world, only it is held that it is specially so in the case
of Hinduism (CW, 15:159; italics mine).
If there is any substance in what I have said, will not the great missionary bodies
of India, to whom she owes a deep debt of gratitude for what they have done and are
doing, do still better and serve the spirit of Christianity better, by dropping the goal of
proselytising but continuing their philanthropic work? I hope you will not consider this
to be an impertinence on my part. I make the suggestion in all sincerity and with due
humility. Moreover, I have some claim upon your attention. I have endeavoured
to study the Bible. I consider it as part of my scriptures. The spirit of the Sermon
on the Mount competes almost on equal terms with the Bhagavad Gita for the
domination of my heart. I yield to no Christian in the strength of devotion with
which I sing, Lead, kindly Light and several other inspired hymns of a similar
nature. I have come under the influence of noted Christian missionaries belonging to different denominations. And I enjoy to this day the privilege of friendship
with some of them. You will perhaps therefore allow that I have offered the above
suggestion not as a biased Hindu but as a humble and impartial student of religion
with great leanings towards Christianity. May it not be that the Go Ye unto All the
World message has been somewhat narrowly interpreted and the spirit of it missed?
It will not be denied, I speak from experience, that many of the conversions are only so
called. In some cases, the appeal has gone not to the heart but to the stomach. And in every
case, a conversion leaves a sore behind it which, I venture to think, is avoidable. Quoting
again from experience, a new birth, a change of heart, is perfectly possible in every one
of the great faiths. I know I am now treading upon thin ice. But I do not apologise, in
closing this part of my subject, for saving that the frightful outrage that is just going on
in Europe, perhaps, shows that the message of Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of Peace, has
been little understood in Europe, and that light upon it may have to be thrown from the
East. (The Hindu, February 28, 1916; CW, 15:159-160; italics mine)
Christians, Gandhi thought, would serve Christianity better if they did not aim
to convert the people they help. Christianity would be a better religion if it understood the Christian message in a different way. Which way? The merit of swadeshi
is something that belongs to all great faiths, hence, also to Christianity. Christianity would do well to learn this concept from the East. The situation of Europe (at
the time of the First World War) was a sign for the need for a reform of Christianity itself. For Gandhi, Hindus are against changing their religion not because they
believe Hinduism is the best religion, but because it is the tradition to which they belong.
If they want to change, they can do so within the confines of Hinduism itself.
What applies to Hinduism, also applies to Christianity. According to Gandhi, Christians had not understood the message of Jesus very well. Otherwise
they would see that new birth and change of heart are things that happen within
38
Chapter 2
a faith. It is not necessary to try to convince others that you are the best; instead,
try to remedy the mistakes within your own tradition and endeavor to improve
your own tradition. Faiths that understand this would not convert or proselytize;
nor would the believers feel the need to convert to another faith. Gandhi seemed
to understand conversion as a process of change of an individual where this individual remains within his tradition, but in a different wayimproving the tradition by purifying it of its elements that are no longer good.
In this emphasis on swadeshi, we note a first aspect where Gandhis reasoning clashes explicitly with the classical western perspective. To illustrate this with
the example of John Locke: given the fact that there is but one truth, one way
to heaven, it would be absurd to ask men to resign themselves to the religion
which either ignorance, ambition, or superstition had chanced to establish in the
countries where they were born. The consequence would be that one country
alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation
of following their princes in the ways that lead to destruction; and that which
heightens the absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity, men would owe
their eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity (Locke 1689, 1315). Yet, Gandhi not only argued that the best stance in religion is to make use of
ones immediate religious surroundings, but also advised Christians to adopt this
stance. This is to subordinate religion to the accidents of birth and geography.
After 1920, Gandhi took up the issue of Christian conversion more frequently. In 1925, he repeated a concern similar to that voiced at the Missionary
Conference of 1916, but in a different context. In the Notes on his travels through
Bihar (published in Young India, October 8, 1925), he recounted his experiences
and encounters with the tribe of the Mundas and, more specifically, with the work
of both missionaries and Hindu workers amongst them. While praising the valuable work that the Christian missionaries have undertaken for generations, he
added the following: in my humble opinion, their work suffers because at the end
of it they expect conversion of these simple people to Christianity...How very nice
it would be if the missionaries rendered humanitarian service without the ulterior
aim of conversion! (CW, 33:63-64).
This attitude blended seamlessly with Gandhis views on conversion and
his ideas of change and reform within a religion or faith or tradition: reform and
change should make the religion more morally praiseworthy and it has to come
from within. There is no need for the Hindu to tell the Christian how the latter
should improve. In other words, from Gandhis point of view, the weakness of
39
Christianity was that, through humanitarian service, it ultimately aimed to convert people from other traditions and faiths.
This mode of reasoning raises an interesting question: does this imply that
religious conversion becomes acceptable if there is a concomitant moral uplifting
of the individual? Gandhi allowed for such a possibility, even though he was not
convinced that conversion to Christianity actually brought this about. Talking
about people classified by the Government as scheduled tribes, he warned the
Hindus (Navajivan, April 18, 1926) that these people attracted a lot of attention from the missionaries and asked how can we blame the missionaries, if the
Hindus take no interest in the Bhils? For to them anyone who is brought into the
Christian fold, no matter how, has become a Christian, has entered a new life and
become civilized. If, as a result of such conversion, the converts rise spiritually or
morally, I personally would have nothing to say against their conversion. But I do
not think that this is what happens (CW, 35:91-92).
Abstractly speaking, the possibility of converting to another faith or religion
was an ever present possibility to an individual. However, taking recourse to this
required that reform and change within ones own tradition had become impossible. In that case, it appeared that even mass conversions were to be allowed, if
it transpired that some or another religion was incapable of reform and change
from within. This was only one implication. The second one, which constituted a
recurrent theme in Gandhis thought that we will meet again, had to do with the
reasons for reform, change and/or conversion: they should be strictly moral considerations.
Amongst other things, Gandhi saw religions also as sets of moral guidelines;
a religious person was a moral person. Change, reform and conversion could be
motivated and justified only in so far as they made an individual a better moral
person. That is to say, an improvement in the moral status of an individual was
the only justifiable reason for a religious conversion. In so far as all great religions
in the world were bearers of excellent guidelines, and in so far as they were capable
of internal improvements of their own guidelines, religious conversion was both
unnecessary and divisive.
The question of the ultimate aim of missionary service retained its appeal to
Gandhi and he repeated some of his main points in Why I am a Hindu (Young India,
October 20, 1927). In response to the request of an American friend to compare
Hinduism with the teachings of Christ, he began by expressing his regret about
the fact that missionaries in India, because they aimed to convert, had generated
40
Chapter 2
suspicion instead of respect. He pointed out that faith is not something that can
be transmitted by telling or trying to persuade others. Hence, it was impossible to
compare Christianity with Hinduism at this level. In other words, if we want to
talk about Hinduism, we must do so along completely different lines than those we use to
talk about the Christian religion. This is how Gandhi began this discussion:
I have ventured at several missionary meetings to tell English and American missionaries that if they could have refrained from telling India about Christ and
had merely lived the life enjoined upon them by the Sermon on the Mount, India
instead of suspecting them would have appreciated their living in the midst of
her children and directly profited by their presence. Holding this view, I can tell
American friends nothing about Hinduism by way of return. I do not believe in
people telling others of their faith, especially with a view to conversion. Faith does not
admit of telling. It has to be lived and then it becomes self-propagating. (CW,
40:290; italics mine)
Here, we have to go deeper. Naturally, the Christian missionaries would also argue
that it is important to embody the message of Jesus Christ and emulate him in
ones own life; however, they cannot limit themselves to this, since they also have
to spread the message of the Gospel. Just by living in a particular way, they could
never transmit the propositional content of Christianity. From the behavior of
the missionary alone, one could never derive that we are all sinners, that God is
the Trinity or that we should surrender to the promise of grace in Christ. Since
biblical religion revolves around the truth of its doctrines about God, humanity
and salvation, one is compelled to transmit this doctrinal content and tell others
about Christ and the promise of grace. Gandhi, in contrast, suggested that it does
not make sense to tell others about ones faith in this way. From the perspective
where propositional content and doctrinal truth are important to religion, his
claim that faith does not admit of telling is flatly counterintuitive.
When Gandhi tried to convey the core of Hinduism, the main referencepoint was the role of heredity: he was born into a Hindu family and therefore
remained Hindu. The other primary reference points were the moral sense and
spiritual growth. If Hinduism could help one develop morally and if it could
stimulate spiritual growth, there were no reasons to leave this religion. Another remarkable characteristic was that other faiths were not viewed as rivals over
truth, but could be admired. One could even assimilate what is good in the other
faiths into ones own:
41
Believing as I do in the influence of heredity, being born in a Hindu family, I have

remained a Hindu. I should reject it, if I found it inconsistent with my moral sense or
my spiritual growth. On examination, I have found it to be the most tolerant of all
religions known to me. Its freedom from dogma makes a forcible appeal to me
inasmuch as it gives the votary the largest scope for self-expression. Not being an
exclusive religion, it enables the followers of that faith not merely to respect all the other
religions, but it also enables them to admire and assimilate whatever may be good in the
other faiths. Nonviolence is common to all religions, but it has found the highest expression and application in Hinduism. (I do not regard Jainism or Buddhism as separate
from Hinduism.) Hinduism believes in the oneness not of merely all human life
but in the oneness of all that lives. Its worship of the cow is, in my opinion, its
unique contribution to the evolution of humanitarianism. It is a practical application of the belief in the oneness and, therefore, sacredness of all life. The great
belief in transmigration is a direct consequence of that belief. Finally the discovery
of the law of varnashrama is a magnificent result of the ceaseless search for truth.
(CW, 40:290-291; italics mine).
Again, Gandhis characterization of Hinduism conflicts with the general understanding of religions or faiths as systems of beliefs. Such belief systems consist of
sets of teachings or propositions that must be minimally coherent and consistent
in order to make sense. While one can imagine that a few teachings of one religion can be adopted by another religion, there is a limit to such a process, because
of the requirement of basic consistency. Gandhi, however, assumed that one faith,
Hinduism, could assimilate whatever it finds good in others. He showed no worries about the coherence of the teachings of such religions.
At the same time, however, Gandhi also adopted the modern western understanding of religions as belief systems, because he characterized Hinduism in
terms of the beliefs in the oneness of all that lives, the transmigration of souls
and the law of varnashrama. If Hinduism is constituted by such beliefs, it cannot
just assimilate any and all valuable teachings of other religions. For instance, the
orthodox Christian teachings on the human soul as a unique spiritual core that
each human individual possesses (in contrast to all other animals) stand in contradiction to any belief in the oneness of all that lives or the transmigration of souls.
So, here we see how Gandhis reasoning on Hinduism and other faiths
revealed a confusing conceptual blend. On the one hand, he adopted the typical
western conception of Hinduism and religion as belief systems or sets of doctrines
or propositions. On the other hand, he discussed faiths in general and Hinduism in particular in a way that indicates that he did not view them as doctrines or
belief systems at all.
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Chapter 2
The same problem reappears if we read the above two citations in conjunction with each other. On the one hand, Gandhi suggests that religion has to do
with moral guidelines. If that is all there is to being a religion, then, sooner or later,
there could be but one religion: a religion that embodies or teaches all the excellent moral guidelines that humankind has discovered so far. In that case, there is
no point or purpose in either defending the existence right of some religion or another or in wanting to distinguish one religion from another: after all, if all that is
to religion is a moral guideline, what does it matter which religion embodies it? In
such a case, there should be no objections to conversion: by definition, a religion
with the most comprehensive moral guideline would attract people as its followers. Furthermore, it should be possible not only to specify these moral guidelines
in some natural language or another but also to judge which of the proposed moral guidelines is more comprehensive than the other. That is to say, one can propose
(even if it is with some difficulty) which of all the religions of the humankind is
the best: that which has the most comprehensive moral guideline. In one sense,
Gandhi does seem to suggest this when he speaks about Hinduism as the religion
where the principle of nonviolence has found its highest expression.
On the other hand, he seems to deny that moral guidelines is all there is to
being a religion. After all, as he puts it, faith does not admit of telling. It does
not admit of telling because, he seems to suggest, faith has something to do with
how one lives: having a faith is to live in a particular way. The only thing that
does not admit of telling is a specific human experience: one can talk about ones
experience and, perhaps, even communicate it partially but no description can
exhaust the nature or quality of ones lived experience. Having faith, then, is to
live in such a way that one has a particular kind of experience that is only partially
communicable. Yet, this experience makes one grow morally and spiritually. In
other words, having religion and living such a religion is to have a specific kind of
experience which makes that particular human being grow morally and spiritually. It is in this sense that religions are different from each other. Here, as it must
be obvious, the notion of moral and spiritual growth is unclear, ill-defined and
nebulous in nature and religion becomes fundamentally an individual experience.
Shuddhi, Tabligh and Proselytization
In the period between 1924 and 1927, Gandhi often tackled the issue of conversion in relation to the concepts of shuddhi, tabligh and proselytization. Two
43
elements were remarkable in his way of dealing with the issue: (1) in each of the
respective traditions, these practices were uncalled forand Gandhi also gave
arguments why; (2) even though it is his firm opinion that they were unnecessary,
he would never endeavor to ban these or prevent those who promote these from
doing so. In an article in Young India on Hindu-Muslim Tension: Its Cause and
Cure (May 29, 1924), he pointed out that for a Hindu all religions are more or
less true and all are equally imperfect:
That, however, which is keeping up the tension is the manner in which the shuddhi or conversion movement is being conducted. In my opinion, there is no such
thing as proselytism in Hinduism as it is understood in Christianity or to a lesser extent in Islam. The Arya Samaj has, I think, copied the Christians in planning its
propaganda. The modern method does not appeal to me. It has done more harm
than good. Though regarded as a matter of the heart purely and one between the
Maker and oneself, it has degenerated into an appeal to the selfish instinct. The
Arya Samaj preacher is never so happy as when he is reviling other religions. My
Hindu instinct tells me that all religions are more or less true. All proceed from the same
God, but all are imperfect because they have come down to us through imperfect human
instrumentality. The real shuddhi movement should consist in each one trying to arrive
at perfection in his or her own faith. In such a plan character would be the only test.
What is the use of crossing from one compartment to another, if it does not mean a moral
rise? (CW, 28:56; italics mine)
The reference point for religion, so we learn, is not the unique truth that one particular religion possesses. In fact, all religions are more or less true. If all religions are
more or less the same with respect to truth, truth cannot be a reason to change
from one religion to another. In contrast, conversion is commonly seen today as a
change from one religion to another, because one has come to believe in the latter as true and rejects the former as false. While Gandhi clearly rejected any such
notion of conversion, this did not exclude the idea that within a religion greater
perfection can be reached, both individually or collectively. But the basis of such a
change was the human character. In this sense, reform or conversion was a process
in which the individual achieves a greater perfection. What kind of perfection?
Some kind of moral and spiritual perfection. The reference point for religion was
morality (and, in some sense, spirituality), not truth. Shuddhi, then, was trying to
arrive at such perfection.
The average Christian would agree that morality is central to religion, but
the difference is that morality is also seen as the expression of holding correct
moral principles and teachings. In this sense, morality is derivative from the truth
44
Chapter 2
of ones moral principles, from the truth of one religion. On the contrary, Gandhi
did not allow for such a link between morality and the truth of propositions or
moral principles. The falsities that may be present in all religions, because of imperfect human instrumentality did not in any way prevent one to arrive at moral
perfection within ones own faith.
Gandhis suspicion of the practice of conversion also surfaced in his Speech
at Sholapur (Young India, March 10, 1927):
As I said at Nasik, I fail to understand the shuddhi, tabligh and proselytization
as they are carried on today. I cannot understand a man changing the religion of his
forefathers at the instance of another. But that is my personal conviction. No one
need stop shuddhi, tabligh or proselytization at my instance. My own duty is clear.
I must go on purifying myself and hoping that only thereby would I react on my
surroundings. It is my unshakable conviction that penance and self-purification
are the only means for the protection of Hinduism. Do any amount of sangathan,
only let not that sangathan be of the evil forces, let it be only of the forces of
good (CW, 38:144; italics mine)
The possibility of converting to another religion was not completely banned

from Gandhis thought. In fact, he left space for such practices. However, he also
stressed that he could not understand their rationale. But he would never consider
banning them. This attitude seemed to be closely related to his idea that reform
had to take place within a tradition, but this did not exclude the idea that different
people within one tradition can have different takes on the kind of reform that
the tradition needs.
The same point became clearer in the thoughts taken from his Notes on
the Shraddhanand Memorial (1927). During the nineteenth century, the Arya
Samaj, a major Hindu reform movement, had transformed traditional shuddhi or
purification rituals into a proselytizing practice, where untouchables and others
were re-converted into Hinduism so as to undo or avoid conversions to Christianity and Islam. Swami Shraddhananda had been a key figure in this shuddhi
movement in the 1920s, and in 1926 he was killed by a Muslim. The Hindu Mahasabha, an early Hindu nationalist organization, had started collecting money
to continue Shraddhanandas works, especially his promotion of shuddhi. While
accepting that some Hindus might see in this a way to reform Hinduism for the
better, Gandhi uttered his reservations about this route:
For my own part I still remain unconvinced about the necessity of the shuddhi
movement, taking shuddhi in the sense it is generally understood. Shuddhi of sin-
45
ners is a perpetual inward performance. Shuddhi of those who can be identified

neither as Hindus nor as Mussalmans or who have been recently declared converts
but who do not know even the meaning of conversion and who want to be known
definitely as Hindus is not conversion but prayaschitta or penance.
The third aspect of shuddhi is conversion properly so called. And I question
its use in this age of growing toleration and enlightenment. I am against conversion
whether it is known as shuddhi by Hindus, tabligh by Mussalmans or proselytizing by
Christians. Conversion is a heart-process known only to and by God. It must be left to
itself. But this is no place for airing my views on conversion. Those who believe
in it have a perfect right to follow their own course without let or hindrance, so
long as it is kept within proper limits, i.e., so long as there is no force or fraud or
material inducement and so long as the parties are free agents and of mature age
and understanding. (CW, 38:16; italics mine)
When Gandhi suggests that shuddhi of sinners is a perpetual inward performance,

the Christian may agree that genuine conversion is the inward turn of the sinner
towards the true God and his gradual surrender to this biblical Gods will and His
promise of grace. However, the difference here is that Gandhi did not view conversion as the turn towards the one true God. That is, one does not have to accept
the account of the biblical God as the sovereign creator of the universe, whose
will is law. In the Christian view, however, accepting this God as the true God
is the precondition of any process of conversion. In this sense, Gandhis internal
conversion and the Christian internal conversion are very different. Yet, Gandhi
also sounded like a pious Christian, because he borrowed theological formulae
like conversion is a heart-process known only to and by God.
Tradition and Conversion
What other predicates did Gandhi attach to the phenomenon of conversion and
what does this teach us about processes of change or reform in India? In a talk
For Christian Indians printed in Young India (August 20, 1925), Gandhi elaborated on the disruptive nature of conversion. On his wanderings throughout India, he recounted, he had often met Christian Indians almost ashamed of their
birth, certainly of their ancestral religion, and of their ancestral dress. Gandhi
pointed out a conflict between what conversion should do and what it actually
did in India: Conversion must not mean denationalization. Conversion should
mean a definite giving up of the evil of the old, adoption of all the good of the
new and a scrupulous avoidance of everything evil in the new (CW, 32:316-317).
46
Chapter 2
By discarding their mother tongue, many Christian Indians cut themselves off
from their nation. The central problem is that they started to behave very differently: drink liquor, eat meat and renounce their birth, ancestral religion and
dress. They rejected their customary ways of doing things and the customs of
their fellow countrymen. Gandhi would understand such a move, only if the new
practices were morally superior to the old, but this was not the case. According
to him, true conversion could never entail such violent change, for it entailed a
life of greater dedication to ones own country, greater surrender to God, greater
self-purification (ibid.). Ideally, this must take place within the confines of ones
own tradition. Conversion happened within ones ancestral tradition: it is how
the tradition was reformed, how it retained its vibrancy and how it also improved
itself. In other words, if we follow Gandhis way of reasoning here, conversion was
vital to the survival of a tradition.
That Gandhi was very much against conversion from one religion to another,
however, surfaced also in his personal correspondence. In a letter (1926) to his son,
Manilal Gandhi, in which he expressed his regret over his sons plans to marry a
Muslim girl, he pointed out that if his son would stick to Hinduism and the girl
to Islam, it would be like putting two swords in one sheath, or they both might
lose their faith. Faith is not a thing like a garment which can be changed to suit
our convenience. For the sake of dharma a person shall forego matrimony, forsake
his home, why, even lay down his life; but for nothing may faith be given up
(CW, 35:11). Similarly, in 1930, he countered the news that Miss Slade (known
as Mirabai, one of Gandhis immediate followers) had converted to Hinduism in
the ashram. It is surprising to see how vehemently he reacted against these reports
(Young India, February 20, 1930). Under the title No Conversion Permissible he
said:
The English Press cuttings contain among many delightful items the news that Miss
Slade known in the Ashram as Mirabai has embraced Hinduism. I may say that she
has not. I hope that she is a better Christian than when four years ago she came to the
Ashram. She is not a girl of tender age. She is past thirty and has travelled all alone in
Egypt, Persia and Europe befriending trees and animals. I have had the privilege of
having under me Mussalman, Parsi and Christian minors. Never was Hinduism put
before them for their acceptance. They were encouraged and induced to respect and read
their own scriptures. It is with pleasure that I can recall instances of men and women,
boys and girls having been induced to know and love their faiths better than they did
before if they were also encouraged to study the other faiths with sympathy and respect.
We have in the Ashram today several faiths represented. NO proselytizing is practised or
47
permitted. We recognize that all these faiths are true and divinely inspired, and all have
suffered through the necessarily imperfect handling of imperfect men. (CW, 48:334, italics mine)
The Famous Discussion on Fellowship

In 1928, Gandhi was involved in a series of debates on the fundamental objective
of the fellowship and, in this context, one of his famous discussions on conversion occurred (Young India, January 19, 1928). Issues such as the tolerations of
religions, suspicion towards other religions, and exclusion of false religion were
tackled. The result, among other things, was one of Gandhis very frequently cited
claims on the relation between Hindus, Muslims and Christians and the role of
conversion:
In order to attain a perfect fellowship, every act of its members must be a religious
act and an act of sacrifice. I came to the conclusion long ago, after prayerful search
and study and discussion with as many people as I could meet, that all religions
were true and also that all had some error in them, and that whilst I hold by my
own, I should hold others as dear as Hinduism, from which it logically follows
that we should hold all as dear as our nearest kith and kin and that we should
make no distinction between them. So we can only pray, if we are Hindus, not that
a Christian should become a Hindu, or if we are mussalmans, not that a Hindu
or a Christian should become a Mussalman, nor should we even secretly pray that
anyone should be converted, but our inmost prayer should be that a Hindu should
be a better Hindu, a Muslim a better Muslim and a Christian a better Christian...
If however there is any suspicion in your minds that only one religion can be true and
others false, you must reject the doctrine of fellowship placed before you. Then we would
have a continuous process of exclusion and found our fellowship on an exclusive basis.
(CW, 41:112; italics mine)
Underlying this understanding of conversion was a particular understanding of

religion, faith or tradition. Most significant was Gandhis approach to the
question of religion and truth: all religions are true and all also have some errors
in them. Later, he elaborated on this: By a true faith I mean one the sum total
of whose energy is for the good of its adherents, by a false I mean that which is
predominantly false. If you, therefore, feel that the sum total of Hinduism has
been bad for the Hindus and the world, you must reject it as a false faith (CW,
41:113).
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Chapter 2
In opposition to the ideas of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, there is not

just one true and revealed religion as opposed to many false corruptions of the
true religion, but all religions are true and all have falsity. From this he derived that
it is best to follow ones own religionmeaning the one in which one is born and
raisedbut at the same time hold the others as dear and close. Hence, conversion
from one religion to another had no place at all in this understanding. The notion
of fellowship discussed here, stood or fell with the acceptance of the fact that religions are all true and have elements of falsity. If one believed that only one religion
can be true and the others are false, fellowship would be untenable.
At first blush, this view of religion and truth harbours a basic inconsistency. If all religions are true, for instance, Christian, Islamic and Hindu teachings
would have to be true at the same time. This claim then entails that one religious
doctrine, which claims that God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit and that Jesus
Christ is the son of God, should be compatible with another, which asserts that
God is one and cannot have a son who is both divine and human. Or it compels
us to accept that, after death, each human soul has an eternal life in heaven or hell
and also to believe in the transmigration of souls. Such a position condemns one
to inconsistency. One could propose that Gandhi had another conception of truth
in mind, rather than semantic or cognitive truth. Indeed, it must be the case that
he does not intend to speak of truth as a property of sentences or propositions.
But in the above passage he appeared to vacillate between different senses of
truth. When he said that he had come to the conclusion that all religions were
true and also that all had some error in them, the predicate true must mean a
different thing than when he refers to the belief that only one religion can be true
and others false. This last sentence reflected the orthodox position of Christianity
and Islam and, here, truth does also refer to the truth of doctrines or propositions.
Yet, Gandhi nowhere distinguishes between these two conceptions of truth. Consequently, at the surface level, Gandhis discussion of religion and truth became
extremely confusing.
In the account of the fellowship-discussion in Young India, it was recounted
how Gandhis emphasis on the idea that one should not even secretly hope to
convert members of another faith to ones own gave rise to a general discussion
on conversion. This compelled Gandhi to voice his ideas on the issue even more
clearly: I would not only not try to convert but would not even secretly pray that
anyone should embrace my faith. My prayer would always be that Imam Saheb
should be a better Mussalman, or become the best he can. Hinduism with its mes-
49
sage of ahimsa is to me the most glorious religion in the worldas my wife to me

is the most beautiful woman in the worldbut others may feel the same about
their own religion (CW, 41:113). The analogy in this passage revealed another
aspect of Gandhis position: he described his judgment that Hinduism is the most
glorious religion in the world as a subjective assessment similar to ones conviction
that ones own wife is the most beautiful woman in the world. If others judged
their religion to be the most glorious one, this must be the same type of subjective
sentiment. However, the claim that ones own religion is the most glorious one,
because it is the truth as revealed by the biblical God, is not this type of assessment. Truth here is independent of what human beings may believe to be the case,
since it is not a human assessment, but Gods own revelation that makes a religion
true. From this perspective, others may believe that their own religion is the most
glorious one, but then they are simply wrong.
However, Gandhi added that his view does not exclude the possibility of
true conversion. It is still possible that for some people moral growth will come
through converting to another faith. The reference points for such conversion are
the moral and spiritual benefits for an individual (ibid.).
As the discussion on conversion and fellowship continued on the subsequent day, Gandhi was asked the following question: Would you have a ruling
of such a character that those who had a desire to convert should not be eligible
for membership? Gandhis answer remains alive today: Personally, I think they
should not be eligible. I should have framed a resolution to that effect as I regard
it as the logical outcome of fellowship. It is essential for inter-religious relationship and contact (CW, 41:113-114).
Many have interpreted this answer as an expression of the support that Gandhis views provide to anti-conversion laws. However, this is doubtful. Following
Gandhis train of thought on conversion in the preceding pages, we observed that
his attitude is much richer and less rigid. He would, for instance, never give up
the possibility of true conversion to another religion, in cases where this allows
the individual to grow morally and spiritually. Even though it would be better for
this to take place within the confines of ones own religion or faith, it is possible
that some may find it only in another faith. Of course, this does not take away the
significance of the above answer. At the very least, we have to accept hat Gandhi
identified a certain attitude towards faith or religion as a threat to the further development of fellowship in India. This problematic attitude buttressed the practice
of conversion, which approached one religion as true and all others as false.
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Chapter 2
In the rest of the discussion, the importance of the underlying idea that all
religions are true became even more striking (CW, 41:114). The question was
raised as to why preaching in religious matters was not similar to preaching theories about an economic order or preaching specific laws regarding health. The crux
of Gandhis answer was the element of truth: If there were different but good
and true health laws for different communities, I should hesitate to preach some
as true and some as false. I am positive that, with people not prepared to tolerate one anothers religious belief, there can be no international fellowship (CW,
41:114). Later, he elaborated on this distinction between spreading spirituality
and spreading natural knowledge such as medicine: But if in matters of medicine
and other natural sciences, I feel my superiority over others, a thing of which I
may be legitimately conscious, and if I have love for my fellow beings, I would
naturally share my knowledge with them. But things of the spirit I leave to God
and thus keep the bond between fellow beings and myself pure, correct and within
limits (CW, 41:310).
This comparison with the natural sciences both clarified and confounded
Gandhis standpoint. The clarification lay in the suggestion that the natural sciences possess criteria to assess the cognitive superiority of one theory over another. Therefore, we could justify spreading particular theories as scientific truth.
However, in religion or things of the spirit, we do not possess any such criteria.
This was also confounding, because it depended on Gandhis idiosyncratic senses
of religion and truth, which were not shared by his dialogue partners. This
became clear in another context, when the American missionary E. Stanley Jones
wrote an open letter to Gandhi on the issue of conversion. Jones pointed out that
religious truth, like scientific truth, was by its very nature universal and reproached
Gandhi for denying the Christians the right to share the truth of Christ with
others (Kim 2003, 28). Once we switch to Jones standpoint, we see how puzzling
the equivocation between different senses of truth was. To this missionary, there
were criteria to determine which religion is universally true and, therefore, superior to other religions.
A few months later, Gandhi returned to some of the same points. He said
he would maintain his claim that all religions were true more or less and that all
were necessarily imperfect (CW, 41:310). Responding to questions, he explained
where the missionary effort went wrong according to him: At the root of missionary effort is also the assumption that ones own belief is true not only for
oneself but for all the world; whereas the truth is that God reaches us through
51
millions of ways not understood by us (ibid.). Here, Gandhis blending of several

notions of truth created more problems. When a belief is true, this entails that it is
true for all of humanity, even though many may not believe in its truth. The truth
of, say, the belief that the earth revolves around the sun is independent of whatever
any section of humanity may believe to be the case. One could defend a relativistic
conception of truth, but Gandhi was not a relativist. When the Christian missionary speaks of truth, he has an even stronger sense in mind: it is the truth of
the biblical Gods revelation, which is independent of any human knowledge. This
truth claim is certainly universal. So, the missionary does not just assume that his
own belief is true for all of humanity, but takes the only consistent position when
one believes a doctrine to be Gods revelation of His will. It may be the case that
God reaches us through millions of ways not understood by us, but this is irrelevant to the universal character of this truth claim.
The role of foreign missionaries in India continued to haunt Gandhi. In
1931, when Gandhi was interviewed by The Hindu about the role of foreign missionaries in the independent India of the future, the newspaper reported that he
would ask missionaries to withdraw if they engaged in proselytizing by means of
medical aid and education. His arguments were clear: Every nations religion is as
good as any other. Certainly Indias religions are adequate for her people. We need
no converting spiritually (CW, 45:320). In 1931, Gandhi expressed his anger in
Young India (April 23, 1931) because the press had twisted his words related to
this issue. He expresses his hurt by saying that he has been voicing his concern
time and again, but apparently without much success. This is what a reporter has
put into my mouth, Gandhi said: If instead of confining themselves to humanitarian work and material service to the poor, they do proselytization by means of
medical aid, education, etc., then I would certainly ask them to withdraw. Every
nations religion is as good as any other. Certainly Indias religions are adequate for
her people. We need no converting spiritually (CW, 51:413). He lamented that he
had given so many interviews but couldnt recall saying any such thing. Then he
retouched the statement as it should have been reported: If instead of confining
themselves purely to humanitarian work such as education, medical services to the
poor and the like, they would use these activities of theirs for the purpose of proselytizing, I would certainly like them to withdraw. Every nation considers its own
faith to be as good as that of any other. Certainly the great faiths held by the people
of India are adequate for her people. India stands in no need of conversion from one
faith to another (CW, 51:413-414; italics mine to emphasize the differences).
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Chapter 2
If we compare the twisted statement with Gandhis correction, we observe

that, apart from a softening of the tone (ask them to withdraw as against like
them to withdraw; every nations religion is as good as any other compared to
every nation considers its own faith to be as good as that of any other; Indias
religions as against the great faiths held by the people of India), the last sentence is important. The issue is not that we need no converting spiritually; in
fact Gandhi wanted spiritual conversion, but whether India stands in no need of
conversion from one faith to another. This last sentence particularly must have
troubled Gandhi. His project as a whole was a call for spiritual reform and conversion within the confines of the traditions of India. The aim of conversion was
moral growth of the individual. Underlying this was the idea that all religions
contained truths and errors.
In October of the same year, Gandhi felt the need to clarify his position
once again, in order to halt all misinterpretations of his ideas. In a speech at a conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland, October 1931, he
repeated that he did not want to ban proselytism: Any suggestion that I should
want legislation to prohibit missionary enterprise or to interfere with the beliefs
of other people is unthinkable (CW, 53:469).
Untouchability, Satyagraha and the Conversion of Hinduism
Gandhi often used conversion in a distinct way and with a quite different meaning than is usual. It is remarkable, for instance, that he saw his political project,
the idea of swaraj, the attitude of non-co-operation and satyagraha as intimately
linked to a process of conversion. The conversions of the truth seekers, of the
Englishmen, and ultimately of India were all dependent on a process of inner conversion or reform. The leaders and people of India themselves, as Gandhi pointed
out, had to go through the process of conversion in order to bring about the necessary change that India needs. As he formulated it at different occasions: Nonco-operation is a process of conversion and we have to convert by our model conduct
even Britishers like Sir Robert Watson-Smythe (CW, 26:308; italics mine). Let
it be remembered that satyagraha is a most powerful process of conversion. It is an
appeal to the heart (CW, 27:285; italics mine). ...a successful khaddar programme
necessarily means the conversion of Englishmen themselves into nationalists, or, at
least, impartial spectators of the Indian movement. They will no longer succeed in
holding India under subjection for the purpose of her exploitation (CW, 28:125;
53
italics mine). To say that I threw the educated class overboard at any time is to
misunderstand me. Does a reformer ever throw anybody overboard? He simply
invites people to join him in a particular reform. He begins with his own conversion.
In other words, he isolates himself from society and remains in that condition till
society sees the virtue of reform, and it is not the fault of the society if its heart
or head cannot understand or appreciate a particular reform. There is obviously
something wanting in the reform or the reformer if he does not get the members
of the society to which he belongs to take up his reform (CW, 33:99-100; italics
mine). I agree also that swaraj is nearer than many may think. The whole thing
resolves itself into conversion of the educated classes. This is bound to happen if some
of us remain true as I know we will (CW, 34:384; italics mine). The method of
non-co-operation is a method of conversion of Englishmen to thinking in terms of
India. If they will respond to our dearest aspirations; if they will make common
cause with us and wear khaddar; co-operate with us in making India dry and
reducing the frightful military expenditure and are prepared to remain in India
not on the strength of their bayonets but on that of our goodwill; will they not be
welcome co-workers in common cause (CW, 34:411-412; italics mine)?
In his Speech at Nagercoil (Young India October 20, 1927) he voiced the
idea of satyagraha as a process of conversion very eloquently:
A satyagrahi therefore expects to conquer his opponents or his so-called enemies not
by violent force but by force of love, by process of conversion. His methods will be
always gentle and gentlemanly. He will never exaggerate. And since non-violence is otherwise known as love it has no weapon but that of self-suffering.
And above all, in a movement like that of the removal of untouchability which
in my opinion is essentially religious and one of self-purification, there is no
room for hate, no room for haste, no room for thoughtlessness and no room
for exaggeration. Since satyagraha is one of the most powerful methods of
direct action, a satyagrahi exhausts all other means before he resorts to satyagraha. (CW, 40:223; italics mine)
And in 1930, in a letter to Lord Irwin, he spoke about the ambition to convert
the British through non-violence: I know that in embarking on non-violence I
shall be running what might fairly be termed a mad risk. But the victories of truth
have never been won without risks, often of the gravest character. Conversion
of a nation that has consciously or unconsciously preyed upon another, far more
numerous, far more ancient and no less cultured than itself, is worth any amount
of risk. I have deliberately used the word conversion. For my ambition is no less
54
Chapter 2
than to convert the British people through nonviolence, and thus make them see
the wrong they have done to India (CW, 48:365-366).
It might look as though Gandhi used the word conversion not to speak of
religious conversion but of moral conversion. However, quite apart from the
foregoing considerations that suggest one dovetails with the other in Gandhis
thoughts, it is especially in the context of the struggle of the untouchables that the
role of this term in Gandhis discourse becomes clearer. In this context, Gandhi
used the term conversion in roughly two distinct ways. (a) Conversion to another
religion as a way of escaping untouchability and (b) conversion as the process
Hinduism and caste Hindus (savarnas)2 have to go through in order to uplift this
faith by making it better and abolishing the practice of untouchability.
(a) First, he focused on a danger in conversion: if poor people think they
will ameliorate their situation by converting to Islam or to Christianity, they are
utterly wrong. The untouchables might think that conversion is going to improve
their situation, but this will not happen, because untouchability is not caused by
Hinduism: The second [course open to the down-trodden member of the nation]
is rejection of Hinduism and wholesale conversion to Islam or Christianity. And if a
change of religion could be justified for worldly betterment, I would advise it without
hesitation. But religion is a matter of the heart. No physical inconvenience can warrant
abandoment [sic] of ones own religion. If the inhuman treatment of the Panchamas
were a part of Hinduism, its rejection would be a paramount duty both for them
and for those like me who would not make a fetish even of religion and condone
every evil in its sacred name. But I believe that untouchability is no part of Hinduism. It is rather its excrescence to be removed by every effort. And there is quite an
army of Hindu reformers who have set their heart upon ridding Hinduism of this
blot. Conversion, therefore, I hold, is no remedy whatsoever (Young India October
27, 1920; CW, 21:388; italics mine). In a speech published in Young India in 1925,
he also warned of this danger. If the unapproachables, he said, lost their faith
in satyagraha, it was not because it is not working, but because of the ignorance
of its working. The unapproachables may force their way by engaging in a free
fight with the superstitious savarnas, he added, but this will not reform Hinduism.
Equally, some of them seem to be seeking refuge in Christianity but this too will
not solve any problem:
2
Savarna Hindus or savarnas is used in Gandhis work to refer to the Hindus with varna, that is,
the Hindus who are a part of the caste system. Most often, it is used as a reference to the higher
castes of Hindu society.
55
But I am further told that some of them even threaten to seek shelter in Christianity, Islam or Buddhism if relief is not coming soon. Those who use the threat
do not, in my humble opinion, know the meaning of religion. Religion is a matter
of life and death. A man does not change religion as he changes his garments.
He takes it with him beyond the grave. Nor does a man profess his religion to
oblige others. He professes a religion because he cannot do otherwise. A faithful
husband loves his wife as he would love no other woman. Even her faithlessness
would not wean him from his faith. The bond is more than blood-relationship. So
is the religious bond if it is worth anything. It is a matter of the heart. An untouchable who lives his Hinduism in the face of persecution at the hands of those Hindus who
arrogate to themselves a superior status is a better Hindu than the self-styled superior
Hindu who, by the very act of claiming superiority, denies his Hinduism. Therefore,
those who threaten to renounce Hinduism are, in my opinion, betraying their faith.
(CW, 31:427; italics mine)
What surfaces here is the idea that Hindus converting to another faith is a kind of
betrayal. To understand this, we need to keep Gandhis notion of swadeshi and its
meaning in a religious context in mind. If there is something wrong with the faith
one belongs to, if it has produced a negative or wrong by-product, this should be
fought from within the tradition itself. Only this can make the tradition survive.
In an interview taken by Dr. John Mott, the long-serving leader of the
YMCA and World Student Christian Federation, Gandhi answered questions
about the relation between his aim to ameliorate the condition of the untouchables and the aim of Christian missionaries to do the same (Young India, March
21, 1929). He explained that he distrusted these Christian mass movements:
They have as their object not the upliftment of the untouchables but their ultimate conversion. This motive of mass proselytization lurking at the back in my
opinion vitiates missionary effort (CW, 45:145). On the interviewers insistence
that many believe that such a conversion would transform the lives of the untouchables for the better, Gandhi stated that he has been unable to discover any
tangible evidence to confirm this view. In talking to converts in a Christian village
he was struck by their evasiveness and fear; he saw a change for the worse instead
of one for the better. Do you then disbelieve in all conversion? the interviewer
asked Gandhi.
I disbelieve in the conversion of one person by another. My effort should never be
to undermine anothers faith but to make him a better follower of his own faith.
This implies belief in the truth of all religions and therefore respect for them. It
again implies true humility, a recognition of the fact that the divine light having
56
Chapter 2
been vouchsafed to all religions through an imperfect medium of flesh, they must
share in more or less degree the imperfection of the vehicle. (ibid.)
The interviewer pushed the issue further by asking whether we should not help
our fellow human beings to find the maximum of truth and the deepest spiritual
experiences? Gandhi thoroughly disagreed with this suggestion and pointed out
that spiritual truth cannot possibly spread in such a fashion. The highest truth,
he proclaimed, needs no communicating, it is by its very nature self-propelling
(ibid.). He made use of the analogy of the rose and its smell: It radiates its influence silently as the rose its fragrance without the intervention of medium
(ibid.).
(b) At the same time, Gandhi did plead for a certain kind of conversion: a
conversion within Hinduism. Especially after 1930, this emphasis is visible in
his writings. Together with a growing preoccupation with the struggle against
untouchability and for the liberation of the harijans, Gandhi spoke about the need
for a process of conversion by which Hinduism should rid itself of some of its aberrations. In the Bombay Chronicle (December 17, 1932) he formulated a message
meant to celebrate the anti-untouchability day:
I hope the message of hope born of the movement for the abolition of untouchability will penetrate Harijan quarters in every village in India on next Sunday
which has been fixed by the Central Board for the removal of untouchability.
Every Hindu child can do something by way of some little service to his or her
Harijan brother or sister in this mass movement of self-purification. I have been
listening to discourses of sanatanist friends with respectful attention with a perfectly open mind, and I shall continue to do so as long as they will strive with me
with a view to conversion to their interpretation of Hinduism, but the conviction is
daily growing upon me that untouchability as it is interpreted and practised today
has no sanction whatsoever in the Hindu Shastras taken as a whole, as they must
be taken. There can be no doubt that the present interpretation and practice of untouchability is utterly contrary to every canon of morality. (CW 58:210; italics mine)
The conversion Gandhi talked about is related to a change in the interpretation

of Hinduism. This new interpretation would make a change in dealing with the issue of untouchability (see also CW, 58:379). The strongest argument that Gandhi
put forward for such a conversion was the fact that it would enhance Hinduism
morally. The two most important conditions of conversion in Gandhis view came
together here: (1) conversion was something that happens within a particular faith
or religion; (2) the aim of conversion must be to make the faith or religion morally
57
better. If the latter was not the case, the former was futile. Moreover, if the latter
was the case, Gandhi was even willing to admit the possibility of genuine conversion where there was also a change of faith and thus drop the first condition.
At the beginning of the 1930s, the theme that the campaign against untouchability is not one of compulsion, but of conversion became a recurring refrain in Gandhis writings and speeches (see e.g. CW, 58:379; CW, 59:229; CW,
59:261). The objects of this kind of conversion were Hinduism and the so-called
caste Hindus. The latter, he said, required a religious conversion. The solution to
economic and political problems related to untouchability would depend on the
success of this religious conversion. Gandhi stated this very bluntly in a letter to
his friend Charlie Andrews dated March 17, 1933 (CW, 60:63). In the April 15,
1933 edition of the Harijan, Gandhi pointed out that many orthodox Hindus
sincerely believed that untouchability as they practice it was a part of Hinduism.
Compelling them to change was not the solution, but what was required was a
conversion of the orthodox. This conversion can only be brought about by an appeal to their hearts, i.e., by evoking the best that is in them (CW, 60:382).
Conversion of the Harijans vs. Conversion of the Savarnas
Especially from 1934, we observe that Gandhi was pushed (through letters, questions, etc.) to deal with the question of whether the Christian missionaries and
the Gandhian harijan liberation movement were not infringing on each others
territory. At first, Gandhi appeared quite surprised by this suggestion: for him, it
was clear that both were engaged in completely different tasks; the liberation of
the untouchables and the acts of the missionaries were quite dissimilar. Though
both might render service to the harijans by providing education, medical care,
etc., the framework within which such activities took place was entirely different.
He continued to oppose the Christian humanitarian service in so far as it aimed
at conversion. But if Christians wanted to serve the Indian population without
this aim, he admitted that they could play an important role in the Indian society.
Hindu service to the untouchables, on the other hand, was of a completely different nature. This service was part of a process of conversion of savarna Hindus
and Hinduism in general. The aim was the uplifting of Hinduism by ridding it of
some of its evil by-products, like untouchability. In this framework, serving the
harijans was meant to be a significant gesture towards them and it was a part of
the conversion of those belonging to the Hindu fold, especially the savarna Hin-
58
Chapter 2
dus (see also CW 68:315-317). But the fact that both Christian and Hindu groups
were serving the harijans did not make them allies or rivals in the same cause.
In response to a question of a harijan (If all religions are one in your consideration, are the Christians not entitled to combat untouchability?) he explained
this difference very clearly in Harijan April 20, 1934:
Not only are the Christians entitled, but it is their duty, to combat untouchability
in their own midst. But if the question is that Christians should combat untouchability in Hinduism, my answer is that they simply cannot do it, because
untouchables of Hinduism should not be untouchables to Christians. The antiuntouchability movement means weaning Hindus from their error. This cannot be
effectively done by non-Hindus, even as Hindus cannot bring about religious reform
among Christians or Mussalmans. If the question means that Christians should combat
untouchability among Hindus by converting untouchables to Christianity, they do not
advance the cause in any shape or form, the cause being reformation among caste Hindus. If the latter repented of their sin, the Harijans would be delivered from the
yoke of untouchability in a moment. Conversion can never do it. It can only add to
the prevailing bitterness and introduce a disturbing factor in a situation which is
already bad but which, owing to the work of the Harijan Sevak Sanghs and other
movements of internal reform in Hinduism, is steadily improving, untouchability
being daily undermined. (CW, 63:418; italics mine)
Gandhis two understandings of conversion surface here: a conversion of the harijans that did not help (converting untouchables to Christianity) and a conversion of savarnas that helped (reformation among caste Hindus/internal reform in
Hinduism). The Christians should not countenance untouchability in their own
circles but they could not abolish it within Hinduism. The struggle against untouchability of the Hindus was of a different nature: purifying Hinduism from
its errors. The Christians had nothing to add with respect to this aim. On the
contrary, if they got involved with their conversions they made the situation even
more complex and introduce a disturbing factor in a situation which is already
bad. Apparently the time had come for Gandhi to elaborate on the kind of reform he envisioned for Hinduism and Hindu society.
Gandhi stressed the patience the harijans had and needed to have towards
Hinduism and he praised them for their strength to remain within the fold of
Hinduism. They had good reasons to doubt, he admitted, whether Hinduism was
a good religion for them:
It is an admitted fact that the conduct of a vast number of Hindus who call themselves sanatanists is such as to cause the greatest inconvenience and irritation to
59
the Harijans all over India. The wonder is that many more Harijans than already
have, have not left Hinduism. It speaks volumes for their loyalty or for the innate
virtue of Hinduism that millions of Harijans have clung to it in spite of the inhumanities to which in the name of that very faith they have been subjected. This
wonderful loyalty of Harijans and their unexampled patience render it imperative
for every savarna Hindu to see that Harijans receive the same treatment that every other Hindu does. The course before savarnas is, therefore, on the one hand not to
interfere with Harijans wishing to leave the Hindu fold by trying to keep them within
it by the offer of bribes in the shape of finding employment or scholarships and, on the
other hand, to insist on full justice being done to Harijans in every walk of life. Indeed
reformers should anticipate the Harijans requirements and not wait till they begin
to complain. (Harijan March 21, 1936; CW, 68:315-316; italics mine)
The solution was not that the untouchables and the poor people convertneither
the conversion to another religion nor the conversion internal to the Hindu tradition lay within their reach. They were not capable of going through the conversion
Gandhi advocated. This is how Gandhi formulated it very bluntly in his discussion with John R. Mott: Would you, Dr. Mott, preach the Gospel to a cow? Well,
some of the untouchables are worse than cows in understanding. I mean they
can no more distinguish between the relative merits of Islam and Hinduism and
Christianity than a cow. You can only preach through your life. The rose does not
say: Come and smell me (Harijan, December 19, 1936; CW, 70:77).
The necessary change within Hinduism would have to come from the conversion of the savarna Hindus. They needed to bring about change in their dealing
with the harijans and to anticipate what was needed to alter the current situation.
Liquidation of untouchability cannot be attained by the conversion of untouchables to Islam or any other religion. For it is the so-called caste Hindu who has to
rid himself of the sin of untouchability. He can wash away the stain only by doing
justice, however tardy, to the outcaste (Harijan, April 20, 1940; CW, 78:149). The
conversion of the savarna Hindus which was so much needed also had to ensure
the survival of the Hindu tradition.
If this conversion did not take place, the Hindu tradition might as well perish. The threat was not conversion to other religions like Christianity (not even
mass conversions); it was the absence of this other kind of conversion which the
Indian traditions needed so much. Here we see that Gandhi was much more concerned about the conversion and reform within the Hindu traditions than he was
worried about conversion to Christianity. The latter only worried him as a sign
60
Chapter 2
of a growing distrust in the capacity of Hindu traditions for moral and spiritual
growth.
Hinduism is passing through a fiery ordeal. It will perish not through individual conversions, not even through mass conversions, but it will perish
because of the sinful denial by the so-called savarna Hindus of elementary
justice to Harijans. Every threat of conversion is, therefore, a warning to the
savarnas that if they do not wake up in time, it may be too late! One word to
the impatient and needy Harijans. They must not use threats when they approach Hindu institutions or individuals for help. They should rely upon the
strength of their case commanding a hearing. The majority of Harijans do not
know what change of religion can mean. They mutely suffer the continuing
degradation to which savarnas in their selfishness have consigned them. They
must be the primary care of Hindu reformers whether they complain or do
not. Those who are enlightened enough to know and feel the degradation
and know also what change of religion means, are either too good Hindus to
desert their ancestral faith and deserve every help they need, or being indifferent as to religion may not claim help from savarna Hindus in exchange for
their condescending to remain in the Hindu fold. I would, therefore, plead
with enlightened Harijans for their own sakes not to seek material betterment
under threat of conversion. And whilst reformers must on no account yield to
threats, they must ceaselessly strive to secure justice for Harijans at the hands
of savarna Hindus. (Harijan, March 21, 1936; CW, 68:316-317)
This theme resurfaced in Gandhis speeches and articles of the same period (See
also Harijan, Speech at Harijan Workers Conference June 20, 1936; CW, 69:107108). If we look at the issue closer, we see how it contains an insight into the nature
of traditions and the way traditions survive and are transmitted. Gandhi repeated
the thought that conversion from one religion to another is not the threat, but
rather the absence of a different kind of conversion within the Hindu traditions.
If Hindu tradition did not succeed in reforming itself and bringing about a moral
changeespecially concerning ills such as untouchabilityit might as well be
sentenced to death. Hinduism would not be saved unless it could perform the
needed conversion: Hinduism can only be saved when it has become purified by
the performance of our duty without the expectation of any return whatsoever
from the Harijans. Nothing less than that can possibly save Hinduism. If you do
something by Harijans as a matter of expediency or political manoeuvre, you have
not rid yourselves of untouchability in your hearts. (CW, 69:107).
61
The real challenge that Gandhi had taken up seemed to be about the survival
of the Hindu tradition as a tradition. That is, according to him, traditions lived
and survived through their capacity of elevating people morally and spiritually. If
Hindu tradition was not capable of doing so to all the people inside its fold, its
degeneration and corruption were inevitable. Gandhi seemed to have understood
the real challenge of Christian conversion: a challenge for the survival of traditions that are very different from religions like Christianity and Islam. If these
traditions had something to offer to humankind, they should be able to show it. If
they did not, they might as well perish and all might as well convert to Christianity. This was the uncompromising position Gandhi took.
Many have been critical of Gandhis option to convert the savarna Hindus
as a means to liberate the harijans. Why not rather generate self-help among
the untouchables? Why expect the Hindus and Hinduism to reform in order to
ameliorate the situation of the untouchables? To understand Gandhis take on this
issue, we need to appreciate the intimate relation he sees between the problems
the harijans face (the problems related to the practice of untouchability and their
economic and political problems) and the structure of Hindu tradition. According
to him simply stimulating self-help amongst them would not do away with the
core of the problem. The core was an error in the Hindu tradition which needed
to be purified: The object of the movement is to do away with this utterly unnatural division and to secure for Harijans the simple justice to which they are
entitled at the hands of savarna Hindus. Thus the movement is one of repentance and
reparation. Hence it is confined, on the one hand, to constructive work among Harijans
and, on the other, to conversion of savarnas by persuasion, arguments and, above all, by
correct conduct on the part of the reformers (CW, 64:67; italics mine). This explication penned down in Harijan ( June 15, 1934) is revealing as it emphasized the
centre of gravity in the reform movement: saving the tradition. In this sense, the
primordial aim of Gandhi was not to save the poor and abolish the practice of
untouchability. The main concern was the survival of Hindu tradition. To prove its
legitimacy it had to show that it was still capable of bringing about moral change
on the issue of untouchability.
Thus we see how Gandhi was pushing the issue of untouchablity to its limits. It is difficult to understand his insistence on this matter without also taking
into account the role this plays in the challenge he has taken up. The challenge is
one between a religion which claims to be the truth for humanity and a tradition
which claims to be apt for a particular people. In other words, what is at stake in
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Chapter 2
this debate is not merely gaining and losing converts to another religion. What is
at stake, and in this matter Gandhi definitely was a visionary, is the survival of the
Hindu tradition as a tradition. What matters for traditions is not whether they
are true. Gandhi never took this route in defending Hinduism, never aimed to
prove that the Indian religion is the true religion as compared to other traditions.
What he endeavored to show was that within the fold of the Hindu traditions
people could flourish, that is, they could grow morally and spiritually. In other
words, the onus was on the ethical force of a tradition: is it capable to make people
moral, good and happy? The test-case was untouchability: this was clearly a cause
of suffering for many belonging to the Hindu fold. If Hindu tradition was alive,
it should be able to overcome this illness and reform itself. If not, it would better
perish, because it had nothing to offer to the world: ...if untouchability does not
go Hinduism will perish. I would go even further and say: I would pray that a
religion which damns any human beings because they were born in a particular
section should perish. And I want you, if you feel with me, to pray that it ought
to perish if this blot on humanity is not removed (CW, 69:119).
Hence, the missionaries and the Hindus had a very different mission:
our going to them is a small proof of our repentance and our assurance to them
that we will not exploit them any more. I should never think of opening a hospital
where there is already one; but if there is a Mission school, I should not mind
opening another for Harijan children, and I would even encourage them to prefer
our school to the other. Let us frankly understand the position. If the object is
purely humanitarian, purely that of carrying education where there is none, they should
be thankful that someone whose obvious duty it is to put his own house in order wakes
up to a sense of his duty. But my trouble is that the Missionary friends do not bring to
bear on their work a purely humanitarian spirit. Their object is to add more members
to their fold, and that is why they are disturbed. The complaint which I have been
making all these years is more than justified by what you say. Some of the friends
of a Mission were the other day in high glee over the conversion to Christianity
of a learned pandit. They have been dear friends, and so I told them that it was
hardly proper to go into ecstasies over a man forsaking his religion. Today it is
the case of a learned Hindu, tomorrow it may be that of an ignorant villager not
knowing the principles of his religion. Why should Missionaries complain if I
open a school which is more liked by Harijans than theirs? Is it not natural? (CW,
66:78; italics mine.)
The fact that the missionaries felt threatened by Gandhi entering the domain
of harijan liberation proves, according to him, that their aims were not purely
humanitarian. Otherwise they would be happy that Hindus take up the duty to
63
set their own house in order. The problem was their aim of gaining converts
and therefore they were not too keen on Gandhi and his movement entering the
picture.
If I had the power and could legislate
In an interview in 1935, Gandhi was asked explicitly by a missionary nurse about
his views on conversion. The article was published in Harijan (May 11, 1935) and
since it contains probably the most quoted sentence of Gandhi on conversion, we
will reproduce it here:
-Would you prevent missionaries coming to India in order to baptize?
Who am I to prevent them? If I had power and could legislate, I should
certainly stop all proselytizing. It is the cause of much avoidable conflict between
classes and unnecessary heart-burning among missionaries. But I should welcome
people of any nationality if they came to serve here for the sake of service. In Hindu households the advent of a missionary has meant the disruption of the family
coming in the wake of change of dress, manners, language, food and drink.
-Is it not the old conception you are referring to? No such thing is now associated with proselytization.
The outward condition has perhaps changed but the inward mostly remains.
Vilification of Hindu religion, though subdued, is there. If there was a radical change
in the missionaries outlook, would Murdochs books be allowed to be sold in mission depots? Are those books prohibited by missionary societies? There is nothing
but vilification of Hinduism in those books. You talk of the conception being no
longer there. Only the other day a missionary descended on a famine area with
money in his pocket, distributed it among the famine-stricken, converted them
to his fold, took charge of their temple and demolished it. This is outrageous. The
temple could not belong to the converted Hindus, and it could not belong to the
Christian missionary. But this friend goes and gets it demolished at the hands of
the very men who only a little while ago believed that God was there.
-But, Mr. Gandhi, why do you object to proselytization as such? Is not there
enough in the Bible to authorize us to invite people to a better way of life?
Oh yes, but it does not mean that they should be made members of the Church. If
you interpret your texts in the way you seem to do, you straight away condemn a large
part of humanity unless it believes as you do. If Jesus came to earth again, he would
disown many things that are being done in the name of Christianity. It is not
he who says Lord, Lord that is a Christian, but He that doeth the will of the
Lord that is a true Christian. And cannot he who has not heard the name of Jesus
Christ do the will of the Lord? (CW, 67:48-49; italics mine)
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Chapter 2
2.3. Equality of Religions or Functional Symmetry?

How can we identify the conceptual schemes behind the semantic distortions in
Gandhis writings? One route is to compare all his particular statements and try
to extract such general schemes. For instance, from the foregoing, we can infer
two basic ways in which he spoke of conversion: one that India needs and one
that India does not need. This is captured by distinguishing between conversion
of a religion and conversion into a religion. In the first sense, the word picks
out the case where some or another religion has scope for moral improvement:
conversion is the moral and spiritual development of a religion, undertaken by its
followers. This process was intimately related to Gandhis concepts of satyagraha,
non-cooperation, swaraj,3 swadeshi and to the kind of reform he advocates for the
Indian society and nation.
However, this inductive approach will lead to uncertain results, given the
internal variety of Gandhis thought. The alternative route is to formulate a general hypothesis on the background conceptual schemes that have structured the
semantic and conceptual distortions in Gandhis reasoning. This hypothesis must
then allow us to make sense of Gandhis several claims and his equivocation. In
the remaining pages of this chapter, I would like to propose such a hypothesis,
which draws upon Balagangadharas theory on the nature of the Indian traditions
(Balagangadhara 1994, 2005). In chapters 4 and 6, the particulars of this theory
will be explained more fully, but here we will sketch some of its outlines to account
for Gandhis viewpoints and language use.
(1) First, when Gandhi spoke of faiths or religions, he referred to traditions. He emphasized that one should remain within ones own faith and advocated swadeshi and the role of heredity in religion, because he fundamentally
viewed religions as the ancestral traditions of a community. The main characteristic of such traditions is that they are transmitted from generation to generation. One does not follow a tradition because of its teachings or the truth of its
doctrinal content, but because it has been passed on by ones ancestors. In other
words, traditions consist of ancestral practices, which are not founded in doctrines
or justified by reasons. Here, practices do not embody beliefs that one holds to be
true.
If traditions are continued because they are ancestral practices, how to account for Gandhis emphasis on reform, purification and the rejection of practices
3
For Gandhis idea on swaraj as they are developed in his Hind Swaraj (1909), see Mukherjee
(2009).
65
like untouchability? It should be clear that tradition in this sense does not entail
that one would defend any practice, just because it has been transmitted by previous generations. This is a fallacy. It is not because one has no reason to continue a
body of practices that one cannot have a reason to discontinue one or several of its
practices. If there are good reasons to end a practice, one should do so. Typical to
a vibrant tradition is its potential to change in this way. One can modify any practice so as to retain its viability in modern times or reject it if the reasons against it
are compelling (see Chatterjee 1983, 8).
This process of purifying a tradition from deficiencies is what Gandhi
called conversion in the second sense. He put a premium on its importance,
because this aspect of traditions is often ignored. He also stressed the particular
relationship between the individual and the tradition one follows. The individual
has the duty to pursue the modification or eradication of practices, when there
are compelling reasons to do so. This attitude is essential to the vibrancy of ones
tradition, but it should be combined with tenacity in continuing the tradition.
(2) Second, religion is the tradition of a particular people, nation or community. It is the set of ancestral practices that has constituted the identity of
the relevant community. Over time, in the process of transmission and selection,
earlier generations have filtered out practices, modified or rejected them. This explains the close connection in Gandhis thought between religious traditions and
the welfare of nations. The desirable kind of conversion stands in a direct relation
to the welfare of the Indian nation. Gandhi connected religions to nations. In his
view, each nation has its own religion(s) and these are adequate to the needs of the
people of that nation (CW, 51:414).
(3) Third, since traditions are not founded in doctrines or beliefs, truth
predicates do not apply to them. Traditions simply do not fall within the scope
of applicability of the predicates true and false. Indeed, Gandhi equivocated
between different senses of truth, but where it concerns propositional truth he
should be read as making this point: if religions are traditions, then no religion is
false. For instance, in 1924, a Muslim correspondent insisted that Gandhi respond
to the following question: You claim that you are a lover, a seeker and a follower
of truth. You have said besides that Islam is not a false religion. It is the command
of Khuda [God] that every person should embrace Islam. Why then havent you
embraced Islam? Gandhis reply is revealing:
It has nowhere been enjoined that everyone should do everything that is not false.
Just as I do not consider Islam to be a false religion, so also do I not consider
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Christianity, Zoroastrianism or Judaism to be false religions. Which religion,

then, should I embrace? Moreover, I do not consider Hinduism a false religion
either. What, then, should one like me, a seeker of truth, do? (CW, 29:234-235)
For the letter writer, Gandhis claim that Islam is not a false religion entailed that
he must embrace it as true religion. Gandhi did not follow the same logic: to him,
Islam was not a false religion, because no religion is false (not because Islam is true
religion). Since no religion is false, the best route to follow is to maintain the religion in which one is born: Hence I cling to my religion, as a child to its mother.
But I have no dislike for other religions, as a child has none for other mothers
(ibid.). In other words: I therefore prefer to retain the label of my forefathers so
long as it does not cramp my growth and does not debar me from assimilating all
that is good anywhere else (CW, 36:253).
(4) Fourth, traditions do not only consist of ancestral practices, but also of
action heuristics that instruct the individual on how to become a more ethical
and happier human being. Unlike religious doctrines, moral principles and beliefs
about the world, such heuristics or rules of thumb are not subject to truth claims.
They are instructions for action, whose efficacy is always relative to the experience,
context and inclinations of the individual in question. In other words, they function like signposts and always depend on the stage of moral and spiritual development of the individual.
This nature of traditions as sets of action heuristics allows us to decipher
many of Gandhis claims. It explains why he viewed religions as moral guidelines,
all of which are valid. Since such heuristics are not subject to truth claims, nothing also prevents them from migrating from one tradition to another. Unlike
doctrines or beliefs, they are not restricted by requirements of consistency and coherence. Taking into account this characteristic of traditions, Gandhis suggestion
that one religion can assimilate valuable aspects of another religion makes perfect
sense. It also explains his stance that a traditions loss of the capacity to instigate
moral or spiritual growth in a community is synonymous to its death. This would
entail that the traditions action heuristics no longer work for its followers.
One cannot preach such action heuristics and insist that others accept them.
Since the efficacy of heuristics depends on the experience, background and inclinations of the individual, it does not even make sense to persuade anyone of
their virtues. The role of such heuristics is to generate certain kinds of action, both
internally as modes of reflection and externally as particular attitudes towards
oneself and others in the world. Inevitably, then, the best way to express such
67
instructions for action is by embodying the kind of actions and attitudes they
generate. The best way to learn such heuristics is not through verbal expression
and reproduction, but through mimesis of actions and attitudes. Most often such
mimesis occurs in a subliminal way. This accounts for Gandhis statements on the
self-propelling nature of religion and his simile of the rose and its fragrance.
It also allows us to take the next step in decoding his notions of religion
and truth. He uses true, false and error in a pragmatic sense, rather than in
terms of the semantic conception of truth: truth is that which helps an individual
to reach his goal. Truth refers to the efficacy of action heuristics in enabling the
individual to progress in the process of moral and spiritual growth. For this reason, Gandhi keeps emphasizing that all religions have some truth and some error
in them; all traditions contain practices and action heuristics that are more and
less efficacious. As traditions, religions are essentially human products that are
transmitted from generation to generation and, consequently, they all contain the
imperfections that are typical of any human product.
(5) Fifth, many interpreters view the equality of all religions as the foundation of Gandhis reasoning on religious conversion. Often, however, this idea is
reduced to a slogan. Taking into account the above hypothesis, how should we
understand this notion of equality of religions? If the religious traditions of a nation are sufficient to meet its needs, what are the implications of the claim that all
religions are equal?
If we take Gandhis statements seriously, it follows that religious traditions
are equal in the sense that they meet the needs of particular nations. It is their
function to do so. This does not imply, however, that the needs of one nation are
necessarily equal to the needs of other nations. In that case, that religion which
satisfies the need of some nation could be more or less than the other, in so far
as one can speak in these terms about the needs of people.
Consider again the modifications in the famous example: Every nations
religion is as good as any other was replaced by Every nation considers its own
faith to be as good as that of any other. This indicates that Gandhis point is not
that all religions are equal or as good as any other, but that all nations consider
their traditions to be so. Functionally, in meeting the needs of a certain people,
they are symmetrical. We believe that this is the best way to make sense of utterances like the following: Accept all religions as equal, for all have the same root
and the same laws of growth (CW, 70:43).
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Chapter 2
Briefly put, Gandhi advocated the functional symmetry between traditions:

in their function of providing action heuristics to people and, as such, in fulfilling
the needs of a people, traditions are symmetrical. This is very different from saying
that all religions are equal. Even though Gandhi often expressed his idea in terms
of equality or equal truth, the notion of functional symmetry better captures
the message he aims to convey. It is less susceptible to misinterpretation than the
idea of equality of religions: it avoids attributing equal truth to all religious doctrines and running into the resultant inconsistencies. It also avoids interpreting
Gandhi as claiming superiority for Hinduism because it advocates this doctrine
of equal truth ( Jordens 1987, 10-13).
More, it avoids the suggestion that giving passive equal respect to other
religions is the aim. In 1930, Gandhi rejected the formula of respect and introduced equality of religions (CW, 50:78-79). Hence, interpreting his equality
of religions as equal respect for all religions is ill-advised. Similarly, he did not
like the word tolerance, because of its connotation of condescension (Iyer 1973,
246). Rather than respecting or tolerating other religions, Gandhi incited one
to study them and learn from them. The notion of functional symmetry helps us
understand why: religions are of equal value in so far as they provide action heuristics to pursue spiritual and moral growth; consequently, adopting such action
heuristics from other traditions can enrich ones own tradition.
(6) Finally, this hypothesis allows us to clarify Gandhis antagonism to
conversion and explain the incomprehension towards Christian proselytizing in
India. If religion is the tradition or set of ancestral practices that constitute a
community, then proselytizing will inevitably be experienced as an unwelcome
intrusion into such traditions and a disruption of communal life. Given that traditions as sets of practices and action heuristics are not subject to truth predicates,
the charge that a tradition is false religion and should be replaced by true religion becomes inconceivable. Traditions possess the resources to change and reject
harmful practices or heuristics, rather than be replaced as a whole.
In fulfilling the needs of a people or community, traditions stand in a relation of functional symmetry. Under these conditions, proselytizing becomes absurd and uncalled-for. It is even experienced as a violation of the integrity of a
community and its tradition. The call for conversion also entails the imposition
of the model of religion as belief, which is alien to Hindu and other traditions in
India. It demands that these traditions refashion themselves and now defend their
practices in terms of true beliefs or justify them with good reasons.
69
2.4. Conclusion
During the last six decades, Gandhi has been pushed into the corner of moral
sainthood. Interest in Gandhi most often takes the form of fascination for the life
of this extraordinary individual. However, his thought merits to be scrutinized
more thoroughly. My argument suggests that a range of deep-rooted Indian attitudes and modes of reasoning are reflected in Gandhis writings. It has aimed
to demonstrate that the distortion in his use of terms such as religion and conversion can be systematically studied and explained. This provides us with a new
angle to decode radically different cultural attitudes towards religion and related
phenomena. This stands in contrast to the traditional approach of simply pointing
out Western influences in Gandhis thought like his interest in the Sermon of the
Mount and the influence of Unitarianism. Instead of identifying traces of Western
thought in Gandhis writings we focused on their accommodation in a different
cultural framework.
As such, the case of Gandhi remains highly relevant to contemporary debates on conversion. His reflections offer a route to comprehending and addressing the anti-conversion sentiment shared by many Indians, without taking the
retrograde step of implementing anti-conversion legislation. They also show to
modern scholars that one cannot brand all opposition to conversion as another
manifestation of Hindu nationalism. Rather, religious conversion in India has become the locus of a stormy encounter between two different ways of going about
in the world. If our theories of religion and our political theories are to cope with
this problem, then we will need to take thinkers like Gandhi seriously and find
new ways of accessing their contributions to the study of religion and politics.
Chapter 3
Conversion, Religious Freedom and Secularism

in the Constituent Assembly Debates
Between 1946 and 1949, the Constituent Assembly drafted the Constitution of
India in a series of landmark debates. India had become an independent nation

on August 15, 1947, but the new Indian Constitution finally came into effect on
January 26, 1950. The way the debate on religious conversion developed in this
context is quite peculiar. At several moments during the Constituent Assembly
Debates (CAD), questions related to conversion, secularism and religious freedom
became central. There was the general question of the secular character of the Indian state: What would it mean for India to be a secular state, given its religious
and cultural diversity? Did secularism entail a state that banned religion to the
private sphere or one that treated all religions symmetrically or even respected
them equally? Closely related were issues of religious freedom, Muslim personal
law and the uniform civil code: Does the freedom of religion include the freedom
to regulate matters of family and inheritance law according to the Shariah? Or
should a secular democracy always have one uniform legal system for all its citizens, regardless of religious affiliation? Within these debates, a first attempt was
also made to address the issue of religious conversion in a systematic way though
systematic may be an overstatement here.
This chapter will first analyze the general discussions on religion, the secular
state and religious freedom in the CAD and then show how these provided the
backdrop for a peculiar dispute on the question of conversion and the freedom to
propagate religion. The first section introduces the theoretical approach of the
chapter by addressing the problem of conceptual transplants: concepts and principles that have moved from one cultural setting to another and have thus been
detached from the larger conceptual framework that originally gave them signifi-
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cance and coherency. In the second section, we will see that the interpretation of
principles of religious freedom and secularism happened in haphazard ways in
the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, there was no shared background framework
that put limitations on the semantic content and relations one attributed to the
relevant terms and principles. Consequently, the debates not only became difficult
to make sense of, but could also not be settled on cognitive grounds.
Yet, when we turn to the question of religious conversion in the third section, we notice that there are systematic patterns to be found in this conceptual
confusion. By contrasting the standpoint of Christian representatives in the Constituent Assembly to that of Hindu and other participants in the debates, we will
discern the outlines of two very different background frameworks that had structured these respective viewpoints. Significantly, while the concerns of Christians
are clear from the beginning, the concerns of Hindu participants will take some
time to discern, because of their peculiar language use and views.
3.1. Conceptual Transplants

From the very beginning, principles of religious freedom and the secular state
have been central to the modern Indian debate on religious conversion. Few
would deny that these liberal principles were first formulated in early modern Europe. Both English-language terms like religion, freedom and the secular and
notions such as religious liberty and the separation of state and religion were
introduced into India during the colonial period. Accordingly as English became
the lingua franca of the intelligentsia of post-Independence India, these words
and principles remained central to public debate.
However, it is very often said that such terms have acquired a different
meaning in India, distinct from the range of meanings they originally had in
Europe and in liberal political theory. The terms secular and secularism are
the most striking cases in point. In his infamous Anti-secularist Manifesto (1985),
Ashis Nandy explains the difference between the two meanings of secularism:
The first meaning is known to every westerner; the second is an Indianism which
has no place either in the Oxford English Dictionary or in the Webster. According to the first, religious tolerance could come only from the devaluation of religion in public life and from the freeing of politics from religion. The less politics is
contaminated by religion, this argument goes, the more secular or tolerant a State
you will have. The word secular here is the opposite of the word sacred. According
Constituent Assembly Debates (1946-1949)
73
to its second meaning, secularism is not the opposite of the word sacred but that
of ethnocentrism, xenophobia and fanaticism. One could be a good secularist by
being equally disrespectful towards all religions or by being equally respectful towards them. And true secularism, the second meaning insists, must opt for respect.
(Nandy 1985, 14)
In addition to secularism, one could also make parallel claims about freedom of
religion, which is often used in distinctive ways by Indian authors (see chapter
4).
Meanings of Secularism
This claim about the new Indian meaning of secularism faces a number of problems. First, like many words in the English language (or any other language), the
words secular and secularism have several senses and connotations as they are
used in the West. For secular, these include relating to the worldly, not overtly
religious, not clerical, non-religious, indifferent to religion, religiously neutral... Without major problems, the Indian connotation of equal respect towards
religions could be accommodated within this range of meanings. For instance,
if the secular state is understood in terms of religious neutrality, such neutrality
could take the form of the state being equally respectful towards all religions and
conceptions of the good life (including atheism). In other words, the supposed
Indian meaning of secular and secularism can be understood as a specific interpretation of western principles of the secular state, rather than as a new meaning
or concept of secularism.
Second, as some authors point out, the Indian debate on secularism has
developed in close relation to western political theory and its debates on the
liberal secular state (Chatterjee 1997, 232). Citing Ainslie Embrees suggestion
that terms like secularism have acquired connotations resonating with the Indian
experience, Rochana Bajpai (2002, 180) makes the following point: While the
connotations of secularism in Indian political discourse are undoubtedly infused
with meanings resonant of Indias own cultural and historical experience, these
connotations do not inhabit an indigenous conceptual world but draw upon standard so-called Western liberal-democratic notions. Indeed, when Indian authors
discuss the separation of politics and religion, symmetric treatment of religions, or
even equal respect towards all religions, they inevitably invoke concepts and theoretical principles borrowed from western political philosophy. After all, the word
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religion is itself one that they have adopted from modern western language-use
(Balagangadhara 1994). To defend the thesis that Indian thinkers have given distinct new meanings to such words, one cannot just say that the word secularism
has acquired a new meaning. One would have to show how an entire set of words
and principles is used in specific and systematic ways in India and then demonstrate that this use deviates from the semantic limits within which the same terms
and principles are interpreted in the West.
This brings us to a third point: concepts like secularism, the secular or religious freedom are always embedded in a larger conceptual framework. In western
political thought, they are part of theories of liberalism that relate notions like the
state, religion, freedom, toleration, the citizen, the secular... to each other in certain systematic ways. The term secularism derives its meaning from this system
of semantic relations and conceptual framework within which it is embedded.
To argue that secularism in India has acquired a new and distinct meaning, one
should be able not just to give a definition like equal respect for all religions, but
also to circumscribe the distinct conceptual framework within which this notion
of secularism is embedded.
Principles such as equal respect for all religions can make sense only if they
are part of a larger well-structured political theory, which explains what religion
is (as the object of equal respect), what equality of respect entails and how these
concepts are related to those of the state, the citizen, freedom... For instance,
should one have equal respect for religious beliefs, practices, or for the persons following a religion? What does it mean to equally respect all religious beliefs? The
authors who argue that Indian secularism has a different meaning are unable to
answer such questions and clarify the larger theoretical framework that sustains
the Indian concept of secularism. It is as though the term secularism could
stand in isolation from any conceptual framework and acquire a new meaning
by migrating to another culture and society. This cannot be the case. Even in western political thought terms like religious freedom and secularism have different connotations in various political theories, but their range of meanings always
depends on a shared background framework common to such political theories. If
this were not the case, communication between thinkers holding and defending
different political theories would be impossible.
75
Concepts of Secularism?
Because participants in the debate on Indian secularism ignore the role of such
larger conceptual frameworks, they tend to discuss the meaning of secularism
in confusing and fallacious ways. Under the influence of postmodernism, it has
become popular to say that secularism does not have one essential or universal
meaning, but that it acquires different meanings according to the historical and
political contexts in which it emerges. Secularism has many or multiple meanings (see Khilnani 2007, 90; Sarkar 1993, 166).
Elaborating on this point, political theorist Neera Chandhoke (1999, 42)
writes the following: Secularism has a very definite meaning for and in India, as
compared to, say, countries in Europe. For secularism in Europe was the product
of historical circumstances and social arrangements of the continent, just as it was
a product of historically specific processes in India. Similarly, Shabnum Tejani
(2008, 4-5), a historian of modern India, accuses each position in the secularism
debate of reifying the categories of secularism and communalism, because they
share the premise that secular and communal have a meaning in themselves,
one that transcends historical context. Instead, she argues, we should consider
the historical dynamics that shaped the meaning of secularism: Secularism is
not a stable, predetermined, universal category, but one whose meaning is particular to its historical context. Therefore, she concludes, a universal meaning for
secularism cannot be assumed (Tejani 2008, 4-6).
This type of argument is problematic. Secularism is taken to be a concept or
category that has wrongly been given a universal, fixed or timeless meaning, while
its meanings are always limited to specific historical and political contexts. The
problem is that concepts do not have meanings; words do. A category or concept
is a word with a particular meaning attached to it. Take the word pipe and its
several meanings. According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, three of
these meanings are a tubular wind instrument; a long tube or hollow body for
conducting a liquid, gas or finely divided solid; and a device for smoking usually consisting of a tube having a bowl at one end and a mouthpiece at the other.
These are not different meanings of the category pipe; rather, each constitutes a
separate category of objects with characteristic properties. In the same way, one
cannot sensibly discuss the universal or multiple meanings of the concept secularism, but only different meanings of the word secularism, which constitute different concepts of secularism.
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Chapter 3
The dominant concept of secularism describes a specific way of organizing

the relations between the state and religion. When we say that the USA, France
and India are all secular states, the suggestion is that these states instantiate this
concept of secularism. This means that we attribute certain basic properties and
principles to them: a minimal separation of the state and its legal system from
religious doctrines and institutions; equal rights to all citizens irrespective of religious affiliation; freedom of conscience and religion; etc.
The fact that different societies in Europe and America have negotiated the
relationship between the state and religion differently does not give us completely
distinct concepts of secularism. Maximally, it can show that different forms of
secularism have developed in these countries. But to argue that countries or continents have developed different forms of the secular state, one should already be
able to recognize some political organization as a secular state or manifestation of
secularism. That is, one has to presuppose certain common properties that these
states possess and that make them secular.
It is true that the secular state has taken different forms in various countries, because of specific historical and socio-cultural dynamics. Still, if we say that
secularism is indispensable to India or India is a secular state, these statements
make sense only because we have a particular concept of secularism in mind. On
the one hand, this could concern the same concept that allows us to recognize
western nation-states as secular. Then the Indian secular state must share the
same set of properties and principles. Naturally, one could argue that the specific
historical and cultural context of modern India has given distinct properties to
secularism here, but this cannot deny the common set of properties and principles. In fact, the only way for us to talk lucidly about the distinct form of Indian
secularism would be by referring to the common structure of secular states. Only
then could we show how Indian secularism has additional properties dissimilar to
those of other secular states.
On the other hand, one could say that India is secular according to a distinct concept of secularism. Then we confront a different situation altogether. To
return to the earlier analogy, this is like saying that some object is a pipe, not in
the sense that it is a device for smoking of a particular shape, but in the sense of
a long tube for conducting liquids. In that case, the Indian state would instantiate
a different concept of secularism. One would then have to use the words secular
and secularism in systematic ways that refer to the common properties shared by
all instances of this distinct concept. Likely, this type of argument would lead to
77
equivocation, because we would confuse between two senses of secularism. The

Indian secular state would not instantiate a different form of secularism; rather,
the word secularism in the case of India would mean something completely different.
Such arguments about the different meanings of secularism in India have
led to conceptual perplexity. Some define secularism as anything that allows different religious and ethnic groups to live together peacefully (e.g. Gopal 1993,
19-20). Hindu nationalists denounce classical secularism as pseudo-secularism
(because it panders to minorities) and suggest that Hindu secularism is better
suited to India. Hinduism is secularism in its noblest sense, they say, and only a
Hindu state would be a genuinely secular state (M.S. Golwalkar in Cossman and
Kapur 1996, 2622; Sudarshan 1995, 192). Yet others conclude that the concept of
secularism has become opaque today and that the term means so many different
things that it has lost all meaning (Srikanth 1994, 39). What is the origin of this
type of confusion about secularism and similar concepts?
The Risk of Conceptual Transplants
It would be foolish to argue that all movement of concepts and theories between
cultural settings is problematic. After all, the impressive cognitive success of the
natural sciences depends to a large extent on their ability to do so. Even the most
critical among us would admit that the worldwide dissemination of notions like
democracy and human rights has had at least some positive consequences. Under
what conditions does such movement of concepts become problematic?
Drawing on Quentin Skinners work, Partha Chatterjee has suggested that
a concept takes on a new meaning not when (as one would usually suppose) arguments that it should be applied to a new context succeed, but rather when such
arguments fail. Thus, the semantic confusion in the secularism debate in India
shows that there are serious difficulties in applying the standard meaning of the
word to the Indian circumstances. The original concept, in other words, will
not easily admit the Indian case within its range of referents (Chatterjee 1997,
232-3). However, Chatterjee adds, this does not indicate that Indians possess a
different concept of secularism:
We could begin by asking why, in all recent discussions in India on the relation between religion and the state, the central concept is named by the English
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Chapter 3
words secular and secularism, or in the Indian languages, by neologisms such as

dharma-nirapeksat which are translations of those English words and are clearly
meant to refer to the range of meanings indicated by the English terms. As far as I
know, there does not exist in any Indian language a term for secular or secularism
which is standardly used in talking about the role of religion in the modern state
and society, and whose meaning can be immediately explicated without having
recourse to the English terms. (Chatterjee 1997, 233)
We need not accept Chatterjees general claim about the circumstances under
which words take on new meanings to appreciate his point. Words like secularism, secular and even religion have no semantic equivalents in Indian languages and the related concepts confront a lack of fit when they are used to describe
and solve problems of pluralism and communal conflict in India.
In this context, Ashis Nandy speaks of a peculiar imperialism of categories: Under such imperialism, a conceptual domain is sometimes hegemonized
by a concept produced and honed in the West, hegemonized so effectively that
the original domain vanishes from our awareness. In South Asia, the domain of
ethnic and religious tolerance has been occupied by the hegemonic language of
secularism popularized by the Westernized intellectuals and middle classes in this
part of the world (Nandy 1998, 321). Perhaps imperialism of categories gives us
an apt metaphor for this process, but it has little explanatory force. It fails to tell us
what happens when a conceptual language that has emerged from the reflections
on political, social and cultural life in western societies is adopted in a completely
different cultural setting like that of India.
In this chapter, I would like to introduce the term conceptual transplant to
refer to this process. This notion is analogous to that of legal transplant used in
the study of law to refer to the transfer of a legal rule or system from one country
to another (Watson 1974). In some of its most interesting applications, the notion
of legal transplant concerns laws that are transferred between different cultural
settings (Chiba 1989, 179; Cotterrell 2006; Shah 2005). Similarly, conceptual
transplants are concepts or fragments of a conceptual language that have been
transplanted from one cultural setting to another.
In a series of publications, Balagangadhara and his research group have
begun to clarify this process of conceptual transplantation in political thought.
Concepts of religion and the secular and principles of the secular state developed
in Europe against the background of larger conceptual frameworks. For instance,
liberal principles of toleration and the separation of politics and religion emerged
79
within the Protestant Reformation and derived their significance, coherency and
intelligibility from a background theological framework shared by European
Christians. Broadly speaking, one knew what religion referred to or what the
separation of the religious and the political amounted to, because these terms
were embedded in this common background framework. Naturally, there were
many different positions and discontinuities in such debates. But disagreements
about the precise meaning of terms or conflicts between normative positions made
sense to the participants, precisely because they occurred against the background
of this type of conceptual framework. The framework put semantic limits on the
potential interpretation of terms and principles, as it related concepts to each
other in particular systematic ways. This background framework reflected not only
generic Christian theology and political theory, but also the common cultural and
historical experience of Europeans (De Roover and Balagangadhara 2008, 2009).
When the relevant terms, concepts and principles migrate from one cultural
setting to another, they are detached from this background framework. Then the
concepts and principles in question will inevitably begin to lose their basic intelligibility and accessibility. There is no shared conceptual framework that puts semantic limits on the interpretations of terms and principles and that allows one to
make sense of conflicting positions. Consequently, even where participants in the
relevant debates adopt the exact formulae of western political thought, these are
interpreted in seemingly random ways. This leads to harmful conceptual obscurity.
In some cases, the participants will draw upon various implicit or fragmentary
conceptual backgrounds. Then, the consequence is that their respective positions
become mutually incomprehensible, because they use words in disparate ways and
interpret principles so idiosyncratically that these interpretations become inaccessible to others (see also Balagangadhara and De Roover 2007; Claerhout and De
Roover 2005; De Roover 2002).
This hypothesis explains some of the problems of conceptual transplants.
The risk is not that they are rejected, as often occurs when foreign organs are
transplanted to a recipient body. Rather, the risk lies in the way in which concepts
are adopted and accommodated into an alien setting. When these concepts are
detached from their background framework, they lose their lifeblood: they are
cut loose from the semantic and conceptual moorings that guaranteed their basic
clarity and coherency.
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Chapter 3
3.2. Secularism and Religious Freedom

To what extent does this hypothesis on the problem of conceptual transplants allow us to make sense of the debate on the secular state and religious freedom in
India? In the second half of the 1940s, the Constituent Assembly held one of the
early discussions on these issues, which set the agenda for many future debates in
Indian politics (Bajpai 2002; Jha 2002). Rochana Bajpai ends her insightful analysis of the use of secularism in the CAD by pointing out that: Connotations of
secularism in both the Constituent Assembly debates and the Shah Bano debate
drew upon standard Western liberal-democratic notions as well as indigenous
cultural and historical idioms (Bajpai 2002, 194). What further implications does
this have? It is to this fascinating discussion that we will now turn.
The Assembly was itself a controversial body,1 because it had been erected on
the basis of the notions of communal representation that dominated the politics
of the last decades of British India:
The Assembly was elected by the provincial assemblies of British India grouped
into three sections Muslim-majority areas in the north-west and north-east and
the remaining Hindu-majority provinces. With each province allotted seats proportionate to its population, legislators belonging to religious categories elected
the members. The outcome was that while the Muslim League led by Mohammed
Ali Jinnah claimed 73 of the 78 Muslim seats and the Panthic Akalis three of the
four Sikh ones, Congress won 202 of the 206 general seats. (Chiriyankandath
2000, 4)
Nevertheless, at first blush, the general principles stated in the Constituent Assembly appeared uncontroversial and simply mirrored principles of liberal political theory. Draft Article 19 of the Constitution was formulated as follows: All
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience, and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality or health...
(CAD, 3:488). Similarly, one Professor K.T. Shah proposed to include this article:
The State in India being secular shall have no concern with any religion, creed
or profession of faith; and shall observe an attitude of absolute neutrality in all
The formation of the Constituent Assembly was a long and complex process intertwined also with
the process of forming an Interim Government, see Brass (1994, 1-28), Copland (2001), Menon
(1957), Singh (2004, 197-216). The members were elected through the Provincial Legislative Assemblies. The great majority of the members belonged to the Indian National Congress, others to
the Muslim League and a few to the Scheduled Caste Federation and the Communist Party. The
Christian representatives who figure in our analysis of the debates on conversion were part of the
Congress.
1
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matters relating to the religion of any class of its citizens or other persons in the
Union. He insisted that this ought not to be controversial: We have proclaimed
it time and again that the State in India is secular, and as such it should have
no concernI should think that would follow logicallywith the affairs of any
religion, with the profession of any particular faith, creed or belief (CAD, 7:815816).
Most, if not all, members of the Constituent Assembly agreed that India
should become a secular democracy. Yet, there was vehement disagreement about
the formulation and interpretation of political principles and legal articles related
to religion. It is in these disputes that conceptual confusion came to the surface
and led to deadlocks. Perhaps the most striking instance was the discussion about
the religious character of personal law and the question whether the secular state
requires a uniform civil code.
This discussion started when Mohamed Ismail, a Muslim representative from
Madras, proposed to add the following proviso to Article 35, the article which
stated that the state would secure for its citizens a uniform civil code throughout
the territory of India: Provided that any group, section or community of people
shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case it has such a law. Ismail defended his proviso in these terms:
Now the right to follow personal law is part of the way of life of those people
who are following such laws; it is part of their religion and part of their culture.
If anything is done affecting the personal laws, it will be tantamount to interference with the way of life of those people who have been observing these laws for
generations and ages. This secular State which we are trying to create should not
do anything to interfere with the way of life and religion of the people. (CAD,
7:540-541)
Several other Muslim representatives agreed that the secular state, as a state that
does not interfere with religion, should not touch personal laws and ways of life
that people had followed for ages. Other members of the Constituent Assembly
rejected this proviso as a direct negation of Article 35. The Muslim representatives
then followed two strategies: they invoked the general interest and suggested that
each religious community had certain civil laws inseparably connected to religious
beliefs and practices, all of which should be safeguarded; and they argued that, for
Muslims in particular, laws of succession, inheritance, marriage and divorce were
completely dependent upon religion.
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The dispute soon turned to the correct interpretation of the secular state
and the references of the word religion in principles of secularism and freedom
of religion. Another Muslim from Madras, Mahboob Ali Baig Bahadur, insisted
that people in India seemed to have very strange ideas about the secular state:
People seem to think that under a secular State, there must be a common law
observed by its citizens in all matters, including matters of their daily life, their
language, their culture, their personal laws. That is not the correct way to look at
this secular State. In a secular State, citizens belonging to different communities
must have the freedom to practice their own religion, observe their own life and
their personal laws should be applied to them. (CAD, 7:544)
Now, the idea that the same set of laws and rights should apply to all citizens, irrespective of religious or ethnic affiliation, is not a very strange idea, but a core
principle of the liberal secular state. The absolute certainty with which Bahadur
proclaimed his correct way of conceiving the secular state indicates lack of familiarity with notions and theories of the secular state.
Something peculiar began to happen here: the principle that the state should
guarantee the freedom of religion and ought not to interfere in religious affairs
became an isolated sentence that one could interpret as one chose to. Take the
suggestions about the freedom to observe ones own life and that the state ought
not to interfere with ways of life that people have been observing for generations and ages. If these were constitutive principles of the secular state, then any
community should be free to continue all practices it considers traditional under
the rule of such a state. Any uniform legal system would then be problematic.
Indeed, on the basis of this principle, Muslim representatives in the Assembly
rejected the intention to have uniformity of law to be imposed upon the whole
people concerning civil matters as a tyrannous provision which ought not to be
tolerated (CAD, 7:545-547).
In response to such arguments, K.M. Munshi, a lawyer from Gujarat and
a prominent Congressman, remarked that liberal secular states in the West had
uniformity of law and that this could hardly be denounced as tyranny. Munshi
also challenged that personal law was part of religion. The Constituent Assembly
had already accepted the principle that if a religious practice followed so far covers a secular activity or falls within the field of social reform or social welfare, it
would be open to Parliament to make laws about it without infringing the right
to freedom of religion. Of course, this gave rise to a central question: When is a
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practice religious and when does it cover a secular activity? In this discussion, the
terms religious and secular were not part of any explicitly formulated theoretical framework and certainly not embedded in a shared conceptual background.
For the different parties involved, these terms lacked any clear and common reference to specific domains of life. Hence, the dispute began to take the form of
disagreement about the meaning of religion and the secular. Munshi argued
as follows: Religion must be restricted to spheres which legitimately appertain
to religion, and the rest of life must be regulated, unified and modified in such a
manner that we may evolve, as early as possible a strong and consolidated nation
(CAD, 7:548).
The level of disagreement and confusion revealed itself when the same points
returned as the Assembly considered the article on freedom of conscience and
religion. Again, Mohamed Ismail wanted to add the freedom to follow the personal law of the group or community to which he belongs or professes to belong
(CAD, 7:721-722). Against Munshis arguments, he insisted that personal law is
indeed part of religion for Muslim believers:
It is a question of difference of opinion as to what a religion should do or should
not. People differ and people holding different views on this matter must tolerate
the other view. There are religions which omit altogether to deal with the question
of personal law and there are other religions like Hinduism and Islam which deal
with personal law. Therefore I say that people ought to be given liberty of following their personal law. (CAD, 7:721-722)
When someone objected that some Muslim groups in India did not accept the
Shariah as personal law, another representative bluntly stated that if there is any
one who wants a change in the mandatory principle, or religion as a matter of
personal law, then he cannot be a Muslim (CAD, 7:756-757). Maulana Hasrat
Mohani explained why this was the case and why personal law could not but be
part of religion: it had been ordained by God, not by human agency (CAD, 7:759).
Here, we see that these Muslim representatives made use of a specific background
framework to give content to the term religion and to interpret principles of the
secular state and freedom of religion, namely, the framework of Islamic theology.
Confronted by this specific theological interpretation of secularism and religious freedom, the secularists failed to draw upon any coherent theory or conception of religion that clarified which properties make something religious or
how one should circumscribe the realm of religion. Instead they took recourse to
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rhetoric: Will you give the right of human sacrifice to those who believe in it and
may claim it under the pretext of their personal law? (CAD, 7:760). The chief
architect of the Constitution and leader of the untouchables, B.R. Ambedkar,
then intervened with the following proposal:
The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect
of life, from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal
law is to be saved, I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a
standstill. I do not think it is possible to accept a position of that sort. There is
nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend beyond beliefs and
such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious.
It is not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or
laws relating to succession, should be governed by religionI personally do not
understand why religion should be given this vast, expansive jurisdiction so as to
cover the whole of life and to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that
field. (CAD, 7:781-782)
Ambedkars argument holds a problem. He gave no criteria to recognize what is

and is not religion, but borrowed from nineteenth-century Orientalism the truism
that religion covers every aspect of life in India. He then proposed to stipulate a
definition of religion in terms of beliefs and rituals that are essentially religious.
However, what is essentially religious will depend on ones definition of religion,
so this cannot serve to define religion. In any definition, the definiens should not
include the definiendum. In spite of this vicious circle, Ambedkar concluded: It is,
therefore, quite impossible for anybody to conceive that the personal law shall be
excluded from the jurisdiction of the State (ibid.). That this is quite possible to
conceive has been demonstrated by history: India has excluded Muslim personal
law from the uniform civil code for more than sixty years now.
As the debate continued, the absence of a common conceptual framework
generated even more puzzlement as to what made a state, nation or society secular. For instance, Tajamul Husain, a representative from the state of Bihar, wanted
the following explanation to be added to clause (1) of Article 19: No person shall
have any visible sign or mark or name, and no person shall wear any dress whereby
his religion may be recognised. In the civilized countries of the West, Husain
argued, one cannot recognize a mans religion by his name or dress. Unfortunately,
in India the opposite was the case. In England, an Act had been passed by which
there was uniformity of dress and this should now also happen in India:
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We are one nation. Let us all have one kind of dress; one kind of name; and no
visible signs. In conclusion, I say we are going to be a secular State. We should not,
being a secular State, be recognised by our dress. If you have a particular kind of
dress, you know at once that so and so is a Hindu or a Muslim. This thing should
be done away with. (ibid., 819)
To be a secular state, under this interpretation, meant to have a society in which

religious or ethnic groups could not be recognized and distinguished from each
other. Now, one could try and rationalize this as an expression of the need to rid
India of so-called ascriptive identities, which was central to the project of nationalism (Bajpai 2002, 6-7). Yet, this vague connection between secularism and
national unity cannot make the proposal any more sensible that the secular state
is one that imposes uniformity of dress. Against the background of liberal political philosophy, this type of policy suits a dictatorship, not a secular democracy.
No wonder then that some Assembly members began to complain: Gradually
it seems to me that our secular State is a slippery phrase, a device to by-pass the
ancient culture of the land (CAD, 7:822-823).
Even where one reproduced the classical formulation and justification of
the secular state, these were subjected to peculiar kinds of distortion. H.V. Kamath, for instance, argued that the separation of church and state was necessary,
because western history had shown that their union brought about violence and
bloodshed. India had witnessed the same problem: even the much-praised rule
of Emperor Ashoka, which identified the state with one particular religion, i.e.
Buddhism, had created strife between Hindus and Buddhists. Kamath followed
the logic of the nation-state here: Therefore, it is clear to my mind that If [sic]
a State identifies itself with any particular religion, there will be rift within the
State. After all, the State represents all the people, who live within its territories,
and, therefore, it cannot afford to identify itself with the religion of any particular
section of the population (CAD, 7:824-825). In the next step, however, it became
clear how different the secular state looked to Kamath: We have certainly declared that India would be a secular State. But to my mind a secular state is neither
a Godless State nor an irreligious nor an anti-religious State. The real meaning of
the word religion, he pointed out, is Dharma or the true values of religion or of
the spirit. All states need these spiritual values to get out of their malaise. Therefore, the secular state was also one which united politics and religion: When I say,
Sir, that the State shall not establish or endow or patronise any particular religion,
I mean the formal religions of the World; I do not mean religion in the widest and
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in the deepest sense. That is, the meaning of religion as the highest value of the
spirit (CAD, 7:826). In one and the same move, the secular state could become
a state that ought to be separated from religion and one that ought to be unified
with religion, because one could give different meanings to the word religion.
At one point, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indias first prime minister and arch-secularist, grew so exasperated by the discussions on the secular state that he begged
the gentlemen who use this word often to consult some dictionary before they
use it. It is invoked in all contexts, he remarked, as if by saying that we are a
secular State we have done something amazingly generousWe have only done
something which every country does except a very few misguided and backward
countries in the world (CAD, 9:401) .
To conclude, in this first aspect, the Constituent Assembly Debates on secularism and religious freedom exemplify the problem of conceptual transplants.
The relevant concepts and principles had been cut loose from their original background framework. Therefore, different representatives could interpret these principles as they saw fit. Muslim representatives gave content to religion, the secular state and the freedom of religion in terms of Islamic theology and concluded
that personal law ought to be protected. Consequently, secularists entered into
tricky debates about the correct delimitation of the term religion. The notion of
the secular state underwent a process of semantic distortion, because there were
no conceptual limits on the interpretation of the terms secular and religious.
3.3. Conversion: From Incomprehension to Irritation

These general concerns about secularism and the freedom of religion provided the
backdrop for a debate on religious conversion in the Constituent Assembly, which
developed in a peculiar way. At first, in a discussion on the Interim Report on
Fundamental Rights, the adoption of Clause 13 of the Justiciable Fundamental
Rights had been presented for discussion to the Constituent Assembly (April
30-May 1, 1947). Nothing noteworthy had happened: the Clause was accepted,
including its mention of the right to propagate religion. The basic part reads:
All persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience, and the right freely to
profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality or health,
and to the other provisions of this Part...
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Shortly thereafter, however, during the discussion on Clause 17, a dispute

emerged (Clause 17 reads: Conversion from one religion to another brought
about by coercion or undue influence shall not be recognized by law). This happened after K.M. Munshi had moved the following amendment with additions
to Clause 17: Any conversion from one religion to another of any person brought
about by fraud, coercion or undue influence or of a minor under the age of 18 shall
not be recognized by law (CAD, 3:488).
At stake was the second part of this amendment. The dispute showed the
delicacy of the matter of conversion of minors for both parties involved. In the
ensuing discussion, a Christian participant interfered by pointing out that the
right to profess, practice and propagate religion is a fundamental right (already
accepted in Clause 13) and that, hence, this right would be taken away by adding
the proviso or of a minor under the age of 18. Another participant explained that
youth under the age of 18 also have a conscience before God and that they should
also be allowed the freedom to change religion. A call from God can come before
the age of 18 and, therefore, the universal right to freedom of religion should be
safeguarded.
Many of the Hindu representatives became irritated hearing such arguments.
Only at this point did the debate on conversion really take off in the Constituent
Assembly. Some Hindus began to express suspicion towards the whole notion of
conversion and, especially, towards the conversion techniques used by Christians.
This opposition made it obvious that conversion had been accepted in Clause 13,
not because the Hindu representatives in the Constituent Assembly considered
this an inalienable human right, but solely because they wanted to grant this to
the Christians, for whom conversion was apparently important. In the end, the
Assembly did not come to a decision and sent Clause 17 back to the Advisory
Committee. Many of the same objections surfaced again on December 3, 1948,
when Article 19 (Clause 13) was discussed. This time, especially the inclusion of
the right to propagate religion created bad blood. In the end, however, none of
the objections were taken into account and the Article was approved with some
minor changes.
Of interest is the fact that many members of the Assembly (minus the Christian representatives) refused to discuss conversion as an inalienable human right.
The only reason why they recognized the right to propagate religion was because
Christians deemed this crucial for the practice of their religion. As they put it,
they wanted to carry their Christian friends with them. The Christian represen-
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tatives, on the other hand, did not hide the fact that they interpreted the right to
profess, practise and propagate religion as the recognition of an inalienable human
right. Thus, we observe two completely different attitudes in the debates. Let us
analyze these two attitudes to see in what respect they differ.
Defending an inalienable human right
The Christian arguments hinged upon the notion of inalienable human rights,
more precisely the inalienable human right of freedom of religion and freedom
of conscience. In the discussion on Clause 17, the Anglo-Indian representative
Frank R. Anthony made the following statement:
I agree that conversion under undue influence, conversion by coercion or conversion by fraud should not be recognized by law. I am only interested in this question, Sir, on principle. My community does not propagate. We do not convert,
nor are we converted. But I do appreciate how deeply, how passionately millions
of Christians feel on this right to propagate their religion. I want to congratulate
the major party for having, in spite of its contentious character, retained the words
right to practise and propagate their religion. Having done that, I say that after
giving with one hand this principle fundamental right, a right which is regarded
as perhaps the most fundamental of Christian rights, do not take it away by this
proviso, or of a minor under the age of 18. I say that if you have this particular
provision, or if you place an absolute embargo on the conversion of a minor, you
will place an embargo absolutely on the right of conversion. You will virtually take
away the right to convert. Because, what will happen? Not a single adult who is
a parent, however deeply he may feel, however deeply he may be convinced, will
ever adopt Christianity, because, by this clause you will be cutting off that parent
from his children. By this clause you will say, although the parents may be converted to Christianity, the child shall not be brought up by these parents in the
faith of the parents. You will be cutting at the root of family life. I say it is contrary
to the ordinary concepts of natural law and justice. You may have your prejudices
against conversion; you may have your prejudices against propagation. But once
having allowed it, I plead with you not to cut at the root of family life. This is a
right which is conceded in every part of the world; the right of parents to bring
up their children in the faith that the parents want them to pursue. You have your
safeguards. You have provided that conversion by undue influence, conversion by
fraud, conversion by coercion shall not be recognized by lawI realise how deeply
certain sections of this House feel on this question of conversion. But I do ask you,
having once conceded the right to propagate, to concede this in consonance with
the principles of family law and in consonance with the principles of natural law
and justice. (CAD, 3:489-490)
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Three elements are important to note here. First, Anthony agreed that conversion
brought about by fraud or inducement cannot be recognized as true conversion.
At the same time he also characterized this as the Hindu safeguard. In other
words, he seemed to point out that these are the most powerful and maybe even
the only arguments that one can legitimately formulate against the right to convert. He made clear what the limits for opposition to conversion are: it should not
be fraudulent, forced or induced. Until today, however, it is a contentious matter
how to identify a conversion as fraudulent, forced or induced (see the next chapter).
Second, Anthony argued that, since the fundamental right is granted to
practise and propagate religion (Clause 13), any attempt to curb this right, for
instance by introducing an age limit, is unlawful. From the Christian point of
view, the right to freedom of religion does not come alone but brings a range of
implications in its wake. One such is the creation of optimal conditions to make
the freedom of religion possible in a society.
A third element in his defence of conversion was that the other Congressmen (mainly Hindus) might be prejudiced. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term prejudice as a prejudgement: Preconceived opinion not based
on reason or actual experience; bias, partiality; (now) spec. unreasoned dislike,
hostility, or antagonism towards, or discrimination against, a race, sex, or other
class of people...2 It is remarkable that Anthony reduced the Indian opposition
to conversion to prejudice. While millions of Christians feel passionately about
the right to propagate their religion, many more millions of Indians experience
resentment towards conversion and the propagation of religion. Could this experience be reduced to prejudices against conversion and against propagation?
The same three elements return in the interventions of other Christian
representatives during the debate on conversion. For example, when Rev. J.J.M.
Nichols-Roy explains that conversion is the exercising of ones conscience he says
that freedom of conversion also implies the freedom of the conscience to respond
to the call of God and that it is not in the hands of human beings to restrict it to
those aged 18 and above.
to think that a youth under the age of eighteen does not have a conscience
before God and, therefore, he cannot express his belief is wrong. That side of the
question must be appropriately considered. There is a spiritual side in conversion
See Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. Prejudice, Oxford University Press, http://
dictionary.oed.com/
2
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which ought to be taken notice of by this House. Conversion does not mean only
that a man changes his form of religion from one religion to another, or adopts
a different name of religion, such as, a Hindu becomes a Christian. But there is
the spiritual aspect of conversion, that is, the connection of the soul of man with
God, which must not be overlooked by this House. I know there are those who
change their religion being influenced by material considerations, but there are
others who are converted being under the influence of spiritual power. When a
boy feels that he is called by God to adopt a different faith, no law should prevent
him from doing that. The consciences of those youths who want to change their
religion and adopt another religion from the spiritual standpoint should not be
prevented from allowing these youths to exercise their right to change their legal
status and change their religionFrom the standpoint of conscience I consider
that it is altogether wrong not to allow a youth from the age of twelve to eighteen
to exercise his own conscience before God. It will oppress the consciences of the
youths who want to exercise their religious faiths before GodWhy should they
be prevented from changing their religion? Why should their consciences be oppressed? That is a very important point, Sir, to be considered by this House. This
freedom I consider to be a Fundamental Right of the youths. No law should be
made which will work against good spiritual forces. India, especially, is a country
of religions, a country where there is religious freedom. (CAD, 3:491)
Conversion and the freedom to convert, for the Christians, are inherently connected to the relation between the human conscience and the spiritual work of
God, so Nichols-Roy explains. This implies not only that the freedom to convert
should be guaranteed by the law, but also, as he points out, that all other laws must
be subordinated to this law: This freedom I consider to be a Fundamental Right
of the youths. No law should be made which will work against good spiritual
forces. From the perspective of Christian theology, this position was eminently
logical. The Reverend also stated very clearly that he was against any conversion
by undue influence or by fraud or coercion (CAD, 3:492). These are the limits
within which conversion can be criticized. But even in fighting these evils, one
should be careful: When we make a law against all these evils we should be careful to see that law does not oppress the consciences of the youths who also need
freedom (CAD, 3:492).
In the discussions, many members of the Assembly seemed to approach the
right to conversion as a minority demand from the Indian Christian community.
Rev. Jerome DSouza deplored this way of looking at the issue: I regret, Sir, that
this discussion should have taken a turn which makes it look as if it is almost
exclusively a minority problem, and as a result of that, a degree of heat has been
imported into it which most of us regret very much indeed (CAD, 3:496).
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For the Christian minorities in the Constituent Assembly something crucial

was at stake: the recognition of the freedom of religion, including the freedom
to convert, as an inalienable and universal human right. The recognition of this
right as inalienable and universal implies that all human beings irrespective of age
and level of intellectual development can legitimately convert from one religion
to another. Conversion is understood as a free act of the conscience. No law may
prevent this.
The principle of religious freedom was interpreted in a particular way here,
because it operated against the background of a theology that had established an
indissoluble link between religious freedom and conversion. Originally, freedom
of religion in Christianity had referred to the freedom to choose between true
and false religion. Augustine and other church fathers conceived of freedom as
the ability to resist the seduction of sin, which Gods grace in Christ gives to the
true believers. One was truly free, only if one turned or converted to the biblical
God by submitting oneself to His will and thus escaping from the grip of Satan.
The link between conversion and freedom of religion, then, is a theological legacy
from Christianity.
What is Inalienable about Reasoned Changes of Opinion?
These objections against Clause 17 (concerning the minimum age for conversion)
created bad blood between the Christian representatives and other Congressmen.
Several of the latter, while they had been silent when Clause 13 (profess, practise
and propagate religion) was moved, now expressed their incomprehension and
aversion towards the practise of conversion. At first sight, these responses appeared less coherent than the Christian standpoint. The Hindu objections were
more diversified and less coordinated. It is clear that the Hindu representatives
experienced a problem, but it is not entirely clear yet what that problem might be.
In the following, we will sketch some of the most important strands in the Hindu
objections against conversion as a universal and inalienable human right.
The first response to the Christian interpellations came from the famous
political leader and social activist, Purushottamdas Tandon, who voiced his surprise:
Some of them have said that in this Assembly we have admitted the right of every
one to propagate his religion and to convert from one religion to another. We
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Congressmen deem it very improper to convert from one to another religion or

to take part in such activities and we are not in favour of this. In our opinion it
is absolutely futile to be keen on converting others to ones faith. But it is only at
the request of some persons, whom we want to keep with us in our national endeavour that we accept this. Now it is said that they have a right to convert young
children to their faith. What is this? Really this surprises me very much. (CAD,
3:492; emphasis mine)
In other words, it is only within the context of Indian state formation and the
need to create a unity between the different groups that one could see conversion as a right: the recognition of this right became a pragmatic way to include
Christian communities. Tandon repeated this point:
We have agreed to the right of conversion. Generally, we, Congressmen do not
think it at all right I say so frankly that people should strenuously go about
trying to convert peoples of other faith into their own, but we want to carry our
Christian friends with us friends who feel that they should have the right to make
conversions and we have agreed on their insistence to retain this formula about
propagation. They know that we are opposed to it, yet we have agreed. (CAD,
I say that the majority of Congressmen do not like the process of making
converts (interruption), but in order to carry our Christian friends with us
I know that most Congressmen are opposed to this idea of propagation. But we agreed to keep the word propagate out of regard for our Christian
friends. (CAD, 3:493; italics mine)
Tandon drew upon an analogy to explain the difficulty he had with this notion of
conversion:
You can convert a child below eighteen by convincing and persuading him but he
is a child of immature sense and legally and morally speaking this conversion can
never be considered valid. If a boy of eighteen executes a transfer deed in favour
of a man for his hut worth only Rs. 100, the transaction is considered unlawful.
But our brethren come forward and say that the boy has enough sense to change
his religion. That the value of religion is even less than that of a hut worth one
hundred rupees. It is proper that a boy should be allowed to formally change his
religion only when he attains maturity. (CAD, 3:492)
According to this analogy, the conversion of a child was a contradictio in terminis.

A child is immature and, therefore, its conversion cannot be valid either legally or
morally. The preconditions of conversion consist of a well-developed capacity to
reason and well-informed opinion in matters of religion. From this perspective,
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conversion of a child can only take place through force, fraud or allurement. The last
sentence in the above citation implies that this objection is not just some unreasonable and general rejection of conversion, since it sees no problem in switching
between religions once one attains maturity.
Tandon was surprised at the fact that conversion was not regarded as the
result of a mature change of opinion on reasonable grounds. While countering
Anthonys remarks that what was given with the right hand (Clause 13) had been
taken away with the left (Clause 17), Tandon noted:
What we gave them with our right hand is that they have a right to convert others
by an appeal to reason and after honestly changing their views and outlook. The three
words, coercion, fraud and undue influence are included as provisos and are
meant to cover the cases of adult converts. The words are not applicable to converts of immature age. Their conversion is coercion and undue influence under all
circumstances. How can the young ones change their religion? They have not the sense
to understand the teachings of your scriptures. If they change their religion it is only
under some influence and this influence is not fair. (CAD, 3:492; italics mine)
Even though Gibbon interrupted Tandon by questioning his competence to speak

for all Congressmen, it is clear that many indeed had a similar take on the issue.
Gibbon was called back by several members of the Constituent Assembly who
bestowed upon Tandon the right to speak on behalf of most of the Congressmen
and allowed him to continue.
Other Congressmen added to this line of reasoning. Algu Rai Shastri, for
example, also explained why conversion of minors is a contradictio in terminis:
Such minors on attaining majority often regret that they were made to change
their religion, improperly. Wherever the Europeon [sic] or the white races of Europe, who rule practically over the whole world, have gone, they have [gone] as
Missionaries. A study of the Prosperous India by Digby shows that cross was
followed by the sword. The missionary was followed by the batons, the swords,
and the guns. It was in this way that they employed coercion for spreading their
religions and for extending their Empire. At the same time, they put economic
and political pressure on the indigenous tribes and consolidated the foundations
of their dominion. We want such an amendment in this clause of Fundamental
Rights that a person who wants to change his religion should be able to do so
only after he is convinced through cool deliberation that the new religion is more
satisfactory to him than the old one. For example it is only when I am convinced that
Sikhism is preferable to Hinduism, that I should be able to change my religion.
This right I believe we have. But no one should change religion out of greed and
temptation. (CAD, 3:497-498; italics mine)
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He too emphasized that the problem is not the change of religion per se:
I have a right to change my religion. I believe in God. If I realize tomorrow that
God is a farce and an aberration of human mind then I can become an atheist.
If I think that the Hindu faith is false, I, with my grey hair, my fallen teeth and
ripe age, and my mature discretion can change my religion. But if my minor child
repeats what I say, are you going to allow him also a right to change his religion
(at that age)? ...In my opinion this majority community should not oppress the
minority. We respect and honour all and we give an opportunity to everybody to
propagate his religion. Those who agree with you may be converted. But convert
only those who can be legitimately be converted. Improper conversions would not
be right. You tempt the innocent little ones whom you take in your lap, by a suit
of clothes, a piece of bread and a little toy and thus you ruin their lives. Later, they
repent that they did not get an opportunity to have a religion of their choice. I, for
myself, am prepared to change my religion. But someone should argue with me
and change my views and then convert me. (CAD, 3:499)
Another Congressman, Jagat Narain Lal, was of the opinion that the freedom to
propagate religion is the furthest that the majority could go in giving in to the
Christian minority. He compared other Constitutions in the modern world and
concluded that the right to propagate religion had nowhere been included:
My submission is that this House has gone to the farthest limit possible with regard
to minorities, knowing well the fact that there are a few minorities in this country
whose right to carry on propaganda extends to the point of creating various difficultiesHonble Tandonji by his observation that on reading the mind of most
of the Congress members of this House he did not want to keep right to do
propaganda (on the statute), has rightly interpreted the mind of most of us. The
fact is that we desire to make the minorities feel that the rights which they had been
enjoying till now shall be allowed to continue within reasonable limits by the majority.
We have no desire to curtail them in any way. But we do not concede the right to
do propaganda. I want to appeal to those who profess to speak for the minorities
not to press for too much. They must be satisfied with this much. It will be too
much to press for more. That would be taking undue advantage of the generosity
of the majority. That will be very regrettable. It is difficult, rather impossible, for us
to go to that limit. (CAD, 3:500; italics mine)
Again, we see that the right to propagate was considered as a pragmatic concession to the minorities. During the later discussions on Article 19 (December,
1948), some old and some new arguments were put forward in the Constituent Assembly. Especially the use of the word propagate continued to generate
discontent. Many members proposed amendments: one Muslim League repre-
95
sentative, Tajamul Husain, suggested replacing the words practise and propagate
religion by practise religion privately.
I feel, Sir, that religion is a private affair between oneself and his Creator. It has
nothing to do with others. My religion is my own belief, and your religion, Sir,
is your own belief. Why should you interfere with my religion, and why should I
interfere with your religion? Religion is only a means for the attainment of ones
salvation. Supposing I honestly believe that I will attain salvation according to my way
of thinking, and according to my religion, and you Sir, honestly believe that you will
attain salvation according to your way, then why should I ask you to attain salvation
according to my way, or why should you ask me to attain salvation according to your
way? If you accept this proposition, then, why propagate religion? As I said, religion
is between oneself and his God. Then, honestly profess religion and practice it at
home. Do not demonstrate it for the sake of propagating. Do not show to the
people that this is your religion for the sake of showing. If you start propagating
religion in this country, you will become a nuisance to others. So far it has become a
nuisance. (CAD, 7:817-818; italics mine)
This is quite remarkable, coming from a Muslim. This indicates that the incomprehension towards Christian practices of proselytization also extended to Indian
Muslims. Here, conversion was characterized as unwanted interference and contrasted to the Indian attitude of non-interference. Neither the Christians with
their conversions nor the secular state should interfere in religious matters. So I
would request you to leave me alone, Tajamul Husain said, to practise and profess my own religion privately.
Another Congress member moved an amendment to curb the right to propagate by adding that this is forbidden in educational institutions, asylums and
hospitals, institutions for the elderly people, etc (CAD, 7:820). The underlying
idea is that conversion or propagation must be allowed but that a change of opinion can only happen after full and mature consideration.
Reflecting the Hindu nationalist viewpoint, Lokanath Misra expressed his
fear for the continuation of Hindu culture. It was he who argued that the emphasis on creating a secular state seemed to be a means to by-pass the ancient culture
of the land, Hindu culture. He said:
this unjust generosity of tabooing religion and yet making propagation of religion a fundamental right is somewhat uncanny and dangerous. Justice demands
that the ancient faith and culture of the land should be given a fair deal, if not
restored to its legitimate place after a thousand years of suppression. We have no
quarrel with Christ or Mohammad or what they saw and said. We have all respect
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for them. To my mind, Vedic culture excludes nothing. Every philosophy and
culture has its place but now the cry of religion is a dangerous cry. It denominates,
it divides and encamps people to warring ways. In the present context what can
this word propagation in article 19 mean? It can only mean paving the way for the
complete annihilation of Hindu culture, the Hindu way of life and manners. Islam
has declared it hostility to Hindu thought. Christianity has worked out the policy
of peaceful penetration by the back-door on the outskirts of our social life. This is
because Hinduism did not accept barricades for its protection. Hinduism is just
an integrated vision and a philosophy of life and cosmos, expressed in organised
society to live that philosophy in peace and amity. But Hindu generosity has been
misused and politics has overrun Hindu culture. Today religion in India serves no
higher purpose than collecting ignorance, poverty and ambition under a banner
that flies for fanaticism. (CAD, 7:823-824)
Misra expressed the fear that giving in to the demands might pose a serious threat
to Hindu culture: Let us not raise the question of communal minorities any
more. It is a device to swallow the majority in the long run. This is intolerable and
unjust (CAD, 7:824). He also pointed out no other Constitution of the world had
recognized the right to propagate religion as a fundamental right. He concluded
his interpellation before the Assembly as follows:
If people should propagate their religion, let them do so. Only I crave, let not the
Constitution put it as a fundamental right and encourage it. Fundamental rights
are inalienable and once they are admitted, it will create bad blood. I therefore say,
let us say nothing about rights relating to religion. Religion will take care of itself.
Drop the word propagate in article 19 at least. Civilization is going headlong to
the melting pot. Let us beware and try to survive. (CAD, 7:824)
This plea did not oppose conversion or change of religion but opposed recognizing it as an inalienable human right. Other members suggested that the problem
lay not in professing, practising and propagating religion, but in the fact that many
did not understand their respective religions well and, hence, did not practice
them in the proper manner (CAD, 7:831). There was also considerable confusion on what propagation meant and implied. Some suggested that it referred to
education in ones religion and even argued that education of the Hindus along
the lines of the Christians might be recommendable in India. As Krishnaswami
Bharathi said:
the word propagate ought to be there. After all, it should not be understood
that it is only for any sectarian religion. It is generally understood that the word
propagate is intended only for the Christian community. But I think it is abso-
97
lutely necessary, in the present context of circumstances, that we must educate

our people on religious tenets and doctrines. So far as my experience goes, the
Christian community have not transgressed their limits of legitimate propagation
of religious view, and on the whole they have done very well indeed. It is for other
communities to emulate them and propagate their own religions as well. (CAD, 7:833;
italics mine)
This idea was carried further when some other representatives began to explore
the opportunities for Hindus to start conversion practices:
It [i.e. propagating ones religion] is perfectly open to the Hindus and the Arya
Samajists to carry on their Suddhi propaganda as it is open to the Christians, the
Muslims, the Jains and the Buddhists and to every other religionist, so long as he
does it subject to public order, morality and the other conditions that have to be
observed in any civilised government. (CAD, 7:836)
In the end, the right to freedom of religion was included in part III of the Constitution of India as a part on Fundamental rights in Article 25:
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of
religion.
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely
to profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent
the State from making any law
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
Explanation I.The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II.In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be
construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed
accordingly.
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3.4. Conversion and Conceptual Transplants

This dispute on conversion and the freedom of religion points to another aspect that complicates the earlier discussion of conceptual transplants. Again, we
see that the different parties interpreted notions of propagation, conversion,
fundamental rights and the principle of freedom of religion radically differently.
However, while it is clear that Christian representatives shared similar interpretations and concerns because of a common background theology, it is much less
clear how to make sense of the other perspective.
How should we interpret the opposition to conversion among these Constituent Assembly members and their understanding of freedom of conscience and
religion? As must be evident, they opposed neither changes of opinion in general
nor all shifts between traditions and practices. Although they had a problem, it is
difficult to pinpoint its core elements. While they were against the conversion of
minors, the poor and the elderly, the underlying concern was not entirely clear.
One route would be to point out that most of these Assembly members were
Hindus and then look for a Hindu theology that might explain their positions
and interpretations of the relevant terms and principles. This route is a dead-end.
On the one hand, as students of Hinduism have long argued, it is impossible to
circumscribe any theology or system of doctrines shared by all Hindus. In fact,
more and more scholars suggest that Hinduism is a western or colonial construction that does not refer to any real religious entity or framework existing in
India (Balagangadhara 1994; Bloch et al. 2010). On the other hand, some nonHindu participants in these debates shared the same attitudes, interpretations and
concerns. So our explanation cannot remain limited to characteristically Hindu
beliefs or attitudes.
In his recent study, Sebastian Kim tries to explain the dispute over conversion, but he fails to capture the main concerns of the Hindu arguments (Kim
1999, 2003). Instead he picks out one aspect and treats it as a self-explanatory
item: colonial resentment against Christian conversion. He points out that Hindus saw conversion as a colonial imposition from the outside (Kim 2003, 42):
For Hindus, Hindu culture and tradition were such an integral part of their identity that religious conversion meant changing ones heritage and thus losing ones
identity. It went against the tradition of social, moral and religious order, established by dharma (CAD Vol. 7:824-826). While Christians feared that the majority Hindus would use their social and political power to suppress conversion,
99
Hindus resented the fact that Christians were determined to have their way over
the right of conversion, which they saw as a symbol of colonial oppression. (Kim
2003, 58)
However, many more arguments were put forward against conversion. In fact,
this element of colonial imposition was marginal in the Constituent Assembly
Debates on conversion. A major factor that emerged was the incomprehension of
Hindus towards the conversion practices of Christian missionaries. Surely, this is
not because of colonial imposition. In fact, in the pages to which Kim refers, we
never find the claim that religious conversion went against the social, moral and
religious order established by dharma. We do read that the state should not identify with one religion; and that dharma, understood as the true values of religion
or of the spirit and spiritual training, has something to contribute to the welfare
of the world. While there was pressure to include the right to convert in the right
to freedom of religion, it is incorrect to summarize the Hindu opposition as an
anti-colonial stance. While such elements definitely played some role, they fail
to clarify the problems which the Hindu representatives had with the idea and
practice of conversion.
Regarding the article supporting the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion, the least we could say about the responses of the non-Christian
members of the Assembly is that they reflected a variety of concerns and that
these were of a different kind than those of the Christians. This brings about a
complication for the hypothesis on conceptual transplants. When Hindus adopt
terms like religion, conversion and the secular and the principles of secularism and religious freedom, they sometimes appear to use them in random ways.
However, this closer look shows regular patterns in how they reason about conversion and the freedom of religion:
(1) First, many members of the Assembly endorsed the freedom to profess,
practise and propagate religion, not because it is a universal and inalienable human right, but as a concession towards the Christian minority. In other words, its
inclusion in the Indian Constitution is founded upon pragmatic considerations.
These considerations take place very explicitly against the background of Indian
state formation and in a climate of mutual give and take. Even if it is admitted
that the inclusion of this right might also benefit other Indian groups (even the
Hindu groups, as pointed out by one of the participants), they do not attempt to
formulate the right to convert as a universal and inalienable human right.
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(2) Second, this brings us to another characteristic of the Indian way of interpreting conversion and freedom of religion: there is a reluctance to accept these
as individual and personal rights. At best they are seen as values important to a
community or, in this case, a certain minority. However, the idea that the right to
convert and the right to freedom of religion refer to the rights of the individual
human being is absent. Equally, there is little indication that these two rights
should be coextensive in all cases, namely, that the right to freedom of religion is
coextensive with the right to convert.
(3) Third, conversion is understood as a change of opinion, which implies
the use of predicates such as maturity, reason, reasoned opinion, knowledge of the
traditions. It is possible that people change their opinion and/or change their religion; in fact, this seems to be accepted as a normal course of things. Even though
most see the activity of trying to convert others to ones own religion as futile, even
though there is a historical hostility towards the Christian mission, it is regarded
as normal and acceptable that people change their opinion. But this has to happen within the limits of reason. Consequently, phenomena such as the conversion
of minors or of the ignorant and the uneducated are denounced as reprehensible
practices. Even though coercion, fraud and allurement in matters of conversion
are considered problematic, these are not the only objections possible against conversion from the majority point of view. Propagation is understood in a parallel
way, not as preaching the truth of ones own religion and trying to convert others
to this truth, but as educating the followers of a religion (and outsiders) about the
nature of its traditions.
(4) Fourth, the general standpoint expressed in these arguments is that conversion is an unwanted interference. Different human ways to salvation exist; because there are different traditions, one should not try to make all people follow
the same path. One should also protect the traditions or the ancient faith and
culture of the land. This kind of attitude generates a specific interpretation of the
principle of religious freedom: it entails that one should be free from the intrusion
of proselytizing activities.
These patterns in the Hindu concerns bring us back to the complication for
the hypothesis on conceptual transplants. When Indians adopted terms like religion, conversion, propagation and the secular and invoked liberal principles
of secularism and religious freedom, they often appeared to use and interpret
these in random ways. However, this closer look reveals more or less systematic
patterns in their language use and reasoning. As was the case in Gandhis writings,
101
there appear to be regularities in the kind of semantic distortion inflicted upon

the liberal principles.
These patterns must reflect the background schemes and attitudes that had
shaped the reasoning of these Indian thinkers. However, while we were able to
understand the interpretations of Muslim and Christian representatives fairly effortlessly, because these drew upon explicit theological frameworks, this is not the
case for the arguments of Hindu members. Here lies the additional complication:
the background schemes behind their particular interpretations and distortions of
secularism and religious freedom are not easily available, but have to be excavated.
One will need to further examine the particular distortions in their language use
as expressions of such background schemes and attitudes. It is to this task that
we will turn in the next chapter, when we analyze anti-conversion legislation in
contemporary India.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter started out by noting the common claim that secularism and other
terms have acquired new meanings in India, distinct from the range of meanings
they originally had in western political theory. While this formulation is inaccurate, we can now begin to see some of the specifics of the problem these authors
are referring to. There are two significant aspects to the way in which this problem
of conceptual transplants operates.
In the first aspect, the concepts of religion, freedom and the secular and
principles of secularism and religious freedom have been detached from the background framework that provided them with minimal coherency and consistency
and that allowed different normative positions to crystallize and make sense in
the West. When they are introduced into Indian debates, these English-language
terms and principles are interpreted in disparate and distortive ways. This happens
either because fragments of a conceptual language are linked to a new background
framework like Islamic theology or because such fragments are invoked in apparent isolation from any larger conceptual framework. The result is tremendous
conceptual confusion.
In the second aspect of the problem of conceptual transplants, this confusion begins to reveal certain regular patterns. This is where the suggestion that
Indians have given a different meaning to secularism becomes understandable.
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The peculiar ways in which issues of secularism, religious freedom and conversion
are discussed point to background frameworks that give shape to these discussions. While the uses of terms like religion, secularism and conversion remain
distortive and puzzling, the semantic distortion itself reveals systematic patterns.
These patterns should be approached as expressions of the background attitudes
and conceptual schemes that determine how fragments of conceptual language
have been adopted from western political thought. The challenge that conceptual
transplants pose to us is the following: we have to track these background attitudes and conceptual schemes by studying the distortions they have caused in the
Indian use of concepts and principles from western thought. This is what needs
to be done to truly make sense of Indian secularism and its debates on religious
conversion.
Chapter 4
Conversion Legislation in India:

A Doubtful Match between Law and Religion
Soon after Independence, it became clear that the Indian Constitution and its
Article 25 would not be able to solve the problems related to religious conversion
in the Indian society.1 As early as 1954, the Indian Converts (Regulation and
Registration) Bill was presented in the Lok Sabha by Jethalal Joshi. He explained
it was to regulate conversion and to provide for registration and licensing of
persons aiding any person to become a convert (cited in Kim 2002, 230). Though
the bill was eventually rejected, it stapled the issue of religious conversion to the
agenda of the central and state governments for the second part of the twentieth
century. Also in 1954, the Madhya Pradesh state government launched an inquiry
into the proselytizing activities of foreign missionaries, which resulted in a report that recommended legal restrictions on conversion, the Niyogi Report (NCR
1956). In the next decade, the Orissa government endorsed the Orissa Freedom of
Religion Act (1967) that put such recommendations into practice and other states
were soon to follow, like Madhya Pradesh with its Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam (1968). As such, the example was set for a series of Freedom
of Religion Acts (aka anti-conversion legislation) in different Indian states.2 Even
today, efforts at formulating, ratifying and enforcing such laws or contesting and
repealing them are in full swing. At the moment there are 5 states (of the 28 Indian states) with active anti-conversion laws.
Before Independence too, some laws and regulations had the objective of regulating religious
conversion but the idea was that the new Indian Constitution would be able to solve the problem
and regulate this situation. Earlier laws were the Rajgarh State Conversion Act (1936) in Madhya
Pradesh, the Patna Freedom of Religion Act (1942) in Bihar, the Sarguja State Apostasy Act (1945)
in todays Chhattisgarh and the Udaipur Anti-Conversion Act (1946) in Rajasthan.
2
See Annex 1 for an overview of the Freedom of Religion Acts in India and their contents.
1
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Chapter 4
4.1. Propagation as Transmission

Both in Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, these laws were contested by Christian minorities, who emphasized that conversion was an integral part of their religion.
Freedom of religion includes the freedom to convert, they argued. Taking this
issue to the courts, they received negative responses in these two states.3 One
State Court acknowledged conversion as a right for the Christians as it is a part of
their Christian religious duty (Orissa); the other emphasized that the freedom of
religion bill is precisely the guarantee for the equality of religious freedom for all.
These contradictory verdicts had to be solved at the level of the Supreme Court
which needed to provide an interpretation of the constitutional right to propagate religion. This case, famous now as the Stanislaus vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
(AIR 1977 SC 908), holds a difficult question for the Supreme Court: does the
right to freedom of religion, as formulated in Article 25 (freedom to profess,
practice and propagate religion) also entail the freedom to convert people?4 If the
verdict was yes, then all anti-conversion acts would be unconstitutional; if no,
the door would remain open for such legislation. Here, something interesting
happened.
Chief Justice A.N. Ray said that the Madhya Pradesh Act was not in opposition to Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution. In fact, it ensures the equality of
religions in India. Both Acts, so the verdict goes, are not opposed to the freedom
of religion as enshrined in Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. After stating the
position of the Christian applicant and reviewing the verdict of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, the Chief Justice interprets this article. Note the particular
attention paid to the interpretation of the word propagate.
Counsel for the appellant has argued that the right to propagate ones religion
means the right to convert a person to ones own religion. On that basis, counsel
has argued further that the right to convert a person to ones own religion is a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 25(1) of the Constitution.
The expression propagate has a number of meanings, including to multiply specimens of (a plant, animal, disease, etc.) by any process of natural reproduction from the parent stock, but that cannot, for obvious reasons be the meaning
for purposes of Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The Article guarantees a right
to freedom of religion, and the expression propagate cannot therefore be said to
have been used in a biological sense.
3
4
For an account of the events, see Kim (2002, 234-238; 2003, 59-87).
Available on this site: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=6398.
Conversion Legislation in India
105
The expression propagate has been defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary to mean to spread from person to person, or from place to place, to disseminate, diffuse (a statement, belief, practice, etc.). According to the Century
Dictionary...propagate means as follows:- To transmit or spread from person
to person or from place to place; carry forward or onward; diffuse; extend; as to
propagate a report; to propagate the Christian religion.
We have no doubt that it is in this sense that the word propagate has been used in
Article 25(1), for what the Article grants is not the right to convert another person to
ones own religion, but to transmit or spread ones religion by an exposition of its tenets.
It has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees freedom of conscience to
every citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that,
in turn postulates that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to ones
own religion because if a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person
to his religion, as distinguished from his effort to transmit or spread the tenets of his
religion, that would impinge on the freedom of conscience guaranteed to all the citizens
of the country alike. (ibid.; italics mine)
This last section is very significant. A sharp distinction is made here between attempts at trying to convert people to ones religion and propagating ones religion
(see also Mehta 2003). What is propagation then? Apparently, it is not conversion. As we saw in the previous chapter, Hindu representatives in the Constituent Assembly also give a different semantic content to propagation, which they
viewed as education on the nature of a religion given to its followers.
This viewpoint is further elucidated by referring to another case, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay & Ors, in which it was held that every person
has a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgement or conscience but to exhibit
his belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion
and further to propagate his religious views for the edification of others. Thus, the
Chief Justice concludes:
This Court has given the correct meaning of the Article, and we find no justification for the view that it grants a fundamental right to convert persons to ones own
religion. It has to be appreciated that freedom of religion enshrined in the Article
is not guaranteed in respect of one religion only, but covers all religions alike, and
it can be properly enjoyed by a person if he exercises his right in a manner commensurate with the like freedom of persons following the other religions. What
is freedom for one, is freedom for the other, in equal measure, and there can therefore be
no such thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to ones own religion. (ibid.,
italics mine)
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So, according to this 1977 judgement, Article 25(1) does not grant the right to
convert another person to ones own religion. While the Christians argue that
freedom of conscience necessarily implies the right to the freedom to convert, the
judge, however, thought differently. There is a right to propagate, he agreed, but not
to convert; the right to propagate is understood as the transmission or exposition
of the tenets of the religion in question. As we have read above, the Constitutional
Bench of the Supreme Court interpreted the word propagate with the help of
the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and the Century Dictionary. A linguistic or lexical
interpretation of the word propagate was deemed indispensible to have clarity
on the issue. But whether this solved the problem is doubtful. Different interpretations of propagate are present even to this day.
The interpretation of this Indian judge seems to be based on the idea that
propagation is something like instruction, transmission of knowledge or education. This seems to refer mainly to those already in the fold of a certain religion or
tradition. One could say that this is what parents do with their children or what
members of a religious community do with other members of the same community. Another characteristic of the proposed understanding of propagation seems
to be that this transmission through exposition (of the tenets of ones religion)
does not conflict with the transmission through exposition of other religions and
traditions. If a person tries to convert, then instead of transmitting the tenets of
her religion she threatens the freedom of conscience of the other groups. The fact
that this is not so for transmission through exposition, indicates that this process
is different and probably not exclusive in the same manner.
This interpretation of Article 25 is taken over in The Constitution of India: A
Politico-Legal Study (2007): Propagation is concerned with right to communicate
beliefs to another person or to expound the tenets of ones religion, but it does not
imply right to conversion of religion by force, fraud or temptation of any kind
( Johari 2007, 61). A reference is inserted to the Stanislaus case.
Sebastian Kim summarizes the impact of this court case as follows:
While Christians saw the right of the person who propagates, which might lead
to the conversion of others, as a fundamental right, the Supreme Court had returned a verdict that those who are subject to the propagating efforts of others
should be able to maintain freedom of conscience in their decision, and that
this is the fundamental right clearly guaranteed in the constitution. This decision
meant that, in spite of repeated Christian questioning of the legitimacy of the
verdict on the basis that it was delivered in the midst of Emergency, in India, at
least in legal terms, there is no fundamental right to seek the conversion of oth-
107
ers. In other words, Christians as citizens of a democratic nation, have to accept

the fact that propagation aimed at conversion is not guaranteed as a fundamental
right in the constitution but is under the discretion of the local legislature. (Kim
2002, 236-237)
Though Kims interpretation makes sense, there is a peculiar tinge to it. He seems
to interpret the courts decision as holding (1) that the fundamental right of freedom of religion in the Indian Constitution is about the freedom of conscience
of the subjects of conversion and (2) that the fundamental right of freedom of
religion does not relate to the conversion of others. He juxtaposes these two and
seems to suggest that there is something unjust or improper about it. The implicit
suggestion is that, in a democratic nation, the situation should be different. However, the Chief Justice seems to have something different in mind: the transmission of everyones religion or tradition should be safeguarded and this is the actual
aim of Article 25. In the attempts to convert people to one religion (Christianity)
he identifies a threat to the equality of religion for all groups.
Apart from a different understanding of propagation, what also seems to
have been at stake in this debate on conversion in the seventies is a certain interpretation of what a secular state should do and how it should relate to religion.
The question was: what does equality of religion mean in the Indian secular context? In criticisms of the judgement in the Stanislaus case, an oft repeated argument is that the judge did not take either the element of secularism in the Indian
Constitution or the fact about the secular nature of the Indian State seriously. As
one recent article puts it: What Stanislaus also seems to have overlooked is the
secular fabric of Indias Constitution...it is precisely the failure of the Supreme
Court to examine the issues from a secular point of view then which necessitates
all constitutional functionaries and courts to do so now (ActionAid 2008). This
element also surfaces with a different twist in one of the contemporary Christian
responses to the judgement of Chief Justice A.N. Ray where E.D. Devadason, a
Christian lawyer, disputes the way secularism and equality of religions were related in this Court decision:
Equality of religions does not mean one should not seek to convert one from
his religion to another...when the Constitution guarantees equality of religions, it
does not require that all citizens should accept equality of religions. It only means
that the State cannot discriminate one religion from another and the State is
bound to treat all religions alike. It does not impose an obligation that the citizens
should treat all religions alike. (cited in Kim 2002, 236)
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Chapter 4
As we have noted before, secularism in the Indian context is often understood as

the equality of all religions. However, the phrase equality of religions is problematic. As we saw in the chapter on Gandhis views on conversion, for instance, this
is related to the idea that all religions are true, as opposed to the view that only
one religion can be the bearer of the truth. Devadason, on the contrary, implies
that equality of religion does not hold this idea of the truth of all religions and
traditions. According to him, this phrase is very limited in scope and only refers
to the attitude by the state: it provides equal treatment to all religions. It would be
wrong to think that this implies that all religions are true and that conversion to
the true religion would no longer be the desired aim.
True, the reasoning of the Chief Justice could go in response to such criticisms, not all should accept this. Religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam,
which believe that their religions are uniquely true and that the other traditions
are either false or deficient, could continue to survive and thrive in India. They are
also allowed to transmit their tradition to their followers but they cannot proselytize or convert other groups. If one says that the notion of equality of religions
does not impose an obligation for all citizens to treat all religions alike, the Chief
Justice would probably agree. But does it follow from this that the conditio sine qua
non for the freedom of religion is the existence of proselytization?
It is not just Christian groups that disputed Rays interpretation of the Indian Constitution. In fact, an eminent authority on law in India, H.M. Seervai
disputed the proposed interpretation of the word propagate and was convinced
that A.N. Rays conclusion ran counter to legislative history. The core problem,
according to Seervai, was that the most central question had not been asked:
whether conversion was part of the Christian religion (Venkatesan 2008). A second point raised by him is what he saw as a basic misconception in the Chief
Justices judgement: Ray C.J. mistakenly believed that if A deliberately set out
to convert B by propagating As religion, that would impinge on Bs freedom of
conscience. But, as we have seen, the precise opposite is true: As propagation of
his religion with a view to its being accepted by B gives an opportunity to B to
exercise his free choice of a religion (ibid.). In other words, Seervai considers it
necessary to leave the door open for conversion by persuasion, a decision which
can only be taken when there is indeed a choice:
Art. 25(1) confers freedom of religiona freedom not limited to the religion
in which a person in born. Freedom of conscience harmonizes with this, for its
presence in Art. 25(1) shows that our Constitution had adopted a system which
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allows free choice of religion. The right to propagate religion gives a meaning
to freedom of choice, for choice involves not only knowledge but an act of will.
A person cannot choose if he does not know what choices are open to him. To
propagate religion is not to impart knowledge and to spread it more widely, but to
produce intellectual and moral conviction leading to action, namely, the adoption
of that religion. (cited in Pal 2001, 26-27)
The argument that freedom of choice is a condition to freedom of conscience, as

formulated by Seervai, is often repeated in todays arguments pro religious conversion. However, as the previous two chapters have shown, this link between
freedom of conscience and freedom of choice is not unproblematic in itself.
4.2. Conversion and the Secular State in India

The issue of the relation between Indian secularism, equality of religions, freedom of conscience and freedom to convert came to the surface long before the
Stanislaus vs. Madhya Pradesh case. In fact, this court case is directly rooted in the
recommendations put forward by the Niyogi Committee (1956). In the Niyogi
Committee Report (NCR), conversion practices are described as a serious threat
to secularism and the secular state. The argument is that the choice of the Indian
State for secularism is a choice for reason against the influence of religious belief:
The members of the Constituent Assembly, it states, arrived at the unanimous
conclusion that the national State of India should be a secular and a welfare state.
The basis of the Constitution of India is, thus, Reason, not Faith; and it is from the
point of view of Reason that we propose to approach the problem for a satisfactory solution (NCR, Vol. I, Part IV, Chapter II).
Conversion practices are described as an erosion of the founding principles
of the Indian secular state. This argument is diametrically opposed to an argument
very popular today, namely that the anti-conversion measures restrict secularism.
But we will analyze this argument later in this chapter. For now, we will look at
the link this Niyogi Report proposes between secularism and the freedom of religion.
After paying tribute to the good works of many Christian missionaries and
acknowledging their positive impact on the formation of Indian social life,5 the
report elaborates on the role of the secular state:
See NCR, Vol. I, Part IV, Chapter II: The contribution of Christian Missionaries to the shaping
of Indian life in modern times has, indeed, been very impressive. Apart from the controversy on the
5
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What is a Secular State? In negative terms, we may say that it is one that is not
a Theocratic State, viz., a state in which the Government is believed to be under
the immediate direction of God and in which religion and politics are inextricably interwoven. In a Secular State, one may broadly say that there is no recognition of
Dogma, everything that comes before the Government concerning the temporal interests
of the citizens is open to full and free discussion. It does not mean, as is generally supposed, that the State is against any or all religions, or that it overlooks moral values. The
Articles in the Constitution of India, which relate to a Secular State, are 25 to 29.
According to Article 25, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of Conscience,
and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public
order, morality and health. There can be a dispute only on the point of the interpretation of the expression propagate any religion.
Suffice it to say here that the State will not allow its citizens to do whatever they
please in the name and under the guise of religion. Article 25 itself specifies the
limits within which religious freedom can be exercised. (NCR, Vol. I, Part IV,
Chapter II; italics mine)
More recently, the Tamil Nadu Prohi

bition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Ordinance (2002), the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act (2003), the Rajasthan Dharma
Swatantrya Bill (2006 and 2008), and the Himachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion
Act (2007) added more confusion to the debate on conversion legislation in India.
As many point out, there is a great deal of confusion related to the language and
concepts used in these acts. Concerning the last mentioned Act, the National
Commission for Minorities noted with great concern the terminology used in the
Act and the methodology prescribed for implementing it. The definition of force
includes threat of divine displeasure and social excommunication; neither of
these is considered an offence in the Indian legal system (NCM 2007). Different
sources have pointed out, concerning the anti-conversion laws, that the language
used is often extraordinarily broad and vague (SAHRDC 2008, 63), inducement could be taken to mean anything (Economist 2008), the imprecision of
this definition [of fraud] is apparent (HRF 2007), the potentially broad scope of
point of proselytization, they merit high appreciation as pioneers in the fields of education and medical relief...They established schools, colleges, hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages and institutions for
the maimed and the handicapped. They elevated the neglected classes to high social position; and
made them worthy of filling responsible posts in public services, and in all cases made them conscious of their dignity as men and inspired them with self-respect. They stimulated many religious
and social reforms in the Hindu Society, and made it self-conscious. They have helped in the elevation of the status of women by giving the lead in female education. The Community Centres and
Industrial Schools opened by them are, like their other institutions, the best of their kind. India will
ever be grateful for the services rendered by them, no less than for the policy of religious neutrality
generally pursued by the British Government, and for the eminent oriental scholars of Europe and
America who brought to light the hidden treasures of the ancient Indian wisdom.
111
the term allurement is troubling (HRF 2007), each of these definitions [in the
Orissa Act] is amenable to varied interpretations, and the scope for its abuse is
inherent (Venkatesan 2008), the loose language (ibid.), how would one prove
misrepresentation of metaphysical beliefs? Could a judge assess a threat involving divine displeasure ( Jenkins 2008)?, the major challenge in implementing
this ordinance was the need to read minds...[h]ow can one determine whether
converts have been forced, lured, or tricked ( Jenkins 2008)?, and so on (see also
Dhavan 2006; Manickam 2003; Owens 2006).
If so many people agree on the vagueness of the language use and the difficulties of interpretation of the anti-conversion laws, is there also agreement on
the cause of this issue? Here, the shoe pinches.
The hard part is to obtain clarity as to what the confusion is about. This will
be our task in the rest of this chapter, where we analyze the core sections of the
Freedom of Religion Acts. We will go through the texts of the Acts in order to
trace the conceptual problems that cause the confusion (Orissa 1967, Madhya
Pradesh 1968, Chhattisgarh 2003, Himachal Pradesh 2006, Gujarat 2003, Arunachal Pradesh 1978, Rajasthan 2008).
If we analyze the texts on conversion in India, we can detect two levels of
discourses and conceptual languages at work. The first is the classical western discourse about religion, conversion, secularism and freedom of religion. Here, there
is a specific logical relationship between these concepts with definite implications.
Prima facie, both sides talk intelligibly about these concepts: conversion is seen as
the change of religion and is related to the individual soul and conscience; both
accept the limits within which conversion can be challenged (fraudulent, forced,
induced conversions); and the contention concerning the anti-conversion legislation revolves around the protection of Hinduism versus the protection of all
religious minorities in India.
At a second level, the discourse on this issue is influenced heavily by the Indian culture, which is dominated by a wide range of practices, attitudes, ideas, and
actions related to its cultural and religious traditions. These elements do not fit into
the internal logic present at the first level. On this level, different relationships are
established: for instance, secularism is tied closely to anti-conversion positions.
Between these two levels, the liberal secularist sees the hypocrisy of many
Indians: they say one thing, but do something else, e.g. they preach equality of religions, while they foster anti-conversion feelings or even support anti-conversion
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legislation to hassle the Christians. Each implementation of an anti-conversion

law is seen as a victory of irrational Hindu nationalism over rational secularism.
Instead of explaining this tension away as hypocrisy or double standards,
I would like to suggest that it reflects the tension between (1) reflecting within the
framework of western-Christian culture for understanding the Indian traditions
and (2) the fact that the Indian traditions are something different from and other
than religion and that the Indian society and its conflicts have different structures
than those identified by liberal secularism.
The champions and adversaries of conversion both use this vocabulary and
make their cases using words like religion, conversion, secularism and freedom
of religion, etc. but they do so in different ways. Both, however, claim to safeguard
true conversion, real secularism, and the true freedom of religion.
The secularists (backed here by the Christian groups) consider it self-evident
that a true secular state has to guarantee the freedom of religion to all groups and
that this is an inalienable human right, necessarily including also the freedom to
convert (under the restriction that this conversion is realnot forced or induced
by material gains). Very briefly, the logical relation between the concepts comes
down to this: conversion is the process of becoming a believer of a particular religion. If an individual is convinced in her conscience about the truth of a particular
religion, she should be able to convert and follow it freely. Secularism is there to
prevent the state from interfering in the religion of its subjects and this is done,
primarily, by guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion.
In India, the adversaries of the freedom to convert put forward a different
idea. On the one hand, they use the same language and the same words: secularism, freedom of religion and conversion. But analyzing their viewpoints, we see
that the semantic content of these words changes in their hands.
(a) Take for instance the idea, very popular in the anti-conversion camp, that
true secularism is basically about equal respect for all religions and that Christians lack this respect because they believe that theirs is the only true religion
and consider others as false. As a VHP working committee puts it: The Working Committee is of the considered opinion that proselytization and secularism
are incompatible. Proselytization which implies the concept of superiority of one
religion and inferiority of all others is the very antithesis of secularism which, in
our national context, reflects the spirit of respectful acceptance of all religious faiths as
equally true (Raghavendra 1979, 21; italics mine).6
6
This is a Hindu reaction to the Freedom of Religion Bill of 1979 as formulated by the Provin-
113
While the words in this quote are familiar (secularism, proselytization, religious faith, equally true), the connections between them are not. First, one cannot
simply say that secularism and proselytization7 are incompatible. They are not, and
the Western culture provides the evidence: in fact, political secularism sees to it
that conversion and proselytization can be practiced freely outside of the sphere
of political authority. So, given the powers of the modern state, secularism is the
conditio sine qua non of free conversion. Second, when they claim that Indian
secularism is the respectful acceptance of all religious faiths as equally true, we are left
in confusion again: if all religions are equally true, then why is there such hostility towards Christianity and Islam? So, not only does the use of these terms not
make sensethey attribute new and seemingly arbitrary meanings to them and
connect them differently. This kind of language use creates confusion in the debate
on anti-conversion bills.
We saw earlier that critics of secularism such as Ashis Nandy, Partha Chatterjee, and T.N. Madan, have also pointed out that secularism is used and spoken
of in a different way (than the western way) in India. But they failed to clarify
the conceptual logic of the Indian use of the term secularism. They could not tell
us what the semantic relations are between terms like religion, secular, freedom of
religion, etc. in this alternative Indian language use.
Elaborating on his view on the two meanings of secularism that coexist in
India, Ashis Nandy argues as follows (Nandy 1998, 321-344; see also previous
chapter): One is the western understanding of secularism which is all about an
area in public life where religion is not admitted. One can have religion in ones
private life; one can be a good Hindu or a good Muslim within ones home or at
ones place of worship. But when one enters public life, one is expected to leave
ones faith behind (Nandy 1998, 326). This understanding might have dominated
Indias middle-class, but the population has depended mainly on another meaning, which Nandy describes as follows: The non-Western meaning of secularism
revolves around equal respect for all religions. This is the way it is usually put by
public figures. Less crudely stated, it implies that while the public life may or
may not be kept free of religion, it must have space for a continuous dialogue
among religious traditions and between the religious and the secularthat, in the
cial Working Committee of Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Karnataka, at its meeting held on March 30,
1979.
7
I prefer not to make a distinction between conversion and proselytization here because this makes
the issue more confusing. In the Freedom of Religion Bills, the term conversion is vaguely used to
refer to both the conversion into another religion and the propagation of a religion.
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ultimate analysis, each major faith in the region includes within it an in-house
version of the other faiths both as an internal criticism and as a reminder of the
diversity of the theory of transcendence (Nandy 1998, 327).
Even though Nandy tries to pinpoint this other understanding of secularism
in India, this does not make the Indian attitudes or practices related to the Indian
cultural traditions any clearer.
(b) Similarly, conversion is used very differently. Conversion is generally
understood as the process of an individual, who, on the basis of his own conscience,
switches from one religion to another. It has to do with God, soul, conscience, the
individual, spiritual conversion, etc. In negative terms, conversion is not true when
it is forced or induced by material or economic gains. The Indian anti-conversion
movement makes use of the same terminology: conversion, spiritual conversion,
true versus forced or induced conversion, etc. But when we look deeper into their
understanding of this notion, we see that they relate different predicates to it:
conversion is characterized as a change of opinion (in matters of religion or tradition) which is related to maturity, knowledge of traditions, reason, the persons
role in a group, community or society, etc. Hence, they appear to be talking about
completely different things. This difference in understanding conversion is not
taken up in any serious way in the literature on religious conversion and causes a
lot of confusion in the anti-conversion bills.
So, the way terms like religion, conversion, secularism and freedom of religion are used in the anti-conversion bills and by the anti-conversion groups (and
by many other Indians) does not seem to cohere within the semantic framework
of liberal secularism. This results from a failed attempt to capture a wide range of
practices, attitudes, ideas, and actions characteristic of the Indian cultural and religious traditions within that framework. The fact that different cultural levels are
intermingledthe western discourse on religion, conversion and freedom of religion on the one hand; Indian ways of speaking and attitudes concerning the tradition and religions of India, on the otherhas made the situation even murkier.
Let us further explore the gap between the conceptual language of liberal
secularism and the language used in the Freedom of Religion Acts.
(1) As explained above, the anti-conversion bills make use of the conceptual
language of liberal secularism to make their case. In most of the anti-conversion
bills conversion is defined as renouncing one religion and adopting another.
This is put forward as though it is a general and uncontroversial formulation. But
this cannot but cause confusion in the Indian context: in order to recognize the
115
renouncement of one religion and the adoption of another religion, one has to
recognize the boundaries and distinctions between religions. But how to distinguish between different religions in India?
Orientalists, missionaries, anthropologists and other scholars have struggled
for more than 200 years with the puzzle of identifying religions in India and there
are ongoing debates about this issue even now. One has merely to glance at the
ongoing debate on the construction of Hinduism to understand what we are saying (Bloch et al. 2010; Dalmia and von Stietencron 1995; Frykenberg 1989, 1993;
King 1999a, 1999b; Oddie 2006; Pennington 2005; Sugirtharajah 2003; Viswanathan 2003). It is completely unclear whether Hinduism exists as a religion (or
not), or as a conglomerate of many religions, as a construction by the British, by
the British-cum-native informants, by the European cultural imagination In
other words, in the Indian context, it is completely unclear what renouncing one
religion and adopting another would mean.
(2) If it is unclear what religion is in India and which traditions would
count as separate religions, it becomes unclear which kind of changes belongs
to the category of conversion. This is apparent, for instance, in Article 25 of the
Indian Constitution where it is affirmed that persons professing the Sikh, Jain
or Buddhist religion are to be considered as Hindus. This implies that, in order
to be able to formulate an anti-conversion law, a huge variety of Indian traditions
must be clubbed together under the label Hinduism. We see this tendency in
the (defunct) Gujarat Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Bill, 2006: Convert
means to make one person renounce one religion and adopt another religion;
but does not include making one person renounce one denomination and adopt
another denomination of the same religion. Explanation: For removal of doubt,
it is hereby illustrated that for the purpose of this Act: (i) Jain and Buddhist shall
be construed as denominations of Hindu religion. Even though this bill was
not accepted because of the protest by Jains and Buddhists (they did not want
to be called Hindus), this presupposition is present in all the anti-conversion
bills. Some claim this is part of the attempt of the Hindu right to absorb all such
religions into the Hindu fold, but we can also see it as an attempt to safeguard
flexibility and changes among the Indian traditions. This is actually what most of
these laws silently do: they deal with the Indian traditions as though they form
one religion and all have to silently agree because otherwise the flexibility and
conversions within the Indian traditions would be curbed by the laws.
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While using the supposedly universal language of religion, conversion, and

freedom of religion, none of the formulations and restrictions in the anti-conversion bills seem to refer to anything in the Indian traditions. By contrast, they
pick out Christianity and Christian practices. For instance, the bills point out
what is prohibited: No person shall convert or attempt to convert, either directly
or otherwise, any person from one religious faith to another by the use of force
or by inducement or by any fraudulent means nor shall any person abet any such
conversion (Orissa 1967). (The formulations in the other Freedom of Religion
Acts are slight variations on this.) It is completely unclear what this means in
the Indian context; yet, the sentence does make a lot of sense in the context of the
Christian religion and its practices of preaching and conversion. It is, in fact, a
description of a distinctively Christian practice.
The only exception to this is something that is Indian and does risk falling
under the legislation: the well-organized Hindu re-conversion attempts. However, to avoid applying the anti-conversion laws to these practices, certain provisions
are included. The Chhattisgarh Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Act, 2006,
for instance, added to the law the following proviso: Provided that the return in
ancestors original religion or his own original religion by any person shall not be
construed as conversion. Ones ancestral original religion is an extremely vague
concept, and one cannot but see here an attempt at creating a backdoor. Similarly,
the Rajasthan Bill explains conversion as such: Conversion means renouncing
ones own religion and adopting another (Explanation: Own religion means [the]
religion of ones forefathers).
Many Freedom of Religion Acts try to circumvent the problem by adding
strange qualifications. This is the problem about the need to distinguish between
a religion such as Christianity and a religion such as the Indian traditions. We
see an attempt to talk about two different phenomena, which cannot be dealt with
in the same way in the anti-conversion bills. The confusion emerges because both
kinds of phenomena are named as religion.
The Arunachal Act, for example, embodies the idea that the Indian indigenous traditions are something other than religion. Therefore, it is deemed necessary
not to define religion, but to define these indigenous traditions as Indigenous
Faiths. At the same time the Act also stresses that when religion is mentioned
in the Act, the indigenous faiths are also referred to. The Arunachal Act states
explicitly that religious faith also includes indigenous faith. Why all the need
for additional clarifications? Is it not clear for those formulating the law what re-
117
ligion is? A long definition of indigenous is also given: Indigenous faith means
such religions, beliefs and practices including rites, rituals, festivals, observances,
performances, abstinence, customs as have been found sanctioned, approved, performed by the indigenous communities of Arunachal Pradesh from the time these
communities have been known and includes Buddhism as prevalent among Monpas, Menbas, Sherdukpens, Khambas, Khamtis and Singaphoos, Vaishnavism as
practiced by Noctes, Akas, and Nature worships including worships of DonyiPolo, as prevalent among other indigenous communities of Arunachal Pradesh.
Let us rephrase the challenge for us, scholars of Indian culture and society.
While it would be easy to dismiss anti-conversion legislation as the consequence
of the growth of Hindutva, they also exhibit an attemptalbeit a failed one
to specify the differences between the Indian traditions, on the one hand, and a
religion like Christianity, on the other hand. While the provided definitions in
the anti-conversion bills suggest that India has religions too, in general, the bills
pull the Indian traditions out of the scope of religion and conversion. This is
contradictory, because if all the Indian traditions are religions too, they necessarily
should fall under the Freedom of Religion Acts, implying also that any change
within the fold of Indian religions and traditions is conversion and should therefore be restricted under the same laws. If they are not religions, then it is clear that
the bills only point their arrows at Christianity.
This patch-work makes laws vague, unclear and open to many interpretations (and misuses). This runs the risk of opening the door to other problems,
which has happened in much of the anti-conversion legislation: Christians feel
victimized; Buddhists and Jains react against their inclusion in Hinduism, etc.
We see that forcing the debate on religious conversion into the straitjacket
of liberal secular terminology is a dead end. The typical semantic, conceptual and
logical relations that hold in the liberal secular framework do not work here. To
coerce the Indian situation into this conceptual straitjacket prohibits one from
taking the Indian reality and experiences into account. The latter, when reformulated in the terminology of liberal secularism, become nonsensical and are no
longer able to reflect the typical Indian attitudes and concerns. Maybe this is one
of the reasons why the laws are also completely ineffective; the violence which
they are supposed to reduce is being inflamed. There are no reports of convictions
under these laws.8
See U.S. Department of State (2009). Also the reports of the previous years (2001-2009) report
that there were no convictions. Equally there are no reports of district magistrates denying permission for conversions. However, the 2006 report recounts that there were reportedly 20 people
8
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4.3. Force, Fraud, Inducement

What then is the aim of the anti-conversion laws? What target are the adversaries
of conversion pointing their arrows at? The main problem leading to the necessity of this legislation, as it is formulated in the Acts and Bills themselves, is the
problem of the force, fraud and allurement used in conversion. However, the
advocates of conversion have often pointed out that this focus is but a scam to
legitimize oppression and violence against Christians.
Let us nevertheless take the argument seriously for the time being. Let us
suppose that the violence certain Hindus experience is related to force, fraud
and allurement in conversion. How have these terms been defined in the different Freedom of Religion Acts?
Orissa (1967)
(b) force shall include a show of force or a threat for injury of any kind including
threat of divine displeasure or social excommunication;
(c) fraud shall include misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance;
(d) inducement shall include the offer of any gift or gratification, either in cash
or in kind and shall also include the grant of any benefit, either pecuniary or
otherwise.
Madhya Pradesh (1968)
(a) allurement means offer of any temptation in the form of
(i) any gift or gratification either in cash or kind;
(ii) grant of any material benefit, either monetary or otherwise;
(c) force shall include a show of force or threat of injury of any kind including
threat of divine displeasure or social ex-communication;
(d) fraud shall include misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance.
Arunachal Pradesh (1978)
(d) force shall include show of force or a threat of injury of any kind including
(e) fraud shall include misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance;
arrested under the Madhya Pradesh anti-conversion law, but all were released on bail. The 2006
report also notes that: There were no available official figures for other states; however, reports from
faith-based NGOs and the media indicated that there were four arrests in Andra Pradesh, fourteen
in Chhattisgarh, twenty-eight in Madhya Pradesh, two in Orissa, and one in Uttar Pradesh during
the period covered by this report.
(f ) inducement shall include the offer of any gift or gratification, either cash or
in kind and shall also include the grant of any benefit, either pecuniary or otherwise.
Tamil Nadu (2002)
(a) allurement means offer of any temptation in the form of:
(i) any gift or gratification either in cash or kind;
(c) force includes a show of force or a threat of injury of any kind including
threat of divine displeasure or social ex-communication;
(d) fraudulent means includes misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance.
Gujarat (2003)
(a) Allurement means offer of any temptation in the form of:
(i) any gift or gratification, either in cash or kind;
(b) Convert means to make one person to renounce one religion and adopt another religion;
(c) Force includes a show of force or a threat of injury of any kind including a
(d) Fraudulent means includes misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance.
Himachal Pradesh (2006)
(b) force shall include show of force or threat of injury or threat of divine displeasure or social ex-communication;
(c) fraud shall include misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance;
(d) inducement shall include the offer of any gift or gratification, either in cash
or in kind or grant of any benefit either pecuniary or otherwise.
Rajasthan (2008)
(a) allurement means offer of any temptation in the form of:
(i) any gift or gratification, either in cash or kind; or
(ii) grant of any material benefit, either monetary or otherwise;...
(c) force includes a show of force or a threat of injury of any kind including
(d) fraudulent means and includes misrepresentation or any other fraudulent
contrivance.
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Seemingly, the contention is all about violence felt through the forced, fraudulent
and allured conversion and the conversion of minors, but the fundamental question is: how can a government distinguish between a true conversion and a conversion induced by force, fraud or allurement? A way to go about deciding upon
this would be by identifying the true motives involved in the conversion. However,
social psychology and sociology teach us that even in an individual case it is very
hard or even impossible to know the real motives behind an action.9 How then
would a government be able to decide upon the real motives behind a change in
the life of an individual? Are they planning to interrogate the converts to this
end?
The proponents of these laws seem to presuppose that by defining force,
fraud and allurement the case becomes clear. However, this is false because
the above clarifications and definitions make it even vaguer what the aim is of
this kind of legislation. For instance, the prohibition against conversion by force,
refers to a show of force, threat of injury (including threat of divine displeasure), and social excommunication. But when does a show of force become a
forbidden show of force? When is a show of force a threat?
Similarly, what counts as a threat of divine displeasure? What are divine
displeasures? Do they happen in this life or after death and why would one take
them seriously? This does not sound like a twenty-first-century Indian piece of
legislation; it sounds like a medieval European one.
How could one ever prohibit social excommunication? Conversion is also
not allowed when it is the result of fraud, which is described as misrepresentation and any other fraudulent contrivance. Which kind of misrepresentation
leads to conversion? How can a government make a decision on these matters
and draw the line between harmless misrepresentations, which are plentiful, and
harmful misrepresentations that lead to conversion?
The terms allurement and inducement are no less problematic. They refer
to the offering of a gift or benefit, or the temptation of getting one. But how and
Current social scientific research on theory of action, the role of motives and the connection between motives and actions does not offer us dominant theories to settle the case between motives
and actions. Too many questions are unanswered and are part of an ongoing debate: Can people
know their own motives? How does a person know if his real motivation is a social, a religious or
a sexual one? How can we understand the relation between conscious and unconscious motives?
Under which other conditions do certain motives arise? What are the mechanisms of the linkage of
vocabularies of motive to systems of action? Can motives change during the action? Can motives
change in different cultural settings and eras? The quest for the real motives and for the unconscious motives is still going on and there are no commonly accepted answers.
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when does a gift become problematic? Where will the government draw the line
between allurement and any kind of gift or benefit?
(1) To sum up, at first sight, the Freedom of Religion laws seem absolutely
superfluous. Why is this legislation needed? Who needs this legislation? If violence occurs, if people are physically attacked and if assaults on the integrity of
individuals take place, any Indian citizen can take recourse to the Indian Constitution, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to prosecute the aggressor in a legal way. Similarly, if certain groups in the Indian society
commit crimes, they can and should be taken to court. Most Christian priests,
missionaries and charity workers openly accept this and clearly dissociate themselves from using any kind of force, fraud or allurement in their activities. On the
contrary, often physical attacks take place against the minority of missionaries
and priests. One wonders who needs extra legal protection. The growing violence
against Christians in India and the attempts of Hindutva groups to dissociate the
Christian groups more and more from the Indian social community is a lamentable evolution. The anti-conversion laws seem to provide a justification for this
tendency towards separatism and violence. Are they putting a halt to violence or
are they supporting it?
(2) It is not clear what the anti-conversion laws aim to guarantee and what
they factually guarantee. The best case in point is the fact that these laws are used
against Christian conversion, but are not considered applicable in the case of the
re-conversion practices of Hindu groups. It has been reported by scholars and
public intellectuals that re-conversion techniques of certain Hindu organizations
bear striking resemblances with Christian practices of conversion, which are being attacked in the Freedom of Religion Acts. Apparently, the Hindu nationalist
groups organizing re-conversion meetings do not have any aversion to offering
medical aid, education and financial incitements to make the tribal and low-caste
people join the Hindu Dharma. The same people who insist on laws against forced,
fraudulent and coerced conversion make use of techniques they supposedly want
to abolish. However, because of the consensus that re-conversion is a different
phenomenon than conversion and that a return to ones original faith is not conversion, they seem also to fall outside the scope of the Freedom of Religion Acts.
This is a strange situation: Hindus promising medical aid to the tribal groups
in return of their participation in shuddhi ceremonies and accepting Hindu Dharma as the truth is completely different from missionaries doing the same in return
for conversion to Christianity. Two questions emerge here. While the Freedom
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of Religion Acts seem to be focussed on attacking the proselytizing methods of

Christianity, the many Hindu groups do not seem to have a moral problem in
adopting the same methods in their re-conversion activities. Hence, either the
Acts are actually aimed at something else than such proselytizing methods, or the
Hindus involved are intellectually dishonest and hypocritical.
(3) Distinguishing between true conversion and conversion caused by force,
fraud or allurement, presupposes the ability to recognize instances of conversion:
knowledge of the phenomenon of religious conversion is assumed. This, we would
like to suggest, is where the shoe pinches: the legislation exemplifies an absolute
incomprehension of the phenomenon of religious conversion. The vague understanding of conversion as renouncing one religion and accepting another or of
renouncing ones traditional religion and accepting another does not help solve
this problem. In the Indian context, it is not clear what falls under religion and
traditional religion, or what distinguishes these phenomena from other phenomena in India (such as dharma, panths, paramparas, sampradayas, margas, etc.).
In fact, the current formulations in the Freedom of Religion laws exemplify
a mix of common sense Indian notions of change between or even within Indian religions and traditions, and a Protestant Christian understanding of the process of
conversion as a new birth in the true religion through Gods call in the conscience.
The first is considered as normal and is experienced as non-threatening; the second is seen as a foreign practice and as a threat to the Indian cultural traditions.
The first should be safeguarded, while the second needs to be restricted.
This brief analysis makes one fact clear: the laws cannot be aimed at the
forced, fraudulent and allured conversion, because it is completely unclear what
a forced, fraudulent or allured conversion would look like in the Indian context.
The only example is the conversion practices of the Christians. So, violence is felt
there; and there is also the will to address this violence. The only problemand
quite a substantial oneis that no one has clearly spelt out what kind of violence
is supposed to be at work in Christian proselytizing.
Our analysis indicates that the underlying concern seems to be of a different
kind than the words of the Freedom of Religion laws suggest at first blush. In the
analysis of the Constituent Assembly Debates, we suggested that the Christians
limited the possible restrictions on conversion and the possible critique on conversion to
these cases (force, fraud and allurement and minority age). This is understandable
from their point of view: conversion is legitimate only when it reflects the free
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operation of God in the souls or hearts of human beings. Hence, conversion is

wrong, if there is an unbalanced human interference in the process.
The Congressmen in the Constituent Assembly were clearly against conversion and, as we showed, this opposition was broader and deeper than solely a
concern with forced, fraudulent and coerced conversion. They accepted this also
as a good description of the problem, but the fundamental concern embraced the
entire Christian notion of conversion as such. The underlying concerns were of
a different kind and the Freedom of Religion laws are not able to capture any of
these.
In other words, while the opposition to conversion is more and more limited
and restricted, we see the violence and tensions growing. This is why the issue of conversion is currently so potentially dangerous for the India of today. It opens up the
colonial wounds of the past. No longer directed at an identifiable and alien enemy
(British and Christian), the violence of today is the violence of the liberal secular
state clashing with the vibrancy of the surviving human traditions and practices
of India.
4.4. Conclusion: Clarifying Confusion

The overview and the analysis so far tell us that there is confusion on various matters. We would like to provide some clarity regarding three recurrent confusions:
(a) that between religion and tradition; (b) that between secularism and equality of religion; and (c) the confusion regarding the notion of conversion itself.
(1) Confusion: religion-tradition
The bills seem to presuppose that all Indian traditions are religions, but at
the same time suggest that this is not the right way of looking at the Indian
traditions. That is to say, one both assumes that there is no distinction between
religions and traditions, while, at the same time, one presupposes a difference between these two, which requires a clear distinction. If the distinction is not made,
it is easy to dismiss anti-conversion laws as irrational attempts to fight Christianity and strengthen Hinduism. Often, this is explained by referring to the dubious agenda of the Hindu nationalists promoting these anti-conversion bills: they
are irrational, illogical, and fundamentalist; therefore, their laws are irrational and
crooked. But this does not explain the broad-based support that the stance against
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conversion enjoys in India. Nor does it make clear to us why there is a widespread
incomprehension and rejection of Christian conversion practices.
(2) Confusion: secularism-equality of religions
Here, there is confusion between the conceptual foundation of an attitude
and the attitude itself. On the one hand, secularism expresses the attitude that the
state has towards all religions in the polity: the state treats all religions equally
or symmetrically. Such an understanding of secularism brings us close to how
western liberalism understands the term. On the other hand, when Indians use
this term as a synonym for equality of religions, they have something different in
mind. Secularism, in this sense, names the doctrine of the equality of religions.
That is to say, the claim is that the Indian State accepts the truth of the principle
that all religions are equal. This is what we see in the expressed views not only of
Gandhi but also in the CAD.
(3) Confusion: conversion and change
Because the above distinctions between different kinds of religions and traditions are both made and, at the same time, allowed to collapse into each other,
the very term conversion threatens to lose clarity. When one speaks of conversion in the Indian legislations, it is obvious that one speaks of a conversion
into Christianity mainly and into Islam secondarily. In this context, as we have
seen, the movements within the Indian traditions, say either from Saivism into
Vaisnavism or from Hinduism into Buddhism, are not regarded as religious
conversions. Many instances of the anti-conversion legislation, as we have also
seen, explicitly include Buddhism, Sikhism, etc. within the fold of Hinduism.
However, there is also the recognition that Buddhism and Hinduism are different from each other and that the conversion from Hinduism to Buddhism could
be seen at the same level as conversion from Hinduism to Christianity or Islam.
With respect to the latter, Ambedkar is a classic example. When he converted to
Buddhism, this was part of a public ceremony of mass conversion of dalits or untouchables to Buddhism. Not only did he advocate that all dalits should leave the
fold of Hinduism and convert to Buddhism. Before he did so, he also considered
the possibility of converting either to Islam or to Christianity to escape from what
he considered as the tyranny of Hinduism. That is, he considered conversions to
these three religions ad seriatim and believed finally that Buddhism was better
than either Islam or Christianity.10
10
For a convenient collection of Ambedkars writings, see Valerian Rodrigues (2002).
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The distinction between religion and tradition

To clarify this conceptual confusion in the anti-conversion laws, we should first
develop a clear distinction between religions and traditions.11 We took the first
steps in doing so in the second chapter, when we explained the conceptual schemes
behind Gandhis understanding of conversion and his interpretation of terms like
religion, faith and the like. As we explained then, these conceptual schemes
reflected some structures characteristic of the Indian traditions, which had shaped
Gandhis reasoning. Let us now return to this attempt to account for the nature of
traditions: what are traditions and what differentiates them from religions?
In the first instance, traditions are simply sets of ancestral practices, that is,
they are the practices that parents and ancestors transmit. The category of practices here has a very broad scope: it includes traditional stories, temple visits and
the performance of rituals. To put it in simple terms, traditions are inherited practices.
If that is the case, how could such traditions be transmitted? There is no
one way of doing so and the means used are those typical to any process of transmission of practices: language, imitation, instruction, repetitive performance, etc.
Since any tradition consists of a totality rather than separate components, this
variety of modes of transmission is required. This also tells us something more:
any attempt to describe traditions in terms of specific sets of beliefs or rituals or
festivals will inevitably distort the nature of the traditions in question.
What is transmitted when traditions are passed on? Naturally, the practitioners themselves claim that it concerns a system of practices that has been transmitted with perfect accuracy from time immemorial, but one could never test the
truth of this belief. At most, we can accept that grandparents and parents transmit
the traditions. Since there is no authoritative institution that fixes the content of
a tradition, changes will always occur and the practices will be modified to new
situations and contexts. In this sense, as we also saw in our discussion of Gandhis
views, traditions cannot but be extremely dynamic and flexible. Traditions survive
precisely because they are adaptable; becoming static entails the death of a tradition.
Is it possible to decide who belongs to some particular tradition? There is no
established authority to pronounce judgement on such issues. Therefore, anyone
born into a tradition is considered part of it. Even people who never perform any
11
In what follows, I draw heavily on Balagangadhara (forthcoming/2010).
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rituals and show absolute indifference to stories, deities and temples are part of
the tradition. Belonging to a tradition is a fine-grained affair and never constitutes
an all-or-none situation. Because of this, people who are not born into a tradition
can be introduced into it.
One should not get the impression that traditions are fluid or amorphous.
Different traditions distinguish themselves from each other in sharp ways and
they strive to retain such distinctions. To some extent, one could say that the vibrancy of a tradition can be measured by its success in distinguishing itself from
other traditions. As Balagangadhara explains, we have difficulty in accounting for
certain properties of traditions, because our theoretical apparatus is not yet welldeveloped:
Today, we are not yet able to make sense of the presence of these two properties:
(a) the enormous flexibility in belonging to a tradition and the sharpness with
which the boundaries between traditions are drawn; (b) the possibility that any
element could be absent from a tradition and yet the necessity for it to maintain a
sense of identity and distinction. Depending on where ones emphasis lies, traditions appear both very elastic and extremely dogmatic simultaneously. If one uses
these terms to describe traditions, we can conclude that one is describing them as
though they are variants of religions or philosophies. They are not: traditions are
neither religions nor philosophies; they are what they are, viz. traditions. (Balagangadhara forthcoming/2010)
Why would one practice a tradition and try to continue and transmit it? In the
context of traditions, this is not a well-structured question. One does not require
a reason to continue a practice: the existence of a practice is its own justification.
In other words, the only reason to continue a tradition lies in the fact that it is a
tradition. So, the question is fallacious: it presupposes that one needs a reason for
engaging in a practice.
Does this mean that all practices can be justified in terms of their status as
traditions? Does slavery or inhumane treatment of untouchables become acceptable, because the practices have been transmitted by ones ancestors? No, this is
a non sequitur. As we saw in Gandhis case, it is not because one has no reason
to continue a tradition as a body of practices that one cannot have a reason to
end one of its practices. If there are good reasons to do so, then one modifies the
practice or abandons it altogether. In other words, reason constrains traditions and
practices from the outside, so to speak. It does not provide the foundation for
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practices, but puts limits on the acceptability and viability of practices. Traditions
do not deny this crucial role of reason.
Given these properties, what is it that differentiates religions from traditions? Consider the best examples we have of religions: Christianity and Islam.
Here, the believers worship the God of the Book in certain ways because this
God has imposed on them the obligation to do so. Human beings were created as
sentient beings for this reason: in order to worship and obey the Creator. Therefore, they have a good reason to worship God: His commandment is to worship
only Him in the way He wants. How could human beings know how He should
be worshipped? Here, revelation is a requirement: God has told humanity how
He desires to be worshipped. This message of self-disclosure can be found in the
Scripture or in the Gospel, which is the word of this God.
Consequently, even if followers of a religion learn to participate in it through
the way they are raised by their parents and through similar processes of transmission, they retain the belief that one needs a reason to continue practicing any
religion. This is intrinsic to the nature of religion. Consequently, they ask the same
question of all alien traditions they encounter: What do you believe in? What
are the reasons behind your practices? In the case of India, Christian and Muslim visitors always assumed that Hindu Indians had Scriptures and held certain
beliefs about the biblical God and His will for humanity. When they saw ritual
practices, they thought this was the worship that expressed Hindu beliefs on how
God should be worshipped.
The best reason for a human being to continue a particular religion is the
truth of its beliefs. It reflects the true revelation of the biblical God and, therefore,
its doctrines are also true. One cannot continue to be a Christian believer, when it
turns out that Jesus of Nazareth never lived and that he was never crucified; one
cannot be a Muslim believer if one discovers that Mohammad was a con-man.
These religions have to claim the absolute truth, if they are religions at all. In other
words, truth is a predicate that applies to religions.
How do traditions behave with respect to truth? Until the twentieth century,
when Hindu reform movements tried to transform Hindu traditions into a pale
variant of Christianity, the question of truth was considered irrelevant. It did not
matter whether Rama or Krishna ever really lived and whether they were really
born in some town in India. One could tell all kinds of stories about these deities,
while ignoring the issues of their truth status. Typically, religions have great difficulty in making sense of this attitude. They assume that Indians have to believe
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that their puranas and stories are the truth about the world and human history.
Hence, the British colonials rejected these stories as myths that gave false and
absurd representations of history and geography. However, truth predicates do not
apply to such stories; therefore, they should not be mistaken for representations of
history or the world in any way.
There is another problem. It is also a category mistake to apply truth predicates to practices. One cannot ask whether agni rituals, pujas in ones home or
daily visits to the temple are true. Even though we use the word true in several
ways, like when we talk about true friends, the only well-elaborated and clear
notion of truth that we possess is one that makes truth into a property of sentences, that is, into a linguistic property. It is only of propositions that we can say
whether they are true or false. In Balagangadharas words: As human practices,
traditions are neither true nor false, whereas linguistic descriptions of such practices
could be either true or false (Balagangadhara forthcoming/2010).
Of course, what is said above is not enough to distinguish between what a
religion is and what traditions are. Let me just notice some of the problems that
require solutions: what distinguishes traditions from each other? What distinguishes, say, the tradition of a craft (masonry, carpentry, etc) from a tradition like,
say, Saivism? What distinguishes Savism from Vaishnavism? What makes one
suggest that the caste system itself is not a tradition or not even something that
belongs in common to all the Indian traditions? These are extremely important
questions to answer, if one wants to maintain that there are enough fundamental
differences between tradition and religion that we should hold them apart. I do
not have answers because these are research questions and not issues that can be
solved by providing good definitions alone. Nevertheless, I should like to clarify
one or two things in this regard.
In the first place, teaching crafts involves transmitting skills to a novice or an
apprentice. Consequently, in so far as one speaks about traditions in this context,
one suggests that the transmission of skills has a history of transmission. The object of traditions such as masonry, carpentry, etc is the transmission of skills. Both
religions and Indian traditions differ from these crafts in so far as the former do
not focus on transmitting skills.
In the second place, the traditions that we talk about in the Indian context
(Saivism, Vaishnavism and such like) do not have as their object transmission of
any particular message. When we speak about the Catholic tradition or the Prot-
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estant traditions, we have in mind such transmission of messages. In this way too
are religions different from traditions.
In the third place, one of the most important characteristics of the Indian
traditions is that there is a story (or history) of transmission from a lineage. That
is to say, the Indian traditions differentiate each other by identifying the source of
transmission, whether that source is historical or merely authenticated by stories.
At any given moment in time, these traditions differentiate each other through
differing beliefs and practices. However, the legitimacy of these beliefs and practices lies in: (a) the source of transmission; (b) the antiquity of that source. The
second criterion is subordinated to the first: some individual is a follower of this
or that teacher and this identification justifies both the belief and the practice of
such an individual.
We need not note that it is easy to describe both Catholicism and Protestantism as traditions in the sense just described. Indeed, this is the case: that is
one of the reasons why Indians are prone to misunderstand the nature of religion.
They find that Christianity, Islam and Judaism can also be described as traditions and hence they believe that their differences from these Semitic religions are
hardly all that significant.
This provides us with a fourth distinction: while it is possible to coherently
describe religions as traditions, it is not possible to provide a coherent description
of traditions as religions. I suggest that this is one of the reasons why it has so far
not been possible to provide a coherent description of any of the pagan or heathen traditions that we know in history.
It is needless to say that each of these distinctions has to be further explained
and grounded in a theory about the nature of traditions, but that is a research task
for the future. For now, I want to take up just one more issue: is the caste system
itself a tradition or a part of all traditions in India or is it something else?
We need to accept the idea that a tradition is always a tradition of a group
in society and that it is not possible to speak of the tradition of a society. Even
when we speak of European or American traditions, we have the traditions of
a group of people in mind. It is like nations in one of its meanings: the way the
Jews are seen as a nation in the Bible. It is not possible to speak of an international tradition. In this sense, when we speak of the caste system, we are
speaking about something that is common to different groups (or nations) in
India: it is something that cuts across different traditions. Thus, the caste system,
as a system, is a social structure of the modern Indian nation-state, and not itself
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a tradition, the way I am outlining the concept. It cuts across different groups
the way some dress habits (wearing sarees, selwaar-kameez, bindi, etc), some food
habits (vegetarianism, reluctance to eat beef, etc) cut across different groups in
the Indian society. While each group may accept these practices as a part of their
traditions, these practices themselves do not, on their own, constitute a tradition.
Analogously, even if various groups in India maintain caste distinctions, the structure (the caste system) itself is not a tradition. This suggests that the Indian caste
system, as a social structure, is not an exclusive part of any one tradition: that is
why the caste distinctions exist among the Hindus, the Jains, the Buddhists, the
lingayats, the Muslims, the Christians and so on. Of course, the presence of these
distinctions does not provide us with arguments about the existence of the caste
system as a social structure, but that is another issue altogether.
So, let me round up: there are enough intriguing differences between being
a religion and being a tradition for us to take the distinction seriously. Furthermore, it is also heuristically fertile as the following considerations make it obvious.
These are some of the ways in which traditions and religions differ from
each other at the basic level of their structure and nature. This allows us to explain
some of the confusion in the anti-conversion legislation: the systematic conflation
between religions and traditions, as though they are variants of the same kind,
has led to opacity. At the same time, one uses the same conceptual vocabulary to
refer to religions and traditions, while one also tries to distinguish between the
two by introducing all kinds of ad hoc distinctions. Inevitably, this comes across as
hypocrisy.
This also allows us to understand the confusion between secularism and the
equality of religions. In order to grasp this, we need to realize that secularism,
in the West, names an attitude that the state assumes with respect to its treatment
of religions. This attitude is based on a meta-cognitive assumption that religions
are candidates for truth: that is, religions could be either true or false.12 This metacognitive assumption provides the required justification for state neutrality, quite
independent of how the neutrality itself is conceptualized. In this sense, secularism is not itself a doctrine but a name for an attitude.
In contrast, the discussion about secularism in India is a discussion about
the doctrinal or cognitive assumption that provides the foundation for this attitude.
This answers the following question: Are all religions equally true (or equally
false, as the case may be)? As we have seen so far, most Indians see religions as
12
See an extended argument that makes this case in Balagangadhara and De Roover (2007).
131
a human search for truth and they cannot accept the claim that one such specific
search only (say that of the Christians or Muslims) is true and that all other human searches are false. In fact, if we keep the above elucidation about the difference between religion and tradition in mind, we can understand their resistance
much better: human practices being neither true nor false, how can one practice
not only be true but also make all other human practices false? It is this difficulty
which they try to formulate by saying that all religions are equal. In this sense,
while many are right in suggesting that secularism carries a different meaning
in India, they are wrong in so far as they are looking for an additional meaning
accruing to the word. The issue of secularism, in India, involves a discussion about
the nature of religion and tradition.
If the specificity of religions and traditions is not taken into account, then
we end up using words from the English language as though they have the same
self-evident reference. This prevents us from noticing the different kinds of issues
in the discussion. Hence, on the one hand, the attempt to differentiate the Indian
traditions from religions, and, on the other hand, collapsing the distinction between the two.
Therefore, the Freedom of Religion Act in the India of the second half of
the twentieth century is the wrong thing, at the wrong place, at the wrong time. It
is the wrong thing, because these Bills are supposed to be a solution to a certain
problem, but they fail to understand the problem and come to a proper diagnosis.
It is also at the wrong place, because the Freedom of Religion Acts are western
inventions to cure problems in the western-Christian world, which cannot solve
the very different problems of modern Indian society. They come at the wrong
time, because at a moment when serious problems need to be tackled in a society like India, the Freedom of Religion Acts function as pseudo-solutions that
only intensify the problems. In the next two chapters, we will try to establish this
case.
Chapter 5
The Impossibility of
a Systematic Debate on Religious Conversion?
The problem we tackle in this chapter is simple; the solution more complicated.
The question is whether the humanities and social sciences developed hypotheses
or theories about the clash over religious conversion in India. We will analyse
the secondary literature on this issue in order to assess whether it gives us more
insights into the Indian debate. Is it possible to draw on this literature to give a
scientific analysis that is not tied to any of the ideological camps in this debate?
Humanities and social science literature on religious conversion is rich and
varied. Generally, we could say that in these studiesfrom fields like history,
anthropology, psychology of religion, sociology of religion and religious studies/
theologyreligious conversion is seen as a universal phenomenon and a problem
of plural societies today. Before the twentieth century, scholars predominantly approached conversion as a topic related to Judaism, Christianity or Islam.1 After the
turn of the century, this begins to change, although even in the early twentiethcentury the link with Christianity remains very significant. In the course of this
century, the non-Western world comes into view, but originally mainly through
the lens of missiology. Pioneering works apart, it is only in the second half on the
century that more studies emerge that are independent from theology and that
focus on the non-Western traditions.
Bibliographic database and catalogue searches on conversion give us hits from theological studies on the process of conversion, dogmatic treatises, conversion accounts and biographies, historical
works on the conversion of Europe to Christianity in different periods and some works on conversion in the psychology of religion. Although different research approaches were combined, studies
on conversion generally belonged to the realm of Christian theology. Studies have also focused on
conversion in Judaism and Islam, especially the issue of the moriscos and the marranos are a case in
point.
1
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Chapter 5
5.1. The Sciences of Conversion?

The first of these studies came from the fields of psychology and sociology. Landmark works are William James The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) and
A.D. Nocks Conversion (1933). Even today, the psychology of religion has continued with a research focus on religious experience, religious emotions and religious
conversion (Rambo 1993, 1999, 2003; Rambo and Farhadian 1999; Rambo et al.
1999).
The topic is also taken up with much enthusiasm by anthropologists and
sociologists, who use the word conversion no longer as a theological term, but as
an analytical tool to describe other traditions and religions in the world. The sociology and anthropology of religion are important players in the academic study
of religious conversion today (Bremmer et al. 2006; Bellah 1964; Comaroff 1991;
Hefner 1993b; Horton 1971, 1975a, 1975b).
In the field of Literary Theory there is a keen interest in conversion accounts. Conversion biographies and their patterns have been studied (Caldwell
1983; Hawkins 1985; Hindmarsh 2005; King 1983; Riley 2004; Stromberg 2008).
The history of conversions and the question of the spread of Christianity has also
attracted the attention of historians (Armstrong 2000; Brosse 1995; Finn 1990;
Fletcher 1997; Goodman 1994; Morrison 1992a, 1992b; Muldoon 1979, 1997a,
2004). Theology and religious studies continue to develop a rich arsenal of studies on conversion too (Attias 1997; Citron 1951; Conn 1986; Gillespie 1991;
Guder 2000; Kreider 1999). Some of these works are philosophical in nature,
others rather historical, yet others psychological. If there is one line of continuity
between the older theological approaches and the twentieth century ones, it is
the persistence of the processes of conversion in Paul and Augustine as reference
points for the studies.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these disciplines are still central
in the study of religious conversion and produce a wide array of studies on this
topic. The most recent trend is to produce cross-disciplinary collected volumes on
religious conversion, where the different approaches are represented, often however, more in juxtaposition than in interaction with each other (Buckser and Glazier 2003; Giordan 2009; Hackett 2008; Hefner 1993a; Lamb and Bryant 1999;
van der Veer 1996).2
When doing a search in the ISI Web of Science on conversio* and religio*, we find that there is a
proliferation of literature especially in the last ten years. Of the nearly 805 hits over the time period
that the Web of Science covers (1955-2009), 489 are from the last ten years. While the articles
2
The Impossibility of a Systematic Debate?
135
Eminent conversion specialist Lewis Rambo points out the weakness of this
approach in his claim that the published material on conversion resembled a
metropolitan train yard crowded with separate tracks that ran parallel to each
other, where each individual train has its own assigned track and never crossed
over to another (Rambo 1993, xiv). According to him, this situation begs for
more multidisciplinary approaches, an appeal he forcefully repeats ten years later
in the concluding chapter of the edited volume The Anthropology of Religious Conversion (2003):
Few scholars have had the chutzpah, energy, and determination to undertake an
authentic, multidisciplinary study of conversion. Sometimes, one gets the impression that anthropology, sociology, psychology, and so on are like parallel railroad
tracks. Each discipline has little or no knowledge or interest in disciplines on the
next track and even less interest in those disciplines several tracks over. With
the exception of acknowledgements to classics [ James and Nock]...scholars either wilfully exclude or ignore other disciplines, or they may be unaware of the
resources in fields other than their own. (Rambo 2003, 219)
But there is a flaw in this metaphor. The problem is not that there is not enough
multidisciplinary work; in fact, the work on religious conversion is fundamentally
multidisciplinary. If we look at the studies mentioned above, it is almost impossible to reduce them to one discipline. Modifying the metaphor, it would be better
to say that the different disciplines are like different trains on the same track: the
trains are all slightly different (different lengths, colours, loads, etc.) and passengers and cargo can move from one train to another. Sometimes there is more
distance between the trains, sometimes less. What remains identical for all of
them is the track, the port of departure and the terminus. There is only one track
and therein lies the problem: the track is taken to be self-evident. All the studies and
approaches know what they are studying and they arrive at the same conclusions
at the terminus. Nothing diverts the train from following its predetermined trail
with the same stations. This trail, the metaphor for the theoretical framework
of the studies, is built on a theological foundation that was laid by the labour of
around the middle of the twentieth century belonged to the fields of psychology, sociology and theology, today it is more difficult to identify the domains of study. Of course one of the obvious reasons
is that there are more scientific journals taken up in the database of the Web of Science today. But it
is also clear that many more academic fields have taken up conversion as one of their objects of study.
The reference search shows articles published in journals belonging to Literature Studies, Theology,
Anthropology, Art, Philosophy, History, Sociology, Religious Studies, and even Medicine. Browsing
library catalogues indicates a similar trend (LibisNet; Aleph; British Library Catalogue; etc.).
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Chapter 5
many pious people. It follows the dictates of 2000 years of Christian historical and
religious developments.
This chapter addresses the fact that, in humanities and the social scientific
literature on religious conversion, symmetry is presupposed about what religion
is, how religions relate to each other and the role of conversion in this scheme.
This pushes such studies in a certain direction, namely investigating the contingent circumstantial and motivational differences in different cases of conversion
(both over time and space). This supposed symmetry, we argue, is accountable for
a fundamental flaw in the academic study of religious conversion in the Indian
context. The flaw is not that the current studies are wrong or uninteresting, but
that they are limited in such a way that the development of alternative hypotheses
about the clash over religious conversion has been next to impossible. In this and
the next chapter, we will explore this claim. We will show that the structural symmetry that is presupposed between different religions and conversions does not
correspond to the actual structure of these phenomena.
The Case of India
The above description also holds for the study of religious conversion in India.
Though many books and articles have been written on conversion and proselytization in India and South Asia, little attention has been paid to the theoretical
frameworks used. A variety of scholars from a variety of disciplines has been active
in tackling the question of conversion in India.3 While many of the studies are
primarily historical and focus on a specific region or period, most take recourse
to the psychology of religion, sociology of religion, anthropology of religion and
to religious studies to build their case. Currently, the study of legal issues related
to conversion is becoming more prominent.4 Generally, one takes recourse to the
psychology of religion for definitional matters or to determine the structure of
inner conversions.5 For a more theoretical analysis, the works of Robin Horton
(1971, 1975a, 1975b) and the Comaroffs (1991) are often cited.
See especially Banerjee (1982), Ballhatchet (1998), Copley (1997), Fernandes (1981), Frykenberg
(1979, 1980, 2003), Harding (2008), Heredia (2007), Kim (2003), Neill (1984), Oddie (1977a, 1997,
1998), Robinson (1998), Robinson and Clarke (2003), Swarup (1986), van der Veer (1996), Viswanathan (1998).
4
See e.g. Baird (1993), Galanter (1984), Jenkins (2008), Larson (2001), Owens (2007), Paul (2000).
5
Especially the following works are used for this: James (1902), Lamb (1999), Nock (1933), Rambo
(1993, 1999).
3
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While many of these publications are edited volumes (e.g. Frykenberg 2003;
Oddie 1977a, 1997, 1998; Robinson and Clark 2003), the most well-known
monographs on conversion in India (Viswanathan 1998; Kim 2003; Heredia
2007) are different from each other in the way they approach their object of study.
Kim, for instance, gives a historical and informative overview of the most significant twentieth century debates on conversion, supplemented by his vision on the
nature of Christian mission in India and concluded with a call for Hindu-Christian dialogue. Heredias book is a long historio-philosophical essay contemplating
the effects of Indias pluri-religious society, which pleads for more tolerance and
a constructive interaction between the different faith-traditions. Gauri Viswanathans study is of another nature. Combining literary criticism and historical and
post-colonial approaches, she offers an account of religious conversion as a factor
that destabilizes modern Indian society because it subverts secular power.
In the next part, we will critically assess this literature, identify its pitfalls and
formulate the interesting research questions they raise. In fact, even such a short
introduction as the current one already raises issues: how is it possible that conversion is dealt with in so many branches of humanities and the social sciences? The
question with which we approach these studies is simple: how do they help us in
gaining an insight into the clash over religious conversion in India? What strategies do they develop, which implications do these hold and which consequences
do they have?
Conversion as Socio-Political Protest
A popular approach to the study of religious conversion in India focuses on the
socio-economic significance of conversion. The relation between conversion and
the caste system is the focus here.6 Here, conversions are mainly approached as
social movements of protest and mobility of lower caste groups. In this context,
psychological changes, especially as they relate to questions of identity, are tackled.
Sometimes the notion of rice Christians is used, referring to the main reason
for becoming a Christian (the incentive of food or money). Others have pointed
out the derogatory nature of this label and its underestimation of the presence of
genuine religious reasons for conversion (e.g. Harding 2008, 3 and 137).
See for instance: Kooiman (1990), Fernandes (1981), Forrester (1977, 1980), Gokhale (1986),
Houtart (1981), Jayakumar (1999), Manickam (1977), Singh (1998), Webster (1994).
6
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Chapter 5
By way of illustration, let us consider some instances in the literature where

we see such an approach to the issue of religious conversion in India. The conversions under consideration in such studies are mainly conversions to Christianity
and to Buddhism. In passing, we will say a few words about the second type of
conversion but the first merits most of our attention.
The question of the conversion of dalits in modern India is often invoked as
one of the reasons why conversion causes controversy. The paradigmatic instance
here is B. R. Ambedkars conversion to equality: his rejection of the Hindu caste
system took the form of an initiation into Buddhism (Viswanathan 1998, 21139). This gave rise to a new Buddhist movement in India:
The Navayana Diksha, Indias twentieth-century Buddhist conversion movement,
has been more of a communal, social action than a personal or ideological one. Its
intended goals have been more material and psychological than metaphysical or
spiritual; its visible effects have been more political than ritual. Rather than being
focused upon some sort of personal transcendence or salvation, Navayana Buddhism is focused on the achievement of social equality in modern society. Before
it was a conversion to a different ideology, the Navayana Diksha was proposed
and engaged as a conversion from Indias ruling communal ideology, of Hinduism. It continues to be primarily a rational, political choice with psychological and
spiritual consequences, more than a theological or metaphysical choice, or a leap
of soteriological faith. (Tartakov 2003, 194)
Brojendra Banerjee states that the dalit conversions represent a social stirring,
and are not a political or, paradoxically, even a religious problem...The harijans
and the Dalits are in revolt against deep-seated and humiliating social inequality, upon which the exploitation and oppression they suffer is founded (Banerjee
1983, 393). So, the main issue in these shifts seems to be the rejection of a nonegalitarian ideology in favour of a message of social equality.
The question that interests us is about the relation between such a shift and a
religious conversion. After all, these changes appear to be closer to the decision of
a European worker to join the socialist party because he prefers its program of social equality, than they are to John Henry Newmans conversion to Catholicism. If
these shifts in India represent a social stirring or a political choice, why not study
them as such? If they exemplify the struggle for political power, social equality and
opportunities, why theorize them in terms of religious conversion?
This step becomes self-evident only because of the presence of certain background assumptions. First of all, a range of social problems (inequality, poverty,
139
social exclusion, limited opportunities, problems of access to institutions, violence,

discrimination, etc.) are related to one root cause: the caste system. Second, the
caste system is taken to represent a religious ideology of inequality, believed to be
an intrinsic part of the Hindu religion. In this way, the problem is identified as a
religious problem. Hence, also the solution is construed accordingly, namely religiously: Buddhism or Christianity are considered as the egalitarian counterparts of
Hindu hierarchy. These religious entities are seen as religious rivals with conflicting messages and conflicting societal models. Let us not underestimate the weight
of these presuppositions: only by presuming that a range of societal problems are
essentially religious problems could conversion to another religion ever be considered as a solution.
These claims would help, if it were clear what renders the entities in question religious and what makes a shift between them into religious conversion. When
one invokes suitable terms, even the French Revolution could be described as an
expression of religious conversion. One could describe the shift of an individual
from the Ancien Rgime ideology to egalitarian Enlightenment philosophy as conversion, if one proposes these two should be seen as distinct religions. However,
ones understanding of these historical situations does not grow by attaching these
labels. The same appears to be true of the Indian case.
That is to say, there is a fundamental shortcoming in studies focussing on
the socio-economic dimension of religious conversion in India. We can formulate
this deficiency in terms of a question: what is the relation between some particular
social structure and the related societal problems such as poverty and inequality of opportunities, on the one hand, and the religious traditions in a society, on the other hand?
Additionally: under what conditions can a religious conversion ever solve (or even
be believed to be able to solve) socio-economic problems?
Caste, Christianity and Conversion
It is true that India was and still is coping with huge problems such as mass poverty, social inequalities and economic backwardness of many groups and regions.
It is equally true that the modern Indian State should find solutions for many of
its societal problems. Today too, due to the economic boom, new socio-economic
inequalities are growing and they impact upon millions of people. Yet, the proposed link between religious conversion, on the one hand, and improvement of
the situation of the poor, on the other, is problematic. Though many have propa-
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gated this idea in the past and even if many have benefited in socio-economic or
political terms from conversion, this does not prove that such a link exists. Say, for
instance, that conversion to Christianity gives one access to literacy and a better
education. Naturally this will be beneficial for ones future career and opportunities in life in general, but apart from a vague link between education and better
opportunities nothing is established by such cases.
Often, reality shows that this link is not self-evident at all. More, it has
been a recurring complaint of converts to Christianity that the socio-economic
inequalities they experienced in life never disappeared after their conversion into
Christianity. Historical studies have pointed this out: for instance, Kenneth Ballhatchet, in his Caste, Class and Catholicism in India 1789-1914 (1998), shows the
continued tensions related to the social inequalities between high-class and lowclass converts to Christianity. Even when they succeeded in bringing together all
Christian converts in the same space (church) and at the same time (for the same
service), the separation between the different groups remained pertinent. Todays
news reports continue to stress the same state of affairs. As a Christian dalit activist says to a BBC reporter: There is no big change after we came to Christianity.
We have very good Christian names, we read Bible and got to Church instead of
temples (Raman 2009).
Talking about the Maratha conversion to Buddhism in 1956, Gokhale
points out that the expectations entertained for Buddhism on the collective level
have not been fulfilled. Although social relationships among Untouchable and
lower-caste communities have been altered as a result of the conversion, the direction of these changes has been to vitiate and erode unity: the opposite of what
was intended (Gokhale 1986, 272). But on the individual level, so she asserts, the
adoption of Buddhism has been a major success. Testimony by the new converts...
reveals the emphatic nature of the change in mental habit and self-conception
that had occurred as a result of the Buddhist conversion...[t]here has been great
cohesion and self-awareness on the part of the new converts and their parent
community, but new cleavages among all Untouchables and lower castes have also
appeared (ibid., 273).
Still, the relation between such social and psychological changes and religious conversion is not straightforward. What is the logical relation between this
kind of social empowerment and psychological reinforcement of identity and the
role of a religion in these changes? With equal plausibility, could we not suggest
that the special attention paid by the successful and influential Ambedkar to this
141
community and its members has provided them with a new sense of self-respect
and self-understanding? Considering the attention the missionaries have given
to many of the lower-caste groups, a similar case could be built for them as well.
What compels us to study these changes as changes related to religious conversion?
Why not study themand we have good reasons to do that since they take the
form of such changesas psychological, social, or political changes? There is no
answer to this question to be found in the literature.
With these general remarks in mind, let us turn to some of the historical
studies that tackle the topic of conversion in India by exploring the social and
economic factors contributing to it. In reality, we should know, these factors are
euphemistic references to the caste system.
In his The Depressed Classes and Conversion to Christianity 1860-1960 (1977),
Duncan Forrester tackles the issue of mass conversions to Christianity by lowercaste groups in the second half of the nineteenth century (see also his 1980). In
looking for reasons for this sudden change, he speaks of social and economic
dislocation as the catalysts: I would suggest that the various aspirationsspiritual, psychological and materialwhich expressed themselves in a mass movement
were best able to surface and become effective in times of social and economic
dislocation, and that such conditions, of which famines represented an extreme
case, were generally present throughout the second half of the nineteenth century
(Forrester 1977, 72). In this sense, a diffuse agitation among the depressed castes
lies at the foundation of many religious conversions. However, as Forrester points
out, the question remains why this agitation took the form of religious conversions. He is not sure about the answer and states that it would be tempting to put
forward that, in this period, the economic conditions of these groups and their
relative position to other castes (with better access to educational and occupational opportunities under the Raj) deteriorated sharply. Regarding the link with
religious conversion, he adds:
Why did the restlessness among the depressed so frequently assume a primarily
religious form, and specifically that of conversion? It seems likely that the traditional possibilities of mobility within the caste system were increasingly effectively
closed to the untouchables. For one thing, they were unusually fragmented, and
collective action, predicated upon horizontal group solidarity which could perhaps
achieve much for castes somewhat higher on the social scale, was seldom feasible
for them. Sanskritisation was a cul-de-sac because of concerted and efficacious rebuffs from the higher castes...Similarly, the possibilities of advancement through
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political action or improved education were not very real for the untouchables.
(ibid., 73)
The link with caste is clear, but the link with religion much less so. Forrester
warns his readers not to misunderstand his study as devaluing the role of the
religious dimension. Religious change was not simply a new way of seeking better economic and social status: While the hope for these things seems always to
be present, it would be a distortion to see it as a dominant or only motive (ibid.,
74). However, what exactly was religious about the change is difficult to pinpoint
even in this very detailed and interesting study of mass movements. The closest we
come to a concrete answer is his suggestion that a conversion movement is like a
kind of group identity crisis, in which the group passes through a negative rejection of its lowly place in Hindu society to a positive affirmation of a new social
and religious identity (ibid.). Reformulated: the lowly place in Hindu society
refers to the caste system, which is thus interpreted as a religious institution of
Hinduism. In other words, Forrester needs to establish the link between caste and
Hinduism in order to let the conversion pass for religious conversion.
At the end of this work, the author brings in another related element. Though
after the 1930s, various kinds of protective discriminations were established for
the depressed classes, in recent years, there is a continuation of group conversions
of Harijans or untouchables (especially to Buddhism). This, as Forrester concludes, might be related to some disillusionment with the fruits of political action and statutory enactments. These by themselves cannot provide the dignity or
opportunities and material advancement sought. Self-respect, as missionaries had
long before discovered, is more important than charity, even if the charity comes
from the government (ibid., 90). The last statement is revealing. Forresters study
is right to ask the question about the religious dimension in these mass conversions, while it primarily refers to social and economic dislocation, related to caste,
as the instigator of such movements. Still, the religious dimension is crucial. It
can give something which the purely social, political, economic changes apparently cannot give: self-respect. This self-respect stands in contrast to the Hindu
caste system, which denies essential self-respect. Hence, obliquely, he reinforces
the idea that religious conversion is the solution, and that it indeed needs to be
a religious solution, because the root cause of the problem is the inequality inherent in
the Hindu religion through the caste system. When we look closer, we cannot escape
from the impression that even the word restlessnesswhich he uses very often
143
in his work in connection to the societal problemsacquires a quasi religious connotation, belonging to the field of emotions and situations related to religious
conversion. (However, one needs to know stories like Bunyans The Pilgrims Progress to intuitively understand this kind of restlessness: the stirrings of the Holy
Spirit in the human soul.)
The issue of caste, then, is crucial to understanding the religious dimension
of the clash over religious conversion in India. But the identification of caste as a
fundamental characteristic of the Hindu religion is not self-evident. Even though
everybody in the West will immediately connect the caste system to Hinduism
today, this link was not always so clear. It was an issue that was discussed and
explained by whole generations of missionaries and Christians in India. In his
book Caste and Christianity: Attitudes and Policies on Caste of Anglo-Saxon Protestant Missionaries in India (1980), Forrester explains this further. Especially at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, discussions abounded among the Protestants
on how to understand and cope with caste. There were many different views and
position on the issue, but [b]y the eighteen fifties virtually all the Protestant
missions with solitary exception of the Leipzig Mission were in agreement that
holding caste was a great evil that must be ruthlessly uprooted from the Church
(Forrester 1980, 40).
This consensus was not unimportant because it now established that caste
was irreconcilable with Christianity.7 Fighting caste, however, was not merely
fighting an unjust social structure. It was fighting an unjust structure related to
a particular false religion. Though the Christian responses to caste were varied, all
generally rejected caste and thought that it was incompatible with Christianity
(ibid., 196). However, the objections to caste were not only ethical and strategic,
Forrester states, but also specifically religious and theological. If missionaries first became aware of caste as an obstacle to conversion they felt on closer acquaintance
that it was an immoral social order which was essentially opposed to Christianity because it was part and parcel of Hinduism (ibid., 198; italics mine). He explains this:
Hinduism provided the religious sanctions and the religious legitimation for caste,
while caste was the classic example of a social order providing the iron frame
for a religion. The two stood, or fell, together. From this flowed the specifically
theological objections to caste, as distinct from objections which were more genSee also Sweetman (2007). On the basis of valuable material from missionary sources, he clarifies
that the understanding of caste as a religious system intrinsically connected to Hinduism came into
being only as late as the 1820s, implying that, before this period, the British colonial rule was not in
need of such a construction. See also Claerhout (2008, 604).
7
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erally ethical, strategic, or sociological. The particular elements in the ideological

undergirding of caste which attracted criticism included the system of karma and
reincarnation, which was seen as quite incompatible with Christian teaching and
as having implications for the understanding of man and of society. (ibid., 198)
In other words, Forresters study elucidates how the connection between caste,
an unjust social structure, and the Hindu religion with its false doctrines was established within a particular Christian theological framework by Protestant missionaries. This insight will help us formulate some of the lingering presuppositions in the current understanding of the link between caste and socio-economic
problems in society.
Ballhatchets study Caste, Class and Catholicism in India 1789-1914 (1998)
shows the development of a similar attitude to caste among Catholic missionaries in India, even though there were significant differences with the Protestant
attitude:
Attempts by missionaries in Tamil Nadu to justify caste divisions as merely social
or as aids to conversions had been accepted reluctantly in Rome as a temporary
solution. But by the 1880s such views seemed increasingly irrelevant and indeed
embarrassing. Many hoped that it would be enough to ignore caste issues and
avoid discussing about them. The Vatican had always pressed for a native priesthood, and increasingly missionaries were urged to encourage vocations without
regard to caste. (Ballhatchet 1998, 141)
Before we formulate some research question ensuing from this connection between caste and religion, let us give a more recent illustration: Christopher Hardings Religious Transformation in South Asia: The Meanings of Conversion in Colonial
Punjab (2008). Studying the mass movement period in Punjab, his attention also
goes to conversion as social protest and conversion as social uplifting. The author
asks how appropriate it is to describe the transformation sought by converts as
religious. Pointing out that conversion is treated in historical discourse as the
least honourable and courageous solution and that the conversion often intensified the subaltern status of untouchables rather than improving it, he asserts:
Given these accusations and outcomes, it is important to find ways of addressing
the question of motivation in mass-movement conversions, but without simply
wielding the analytical knife to segregate religious, social, and material. There is
a need to develop an alternative approach to investigate this emergence of a subaltern movement, through an open-ended evaluation of what the terms religious
and conversion actually meant in the mass-movement context. This was, after all,
145
a period of the most intense competition among in rural and particularly urban
Punjabas elsewhere in Indiaamong social reformers offering multidimensional social visions and programmes, taking in basic education, social welfare, the
status of women, new philosophical directions, and the pruning of what different
individuals and groups regarded as undesirable aspects of local or national socioreligious culture. Where does conversion to Christianity sit here? As a protest
against caste and the prevailing social system in general? As a strategy to move up
within or to rework that system, rather than repudiate it? (Harding 2008, 3-4)
The main elements in his question have to do with the emergence of a subaltern movement, religious conversion and social reformers. To understand how
these are related to each other, Harding focuses on a number of villages and their
interaction with the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and Belgian Capuchin
missionaries. One of the possibilities that Harding suggests has to do with the
penetration of reformist ideas in India in organizations like the Arya Samaj and
Ad Dharm:
One of the possibilities addressed in this work is that although rural low-castes
were largely removed from the emerging urban public arena of newspapers, journals, professional circles, societies, and conferences which helped to support the
activities of social reformers and reform groups, a notion of community uplift
may nevertheless have filtered through to them via the leaders described by Webster and via the outside groups, missions included, who claimed to be taking an
interest in their welfare in this period. In that case, meaning in the mass movements could in part be located in convert desires for uplift of some sort, with a
basis both in their socio-religious culture and recent experience and in European
rhetoric of social uplift which was introduced into Punjab by missionaries and
others. (ibid., 15)
The missions and the missionaries (co-)introduce the idea of social uplifting. The
success of the missionaries in exporting their worldview would depend upon a
convincing engagement with the socio-economic predicament faced by low-caste
Punjabis, deeply intertwined as it was with their religious outlook (ibid., 60).
Here, we see the familiar connection resurfacing. In order to make conversion
into a plausible solution for the socio-religious predicament, caste and its link
with religion have to be introduced. But this link is not made intelligible. Hence
the conclusion: This, then, was religious transformation in rural Punjab around
the turn of the twentieth century: the coming together of entire models of individual being and of corporate society, communicated and contested in idioms of
opportunity, security, conversion, religious commitment, and behaviour. From the
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Chapter 5
constituent parts of two mission Christianities never torn from their European
roots, converts refashioned their socio-religious identity (ibid., 259). Though this
study is very rich in historical material and a pleasure to read, one finishes reading
it with a feeling of disappointment: the explanatory force is missing. It shares this
problem with many historical studies on religious conversion.
The Miracle of Social Reform
We need to think more about the suggestion of seeing conversion as social protest or as social uplifting. As many emphasize, social reformers competed with
each other during the nineteenth century.8 As Harding (2008, 3) formulates it,
an intense competition among social reformers offering multidimensional social
visions and programmes, taking in basic education, social welfare, the status of
women, new philosophical directions arose in that period. In the literature there
is a general agreement on this.
But this state of affairs allows for different kinds of interpretations. Whence
the growth of an awareness of a range of societal problems and ills? Whence the
emergence of a generation of social and religious reformers? In answering these
questions, the roles of Christianity, the missionaries and the British educational
system are most often called upon in the literature.9 It is said that the missionaries played a crucial role in bringing the social problems to the fore and creating
awareness towards a range of inequalities and injustices. Others have pointed out
that this happened because the missionaries engaged with a range of problematic
situations in the Indian society and thus set the example. In this context, different
scholars also draw attention to the fact that the success of this approach could
not always be measured in terms of converts. Even though the missionaries did
not win many converts, they did have a great impact on the Indian society by the
kinds of reforms they initiated.10
8
See also the still indispensible study by Oddie (1979). The following works explore the emergence of the social and religious reform movements in the nineteenth century: Bayly (1999), Bugge
(1998), Clmentin-Ojha and Gaborieau (1994), Downs (1981), Eaton (1984), Hardiman (2007),
Jones (1989), Kooiman (1990), Manickam (1977), Mitra (1983), OHanlon (2002), Oommen
(1996). This is a selection from a wide variety of literature, which includes materials on reformers
and reform movements.
9
See in particular Forrester (1977, 1980), Heimsath (1964), Kooiman (1984, 1990), Oddie (1977).
10
See Forrester (1980, 202), Harding (2008, 259), Kooiman (1984, 188), Oddie (1979, 245-255).
147
This link between the emergence of social and religious reforms and reformers, on the one hand, and Christianity, on the other, is extremely significant.
However, even though many studies accept this as a given, not many really take it
seriously as an object of study. In most accounts, for instance, the Indian social and
religious reformers become imitators: following the good example of the Europeans, they finally see the immorality of a range of practices and establish reform
movements. Or the emergence of the Indian reform movements is described as a
reaction to Christian propaganda. But there is a problem in such interpretations:
is it not it strange that the caste system could thrive for centuries, if not millennia, only to be questioned by the Indians after a handful of enlightened priests and
missionaries reached the shores of India? If the caste system is all that immoral,
how could millions upon millions in India, age after age, not see this? Could a
few years or even a few decennia of teaching and preaching by small groups of
Christians alter a culture that easily? This sounds implausible.
Implausibility apart, there is also an improbable assumption underlying the
standard accounts. Many have noticed that moral and ethical criticisms of the
caste system emerged in India only subsequent to her colonization by the British.
This situation indicates one of two things: either Indians had no notion of morality and had no ethics until the British and the Christians came to India; or they
did have both except that their morality is what the West considers as immoral.
The first suggestion runs contrary to everything we know about human societies: we know of no society that has survived for millennia without having some
or another system of morality and ethics. Even were we to say that this knowledge
of human societies is deficient, there is the near impossible task of explaining how
the intellectuals of a totally immoral culture could suddenly, in a few decennia,
grasp the intricacies of Western thinking on morality and ethics. Not only do
these individual reformers understand Western ethics but they are also able to
express these ideas in a language that could not have had a moral vocabulary (after
all, a culture that is totally lacking in morality and ethics will not have an ethical
and moral vocabulary in any of its languages). And such a vocabulary will have to
be fashioned in the local languages of India and, because the reformists launched
a mass movement, the general population would also understand it effortlessly.
Surely, this cannot be the case.
As far as the second possibility is concerned, let us note that no researcher
has discovered a system of ethics and morality in India that is utterly alien to the
ethics and morality of either Christianity or the Western culture. Consequently,
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even this assumption cannot be made. In that case, from whence is the truth of
either of these two presumptions derived?11
Western-Christian Descriptions
Without ignoring the crucial facts in this account, another train of thought might
be interesting to explore. Many have observed that social and religious reformers
were active at the end of the nineteenth century. What if the crux of the story is
not that the missionaries brought about an awareness of certain problems but that,
through their experience and description of the social world, redescribed certain
phenomena and identified their descriptions as problems of the Indian society?
As the nineteenth century progressed, the missionaries could benefit from
the percolation of these descriptions in Indian society. This enabled both the educated elites and those other groups where the European experience and description of the Indian society percolated (through study, education, etc.), to understand
the concerns of the Christians and missionaries. Such an understanding enabled
them to see and identify the same problems and shortcomings in the Indian society and its traditions.
This suggestion sounds similar to certain analyses in the literature, but in fact
it leads to a different point. It suggests that the appealing questions are not which
reformer in which village had which successes and which failures. The question is:
which dynamic is accountable for the fact that, by the end of the nineteenth century,
Indian social reformers and Christian missionaries could compete with each other on
seemingly equal grounds? However, we will further argue that the ground on which
they competed was far from equal.
In the following chapters, we will give a scientific foundation to the following suggestion: Western-Christian descriptions of Indian society were somehow
accepted as true descriptions and, by the end of the nineteenth century, this
began to bear its first fruits in the social and religious reform movements. These
descriptions percolated in Indian society and had considerable impact. For the
first time in Indian history, this made conversion to Christianity an eminently
sensible and viable option. First, one needed to establish an arena of competition;
only then could the game of winning converts be played. Before this time, before
It is impossible to tackle this issue adequately here. However, consult the following work: Balagangadhara, Bloch and De Roover (2008).
11
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the arena of competition was created, religious conversion to Christianity failed to

make sense to most Indians.12
For a long time, conversion to Christianity had been quite unsuccessful,
given that its aim and nature were incomprehensible to the majority of the Indian population. Only a handful of charismatic priests succeeded, like the classical example of the respected Jesuit missionary Di Nobili, the Roman-Catholic
Brahmin, in the seventeenth centurybut even this had probably more to do
with the openness of the Indian traditions with respect to teachers (among other
things, he was respected for his learning) than with the message of Christianity
itself. This changed radically in the course of the nineteenth century. Not because
suddenly all Indians changed their minds and were willing to listen to the missionaries. In this scientific context, we can also not assume that it was because they
finally began to understand the truth of Christian religion. Instead, the cause is
to be sought in the percolation of Western-Christian descriptions of India and
its religions in the Indian society. This process allowed for many different shifts
and changes. Large groups of Indians began to see and experience their culture
and traditions in a different light and this enabled them to see and identify things
differently. A result of this is that an array of social and religious reformers could
emerge and religious conversion became an option. This took place along with the
emergence of options which were also new, like joining the Arya Samaj, Brahmo
Samaj, groups defending the rights of women, of dalits, of poor in general, etc.
To understand this movement, the following is crucial: the emergence of an
arena for competition between social and religious movements and the fact that conversion to Christianity became an option for certain groups of Indians. Many agree that
somehow the missionaries, Christianity or the British played an important role
in the creation of this situation. We agree, but we need to fine-tune this observation: not by going into greater details (e.g. this missionary was successful in 12
villages; providing detailed histories of the missionary associations that emerged;
by showing how the topic of equal education for women was taken up by this or
that Indian reformer, etc.), but rather by developing an insight into how all these
phenomena relate to each other in a systematic way, a systematic which is related to the
dynamics of the Christian religion.13
For now the only thing we would like to say is that it is implausible to simply
suggest that Europeans and missionaries identified a range of ills in India which
12
13
In chapter 9 we will take up this issue.

See chapters 6-10 for further explanation.
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were ignored for millennia by the Indians. Rather, a specific description of the
Indian society emerged in certain socio-economic circumstances. By saying this,
I am not suggesting that the emergence of the Western description can be causally
tied to specific socio-economic circumstances. In fact, I believe that one has to tie
this description to the nature of Western culture and not to any socio-economic
factor in India. However, it might be the case that the acceptance of this description was more contingent upon the socio-economic reality in India (e.g. the emergence of an English education, mobility in society, the staffing of bureaucracies,
etc). Whatever is the case, this description is part of the Western-Christian cultural experience of India and became accepted by the Indians. It was the sine qua
non in order to see different jatis as parts of the caste system, see different Indian
traditions as different religions and support the need for competing socio-religious
reformers in Indian society.
A short note of caution is required here. The claim is not that the missionaries and other Christians were hallucinating when they saw and described certain
situations in India. We are saying that they could see and experience them the way
they did, because of their Western-Christian background. But we need to keep
in mind that this does not make the framework into a true description of the Indian
society. In simpler terms: the missionaries and Christians have undoubtedly seen,
experienced and often remedied unjust situations in India (e.g. a child without
opportunities that is kept as house slave), which, however, does not imply that
the framework against which they did this is the true description of Indian society
(e.g. inherently immoral caste system). The work that the Belgian Catholic sister
Jeanne Devos is doing in Bombay (providing refuge for domestic child slaves)
is without any doubt praiseworthy. She is devoting her life to help the poor and
marginal people and helps in educating them and find jobs. However, this does
not mean that we, as social scientists, have to accept her analysis of the situation
(caste system, exploitation of children, immorality in the Indian society) as a true
description of the Indian social system. A refusal to accept the popular link between the caste system, an inherently immoral social system and Hinduism does
not logically imply an approval of situations of inequality and atrocity in the world
and in India. It does imply that we would propose to fight the latter in different
ways and look for solutions in different places than in the religious arena. If our
aim is to gain sound knowledge of the Indian society, we need to keep these two
apart.
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To summarize what has been said so far: (1) a certain connection is postulated between socio-economic problems, caste, the Indian social structure, and
Hinduism in the studies which approach caste as a protest against socio-economic ills; (2) there is something very interesting in the link between the spread of
Christianity and the creation of an arena for social change. Both elements need
to be explored and this will be done subsequently. The last will be explored in the
final chapter of this thesis. The first will be explored in the historical chapters
(chapters 7 and 8) as this connection has been formulated clearly in the Protestant
description of Catholic society of the sixteenth century.
Immoral Religion
The connection postulated between caste, religion and the ills of Indian society
leads to a set of questions. First, why is there an identification of the Indian social
structure with the immoral Hindu caste system? The claim is not that the Indian
social structure has immoral elements in it or that it has a corrupt dimension. The
claim is that the caste system, that is, the social system and structure that prevails
in India, is inherently immoral and bad. Surely, this claim about a culture and society that have survived for thousands of years is in need of justification.
Second, why have many Indians and Indian groups accepted this representation or description as a true description of their society? In fact, this question
has intrigued some scholars because it is about the impact of the missionaries
in general (education, empowerment of marginalized groups, support of women,
critiques on the caste system, critiques on certain immoral practices in India) and
the emergence and growth of Hindu Reform Movements in the second half of
the nineteenth century. We need to explain this impact. In a very rich study, Social Protest in India: British Protestant Missionaries and Social Reforms 1850-1900
(1979), the historian Geoffrey Oddie traces the relationship between the attempts
by Protestant missionaries to bring about social reforms in India (against infanticide, the treatment of the sick and the dying, practices like hook swinging, sati)
and the ensuing response by the Indian Social Reform Movements. Though the
initial feeling of the missionaries about their endeavour to convert the Indians was
rather one of disappointment, the idea grew that the Indian society first needed
those societal changes in preparation for the preaching of the Gospel. Though a
certain tension remained between the spiritual duties to convert and the duty to
bring about societal change in preparation of the Gospel, the emphasis on the sec-
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ond gradually won field in the nineteenth century (Oddie 1979, 1-44). Especially
regarding the caste system, the missionaries played a pivotal role in making this
into an issue for the Indians as well:
The effect of the missionary assault on the caste system is by no means easy to
ascertain. However there can be little doubt that missionary agitation and arguments against caste, together with the spread of Christian ideas, at least stimulated
or reinforced Hindu attempts at reform. Some of the most vehement critics of
caste, including N.G. Chandravarkar, M.G. Ranade, Keshub Chandra Sen, Jotiba Govinda Phule, Behramji Malabari and others, were influenced by the Bible
and the Christian ethic. Furthermore, quite apart from their effect in stimulating
Hindu movements for reform of the caste system, the missionaries were also, more
indirectly, undermining the effectiveness of caste sanctions and weakening the
power and hold of caste over individuals. (Oddie 1979, 69)
Third, how is it possible that the social scientists do not see the link, presupposed
in these studies, between a corrupt religion (Hinduism) and a corrupt society (the
ills resulting from the caste system)? We need to explain this blindness.
A problem present in the explanations about religious conversion in India is
that they shift to political explanations and slide into the secularism-Hindutva divide. Once accepted, this framework leaves no other option than to choose sides:
either one is secular and one advances toleration, freedom of religion, the separation between religion and the state and the freedom to convert; or one is a religious fundamentalist and one strives for a Hindu state with Hindu believers and
is against religious conversion (e.g. Coleman 2008; Arun n.d.). In other words, the
opposition to conversion is seen as anti-modern, nationalistic and fundamentalist; the support of conversion is seen as modern, cosmopolitan and rational. These
stances paralyse the academic study of religion and the study of conversion in
India in particular.
5.2. The Universal Predicament of Conversion

To explain the success of these notions in the social sciences and humanities we
need to shift the debate to a higher level. The predicament of religious conversion
is considered as common to all societies where two or more religions coexist. In
such plural societies, competition arises between the different religions or religious groups.
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This may take many different forms. Recent studies on the controversial
issue of conversion stress the variety of the problem (Bryant and Lamb 1999;
Buckser and Glazier 2003; Robinson and Clarke 2003). Israel and several Muslim
nations have put legal restrictions on conversion. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist bhikkhus and laymen exhibit a strong hostility towards Christian missionary activities
in their society. The Hindutva movement and traditional Hindus do the same in
India. Both in Russia and Latin America, the dominant churches are dismayed
at the arrival of U.S.-based evangelicals on a mission to bring all peoples of the
world to the true faith. These are but a few cases, but the general picture is clear:
Conversion is the troubling issue underlying these discordant voices. And it is at
the very heart of the new religious pluralism that is sweeping the planet (Bryant
and Lamb 1999, 11). In all plural societies, the consensus suggests, we encounter
variants of one problem, viz. that of religious conversion.
This consensus, however, contains a difficulty. In order to see the problem of
religious conversion in all these different societies and situations, we should know
what the problem is, i.e. how to identify it. Every change in the life of an individual cannot count as an instance of religious conversion. A decision to stop eating fast food could hardly be that. Neither could the movement of an individual
(or of a group) between two communities, organizations or systems. A scientists
rejection of one hypothesis about the nature of quarks and his acceptance of another does not exemplify religious conversion. Unless we trivialize the notion, we
should be able to distinguish between such events and cases of religious conversion. Still, there is great difficulty in deciding what makes some event or process
into religious conversion. This creates confusion and ambiguity throughout the
contemporary debate, especially in the Indian context.
Narrow Notions and Obscure Terms
A popular solution, often proposed in the literature on the subject, tackles this issue as follows: the narrow concept of conversion, based in the Christian religion,
should be extended so that other aspects and kinds of conversion can be included.
The editors of a recent volume, The Anthropology of Religious Conversion (2003),
argue along these lines:
Cross-cultural analyses of conversion inevitably encounter difficulties when they
try to define their subject. Academic models of conversion tend to draw heavily
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on Christian imagery, particularly on such dramatic scenes as Pauls vision on the

road to Damascus. These images construct conversion as a radical, sudden change
of belief, one in which old ways and associations are left behind as a result of a new
theological outlook. How can such models encompass non-Christian religions,
which often regard belief as less important than religious practice? How can they
accommodate the slow and partial stages through which conversion often takes
place? Even more difficult, how can they accurately describe cultures for which
belief, practice and membership have profoundly different meanings than they do
in Western society? (Buckser and Glazier 2003, xvi)
Indeed, scholars studying the Indian traditions face this difficulty. The editors
of another recent volume, Religious Conversion in India (2003), stress that their
volume invokes the idea of conversion as a terrain of multiple and diverse possibilities, rather than restricting it to the assumed rigidity of Islamic or Christian conversion (Robinson and Clarke 2003, 13). It brings together on the same
ground multiple contextsancient Jain and Buddhist conversions, conversion to
varied varieties of Islam or Christianity or even Sikhism at different points of time
and through differing modes and motivations as well as tribal conversions and
transformations of sect and caste, but this is not the yoking of a series of incompatibles (Robinson and Clarke 2003, 13). Others state that the authoritative understandings of conversionremain rooted in common sense European connotations of the category and that conversion is, of course, a Western idea (Dube
and Dube 2003, 222-223; Brekke 2003, 182). Or they point out: not only is the
concept of conversion which we understand today a category which emerges out
of the Semitic religious traditions but it is also a product of modernity (Fenech
2003, 149). This difficulty is stated again and again: the current model of religious
conversion is limited to a Western and Christian understanding; at most, it can
include Islamic or even Judaic conversion, but other instances are excluded.
We need to spell out clearly what this situation could imply: It could entail
that conversion is a process and problem internal to Christianity and Islam. The
model cannot be extended because the phenomenon under analysis exists only in
these religions. It may also imply that conversion is a general phenomenon and
that the Western model constricts our understanding. To show this is the case, one
would have to identify the common structure or characteristic properties of the
phenomenon of conversion, which differentiate it from other processes of change.
Then, one could consistently extend the understanding of religious conversion so
as to analyse the relevant processes.
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There is also a third possibility: one presupposes that a series of events are
instances of religious conversion; one notes that no theoretical model is available
which allows one to make sense of these events as conversions; one suggests the
current model or concept should be extended. In this case, one has no way of being sure that one is not yoking together a series of incompatibles. If one is not
able to identify the basic structure of the phenomenon, how does one know one is
studying religious conversion and not entirely different processes?
This last option is the one most often chosen in the literature on conversion. To take one example, Dube and Dube (2003, 223) are critical of the concept
of conversion, because it is at once too constrained a concept and too grand an
arena. They suggest their study of the transformations of caste and sect in India
indicates the importance of understanding conversion less as unremitting rupture and more as the fashioning of novel practices, beliefs, identities, visions, and
boundaries of discrete religiositiesoften vernacular, distinctly Indian (Dube
and Dube 2003, 249-250). However, it remains unclear what makes these various
transformations and fashionings into the same kind of event as Islamic and
Christian conversion.
One could always extend ones definition of the word conversion so as to
include these processes, but this does not increase our understanding. On the
one hand, the obscurity of a termreligious conversionhas increased. Why not
simply use the word change, for instance? What arguments are there to counter
this naive suggestion? But not only does the term religious conversion become
more obscure, additionally, the nature of cultural processes of change continues
to escape us, because we classify them all as religious conversions. Remarkably, this
approach has become a theoretical guideline in todays social sciences and humanities. Thus, the editors of the same volume on conversion in India discuss the
many meanings of religious conversion on the Indian subcontinent:
Our understanding of the processes of conversion should be broad enough to
capturevariations across time and complexities across denomination and region.
There does not seem to be a good enough reason to abandon the term conversion,
for there are few others to replace it without difficultyIt appears much more
exciting and relevant to speak of a range of situations and meanings that are a part
of the field of conversion, with conversion requiring a proper initiation ritual,
exclusive adherence to a set of dogmas and abandonment of all other beliefs and
practices being only one possibility and, perhaps, lying at one extreme. (Robinson
and Clarke 2003, 10)
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The formulation is as striking as it is confusing. First, it is not clear whether the

authors desire to capture a general process of conversion across time, region and
denomination or different kinds of processes that they want to call conversion.
The difficulty, they suggest, is to make our understanding broad. The question
whether a general process of conversion actually exists across the various cultural
and religious traditions in India does not appear a legitimate question to ask. One
has to extend ones theorizing until it encompasses all cases of what one supposes
to be religious conversion. Second, the authors confuse the use of a term (conversion) with the understanding of a process (conversion). The problem is not what
word we use, but whether or not we are actually studying the same object, the
same kind of process, the same human phenomenon in different situations and
societies. Third, this problem cannot be solved by talking about a field of conversion containing a range of situations and meanings, unless it is clear which
range of situations exemplifies religious conversion. One pole may be exclusive
adherence to a particular set of dogmas and abandonment of all others, but what
does the other pole consist of and what lies in between?
To sum up, the following puzzle haunts the academic study of religious conversion: it is assumed to be a problem challenging all plural societies and common to
most religious traditions, but there is no clarity whatsoever on how to distinguish
religious conversion from other processes of change.
Religion in Religious Conversion
Given the situation in India, the matter of conversion is not as clear cut as the
social sciences and humanities would like it to be. We have pointed out that there
are serious problems with presupposing that the debate on conversion in India is
simply about winning more believers for ones own religion or about the fear of
losing followers. We have shown that many Indians, not just Hindu nationalists,
do not understand the practice of conversion and that, furthermore, they generally think of it as reprehensible. This brings some interesting problems to the fore:
What makes the scholars perceive the predicament of conversion as lying at the
very heart of the new religious pluralism that is sweeping the planet? From where
does the certainty arise that religious conversion is a general problem of the modern world, in spite of the inability to identify its characteristic structure? To solve
these questions, let us turn again to some of the ambiguous cases in India, which
have been identified as instances of religious conversion.
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Today, scholars conceive of many shifts between communities and traditions

in India as conversions. A typical proposal is that changes within and among the
various Hindu traditions, castes and sects should be understood as instances of
religious conversion (Dube and Dube 2003; Hardiman 2003). The Buddhist, Jain
and Sikh traditions are also included (Brekke 2003; Dundas 2003; Fenech 2003).
Even shifts among the tribal peoples of India are counted as conversions. David
Hardiman makes the point as follows:
Although studies of the process of conversion in India tend to focus on the change
from one religious category to another, e.g. from Hinduism to Islam, or Hinduism to Christianity, it can be argued that many internal conversions have also
occurred, e.g. from Shaivism to Vaishnavism, or from one Bhakti sect to another.
This rule may be seen to apply similarly in the case of transformations amongst
the so-called tribals of India. (Hardiman 2003, 255)
Hardiman himself raises the question whether or not we can define such movements as conversions. Even though there was no talk of any conversion to Hinduism, he suggests, systems of belief and practice that were carried on within
India frequently competed with each other to attract followers (ibid., 277). This
may have been the case. However, the same is also true about different scientific theories and research traditions in the West from the seventeenth century
onwards. The philosophical schools of Ancient Greece and Rome were equally
involved in a competition to attract followers. Yet, no one thinks of studying those
cases of competition as religious conversion. Why is this so self-evident where it
concerns shifts among Indian traditions?
The facile way out is to suggest that it must be religious conversion in the
Indian case, because different religions are involved. But bringing the word religions into play does not help us to grasp what is happening. The theoretical
difficulties still remain in place. Most would agree that movements between the
different denominations of Christianitye.g. from Catholicism to Protestantismare religious conversions. The question then is how shifts among the different Hindu traditions could be instances of the same process as a conversion
experience within the Christian fold or shifts of believers among Christianity and
Islam.14
If the anti-conversion laws in India reveal something, it is at least that internal shifts between and
among the Indian traditions are seen as phenomena entirely different than Christian conversions.
In fact, such shifts are not seen as conversions at all.
14
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The importance of such theoretical questions is ignored, precisely because

of the assumption that the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions are also religions.
They are taken to be variants of the same phenomenon as Christianity and Islam.
Therefore, it has become self-evident that changes and competition among these
traditions revolve around the issue of religious conversion.
This brings us back to the classical way of explaining the tensions surrounding conversion, which is relatively simple but also highly unsatisfactory: behind the
issue of conversion lurks the struggle between nationalist and reactionary forces
(Hindutva), on the one hand, and modernizing and liberal-democratic tendencies (secularism), on the other. It is not so much a religious issue, but one related
to political dynamics, the contest for power and the struggle for social equality.
First of all, this explanation does not do, because it does not transcend the level of
propaganda that is beset with half-truths.
One often argues that the dominant Hindu community or the Hindutva
movement fears it will lose some of its power and dominance in Indian society
because of conversion. As rights activist Ashgar Ali Engineer puts it:
In practice all religious communities want to add to their numbers to enhance
their political weight. In this case every conversion to Islam or Christianity is
strongly resented by the rightists in the majority community as it amounts to
loss of numbers and hence loss of political weightage. It was for this reason
that the conversion of a few Dalits to Islam in Meenakshipuram caused such
furore in 1981 and it was after those conversions that the VHP became so
aggressive and politicised. (Engineer 1999)
Some say that the high-caste Hindus oppose conversion of the lower castes away
from Hinduism, because it would diminish their grip on society (Vyas 2002).
Others suggest that the assault on conversion is but a pretext of the Hindutva
movement to promote its goal of a Hindu nation: Conversion to Christianity
threatens the construction of India as a nation for Hindus (Menon 2003, 50;
see also Sarkar 1999a, 1999b). These accounts of the politics of conversion are
increasingly popular, but they make one wonder which problem is being examined. How is the problem different from the contest between political parties in
any democracy, trying to gain voters or to prevent losing them? Such a contest
may also involve threats to one ideology by another. It often concerns parties with
some religious affiliation, which try to win votes. It is a contest for political power.
As a consequence, certain communities fear the decline of their numbers and in
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their hold on society. A satisfactory theory on the question of religious conversion

should tackle these problems.
What is Religious about Social Reform?
One of the classical reference points in the study of conversion to Christianity
in India lies in the work of someone whose name we have come across several
times in this essay, the Australian historian Geoffrey Oddie. He has published
on social and religious developments in colonial India and edited several volumes
dealing with religious conversion in India. Most notable are his Religion in South
Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in Medieval and
Modern Times (1977), Religious Conversion Movements in South Asia: Continuities
and Change, 1800-1900 (1997) and Religious Traditions in South Asia: Interaction
and Change (1998).
In the introductions to these books he has always stressed the importance
of not only paying attention to the social and political circumstances related to
conversion, but also directing attention to the religious ideas involvedboth in
the case of conversion of individuals as of groups. Both in his own writings and
in the works on conversion he has edited, he has supported this intellectualist
approach, which is often advocated by referring to the work of Robin Horton on
conversion in the African context.
Explaining the general approach of his Religion in South Asia (1977), Oddie
points out that though most scholars use the term conversion rather loosely and
avoid strict definitions, there is nevertheless widespread consensus that it involves
some kind of religious or socio-religious transformation or change (Oddie 1977a,
4). This stands in connection to three different types of changes. First, referring
to A.D. Nocks Conversion (1933), there is the experiential or inner psychological
view of religious conversion. The emphasis lies on the inner life and the emotional
and inward experience of the converted. What is problematic, he points out, is the
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Western Christian, even Pauline model, which is reflected here:15 It has yet to be
shown that it describes the experience of converts to non-Christian religion or
indeed the experience of most converts to Christianity in a non-Western cultural
environment (ibid., 5).
Second, conversion is used, mainly by historians to refer to the process of
people opting out of a religion and choosing another one, to talk about a change
of fellowship. The relation between this and an inner change is not clear here
but while a change of religious fellowship does not necessarily signify an inner change or transformation it does suggest a certain level of dissatisfactiona
restlessnessa seeking of something better (ibid., 6). He relates this conversion
to issues of identity, valuing the former community somehow negative in relation
to another community, the importance of the rites enabling the transition and he
stresses that though success is not guaranteed, such a transition might be the first
point of exposure or acculturation into a new tradition. This is how many scholars
approach the issue of conversion.
Third, there is a form of conversion which might be most fruitful, if applied
to study religious conversion in India: conversion as a change involving transition in belief. Oddie illustrates this approach using the work of Robin Horton
on conversion in the context of African religion.16 Though there are ample differences between African religion and Hinduism, Hortons thesis is important for
South Asian Studies not only because his ideas may prove to be more fruitful for
scholars studying conversion movements among tribals than among Hindus, but
also because the Horton debate...does challenge scholars to think more about
preconversion systems of thought and belief and the way in which indigenous
ideas and perceptions relate to conversion (ibid., 7-8).
To conclude, Oddie raises the question about the relation between these different changes and points out that they are not mutually exclusive and sometimes
can be present as different stages in a conversion account. However, this does not
Of course, it is anachronistic to speak of the Pauline model as a Western Christian one because,
as we know, Western Christianity is a contrast term to Eastern Christianity and the Pauline
model ante-dates the former by nearly a thousand years. Furthermore, if one does not presuppose
that St. Paul (before his conversion on the way to Damascus) was a Westerner and a Christian,
it does not make much sense to call this model a Western Christian one. Furthermore, in so far
as Antique Christianity spread across non-Western nations and people, which it did, it is difficult
to say whether or not the Pauline model helps us understand the spread of Christianity in a nonWestern cultural environment. But these objections do not invalidate the point that Oddie wants
to make with respect to Nocks work.
16
The most important articles on religious conversion by Robin Horton are Horton (1971, 1975a,
1975b).
15
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make up for the lack of a theoretical basis in the edited volume. This situation did
not pass unnoticed, as this selection from a review by historian Richard M. Eaton
illustrates:
I would register two general criticisms. One is that whereas the book supplies
abundant examples of the social, the economic, or the political dimensions of
religious change--and these factors are doubtless important--there is surprisingly little information about the religious dimensions of religious change. Almost
nothing is said of the preexisting religious and cosmological systems of the people
to be converted; so we are left with little understanding of exactly how new deities,
symbols, or rituals replaced or modified former such entities--much less why this
happened. Even when conversion is defined in a sociological sense, as it is in this
book, there eventually takes place a change in the ideational and religious spheres,
for surely the converted peoples had not, before their conversion, been living in
a cosmological vacuum. This aspect of the whole problem, however, is addressed
only occasionally and tangentially...My second criticism is that the book contains
no conclusion that ties together the essays; more fundamentally, it has no single
theoretical framework on the basis of which the rich data of the eight case studies could have been systematically analyzed and compared. But the hard work of
integrating diverse data such as are presented in this volume cannot begin until
the proper questions are raised; and in this last sense, this volume had taken an
important step forward. (Eaton 1978, 547)
Eaton raises a point that Oddie is particularly sensitive to. He too supports this
intellectualist approach in which the question about the religious change is asked
and in which the link between the previous and the new belief is thoroughly studied. Explaining the scope of a later edited volume, Oddie seems to be somewhat
more disturbed about the question of definition. In the introduction to his famous
Religious Conversion Movements in South Asia (1997), Oddie points out that one
of the major problems in the study of religious change in South Asia has always
been the question of definition: What is conversion and what are conversion
movements? At the simplest and popular level most commentators seem to be referring to some sort of change in religious belief and/or affiliation, a change which
is often thought of as communal and which is expressed symbolically through the
performance of ritual (Oddie 1997, 2).
According to Oddie, the reason why conversion is so frequently used to
describe these sorts of change of fellowship has to do with the fact that these are
observable phenomena. In that sense, [i]t is easy for scholars and other observers
to talk about the shifting of camps and the way in which people either opted out
of and joined or simply joined a new community (ibid.). They can be studied
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through baptism and other rituals, scholars can make use of membership lists, etc.
Yet, one may ask whether this is evidence of conversion, and what all this data
on changes in communal affiliation really means? (ibid., 3). Conversion can actually have a variety of meanings, he concludes: If we accept Rambos suggestion
that conversion has a variety of meanings but take, as a starting point, popular
usage and the idea of conversion as the act or process of joining a new religious
community, then what more can be said about the practice in India and the people
involved? The main challenge facing the thoughtful enquirer in this case is neither
to read too much nor too little into what appears to have been going on (ibid.).
This is puzzling advice, but, much like in his 1977 book, Oddie seems to stress
that a change of fellowship can be the first step of a genuine spiritual journey and
might hold promises in terms of studying the process of inner conversion too.
However, Oddie repeats the need to study conversion as a transition in belief as
the most influential exponent of this view, Horton, has done. In his own contribution to this volume, Oddie adopts this theory to his study of the Kartabhaja
conversion in Bengal in the nineteenth century.
In a later volume, Religious Traditions in South Asia (1998), Oddie does not
undertake a review of the literature, but while speaking about religious change
asks about the why and how of religious change. By looking at the answers provided by the contributors to this volume, he speaks of a felt need. He points out
that this need can be varied: social, material, but also religious. By religious need
is meant at the very least, the desire to make sense of the world and to respond
to what the individual believes is the nature or will of a supernatural/transcendent
power (Oddie 1998, 4). He goes on to explain this:
The drive to satisfy or fulfil these needs (such as the desire to find ultimate meaning during periods of turmoil and dislocation, to respond to what is believed to be
the love of God, or the will of God, or to become more of what one is meant
to be) may indeed provide a strong motivation for change in the life of the individual, or for more general change in the life of society. In cases such as this, the
religious imperative is at least one of the reasons why individuals become interested in promoting change within their own religious tradition and/or attracted
by what other religious traditions have to offer. Hence, in certain circumstances,
religion itself becomes an important factor in promoting religious interaction and
change. (Oddie 1998, 4-5)
In other words, Oddie puts forward the idea that religious needs are among the
factors involved in religious conversion and should be studied as such. He pushes
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this point one step further by asking about how and why such religious needs
arise. Historians might not be able to answer this question, he asserts, but these
needs appear to be prompted by a variety of religious and non-religious factors
in the background, life and experience of individuals and groups. Among these
elements was religious influence (ibid.). What he is saying is that the alternative
worldviews offered, for instance, by the missionaries in colonial India did contribute (together with economic and societal changes) to the feelings of unrest, unease
and crisis in the life of certain indigenous populations. In other words, religious
change occurs as a result of a variety of factors not excluding religious influence
(ibid.). What new religions can do, for instance, is increase the dissatisfaction with
the traditional systems or provide models for change or suggest alternative ways
of life.
What is remarkable about Oddies stress on the religious dimension in the
contemporary study of religious conversion in India? As we noticed in the previous section, much literature singularly focussed on the social, economic and political circumstances in which conversion took (and takes) place; other studies aim to
take into account the religious dimension but without being able to identify the
religious nature of the conversion. The main weakness in these studies of religious
conversion in India is that they do not succeed in clarifying why the changes involved are religious conversions. Why not study them as (and name them after)
political transitions, dynamics of upward social mobility or psychological evolutions for that matter? What reasons do we have to study them as instances of the
phenomenon of religious conversions?
Scholars like Oddie are sensitive to this problem and take the query what
is religious conversion?, what is religious change? seriously.17 Hence, he urges
his colleagues to study the element of a transition of belief in a serious and
genuine way. But though this move undoubtedly was necessary to bring the study
of religious conversion in India into balance, it still disregards some of the most
important issues. A better way of formulating the challenge before us might be to
point out that these studies too are trapped in a framework, which does not allow
them to study whether the changes in India referred to have the property of being
religious, have the property of being religious conversions, and whether the opposition to conversion in India is religious in nature or what the link is between religious conversion in the Christian tradition and processes of change in the Indian
Richard Eaton too subscribes to the necessity of such an approach in his articles (1997, 1984). In
the context of conversion in Africa, the often referred to example of this approach is Robin Horton
(1971, 1975a, 1975b).
17
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traditions. In other words, this tradition of scholarship presupposes that religious

conversion is a predicament in all human societies and that the problems in India
are simply specific manifestations of this universal predicament.
The Turn to Theology
In his overview of the literature on the Indian debate on religious conversion, Kim
asks the question as to why conversion is so problematic in India (Kim 2003, 4). He
looks at the way social scientists have tackled the issues and says that [h]istorians
have examined the problem of conversion in relation to several socio-cultural dynamics and this has resulted in four main explanations (ibid.). In the first explanation, the tensions are related to colonial modernitys consequence, which intensified
communal discordances between groups in India. This happened in particular by
the policy of encouraging different legal systems for different communities and by
the late-colonial politics of numbers through the introduction of separate electoral systems for different communities (ibid.).
The second range of explanations why conversion is problematic points to
the challenges that conversion poses to the existing socio-economic establishment. Therefore, it is not only a challenge for the caste system, but also for the established economic interests of the landowners. Third, the conflict concerning conversion has
grown because of the Hindu reaction in the counter-conversion movement: In this
view, the political rise of the movement for Hindutvamaking India a Hindu
nationand the aggressive campaign of Hindu fundamentalists resulted in the
manufacture of the issue of conversion as an excuse to bring about the political
agenda of Hindu fundamentalist groupsFurthermore, it is argued that conversion was used by the Hindu fundamentalists as part of a deliberate attempt to
undermine the Christian community (ibid., 5). A fourth explanation that the historians often take recourse to says that Hindus and Christians understand conversion differently, which puts them at cross-purposes: It is argued that Hindus see
conversion in sociological and political terms while Christians view it in theological terms. Hindus feel threatened by Christian campaigns of conversion because
of their historical experience with colonial power, which causes them to interpret
even the spiritual conversion, which Christians declare to be their concern, as
socio-political in nature (Frykenberg 1999) (cited in ibid., 5). Kim shows how
the historians relate the problem of conversion to a particular aspect of Indian
societycommunalism, economics, politics, or cultural diversity (ibid.).
165
Kim argues that what is lacking in such analyses of the debate on conversion
is the study of the ideological and theological notions behind the conflict. The socio-cultural reasons only offer partial explanations of the contention, Kim argues,
and therefore he feels the need to go beyond the current political explanations of
the problem of conversion. The objections of the Hindus leaders of conversion,
among other things, have not been studied seriously. Or at least, the explanations
offered do not sufficiently account for the situation in India:
What is strikingly absent in the existing literature on conversion is a willingness
to listen to the voices of Hindu leaders who strongly contest Christians conversion, and to the Indian theologians who struggle to find ways to solve the problem
of conversion in India. Moreover, both Hindu leaders and Christian theologians
tend to ignore each other, each accusing the other of fundamentalism or imperialism, and being suspicious of the others motives. In the light of consistent Hindu
objections to conversion, in spite of Christian efforts to redefine and adapt it in the
Indian context, the problem of conversion would seem to demand further investigation. The above socio-cultural reasons for Hindu objections to conversion serve
only as a partial explanation of the problem of conversion in IndiaFurthermore,
the fact that Hindu resentment against Christian conversion continues despite
political changes both during the Raj and in post-Independence India in which
Hindus obtained considerable socio-political power indicates that conversion is
more than a political issue. (Kim 2003, 8-9)
We agree wholeheartedly with Kim that the debate over conversion is more than
a political issue, but whether a theological turn would solve the problem is another
question. The challenge of Hindu leaders and the consistent Hindu objection to
conversion cannot be explained merely by socio-cultural and political explanations, as Kim rightly points out. But the train of thought he follows after reaching
this insight is very different from ours.
Kim tends to limit the issue of conversion in another way: he stresses the neglect of the theological component. But the problem related to conversion might
be different than a religious or theological problem. Kim aims to demonstrate that
though Hindu objections to conversion are conditioned by socio-cultural and
political circumstances, their arguments are deeply rooted in their own philosophy
and religious traditions (ibid., 12). This is the reason why he deems it necessary
to take the Hinduhe means, the Hindu religious and theologicalarguments
more seriously in analysing the debate on conversion in India (ibid., 180-183). He
points out that:
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Close examination of the debate reveals that these [Hindu arguments] are based
on understandings of faith and practice, and more importantly, the ways to achieve
their own dharma, which are deeply rooted in Hindu philosophy and religious
practiceMoreover, on the issue of conversion, the study reveals that Hindu resentment toward conversion is not confined to fundamentalists but is widely shared by a
majority of Hindus. Though this is often expressed in the form of resentment over
colonialism and concern about the threat caused by contemporary globalization,
it is evident that there are also religious understandings of conversion underlying
it. (ibid., 182; italics mine)
Interesting in Kims analysis is his emphasis on the fact that not only Hindu nationalists are concerned about conversion but also a majority of Hindus resent
this practice. Equally important to remember from Kims study is that one cannot
understand the core of the debate, if one focuses on the socio-political, historicalcolonial or communalist dimensions of the issue alone.
We have to look elsewhere. According to Kim, this elsewhere lies in the religious and theological domains. He makes the case that we can only understand
the debate through a study of the Christian theological standpoints which clash
with the theological viewpoints of Hinduism. The clash about religious conversion is a clash between two different religious systems: Despite the complexity
of the history of Christian mission in India, the socio-economic systems, and the
political changes in contemporary India, the problem of conversion in India has to
be seen as primarily the religious problem of an encounter between Christianity and
Hinduism (ibid., 183; italics mine). Hence, he sees a solution for the contention
in a double emphasis on the Christian Human Rights tradition, on the one hand,
and the Hindu tradition of tolerance, on the other (ibid., 12, 183-200). In the
concluding paragraph of his book he formulates it thus:
The struggle between Hindus and Christians on the issue of conversion is undoubtedly due to the socio-political problems of the Indian context but, more
fundamentally, it is also due to different theological searches for the meaning of
life and the way to achieve ita common quest but answered in widely differing
ways. Acknowledgement that this is an encounter of two radically different religious
systems and respect for these differences are necessary steps towards untangling
the problem of conversion. It seems that the debate over religious conversion is set
to continue, and indeed it should continue as a positive feature of a multi-religious
society in which Hindus and Christians respect each others faiths and neither is
forced to yield to the other. (ibid., 200; italics in the original)
167
This is disappointing because he turns to Christian theology to solve the problem.

Theology cannot take up this role; we will show that it lies at the root of the problem, instead of being a potential solution. The reason why so many Indians oppose
conversion might have less to do with religion (Hinduism) than with characteristically Indian cultural practices and attitudes. Therefore, we will try to look at the
issue in another way and argue that the clash over religious conversion in India
takes the form it has, precisely because it is not about two different religions: it is about
one religion (Christianity) that is trying to transform a range of Indian traditions into
its mould.
5.3. Conclusion: The Conceptual Limits of Change

Kim is right in pointing out the importance scholars give to socio-political motives and their role in the conversion debate in India. But there is an additional
problem in giving much weight to personal motivations and individual reasons in
explaining conversions. It is often said that the Christian missionaries have been
successful among the poor, because of their aid in terms of housing, schools, hospitals and medical issues. Even though this might indeed lead to the conversion
of some people or some groups (or even large groups in some noted cases), this is
not a major issue in the debate on conversion in India. In fact, these activities of
the Christians and missionaries have always been lauded and appreciated, even
by Hindus.
What is really resented is something more challenging: processes of change
and reform have been related to a specific religion or at least to the specific route of
transformation that this religion proposes. In initiating the campaign for internal
reform, this is precisely what Gandhi reacted against. Oddie also points out this
element and recounts that a characteristic of the introduction of a new religion
is to increase the dissatisfaction with the traditional systems and provide models
for change or alternative ways of life. This is what Christianity has been able to do
in India. Here may the key factor may be situated, which has generated so much
opposition. That is, changes that could be conceptualized in the Indian culture in various ways are being limited to the conceptual possibilities available within the Christian
religion. Let us explain this proposal.
Take for instance, the link some have proposed between conversion, on the
one hand, and caste mobility, structural change and communal identity, on the
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other, in nineteenth century India. Potential caste mobility and the possibility to
escape from caste restrictions form important reasons for the relative success of
religious conversion at certain times and in certain regions. So do medical care
and scientific education, which were both offered by Christian missionaries to
Indians along with Bible study or at least some exposure to Christian teachers and
their way of life. Such social benefits are referred to in the debate on conversion.
However, human motivations and motives are a very unreliable set of
facts in the social scientific study of cultures and societies. Undoubtedly all kinds
of motivations play a role here. The more interesting challenge is to trace the
structural limits to the possible changes. To put it crudely, if social conditions are
bad, why not commit suicide, consider a career shift, do nothing at all, immigrate
to more fertile regions or do something else, instead of converting to Christian
religion? After all, as many scholars have realized and as many studies have also
shown, conversion does not necessarily bring about the desired change in caste or
social status.
Even though, for many poor Indians, conversion did not change their status,
they accepted conversion as a potential route to a certain change or reform. How
is that possible? Additionally, why is this experienced as threatening and subversive by the Indian population in general? What kind of transformation does
conversion bring about so that a wide range of people have either the first or the
second experience?
These questions are important in the light of the current contention over
the alleged forced, fraudulent, or induced conversions. Taking this concern seriously means that we have to explain how such different experiences can coexist and where they come from. What is often forgotten in the historical studies
highlighting the motivations of certain specific groups is that these motives and
reasons did not simply fall from the sky one fine day. That is, in order to link ones
poverty and social backward status to the caste system, the caste system to the
Indian traditions and practices, these to the religion of India, viz. Hinduism, some
cognitive steps have to be taken. In other words, in order to experience a religious
conversion as a profound change in ones life, one has to go through a process of
learning first. The fact that these cognitive steps are very familiar for a Western
social scientist does not make them so for the majority of the Indian population.
In other words, what these kind of studies oftendeliberately or notforget
is that people first need to see and experience the world in a particular way, before
making the cognitive inferences that this chapter has discussed. As such, these in-
169
ferences involve relating a range of problems in the Indian society (poverty, lack of
equal opportunities, backwardness in rural areas, discrimination, etc.) to the caste
system and the Indian religions. Therefore, studying conversion in India cannot be
limited to a study the socio-economic, political and other motivations that people
give to explain conversion. Before religious conversion can be experienced as a
solution to any kind of problem, one has to see the link between a range of social
ills, a religion, and religious conversion. Seeing this link presupposes a certain way
of looking at the world. In the current humanities and social science literature,
this way of approaching and explaining the issue appears absent.
Let us recapitulate the consensus in the academic study of religious conversion in India. Start: Religious conversion is a (complex) phenomenon that generates a range of problems in Indian society. Research: In reality, the complexity
has to do with the social, economic, psychological, religious, political, material
and other motivations/circumstances/reasons. Caste, the issues of identity and
the secularism-Hindutva divide are central in the studies. Together these factors
explain why and how religious conversion takes place and causes tensions. The
potential for case-studies is almost infinite here. Conclusions: The potential solutions of these problems consist of (1) explicitly religious solutions (inter-religious
dialogue, involving religious leaders) or (2) liberal political principles related to religion (freedom of religion, religious toleration, state neutrality towards religions,
equal respect for all religions).
This portrayal of the academic studies of religious conversion is crude, but
it reflects the limits within which most of them develop, especially the historical
and anthropological ones. Though these studies are extremely valuable for the
historical material and the information they provide, their theoretical framework
is inadequate.
The studies are begging the question: they presuppose that a range of phenomena are religious conversions, while they actually still need to show under
which conditions these phenomena can be understood as religious conversions.
The studies ignore the fact that one needs to make a range of assumptions before
this suggestion becomes intelligible. The result is that there is no causal or any
other scientifically or systematically interesting relationship between (b) and (a),
or between (b) and (c). The only thing we can say is that the research (b) presupposes the truth of (a) and (c). These reflect a specific theory, which functions as the
theoretical background for the studies, but has become untouchable and belongs
to the domain of intuitively received facts about the world. To go back to Lewis
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Rambos analogy18: (a) and (c), as the start and the terminus constitute the railway
track. The research (b) is responsible for the wide variety of trains and wagons.
In the analysis in the coming chapters, we will not focus on (b), which has
been adequately illustrated in this chapter. What we aim to tackle here are the
theoretical limits within which they move, or better, the track on which they move,
whether this happens consciously or subconsciously, explicitly recognized or not.
These limitsset by the theoretical account which is present in the background
are accountable for the fact that it has become impossible to take further cognitive
steps in understanding and explaining the debate on conversion in India.
18
See the beginning of this Chapter 5.1. The Sciences of Conversion.
Chapter 6
Two Worlds of Conversion
The basic difference between religions and traditions has been one of the recur-
ring themes so far. We noted that awareness of this difference is required in order
to understand the position towards religious conversion among followers of the
Indian traditions. However, this difference is not adequately conceptualized in the
academic literature on conversion in India. Maximally, one suggests that Hinduism is a different kind of religion or notes that it does not proselytize and is doctrinally tolerant, but socially intolerant (e.g. Parekh 2003; Spinner-Halev 2005).
In this chapter, we will see that the dividing line between religions and traditions coincides with a gulf between two radically different perspectives on the
question of conversion. That is, the conceptual structure of religions gives rise to a
particular perspective on the encounter between traditions and religions in Indian
society. Similarly, the structure of Indian traditions generates another perspective,
which attributes completely different properties to this encounter.
These two perspectives are so different that they often become mutually
incomprehensible and inaccessible. As Thomas Kuhn once said about scientists
working in different paradigms, it is as though the two groups that hold these two
perspectives inhabit different worlds. In his words: Practicing in different worlds,
the two groups...see different things when they look from the same point in the
same direction (Kuhn 1962, 150). This chapter will argue that two groups
Christians and Hindusindeed see different things, when they look in the direction of the problem of conversion. When speaking in English, the two groups use
the same words, but give different semantic content and connotations to these
words. Each group misinterprets and reduces the statements of the other group
so that they fit in its own conceptual schemes. Since these distinct interpretations
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of the same sentences have different implications, each also accuses the other of
hypocrisy and ignoring the logic of its own reasoning.
Considering the distinction between these two perspectives, it becomes clear
that both western and Indian scholars have systematically privileged one side.
The background framework shaping their analysis of the problem of conversion
shares the basic conceptual structure of the Christian theological understanding of religions. Therefore, the modern scholarship on conversion in India fails
to take into account the perspective of the Indian traditions. This has led to a
fundamental asymmetry in the academic debate: unwittingly, it skews all analysis
and principled solutions of the problem of conversion in favour of religions like
Christianity.
In the first section, we will show that three implicit premises constitute the
basic scholarly framework through which the problem of religious conversion is
approached. Prima facie, these premises appear to possess self-evident truth, but a
second look shows that this is not the case. The section suggests that these three
premises reflect the theological perspective of the religions of the Book and that
they stand in logical contradiction to the perspective of the Indian traditions.
After stating the three premises in their logical and theological form, we go
into the history of this state of affairs. The following sections trace the historical encounters between religions and traditions. To fully recognize the nature of
the problem, we have to realize how its basic structure has remained constant,
irrespective of contingent historical circumstances. Therefore, we start by briefly
characterizing the conflict between early Christianity and the pagan traditions in
the late Roman Empire. Many of the difficulties expressed by ancient pagans in
the confrontation with Christianity are akin to the Hindu responses to Christian
proselytism.
In the third section, we show how the two worlds of conversion crystallized in the encounter between Europe and India. On one hand, we trace the
process through which Europeans constructed the Hindu religion as a religious
rival for Christianity. This process was a precondition for creating the possibility
of converting from this imaginary Hindu religion to the Christian religion. The
problematic of conversion now presented itself as a struggle between several competing religions: Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and Islam.
On the other hand, we analyze how followers of the Indian traditions responded
to this process. They showed incomprehension towards the view that transformed
different traditions into religious rivals.
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6.1. Premises of the Two Worlds

In the previous chapter, we noted a peculiar paradox in the academic literature
on conversion: While most agree that religious conversion is a universal predicament of plural societies, no one seems able to characterize the structure of this
predicament and show what properties make a process of change into religious
conversion. In fact, this contemporary understanding of conversion emerges from
three implicit premises.1
The first premise is that a variety of cultural traditions must be understood as
religions. Hence, the various communities in Indian society are taken to be bearers
of different religions and religious identities. Let us say a Christian becomes Hindu. Why should this be an example of religious conversion? Why is this not the
same kind of event as a scientist rejecting one theory to accept another? After all,
the person in question also appears to reject a particular set of propositions (e.g.
that a righteous soul will obtain eternal life in heaven through Gods grace) and
accept another (e.g. that of the transmigration of souls). Why should the turning
Hindu not be described as a radical change of dietary habits instead of a religious
conversion? After all, the change often involves a shift towards a vegetarian diet.
Or why is it not equivalent to swapping ones favourite idol, where pictures are
replaced and reverence redirected? The obvious answer to such questions (which
accounts for the fact that these questions seem absurd) lies in the presumed fact
that Hinduism and Christianity are phenomena of the same kind: they are both
religions. Therefore, a shift from one to the other is a religious conversion.
The second implicit premise is that these different religions are each others
rivals. The common structure attributed to the problem of conversion becomes
clearest, when described in minimal terms. As the legal scholar Moshe Hirsch
puts it in his reflections on the freedom of proselytization in international law:
Conversion is a dynamic dimension in the life of every religion. Through this
process religions acquire new believers and lose existing ones. It is generally safe to
assume that every religion is interested in increasing the number of its adherents
and avoiding as much as possible the conversions of its believers to other religions.
The predominant motivation behind these complementary aims is the metaphysical moral conception of contemporary world religions, which generates the desire
to bring about universal acceptance and application of the particular religious vision which one holds to be universally trueThe basic setting in which the proThe identification of the premises builds further on the insights into the characteristics of religion
as they have been systematically isolated and studied in Balagangadhara 1994, especially chapter 9.
1
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cess of conversion takes place has strong features of a zero-sum game, in which
anything that one player wins the other loses. In inter-religious conversions, every
new convert to a particular religion is also an apostate from the other religion. The
preferences of the two religions are thus opposed, and they are considered rivals.
(Hirsch 1998, 441)
What Hirsch states explicitly is most often assumed implicitly: the problem of
conversion revolves around the rivalry between religions. This does not concern
just any kind of rivalry. For instance, two groups or organizations with different religious affiliations may compete economically or socially, while there is no
relation to the rivalry between religions. This could be free market competition
between two capitalist companies, which happen to be run by different religious
groups. Or the kind of social competition one finds among the Protestant churches in the United States. The kind of rivalry involved in conversion, however, is
religious rivalry: a competition between the teachings, doctrines or belief systems
of the two religions in question.
The third premise concerns the origin of this rivalry: Different religions are
rivals, because they are bearers of truth predicates. That is, competition exists between the teachings, doctrines or belief systems of religions, because they make
competing truth claims. Could orthopraxy not cause rivalry between religions in
the same way as orthodoxy? Generally, this has not been the case. Insofar as religious conflicts revolve around practices, this happens because practices are seen
as embodiments of incompatible doctrines. One need think only of the clashes
between Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists about the liturgy of the Mass and its
relation to the doctrine of transubstantiation. Where it is not based in orthodoxy,
orthopraxy is directed only at those belonging to a particular tradition. The strictness of ritual might generate temporary conflicts within traditions, but does not
transform different religions into rivals. Truth claims do so.
Problems in the premises
What is the problem with these premises? Prima facie, they appear trivial: the cultural universality of religion and the rivalry between different religions are basic
facts of the human condition. However, I would like to argue that they are wrongly
taken to be so: in reality, these facts are constituted by a set of theological claims
from Christianity, which have shaped the received view on cultural diversity. The
situation in India is a case in point (see also Bloch et al. 2010).
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One typical difficulty in the study of religion is to show how Hindu, Buddhist, Jain and other Asian traditions, on the one hand, and Christianity and
Islam, on the other hand, could possibly be instances of the same kind or manifestations of the same phenomenon of religion. Often, for instance, one notes that
Hinduism lacks all characteristics that allow us to recognize and differentiate the
latter three as religions: a fixed body of doctrine or belief system, an ecclesiastical organization or central authority, a holy book, etc. (e.g. Dandekar 1971, 237;
Knott 2000, v; Weightman 1984, 191-192). This gives rise to doubting whether
Hinduism could be called a religion at all. In other words, there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist traditions and Christianity
and Islam are phenomena of different kinds.
In contrast, if we look at the diversity of Indian society from the viewpoint
of Christianity, we get a picture that makes it obvious that the Indian traditions
must be phenomena of the same kind, i.e. that they must be religions. The universality of religion has always been an unquestionable truth to the religions of the
Book. They share an account of the history of humanity that incorporates all other
human traditions and transforms them into false religions. In Balagangadharas
words, this theological story goes as follows:
There was once a religion, the true and universal one, which was the divine gift to
all humankind. A sense or spark of divinity is installed in all races (and individuals) of humanity by the creator God himself. During the course of human history,
this sense did not quite erode as it was corrupted. Idolatry and worship of the
Devilthe false God and his minionswere to be the lot of humankind until
God spoke to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and led their tribe back onto the true
path. (Balagangadhara 1994, 57)
The true religion has existed since the creation of man, but degenerates until restored to its pristine purity. Even when the traditions that Christianity and Islam
encountered elsewhere were of a totally different nature, it was obvious that false
religion would be present everywhere.
From the perspective of Christianity and Islam, the Indian traditions are
religious rivals. Both religions claim that they are the unique revelations of the
biblical God to humankind. Therefore, they are true. They believe in one true
God, the Creator and Sovereign of the world. The world (everything that has ever
happened, happens, and will happen) expresses His will or purpose. According to
each of these religions, their respective doctrine is the one true revelation whereby
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the biblical God reveals His will to humankind. The only road to salvation lies in
a genuine belief in this doctrine and submission to the divine will.
This self-image also entails a description of the other as a rival religion.
Other traditions are heresies, express deficient worship, or false religions. The different traditions in the Indian society are the result of the devils work to seduce
humanity. In this way, Christianity and Islam take religion to revolve around the
question of the truth and falsity of a set of doctrines. One religion is considered
to be Gods gift to humanity, while all others are the devils corruptions. Islam and
Christianity are each others rivals in the restoration of divine truth and the Hindu
traditions are idolatrous or false religions. Consequently, it is clear that different
traditions confront each other as rival religions in India. As different religions, they
must necessarily be competitors. Religions are competitors, because they revolve
around doctrines, which can be either true or false. Since such truth predicates
apply to them, they are engaged in a competition over religious truth.
If we look at the diversity in India from the perspective of Hindu, Jain and
Buddhist traditions, it turns out that this premise of religious rivalry is alien to
them. These traditions do not view the diversity as rivalry over doctrinal truth.
Historically, when they came into contact with Christianity and Islam, they expressed incomprehension towards the presumed rivalry. From this perspective,
the different traditions could never be religious rivals, because truth predicates do
not apply to them. The various traditions are part of a human search for truth and
the different practices are paths in this ongoing quest. In Gandhis words (Hind
Swaraj 1908): Religions are different roads converging to the same point. What
does it matter that we take different roads so long as we reach the same goal?
Wherein is the cause for quarrelling? The idea that a certain religion is true, while
others are false, is improper from this perspective. There is no one true God, who
has revealed His will, contrasted with multiple false gods. There are many different
deities and different stories about them. Different traditions differentiate communities from one another.
Given this incomprehension towards doctrinal truth claims, it is often said
that Hindus look at the truth of religions in a different waya pluralistic conception of religious truth, this is sometimes called. Indeed, one option is to say
that the Hindu view does entail the ascription of truth-predicates to religions, but
in a pluralistic manner. However, not only is it unclear what it means for truth
to be conceived pluralistically, the attribution of this notion of religious truth to
Hindus also threatens to turn them into beings who do not possess the basic ca-
177
pacity of consistent reasoning. If all religions are true, both Christian and Islamic
doctrines have to be true at the same time. The implication would be that Hindus
fail to see that one religious doctrine, which claims that Jesus is God and the son
of God, stands in contradiction to another, which asserts that God is one and
cannot have a son.
The alternate option avoids this. It agrees that, today, English-educated Indians have learnt to talk in terms of religion and truth. Historically, the Indian
traditions have generally tried to make sense of the Christian claims about religion and truth from their traditional perspective, which does not assign truth
predicates to traditional practices. The result is the often-repeated claim that all
religions are true. This does not reflect a pluralistic notion of religious truth, but an
attempt to translate the attitude of one culture into the language of another. This
view does not see the different traditions of humanity as either true or false. Consequently, the belief that the diversity of traditions reflects a rivalry over religious
truth is confined to religions like Christianity and Islam.
Either/Or
The significance of these three premises becomes clear when we realize they are
mutually exclusive: either one looks at the diversity of Indian society (or of humanity in general) as religious rivalry or one views it as a co-existence of traditions. In each of the assumptions, one side is the logical negation of the other: (1)
Hindu, Jain and Buddhist traditions and Islam and Christianity are phenomena
of the same kind, or they are not. (2) As such, they are religious rivals, or they are
not. (3) As rivals, they compete with each other regarding truth or falsity, or they
do not. They can do so because some religion is false, but they never could if no
religion is false.
In each case, the positive statement corresponds to the Christian and Islamic theological view of the cultural diversity of humanity. It also coincides with
the three assumptions shaping todays view of religious conversion as a universal
problem. In the second and third case, moreover, the negations also fall together
with the attitude common to Hindu, Jain and Buddhist traditions. The conclusion
is inevitable: conversion becomes a general problem of humanity, if and only if one
looks at the world the way Christianity and Islam do. In other words, the universal
predicament of religious conversion exists within the experiential world of these
religions and not outside.
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At the theological level, this is clear. As a consequence of the universal truth

claims that Christianity and Islam make, a dynamic of proselytization is intrinsic
to these religions. When the biblical God reveals His will, it covers the whole of
humankind. It cannot be confined to any one group of people. Those who receive
this revelation have a duty to convert the others into accepting the biblical Gods
message. In Christianity, the biblical God has disclosed His will to humanity in
Christ. This is the one and only truth. It is only through belief in it that human
beings can be saved from eternal damnation. All other religions are false. Under
these conditions, it is immoral not to try and convert others. The traditions of
these others become obstacles to conversion to the true God.
This theology of the problem of conversion has received its secular translation in the three implicit premises. When all traditions are competing religions,
conversion indeed becomes the predicament at their encounter. In this image, the
rivalry over doctrinal truth lies at the heart of the diversity of Indian society and
the world at large. As long as this theology remains the background that sustains
and constrains ones understanding of cultural pluralism, one is bound to consider
religious conversion as a universal predicament. The further this theology recedes
into the background, the more obscure becomes ones understanding of the problem of conversion. Today scholars are no longer able to identify its characteristic
structure. Nevertheless, the implicit premises inherited from the Christian theological framework compel them to see the problem of religious conversion at the
heart of the pluralism of our planet.
6.2. Ancient Foundations of the Two Worlds

While a leap in time and space to the late Roman Empire may seem out of place
here, we hope to show that it is not. A brief sketch of the conflict between early Christianity and the ancient pagan traditions will reveal its relevance to the
contemporary debates on conversion in India. Drawing upon work by Balagangadhara (1994, chapter 2) and by specialists in the field of ancient Roman and
Greek religion and early Christianity, this comparison reveals structural parallels
between the two historical situations.
The first parallel lies in the self-understanding of the ancient Roman and
Greek traditions. Much like the Indian traditions, these were ancestral traditions
transmitted from generation to generation. Practices were continued, not because
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they embodied beliefs regarded as true, but because they had been passed on by
the ancestors. Whatever their philosophical predilections, intellectuals from antiquity did not oppose their beliefs and doctrines to the traditional practices of
their day. Such was the Roman religio that its practice was indifferent to any fixed
set of doctrines. One allowed two distinct things to coexist relatively independently: theoretical reasoning about the deities and religio, on the one hand, and
religious traditions and practices, on the other.
As an illustration, consider the dialogue in Ciceros De Natura Deorum, between Cotta the sceptic and the stoic philosopher Balbus. First, Cotta tells the
other participants in the dialogue that, even though he is a high priest and considers it his duty to maintain the established religion, he sometimes thinks the deities
do not exist at all. When he is told that he should remember that he is both a
Cotta and a pontiff, he responds as follows:
This is no doubt meant that I ought to uphold beliefs about the immortal gods
which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and
duties of religion. For my part, I shall always uphold them and have always done
so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned shall ever dislodge me from
the belief...which I have inherited from our forefathers...Balbus...you are a philosopher, and I ought to receive from you a proof of your religion, whereas I must
believe the word of our ancestors even without proof. (DND, III, ii, 5; Rackham
1971, 289, 291)
Two points are important here. First, certain practices are retained, because they
have been transmitted over generations and this gives them legitimacy. Second,
rational argument may establish some opinion or reject it, but this is irrelevant to
continuing ones traditional practices. This second point returns in even stronger
form: Although I for my part cannot be persuaded to surrender my belief that
the gods exist, nevertheless you teach me no reason why this belief, of which I
am convinced on the authority of our forefathers, should be true. Cotta feels
that Balbus attempt to prove the existence of the deities through rational argument is somehow improper: You did not really feel confident that the doctrine
of the divine existence was as self-evident as you could wish, and for that reason
you attempted to prove it with a number of arguments. For my part a simple argument would have sufficed, namely that it has been handed down to us by our
forefathers (DND, III, iv, 9-10; Rackham 1971, 295). In other words, ones beliefs
about the existence of the deities are irrelevant to religion, because religion is that
which is handed down over generations.
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In The Octavius (VI), Caecilius the pagan argues that it is preferable as high
priest of truth, to receive the teaching of your ancestors, to cultivate the religion
handed down to you, to adore the gods whom you were first trained by your parents to fear...not to assert an opinion concerning the deities, but to believe your
forefathers (ANF, 4:176). Religion, then, appears to fall together with tradition.
Continuing a tradition does not require any reason other than itself. That is to say,
no additional justification was needed to uphold ancestral customs (Liebeschuetz
1979, 31-322; Macmullen 1981, 2; Wilken 1984, 62).
Consider a second parallel with the Indian traditions: from the ancient pagan
perspective, each community or city also had its own traditions that constituted
its identity as a community or city (Nock 1933, 17-19). The value of traditions lay
in the fact that they had been transmitted by one generation of this community
to the next. As a consequence of this stance, the presumed antiquity of a tradition
became one of the criteria to assess its eminence.
This pagan view of tradition was mirrored in the Christian desire to overturn
its foundations. In his Apology (197 C.E.), the founding father of Latin Christianity, Tertullian, tried to convince the Romans that their claims to antiquity were
bogus:
What has come to your religionof the veneration due by you to your ancestors?
In your dress, in your food, in your style of life, in your opinions, and last of all in
your very speech, you have renounced your progenitors. You are always praising
antiquity, and yet every day you have novelties in your way of living. (ANF, 3:23)
Another parallel is found in the typical stance towards the truth of religions: as
is the case in the Indian traditions, the ancient pagan conception of the relation
between traditions and beliefs also entailed that one could not attribute truth
predicates to religion. Religio consisted of the traditional practices of a people,
which did not depend on beliefs. Therefore, discussing the truth value of such
beliefs was irrelevant to the continuation of the practices. This also accounts for
the general tolerance towards the variety of traditions and rites in the Roman
Empire. Ancient Rome permitted each people to continue its own tradition, on
the condition that it acknowledged its allegiance to the Roman authorities in the
state ceremonies (Wiedemann 1990).
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The Christian Domestication of Paganism

The demand that each community acknowledges its loyalty by participating in the
state ceremonies caused a significant problem for the Jews, since they refused to
worship deities other than the God of the Hebrew Bible. Partly because of this
reason, the Romans were often hostile towards the Jews, whom they viewed as
misanthropic and obsessed with communal boundaries (Lieu et al. 1992). Judaism was nevertheless able to acquire an uneasy recognition from the Romans, by
claiming great antiquity for the tradition of Mosaic Law and arguing that this
ancient tradition demanded exclusive allegiance to the one God.
The early Christians, on the contrary, could not take this route. They refused
to participate in the Roman cults and also rejected the Mosaic Law. Christianity
could not in any way be viewed as the tradition of a people with a respectable past.
Consequently, the Christians were accused of lacking religio, of being atheists and
of disrupting tradition (Benko 1985; Muth 1978). The ancient Roman pagans
posed the following challenge to Christianity: how can you be religion if you do
not have tradition?
Responding to this challenge, the church fathers appropriated the past of
the Jews as a tradition for the Christians, but did so in a peculiar way: they said
that Christianity was the completion of Judaism correctly interpreted. The Jews
had not appreciated the depth and truth of their own scriptures, but Christianity
would now allow them to see this truth. In this manner, the church fathers were
able to transform the question of tradition into a question of true doctrine. They
could do so by arguing that, if one properly understood the prophecies of the
Messiah in Judaism, one was compelled to accept that the religion of Jesus Christ
was its fulfillment. The Jewish prophets had announced the coming of the Christ;
the Christians were His followers. Hence, they were the only genuine inheritors
of the Judaic past.
Apart from the charge of lacking tradition, the pagan accusation of atheism had also dogged the early Christendom, because of its refusal to pay reverence to the city deities. To defend itself against similar charges, Jewish apologetics
had already established that Moses and the prophets were older than the Greek
philosophers and poets, and must have been the source of the latters learning
(Chadwick 1953, ix). The church fathers continued this tradition and argued that
they indeed refused to participate in Roman ceremonies, but only because they
followed the Reason that the luminaries of all nations had respected. The claim
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that all nations had anticipated Christianity became central here. One had to
prove that Christianity was the oldest religion of all.
In response to the doubts about the antiquity of their religion, the early
church fathers claimed that it was not only the most ancient, but also the one true
religion, because it was identical to the one that the Creator had given to humanity. The biblical God had given true religion to humanity at its very beginning,
but it had been corrupted everywhere by the devil and his minions. All religiones
of all nations, the church fathers said, were but anticipations of the restoration of
true religion. Christianity was both the most ancient religion of humanity and the
true religion for humanity. It was the true religio for all peoples. This must have
sounded absurd to pagan ears: it involved a category mistake, since religio was
always the tradition of a particular people.
The Christians had not only severed the tie between being a people and possessing religio, but also converted the central issue from the antiquity of tradition
into the truth of doctrine. This transformed the pagan challenge at its very core.
The Christian response said that Christianity was religion, precisely because it was
not tradition. All human traditions were only so many corruptions of the truth
that the biblical God had given to humanity, while the Christian religion restored
this truth.
Since Christianity was the true religion, the pagan traditions of Rome could
but be one thing: false religion. These traditions, the theologians argued, were human products, whereas Christianity was the revelation of the biblical God. The
church fathers began to criticize the practices, stories and cults of Greece and
Rome as so many expressions of false belief. Parallel to the way in which they had
transformed the question of tradition into one of doctrine, they now established
a new link between practice and doctrine in which the former had to embody the
latter. To Roman pagans, there was no such connection. One continued to participate in cults and ceremonies, even if one disbelieved the existence of the deities.
Yet, once the church fathers had reconfigured the relation between practice and
belief, they began to ridicule pagan practices in terms of the beliefs upon which
these were supposed to be founded.
They harped on the inconsistencies in the Greco-Roman stories about the
deities. The traditional stories of the pagans were condemned as false historiography, which was ignorant of the true divine providence operating in human history. The church fathers also viewed the pagan dei as demons or false gods; false
variants of the biblical Deusimperfect, impotent and treacherous. The origin
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of demons and deities was accounted for in different ways. Some were said to be
the offspring of disobedient angels whom God had instructed to rule the earth,
but who had been captivated by love for women. Others were deified men or human fabrications, but the worst were the animals of the Egyptians. All were part
of creation and made of corruptible matter: stone, brass, wood, silver, iron, and
earthenware, the promiscuous rabble of creatures begotten and born. The pagan
deities were creatures, whereas Christians worshipped only the one true Creator.
As the sovereign of the universe, the biblical God had to be omnipotent,
since the order in all that existed depended on His will. Traditionally, the pagan
deities had not played such a role, but the Christian apologists reduced them to
fallible and untrustworthy guarantors of cosmic order, who had invented Fate
to hide their own impotence. In the words of Tatian the Assyrian: And are not
the demons themselves, with Zeus at their head, subjected to Fate, being overpowered by the same passions as men? And, besides, how are those beings to be
worshipped among whom there exists such a great contrariety of opinions? The
Christians, on the contrary, were superior to Fate, and instead of wandering
demons, we have learned to know one Lord who wanders not; and, as we do not
follow the guidance of Fate, we reject its lawgivers (ANF, 2:68-69). In the eyes
of the Christian apologists, all ceremonies and rituals became expressions of false
belief and the worship of false gods. This was the greatest of all sins: idolatry or
devil worship.
Finally, the church fathers established a historiographic framework that incorporated all of humanity. They had argued that Christianity was the restoration
of the ancient religion that lay at the origin of human history. The telos of this
history was the true religion of Christ and, eventually, the last judgement announced by that religion. The task that remained was to arrange whatever came in
between. The ground had been well-prepared here. On one hand, many traditions
were transformed into anticipations of the coming of Christ. The church fathers
began to show how the writings of the best pagan minds were rays of light that
reflected the revelation of the biblical God. On the other hand, all human traditions before Christianity embodied the seduction of humanity into idolatry, the
worship of the false god. Cataloguing the knowledge of Jews and Gentiles, Eusebius came to the following conclusion in his Praeparatio Evangelica: All these
circumstances then confirm the story of the facts of our religion, and show that it
was not contrived from any human impulse, but divinely foreknown, and divinely
announced beforehand by the written oracles, and yet far more divinely proffered
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to all men by our Saviour (Gifford 1903, 9). In effect, the pasts of all peoples were
thus embedded into the history of Christianity, which became the equivalent of a
universal history of humanity.
In this process, early Christianity succeeded at domesticating the Roman
pagan traditions. This domestication had two crucial consequences. On the one
hand, it allowed Christianity to transform these pagan traditions into a pale and
erring variant of itself (Balagangadhara 1994, 58). Whereas the Christian religion was the true religion that possessed true doctrines and worshipped the true
God, the Roman traditions were false religion based on erroneous teachings and
devil worship. On the other hand, this also transformed the Roman pagan traditions into a religious rival for Christianity. It had now become possible to convert
followers of these traditions to Christian religion, by demonstrating how their
own religio was false and untrustworthy and merely anticipated the coming of
Jesus Christ. This theological domestication of paganism would prove indispensable to the spread of Christianity; in order to proselytize, one first had to turn the
Roman pagan traditions into pale and erring counterparts of Christian religion.
Only then could one convert from one religion to another.
The Blindness of the Heathen
The most significant parallel with the contemporary Indian debate on conversion
is that the ancient pagans were equally unable to make sense of Christianitys
self-understanding as the true religion revealed by God to humanity. As we note
in the relevant texts that have survived time and censorship, this self-description
proved inaccessible to pagans.
The finest illustration of this inability to comprehend Christianity is found
in the arguments of the pagan philosopher Celsus, as reproduced in Origens Contra Celsum. Celsus faced major problems in making sense of the biblical God and
Jesus Christ. The latter, he claimed, could only be some kind of sorcerer or magician, since it was by magic that he was able to do the miracles which he appeared
to have done (Cels., I, 6; Chadwick 1953, 10). This was one instance of a general
tendency to transform Jesus into a mere human being with certain exceptional
skills. Celsus claimed that Jesus was the offspring of the adultery between Mary
and a soldier who had seduced her. Because Jesus and his mother were poor, he
hired himself out as a workman in Egypt, and there tried his hand at certain
magical powers on which the Egyptians pride themselves; he returned full of
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conceit because of these powers, and on account of them gave himself the title of
God (Cels., I, 28; Chadwick 1953, 28).
Celsus suggested several times that Jesus and the Apostles were a group
of conmen, who had been able to mislead the gullible. Basically, this philosopher judged Jesus according to purely human standards (Cels., I, 62, 56 and II,
20; Chadwick 1953, 56-57, 84-85). In his response to such charges, Origen kept
pointing out that Jesus had not just been some philosopher or magician, but rather
the Son of God, who incarnated the biblical Gods will and offered divine teachings to humanity. He complained that Celsus wants to put the wonders of Jesus
on a level with human sorcery and that he treated the gospels like any human
book, because he seems to believe the scriptures whenever he wants to do so in
order to criticize Christianity, and seems to disbelieve the gospels when he wishes
to avoid accepting the obviously divine character proclaimed in those very books
(Cels., I, 63 and II, 49; Chadwick 1953, 58, 104).
Clearly, Celsus could not comprehend the extraordinary status that Christians gave to Jesus and to the Gospel. He accused them of inconsistency, because
they accused sorcerers of being the devils servants, while they transformed Jesus
into a god on account of the same kind of sorcery:
O light and truth, with his own voice he explicitly confesses, as even you have recorded, that there will come among you others also who employ similar miracles,
wicked men and sorcerers, and he names one Satan as devising this: so that not
even he denies that these wonders have nothing divine about them, but are works
of wicked men. Nevertheless, being compelled by the truth, he both reveals the
deeds of others and proves his own to be wrong. Is it not a miserable argument to
infer from the same works that he is a god while they are sorcerers? Why should
we conclude from these works that the others were any more wicked than this fellow, taking the witness of Jesus himself ? In fact, even he admitted that these works
were not produced by any divine nature, but were the signs of certain cheats and
wicked men. (Cels. II, 44-50; Chadwick 1953, 100-104)
In return, Origen accused Celsus of wilfully making category mistakes:

He puts together in one category things which really fall into two different categories. Just as a wolf is not the same species as a dog, even if it seems to have some
similarity in the shape of its body and its bark, and just as a wild pigeon is not the
same as a tame one; so also what is accomplished by Gods power is nothing like
what is done by sorcery. (Cels., II, 51; Chadwick 1953, 105)
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Throughout Celsus argumentation, it is clear that he did not see how this involved
a fallacy. He pointed out that there are many instances of people claiming to have
returned from the dead and gave illustrations from Greek stories. Origen then
noted that such stories could never be compared to the true history of Jesus resurrection from the dead. He charged Celsus with blindness, because he did not see
the difference between the Bible as the word of God and mere myths (Cels., II,
55-58; Chadwick 1953, 109-111).
From Celsus perspective, however, there was no significant difference between the story about Jesus and those about Greek deities and heroes. The difference was self-evident to Origen: For Jesus has been able to show to a considerable number of men that he came from God to visit the human race (Cels., III,
34-5; Chadwick 1953, 150-152). The Greek stories did not have support in divine
scripture, but the gospel of Jesus Christ does. To Celsus, such arguments merely
showed the bias of the Christians: their faith, he said, had prejudiced their souls
and made them hold this belief about Jesus (Cels., III, 39; Chadwick 1953, 155).
Similarly, Celsus attributed human properties and desires to the biblical
God, the Creator of the universe. He understood God in terms of human psychology and accused him of mortal ambition, because He had wanted to make
Himself known among human beings, after noting that He was unknown and
therefore underrated (Cels., IV, 6; Chadwick 1953, 188). Celsus also wondered
why this God, beautiful, good and blessed, would descend among humans and
hence, undergo a change from good to evil, from virtue to vice, and from happiness to misery. Only mortals could wish to make such changes; He would never
admit of it, certainly not for the worse. The Christian God had become a mere
immortal deity in the hands of Celsus, similar to the supreme deity of the Stoics.
Consequently, he could also judge the deeds of this God in human terms. How
could He who sent His son to humanity with the instruction to worship Him
alone also allow His son to be treated cruelly? What kind of a father would ever be
that inhuman (Cels., IV, 14; Chadwick, 192-193)? This is the first gulf separating
Roman pagans and early Christians, a gulf that tells us about the extent to which
the former misunderstood the doctrines of Christianity. They found the Bible a
set of improbable and crude stories and could not see what was so extraordinary
about Jesus of Nazareth and the God of the Bible.
The Romans also failed to understand the refusal of the Christians to indulge
in idolatry. Celsus, for instance, was unable to figure out the biblical injunctions
about idolatry or why it was considered a sin. Minucius Felix misunderstood the
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foundations of the prohibitions against idolatry and ridiculed the Christian dread
for idolatry as an expression of their fear of the gods they rejected. He also related
it to their hopes for an after-life and their ascetic contemporaneous existence.
You do not visit exhibitions; you have no concern in public displays; you reject
the public banquets, and abhor the sacred contests; the meats previously tasted
by, and the drinks made a libation of upon, the altars. Thus you stand in dread of
the gods whom you deny. You do not wreath your heads with flowers; you do not
grace your bodies with odours; you reserve unguents for funeral rites; you even
refuse garlands to your sepulchrespallid, trembling beings, worthy of the pity
even of our gods! Thus, wretched as you are, you neither rise again, nor do you live
in the meanwhile. Therefore..., cease from prying into the regions of the sky, and
the destinies and secrets of the world: it is sufficient to look before your feet, especially for untaught, uncultivated, boorish, rustic people: they who have no capacity
for understanding civil matters, are much more denied the ability to discuss the
divine. (ANF, 4:179)
Such objections proved to the Roman pagans the absurdity of Christianitys claim
to universality, which could not be made by any human being or tradition. For
instance, Augustine paraphrased Porphyry as saying that no system of thought
which contains the universal way of the souls deliverance has yet been received,
either from the truest philosophy, or from the morals and practices of the Indians,
or from the initiations of the Chaldeans, or from any other directions (City of
God, X, 32; Dyson 1998, 442). If that was the case, the universal validity that the
Christians attributed to their religion must also be humanly impossible. Celsus
argued similarly in Origens rendition: Would that it were possible to unite under
one law the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Libya, both Greeks and barbarians
even at the furthest limits. This would be much desirable indeed, Celsus judged,
but he who thinks this is really possible knows nothing (Cels., VIII, 72; Chadwick 1953, 507).
The inability to understand how Christianity could be regarded as universally
true led to an almost tragic incomprehension of the Christian model of religious
rivalry. This is most beautifully expressed in the letters of Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, the last pagan prefect of Rome, who addressed the Christian Emperor
Valentinian II as follows:
Grant, I beg you, that what in our youth we took over from our fathers, we may
in our old age hand on to posterity. The love of established practice is a powerful
sentimentEveryone has his own customs, his own religious practices; the divine
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mind has assigned to different cities different religions to be their guardiansIf

long passage of time lends validity to religious observances, we ought to keep faith
with so many centuries, we ought to follow our forefathers who followed their
forefathers and were blessed in so doingAnd so we ask for peace for the gods of
our fathers, for the gods of our native land. It is reasonable that whatever each of
us worships is really to be considered one and the same. We gaze up at the same
stars, the sky covers us all, the same universe compasses us. What does it matter
what practical system we adopt in our search for truth? Not by one avenue only
can we arrive at so tremendous a secret. (Barrow 1973, 37-41)
The Roman pagans perceived Christianity as another philosophical or cultic tradition, analogous to those they were familiar with. Maximally, it could be one of
the many philosophical schools that resulted from the human search for truth
and pursuit to understand the universe. Consequently, these pagans simply could
not comprehend Christianitys self-understanding as a set of teachings authored
by God Himself, rather than any human being. They failed to understand how
Christian religion and Roman religio could be rivals with regard to truth. Looking at Christianity through the framework and categories of their own world and
culture, they could not but view this religion as another human tradition. In doing
so, they became blind to the kind of religion that Christianity claimed to be.
6.3. Two Worlds between Europe and India

When European Christians began to explore Asia, Africa and the Americas in
the early modern period, the chasm between pagan traditions and Christian religion became central once again. After the successful experiment in domesticating the ancient paganism, one could now invoke the basic theological framework
that had transformed all such traditions into pale and erring variants of Christian
religion.
European travellers, missionaries and scholars tried to make sense of the
cultural traditions they confronted in Asia and elsewhere. They could not but
construe these in terms of religion. They identified new rivals for the Christian
religion; rivals whose basic structure was taken to be identical to the false religion that the early Christians had supposedly faced in ancient Rome. In this way,
Europe imagined religions in Asia by describing the Asian traditions as false variants of Christian religion.
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Constructing a Religious Rival

In this section, we will draw upon a particular hypothesis about the creation of the
concept of Hinduism or Hindu religion (Balagangadhara and Keppens 2009;
De Roover and Claerhout 2010). This hypothesis does not depend on any general
proposition that religion is constructed or created, but rather on the empirical
conditions under which Europeans approached and understood other cultures.
First of all, Christian theology had predicted that religion would exist among
all nations, because God had gifted religion to humanity at the time of creation.
Over the centuries, different perspectives developed on this issue. For instance,
some said that God had given knowledge of His will to Adam and that it was
later corrupted by Satan and his minions. Others suggested that the Creator had
inscribed a sense of divinity in the human soul, which was misdirected to the
worship of false gods; yet others that He had created human reason in such a way
that it naturally discovered religion. Later some thinkers substituted nature for
God and suggested that human nature was the cause of the universality of religion. Generally, however, the theological prediction that one would find religion
among all nations and tribes shaped the expectations and experiences of travellers to India and elsewhere. Even when one did not find religion among certain
groups at first sight, different conceptual manoeuvres and modifications ensured
that it would turn out that no nation was so barbarous, no people so savage, that
it had no religion.
The European creation of Hindu religion built on this theological certainty
that India could not but have religion. Elements of the traditions of Indiatheir
intellectual treatises, stories, rituals, practices, temples, their devas and devis, etc.
were gradually interpreted and linked to each other in such a way that coherent
patterns came into being in the European descriptions of India. From treatises
and stories, European scholars extracted the presumed sacred doctrines, beliefs
and laws; rituals became worship practices that embodied these doctrines; temples
had to be houses of worship; and devas and devis were gods, of course. While one
had originally described internal variations or sects within what was called pagan
or heathen religion, one began to distinguish these coherent entities as several
separate religions in the course of the nineteenth century: Hinduism, Buddhism,
Jainism, Sikhism (Masuzawa 2005; Oddie 2006, 14-5; Pennington 2005, 111-8).
In this way, Hindu religion and Hinduism emerged as concepts within
the framework of generic Christian theology, which guided the European un-
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derstanding of the traditions of India. This background framework determined

the particular interpretations and translations of texts and practices. It also established the relations among those elements fractured and extracted from the
Indian traditions, which were viewed by Europeans as doctrines, scriptures, sacred
law, worship, priests and gods. Against the background of this framework, the
Hindu religion and Hinduism could come into being as coherent patterns of
description.
It was within this theological framework that the Christian and Hindu religions were inevitably viewed as each others religious rivals. From the earliest encounters, missionary zeal characterized the way European Christians approached
the Indian traditions. The Portuguese Catholics who conquered the isle of Goa
adopted this stance. In 1545, King John III of Portugal gave a series of detailed
instructions to the Governor of Goa about dealing with the Indian heathens:
In this brief the king orders that neither public nor private idols be tolerated on
the island of Goa and that severe punishment must be meted out to those who
persist in keeping them. The houses of people suspected of keeping hidden idols
are to be searched. Heathen festivals are not to be tolerated and every Brahman
is to be banished from Goa, Bassein and Diu. Public offices are to be entrusted to
neophytes and not to heathens; Christians are to be freed from heavy labour at
the port of Goa, such tasks in the future being reserved exclusively for heathens.
Portuguese, under pain of severe punishment, are forbidden to sell heathen slaves
to Muslims, since heathens are converted more easily to Christianity under the
Portuguese and to Islam under Muslim ownership. Revenues previously used for
the support of mosques and temples should be diverted to aid in spreading the
gospel. (Lach 1965, 239-240)
In the Portuguese view, the future of the indigenous traditions was clear: these
had to be eradicated. The idols could not be tolerated and neither could heathen
festivals. Measures had to be taken to spread the gospel and to promote the conversion of heathens to Christianity.
In spite of their theological disagreement, Protestant missionaries shared
with Portuguese Catholics this basic perception of the Indian traditions and also
the desire to proselytize. In the early eighteenth century, the Lutheran missionary
Bartholomaeus Ziegenbalg composed a pamphlet entitled Abominable Heathenism, which contained a clear formulation of the reasons behind the need for conversion. Originally written in Tamil, this pamphlet was distributed in Tamil Nadu
in order to convince local Hindus that their lives were rooted in error. Using the
Sanskrit word a-jnana (ignorance) to convey the idea of sin or error, Ziegen-
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balg told the Hindus the following: We have come to you to save you from ajnana...Make a study of the Christian precepts and accept them in faith, and so
become the people of God. In the eight chapters of the pamphlet, Ziegenbalg
told the heathens how the Gospel would save them from their ignorance:
(1) What is a-jnana? It is idol-worship and moral perversion according to Rom.
1: 21-32. (2) How a-jnana spread in this world. It did so because of the devils
deceit and mens guilt and not because of God. (3) There is much a-jnana in the
whole of Tamilnadu. (4) How detestable a-jnana is. Because by a-jnana soul and
body will be perverted and punished. (5) How God is helping those in a-jnana
to be saved. Jesus Christ took upon himself the burden of a-jnana and delivers
from a-jnana saving soul and body. (6) What the things are which those who wish
to be saved from a-jnana have to do. Answer: Scripture reading, realisation and
confession of sin, faith in Jesus Christ, asking for baptism with renunciation of
a-jnana and acceptance of the triune God, living in the communion of the Word
of God and the Lords Supper, living a life of witness and suffering and a life of
love and justice. (7) The trials and tribulations which those who give up a-jnana
and enter the Church experience in the world for the sake of righteousness. (8)
The benefits promised to those who give up a-jnana, accept the true religion and
stand in the Christian faith unshaken. (excerpt in Grafe 1972, 59)
This summary reflects what type of a phenomenon religion was in the eyes of early
modern European Christians like Ziegenbalg. On one hand, the false religion of
heathens consists of sin and error; it perverts soul and body; its believers are followers of the devil. The heathens should be saved from this religion. On the other
hand, there is the true religion of the people of God; the divine gift to humankind
that provides the only way to salvation. To escape from false religion, the heathens
have to turn to God: they have to read the Scripture, accept the triune God, confess their sins, have faith in Jesus Christ, etc. In short, they have to give up false
religion, accept the true religion and stand in the Christian faith unshaken.
Naturally, not all Europeans travelling to India in the early modern period
shared the missionarys fanaticism to do away with heathen idolatry. Some of
the East India Company officials gave more sympathetic accounts of the Hindoo
religion. Among the latter was Alexander Dow, who wrote a dissertation on the
Hindoos in his History of Hindustan (1768). What struck him about the Hindus
was that they did not try to convert:
Contrary to the practice of all other religious sects, they admit of no converts; but
they allow that every one may go to heaven his own way, though they perhaps
suppose, that theirs is the most expeditious method to obtain that important end.
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They chuse rather to make a mystery of their religion, than impose it upon the
world, like the Mahommedans, with the sword, or by means of the stake, after the
manner of some pious christians. (Dow 1768, 110)
As he repeated a few pages further, the Hindus never tried to convince others
that theirs was the one true way to heaven: It is, as we have already observed, a
principle peculiar to the Hindoo religion, not to admit of proselytes. But instead
of being solicitous about gaining converts, they always make a mystery of their
faith. Heaven, say they, is like a palace with many doors, and every one may enter
in his own way (Dow 1768, 115). Many would join Dow in pointing out the peculiar absence of an urge to convert in the Hindu religion (e.g. Holwell 1765, 28;
Craufurd 1790, 131-2). Naturally, this absence becomes peculiar, only if one has a
particular horizon of expectations about religion.
How could one develop this kind of expectation? On the one hand, Dow
could have reached this point through induction. All religious sects he had encountered so far did convert, and thus he expected the same to be true of the Hindus. Considering the limited number of religions he could possibly have known
in the eighteenth century, this makes for a rather weak case. On the other hand,
Dow could simply have assumed that all religions do proselytize. That is, he might
have held an image of religion which told him that there is continuous competition among religions with respect to gaining converts. Dow may not have been a
fanatic or a missionary, but of course he had a Christian background. He shared
this image with his fellow Europeans. It derived from the belief that religion revolves around the struggle between God and the devil for the souls of men and
women. Satan seduces humanity with subtle lies; God saves with the gift of truth.
Given this background, the surprise must have been great indeed when one came
across a religion that did not bother gaining converts.
Inspired by Enlightenment philosophy, some British observers would even
celebrate the exceptional religious toleration among the Indians and try to find
explanations for this fact:
A Hind cannot conceive the possibility of a rational being pursuing and destroying his fellow-creature, merely to establish a certain speculative point of doctrine.
In Poonah, which is the metropolis of the empire, and the seat of Brhmniecal [sic]
authority, there are many mosques, and one christian church, where the votaries of
both religions may offer up their devotions without any hindrance or molestation.
What a noble example of moderation is this, especially when contrasted with the
bigoted and sanguinary principles of Christian and Mahommedan zealots!...It
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is, however, worthy of remark, that the same indifference to religious distinctions
obtained among the ancient Greeks and Romans, who, like the present Hinds,
believed in the multiplicity of deities, and appears to be one striking feature of the
doctrine of polytheism. (Tone 1800, 127-8)
Thus, Europeans perceived the similarity between modern Hindus and ancient
pagans in regard to religious tolerance as a typical property of polytheism. Indifference to religious distinctions had to be part of the doctrine of such religions.
To the more zealous Christians, however, the Indian subcontinent appeared
as a battleground between Gods truth and Satans lies. In the early nineteenth
century, the evangelical missionaries of the London Missionary Society already
knew what to expect when they set foot on Indian soil. One of them, George
Gogerly, tells his readers that an unusual feeling of solemnity gradually crept
over his mind as he caught his first sight of India:
Before me was the land of idolatry, concerning which I had heard and read so
much; and I was now to come into contact with that mighty system of superstition
and cruelty which was holding millions enslaved in its bonds; to see its hateful
rites, and by the exhibition of the Truth, to contend with its dreadful power. (cited
in Kitzan 1970, 29-30)
The expectations of the missionaries, so they thought, were confirmed everywhere

in the traditional practices and stories of the Indians. When they were confronted
by the vaunted holy books of the Hindus, the strongest terms of denunciation
would not do. In the words of William Campbell:
In what terms shall I describe the Hindu Mythology? There was never, in any age,
nor in any country, a superstition so cruel, so atrocious and so diabolical as that
which has reigned over this people. It is a personification of evil. Satan seems to
have used all his ingenuity, his malice and his gigantic power to create a system
which would represent all his own attributes upon the earth, render its votaries as
much like his angels as possible, and make Hindosthan an image of the infernal
regions. (cited in Kitzan 1970, 31)
When this is how one views the practices and the stories of Hindus, the desire to
convert must be strong indeed: Hindus had to be freed from the system of superstition that enslaved them. What should come in its stead except the true message
of the atoning death of Jesus Christ?
This was not just the victory cry of a religion out to rule the world. Instead,
Christians were sincerely and deeply concerned about the souls of Indian subjects
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of the Empire. In his Letters on India: With Special Reference to the Spread of Christianity (1840), for instance, William Buyers wrote the following:
The fact that nearly one hundred millions of our fellow-subjects are living and dying in a state of awful estrangement from God, and without the means of having
that estrangement removed the victims of error, superstition, pollution and horrid cruelty while we possess every facility of access to them, involves a responsibility the most tremendous that can possibly be conceived. (Buyers 1840, viii)
Fifty years before, the famous missionary William Carey had also reminded the
Christians of their obligations. In his An Enquiry into the obligations of the Christians, to use means for the conversion of the heathens (1792, 69-70), he asked rhetorically:
After all, the uncivilized state of the heathen, instead of affording an objection
against preaching the gospel to them, ought to furnish an argument for it. Can
we as men, or as Christians, hear that a great part of our fellow creatures, whose
souls are as immortal as ours, and who are as capable as ourselves, of adorning the
gospel, contributing by their preaching, writings, or practices to the glory of our
Redeemers name, and the good of this church, are enveloped in ignorance and
barbarism? Can we hear that they are without the gospel, without government,
without laws, and without arts, and sciences; and not exert ourselves to introduce
amongst them the sentiments of men, and of Christians?
Why did the Reverends Buyers and Carey and their Christian audiences have
the responsibility of bringing their fellow human beings back to God? In Christ,
they believed, God had disclosed His will to humanity. It is only through belief
inand submission toHis revealed will that human beings can be saved from
the devil and eternal damnation. Thus, it becomes the duty of the Christians to
try and convert others. It would be sheer cruelty and a violation of Gods will not
to do so.
The only hope for India, as the famous Sanskrit scholar Edward W. Hopkins
remarked in his Religions of India (1885), was to be found in her new religion:
In her own religions there is no hope for India, and her best minds have renounced
them. The body of Hinduism is corrupt, its soul is evil. As for Brahmanismthe
Brahmanism that produced the Upanishadsthe spirit is departed, and the form
that remains is dead. But a new spirit, the spirit of progress and of education, will
prevail at last. When it rules it will undo the bonds of caste and do away with low
superstition. Then India will also be free to accept, as the creed of her new religion,
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Christs words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbor as thyself .
(Hopkins 1885, 570-571)
This background allows us to make sense of the claims of both Indian and western Christians that conversion is a right and duty of the religious. They ought to
share the universal truth of Christ with the rest of the humankind. They should
at least attempt to convince the heathens that the latters corrupt beliefs ought to
be replaced by pure Christian doctrine. This explains why E. Stanley Jones reacted
so strongly to Gandhis claim that every nations religion is as good as any other.
And it also accounts for the position of the Indian Christians in the Constituent
Assembly.
From the sixteenth century onwards, western Christians have viewed the
encounter with the Hindu traditions as a struggle between Christianity and idolatry, true and false religion. In the early twentieth century, a missionary scholar
pointed out that it will be seen at a glance that the Indian Empire is remarkable...
as a meeting-place and arena of conflict for all the great religions of the world...,
in the Indian Empire Christianity is confronted at once by Hinduism, Islam, and
Buddhism, the three strongest non-Christian religions (Griswold 1912, 163-4).
This notion of the Indian subcontinent as an arena of religious rivalry was now
self-evident, but it had taken centuries of theological work to make this visible at
a glance.
The theological framework underlying this view of conversion attributed
certain characteristic properties to religion, corresponding to the three premises
we noted earlier. Religions are rivals; they are subject to truth predicates; and they
revolve around beliefs and doctrines, which provide the required foundation and
justification for the religions practices.
The Blindness of the Hindu
From the very first encounters, followers of the Indian traditions failed to understand the European Christians, whenever these argued about the truth and falsity
of religions and the universal validity of true religion. An excellent early illustration occurred in a seventeenth-century dialogue between the French traveller
Franois Bernier and some Brahmins:
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When I told them that in cold Countries it would not be possible to observe that
Law of theirs in Winter (which was a sign of its being a mere human invention)
they gave this pleasant answer: That they pretended not their Law was universal;
that God had only made it for them, and it was therefore they could not receive
a Stranger into their Religion: that they thought not our Religion was therefore
false, but that it might be it was good for us, and that God might have appointed
several different ways to go to Heaven; but they will not hear that our Religion
should be the general Religion for the whole earth; and theirs a fable and pure
device. (Bernier 1671, 149-150)
The response was similar, when Ziegenbalg tried to convince Malabarian Brahmins of the truth of Christianity in the eighteenth century. In 1719, he published
reports of some conferences in which he had discussed the truth of the Christian
religion with the Malabarian natives.
The first conference gave an account of Ziegenbalgs attempt to convince one
of the local Brahmins of the falsity of his religion. When the missionary urged
him and his fellow Hindus to break off the Cords of inveterate Errors, and save
your own Souls, seeking diligently the Knowledge of the One only True God, the
Brahmin gave the following retort: Our Religion is Venerable for its Antiquity,
and has been professed by many pious Kings and holy Prophets, thro an Uninterrupted Succession of many incircling Ages (Ziegenbalg 1719, 4-5). His religion
could not be false, the Brahmin continued, since so many generations had continued its practice. In Ziegenbalgs opinion, this was a ridiculous argument:
Uninterrupted Succession, and great Throngs of Proselytes are no Characteristicks
of the Truth of any Religion; else it would follow, that the Devil is very Orthodox:
For he is as famous for the Multitude of his Disciples, as he is for his hoary venerable Antiquity. But you must judge of the Goodness or Badness of Religion, by
the Fundamental Articles thereof, agreeing or disagreeing with the revealed word
of the true God; but you Malabarians having no Knowledge of Gods Word, can
take no Cognizance of what is true Worship, believing with an implicit Faith, the
Fables and Reveries of Tradition-mongers, your Poets and Doctors. (Ziegenbalg
1719, 5)
The Brahmins conclusion that his religion must be true, because it had existed
for so many ages, was altogether illogical and an unjust Way of arguing, according to Ziegenbalg (1719, 6). Nevertheless, the Hindus consistently defended their
tradition in terms of its antiquity, rather than in terms of truth. In another conference, while Ziegenbalg was heaping ridicule on the Hindu deities, a Venerable
Old Man stood up and said that we have no True, but false Gods in our Country,
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this you are still to demonstrate: For tho the Christians call us Heathens, we are
not so in Reality; but we are a very Ancient Nation, whose Religion is as Old as the
World itself (Ziegenbalg 1719, 103).
To a Christian missionary, these claims to antiquity could not count as evidence for the truth of religion. European heathens had also worshipped the devil
for millennia before being enlightened by Christianity. Besides, God had promised sending His Son as the Redeemer: And thus you see, that the Christian
Religion has been professd from the Beginning of the World, and is certainly the
most Ancient of all Religions; and your Religion is nothing else but the Corruption of ours (Ziegenbalg 1719, 11). But when Ziegenbalg explained the promise
of Gods grace in Christ, his Brahmin opponent was equally unimpressed:
I believe all you say of Gods Dealings with you White Europeans, to be true; but
his Appearances and Revelations among us Black Malabarians, have been quite
otherwise: And the Revelations he made of himself in this Land are as firmly
believd here to be true, as you believe those made in your Country: For as Christ
in Europe was made Man; so here our God Wischtnu was born among us Malabarians; And as you hope for Salvation through Christ; so we hope for Salvation
through Wischtnu; and to save you one way, and us another, is one of the Pastimes
and Diversions of Almighty God. (Ziegenbalg 1719, 14)
The Christian religion is fine for Europeans, the Brahmin suggested, and so were
the Hindu traditions for Indians. That is, the Hindus simply refused to see Christianity as a rival to their own traditions.
No matter how much the missionaries stressed the falsity of Hindu religion, the potential converts maintained that every one may be saved by his own
Religion, if he does what is Good, and shuns Evil (Ziegenbalg 1719, 15). And
when Ziegenbalg tried to show how wicked and ridiculous their gods were, one
of the Malabarian Hindus stood up and told him that it does not become an
holy Man to blaspheme our Gods; for true Piety despises no Man upon Account
of Religion; and tis therefore we Malabarians do neither condemn nor despise the
Christians upon the Account of their Religion (Ziegenbalg 1719, 107). In this
way, the diatribes of Christian missionaries provoked a systematic response from
the Indians. This never took the form of a plea for the doctrinal truth of Hindu
religion; nor did it consist of counter-attacks on Christian teachings.
Over the next few centuries, Christian colonials would undertake more attempts to convince the Indians that Jesus Christ was the only way to salvation. In
1839, the East India Company servant and Orientalist John Muir published the
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Matapariksa, a Sanskrit tract that was to prove that Christianity was true religion
while the Hindu traditions were false. When three Hindu scholars wrote rejoinders to this tract, they opposed the idea that one single religion was to be followed
by all human beings. One of them, Nilakantha Goreh, pointed out the many different ways of attaining moksha:
If someone located in Gaya wants to go to Kasi, he asks people there and they
tell him, You must go west, whereas an inhabitant of Prayaga, wanting to go to
Kasi, asks people there and is told, to the contrary, Go east. Going both east and
west, which is by all means contradictory, yields one result on account of being
located in different places. By the same token, one way [to salvation] would not be
rewarding to [all] men, whose aptitudes are different, on account of the unarguable maturation of their good and bad deeds. Reflecting in these terms, Bhagavan,
an ocean of compassion, made various kinds of margas by which everyone may
attain salvation. For instance, among all the scriptures, the Sankhya, Vaisesika and
others, likewise the devotional margas of Vaishnavas, etc., in which their faults are
completely done away with by means of much examination and meditation, some
people esteem the Vaisesika, some the Sankhya or others, some the Vaisnava marga, and others the Saiva, etc. This indicates that people have different aptitudes
Yet only one among the margas yields a direct result, it alone is followed by people
whose aptitude is pure. (excerpt in Young 1981, 123)
As there are various kinds of people with different capacities and skills, so there
are several paths they can take to arrive at moksha. This is not to say that all paths
are equal. As another critic of Muir, Somanatha, wrote:
Men who travel on other roads are not said to be competent for the Vedic marga.
It is for this reason that Hari would be displeased when someone spurns his own
religionWhen men who dwell in various quarters are going to a certain city, in
no way whatsoever would they reach it by [travelling] only on one path. Likewise, those men, whom the all-creator made to possess different qualifications
(adhikara) and [put into] different situations, would be unable to attain God by
means of any single pathFor each person his own religion is best; the same religion would be perilous for another person. Now, therefore, praise be to those who
worship Hari according to their religion without reviling other [paths]. (excerpt
in Young 1981, 145)
The religion one should follow depended on ones specific situation. Therefore,
persons belonging to different religions should neither dismiss their own religion
nor that of others. In fact, the deities would be displeased to see this happen. If
this is basic to religion, this religion is very different from the phenomenon the
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Christians were describing. In one case, the diversity of religions is said to consist
of one path through which God saves humanity from eternal damnation, while
the other paths are the devils snares. In the other case, the diversity of religions
corresponds to the innate diversity among human beings. Various valid paths exist, which have been developed forand bydifferent groups of people.
The Absurdity of One True Religion
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, few Hindus had as yet adopted
the tendency of Christians to conceive of religion in terms of truth and falsity. By
mid twentieth century, Gandhi began to expound his views on the relation between religion and truth. Yet, he also failed to understand Christianity and its selfimage as true religion. This became clear in a piece About Conversion, published
in Harijan on 28/09/1935. After being invited to do so, Gandhi commented upon
a set of nine Christian propositions about conversion:
1. Conversion is a change of heart from sin to God. It is the work of God. Sin is
separation from God.
2. The Christian believes that Jesus is the fulfilment of Gods revelation to mankind; that He is our Saviour, that He alone can bring the sinner to God and thus
enable him to live.
3. The Christian, to whom God has become a living reality and power through
Christ, regards it as his privilege and duty to speak about Jesus and to proclaim
the free offer which He came on earth to make.
4. If any mans heart is so moved by the hearing this message that he repents and
wishes to live a new life as a disciple of Jesus, the Christian regards it as right to
admit him to the company of His professed believers which is called the Christian
Church.
5. The Christian shall do all in his power to show sincerity of conviction and shall
point out the consequences of such a step, emphasizing the duty a man owes to
his family.
6. The Christian shall do everything in his power not to be self-seeking and make
sure that material considerations are not the motives of the convert.
7. Inasmuch as Jesus came to give full life and that, as a matter of history, conversion has often meant an enhancing of personality, the Christian shall not be accused of using material inducements if conversion results in the social upliftment
of the convert provided it is understood that such shall never be a means to an
end.
8. The Christian is right in accepting as his duty the care of the sincere convert
body, soul and mind.
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9. It shall not be brought against the Christian that he is using material inducements, when certain facts in Hindu social theory are an inducement to the Harijan. (But see points 5 and 6.) (CW, 68:17-18)
Gandhi remarked that these propositions on conversion had to concern the individual and never the whole of humankind. What did he mean by this? He referred
to the first proposition and pointed out that, as man cannot even know his own
heart well, one human being was never able to judge the state of the heart of others.
In the second proposition, the Christians presented the core idea of their
belief, namely that Christ is the Saviour of humankind. From their perspective,
this was true not only for Christians but also for the whole of humankind. In Gandhis response to this idea, we see how he understood this proposition differently. He pointed out that the Christian belief is a belief handed down from one
generation to another. Underlying this was the idea that religion is a collection
of ideas, beliefs and practices that a certain community or people transmits from
one generation to another. Gandhis explanation showed his ignorance of the fact
that, according to the Christians, the Christian belief is not just a human tradition
transmitted from generation to generation, but primarily the divine revelation
from God to humankind.
In other words, he saw Christianity as one more human tradition, but one
that held the idiosyncratic belief that it is the one true religion. Being one among
the many traditions, he found it peculiar and even dangerous that Christianity
presented its beliefs to people brought up in other traditions as though the Christian beliefs could be tested and found true. This is not the case, he said, and therefore he concluded: It is highly likely that mine may be good enough for me and
his for him. A thick woolen coat would be the thing for one living in the cold
region of the earth, as a piece of loincloth for another living near the equatorial
regions (CW, 68:19).
In their propositions on conversion, Christians said that they regarded it
their privilege and duty to speak about Jesus. Gandhi responded that while such
beliefs can be transmitted among followers of a particular religion, they would
only repel those brought up in different traditions: The third proposition too, like
the first, relates to the mysteries of religion which are not understood by the common people who take them in faith. They work well enough among people living
in the traditional faith. They will repel those who have been brought up to believe
something else (ibid.). Here, we sense Gandhis shock at the idea that the beliefs
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of one religion could be universally true and could thus be presented to people
brought up in another religion as the tested and true beliefs for all of humanity.
Gandhi was not the only one to translate the stance that allowed human beings to follow various paths into the proposition that all religions are true. In the
Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, Ramakrishna is recorded to have made similar points
about the variety of paths: God can be realised through all paths. It is like your
coming to Dakshineswar by carriage, by boat, by steamer or on foot. You have
chosen the way according to your convenience and taste; but the destination is the
same. Some of you have arrived earlier than others, but all have arrived (cited in
Neufeldt 1987, 67). And he also presented the claim that all religions are true as
the equivalent of this point: God can be realised through all paths. All religions
are true. The important thing is to reach the roof. You can reach it by stone stairs
or wooden stairs or by bamboo steps or by a rope. You can also climb up by a
bamboo pole (cited in ibid., 68).
When religion does not revolve round the truth of its beliefs, it is futile to
compare different religions in terms of truth or falsity. Swami Vivekananda, for
instance, suggested that only those who do not properly understand religion insist
that religions be compared in order to decide which is best. Religion, according to
him, had nothing to do with the truth of certain views, but everything with the
great universal truth. Instead of being contradictory, religions are supplementary,
said Vivekananda, each religion, as it were, takes up one part of the great universal
truth and spends its whole force in embodying and typifying that part of the great
truth (Vivekananda 1963, 365). Different religious traditions are not conceived
of as rivals, neither when it comes to the ultimate goal they pursue, nor where it
concerns the morality of their followers. He expressed this in a talk in the United
States:
We do not say that ours is the only way to salvation. Perfection can be had by everybody, and what is the proof ? Because we see the holiest of men in all countries,
good men and women everywhere, whether born in our faith or not. Therefore it
cannot be held that ours is the only way to salvation. Like so many rivers flowing from different mountains, all coming and mingling their waters in the sea, all
the different religions, taking their births from different standpoints of fact, come
unto Thee. This is a part of the childs everyday prayer in India. With such everyday prayers, of course, such ideas as fighting because of differences of religion are
simply impossible. (Vivekananda 1964, 8:210)
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It is not as though these Hindu spokesmen were ignorant of Christianitys claims

to universality. However, even after spending many years on the comparative
study of religion, the philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan could not consent
with the Christian notion of true and false religion. In fact, he went so far as to say
that the idea of one single religion for the humankind is illogical:
The illogical idea of one single religion for all mankind, one set of dogmas, one
cult, one system of ceremonies which all individuals must accept on pain of persecution by the people and punishment by God, is the product of unreason and intolerance. A religion represents the soul of the people, its peculiar spirit, thought,
and temperament. It is not a mere theory of the supernatural which we can put
on or off as we please. It is an expression of the spiritual experience of the race,
a record of its social evolution, an integral element of the society in which it is
found. (Radhakrishnan 1969, 81-82)
The religion of a people is a record of its evolution and an expression of its spiritual experience. To understand what Radhakrishnan means, let us turn back to the
Hindus who told Ziegenbalg that they had venerable antiquity on their side, since
they were a very Ancient Nation whose Religion is as Old as the World itself.
Religion, both to these seventeenth-century Indians and to a twentieth-century
Indian philosopher, is the tradition of a people or a community. It consists of the
practices, customs, and stories that have been passed on by the ancestors of this
community from ancient times. Therefore, the older it is, the more respectable it
is. When they are accused of being followers of false religion, the Hindus reply
that their religion is tradition, so how could it be false? As tradition, religion represents the past experience of a people, and hence the idea of one single religion
for humankind becomes inconceivable.
The foregoing permits to sum up some of the properties that Hindus attribute to the phenomenon they have learned to call religion since colonial times.
On the one hand, religion consists of a variety of paths an individual can take to
attain moksha. On the other, religion is the ancestral tradition of a people, viz., a
system of practices, customs, and stories a particular community has passed on
over time. In both aspects, different religions are not rivals with respect to gaining
converts, nor competitors with respect to truth. Religion does not revolve around the
belief in a system of doctrines, which is either true or false. Therefore, truth predicates do not apply to the object that religion is. All religions may be true in the
sense that they all lead to the same goal of moksha, but no religion can possibly be
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false. Finally, various religions are not rivals when it comes to the morality of their
followers. All traditions produce good men and women.
These traits of religion again allow us to throw light upon the conversion
dispute. For instance, in December 1946, a conference of the heads of various
Hindu institutions issued a memorandum to the Constituent Assembly, in which
they concluded that social peace and political stability can best be secured by allowing cultural and religious groups to live their own life, unhampered by external
interference and aggression, letting the people continue in the faith in which
they were born, free from proselytising interference (in Kim 2003, 42). In the
words of Article 23 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal:2
Every person shall have the right to profess, practise and preserve his/her own
religion as handed down to him/her from ancient times having due regards to the
social and cultural traditional practices. Provided that no person shall be entitled
to convert another person from one religion to another, and shall not act or behave
in a manner which may jeopardize the religion of others.
Where religion is the ancient tradition of a people and one of various valid
paths, this staunch defence of non-interference makes sense.
Under such conditions, the proselytizing drive of the Christian religion is
viewed as one-sided violence, as Swami Dayananda Saraswati wrote in his Open
Letter to His Holiness the Pope John Paul II. Composed on the occasion of Pope
John Paul IIs visit to India in 1999, this document voiced the injury that conversion causes to those who conceive of religion as tradition:
Any protest against religious conversion is always branded as persecution, because
it is maintained that people are not allowed to practice their religion, that their
religious freedom is curbed. The truth is entirely different. The other person also
has the freedom to practice his or her religion without interference. That is his/
her birthright. Religious freedom does not extent [sic] to having a planned program of conversion. Such a program is to be construed as aggression against the
religious freedom of others.
Religious conversion is violence and it breeds violence, Dayananda Saraswati

concludes. When religion is the tradition that makes a community into a community, conversion becomes a disrupting intrusion into the social fabric of that
community.
2
See http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nepal_Interim_Constitution2007.pdf
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6.4. Conclusion
Instead of speaking of one universal predicament of conversion, scholars should
realize that we in fact confront two distinct problems that emerge from two radically different perspectives on the encounter between religions and traditions.
In one world, the problem of conversion is viewed as a consequence of the
competition between religions with regard to the truth of their beliefs. This perspective involves a variety of cognitive manoeuvres that are part and parcel of the
dominant scholarly analysis of conversion in India. One conceptualizes the Indian traditions as distinct religions like Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism and
views these as potential rivals of Christianity. Explicitly or implicitly, one links
social discrimination, poverty and other deplorable situations in Indian society to
the teachings of Hindu religion and suggests that inegalitarianism lies at the heart
of the Hindu caste system. Therefore, conversion is viewed as the escape route of
the dalits towards religions with a more egalitarian and humane message. Opposition to conversion is then understood as the expression of the fear of high-caste
Hindus that their religion will lose out in this rivalry. The conceptual foundations
of this world consist of the generic framework of Christian theology.
In the other world, the problem is perceived as the unsolicited and aggressive intrusion upon the social and communal life of a community constituted by
a particular tradition. Here, traditions are human products transmitted over time
and the truth value of their stories is largely irrelevant. When one condemns the
whole of such a tradition as false or evil or tries to undermine its foundations, this
is experienced as a violation of the integrity of the community and its tradition.
The conflict between these two worlds gives rise to a clash over the principle of religious freedom. When religion is viewed as a matter of doctrinal truth
and different religions are rivals, then the freedom to convert from one religion
to another becomes of the greatest importance to humanity. It is a question of
eternal life and death: either one remains caught in the snares of false religion or
one is free to convert to the true religion. The question is also about ones ethical
life here on earth. Since false religion always implies immoral and unjust practices
according to the Christian and Islamic viewpoints, conversion entails the escape
from immorality and injustice. After the secularization of Christian theology, this
is translated into the importance of the absolute right to profess, propagate and
change ones religion. In other words, the dominant principle of religious freedom
reproduces a deeply theological view of the nature of religion.
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Where ancestral tradition stands central, the significance shifts to the freedom to continue ones tradition without aggressive interference from the outside.
That is, the integrity of the ritual and narrative traditions of a community becomes
central here. This does not entail that any criticism of these traditions is unwelcome. Both insiders and outsiders are free to proffer reasons to end a practice.
Responses will be varied. Conservative followers of the tradition in question may
react negatively, while the more progressive ones might listen to the voice of reason. However, both feel violated by the onslaught of Christianity or Islam on their
traditions.
Since ancestral practices are considered to be the common inheritance that
holds a community together, any denunciation of these as false religion and idolatry is viewed as an attempt to destroy the social fabric. From this perspective, successful conversions to Christianity and Islam create tears in this social fabric. Religious conversion disintegrates communities and families by drawing individuals
away from the ancestral traditions. In other words, a stance of non-interference is
central to these traditions.
Thus, the two worlds generate different interpretations of the freedom of
religion. For Christians, Muslims and secularists in India, the principle revolves
around the freedom to convert and proselytize. For Hindus, Buddhists and Jains,
it revolves around freedom from the intrusion of proselytization. There is no neutral position between these two interpretations of religious freedom. Either one
accepts that some religions are false or one believes that no religion is false. One
cannot have both, since these are contradictory propositions. In the same way,
there is no neutral ground between the claim that religion revolves around doctrinal truth or that it does not. Since the interpretations of religious freedom derive
from these contradictory propositions, they are also mutually exclusive. Therefore,
with regard to the problem of proselytization, it seems logically impossible to interpret the principle of religious freedom in a way that is neutral between religions
and traditions.
The dominant principle of religious freedom, then, must necessarily favour
one of the two sides of the Indian equation. It does. The liberal principle of religious freedom, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the Indian Constitution, privileges Christianity and Islam, because it involves the
freedom to propagate or manifest ones religion and to proselytize. It implicitly
endorses the assumption that religion revolves around doctrines and truth claims.
Therefore, each citizen ought always to be free to decide about the truth or falsity
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of religion and should also be free to persuade followers of other religions of the
unique truth of his own. This is not a scientific or neutral claim about the nature
of religion, but a proposition from the theologies of Christianity and Islam.
In an important essay, Makau Mutua takes the dominant principle of religious freedom to task for its intrinsic inequity:
Since the right to freedom of religion or belief includes the right to be left alone
to choose freely whether and what to believethe rights regime incorrectly assumes a level playing field by requiring that African religions compete in the marketplace of ideas. The rights corpus not only forcibly imposes on African religions
the obligation to competea task for which as nonproselytizing, noncompetitive
creeds they are not historically fashionedbut also protects evangelizing religions
in their march towards universalization. In the context of freedom of religion or
belief, the privileging by the rights regime of the competition of ideas over the
right against cultural invasion, in a skewed contest, amounts to condoning the
dismantling of African religions. (Mutua 2004, 652)
We contend that the same is true for the Indian situation. The dominance of the
framework that construes religions as rival belief systems has produced a skewed
contest.
The dominant epistemic, moral and legal framework, through which the
international community addresses the problem of proselytization, reproduces
theological premises in secular guise. The same framework prevents one from appreciating the concerns of non-proselytizing ancestral traditions. They are robbed
of their voices. As a result, the traditional stance of non-interference is giving way
for an increasingly shrill and aggressive voice: that of Hindu nationalism, which
seeks to impose its own principles on all others.
Chapter 7
The Protestant Reformation

and the Corruption of Religion
To understand the nature of the process of conversion and its role in the Indian
debate, we have to turn to the history of Christianity in Europe. Conversion is a

process pivotal to Christian religion: it is the process of transformation whereby
the believer becomes a true Christian. Naturally, the word also denotes the transition of an individual or group from one religious confession or denomination to
another. In both senses, conversion plays an important role in the expansion of
Christianity. On the one hand, it drives the diffusion of this religion among individuals, groups and peoples, i.e., its growth in terms of geographical scope and the
number of believers. This could be called the horizontal expansion of the Christian
religion. On the other hand, conversion propels the growth of Christianity within
individual human beings and societies. Here, individuals have to become true
believers living a life guided by faith and social institutions need to be reformed
according to Christian models. This is the vertical expansion of this religion. In
our analysis of the Protestant Reformation, we will be concerned with this second
dimension, which we refer to very broadly as the process of conversio. This process
is the answer to one of the fundamental questions of Christianity: Quid sit Christianum esse? What is to be a Christian (Balagangadhara 1994, 442)?
This chapter and the next introduce a hypothesis on the basic dynamic behind the Protestant Reformation. The Reformers were gripped by the following predicament: in late medieval Europe, they felt, the majority of Christians
were not real Christians, but only nominal ones. These nominal Christians were
misguided by the Church hierarchy and the efficacy of works and ceremonies,
they failed to submit their will to that of the Creator; they did not lead lives of
faith. Consequently, the Reformers concluded, these Christians remained in the
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stranglehold of sin. The critique on medieval Christianity and its society as formulated by the Protestant Reformers on the one hand and their understanding of
the process of religious conversion on the other are closely related. Concomitant
with this diagnosis of the ills of medieval Christendom, the process of conversio
assumed a new form. We will refer to the dynamic that propelled this transformation as the monasticization of daily life.
Originally, conversio had been the life-process that shaped the everyday existence of monks and the institutional structures of the monastery. Monks were
considered to be the truly religious, because the ascetic life they led in the monastery allowed their souls to undergo a process of spiritual conversion. During the
high Middle Ages, the scope of this process expanded to the priest, who became
the main bearer of spiritual authority. In the next step, the Protestant Reformation
extended this monastic process to all believers, so as to ensure the vertical expansion of Christianity within European societies. For the populace to become real
Christians, they had to abandon traditional ways of doing things and start conforming to the will of God in all aspects of life. Monasticism had to be abolished,
but the basic structures of monastic life were to shape the lives of all Christians.
In classical terms, this is referred to as the priesthood of all believersthe state
where each believer takes responsibility for his or her own salvation.
This monasticization of daily life generated and required a new description
of European medieval society. Early Reformers viewed the Christian citizenry of
their time as degenerate, the clerical institutions and religious doctrines as corrupt,
and social life as depraved. According to them, a faction of clerics had hijacked
spiritual conversion towards God under false pretences and thus misled masses of
believers. The remedy would consist of the conversion of each individual believer
and of the community at large. To transform nominal Christians into true believers, all were expected to go through a conversion process, no matter which walk of
life one belonged to (cleric or lay, rich or poor, child or adult). The process of conversio broke out of the conceptual limits set by medieval theology and created new
experiential structures that would transform human beings all over the world.
The present chapter will focus on the kind of descriptive model developed by
the Protestant Reformers to characterize the ills of late medieval society and the
Roman-Catholic Church. The first section briefly considers the process of conversio as it developed in the monasteries and the Church in Western Europe before
the sixteenth century. Next, we look into the theological notion of the corruption
of religion that emerged during the early stages of the Reformation in close rela-
The Protestant Reformation and the Corruption of Religion
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tion with the process of conversio to all believers. The third section then examines
how the early Reformers built a fundamental critique of the Roman-Catholic
Church along the lines of this theology of the corruption of religion. They rejected
the papacy, its priesthood and its monasticism as the Devils church, because no
human being had the authority and capacity to intervene in the spiritual realm
of God.
7.1. Conversion before the Reformation

The Danes had long been Christians but they nevertheless worshiped idols with
pagan rituals, is what the German chronicler Widukind noted in the 10th century (Sawyer and Sawyer 1993, 100-101). According to historians Birgit and Peter Sawyer this description probably applied to many other Scandinavians in the
tenth century. Without deeply exploring this now, we can point out that conversion in the long Middle Ages is generally understood as referring to either (1)
the transition from paganism to Christianity or to (2) the process of individual
turning towards God that the priests, monks, ascetics and certain lay-believers
underwent.1 If lay-believers went through conversion this was generally the sign
to join some belief-community, whether a lay communitylike the beguines and
movements promoted by the Devotio Moderna2or a monastic community, or to
become a hermit or ascetic etc. In fact we can roughly determine three models
within which conversion could fully develop: the monk or nun, the priest, the ascetic.3 These communities or ways of life are the limits within which the believer
can develop his or her conversion. The key elements to this process were the three
building blocks of penance: contritio, confessio, satisfactio.
What we actually observe is that scholarly analyses of medieval conversion
struggle with a typical question that we have faced before. Does conversion refer
to a personal spiritual experience of momentous impactsay, the kind of experience that Paul had on the road to Damascusor can its scope be extended to a
See especially Morrison (1992a, 1992b). See also, e.g., Armstrong and Wood (2000), Brown (1995),
Hillgarth (1969), Markus (1990), Mills and Grafton (2003a), Muldoon (1997a), Sterk (2004).
2
On this movement, see Van Engen (2008).
3
The project Narrative Sources (an academic collaboration between Ghent University, the Catholic University of Louvain and Groningen) collecting records of narrative sources from the medieval
Low Countries, is helpful in finding conversion stories, hagiographies and vitae from the Low
Countries. Often hagiographical works or vitae contain conversion narratives. On such medieval
conversion stories, see also Morrison (1992a, 28-65), Hindsley (1997) and Kuznetsova (2000).
1
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variety of experiences from the prolonged search of an individual for God to the
collective turning of an entire nation to Christianity? Scholars argue that to use
the same term for both Augustines lengthy, emotionally intense search for God
and the corporate or communal acceptance of a new god by an Anglo-Saxon
people at the behest of their king and leading men is to stretch the meaning of the
word conversion to the extreme (Muldoon 1997a, vii; see Yavari 2000, 226). James
Muldoon elaborates on the problem:
By using the term conversion to describe a wide range of related religious experienceswe oversimplify its meaning. St. Pauls intense personal experience is
equated with the gratitude that Constantine felt towards the deity who insured
his crucial victory. The result is a far too simple model of that experience that
causes a rapid, radical change in an individuals or societys way of life. In reality,
these experiences form a range or spectrum of experiences that we label conversion
rather than a single moment. (Muldoon 1997b, 1)
From Muldoons account it appears that the two dimensions do not exclude each
other, in fact they are mutually interdependent: The conversion of Europe was
at least as much a process of introducing large groups of barbarian pagans to a
Christian way of life as it was a matter of personal spiritual experience (ibid., 4).
As such, so he explains: The goal of the missionary who baptized an entire people
was to enable each individual eventually to become fully transformed in Christ
(ibid., 4).
In that case, the question remains which structure (shared across this spectrum) renders the variety of transforming experiences into instances of conversion. At stake is not the definition of the word conversion. Rather, scholars of
medieval conversion are confronted with a range of processes, including both the
instantaneous transition from paganism to Christianity and a long process of inner change, usually set in the monasteries.
Monastic Conversion and the Medieval Church
In the early medieval period, conversion was not in the first place the change from
a non-Christian to a Christian life, but from Christianity to a stricter following of its precepts, involving the taking of a vow. Conversion was equated with
entering a monastic community, following a new manner of life, and separating
oneself from the life of the secular world (Harran 1983, 31). In this way, the pro-
211
cess of conversion and monasticism were deeply related. Conversion constituted

the entrance into the religious life. Until the later Middle Ages, conversion refers
predominantly to the change of life from the secular to monastic (Harran 1983,
52-53; Van Engen 2003, 30-31).
The locus of the process of conversio was the monastery and its stimulus the
attempt to live an ascetic life in imitation of Christ. It developed within the walls
of the monastery among small groups of monks or nuns. Here, conversion became
an extensive process with different phases and degrees: Conversion in this view
is a long formative pedagogical process full of pitfalls and reversals, rather than a
moment of cataclysmic change (Roest 2000, 297).
From the church fathers onwards, Karl Morrison tells us in his Understanding Conversion (1992a), it became a constant motif in Christian religious writing to
lament that while the world professed Christianity, the followers of Christ were
few (Morrison 1992a, 11). This concern about nominal Christians spawned the
formation of a life-encompassing process of turning towards God and Christ:
Clearly, changes of heart and mind and initiation rituals such as baptism were not
safeguards against infidelity. They were only the beginning of a gradual process the
outcome of which could not be foretold, one in which there must be frequent, indeed daily, conversions. Authentic baptism could not be repeated. Therefore, rituals and ceremonies of pardon and reconciliation had to be developed; doctrines
of the Churchs power to judge and correct sins throughout its childrens lifetimes
had to be framed. The long process of conversion was identified with penitential
asceticism, suffering, and martyrdom. (Morrison 1992a, 14)
The ideal of gradual conversion was institutionalized in monasticism and canonized in the Rule of St. Benedict. Consequently, its identification not merely
with ascetic tradition but precisely with monastic order was so close that, unless
otherwise defined in context, the word conversio came to mean entrance into that
discipline (ibid., 14). This moment of entrance did not exhaust the process:
the moment in which one entered a monastery was not the full conversio, but
only its beginning, the initium conversionis according to the rule of St. Benedict
(ibid., 14). The monastery, so he stresses, was actually designed for the purpose of
lifelong conversion. The power of this institution in European society is evident,
Morrison points out, in the numbers of men and women drawn to it, in the role
that monks and their communities played in spreading Church and Christianity
throughout Europe, and, by no means least, in the normative effect that monastic
discipline imparted to the ethics of secular government as monks educated rulers
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in their duties as Christian princes (ibid., 14-15; italics mine). Among the different patterns of conversion, one became dominant at the time: the imitation of
Christ, especially of his Passion (ibid., 20).
Exploring the elements that contributed to this notion of conversion, Morrison concludes that the peripety paradigm (Nock 1933)the idea of conversion
as radical momentous insightfails to capture the medieval experience:
The emphasis on conversion as a cataclysmic change, the Augustinian crisis pattern, narrows the actual repertory of kinds of conversion to oneIt presupposes
that conversion was an irreversible peripety and therefore leaves aside the whole
range of systemic doubt that made fear of apostasy a great element in the concept
of conversion. It also heavily discounts the ascetic ideals, already institutionalized
in monasticism during Augustines lifetime, of conversion as a long, pedagogical
process lasting until death, full of pitfalls and reversals, and by no means assured of
attaining its goal, no matter what its beginning. (Morrison 1992a, 23-24)
The cataclysmic notion obfuscates the supernatural dimension central to the

Christian notion of inner conversion. Medieval Christians viewed conversion as
a gradual process of testing and education induced by God from outside nature.
Fundamentally, in its supernatural dimension, conversion was indistinguishable
from Christian life (ibid., 25). Describing continuing and perilous transformation, rather than abrupt and permanent change, the process of conversion became
the model that structured the life of the Christian. In this sense, as Adolf Harnack
(1895, 2) tells us, the true monk is the genuine and perfect Christian and monasticism is the Christian life.
The medieval ideal depended on the
establishment of a setting that disposed the Christian to a deeper life in Christ, which in turn would bring about
the interior conversion of the individual (Hindsley 1997, 31). This interior process required repentance and a continuous deepening of ones personal relationship with Christ. In his study of the conversion of the Dominican nun Margaret
Ebner (1291-1351), Leonard Hindsley shows that the institutional structure of
the monastery sustained this process, since it provides the setting for living the
monastic ideal of Christian life and its rules and even its architecture foster conversion (ibid., 32). Monastic rules played a pivotal role here. They regulated every
aspect of life so as to contribute to the growth of inner conversion. This process,
Hindsley concludes, was a gradual process of conforming the will of the nun or
of any believer to the will of the faithful and benevolent God (ibid., 45). In addition to the monastic rules, the hagiographical literature also functioned as aids
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in instructing the monk and shaping this process of conversion and submission to
the will of God (Van Egmond 2000). The hagiographies, as it were, allowed one
to apply Scripture to life.
The structure of this process of inner conversion, Morrison argues, was very
different from any process of change in classical antiquity. The typical form was
fundamentally the imitation of Christ, the paradigmatic forma conversionis. The
most fundamental difference was the nature of the commitment to the Christian
God:
Ancient religion demanded no ultimate commitment. Commitments were proportional. One does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, Aristotle wrote. The gods
were not lords of history nor, in their dealings with one another or with human
beings, were they notably faithful. Correspondingly, religious obligations were not
understood in terms of love, and the prayers of the ancient world represent a
bargaining movement from supplication to gratitude, rather than unconditional
devotion. Aristotle observed that it would be eccentric for anyone to say that he
loved Zeus; neither Greeks not Romans referred to their gods with the possessive
pronouns my or our. (Morrison 1992a, 58-59)
Christian conversion implied an ultimate commitment, absent in the traditions of

Antiquity. It demanded of the believer an absolute surrender to the will of God,
overriding any human concern.
To appreciate the depth of this monastic process, let us turn to the description given by Balagangadhara (2005) of the medieval monks experience of conversion. He characterizes the process in terms of a spiritual crisis and its resolution. The starting point is the monks conviction that man is a sinner, but God
loves him nonetheless. The monk believes in the truth of this doctrine, but has no
sense of the scope of his own iniquity and Gods infinite love. He has not experienced what the doctrine says. In the monastery, he lives according to all monastic
rules; he fasts, prays and studies the Scripture; perhaps, he even wears a cilice to
induce discomfort. In spite of obeying the rules and trying ever harder at acts of
repentance, the desired result does not materialize: the monk does not experience
the love of God. He begins to doubt his own sincerity and his ability to fight the
power of sin and Satan. Anxiety overtakes him:
The monk now enters a loop: the more he tries, the less successful he is. The less
successful he is, the harder he tries. Each circuit through this loop increases the
stress, and that merely makes the subsequent traversing of the loop even more
stressful. Very soon, this loop opens up another loop within itself. The monk be-
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gins to doubt whether he will ever find Gods love. However, to entertain this
doubt is to doubt the truth of the scriptures. Believing in the scriptures is leading him experientially to doubt the truth of the scriptures. His faith assures him
that he too shall experience Gods love; his experience makes him doubt whether
he ever will. (This is the second loop.) Now the monk is undergoing what could
properly be called a spiritual crisis: he has begun to doubt the words of the Holy
Spirit. (Balagangadhara 2005, 994-995)
This crisis convinces the monk that he is to blame for his failure to find Gods
love. Profoundly sinful, he cannot escape the clutches of Satan, who is sowing
these seeds of doubt in his mind. The monk begins to experience absolute and
total despair; his sense of his own sinfulness and worthlessness keeps increasing.
He is unable to truly repent and live up to the demands of divine law. In the depth
of despair, however, there is still hope for him, because he knows that God has
proclaimed His love and sacrificed His son to save humanity. Aware of the scope
of his own depravity, the monk is now dumbstruck: how could God love a sinner
like him? The monk is not worth it, this he knows in his heart, and yet, in His
infinite mercy, God promises to save him. At last, he understands (from the bottom of his heart, so to speak) why Gods grace is incomprehensible and infinite
(ibid., 996). He realizes that he cannot do anything about his sinful nature; he
simply has to surrender to the Lord, the workings of His Spirit and His promise
of grace in Christ. This is how the monks own will shall be subjugated to the will
of God and his soul shall turn towards Christ. The monk has embarked on the
journey of conversion.
Before the eleventh century, the term religion primarily referred to this
monastic life of conversion (Little 1993, 454). Monasteries would play an increasingly important role in medieval European society and in the formation of the
Church (Morris 1989, 9). Calling the period between 750 and 1150 the Romanesque age, Lester Little evokes the centrality of monasticism in society:
The virtually unique model of religious life lay in renunciation of worldly power and immersion in a monastic community, living by the rule of St. Benedict.
Monks and nuns had considerably better chances of achieving salvation than other people, and this privileged status gave them easy access to powerful members of
society and considerable influence in worldly affairs. The potentates of Germanic
societykings, counts, dukes, and the warriors who supported and emulated
themall had favorite monasteries, and many even had their own. Each really
important family had a family monastery, that is, an abbey founded by an ancestor
(who had thereby gained sainthood), in which family members served as abbots
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or abbesses, and which, in turn, served the family as a mausoleum. Monks served
as councilors to rulers and prayed for their well-being and success; they set the
standards for royal behavior through the biographies, admonitions, and tracts on
political theology that they composed. They had a virtual monopoly on schooling
and literacy, plus at least a majority of shares in sainthood. Even bishops and the
canons who served their churches were pressured to live by a monastic model, and
indeed many bishops came to their posts from monasteries; Whitby in Northumbria and Luxeuil in Burgundy were famous for producing bishops. The Romanesque age saw many monastic popes, and it is no aberration that at its close, when
the king of France went on crusade, the abbot of Saint-Denis served as regent.
Monasticism was thus an integral part of the nexus of power, even though it had
not always been so. (Little 1993, 456-457)
The tenth and eleventh century saw the emergence of a movement of monastic
reform, which would impose stricter rules on the monks and model all monasteries on a uniform structure. The famous monastery of Cluny in Burgundy became
one of the basic molds for this reform. Clunys abbots had established an exceptionally rigorous discipline, impressing visitors and fellow clerics. Together with
other strict monasteries, the Cluniac monasteries instigated the reform of monastic communities throughout Western Europe (Morris 1989, 57-74).
During the eleventh century, the monastic structure also provided the model
for the Gregorian Reform of the Church. This Papal Revolution, as Harold Berman (1983) has aptly characterized it, was the culmination of the monasticization
of the Church. It extended the process of conversio beyond the walls of the monastery to the priests, who were to guide the flock of lay believers in this world. Once
the scope of monastic conversion had thus expanded, the priest became subject to
increasingly strict moral demands. The Gregorian reformers imposed a rigorous
canon law on the clergy, which linked particular sins to rules never to be violated
by any priest (Berman 1983; Witte 2008, 9-15). At the level of the entire church,
the canon law took over the role that the rule of St. Benedict and other monastic
rules had played in the monastery. It required from the priest an ascetic life of
continuous conversion to the will of God.
More and more, the priest replaced the monk as the central figure of Christian religion. However, the priest acquired his position of spiritual authority
through the same process that shaped the life of the monk. The theologians of
this period argued that the clergy were superior to the laity, since the latter were
incapable of acting up to the same spiritual standard. The priest stood to the layman like parent to child. Unlike the monastic asceticism of earlier centuries, the
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sacramental hierarchy of the Church was not primarily concerned with the next
world, but intended to lead the people of God in this temporal world. The priest
had to undergo spiritual conversion. Thus, he attained libertas or freedom. This
spiritual freedom of priests and bishops corresponded to a superior position in the
spiritual hierarchy that ordered this life on earth (Tellenbach 1936).
When this sense of authority of the clergy over the laity had fully developed, the Papal Reform set out to subordinate all lay rulers to the Church. Under
the motto of libertas ecclesiae, Gregory VII and his associates desired to free all
churches from lay domination. Because of their spiritual vocation and conversion,
the priests became the true servants of God, who gifted them His grace. Through
the sacramental hierarchy and the authority of the priest, the flock of lay believers
could share in this divine grace. Since ones eternal happiness depended on the
Church, it was obvious that even kings and princes were subject to the spiritual
father that the priest was (Tellenbach 1936, 134).
The Theology of Turning to God
The principal theologians of the medieval period reflected on the nature of the
process of conversio. As an illustration, let us briefly consider the theology of conversion of the major religious thinker of the high medieval period, Thomas Aquinas. To this day, the code of Canon Law of the Roman Church says that the formation of clerics should include classes of dogmatic theology, always grounded
in the written word of God together with sacred tradition; through these, students
are to learn to penetrate more intimately the mysteries of salvation, especially with
St. Thomas as a teacher (Code of Canon Law; Can. 252 3).
In his Summa Theologica, Thomas described the justification of the ungodly
as a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of
justice (ST, I-II, q.113, a.6). Four factors are necessary to this movement, namely,
the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the
movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. These are simultaneous in time, but in the order of nature, one is prior to the other: The
entire justification of the ungodly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace
(ST, I-II, q.113, a.6-7). While divine grace is the cause of whatever is required for
the justification of the ungodly, human reason also has some role to play. In principle, reasoning can help one realize certain aspects of divine truth. Nevertheless,
the knowledge revealed by God is necessary:
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Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the
grasp of his reason: The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast
prepared for them that wait for Thee (Isa. lxvi. 4). But the end must first be known
by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was
necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason
should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths
about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man
should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and
with the admixture of many errors. Whereas mans whole salvation, which is in
God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary
that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. (ST, I, q.1, a.1)
To initiate the process of turning towards God, one must first have a minimal
knowledge of its goal, namely, God and the souls union with Him. Without the
act of divine revelation, genuine conversion would be impossible.
The ultimate goal of the movement of turning towards God is union with
Him or the vision of the Divine Essence, but this goal can never be fully realized
here on earth. Thomas distinguished between two kinds of happiness: Happiness
is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God (ST, I-II, q.4, a.5). It is only when nothing remains for
humanity to desire and seek that we can be perfectly happy. This state consists of
union with God (ST, I-II, q.3, a.8). It can never be reached in the earthly life, but
the believer should nevertheless pursue it. This is typical to the Christian process
of conversion: the process of transformation is endless and its success can never be
guaranteed, but it is also the only way to seek the grace of God. Thomas explained
this in terms of the two kinds of happiness:
A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and
true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold
consideration. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a perfect and sufficient good, it excludes every evil, and fulfils every desire.
But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to
many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate
affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penal ties in the part of the
bodyLikewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For
man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods
of the present life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally
desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks
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from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true happiness in this life.

Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz., the
vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this lifeHence
it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life. (ST,
I-II, q.5, a.3)
Thomas goes on to explain that mere human beings cannot see God in His essence, while we are part of this mortal life. Here on earth, our soul has its being in
corporeal matter and is limited by this corporeal state. Therefore, we cannot know
the Divine essence, which lies far beyond the nature of material things.
Humanity can obtain imperfect happiness through the natural principles
that we possess, but perfect happiness surpasses human nature and hence humanity can obtain it by power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead (ST, I-II, q.62, a.1). Therefore, we receive from God additional principles,
the theological virtues:
Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles,
whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed
to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without
the Divine assistance. Such like principles are called theological virtues: first,
because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues
are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.
(ST, I-II, q.62, a.1)
To pursue supernatural or perfect happiness, humanity needs supernatural principles that direct the intellect and the will. To direct the intellect, we receive the
articles of faith that give us the virtue of faith; to direct the will, we receive hope
and charity. These three are the theological virtues gifted by God to humanity
so as to enable us to conform to His nature. The measure of these virtues is God
Himself, because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according
to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness (ST, I-II, q.62, a.3.; q.64, a.4). Naturally, this measure is impossible
to attain for human beings: our faith can never live up to Divine truth; our hope
cannot come close to His Omnipotence; and our charity is but a feeble reflection
of His infinite love. We are bound to fail in living up to the virtues we ought to
embody. Therefore, we should measure the theological virtues not only in terms of
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the perfection of God, but also in terms of our own progress in turning towards
God.
Fundamentally, then, Thomas described a process of turning to God, where
the soul moves from sin to justice. The process is caused by His infusion of divine
grace and directed by His gift of the theological virtues. Human reason has a role
to play, but should never be overestimated in its capacity to grasp God. In addition to divine grace, the other three moments in this process are the movement
of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin,
and the remission of sins (ST, I-II, q. 113, a.7). It is only after Divine motion has
interfered that the movement of the free will can begin. Therefore, conversion
should not be misunderstood as a process whereby the believer achieves or creates
something, but rather it makes him aware of what God realizes within him.
Peculiarly, the movement towards God is both instantaneous and gradual at
the same time. Since the Holy Spirit comes to our mind suddenly, the infusion
of grace makes conversion an instantaneous process. In this sense, the four moments are simultaneous. But qua nature, it is a gradual process where the different moments follow each other (first the infusion of grace, second the free-wills
movement towards God, then the free-wills movement towards sin en lastly the
remission of sin):
The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is naturally
first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of the moved, is second; the
end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests, is last.
Now the motion of God the Mover is the infusion of grace; the movement or
disposition of the moved is the free-wills double movement; and the term or end
of the movement is the remission of sinHence in their natural order the first in
the justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is the free-wills
movement towards God; the third is the free-wills movement towards sin, for he
who is being justified detests sin because it is against God, and thus the free-wills
movement towards God naturally precedes the free-wills movement towards sin,
since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, to which
this transmutation is ordained as to an end (ST, I-II, q.113, a.8)
In other words, the notion of conversion as a moment of radical change and that
of conversion as a gradual process of transformation are not incompatible. They
seem to reflect two aspects of the same process of turning to God.
Thomas Aquinas also reflected upon the nature of the religious life. Human existence comprises two potential states, the active and the contemplative
life. The first is the life of the senses, while in contemplation the intellect seeks
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divine truth, which is the end of our entire life. This end cannot be attained in this
earthly life, but will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to
face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation
of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely through a glass and in a
dark manner (1 Cor. xiii. 12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude,
which begins now and will be continued in the life to come... (ST, II-II, q.180,
a.4). In this life, we can maximally attain a state of rapture where we experience
brief moments of union with our future state.
Generally, Thomas considered the contemplative life superior to the active
life. Nevertheless, religious orders and the monastic life can be directed also to
the works of the active life, in ministering to our neighbors needs. Ultimately,
however, the contemplative life in which the monk seeks union with God through
contemplation is preferable. Thomas quoted Gregory to suggest that this life consists in a certain liberty of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal
things. Or in Boethius words: The soul of man must needs be more free while it
continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things.
From this, Thomas concluded that the active life serves rather than commands
the contemplative life; in Gregorys words once more, the active life is bondage,
whereas the contemplative life is freedom (ST, II-II, q.182-188).
In brief, this is the theology of turning to God, as elaborated in the major
theological work of the High Middle Ages. The process of conversio received a
theoretical explanation and justification that would play a vital role in the formation of clerics in the Roman Church for centuries to come. Less than 250 years
later, however, the monastic life, the clerical hierarchy and its scholastic theology
would also become subject to the severest conceivable criticism.
7.2. Human Sin and the Corruption of Religion

Anticlericalism took centre stage in all parts of Europe where the Protestant
Reformation penetrated during the sixteenth century. In the act of rejecting the
Roman priesthood, the slogan of the priesthood of all believers found its tangible consequence (Goertz 1993, 500-501). Here and in the following chapter,
we will develop the hypothesis that the Protestant Reformation was propelled by
the monasticization of daily life. The Reformers extended the monastic process of
conversio to all believers. They stripped it of the particular features that had limited
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spiritual conversion to the monastery or the priesthood, so that this life-process

could begin to shape the everyday existence of early modern Europeans. In brief,
they abolished the priesthood in order to make every believer into a priest, as in
the famous phrase the priesthood of all believers.
This extension of conversio to all Christian believers challenged the foundation of the Roman hierarchy of priests. The spiritual authority of the clergy
over the laity depended on the process of turning to God that caused the priests
spiritual liberty. Once all believers were expected to undergo the same process of
direct submission to Gods will, they would all share in this liberty. In that case,
there could be no special class of spiritual shepherds, who had the power and authority to guide the flock of lay believers. But if this was true, then the clergy who
had claimed this special spiritual authority must be fraudulent. The priests must
be wolves that prevented the believer from becoming a true Christian, rather than
channels of grace between God and the believer. In the remainder of this chapter,
we will examine the Reformations fundamental critique of the Roman-Catholic
church, its priesthood and its monasticism. Our main guides will be the magisterial ReformersMartin Luther, Philipp Melanchthon and John Calvin, in
particular. When appropriate we will also include material from other Reformers
such as Katharina Schtz Zell, Martin Bucer and Huldrych Zwingli.
Divine Truth vs. Human Tradition
According to tradition, the Reformation started with Luther nailing his 95 theses
to the door of the castle-church of Wittenberg in 1517. Three tumultuous years
later, Luther exclaimed the following in a letter to the Emperor Charles V: I
strove for nothing other than spreading the truth of the gospel against superstitious opinions stemming from human tradition (LW, 48:177). This one sentence
contains the crux of an entire theological edifice. The truth of the gospel is opposed to superstitious opinions; the first has its origin in God and the second in
human traditions.
To grasp the Protestant notion of the corruption of religion, we first have to
realize how the Reformers viewed the intrinsic iniquity of humanity. Central to
their message was the thesis that humanity could not accomplish its own justification and salvation, but depended completely on God, the Sovereign Creator of
the universe. As Luther had explained in many of his writings, the gospel is the
New Testament message, consisting of the promises of God to humankind. These
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promises go hand in hand with the commandments of the Old Testament. The
commandments confront human beings with their sin and helplessness with respect to salvation. The promises show Gods love and his willingness to help. God
promises each and every human being. All should have faith in these promises,
because this is the only way we can relate to God. Given that we are inherently
sinful and incapable of altering this situation, the help of God is our only hope.
Believing in the promises, therefore, is to put ones entire life in Gods hands and
trust Him unconditionally. This is how Luther put it in The Babylonian Captivity
of the Church (1520):
For God does not deal, nor has he ever dealt, with man otherwise than through a
word of promise, as I have said. We in turn cannot deal with God otherwise than
through faith in the Word of his promise. He does not desire works, nor has he
need of them; rather we deal with men and with ourselves on the basis of works.
But God has need of this: that we consider him faithful in his promises [Heb. 10:23],
and patiently persist in this belief, and thus worship him with faith, hope, and love
(LW, 36:42, italics mine).
In other words, human beings should believe in the truth of the gospel, because
this is the true worship of God. God promises us and we have faith in these promises. This is the nucleus of the relation between God and humanity. Human works
have no role to play here. They are necessary for arranging life on earth, but have
no significance in relation to God.
The only alternative to faith is to believe in the human capacity to alter our
situation. According to Luther, this involves tremendous danger, since human
traditions cause superstition whenever they go beyond the realm of human affairs.
While human opinions might regulate the interaction among humans on earth,
they should not interfere in the relation between God and humanity. Any human
tradition that does so inevitably causes superstition. This generates the binary opposition: either one spreads the truth of the gospel, or one continues superstition
stemming from human traditions.
Both elements necessarily go hand in hand: spreading truth is to defeat superstition. Doing the first, one also does the second. Such a necessary link between
spreading and defeating exists only when truth is at stake. Only when two
accounts are competitors over truth, does the spreading of one entail the defeat
of the other. In these circumstances, the rival is a false counterpart to the true account. The gospel and its promises are true and any rival account is therefore false
superstition. Superstitions are many; truth is singular and has one very specific
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origin. Truth was never spoken of in the abstract, either in Luthers work or the
writings of other Reformers. It concerned the truth of the word of God, that is,
the truth of Gods commandments and promises to humankind. To interpret this
as abstract truth would be mistaken. The promises are true, not merely in the sense
that we have good reasons to believe that they will be fulfilled in the near future,
but in the sense that their origin lies in God. Given its divine origin, this truth
stands above all human traditions.
But how could one recognize the origin of things as either divine or human?
The only standard humanity possesses is the Word of God, the Scripture that
contains His revelation of His will. If something is the Word of God, it should be
followed; if not, then it stems from human traditions. Human additions to Gods
word, where they try to mediate the spiritual, should be rejected. Consequently,
one requires an understanding of what separates the spiritual from the human
realm in order to know what belongs to the truth and what to superstition. The
spiritual is the eternal realm of God, the soul and religion (as the relation between
the soul and God); the realm of the human is the realm of earthly life, of human
corporeal existence and of the secular. The first is the sphere where faith in God
is central; the second that where human opinions are free to arrange human existence on earth.
The other giant among the magisterial Reformers, John Calvin, also viewed
the battle against superstition in terms of the distinction between the divine and
the human. In his seminal work, the Institutes of the Christian Religion (the final
versions appeared in 1559 and 1560), he identified two groups of people in the
world, the superstitious and the heretical. Though God has sown a seed of religion in all men, scarcely one man in a hundred is met with who fosters it, once
received, in his heart, and none in whom it ripensmuch less shows fruit in season. The former may evaporate in their own superstitions, while the second deliberately and wickedly desert God. And so it happens that no real piety remains
in the world (Inst., 1, IV, 1; McNeill 1960, 47). The superstitious fail to worship
God in the right way, because they adapt the worship of God to the human will.
They speculate about God and invent new modes of worship and they think zeal
for religion is sufficient: But they do not realize that true religion ought to be
conformed to Gods will as to a universal rule; that God ever remains like himself,
and is not a spectre or phantasm to be transformed according to anyones whim
(Inst., 1, IV, 3; McNeill 1960, 49). Whatever the superstitious have, it is not true
knowledge of God. The problem of heretics is different, since they revolt from
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God. They knew God once, but rebelled against Him. Instead of cherishing and
nurturing the gift of God, they pandered to human desires and tendencies.
According to Calvin, all human beings have been imprinted with a sense of
divinitythe sensus divinitatisGods gift to humanity (see also Dowey 1952,
50-56). This knowledge of God is crucial to the process of gaining insight into
the human condition. Left to themselves, humans can never understand their own
situation. They need a standard and the only legitimate standard is comparison
with God. Since He is good and trustworthy, God gives the required knowledge
of Himself to all human beings. All have this initial knowledge engraved in their
minds. This reward is free and given out of love, Calvin added, and allows us to
take the first step in seeing human helplessness.
This makes Calvins agitation understandable. While Gods gift of knowledge is but the first step in the process of turning to God, humanity responds
by corrupting the sensus divinitatis and turning away from God instead. No one
is able to hold fast to true religion, since even those who respond positively are
bound by their carnal conditions on earth. As long as one lives this carnal life, one
inevitably remains under the spell of sin. Therefore, even the children of God,
who have been regenerated by Him, are never free from sin:
Thus, then, are the children of God freed through regeneration from the bondage
to sin. Yet they do not obtain full possession of freedom so as to feel no more annoyance from their flesh, but there still remains in them a continuing occasion for
struggle whereby they may be exercised; and not only be exercised, but also better
learn their own weakness. In this matter all writers of sounder judgment agree
that there remains in a regenerate man a smoldering cinder of evil, from which
desires continually leap forth to allure and spur him to commit sin. (Inst., 3, III,
10; McNeill 1960, 602)
Luther also evoked this continuous allurement of sin: It has been shown above
that without grace there is nothing good in man, and even those who are living in
grace must struggle against sin and evil within (LW, 32:39). The degeneration of
religion results from giving into this allurement of sin and evil within.
Given that we all share the smoldering cinder of evil within ourselves, religious degeneration is found everywhere among human beings. The
only alternative to degeneration is complete regeneration; that is, achieving freedom from
sin. This is what Calvin called true godliness. However, this genuine freedom
requires freedom from the annoyances of the flesh. Because desires are intrinsic to
the flesh, no human being is able to dispose of them completely. In other words,
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the best a human being can do is to curb and constrain the desires. Consequently,
humanity is bound to corrupt religion according to its sinful desires; maximally,
we can curb this by imposing very strict standards rooted in Scripture.
The Degeneration of Religion
In the abstract, the degeneration of religion emerged from human additions to the
revealed Word of God. Inspired by the human inclination to sin, such additions
adapted the divine word and worship to human desires. More concretely, in the
eyes of the Reformers, this degeneration took the form of the system of superstition cultivated by the Roman hierarchy. Luther never minced words here. In The
Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), for example, he analysed the sacraments
of the medieval Church:
For these monstrous things we are indebted to you, O Roman See, and to your
murderous laws and ceremonies, with which you have corrupted all mankind, so
that they believe they can with works make satisfaction for sin to God, when he
can be satisfied only by the faith of a contrite heart! Not only do you keep this
faith silent with this uproar of yours, but you even oppress it, only so that your
insatiable bloodsucker may have those to whom it may say, Give, give! [Prov.
30:15] and may traffic in sins. (LW, 36:90).
Some background theology helps to interpret this passage. Luther believed that
humanity is fundamentally corrupted by sin through the legacy of Adams original
sin. The only route to salvation from sin is through the faith of a contrite heart, but
no human can render his heart contrite or acquire faith by his own powers. Man
requires Gods grace. To be open to His help, we need a deep and sincere insight
into our own helplessness and our complete and unconditional dependence on
God. This implies realizing that we are unable to contribute anything meaningful to our own salvation; human works cannot help. However, many laws and
ceremonies of the Roman Church pretended to benefit human beings in their
search for salvation. The believers followed the Roman pope and his priests and
lost themselves in these laws and ceremonies. Thus, the Roman Church misled
the mass of believers and prevented them from seeing that their belief in human
works is erroneous. Consequently, it closed off the only possible route to salvation, which lies in despair about ones own helplessness. Hence, Luther described
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the Roman See, the bishops and priests as monstrous: they murder the souls of the
believers and oppress true faith.
Without understanding this theological background, one cannot grasp Luthers critique of medieval society and the Roman Church. Some interpreters picture Luther as a freedom fighter attacking the tyrannical power and financial
abuses of the Roman Church and her priests. Indeed, he attacked these, but only
because he viewed them as expressions of the corruption of priests, who had hijacked Scripture to spread the Devils religion. Luther was not concerned about
such clerical abuses per se, but rather about the role they played in the dominance
of false religion. With their wealth and pomp, the clergy impressed and blinded
the masses. Acting as treacherous guides, they kept the souls of lay believers in
captivity. Thereby a vast tyranny came into being, the tyranny of false religion.
In his famous work The Freedom of a Christian (1520), Luther explained
some of these issues concerning the degeneration of religion by relating them to
the spiritual freedom of individual believers. Distinguishing between body and
soul, he argued that the body could never affect the righteousness of the soul:
First, let us consider the inner man to see how a righteous, free, and pious Christian, that is, a spiritual, new, and inner man, becomes what he is. It is evident that
no external thing has any influence in producing Christian righteousness or freedom, or
in producing unrighteousness or servitude. A simple argument will furnish the proof
of this statement. What can it profit the soul if the body is well, free, and active,
and eats, drinks, and does as it pleases? For in these respects even the most godless
slaves of vice may prosper. On the other hand, how will poor health or imprisonment or hunger or thirst or any other external misfortune harm the soul? Even the
most godly men, and those who are free because of clear consciences, are afflicted
with these things. None of these things touch either the freedom or the servitude of the
soul. It does not help the soul if the body is adorned with the sacred robes of priests
or dwells in sacred places or is occupied with sacred duties or prays, fasts, abstains
from certain kinds of food, or does any work that can be done by the body and in
the body. The righteousness and the freedom of the soul require something far different
since the things which have been mentioned could be done by any wicked person. Such
works produce nothing but hypocrites. On the other hand, it will not harm the soul if
the body is clothed in secular dress, dwells in unconsecrated places, eats and drinks
as others do, does not pray aloud, and neglects to do all the above-mentioned
things which hypocrites can do. (LW, 31:344; italics mine)
To argue his case, Luther built on the theological anthropology of Christianity:

the human being is not a single entity, but consists of an inner spirituality and an
external carnality. The inner is the space where righteousness, freedom and piety
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must reign. The external refers to all kinds of bodily states: being well, free, and
active; eating and drinking, praying, fasting, abstaining from food and dwelling in
sacred places. Any bodily act cannot benefit the state of the inner soul. Therefore,
the belief in the efficacy of human works is wrong; worse, this belief corrupts us
and makes us hypocrites, according to Luther.
In the Loci Communes Theologici (1521), one of the early theological handbooks of the Reformation, Philipp Melanchthon also addressed the issue of the degeneration of religion.4 He linked degeneration to the degree to which something
is Scriptural. After the time of Ambrose and Jerome, he argued, one could almost
say that the more recent an author is, the less Scriptural he is. In a word, Christian
doctrine has degenerated into Scholastic trifling, and one does not know whether
it is more godless than it is stupid (Loci 1521, 19-20). The Christian doctrine
had degenerated, because it drifted away from its source in Scripture and because
human reason interferes in this ongoing process. According to Melanchthon, the
result could be seen in the work of scholastic theologians. They had ignored the
only safeguard against degeneration: the Holy Scripture. The word of God itself
states that only the word of God is the standard for true Christian doctrine. Anything that does not meet this standard is a degeneration of true Christianity.
According to Melanchthon, not using the Scripture as the standard to
think about God and religion is not only godless, but also stupid. The stupidity
has to do with overestimating the potential of human reason. Scripture, the word
of God containing His commandments and promises, creates the conditions that
generate belief and faith in the believer. Reading them is necessary to initiate the
process of conversion, through which one is regenerated into a new spiritual being. But human abilities can intrude upon this process and, therefore, they should
be subordinated to the Scriptures. Otherwise, reason merely builds human theological and philosophical systems, unrelated to the Word of God.
While Melanchthon focused on the degeneration of Christian doctrine, he
saw the same degeneration in the Roman Church as a social institution, spiritual
entity, communion of people and body of laws and rites. This wider degeneraLuther valued Melanchthons Loci Communes Theologici very highly. For instance in his famous
Preface to the Complete Edition of Luthers Latin Writings (1545), he wrote: For a long time I strenuously resisted those who wanted my books, or more correctly my confused lucubration, published. I
did not want the labors of the ancients to be buried by my new works and the reader kept from reading them. Then, too, by Gods grace a great many systematic books now exist, among which the Loci
communes of Philip excel, with which a theologian and a bishop can be beautifully and abundantly
prepared to be mighty in preaching the doctrine of piety, especially since the Holy Bible itself can
now be had in nearly every language (LW, 34:327).
4
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tion originates in the degeneration of doctrine. Melanchthon expanded on this

by describing the Roman Catholics as the new Pelagians,5 who also relied on
mere human effort to attain righteousness: The ancient Pelagians can be refuted
with less trouble than the new Pelagians of our times. Although our contemporaries do not deny the fact of original sin, they nevertheless deny that its power is
such that all deeds of man and all human efforts are sin (ibid., 33). By describing the sixteenth-century Church in terms of this fifth-century Christian heresy,
Melanchthon intended to point out that a Christian doctrine, that of original sin,
had degenerated into heresy in the hands of the Roman priesthood, who denied
that the power of sin is such that it taints all human efforts. By deviating from
the pure word of God, Catholics had turned into heretics holding false human
beliefs.
How could this Protestant depiction of the Roman Catholic Church have
the enormous impact it had, from the sixteenth century onwards? To give a partial
answer to these questions, we need to understand the foundations of this image of
religious degeneration and corruption. In the first place, these notions of corruption and degeneration did not refer to priests accumulating riches or eating their
bellies full. Rather, the corruption is that of the true word of God and Christian
doctrine, while the degeneration is caused by the conviction that human efforts or
good works could ever help in the search for salvation. These theological notions
are the key to understanding the main concerns of the Protestant Reformation.
7.3. The Evil Hierarchy of Popes, Priests and Monks

Beware of the Antichrist, the pope! (LW, 32:41). Luther would become legendary for his stinging attacks on the medieval hierarchy, replete with expletives. Not
only had the popes, bishops and priests neglected their primary task of serving
God and spreading His Word, Luther cried out, they had also sustained false belief, idolatry and heathendom. In short, they were the servants of Satan, the false
god, who wished to overturn the religion of God and the order of the world. Luther called the clergy so-called spiritual leaders (LW, 32:272), or the unlearned
mobthe pope with his cardinals, bishops, priests, and monks (LW, 39:219) and,
Pelagianism was a fifth-century heresy, most famous for its denial of original sin. It considered
Adam a bad human exemplar, but rejected that his mistake had stained human nature. According
to the Pelagians, human beings still had full control over and responsibility for their own sin and
for their own salvation. Even without divine aid, the moral will was considered capable of choosing
between good or evil.
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referring to the trials of the Jews under Pharaoh, claimed that their wickedness had blinded them and hardened them like Pharaohs (LW, 32:275). He even
spoke of the whorelike church of the pope (LW, 41:207).
The Roman-Catholic ceremonies and the role of priests were of great concern to all Protestant Reformers. The Reformers challenged the idea that human works and precepts had the power to guide the believer to God. The Roman
Church, its pope, bishops and priestsso they claimedencouraged ceremonies,
pilgrimages, sacraments, indulgences and good works in order to create the illusion that human actions could intervene in the spiritual realm of God. The priesthood obfuscated true religion and misguided the believers by instructing them to
look for God, Christ and salvation in all the wrong places.
The Devils Church
In the early years of the Reformation, the papacy still sent out theologians to reprimand Luther and try to persuade him to return to the fold of orthodoxy. However, the attempts of theologians like Hieronymus Emser and Johann Eck had
adverse effects. The more they tried, the more radical became Luthers opposition
to the papacy. For instance, he acknowledged his gratitude for their instructions
concerning the primacy of the pope as follows:
For while I denied the divine authority of the papacy, I still admitted its human authority. But after hearing and reading the super-subtle subtleties of these
coxcombs, with which they so adroitly prop up their idol (for my mind is not
altogether unteachable in these matters), I now know for certain that the papacy
is the kingdom of Babylon and the power of Nimrod, the mighty hunter [Gen.
10:89]. Once more, therefore, that all may turn out to my friends advantage, I
beg both the booksellers and my readers that after burning what I have published
on this subject they hold to this proposition: The Papacy Is the Grand Hunting of
the Bishop of Rome. (LW, 36:12)
Nimrod was the king who had united humanity, but whose hubris had inspired
him to act against God by trying to build a tower that would reach the heavens.
Luther equated the papacy to this builder of the Tower of Babel and rejected its
arrogation of human and divine authority.
He condemned the Roman Church as the church of the devil, because it had
abandoned the practices, doctrines and faith of the ancient church. It had failed to
remain faithful to the ancient primitive church, which incorporated true faith and
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doctrine. Additionally, the Church had not remained faithful to her bridegroom,
Jesus Christ. Drawing on the old biblical analogy between idolatry and adultery
(Halbertal and Margalit 1992), Luther said that the church and the papacy had
become the arch-whore of the devil, because they have abandoned the ancient
church and its ancient bridegroom and have not only become apostate and heretical..., but Antichrist and antigod, indeed, the last and most shameless bride of the
devil, setting herself up even above God (LW, 41: 205). The medieval Church
had placed itself above God in that it claimed spiritual authority, which belonged
only to Him.
In a later work, Against Hanswurst (1541), Luther argued for the continuity between his own teachings and those of the ancient Church. Additionally,
he also showed the perverse nature of Roman-Catholic teachings that lay at the
foundation of the Churchs false religion. He considered the theological notion of
satisfaction as the source of the degeneration of the papacy:
And this matter of satisfactio, satisfaction, is the source and origin, the door and
entrance, to all the abominations of the papacy, just as in the church baptism is the
source and entrance to all grace and forgiveness of sins. For where there is no baptism, the sacraments, the keys, and everything else are of no avail. Had the notion of
satisfaction not arisen, then indulgences, pilgrimages, brotherhoods, masses, purgatory,
monasteries, convents, and most abominations would not have been invented, and the
papacy would not have grown so rich and fat. Therefore they have called it baptism
in their church, because it has effected many baptisms, the sacrament and forgiveness of sins, and indeed even great holiness! This is nothing but self-righteousness,
a holiness based on works, about which we have written a great deal. Who has commanded you to do this? Or where is it written? Where do you find in the ancient church
that you may invent such a new baptism and holiness? Who then is a heretic, apostate,
and a new church? (LW, 41:199; italics mine)
The theology of satisfaction gave rise to a notion of holiness based on works,

which Luther condemned as the worst kind of self-righteousness. It was a false
righteousness based on human works, while genuine righteousness can only be
the gift from God.
When compared to the ancient church, so the Reformers said, most teachings and ceremonies of the Roman papacy were human additions. Therefore, they
were unnecessary and even harmful innovations, like purgatory, relics, consecration of churches, swarms of decrees and decrials, and many more countless books
full of vain, new inventions, of which neither the ancient church nor the apostles
knew anything (LW, 41:205). Luthers main problem with these Menschensatzun-
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gen lay not in the fact that they were innovations, but in the fact that they were
presented as necessary for obtaining grace and salvation. Since these teachings
and practices were not required by the word of God, they could not be necessary,
because they had no foundation in scriptural authority. The only result of performing them was that Rome acquired more riches and that the believers became
more corrupt. Therefore, the Roman Church was a whore; she gratified the desires
of the Devil, in return for material wealth:
If such innovations in the papacy were or could be simply novelties, they could to
some extent be borne for the sake of peace, just as one bears or puts up with a new
coat. But now this devilish poison and hellish murder is glued to itit is the command
of the church, the holy worship of God, the good and spiritual life, for which one deserves
grace and life (if one obeys) or wrath and death (if one doesnt). That is to make truth
out of falsehood, God out of the devil, heaven out of hell, and vice versa. For this
reason the popes church is full and swarming with falsehood, devils, idolatry, hell,
murder, and every kind of calamity. (LW, 41:205; italics mine)
Calvin went even further than Luther in rejecting the external splendour and
ceremonies of the Church. According to the later Lutheran theology, one could
still argue that such external elements are indifferent to religion and salvation and
only become harmful when they are imposed as a part of religion. However, they
should be tolerated, as long as they were correctly viewed as things indifferent
to salvation.6 According to Calvin, all of the Roman ceremonies only resulted in
illusion, hypocrisy and blindness. They diverted the attention of the lay believers
away from true religion; they created and sustained the illusion that the believers are
working towards salvation; and they blinded believers to their true state of deception and spiritual decline. As Calvin put it, whenever there is great ostentation in
ceremonies, sincerity of heart is rare indeed (Inst., 1, II, 2; McNeill 1960, 43).
How could these ceremonies acquire the power to oppress true faith? Part of
the reason, the Reformers said, lay in the fact that the popes and priests knew that
the ceremonies guided the flock away from God, but nevertheless encouraged
these. They did so to gain power and wealth and to promote the decline of true
faith. This was the ultimate hypocrisy: while pretending to work towards improving the soul of men, they harmed the growth of true faith and spread false religion.
Reformers often spoke of the work of the devil in this respect and described the
pope as the Antichrist, the priests as the servants of the devil, the theological universities as the synagogues of Satan and the Church as the whore of Babylon.
6
Eire elaborates on the difference between Lutherans and Calvinists on this point, see Eire 1986.
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Spiritual Authority and Christian Liberty

The Reformation was not simply concerned about the fact that gold, pearls and
other pomp abounded in the Roman ceremonies and rituals. The problems they
experienced were related to the mixing up of the spiritual and temporal spheres
and pertained primarily to the question of spiritual authority and Christian liberty.7 Christians were not being instructed to look in the right place for their spiritual health, this is what is behind the debates on rituals and ceremonies. Melanchthon addressed the problem of the Roman hierarchy and its laws, decrees and
councils from this perspective. As Scripture was the sole true spiritual authority,
he asked, where did the pope and his priests think they acquired the authority to
make spiritual laws? The conscience and the soul could never be bound by human
traditions:
How do traditions of men bind consciences? Do they sin who violate the decrees of men?
I answer that papal laws must be endured as we endure any injustice or tyranny,
in accordance with Matt. 5:41: If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him
two miles. They are to be endured, however, only insofar as conscience is not
endangered by them. Acts 5:29 says: We must obey God rather than men. When
traditions hinder faith, and when they are an occasion for sin, they must be violated. He
who violates them without offending his spiritual judgment does not sin[Y]ou
have unequivocal passages of Scripture which teach that consciences are not to be
bound by human traditions. (Loci 1521, 67-68; italics mine)
See Edward Muirs Ritual in Early Modern Europe (1997) on the centrality of the question of
authority in the early modern rejection of ritual and idolatry. He argues convincingly that an altered
understanding of authority implied that ritual changed from a performative action into something
that needs to have meaning and needs to be treated hermeneutically (in the sense of distilling the
meaning out of it). What do rites do?, he argues, was the deceptively simple question on which
the Reformation debate on rites and ceremonies hinged (Muir 1997, 7). In our own analysis of
the reformers critiques on ceremonies and rites we brought to the fore the underlying dimension
of authority and the freedom of the believers. Muirs work allows us to go one step further: this
brought in its wake not simply a heavy attack on ceremonies and rituals but also a transformation
of what rituals and ceremonies are and how they can be seen and experienced by human beings.
Muirs analysis is crucial as it helps to capture in what way the Protestant Reformation is not only a
social and political movement, but is also driven by a religious dynamic. He does this by elaborating
on this crucial transformation in the Christian ritual system. He explains how this transformation
closed off a certain experiential world and replaced it by another. This crisis of the performative
sign resulted in the very negative connotation the term ceremony adopted in the 16th century
(Muir 1997, 167). Finitum non est capax infiniti (the finite cannot contain the infinite), captures
the position of the Reformers. This, led them to eliminate or dilute the cult of the saints, to abhor
or destroy religious images, and to revise or drop sacramental rituals. In doing so they created a new
theological metaphysics by drawing precise boundaries between the spiritual and material worlds,
breaking the deeply mysterious connections between the two made evident in traditional rituals
(Muir 1997, 181).
7
233
Along with other Reformers, Melanchthon raised the question concerning the
relation between the realm of the human and that of religion. Human traditions
concern what human beings do in this life on earth and how they deal with their
fellow human beings. Conscience, on the other hand, is how God works in the inner man. It belongs to the spiritual or religious domain, that is to say, the domain
where only God can interfere.
External human things, so Melanchthon claimed, could neither help nor
harm the spiritual and the conscience. Therefore, the papal laws and decrees,
which are nothing but human laws, can be endured as long as their impact and
scope is limited to the human sphere. However, when the boundary between the
two spheres is violated, serious problems emerge, because human traditions will
then hinder faith and cause sin. In those cases, the human laws should be violated
rather than endured. The conscience is safe if one obeys God in spiritual matters
and endangered if one obeys human authorities here. The human laws and traditions of the Roman Church misguide the conscience by informing it according
to false religion. Therefore, conscience cannot judge ones deeds anymore and has
one think that one is working towards salvation, while one is on the path to perdition. This was the most troubling aspect of the corruption of the Roman Church.
The popish laws were tyrannical and unjust, Melanchthon said, not merely
because Rome had gained more wealth and power, but because it spread false religion. Its tyranny and injustice made human beings blind to their sinful state: But
those whose freedom of conscience has been snatched away by traditions become
slaves of men. For as Christian freedom is freedom of conscience, so Christian
slavery is the enslavement of conscience (ibid., 68). Christian freedom entailed
defying conventions and laws of men, whenever these pretended to take the place
of the word of God. Like Luther, Melanchthon pointed out the pernicious role
of the notion of satisfactions here. He located their birthplace in the Council of
Nicaea, where certain kinds of penances had been established:
They were perhaps tolerable at first when the understanding of the gospel within
the Church was still rather pure. But a little later, what a torture of consciences
did those satisfactions become! Grace was obscured. What the gospel attributes
to faith began to be attributed to satisfactions, and what is more godless or pernicious? And the Council of Nicaea certainly gave occasion for these evils...Moreover, the so-called theologians of our times, following the ancient tradition of the
Council of Nicaea, have made satisfactions a part of penance. Obviously, there is
no other error more harmful than this one. (ibid., 69)
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Souls can be destroyed; the conscience can be troubled and tortured too. Consciences following human laws suffer endless oppression; while the conscience
guided by God becomes free.
Lutheran confessions of faith reproduced these conclusions about the ceremonies and laws of the Roman Church. Late in the spring of 1530, seven princes
of the Holy Roman Empire and the representatives of two imperial cities confessed their faith before the emperor Charles V. The written form of this confession of faith, the Augsburg Confession (1530), had been edited by Melanchthon
and became one of the central documents of the Lutheran Reformation. The text
argued that one should not fret over ceremonies and traditions, as long as they
did not burden the consciences of believers. It added one proviso: as long as the
believers do not think that performing ceremonies or following traditions pleases
or displeases God. Only the word of God could impact the conscience:
Our side also retains many ceremonies and traditions, such as the order of the
Mass and singing, festivals, and the like, which serve to preserve order in the
church. At the same time, however, the people are taught that such external worship of
God does not make them righteous before God and that it is to be observed without burdening consciences, that is, no one sins by omitting it without causing offence. The
ancient Fathers also maintained such liberty with respect to external ceremonies.
(CA, XXVI, 40-43; Kolb and Wengert 2000, 80-81; italics mine)
The Apology of the Augsburg Confession repeated that human traditions could be
useful to keep order in the Church, but had no more value. In the article on Human Traditions in the Church we read that:
The holy Fathers did not institute a single tradition for the for the purpose of
meriting the forgiveness of sins or righteousness; they instituted them for the
sake of good order in the church and for the sake of tranquillity. Now if someone
wants to institute certain works for the purpose of meriting the forgiveness of sins
or righteousness, how will that person know that these works please God without
the testimony of Gods Word? How will they make others certain about Gods
will without Gods command and Word? Does not God throughout the prophets
prohibit people from instituting peculiar rites of worship without his command?
(Ap., XV, 13-14; Kolb and Wengert 2000, 224)
The main point here was that humans cannot know whether some ceremony or
ritual pleases God, unless it is stated so in Scripture. What is not found in the
Word of God is human fabrication and may or may not please God. Therefore, it
is indifferent if one follows these traditions or not. The minute one believed such
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indifferent matters involved spiritual merit, however, one set up the kingdom of
Antichrist. As the Apology continued:
If our opponents defend these human acts of worship as meriting justification,
grace, and the forgiveness of sins, they are simply establishing the kingdom of
the Antichrist. For the kingdom of the Antichrist is a new kind of worship of
God, devised by human authority in opposition to Christ, just as the kingdom of
Mohammed has religious rites and works, through which it seeks to be justified
before God. It does not hold that people are freely justified by faith on account of
Christ. So also the papacy will be a part of the kingdom of Antichrist if it defends human rites as justifying. For they deprive Christ of his honor when they teach that we are
not freely justified freely on account of Christ through faith but through such rites, and
especially when they teach that such rites are not only useful for justification but even
necessary. (Ap., XV, 13-14; Kolb and Wengert 2000, 225; italics mine)
Fundamentally, there are two kinds of authorities that coexist as long as each remains within its assigned field: human and divine authority. The medieval church
had violated the boundary between these two authorities, the Reformers argued:
the priesthood had allowed human authority to intrude on matters where only
Gods authority counts. On the basis of human authority, the Church urged the
believers to follow human rites and had them believe that these led to justification, grace and forgiveness of sins. From the Reformers perspective, this was diametrically opposed to the free grace of Christ of which Scripture speaks. This free
grace can be administered only by the sovereign God; no human being has any
influence or authority here.
Clergy and Laity
In the popular view, one often locates the source of clerical corruption in the period preceding the Reformation in the unbridled lust for power or wealth. Historical accounts abound about corrupt popes possessing vast material wealth, reserving important positions for friends and family members and maintaining many
mistresses. While Luther also condemned such practices, to him the fundamental
source of the corruption of the clergy lay not in these material matters, but instead
in its sinful disregard for the word of God, preaching its own teachings instead:
We have demonstrated sufficiently from the Scriptures that everything which is
not the word of Christ is a lie of the devilIs that not clear enough, that truth
has to be spoken by God alone, and that whoever speaks out of or according to his
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own nature is lying and deceiving? The pope with all his adherents says everything
on his own authority, without that of the Scriptures. Therefore, as his priestly office is, so is also his sacrifice. His priests, his laws, his works are nothing but vain
lies of the devil. Let any Christian person, therefore, look upon the innumerable
throng of monks and priests, with their masses, offerings, laws, doctrines and all
their works, and he will see nothing but the devils own folk and servantsan
unbelieving people of perdition, for whom the wrath of God is reserved eternally
[II Pet. 3:7]. (LW, 36:153)
Luthers prime worry was not so much about the priests going astray, but about
their success in dragging the flock of believers into eternal damnation. The priests
kept faitha free gift of God to humankindin captivity and created a devilish
tyranny to rule the laity.
The clergy claimed to constitute a special class of spirituales. By leading strict
ascetic lives, they believed they acquired spiritual authority over the laity and became the spiritual estate elevated above the temporal estate of lay believers. Luther
eliminated this division between two classes of believers in this world. In Against
the Spiritual Estate (1522), he argued that the majority of priests, monks, and
nuns...want to do penance and to be saved through the strict life, and thus they
attribute to works and to the spiritual estate what belongs to Christ and to faith
alone (LW, 39:287). This, Luther said, was equal to the Jewish belief that following the old law would bring one closer to God; it was to believe in human works
and laws. Among people on earth, no spiritual divisions can be made; therefore
both an active life and a life of contemplation offer equal chances to come closer
to God. The last is not dependent on the life one is leading, but on the workings
of God in the inner man.
The priests had become servants of the devil, because, as Luther put it in
The Misuse of the Mass (1521), the true mass and the true priesthood have fallen
and have been completely eradicated, so that instead of faith they have preached
outward works, which even a sinner and rogue can do. True priesthood was to
bear the cross as being affliction, agony, pain and all that vexes us, but this had
been extinguished and in its stead an idol of human law and human doctrine is
set up (LW, 36:161). This human law and doctrine only generated idleness in the
hearts of believers, who now preferred peace and calm to the suffering of the real
Christian going through the lifelong process of conversion.
Popes and priests had invented their own religion and developed their own
rules and standards, instead of Scripture. Thus, they had extinguished the spirit of
Christian freedom and aroused fear in humanity:
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In the first place, let us pay no heed to the irreligious religion which those foolish
people have invented and persuaded the whole world to believe, namely, that the words
of consecration have been kept secret and their use and knowledge entrusted to no
one but the priests, and to them only after they have celebrated mass. These words,
after all, should fittingly have been common knowledge to all people, because the
faith, consolation and salvation of all people is contained in them...Not that I
should find it pleasing for the form of the sacrament to be changed by the whim
of any human being, but such wickedness and daring hurts me: that these rogues
dare to make necessary articles of faith out of things which are not commanded,
and by their own devices make sins out of things in which there can be no danger
or sin. They terrify and corrupt those who have weak consciences, so that they extinguish
the spirit of Christian freedom and arouse in us the craven spirit of fear [Rom. 8:15].
(LW, 36:164; italics mine)
The boundary between the true believer and the heretic was at stake here. The
Roman hierarchy distinguished between these two in terms of the orthodoxy of
its laws and regulations: adherence differentiates the true believer from the heretic. The Protestant Reformers contended that these standards were illicit human
additions to Scripture. Of course, this led to a fundamental query: Who then is
a true Christian? In raising this question, the Reformers were also providing the
guidelines to answer it.
The most important underlying question was that of religious authority:
Who had the authority to speak in the name of God? In the Roman Church, authority over the spiritual realm was transmitted by Christ to the apostolic Church,
its pope, bishops and priests. Therefore, individual believers should turn to them
and follow their instructions in order to obey the will of God and gain access to
the spiritual realm. The priests were the intermediaries between the laity and God;
the laity needed the clergy.
The Reformers opposed this understanding of spiritual authority. Only God
has authority in His spiritual realm, only He can interfere there, and only He can
provide access to this realm. Therefore, in matters of spirituality and religion, the
believers should be left free as much as possible in order to follow the authority of
God as well as possible. No human being can claim to know when God is speaking to a believer and when He is not; therefore, each believer is free to respond
to the voice of God. Consequently, the holy sacraments that Rome prescribed to
the masses were nothing but corruptions of the divine message. In The Babylonian
Captivity of the Church (1520), Luther analysed all seven sacraments, but mainly
the mass and baptism. Only the latter two should be retained, but only after reconsidering their significance (LW, 36:42).
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Since neither the sacramental hierarchy nor the spiritual estate had any
scriptural foundation, the Christian community had to be an undivided community of sinful human beings with equal access to God. In the Confession Concerning Christs Supper (1528), Luther explained the nature of this single community
of Christian believers and the role of the priests:
I believe that there is one holy Christian Church on earth, i.e. the community or number or assembly of all Christians in all the world, the one bride of Christ, and his spiritual body of which he is the only head. The bishops or priests are not her heads or
lords or bridegrooms, but servants, friends, andas the word bishop implies
superintendents, guardians, or stewards. This Christian Church exists not only
in the realm of the Roman Church or pope, but in all the world, as the prophets
foretold that the gospel of Christ would spread throughout the world, Psalm 2[:8],
Psalm 19[:4]. Thus this Christian Church is physically dispersed among pope,
Turks, Persians, Tartars, but spiritually gathered in one gospel and faith, under one
head, i.e. Jesus Christ In this Christian Church, wherever it exists, is to be found
the forgiveness of sins, i.e. a kingdom of grace and of true pardon. For in it are found the
gospel, baptism, and the sacrament of the altar, in which the forgiveness of sins is offered,
obtained, and received. Moreover, Christ and his Spirit and God are there. Outside
this Christian Church there is no salvation or forgiveness of sins, but everlasting
death and damnation; even though there may be a magnificent appearance of holiness and many good works, it is all in vain. (LW, 37:367-368; italics mine)
The priests tasks are no different from the tasks of other members of the Christian
community: In the sacrament of penance and in the remission of guilt, pope and
bishop do no more than the humblest priest. Indeed, if a priest is not available,
any Christian could do just as much, even a woman or a child (LW, 32:51). This
issue of the role of the priests was also taken up by reformer Katharina Schtz
Zell. She was an outspoken reformer of the first half of the sixteenth century in
Strasbourg, who participated actively in the formation of early Protestant thought
(see McKee 2006). She accuses the priests in their negligence of taking up their
roles as teachers. Like Calvin, Zell stressed the necessity of acquiring knowledge
of God as an important part of the process of conversion. All human beings are
expected to (and considered to be able to) listen and learn. As faith and salvation
come through the knowledge of Gods grace in Scripture, everyone ought to study
this (McKee 2006, 183). This, however, does not imply that, if one studies, one
automatically deserves the gift of grace.
Zell pointed out that there are different gifts, both for learning and teaching. In other words, not all human beings will receive the same gifts; some may be
239
more qualified to teach than others. Zell attributed great significance to the inward call or vocation as a qualification for public ministry, but other signs such as
knowledge of the Bible are also pivotal. When she discussed these matters in her
letter To Sir Caspar Schwenckfeld (1553), she elaborated on the notion of priesthood of all believers. The believers here play an important role in the recognition
of their teachers. Though the community should obey and listen to them, each
believer should at the same time remain critical and maintain her own judgement
on the basis of her knowledge of the Bible (ibid., 184).
In the same letter, Katharina Schtz Zell responded to some rumours her
opponents had spread about her. One such was that her pride had made her unwilling to learn from other teachers. To counter this attack, she referred to her
own process of conversion in which she sought the help of so many clergy and
God-fearing people to experience the way to heaven (McKee, 207). The result of
this was a distress in her conscience, which Luther and his teachings had helped
to solve.
Human beings cannot know which souls are closer to God and which are
not. Only God has authority over the spiritual domain, thus only he can judge
the progress of the soul. This also has implications for the lawful administration
of the sacraments. As priests are spiritually not closer to God than lay believers,
there is no reason to think they are better suited to administer sacraments. All
the more reason not to divide Christianity on the basis of the administration of
sacraments:
Therefore all Christians should be on guard against this antichristian poison of the
pope. If all baptisms and all masses are equally valid, wherever and by whomever
they are administered, then the absolution also is equally valid wherever and by
whomever it is pronounced. Everything depends on the faith of him who receives
it, not on the holiness, learning, rank or power of him who administers it. We cannot divide baptism and give the pope and the bishops a part of it which is different from
that which all Christians have. Neither can we divide the mass and the keys in order
that the pope may have a mass and a sacrament of the keys different from those which all
of Christendom has. But if he has a different sacrament, or a better sacrament, then
St. Paul excludes him from Christendom, for he says in Eph. 4[:5], One Lord,
one faith, one baptism. (LW, 32:51; italics mine)
The foundation of this critique of the clergy was the fundamental conviction that
human works and efforts cannot contribute to salvation and should therefore never be misrepresented as efficacious.
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Roman-Catholic theologians responded to this message by saying that it

gave complete license to any misdemeanour among human beings. The idea became popular that the Protestant Reformers had prohibited good works or considered them altogether impossible (Scribner 1981). The early Reformers then
defended themselves against such allegations. The Augsburg Confession stated that:
Our churches are falsely accused of forbidding good works (CA, XX, 1-2; Kolb
and Wengert 2000, 52). In fact, good deeds were required (see CA, XX, 1-39; Kolb
and Wengert 2000, 52-57):
it is taught that good works should and must be done, not that a person relies
on them to earn grace, but for Gods sake and to Gods praise. Faith alone always takes hold of grace and forgiveness of sin. Because the Holy Spirit is given
through faith, the heart is also moved to do good works. For before, because it
lacks the Holy Spirit, the heart is too weakThat is why this teaching concerning
faith is not to be censured for prohibiting good works. On the contrary, it should
be praised for teaching the performance of good works and for offering help as
to how they may be done. For without faith and without Christ human nature
and human power are much too weak to do good worksSuch lofty and genuine
works cannot be done without the help of Christ (CA, XX, 27-39; Kolb and
Wengert 2000, 56)
However, the Confessio added, the Roman church had emphasized childish and
unnecessary works such as rosaries, the cult of the saints, joining religious orders, pilgrimages, appointed fasts, holy days, brotherhoods (CA, XX, 3; Kolb and
Wengert 2000, 54).
Human works become problematic the moment they claim spiritual implications or effects. Only those works effectively sprouting from God and true faith
can be good. In that sense, good works do not have spiritual implications, but
rather result from the spiritual progress of the people performing them. All other
works, not sprouting from the workings of God in the human spirit, are vain attempts to warrant spiritual benefits. The Protestant Reformers did not oppose the
performance of good works; instead the ability to do good works demonstrated
to them the power of faith. Good works are faiths fruits or testimony, but acts like
fasting, meditation, charity and innumerable other good deeds could not add
anything to faith and spiritual progress. Only the infusion of Gods grace can
make a difference. Interestingly, this established a deep connection between action
and faith: ones acts became testimonies of ones faith.
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Human Teachings as Idolatry

All idolatry is nothing but human teaching, Luther wrote, and the bishops,
priests, monks, universities, princes, and all authorities that followed the pope,
where participants in the idolatry of Antichrist. What had betrayed the pope was
his disregard for the word of God and his contentment to preach his own teaching: His singing betrays the kind of bird he is. Just as John envisaged in Revelation 13[:11] an animal with two horns, looking like a lamb yet speaking like a
dragon, so too the crowd of papists has to be viewed; they appear to be Christians
yet preach like the devil (LW, 39:194). This notion of idolatry among Christians
would become vital to the Reformation.
The concept of idolatry, much like those of corruption and degeneration, was
not new to Christian theology. For fifteen centuries, Christians had made the distinction between idolatry and true worship. Early Christians described many Roman practices as idolatry and their followers as idolaters. Similarly, in the course
of the next centuries, European Christians viewed many alien groups as idolaters
or devil worshipers. Luther did not speak of idolatry only in this way, but mainly
referred to the idolatry present among Christians. In his War Against the Idols
(1986), Carlos Eire masterly explores how the early sixteenth-century Reformation began to attack medieval piety as idolatry or false religion.
In a well-chosen image, Eire evokes the shift in the notion of idolatry:
[A]t just about the same time that the soldiers of Charles V replaced the horrible
idols of the Aztecs with beautiful crosses and images of Mary and the saints
in the New World, Protestant iconoclasts were wreaking havoc on these Catholic objects in lands nominally ruled by him in Europe. The grisly cult of human
sacrifices led by bloodstained priests inside the Wall of Snakes in Tenochtitln
inspired the same kind of reaction among the Conquistadores as the celebration
of the Mass in the richly decorated cathedral of Basel did among Protestants.
(Eire 1986, 5-6)
This shift would prove crucial to the history of Christian Europe. In his Enchiridion Militis Christiani (1503), Erasmus had already expressed his disgust towards
the cult of the saints and that of relics, because these looked to the material world
for matters that were in reality exclusively spiritual. However, though improper,
he also regarded the material piety of the medieval church as a matter indifferent
to religion.8
8
Erasmus attacked medieval piety as superstition which was for him the ...misplaced faith in the
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The argument against idolatry among Christians was typical to the Reformation and would acquire its fullest expression in Calvins theology. Early Reformer Zwingli regarded the central issue as that of separating human customs
from divine ordinances (Eire 1986, 54). Consequently, Eire argues that the issue
of iconoclasm played an important role in the process of religious change in many
communities.9
The young Luther also rejected all image worship, but later inclined towards
viewing the medieval rites and ceremonies as matters indifferent to religion.
However, Lutherans always opposed the imposition of such rites as necessary to religion,
because this amounted to idolatry. In contrast, the Reformed theology inspired by
Zwingli and Calvin rejected as idolatry all rites and ceremonies of the RomanCatholic Church. From the early phases of the Reformation, this difference had
been central. Eire recounts the conversion account of one of the early French
Reformers, Guillaume Farel, who would influence Calvin:
The focus of his conversion is the problem of idolatry: For him, Catholic worship
is evil, sinful and dangerous. It is not merely corrupt piety, it is false religion, and
as such can bring damnation. Farels conversion, unlike Luthers, is not centered
on the problem of faith and justification. His focus is false worship and the satanic
influence behind it. Farel speaks of his Catholic days as a period when he was under the power of the devil; views his devotion to the cross, pilgrimages, and images
as diabolical things and says he was immersed in them without limit as in the
depths of iniquity, idolatry and perdition. He looked back on his love of the Mass
external forms of religion (Eire 1986, 37). Especially the cult of the saints, so Eire argues, was considered an ocean of superstition, the main objection being that this kind of worship distracted the
people from the true worship of God. The cult of the relics too meets Erasmus disgust. Together
with the focus on Christ as the true example to follow, the stress on inward spirituality, and the focus
on the Scriptures as the most faithful picture of God, Erasmus ideas seems to be in harmony with
many of the Reformers critiques (see Eire 1986, 36-53). Not surprisingly many Catholics and also
many Protestants saw similarities between Erasmus and the Protestants. However, according to Eire
it is not possible to trace the Protestant attack on Catholic worship directly to Erasmus (Eire 1986,
52. Eire also shows how Karlstadt, though being influence by Erasmus, evolves towards a position
clearly apart from that of the last, see Eire 1986, 56). Though Erasmus saw much of the medieval
piety as misdirected and superstitious, he did not see it as evil. There is, therefore, one crucial factor
to add our depiction of Erasmus criticism: Erasmus critique is based on a vision in which the material piety of the medieval church is considered to be an indifferent thing: [r]eligious materialism
corrupted true piety, but it was not a sinful evil (Eire 1986, 57). This indifference towards external
piety distinguished him from much of the Protestants and Catholics.
9
He argues this point and illustrates its relevance by studying the situation in 16th century Switzerland; see Eire 1986, 105-165. In a next chapter he analyses the situation of France, related to Calvins
activities (Eire 1986, 166-194), pointing out that this centralized state (with a monarch against
religious change) was less susceptible for the city reforms characteristic of Switzerland.
243
as particularly heinous, especially because of his devotion to the consecrated host,

which he now called, with spiritualistic disdain, that magic morsel and that god
of batter. (Eire 1986, 188)
This abhorrence towards Roman idolatry received its most eloquent translation in Calvins theology. There, the issue of idolatry was intimately related to the
absolute transcendence and sovereignty of God. The rites and ceremonies of the
Church were idolatry, because they constituted the improper mixing of spiritual
and material in worship and reflected mans attempt to domesticate God and
to rob him of his glory. As Eire recapitulates Calvins view: Idolatry is thus the
most sinister parody of mans relationship with God and the boldest affront on
the divine majesty (ibid., 216). This identification of all image worship as idolatry
caused the outbursts of iconoclasm in countries that had embraced the Reformed
tradition.
However, idolatry no longer referred exclusively to the worship of idols or
images. Any worship that relied upon human laws and works in order to obey
God and pursue salvation was equivalent to idolatry. Thus Melanchthon said that
those men doing good works to pursue salvation fashion idols for themselves
from the law, images of men, and semblances of the carnal virtues. For they are
drawn to simulate good works by some carnal passion, either by fear of punishment or by desire for the convenient; since they do not see the sickness of their
soul, they are secure in their stupidity (Loci 1521, 78).
In the centuries that followed, many practices common to medieval society would be denounced as idolatry. Reformed churches across Europe rejected a
variety of practices in terms of idolatry and superstition: divination, herbal medicine, dancing, carnival, playing music or cards, holding banquets and folk customs
related to funerals or the cycles of nature (Graham 1996; Mentzer 1996). The
Lutheran estates also shared this fixation on idolatry. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the new genre of Teufelbuch or devil books disapproved of a range
of attitudes and emotions as indirect worship of the devil: Thus we have books on
the fashion, gaming, dancing, drinking, marriage, whoring, and curse devils; and,
in addition, the diverse theological satans, among them the sabbath, pride, magicians, learning, sacramental, holy, and christian-dogmatic devils (Nischan 1999b,
4; see also Kolb 1982).
Not only do the Protestants describe the medieval church and the piety of
the people as false religion and idolatry, also it becomes crucialfor the survival
of the true religionto distinguish those practices (rites, ceremonies, works, laws,
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vows) which have a human origin from the practices in harmony with the law
of Godknown by the Scriptures. But, as Luthers indifference indicates, this
is not the core focus of the needed reform. The core is the formation of a new
kind of Christians, true Christians. As always, the foundation that allowed one to
distinguish between correct worship and the idolatry emerging from human additions to true religion was the standard of Scripture. Therefore, not only did the
Protestant Reformers describe the medieval church and popular piety as idolatry,
they also considered it crucial to distinguish all false spiritual practices of human
origin from true spiritual worship, which was in harmony with the law of God as
revealed in the Scripture. When Eire stresses the enormous transforming power
of the war against the idols, he points out a crucial dynamic of the Reformation.
This was not just one among many theological quarrels, but propagated a new
form of worship that went hand in hand with a new vision of Christian society.
Monasticism and the Christian Community
Next to the rebuking of popes and priests, diatribes against
monks and monasticism were also central to the Protestant Reformation. To get a feel of how the
early Reformers looked at monks, some passages from Luthers Table Talk are very
telling. For instance, in a conversation recorded by Anthony Lauterbach between
January 12 and 15, 1539, Luther considered a fable about the origin of monasticism:
There was mention of the suspicious origin of monasticism and of the monks.
It was said that it is manifest that the devil is the author of the monks; when he
wished to imitate God, the author of the priests, he made the mold too large,
and it turned out to be a monk. Thats an appropriate fable [said Luther], for
a monk is useful neither for the church, nor for the state, nor for domestic life.
Accordingly the devil has to make monks, who obscure the works of God. In the
church theyre of no use, civil government they defame, and of marriage they think
and teach callously. If the institution of marriage had stood firm, monasticism
wouldnt have amounted to anything. Thus Satan obscured the glorious ordinance
of God (namely, marriage) with the glittering phantom of the monks. If there had
been God-fearing and pure teaching about marriage in the church, the monks and
nuns wouldnt have counted for so much. (LW, 54:328)
A thorn in the flesh of many a Reformer, monasticism was described as the devils
fabrication. Given the fact that monasticism had been the most central and suc-
245
cessful Christian institution for ages, why did sixteenth-century Protestants attack its very foundations?
Luther suggested that monks were both useless and dangerous, because they
continued to believe in the special status of the spiritual estate and its ascetic life
and also embodied the corrupt Roman teachings on marriage. The monks constituted both the result and cause of corruption. They were hypocrites par excellence,
according to the early Protestant Reformers, and monasticism was the typical
fruit of the degeneration of religion. Luther considered the monks quite skilled
in deceiving poor, naive people with their hypocrisy (LW, 32:280) and wrote that
a monk is useful neither for the church, nor for the state, nor for domestic life
(LW, 54:328). The monks vows were a pit of perdition (LW, 34:358). In brief,
monasticism amounted to another part of the devils retinue, the great countless
crowd of monks, who want to be neither priest nor laymen, a new sea-monster
concocted, created, and compiled by the devil himself out of all the components
of treachery (LW, 36:158).
In The Misuse of the Mass (1521), Luther explained why monks were much
worse than ordinary priests:
Insofar as they are priests, what we have said of the priesthood and its sacrifice
and office applies to them also. Insofar as they are monks, however, with their foolish,
ungodly, and impossible vows, which have never yet been kept by anyone, they require
a book of their own...It is enough now that we know that a Christian people is undivided, without any distinctions of sects or persons, a people among whom there is to be
no layman, no cleric, no monk, no nunno differences at all, all being married or celibate as each one pleases. There is also no essential difference between bishops, elders, and
priests on the one hand and laymen on the other, nothing to distinguish them from other
Christians except that the one has a different office which is entrusted to him, namely, to
preach the Word of God and to administer the sacraments; just as a mayor or judge is
distinguished from other citizens by nothing except that the governing of the city
is entrusted to him. The same persons who have introduced such sects among the
Christian people and divided them into clergy and laity so that some are tonsured
and some are not, and the tonsured are partly monks and partly priests, and the
monks are even divided among themselves according to a variety of garbs and diets; the
same persons who invented these things have severed and cut to pieces the unity of the
Christian people. (LW, 36:158; italics mine)
There could be no essential difference between the clergy and the laity. The monks
deserved no special merits because of their ascetic lifestyle. Rather, all Christians
should live the Christian life of conversion towards God in this world here on
earth, as a part of their station in life. In other words, all occupations became
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potential vocations and sites of conversion. This sanctification of daily life and
extension of conversion to all believers disallowed any special spiritual status to
any estate or class of Christians.
In the terms of our hypothesis, the monasticization of daily life had to rid
the structure of conversion from its monastic constraints, so as to extend this
process to all believers and all of society. This explains the aversion of Reformers
like Luther. To him, the institution of monasticism promoted the idea that in the
community of Christian believers some human beings can have a different spiritual
status by their own human works. In reality, all had equal access to God through
the Scriptures and shared equal abilities to live according to Gods law. None is
spiritually superior to any other. Entering the monastic life had no surplus value
as compared to the everyday life of the lay believer. While Luther did not object
to living in a monastery as such, he feared that certain people would always start
thinking that their status as Christians is altered by living up to monastic precepts,
while the only criterion is true faith that can be present equally in the monk, the
housewife or the farmer (LW, 36:78).
Calvin also liked to elaborate on the immoral qualities of monks, whom he
considered to be lazy drunkards, living at the expense of others. He shared the
objections to monastic vows, since these created the illusion that the Law of God
had to be observed by monks alone, instead of all human beings. In Roman-Catholic theology, this had taken the form of a distinction between commandments, to
be obeyed by all, and counsels, to be followed by the spiritual few. Calvin argued
that this caused negligence of the law of God among the believers:
These commandmentshave been turned by the Schoolmen into counsels,
which are free either to obey or not to obey. What pestilential ignorance or malice this is! Moreover, they have saddled the requirement to obey these counsels upon
the monks, even more righteous in this one respect than simple Christians because they
voluntarily bound themselves to keep these counsels, and the reason they assign for not
receiving them as laws is that they seem too burdensome and heavy, especially for Christians who are under the law of grace. Do they dare thus to abolish Gods eternal
law that we are to love our neighbor? Do Does such a distinction appear on any
page of the law? Rather, do not commandments commonly occur there that very
strictly require us to love our enemies?...Either let them blot out these things from
the law or recognize that the Lord was Lawgiver, and let them not falsely represent
him as mere giver of counsel. (Inst., 2, VIII, 56; McNeill 1960, 419; italics mine)
This passage gives a further approximation of what it means to be a true Christian

or to follow false religion. True religion is submission to Gods Law as revealed
247
in Scripture. One of the reasons for the spread of false religion is the fact that lay
believers are being freed from their obligation to live according to the law and
precepts of God, while such a life is the first step towards any potential spiritual
progress. What the monks do, Calvin argued further in the Institutes (Inst., 4,
XIII, 17; McNeill 1969, 1271-1272), is to create a new and fictitious worship, in
which they aim to gain Gods favour by living up to certain vows, but their attempt
is rash and unlawful because they invent any mode of life they please without
regard for Gods call. They consecrate themselves to the devil and corrupt the true
worship of God by profane ceremonies. Calvin asked what are the kinds of vows?
They promise perpetual virginity to God, as if they had previously covenanted
with God to free them from the need to marry (Inst., 4, XIII, 17; McNeill 1969,
1271-1272). By their propagation of vows as a mode to come closer to salvation,
the monks propagated the view where human works have impact on the grace of
God. To Calvin, this was an abomination.
Believing that works and vows bring one closer to God is a clear mark of
lacking faith in God. Similarly, the belief in the vow of virginity shows the shamelessness of the clergy. Human beings simply cannot live up to such a vow; therefore God created marriage. Human beings cannot make their own laws and live
under the false impression that this shall benefit them in terms of their salvation.
In agreement with Luther, Calvin too argued that celibacy is an idiotic overestimation of human abilities:
Come now, let them call slanderous my previous statement that they are not content
with the rule laid down by God. Even though I refrain from speaking, they accuse
themselves more than enough. For they openly teach that they shoulder a greater
burden than Christ laid upon his people, seeing that they promise to keep the
evangelical counsels to love ones enemy, not to seek vengeance, not to swear, etc
by which Christians are not commonly bound. What antiquity will they claim
against us here? This never entered the minds of the ancients. All declare with one
voice that men must of necessity obey every little word uttered by Christ. And without any hesitation they consistently teach that these things are particularly commanded which our good interpreters imagine Christ only advised. But because
we have taught above that this a most pestilential error, it is sufficient here briefly
to have noted that present-day monasticism is founded upon the very opinion which all
pious folk ought by right to abhor. This opinion is that a more perfect rule of life can be
devised than the common one committed by God to the whole church. Whatever is built
upon such a foundation cannot but be abominable. (Inst., 4, XIII, 12; McNeill
1969, 1266; italics mine)
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In the context of the vow of celibacy, Calvin argued that human beings are unable to conquer sinful desires (Inst., 4, XIII, 3; McNeill 1969, 1256-1258). He
considered it insane audacity to think they have the capacity to do so. Desires
are feelings connected to the very nature of human beings. Thus desires are closely
related to the inherent iniquity of human nature. They are the stings of sin in
humanity, which we cannot overcome on our own. The help of God is essential.
In the institution of marriage, God indeed helps human beings. Also, the gift of
continence can be temporarily granted by God. However, thinking that a human
being, by vows of celibacy, can overcome the desires and therefore attain a better
spiritual estate is insane. It is human pride and stupidity exemplified.
Calvin also referred to the Ancient Church, when Christianity was purer
and the monasteries were places of training. The monastic life had a practical and
pragmatic function. Nowadays, he added, monks think that, by their vows and the
kind of lives they live, they have attained a better spiritual state. Calvin saw no
problem in monasteries and the monastic life as long as they did not claim spiritual
authority and did benefit the functioning of the Church: training of austerity and
patience, abstinence from a luxurious life and training for ecclesiastical functions
(see Inst., 4, XIII, 8-16; McNeill 1969, 1261-1271). The medieval monasticism,
however, had committed many errors. First, what God has left free (i.e., what is
not spoken of in the word of God) cannot be demanded of human beings. In fact,
if such things are demanded of human beings, human institutions exceed their
authority and exercise coercion in the spiritual domain. Second, monks should not
live idly on others means. Third, monasteries have a very specific function: they
should serve to train and assist the offices of piety recommended to all Christians.
This implies that one cannot become more spiritual than another just by living
in a monastery and following its rules. Calvin thought that the monasteries of
his time were lost in devising and following purposeless and ungodly rules and
regulations, which were imposed on the monks and whose neglect was considered
a crime. Further, monks are bound only to each other and are separate from the
rest of the Church. Therefore, they are far from being in training and are of no
assistance to the office of piety.
By this comparison of ancient and present-day monasticism I trust I have accomplished my purpose: to show that our hooded friends falsely claim the example
of the first church in defense of their professionsince they differ from them as
much as apes from men. Meanwhile, I frankly admit that even in that ancient
form which Augustine commends there is something that I do not like very much.
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I grant that they were not superstitious in the outward exercise of a quite rigid discipline, yet I say that they were not without immoderate affectation and perverse
zeal. It was a beautiful thing to forsake all their possessions and be without earthly
care. But God prefers devoted care in ruling a household, where the devout householder,
clear and free of all greed, ambition, and other lusts of the flesh, keeps before him the
purpose of serving God in a definite calling. It is a beautiful thing to philosophize in
retirement, far from intercourse with men. But it is not the part of Christian meekness, as if in hatred of the human race, to flee to the desert and the wilderness and at
the same time to forsake those duties which the Lord has especially commanded. Though
we grant there was nothing else evil in that profession, it was surely no slight evil
that it brought a useless and dangerous example into the church. (Inst., 4, XIII, 16;
McNeill 1960, 1270-1271; italics mine)
This paragraph suggests that one can serve God in any kind of vocation. Ones
human occupation in this world is irrelevant for spiritual progress. Whether one
is a mother, carpenter, judge or beggar, there is no direct link between any of these
and spiritual progress. Any vocation suffices to serve God. Serving God is living
according to the will and the law of God. One does not need to lead a secluded
life to live according to his will and law. In fact, each and every human being is
able to do so and no one has any excuse not to live according to the will and the law
of God. All ought to follow it.
Like Luther, Calvin was also concerned about the unity of the Church and
convinced that it had been cut in two by the so-called spiritual estate. He argued
in the section on Monastic Sectarianism (see Inst., 4, XIII, 14; McNeill 1960, 15681269) that the Fathers of the Church had not intended to establish the kind of
perfection afterwards fabricated by these hooded Sophists so as to set up a double
Christianity. By proclaiming the sacrilegious dogma that compared the profession of monasticism to a second baptism, the monasteries had withdrawn from
the real Church: Do they not separate themselves from the lawful society of believers, in adopting a peculiar ministry and a private administration of the sacraments? If this is not to break the communion of the church, what is? The bond of
unity between Christian believers was endangered by the acts of the monks. They
excommunicated themselves by creating a separate church and worship. They cut
themselves off from the legitimate society of the faithful and some call themselves Benedictines instead of Christians, some Franciscans, some Dominicans.
And: when they haughtily take to themselves these titles as their profession
of religion, while affecting to be different from ordinary Christians! Thus they
became schismatic and disturbed the ecclesiastical order.
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Calvins solution was simple and radical: the monks and the nuns would
better withdraw from the monasteries and get married. This is a more honourable
way of living. It is better to live in the framework of an institution that God has
approvedmarriagethan to try to live in agreement with additional human
rules leading nowhere. The ordinary family life provides more opportunities to
live as a Christian. Therefore, Calvin encouraged the monks and nuns to abandon their monasteries. The monastic rules and vows were but extraneous chains
from which Christ had actually freed the believer: For if the cross of Christ has
such a great power that it frees us from the curse of Gods law, by which we were
held boundhow much more will it deliver us from those outward fetters which
are nothing more than the deceptive nets of Satan! These is no doubt that those
whom Christ illumines with the light of his gospel he also releases from all halters
which they had taken upon themselves through superstition (Inst., 4, XIII, 21;
McNeill 1960, 1276).
There is no particular perfection in the institution of monasticism,
Melanchthon argued along with his fellow Reformers. He also denounced the
slavery of vows, which chained human beings to the earthly life: The Scholastics even teach that a work done under a vow surpasses a work done without a vow.
Godless fellows, if they think godliness comes from works rather than from spirit
and faith! (Loci 1521, 59-60). Monasticism does not contribute anything to the
Christian community: the commandments of God are the same for the monks as
they are for any Christian. Melanchthon also allowed for the possibility of a pure
and beneficial form of monasticism. But then the difference between monasticism
as it was intended and the actual corrupted forms of monasticism was stunning:
The whole manner of life was not regarded as some peculiar type of Christianity or a state of perfection, as they now speak of it, but rather as a discipline and
training for the immature. Would that this were the condition of the monasteries
today! If it were, we should have schools that would be holier, and we should have
less superstition and godlessness. For in what part or Christianity does Antichrist
reign more powerfully than in monastic servitude? (Loci 1521, 60-61)
As long as the monasteries contributed fruitfully to the practical organization

of the Church on earth, there is no objection against their existence. However,
the moment monks claimed to be a separate group with higher spiritual powers, they became moulds for the corruption of faith. In the Augsburg Confession
(1530) Melanchthon stated that: In former times, people adopted the monastic
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life in order to study Scripture. Now they pretend that the monastic life is of
such a nature that through it a person may earn Gods grace and righteousness
before Godindeed that it is a state of perfection, far above all other walks of life
instituted by God (CA, XXVII, 16; Kolb and Wengert 2000, 84-85). Once the
monastic vocation was presented as more meritorious than other kinds of life, this
had a pernicious impact on the ordinary believers as well. The believers are being
warned for their wrong perceptions of monasticism:
the commands of God and proper, true service of God are obscured when
people hear that only monks must be in the state of perfection. For Christian
perfection is to fear God earnestly with the whole heart and yet also to have a
sincere confidence, faith, and trust that we have a gracious, merciful God because
of Christ; that we may and should pray for and request from God whatever we
need and confidently expect help from him in all affliction, according to each persons
vocation and walk of life; and that meanwhile we should diligently do external good
works and attend to our calling. This is true perfection and true service of Godnot
being a mendicant or wearing a black or grey cowl, etc. However, the common
people form many harmful opinions from false praise of the monastic life, such
as when they hear the state of celibacy praised above all measure. For it follows
that their consciences are troubled because they are married. When the common
people hear that only mendicants may be perfect, they cannot know that they may
keep possessions and transact business without sin. When the people heat that it
is only a counsel [of the gospel] not to take revenge, some will conclude that it
is not sinful to take revenge outside their office. Still others think that revenge is
not right for Christians at all, even on the part of political authority (CA, XXVII,
49-55; Kolb and Wengert 2000, 88-91; italics mine).
Thus, the attitudes of monks had perverse effects on the community of believers.
They saw the everyday life of each believer as deficient and the monastic life as a
state of perfection. This is countered here by pointing out that marriage is good
for Christians and that an active life, e.g. as a businessman or as a civil officer are
worthy walks of life for Christians. The translation from the Latin version add
this more clearly: Others err still more, for they judge that all magistracy and all
civil offices are unworthy of Christians and in conflict with an Evangelical counsel (CA, XXVII, 55; Kolb and Wengert 2000, 91). A veneration of monasticism
therefore misled the believers, the vows had no meaning: [t]here are so many
ungodly notions and errors attached to monastic vows: that they justify and make
righteous before God; that they must be Christian perfection; that through them
a person may keep both the counsels of the gospel and the commandments; that
they contain works of supererogation, beyond what is owed to God. Since, then,
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all of this is false, useless, and humanly contrived, monastic vows are null and void
(CA, XXVII, 61-62;Kolb and Wengert 2000, 90-91).
The Protestant Reformers kept stressing that fleeing from the world and
seeking a holy kind of life was equivalent to obeying human, rather than divine,
commands. The truly Christian life was to be found in the everyday life of the
believer, which now had to be reformed according to a generalized process of
conversion. This was a crucial theme too in the work of Katharina Schtz Zell.
In the pamphlet Apologia for Master Zell (probably written in 1524), McKee tells
us, Zell set for herself two tasks: first, to prove that Scripture teaches the correctness of clerical marriage; second, to refute the superior holiness of celibacy as an
invention of the Church (McKee 2006, 57). Within this context, Zell made a
range of interesting points that give us a clear picture of her ideas on the corruption of the church and the need to turn to the word of God as the sole source of
true religion.
The Roman Church, Zell argued, was against clerical marriage for several reasons that revealed the deeply corrupt nature of the Church. First of all, if
they would allow clerical marriage, they would lose the money that was collected
through the taxes of the Church on concubines and children. Second, if they
would allow clerical marriage, then the priests would have to stick to one wife. The
message Zell aimed to convey was clear: clerical marriage is the more evangelical
option in line with the Scriptures; its prohibition on spiritual grounds is a human
fabrication. This brought her to a more general point: we should not listen to or
follow other men in matters of salvation:
He does not want us to fear human beingsEqually little does He want us to
trust in human beings and their help, and He cries in the prophet Isaiah in chapter
31, Woe to those who trust in the great number and strength of human beings
and not in the Holy One of Israel and who do not seek God. And He tells how
He intends to send evil on them and not allow His word to be overcome and will
rise up against the wicked and their helpWe have consolations enough in all the
scripture, which we should have always before the eyes of our hearts. If, however,
we are weak in our fleshwe should always encourage each other with the word
of God, by which we will be consoled through our faith that we hare among ourselves, as Paul says to the Romans in chapter 1 [:12]. (ibid., 80)
In addition to these instructions not to count on human authority in matters

of salvation, Zell also revealed the main reasons for her concern. She too is very
much perturbed by the fact that, even though many are called Christian, few
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are real Christians. In her explanations of Our Father she says: Grant also, dear
Father, that we may not boast of Your name without cause (in a false hypocritical folly and show of praising Your grace and righteousness); grant that we may
not enjoy being called by the name of Your Christ while still conducting our whole life
contrary to it and sinning against the other words of Your commandments (ibid., 160;
italics mine). To become truly Christian, one has to change the will and let the
human will be governed by God. The main pitfall was to follow human authority
in these spiritual matters.
7.4. Conclusion
Theology and Methodology
If we look at the most significant studies on the early Reformation, we see that it
is common practice to capture the driving force behind the Reformers concerns
either as theological and religiously inspired or as mainly socio-economic and
political in nature, orand this is a popular route todayas a combination of
these two.10 Before the 1960s, studies of the Reformation focused primarily on
the analysis of the theological doctrines of the Protestant Reformers. The Reformation was above all a revival of religion, as Ronald H. Bainton (1952, 3-4) put
it, and a renewer of Christendom. Harold J. Grimm (1954, 1-2) too formulates
the main concerns of the reformers in theological and religious terms and points
out that the rapidity with which the doctrines of Luther and the other reformers
spread throughout Europe is evidence of a general concern over the question of
salvation and also of a strong dissatisfaction with the secularized church for not
adequately serving the religious needs of the people.
Under the influence of Marxism and social history, this analysis of the theological motor of the Reformation gave way for a focus on socio-economic and
political factors. But in the last few decades scholars have re-emphasized the importance of the theological framework, since the Reformers could not be misunderstood as social activists concerned with equality and freedom in this temporal
world. Theology could not be explained away as a cover for the Reformers real
motivations and concerns (Ozment 1991, 22-3; Reardon 1981, ix-x).
Some of the classical works consulted are Bagchi and Steinmetz (2004a), Bainton (1952), Cameron (1991), Chadwick (1964, 2001), Grimm (1954), Lindberg (1996, 2002), MacCulloch (2003),
Ozment (1980, 1991), Reardon (1981), Williams (1962).
10
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Bernard M.G. Reardon, for instance, points out that the religious beliefs
promoted by the reformers need to be central in any serious study of the Reformation, even where one pays attention to the socio-economic and political setting.
For him the question is:
What in fact were the religious convictions which the reformers upheld, taught,
struggled for and sometimes died for? To a Luther or a Calvin, to a Zwingli, a
Melanchthon or a Cranmer, these matters were of absolute primary significance,
since the whole meaning of life, as they saw it, turned on them. To suppose that
because in a secular age, in which religious principles are likely to be equated at
best with a few simple ethical precepts, the notions of justification by faith alone,
or predestination to eternal bliss or perdition, or the living presence of Christ in
the eucharist may have little intelligibility, is no excuse for neglecting or minimizing their historical importance (Reardon 1981, ix-x)
Steven Ozment, in his stimulating book Protestants: The Birth of a Revolution

(1991) also cautions against the tendency of looking at the early reformers as
primarily social activists. According to him, the Reformation did not encourage a
social revolution. From the beginning, the reformers carefully distinguished freedom and equality pertaining to the spiritual lives of the believers from the relationships of dependency and subservience as it persists in a society. The mainline
Protestant traditions, both Lutheran and Reformed, so Ozment argues,
were never socially and politically egalitarian, nor did they ever admire pacifism. Although in the Reformations early years, contemporary politics and culture
thrust upon it strong associations with political freedom and social equality, the
reformers themselves did not battle for radical political and social change. Nor
did such change come about in the Age of Reformation, which remained an age
generally more fearful of anarchy than of tyranny and preoccupied far more with
problems of continuity and order than with ways to bring about change. (Ozment
1991, 22-23)
Scholars warned that it is time to affirm once again, with due appreciation for
historical contexts, that theological ideas matter, and that theology may be a motor for historical events and not just driven by them (Lindberg 2002, 2-3). Consequently, a kind of synthesis came into being. In Euan Camerons words, this
amounted to a social history of belief, where the role of ideas is neither assumed, nor ignored, but analysed (Cameron 1991, 3). Today, this rehabilitation
of theology as an essential tool for the student of the Reformation has come full
255
circle and Reformation theology has once again taken centre stage (Bagchi and
Steinmetz 2004b, 1-4).
This focus on theology to account for the Reformation, however, faces its
own problems: What is the relation between theological debates and changes in
society? How could theology ever be the motor of historical developments? This
debate is not trivial. In fact, this discussion about the relation between theological
beliefs and the social circumstances hides a deeper problem that both the historians and the theologians barely touch upon: the question of the role of religion in the
development of the western-Christian culture. How does religion affect a culture?
How does religion form a culture? Are the influences limited to the impact of
this or that pope on this or that king or can we talk about a dynamic of religion
having an impact on the formation of peoples and societies? If yes, what does this
mean, how can we conceptualize this? In our case: What is the relation between
the beliefs the Reformers held and the changes that happened at the beginning
of the 16th century? What is the role of religion and religious beliefs in a period
such as the Reformation? These question, barely explicit in the debate, are crucial
for any progress of our insight into the role of Christianity in the formation of
Western European culture.
Though only few historians would subscribe to the claim that theological
ideas were mere cloaks to disguise the real political or social revolutionary goals,
and even though it is a common place to assert that theological beliefs played an
important role, it is still not clear what this important role of religion consists
of. It seems obvious to identify the religious concerns of the Protestant reformers
in terms of their Christian theological concerns. Reading the primary sources of
the early Reformation, after all, confronts one unmistakably with theological discussions on God, grace, trinity, truth, sacraments, spiritual authority, original sin,
justification, worship of God, and so on. If one were to stay within this theological
framework, tracing the Reformers concerns would show us how they criticized
certain Roman interpretations of these theological issues and proposed alternate
interpretations.
While we cannot hope to solve these problems within the confines of this
chapter, our argument has respected the renewed focus on theology, but also tries
to account for the theological developments in terms of a deeper religious dynamic at work in the Protestant Reformation. We have characterized this dynamic as
the monasticization of daily life, manifesting itself mainly in the Reformations
dissemination of conversion as the life-process of all Christians. The basic struc-
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ture of the process of conversio was rid of its monastic constraints in order to affect
the everyday existence of all believers. Spiritual conversion expanded beyond the
walls of the monastery and the institutions of the medieval hierarchy in order to
shape Christian society.
The Concerns of the Reformers
Earlier we called the notions of degeneration and corruption keys to access the
underlying concerns driving the early Protestant Reformers. This is also the reason we have put so much time and energy into analyzing their descriptions of
medieval Roman Christianity and its society. It helped us to identify the domains
where notions of degeneration and corruption apply: the Church hierarchy
with its pope and priests; the propagation of ceremonies and good works; the offices of the monks and monasticism.
But the Reformers were against such abuses only at one level. Let me put it
differently: though these transgressions functioned as the facts in the critiques of
the reformers, they can only be significant facts because of the presence of a theory
of what true Christianity is. This goes hand in hand with conceptions about what
a true believers is and how a good human society looks like. This theory itself has
other origins than the (socio-economic) facts in the world.
The Reformation is not an unguided missile; it followed a certain dynamic
and that dynamic was religious in nature. Why, for instance, would the Reformers
propose certain theological solutions to the above mentioned abuses? Why create
a new theology of a particular kind, in which all individuals become priests? Why
speak of a new kind of religious conversion that all believers have to go through, if
one wanted to criticize the wealth of the monasteries? The socio-political and economic circumstances play an important role but they cannot account for the kind
of proposed reforms. This tells us that describing the socio-historical circumstances
is not sufficient to explain why the Reformation went in the direction it went.
Let us, by way of an example, look at the early Reformers critiques on the
monks and monasticism. While socio-economic criticisms are indeed formulated
(the wealth and extravagance of the monasteries, the gluttony of the monks, the
origin of prostitution etc.), the centre of gravity of these critiques, so we showed
in the above analyses, lies elsewhere: (1) in the false belief that by living according
to human vows, the monks attain a higher spiritual estate than lay believers (after
all, these vows are but human additions to the law of God) and (2) in the idea
257
that lay believers are exempt from the obligation to live according to the will and
the law of God. The early Reformers did not reject the whole of monasticism, but
wanted it purified of these false teachings (the vows, the belief in human works,
etc.). Subsequently, they made such purified monasticism binding upon every
believer. In this sense, the Protestants monasticized the daily life.
Theologically, this monasticization of daily life found expression in the denunciation of the belief that human works and laws could contribute anything to
the pursuit of salvation. Instead, the believer had to experience absolute despair
when confronted with his own inability to fulfill Gods commandments and then
surrender to Gods promises of grace in Christ. This understanding of Christian
faith went together with staunch criticism of monasticism, its vows, rules and
practices. However, as the renowned Reformation historian Scott Hendrix points
out, this criticism cannot be interpreted as a breaking away from the monastic
structures:
By concentrating on the application of theology to piety and insisting that believers informed by spiritual knowledge could live more faithful lives, reformers were
drawing on the tradition of monastic theology even while the Protestants among
them rejected the structure of monasticism and applied its ideal to life outside the
cloister. For that reason it is possible to say: In its dynamic utopias the early Reformation was a new monasticism. (Hendrix 2004, 29)
This new monasticism was a monasticism that broke out of the monasteries and
penetrated society as a whole. As Hendrix puts it in his insightful work Recultivating the Vineyard (2004), the Reformation continued the process of Christianization that had started in the monastic reform movements. But the ambitions of
this Reformation were greater, and it stove to become more than another stage in
the long tradition of monastic reform (Hendrix 2004, 35).
For reformers both Catholic and Protestant, religious transformation and social
change were more important than intellectual renewal, and the religious penetration of society as a whole took priority over the reinvigoration of its clerical and
monastic sectors. The Reformation was a second step in the process of Christianizing the entire culture, an extensive attempt to rid Europe of superstition as
medieval commentators had defined it and to produce a purified Christian culture according to the various agendas of Catholic, Protestant, and Radical reform.
(Hendrix 2004, 35)
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The concern was not simply Christianization but a deeper percolation of Christian religion in society and the individual believer.11 Were we to capture in one
sentence the concerns of the Early Protestants in their own words, it would be:
though many are Christian in name, true Christian are scarce: numero-merito.
As Calvin put it in the section The Christian life is not a matter of the tongue but of
the inmost heart of his Inst. (III, vi, 4; McNeill 1960, 687): And this is the pace to
upbraid those who, having nothing but the name and badge of Christ, yet wish to
call themselves Christians. Luthers agenda was first to create real Christians,
as he called them, believers whose main concern should be whether or not they
had become different people (Hendrix 2004, 39). Luther realized that this is
not an overnight transformation. Hendrix suggests therefore that [t]he agenda
developed by him [Luther] during the years 1517 to 1522 was to Christianize
Christendom (Hendrix 2004, 42).
This deeper Christianization also generated a new understanding of medieval Christendom. Crucially, the image of medieval Christendom as degenerate,
superstitious and dominated by corrupt popes, bishops and priests is a Protestant
theological image and not some neutral secular assessment. The Reformers claimed
that the sixteenth century marked the beginning of the conversion of Europe
to Christianity (Muldoon 1997b, 9). In the Roman Church, so the Reformers
were convinced, they confronted not Christianity, but the corruption of religion
into idolatry and superstition. They faced a flock of believers, who falsely believed
to have turned to Christ and surrendered to Gods will, but had really given up
their souls to the devices of the Devils priests. The Reformers thought they had
to destroy the worship of idols, superstitious divination and witchcraft, and other
varieties of belief in the human capacity to intercede with the spiritual domain.
They had to fight the papacy and the clergy, who had invented a system of human
laws and works that attempted to replace Gods revelation. The challenge is serious. A new way of turning towards God can solve their problem. We will explore
this new conversion elaborately in the next chapter.
This concern for a deeper Christianization was also shared by many Catholics in this period and
in the subsequent centuries. Hence, scholars also speak of a Catholic Reformation, which shared
the aim of renewing Christianity (Maurenbecher 1880; Bireley 1999, 2). Interpretations stressing
Protestantism as the sole savior of a deteriorating medieval Christianity and limiting the Catholic
response to repression and inquisition are pass. It has become a common place today to say that
the Reformation exhibits the attempts of both Catholics and Protestants to renew Christianity. The
reason why we focus on the Protestant Reformation and its concerns is the impact these would have
on the contemporary understanding of conversion and on the Indian debates.
11
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Escaping from this quagmire of false religion required a different type of

conversion altogether. And the first step in this process of conversion was to have
the European populace accept the Protestant description of the Roman papacy
and priesthood as the Devils church. In the next chapter we will analyze the kind
of conversion that the Reformers proposed in order to bring Western Christendom back to true religion.
Chapter 8
Conversion and
the Creation of True Christians
Our brief consideration of conversion in the Middle Ages revealed a tension
between the nominal Christianization of Europe, on the one hand, and the development of inner conversion in the monasteries, on the other hand. Both are
dimensions of the expansion of Christianity. The ultimate aim is inner conversion,
but nominal conversion is a necessary step. We also pointed out that the way in
which both dimensions related to each other could change over time. For instance, at certain moments the conversion of peoples like the Francs was relatively
detached from the process of inner conversion. But when the monastic tradition
flowered, attracted thousands of adepts and had a significant impact on the intellectual and social world of Christendom, we see both dimensions drawing nearer
to one another.
At times the tension between these dimensions is framed in methodological terms: we can find historical records and source material pertaining to the
first (entering a religion), but how do we gain insight into the inner conversion
of individuals or peoples? Scholars have pointed out the absence of biographical
conversion narratives in the sixteenth century and also the retrospect and normative nature of the few accounts that are available (Pollmann 1996; Wanegffelen
1997). However, it is misleading to suggest that scarcity of sources prevents us
from studying the process of inner conversion. Some also claim that this process is
too hard to be studied, because it is propelled by a variety of personal motives. This
may be the case, but still inner conversion is structured by a range of identifiable
patterns, which can be studied. The process develops within the scope of certain
cognitive and conceptual limits.
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In this chapter, we suggest that the medieval balance between the two dimensions of conversion changed radically during the Reformation. This brought
into being new limits within which the process of conversion could develop. Research has been conducted on denominational shifts among Roman Catholicism
and the various Protestant confessions in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.1
If these studies show one thing it is that a simplified idea of a mass conversion
to Protestantism does not hold. Still, many of the ideas of the Reformation did
impact greatly and, as some have pointed out, the majority of the population
of Europe may have received the new ideas rather as involuntary Protestants
(Scribner 2001, 79). Though the question of the relation between religious ideas
and changes in society is a formidable one (see chapter 10), we will simply explore
how the process of inner conversio and its expansion contributed to this.
In the previous chapter, we saw that the concerns of early Protestant Reformers about the corruption of religion were closely related to a vision of the
deeper penetration of Christianity into the lives of all believers. One of the chief
concerns was the transformation of nominal into real believers. The Reformers rejected the monastic and clerical process of conversion, because conversion
now had to encompass all believers. They characterized the Church hierarchy and
the monastery as hotbeds of false religion. To escape from false religion, a new
process for the diffusion of true religion had to take shape, a new kind of religious
conversion. This chapter will focus on this solution of conversio. The development
of this new process of conversion converged with the deeper vertical expansion
of Christianity in European culture. What type of process of conversion did the
Reformation create? This will be our main question in this chapter. Naturally, the
early Reformers did not have to invent a brand new process. In fact, all components of this process had a long history in Christianity. We will explore what was
new about the Reformations understanding of conversion and what were some of
its implications for the lives of European Christians.
A good collection is Konversionen im Mittelalter und in der Frhneuzeit (1999), edited by Friedrich
Niewhner and Fidel Rdle. Especially the contributions by Johannes Schilling and Dieter Breuer
are illuminating. Two works on conversion in France in the 17th century are also worth mentioning: in his Consciences en libert? Itinraires decclesiastiques convertis au protestanstisme (1631-1760),
Didier Boisson studies conversions to Protestantism in this period and comes to the conclusion that
especially ecclesiatics convert. Wanegffelen in his Ni Rome Ni Genve (1997) poses the question
whether people were willing to make confessional choices and what made them doubt. One of his
conclusions is that people seemed to be reluctant to make such clear-cut confessional decisions. A
range of articles give an impression of confessional changes in the different countries and regions of
Europe in the early modern period: Kooi (2001), Kowalski (2001), Pollmann (1996), Siebenhuner
(2007), Wanegffelen (1997), Wickersham (2003).
1
Conversion and the Creation of True Christians
263
What were the outlines of the process of conversion? This section will turn
back to the works of three major magisterial Reformers, namely, Luther, Melanchthon and Calvin. Our aim is to isolate the central properties and different stages
of the process that, according to them, ought to shape the life of every human
individual. Perhaps the best way to start is to allow Luther to describe his own
conversion, the so-called Turmerlebnis or Tower Experience:2
Though I lived as a monk without reproach, I felt that I was a sinner before God
with an extremely disturbed conscience. I could not believe that he was placated
by my satisfaction. I did not love, yes, I hated the righteous God who punishes sinners, and secretly, if not blasphemously, certainly murmuring greatly, I was angry
with God, and said, As if, indeed, it is not enough, that miserable sinners, eternally lost through original sin, are crushed by every kind of calamity by the law of
the decalogue, without having God add pain to pain by the gospel and also by the
gospel threatening us with his righteousness and wrath! Thus I raged with a fierce
and troubled conscience. Nevertheless, I beat importunately upon Paul at that place,
most ardently desiring to know what St. Paul wanted.
At last, by the mercy of God, meditating day and night, I gave heed to the
context of the words, namely, In it the righteousness of God is revealed, as it is
written, He who through faith is righteous shall live. There I began to understand
that the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God,
namely by faith. And this is the meaning: the righteousness of God is revealed
by the gospel, namely, the passive righteousness with which merciful God justifies
us by faith, as it is written, He who through faith is righteous shall live. Here I
felt that I was altogether born again and had entered paradise itself through open gates.
There a totally other face of the entire Scripture showed itself to me. Thereupon
I ran through the Scriptures from memory. I also found in other terms an analogy, as, the work of God, that is, what God does in us, the power of God, with
which he makes us strong, the wisdom of God, with which he makes us wise, the
strength of God, the salvation of God, the glory of God.
And I extolled my sweetest word with a love as great as the hatred with
which I had before hated the word righteousness of God. Thus that place in Paul
was for me truly the gate to paradise. (LW, 34:336-337; italics mine).
Conversion is an amalgamated process, consisting of a cluster of experiences. The

cluster may vary across different Protestant denominations, but certain core elements are always present: the painful experience of being a sinner; the recurring
This famous conversion experience was penned down by Luther only in 1545 in his Preface to the
Complete Edition of Luthers Latin Writings. Scholars have tried to link it to his earlier theological
ideas on justification and righteousness before God. Some understood this 1545 formulation as the
reflection of a much older actual experience, others saw it as the reformulation and culmination of a
range of ideas finally coming together in his later years. For a lucid overview of the different interpretations of Luthers tower experience, see Harran (1983) and Peters (1968).
2
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failure to live up to the Law of God; the persistence of the disturbed conscience;
the salvific role of the Word of God; the experience of the righteousness of God;
the realization of faith as the gift of God; the experience of being born again; the
workings of God in the individual believer.3 The sequence of these stages is also
telling: in the beginning, one wrestles with a fierce and troubled conscience; then,
solace is found in the Word of God, more precisely in the Gospel. The solace is the
result of the realization, through the help and power of the Gospel, of the righteousness of God and the justification of the righteous through faith. This brings
us to the experience of being born again and entering paradise. Then, the other
face of the Word of God is revealed, namely, the saving promises.
Much earlier in Luthers life, he had already spelled out the conceptual core
of this process. The first thesis of his famous Ninety-five Theses (1517) spelled out
one of the most important elements of his theology: When our Lord and Master
Jesus Christ said, Repent [Matt. 4:17], he willed the entire life of believers to be
one of repentance (LW, 31:23).4 The theses are popularly considered to be the
theological birth of the Reformation. Hence, it is all the more striking that the
first thesis concerns the process of conversion. Repenting or doing penance, so
Luther explained in his Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses (1518) is the same
as going through conversion. Do you not see, he asks here, that he imposes no
penance except that of observing the commands of God, and that he therefore
desires that penance be understood as nothing except conversion and the change
In an interesting analysis historian Sears McGee poses the question whether it is possible to speak
about a Protestant conversion experience (in the context of Elisabethan and Stuart England) or
whether is it only possible to speak about Anglican and Puritan experiences (Sears McGee 1976).
She points out that there are limits within which conversion is viewed by all Protestants. One such
is the involvement of God in conversion and mans limited role in this: Protestants agreed that no
man could save himself and that God had to participate in each conversion. God justified man by
imputing to him Christs merits, thereby making his conversion both possible and inevitable (ibid.,
22). Similarly the different groups subscribe to the urgency of conversion and the fact that human
beings desperately need it. This does not mean that there are no fundamental differences between
the Protestants (Anglicans and Puritans in her case) concerning their views on conversion. They
differed radically on a range of things, such as the human role in conversion: should man strive for
it or wait for it? There was also disagreement on the kind of grace that was needed and on the kind
of sermons that were needed to enhance conversion: should conversion be presented as very difficult
or should the simplicity be stressed (ibid., 24)? The difference, so the author concludes, it a relative
one. Though there is definitely a broad agreement among English Protestants about the theology
of conversion, she confirms, this does not imply that differences about the strategy and tactics
trivial (ibid., 33).
4
Repent here is a translation from the Latin poenitentiam agite and the German tut Busse..
The translator
(
Tappert in his translation of Luther 1517, 51) remarks that penance may be translated as repent or as do penance.
3
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to a new life (LW, 31:95)? Luther was still in his formative years here yet the
crucial place of life-long conversion was already at centre stage as an answer to the
question of how the Christian should live. Apparently, reformation, penance and
conversion are most intimately related.
Like many Christian thinkers before him, Luther faced this underlying
worry: How can a Christian know whether he is on the path of sin or salvation?
In Luthers case, however, this question is formulated as the concern of each and
every Christian. Every person calling himself a Christian should be continuously
concerned about his or her salvation. Luthers audience is not a congregation, a
monastery or the leaders of a Church, but all Christian believers. He addressed
an old question to a new audience: to the community of believers at large, to the
laymen, and to all Christians whatever their position in the world. How can a
Christian convert towards God and begin a new life?
Calvin also discussed his conversion to Protestantism in his writings.5 Especially his introduction to the Commentary on the Psalms (1557), where he discusses his conversio subita, has received the attention of many scholars.6 Recounting how his father had made him study law, Calvin stated that God had other
plans with him:
[B]ut God, by the secret guiding of his Providence, at length gave a different
direction to my course. And first, since I was too obstinately devoted to the superstitions of Popery to be easily pulled out from so profound an abyss of mire,
God by a sudden conversion subdued and brought my mind to a teachable frame,
which was more hardened in such matters than might have been expected from
one at my early period of life [animum meum, qui pro aetate nimis obduruerat, subita
conversione ad docilitatem subegit (McNeill 1954, 108)]. Having thus received some
taste and knowledge of true godliness, I was immediately inflamed with so intense
a desire to make progress therein, that although I did not altogether leave off other
studies, I yet pursued them with less ardour. (Lindberg 2000, 164)
Some authors have stressed the sharp and instant change in Calvins conversion
(see McNeill 1954, 107). However, when he elaborated upon conversion in his
theology, most notably in his Institutes, the main reference was not to this sudden
shift away from popery. As Boisson (2009, 16) points out, the transition from one
Fischer names three places where accounts of Calvins conversion are found (see Fischer 1983,
203): the Introduction to Commentary on the Psalms (1557), the Reply to Sadolet (1539), and a passage in the second response to Westphal (1556).
6
E.g. Battles (1975, xxvi-xxxvi), Boisson (2009, 15-16), Bouwsma (1988, 10-11), Eire (1986, 195196), Fischer (1983, 202-205), McNeill (1954, 107-118).
5
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religion to another is never central to Calvins notion of conversion, but rather the
new spiritual condition that humanity attains in relation to God through conversion of the heart. This process of conversion was as central to Calvins theology as
it was to Luthers:
Indeed, I am aware of the fact that the whole of conversion to God is understood
under the term repentance, and faith is not the least part of conversionThe
Hebrew word for repentance is derived from conversion or return; the Greek
word, from change of mind or of intention. And the thing itself corresponds
closely to the etymology of both words. The meaning is that, departing from ourselves, we turn to God, and having taken off our former mind, we put on a new.
On this account, in my judgment, repentance can thus be well defined: it is the
true turning of our life to God, a turning that arises from a pure and earnest fear
of him; and it consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man, and in
the vivification of the Spirit. (Inst., III, iii, 5; McNeill 1960, 597)
This passage from the Institutes would convey Calvins notion of conversion, were
it not that one fundamental component is missing. We have to add that the
more earnestly any man measures his life by the standard of Gods Law, the surer are
the signs of repentance that he shows. Therefore, the Spirit, while he urges us to
repentance, often recalls us now to the individual precepts of the Law, now to the
duties of the Second Table (Inst., III, iii, 16; McNeill 1960, 609; italics mine).
The necessity of the Law of God is one of the most crucial elements in Calvins
process of regeneration.
Schtz Zell also describes her own process of conversion. It is remarkable
to see how one of the starting points of the process is her attitude of despising
the world. The result of this was a distress in her conscience, which Luther and
his teachings had helped to solve. Her story too illustrates a life-long process in
which the role of God, the conscience, the Scripture, the Holy Spirit and Christ
are crucial:
From my youth on I have zealously sought and prayed for Gods wisdom, which
He has also given to me. From a child in my dear fathers house onward He laid
the foundation stone in my heart to despise the world and exercise myself in His
religionThat I did under the papacy with great earnestness. In that time of ignorance I very zealously, with great pain of body and anxiety of heart, sought out
so many clergy and God-fearing people to experience the way to heaven; about
that I will say no more. How very wonderfully the Lord led me then! And afterward He did not leave me in distress. He sent to me, and to many poor afflicted
consciences, the dear and (I hope) now blessed Martin Luther, who showed me
267
my error and pointed me to Christ, in whom I would find rest. Then God opened
my understanding to comprehend the Holy Scriptures, which I had previously
read as a closed book and had not understood; then the lamb opened the book of
the seven seals and took away my lack of understanding and gave comfort in my
heartI have not (as these relate) chosen my own ideas, but I have let the will of
God be more pleasing to me than my own. God has sent His Holy Spirit in my
heart and allowed the messengers He has sent to teach me with outward writings
and words so that the longer the time the more I have come to the knowledge of
Christ (ibid., 206-207).
There are significant differences between the theologies of conversion of Luther,

Calvin and the other Reformers. However, of importance to us are the basic conceptual and experiential structures, which all of them link to the fundamental
process of turning to God. In order to understand the process of conversion and
its impact in Europe and India, we need to identify the common structures, rather
than focus on theological intricacies.
8.1. Approximations of Conversion

A Spiritual Change
According to the Reformers, it is not the human being in general that undergoes the process of conversion, but rather spiritual man. To appreciate what this
means, we have to keep in mind the distinction made by Luther and other Reformers between the spiritual and bodily nature of human beings on earth. As
Luther explained in The Freedom of a Christian (1520):
Man has a twofold nature, a spiritual and a bodily one. According to the spiritual
nature, which men refer to as the soul, he is called a spiritual, inner, or new man.
According to the bodily nature, which men refer to as flesh, he is called a carnal,
outward, or old man, of whom the Apostle writes in II Cor. 4[:16], Though our
outer nature is wasting away, our inner nature is being renewed every day. Because
of this diversity of nature the Scriptures assert contradictory things concerning
the same man, since these two men in the same man contradict each other, for the
desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against
the flesh, according to Gal. 5[:17]. (LW, 31:344)
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Humanity consists of the inner and outer man, soul and flesh. These two natures
are locked in an ongoing struggle: the soul and the body aim at different things.
The soul has spiritual needs and longs for a Christian life; the body has worldly
needs and longs for the fulfilment of its desires. Consequently, under the influence
of their bodily nature, people search for salvation in worldly works: fasting, abiding by human precepts and ceremonies. However, only the spiritual nature can
make humanity change for the better, since the flesh only corrupts us. The spiritual
nature of man is the main target of conversion.
Melanchthon agreed that human beings are all under the power of sin and,
hence, that all human actions are necessarily sinful. Sins are depraved activities of
the heart against the Law of God (Loci 1521, 31). The human fleshor the old
man, as Melanchthon sometimes calls itis utterly sinful: For they are deceived
who think that in a man whom the Holy Spirit has not renewed and cleansed
there is anything at all which cannot be called flesh or corrupt (Loci 1521, 38).
Pauls Letters often led the Reformers to such reflections on the spiritual and the
carnal:
Paul has stated the summary of his argument to this point, namely, that since it is
impossible for us to keep the law because we are carnal, God sent his Son that he
might satisfy the law for us who are dead to the flesh, but alive in the Spirit. Here
I ask, What does he call flesh? For, since it is evident that the Holy Spirit is
called Spirit, his movements as well as his impulses, it necessarily follows that
you call flesh whatever in us is foreign to the Holy Spirit. (Loci 1521: 38)
As the nature of each human being is carnal, no one can live up to the law of God
and all are in need of transformation or rebirth. This is the drama of humanity.
Under the spell of sin, we are unable to submit ourselves to the law of God and all
our deeds are necessarily evil and corrupt:
Consider, I beg you, Pauls conclusion: he finishes by saying that all power of our
flesh is hostile to God and that it cannot submit to Gods law. If it cannot submit
to the law of God, why do we doubt as to what kinds of fruits it bears? Now he
not only says that it does not submit to Gods law, but also that it cannot submit to
that law. It follows, therefore, that all works of man, however praiseworthy they are
externally, are actually corrupt and are sins worthy of death (Loci 1521, 39).
All such arguments about the deeply corrupt condition of human nature and human works led to the same conclusion: the only potential site of positive change
within us is the spiritual realm.
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Calvin also emphasized the spiritual nature of repentance and argued that
the true Church and true worship did not lie in the outward church, but in preaching Gods word and the lawful administration of the sacraments (Inst. Prefatory
Address, 6; McNeill 1960, 24-27). According to him, each human being should
repent, not by ceremonies, but with the heart. The fictitious rites and other outwardly observances do not bring the believer to real faith. He explains this in a
section on the belief in Good works as redemption of punishment (Inst., III, iv, 36;
McNeill 1960, 666):
When Solomon teaches that by mercy and kindness sins are atoned forhe
does not mean that they are paid for in the Lords sight, that God, appeased
by such satisfaction, may remit the punishment that he otherwise was about to
mete out. Rather, in the familiar manner of the Scripture, he indicates that he will
be found merciful to those who, having bidden farewell to past vices and evils, are in
piety and truth turned to him. It is as if he said that the Lords wrath subsides
and his judgement rests when out transgressions rest. And he is not describing the
cause of pardon, but rather the means of true conversionWhen Christ, deriding the
Pharisees for paying attention only to cleansing dishes but neglecting cleanness
of heart, bids them give alms to make all things purehe surely does not urge
them to make satisfaction. Rather, he teaches only what sort of purity is approved
of God. (Italics mine)
According to Calvin, there are two possible paths. On the one hand, one can do
things because one believes in the notion of compensation: by the satisfaction
of God sins will be remitted. On the other hand, one can realize that the only
possible thing to do for a human being is to stop sinning. This will not cause anything, but it is the only mode of true conversion. By repentance, by focusing on
the purity of heart, one will not cause purification by God, but one will undergo
conversion. Any human being has but these two options: to believe that human
actions are compensated by the remission of sins (the route of false religion) or to
surrender to the process of spiritual conversion and purification of the heart (the
route towards true religion).
To finish this subsection it is interesting to involve also the view of Schtz
Zell. She too characterized the process of conversion to God mainly as the process
whereby the old person with his human will of the flesh is reborn as a new person.
This new person with a new heart and spirit is under the guidance of God. Let us
see how she described this process in her explanations of Our Father:
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Oh, dear Father, grant that with our whole heart we may give ourselves to full
obedience to Your will and confess that Your will is best of all so that we may
break and hinder our evil will, which is still only inclined toward the fleshwhich
is why it also does not bring forth children of God. Help us to put off the old
person who is born from the will of the flesh and put on the new person who is
born (geboren) from God, according to Your image, the way you first created us.
(McKee 2006, 161)
This idea that human beings should subordinate their will to the Will of God
needed to be operationalized. How could human beings do this? What is needed,
Zell wrote, is that God writes his law in the hearts of man: Grant us also, O God
and Father, a pure heart and willing spirit so we may hear what You say to us and
may obey it and not turn away from You and to wickedness. But write Your law in
our hearts and grant us to acknowledge Your will and pay heed to Your wisdom,
which otherwise is hidden (ibid.). This kind of prayer highlighted the fact that
God is totally in charge of this process of change. Man should direct his life according to the will and law of God: By that will and wisdom may we direct our
life so that You may be pleased with usas You are pleased with all the blessed
ones in heaven. There your will alone pleases all of them and it is done in them
(ibid., 161-162). Man needs to beg God to start and sustain the process of conversion:
Grant us help also, O God and Father, that we may turn to You with our whole heart
and give ourselves obediently to Your will, even to the cross if (through Your holy counsel
and providence) You allow that to come upon us. If You strike us down because of our
sins, may we not separate ourselves from You, deny, murmur, and wound You, like
Judas, the children Israel, and the thief on the left handBut may we, with Peter,
suffer the rod of discipline from You, reflecting on our sins, and may we weep for
them from the heart and henceforth live in Your willWith the thief on the right
side, may we acknowledge and confess our sin and Your just judgement and with
him call to Christ on the cross and say, Lord, I am guilty, but You are righteous;
remember me in Your Kingdom... (ibid., 162; italics mine)
The process of conversion to God is a process of suffering, weeping and reflecting

upon sin. The aim is one day to live in accordance with the will of God. Explaining the verse And Give us Our Daily Bread Today, Zell added another element:
we human beings are as children turning to a faithful Father who has in his hand
food and nourishment for soul and body and who cannot deny His children
who earnestly seek this from Him (ibid.). The attitude required of usin order
to start the process of turning the heart and the soul to Godis one of recogniz-
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ing the hunger of our soul: We are now hungry in our souls, and so from the
heart we pray You to feed us without ceasing and without delay, today and always,
with Your holy word through which we learn Your will and may come to the true
knowledge of You and of Him whom You sent, Jesus Christ, and may be strengthened in faith toward You. McKee points out that for Zell (like for Luther), our
daily bread primarily refers to preaching (for the Roman Catholics it commonly
referred to the Mass). The hunger of the soul can be stilled by one thing alone: the
Word of God, which allows us to know Gods Will and grow in faith.
Additionally, not only should the heart be turned to God in this way, at all
times it is necessary that man is not sidetracked by the world (ibid., 164). Seduced by the joys, goods and honours of the world, Zell cautioned, we can easily
lose our hunger for Gods wisdom. Therefore, Christians should also pray to God
and beg to only have hunger for Gods wisdom, righteousness, sanctification,
and redemption, a hunger that can only be satisfied in Christ (ibid., 165-166).
Without turning to God, humanity is completely lost because of its inherently
sinful nature. Zell emphasized the urgency of human sinfulness while analysing
the verse And Forgive Us Our Debts As We Forgive Our Debtors. Human
nature is corrupt and was conceived (empfangen) and born (geboren) in sin and
always desires only what is wrong (ibid., 167). We should pray to God to end our
sinning through the process of conversion: May we be granted to sin no more,
but henceforth to lead a new life according to Your will, so that we may willingly
come to You out of this world, comforted and happy, as a pilgrim out of exile and
a foreign place comes home to the fatherland, as children whose accounts have
been settled come to their Father who wills them good. And so may we come to
a blessed resurrection (ibid., 168).
As a first approximation of conversion, then, we can say that it is a process
of spiritual change and growth. What or who is being transformed spiritually? The
mind, the spirit, the heart, the senses and feelings of the Christian believer are
the main objects of this spiritual transformation. The core of the transformation
is that one is no longer occupied with earthly matters, but gets insight into the
spiritual domain. This is what the phrase new birth signifies and this is why it is
an internal Christian process (see Citron 1951). This presupposes a certain understanding of man as consisting of two natures. Conversion redirects the attention
and the entire being of man from the material to the spiritual; from his sinful
nature to insight into sin.
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The Lord God Alone

As the above section already implicated, the Reformers believed that spiritual
man could not make any progress without the help of God. Without external interference from God, the human spirit could not move in the right direction. This
has two crucial implications for the process of conversion: (1) Humanity is not the
subject of conversion, but rather our spiritual nature is the object of conversion by
God. (2) Without divine interference, humanity clings to its bodily nature. Our
spiritual nature can only degenerate without God. In Luthers works, it is very
clear that God alone is the cause and catalyst of the process of conversion.7 Only
a revelation from God in humanity enables us to see our sinfulness. That is to say,
without God, man sees himself as truthful, righteous, and wise (LW, 25:213).
Only if God reveals himself in humanity, do we begin to gain knowledge of our
own situation, teaching us that we are liars, sinners and unrighteous beings. In his
Lectures on Romans (1515-1516), Luther wrote the following:
And thus God through His own coming forth causes us to enter into ourselves,
and through this understanding of Him He gives to us also an understanding
of ourselves. For unless God had first come forth and sought to be truthful in
us, we could not have entered into ourselves and be made liars and unrighteous
men. For man of himself could not know that he is such a person before God, unless God
Himself had revealed it to him Therefore we have to yield to this His revelation,
His words, and believe and thus declare them righteous and true and thereby also
confess that we ourselves are sinners according to them (a fact we did not know
before). (LW, 25:213; italics mine)
We know that God is pivotal in the process of conversion, but how does he go
about reviving the soul? How does he interfere in human beings? In The Freedom
of a Christian (1520), Luther threw more light on this issue:
One thing, and only one thing, is necessary for Christian life, righteousness, and freedom. That one thing is the most holy Word of God, the gospel of ChristLet us then
consider it certain and firmly established that the soul can do without anything
except the Word of God and that where the Word of God is missing there is
no help at all for the soul. If it has the Word of God it is rich and lacks nothing
since it is the Word of life, truth, light, peace, righteousness, salvation, joy, liberty,
Every theory of conversion which stresses proper preparation for the reception of grace, would
have been rejected by the Reformers, as Steinmetz stresses. Luther rejected categorically Gabriel
Biels theology of preparation for grace, where grace is a reward for exemplary moral. For him
morally good acts do not have a claim on the favor of God (Steinmetz 1978, 26-27).
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wisdom, power, grace, glory, and of every incalculable blessing (LW, 31:345-346;
italics mine).
Simply putting aside human works, Luther explained, does not help the believer
in his spiritual quest. Omitting them is as irrelevant to spiritual progress as committing them. Humanity needs only one thing: the Word of God. The interference of God occurs through His Word, the Gospel of Christ.
However, simply hearing or knowing the Word of God is not enough to
initiate the workings of God. It is only the start of a life-long process of transformation. It is the sine qua non of conversion, but is in no way sufficient. Luther went
further: Faith alone is the saving and efficacious use of the Word of God. This
faith is faith in Christ and the Word of God cannot be received and cherished by
any works whatever but only by faith. The passage continues:
Therefore the moment you begin to have faith you learn that all things in you are
altogether blameworthy, sinful, and damnable, When you have learned this you
will know that you need Christ, who suffered and rose again for you so that, if you
believe in him, you may through this faith become a new man in so far as your
sins are forgiven and you are justified by the merits of another, namely, of Christ
alone. (LW, 31:346-347)
Only faith in Christ can make the Word of God into a source of salvation. Peculiarly, in order to become a real believer the necessary prerequisite is that one already has
faith. This reveals something interesting about the process of becoming a Christian believer. The idea is not that the believer comes to faith by gradually learning
more about the faith and slowly accepting it. Faith has to be present in advance,
before the process of conversion can even take off. Faith seems to be the precondition, not the end result, of the process of conversion. Faith in the gospel of Christ
precedes the spiritual transformation of the soul.
Like Luther, Melanchthon also reflected on the fact that human beings are
so corrupt that they lack the ability to turn to God. What then should they do?
Repentance as it was conceived in the scholastic tradition is not the solution,
Melanchthon argued. He rejected the threefold path of contrition of the heart,
oral confession, and satisfaction of the good work, because this created the
illusion in human beings that they, on their own powers, can become good. Something else is required instead:
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There is a twofold turning of God to us: one precedes our repentance, and the
other follows it. The one that precedes takes place when God causes us to repent by
the inspiration of his Spirit, when he terrifies and disturbs us by showing us our sin.
But Gods turning to us following repentance takes place when he puts a stop to
our punishments, consoling us and declaring openly that he favors us. (Loci 1521, 45;
italics mine)
As opposed to the threefold path proposed by the Scholastics, Melanchthon emphasized that a human being has nothing important to contribute to his own conversion. There is a twofold turning of God to us; it is God who takes the initiative
and does the work. In turning to God, God is active, humanity passive. Humans
lack the power to turn to God on their own effort. The beginning of repentance
lies solely in Gods hands:
God himself invites us and draws us to himself, and when he has drawn us, he takes
away our punishments and declares that he is pleased with us and reconciled to
us. And because he commands, Return to me, it does not follow that it is in our
power to repent or to turn. In the same way, just because he commands that he is
to be loved above all, it does not follow that this is in our strength merely because
he enjoins it. On the contrary, because of the very fact that he orders it, it is not in
our power. For he commands the impossible that he may commend his mercy to
us as we shall state below when discussing the law. (Loci 1521, 45; italics mine)
In other words, God commands the impossible so that we may become aware that
we are totally dependent on Him.
For Calvin, the beginning of conversion is located in knowledge of humanity and the human condition, which is the first step towards knowledge of God.
As he starts his expos in the Insitutes (Inst., I, i, 1; McNeill 1960, 35): Without
knowledge of self there is no knowledge of God. But without knowledge of God
there can be no knowledge, he explains in the next pages. Humanity, so he explained, can get to know God, because awareness of the iniquity of human nature
discloses the infinitely good nature of God:
Each of us must, then, be so stung by the consciousness of his own unhappiness
as to attain at least some knowledge of God. Thus, from the feeling of our own
ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity, andwhat is moredepravity and corruption, we recognize that the true light of wisdom, sound virtue, full abundance
of every good, and purity of righteousness rest in the Lord alone. (Inst., I, i, 1;
McNeill 1960, 36)
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However, to achieve this knowledge of the human condition, humanity needs a

standard or measure. This standard is found in the will and law of God. Human
beings cannot live up to the law of God and it is precisely this failure that enables
them to experience their corruption. Only this experience can humble them and
have them recognize the immense goodness and wisdom of God.
Knowledge has a specific aim and is of a specific kind here. First of all, to
obtain knowledge one requires this standard; otherwise one has no moorings and
cannot compare or judge. This implies that one first needs knowledge of the Law
of God to be able to judge ones own situation. This first knowledge, humanity
cannot reach on its own; it has to be bestowed upon us by God and His revelation.
Second, the knowledge has the specific aim of pointing out the inevitable failure,
deprivation, helplessness and despair of the human condition. Knowledge creates
awareness of ones unhappiness here on earth. Third, thus, this knowledge opens
up the route towards gaining knowledge of the righteous and forgiving God. As
before, this route becomes available to us only because of the instigation of God:
Again, it is certain that man never achieves a clear knowledge of himself unless
he has first looked upon Gods face, and then descends from contemplating him
to scrutinize himself. For we always seem to ourselves righteous and upright and
wise and holythis pride is innate in all of usunless by clear proofs we stand
convinced of our own unrighteousness, foulness, folly, and impurity. Moreover, we
are not thus convinced if we look merely to ourselves and not also to the Lord, who
is the sole standard by which this judgment must be measured. (Inst., I, i, 2; McNeill
This standard is the conditio sine qua non of self-knowledge and conversion. Knowledge of God comes first, because human knowledge is misleading, as long as it is
not guided by the standard that God provides:
As long as we do not look beyond the earth, being quite content with our own
righteousness, wisdom, and virtue, we flatter ourselves most sweetly and fancy
ourselves all but demigods. Suppose we but once begin to raise our thoughts to
God, and to ponder his nature, and how completely perfect are his righteousness,
wisdom, and power the straightedge to which we must be shaped. Then what
masquerading earlier as righteousness was pleasing in us will soon grow filthy in
its consummate wickedness. What wonderfully impressed us under the name of
wisdom will stink in its very foolishness. What wore the face of power will prove
itself the most miserable weakness. That is, what in us seems perfection itself corresponds ill to the purity of God. (Inst., I, i, 2; McNeill 1960, 38)
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To gain access to true knowledge of humanity, one requires the help of the knowledge of God. But how can one ever start going through conversion to God, if
knowledge of God is the prerequisite?
From these aspects of early Reformation theology, a basic problem emerges,
related to Christianitys quest to spread itself. Inducing more believers into Christian religion cannot be done by spreading the Word of God or preaching the
Gospel alone. To preach true doctrine has positive results for the soul, provided
that one already believes the preaching; to spread knowledge of God is possible only
if the potential convert already has knowledge of God. Even though preaching
the Word is an important part of the preparation for conversion, it lacks the ability to really change people and transform them into true believers. The Word of
God can only disclose its saving and efficacious properties if connected to faith
in God and Christ. So, only if people already have faith will they start seeing their
own sinful nature and start realising that they are in need of Gods grace. This
posed a problem not only for the early Reformers, but also for later missionaries
and other Christians preoccupied by disseminating Christianity. Human beings
cannot contribute to their spiritual progress, since human efforts and works are
but expressions of sinful pride. What then could one do to instigate the process
of conversion? What role could human beings play in inducing others into true
religion?
The questions derive from the second approximation of conversion we have
identified here: it can only start with the help of God. Conversion is the experience and realization of personally being saved by God. Not only does this take
place under the authority of God, God is also the only one able to set the process
in motion, to sustain it and to fulfil it.
A New Life: Seeing Sin
Certain ways of involving the believers into Christian religion were no longer
considered valid options by the Reformers. In the era preceding the Reformation,
the longing to become a true Christian could take various forms: one could try
and live according to the rules and regulations of one or another religious order
(mendicant orders, monastic orders, religious congregations); one could become a
priest; one could join lay ecclesiastical movements, secular institutes or confraternities; one could go on pilgrimage to Rome; one could pray to saints or relics and
ask for comfort and help. Winning new converts meant introducing them to this
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elaborate system of possible wayssome more rigorous than othersof becoming Christian (see Duffy 1992). However, the Reformers theological attacks on
medieval religion altered this array of possible routes. Many of the above mentioned forms of religiosity were rejected as examples of corrupted religion.
How then could the Reformers solve the problem of creating real believers?
Behold, he imposes nothing except justice and righteousness, and these things
must be done in every aspect of his life...God requires no such things [offerings]
because of sin, but rather he requires justice, compassion, and fear. This, as I have
said, means a new life (LW, 31:95). This is what Luther stated in the Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses (1518). Elaborating on the first thesis, Luther said
the following:
When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ said, Repent [Matt. 4:17], he willed
the entire life of believers to be one of repentance. This I assert and in no way
doubt.
1. Nevertheless, I shall prove the thesis for the sake of those who are uninformed, first from the Greek word metanoeite itself, which means repent and
could be translated more exactly by the Latin transmentamini, which means assume another mind and feeling, recover ones senses, make a transition from one
state of mind to another, have a change of spirit; so that those who hitherto have
been aware of earthly matters may now know the spiritual, as the Apostle says
in Rom. 12[:2], Be transformed by the renewal of your mind. By this recovery
of ones senses it happens that the sinner has a change of heart and hates his sin.
(LW, 31:83)
What are the characteristics of the new life of the sinner? This is a life in accordance with the will and law of God. In other words, human beings need to start
living in a different way: according to the commands of God. This must be done
in every aspect of ones life; this recovery or hatred of oneself should involve ones
whole life, Luther added. The new life consists of an internal spiritual transformation: becoming a spiritual man; seeing sin, hating sin and suffering because of
ones own corruption; living according to the will of God; being able to live up to
Gods law. Such a transformation brings about satisfaction and penance and hence
creates human goodness and happiness. Luther clarified the issue further:
2. I shall prove this thesis also according to reason. Since Christ is the master of
the spirit, not of the letter, and since his words are life and spirit [ John 6:63], he
must teach the kind of repentance which is done in spirit and in truth, but not
that which the most arrogant hypocrites could do openly by distorting their faces
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in fasts and by praying in streets and heralding their giving of alms [Matt. 6:16].
Christ must teach a repentance, I say, which can be done in every walk of life, a repentance which the king in purple robes, the priest in his purity, and the princes in
their dignity can do just as well as the monk in his rituals and the mendicant in
his poverty, just as Daniel and his companions did in Babylon [Dan. 1 and 3]. For
the teaching of Christ must apply to all men, that is, to men in every walk of life.
3. We pray throughout our whole life and we must pray forgive us our debts
[Matt. 6:12]; therefore, we repent throughout our whole life and are displeased with
ourselves, unless anyone may be so foolish as to think he must only pretend to pray
for the forgiveness of debts. For the debts for which we are commanded to pray
are real and not to be treated lightly; and even if they were venial, we could not be
saved unless they were remitted. (LW, 31:84-85; italics mine)
The process of conversion is all-embracing. Not only is it a process stretched out

over the whole life of the believer, it also applies to all believers, in every walk of
life. But Luther was not yet satisfied by this explanation and cautioned his readers
in the second of his Ninety-five Theses: This word [repent] cannot be understood
as referring to the sacrament of penance, that is, confession and satisfaction, as
administered by the clergy. He explained this clause by showing how the repentance he had in mind differed thoroughly from the sacrament of penance
(LW, 31:85). The first reason is that the sacrament is temporal and cannot be
done all the time, because otherwise one would have to speak with the priest
continually and do nothing else but confess ones sins and perform the satisfaction which has been imposed. Second, Luther pointed out that the sacrament is
only external and its validity depends on the inward penance; consequently, true
inward penance can exist without the sacrament. A third difference is that while
[s]acramental penance can be a sham, inward penance cannot exist unless it is
true and sincere. Fourth, he pointed out that the sacrament of penance is instituted by the Roman Church and the popes, but that there is no teaching of Christ
concerning this. This makes penance mutable according to the whims of the popes
and church, while evangelical penance is divine law and never mutable, for it is
unceasingly the sacrifice which is called a contrite and humble heart [Ps. 51:17].
Lastly, Luther argued how the scholastic teachers were wrong when they saw real
penance as the subject of sacramental penance. To repent is a life-long process,
which is not limited to any human sacrament.
As a life-encompassing process, conversion brings about a particular change.
The change is one by which man assumes another mind and feeling, recovers his
senses, makes a transition from one state of mind to another, has a change of
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spirit. Conversion is not just about adopting new habits or practices, but about being transformed spiritually. Starting this new life is synonymous with beginning
to see sin. How could one be aware of sin, hate sin and stop sinning, given that
humanity is inherently sinful? Luther went deeper into this predicament in his
address to Pope Leo X in response to the Popes bull Exsurge Domine (1520):
This proverb is true and better than all the doctrines of contrition which they have
taught up till now, which says, To sin no more is the highest form of repentance,
and, A new life is the best repentance; that is to say, To turn from evil ways is
best.
If to sin no more is not the highest form of repentance, as everybody rightly
says, then what is the highest form of repentance? Speak up, O holy father pope,
we are ready to listen! O you wolf in Christendom, is it not true that to sin no
more is not only true contrition for sin but involves a change in the whole life?
Why, then, is it not the highest and best form of repentance? Where, through
Gods grace, contrition has truly started, there the whole man is at the same time
transformed into another man with another heart, another disposition, another
mind, and another life. This I call sinning no more and a new life.
Now, since the pope denies that to sin no more is the highest form of repentance, let us see what it is in his opinion. Surely, he will not say that to keep
on sinning is the best repentance, though, in fact, this is the way he and his followers do repent. The first letter of never is too much for them, and out of never
sinning they do make ever sinning. No wonder he says that Judas repentance
or gallows repentance is the best repentance. For this is brought about entirely
by the power of mans nature, without divine grace. It is utterly false, does not create a new life, and does not even stop from sinning as a result of any serious and
heartfelt intention. It has been shown above that without grace there is nothing
good in man, and even those who are living in grace must struggle against sin and
evil within. (LW, 32:39; italics mine)
True repentance, hence conversion, is all about sinning no more and a new life.
It presupposes a new way of seeing and experiencing things. The heart, the life, the
mind and all other dispositions come under the authority of God and turn away
from the worldly desires. This transition is dependent solely on the grace of God.
When Gods grace sets in, humanity is completely transformed, with another
heart, another disposition, another mind, and another life. Luther calls this sinning no more or a new life. The sinner has a change of heart and hates his sin.
There is an intimate connection between change of heart and seeing sin. Here
on earth, we are necessarily sinners, but the change brought about by conversion
changes our heart in such a way that we start hating sin.
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This aim of seeing sin is also related to a particular stance towards human
reason. The process a believer goes through requires an incessant attack on one
great enemy: the judgment of ones own human reason. Melanchthon pointed
out this problem in his writings on free will (liberum arbitrium). Because of free
will, human reason could flourish unbridled. Exactly this primacy of the judgment of human reason obfuscates the needed knowledge of Christ (see Loci 1521,
23). Melanchthon called the theologians the blind leaders of the blind. He often
repeated the idea that human reason can only misguide the believer and thus obfuscate Christian knowledge. It is blind in the sense that it does not help to gain
insight into the nature of sin and justification. Here, a human being can only hope
for God to enlighten him:
Therefore, it is to be hoped that God will change our minds from the judgment of
human reason and from philosophy to spiritual discernment. For the blindness of
human reason is such that we cannot recognize the full nature of sin or righteousness without the light of the Spirit. All the capacities of human reason
are mere shadows. The Spirit of Christ is light, and he alone teaches all truth.
The flesh or human reason cannot fix its eyes on the glowing countenance of
Moses, and therefore a veil shields the law. (Loci 1521, 47; italics mine)
Conversion, then, is also the process whereby God changes our minds from the
judgment of human reason to spiritual discernment. It ends our blindness and
compels us to recognize the full nature of sin.
Does the new life entail that one is no longer a sinner? That could never be
the case. According to Luther, the new life is a life where man is simul iustus et
peccator; we are righteous and sinners at the same time. To understand the role of
human beings in the process of conversion we need to understand this complex
idea. Luther explained it in the Lectures on Romans:
Man is always in nonbeing, in becoming, in being, always in privation, in potentiality,
in action, always in sin, in justification, in righteousness, that is, he is always a sinner,
always a penitent, always righteous. For the fact that he repents makes a righteous
man out of an unrighteous one. Thus repentance is the medium between unrighteousness and righteousness. And thus a man is in sin as the terminus a quo and
righteousness as the terminus ad quem. Therefore if we always are repentant, we are
always sinners, and yet thereby we are righteous and we are justified; we are in part
sinners and in part righteous, that is, we are nothing but penitents. Likewise, on the
other side, the ungodly, who depart from righteousness, hold a middle position
between sin and righteousness, but with a contrary direction. For this life is the
road to heaven or to hell. No one is so good that he does not become better, and
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no one so evil that he does not become worse, until at last we come to our final
state. The apostle [Paul] touches on this in a very effective way. He does not say:
Be transformed to the renewal, but by the renewal, or through the renewal,
or still better as it is in the Greek without a preposition: Be transformed by the
renewal of your mind. He adds the expression by the renewal so that he should
not appear to be teaching through the expression transformation something of
the transformation of an unstable mind or some renewal of an outward worship,
but rather renovation of the mind from day to day, more and more, in accord with the
statement in 2 Cor. 4:16: Our inner nature is being renewed every day, and Eph.
4:23: Be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and Col. 3:10: You have put on the
new man, which is being renewed. (LW, 25:433; italics mine)
Luther argued that the believer is always penitent, every single day, and, consequently, always sinner and righteous at the same time. Conversion is not a single
transformation bringing about renewal, but rather continuous renewal. Harran
explains that in his Lectures on Romans, Luther was struggling to determine and
formulate the place of humanity in the complex process of conversion. The only
thing he seems to be certain about at this stage is that the Christian is on the road
to righteousness:
Such a person is semper peccator, semper iustus, simultaneously justified and sinner.
Between these two poles of the Christian life, Luther places the phrase semper
penitens, always penitent. It means always converting to God from ones sins; always persevering in conversion. With this phrase he makes unequivocally clear
that conversion is at the very heart of Christian life and his own theology. (Harran
1983, 113)
Conversion must go hand in hand with the ongoing process of realising the iniquity of human nature. It must correct the blindness of human reason, which
would never allow one to start the transition from human preoccupations towards
spiritual preoccupations. This gives us another approximation of conversion. The
third approximation refers to the mechanism that restores the sight of the sinner
and makes one see ourselves and the world differently: one sees sin and deplores it
and realizes the ever present need for penance.
Conversion of the Law and conversion of the Gospel
As a mechanism that transforms our experience, conversion is connected to the
tension within Christianity between intellectual belief and genuine faiththe
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theological problem of fides quaerens intellectum. Luther pointed out that it is not
enough for a Christian to believe intellectually that Christ is the saviour of humankind; a true believer also experiences this. Conversion acts as the bridge that
renders a range of theological beliefs into lived experiences. Luther formulated
the problem as follows in the Lectures on Hebrews:
One should note that it is not enough for a Christian to believe that Christ was
appointed to act on behalf of men unless he believes that he, too, is one of those
menSt. Bernard speaks axiomatically in the following way: It is necessary for
you to believe that God can remit your sins, bestow grace on you and give glory to
you. And this is not enough, unless you believe with complete certainty that your
sins have been remitted, that grace has been bestowed on you, and that glory is
to be given to you. And this is the testimony of our consciencethe testimony
which the Spirit of God gives to our spiritFor, as St. Bernard says, the testimony
of the conscience is not understood as being of the kind that is to us from usfor
this is Pelagianand glory in shame, but as the testimony which our conscience
receives, just as it receives righteousness and truth, etc. Therefore it comes about
that no one attains grace because he is absolved or baptized or receives Communion or is anointed, but because he believes that he attains grace by being
absolved, baptized, receiving Communion, and being anointed in this way. For
that very commonly known and completely established statement is true, that it
is not the sacrament but faith in the sacrament that justifiesif they believe and
are confident that they will attain grace, this faith alone makes them pure and
worthythis faith which does not rely on those words but relies on the completely pure, holy, and firm Word of Christ(LW, 29:171).8
Conversion involves a different kind of knowledge, since it generates the personal

experience of Gods promise of grace. The believer needs to realize that Gods law
and His grace pertain to him personally. Simply believing is not sufficient; one
has to believe with complete certainty that ones sins are remitted and that grace
is bestowed. How can a person attain this deep faith? The Word of God is crucial
to bring this about. The ultimate disaster for the human being is deprivation from
the Word of God. This is synonymous with spiritual death.
The Word of God has two distinct roles in the process of conversion, or, put
differently, conversion has two aspects that reflect Gods revelation. First, the Law
This lecture was prepared for publication only in the twentieth century. The commentary is part of
Luthers work as a Professor of Bible at the University of Wittenberg (Introduction to Volume 29,
LW), where he taught on this letter in 1517-1518. Though we are less reliably informed about this
Lecture on Hebrews, so Jaroslav Pelikan notes, it remains abundantly clear that both in its form and
in its content this material comes from the man who, during the very months that he was lecturing
on Hebrews, was also achieving notoriety as the author of the Ninety-five Theses.
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of God brings us to despair; next, the promise of the Gospel saves us. Interpreting a verse from the BibleTurn ye unto me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will
turn unto you, saith the Lord of hosts (Zach 1:3)Luther explained how he
understood this relation. First, he objected to scholastic misinterpretations of this
verse, which presented it as evidence for free will. This is incorrect, said Luther,
as it would imply that the human being can freely chose to respond or not to the
workings of God in his heart. This was mistaken according to Luther, because it
wrongly derived a human abilityfree willfrom a verse telling man, not what
he can do, but what he should do. Luther gave this explanation in Lectures on Zechariah: The Latin Text (1526). He stressed that concerning spiritual matters our
human blindness is total if the grace of God is lacking. The only guide we have is
what we should do, namely, follow the law of God.
Luther described conversion as twofold: God turns to humanity (the conversion of the Gospel) and humanity to God (the conversion of the Law). This
turning never happens on the basis of human strength, but rather on the basis
of insight into the weakness of human beings. In fact, God does all the turning
himself. Humanity should only follow the law of God and attain insight into its
deplorable and sinful condition.
I am not told here what I can do but what I should do. You see, Return to Me,
etc., is the word of the Law. Consequently this text does not speak in favor of our
will but against free willIndeed, this turning is twofold. One is our turning to
God; the other is His to us. After all, it is one thing when God turns toward us,
and another when we turn to God. The Lord demands that we turn, not because this
is something we can accomplish by our own power, but rather that we may acknowledge
our own weakness and implore the help of the Spirit, whose prompting can turn us. This,
then, is the conversion caused by the Gospel. There is, you see, a twofold conversionthat
of the Gospel and that of the Law. The Law merely gives the command, but nothing is accomplished; something is accomplished, however, through the Gospel,
when the Spirit is added. He renews hearts, and then God turns toward us. This
is the conversion of peace, that is, that we are not merely righteous but also filled
with joy and find delight in Gods goodness. This is what Paul always wished the
Christians: Grace and peace. (LW, 20: 9; italics mine)
Luthers emphasis on the fact that the word of the law does not consist of the
things we can do as human beings, but of the things we should do is revealing. The
process of conversion starts, apparently, by following normative laws: things that
human beings ought to do (but cannot do). The role of the law of God is somewhat
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peculiar: not to make people follow certain rules and thereby lead good lives, but
to have them experience inability and failure.
Luther elaborated on how the law of God works. It tells us how we should
live. However, through our own efforts we cannot succeed in following the law
in all aspects of life. This inability to live up to the law gives humanity awareness
of our deficiency to live a life pleasing to God. We begin to experience our own
iniquity and corruption. This brings us to absolute despair. Only the help of God
can offer a way out of this state: he can give us the ability to live up to the law.
Therefore, the conversion of the gospel is required. Without the gospel, the law
would only create hypocrites, so Luther argued.9 Hence, the distinction between
the conversion of Law and the conversion of the Gospel is significant. The law
gives the command to the people to turn to God, but nothing is realized as human
beings fail to live up to it. The conversion of the Gospel, however, takes place when
God interferes through the Spirit. Then the heart of the believer gets renewed and
God turns towards man. Let us formulate the fourth approximation of conversion.
Inner conversion has two fundamental dimensions: the Law and the Gospel. The
first is characterized by terror, pain, agony, deficiency and failing; the second by
peace, joy, fulfilment and delight in Gods goodness.
In an interesting analogy in Lectures on Genesis, Luther points out that the Law alone is like the
raven: either it is a carrier of sin, or it creates hypocrites: The raven is indeed sent out: God wants
the Law to be taught, and He Himself reveals it; nay, He even writes it upon the hearts of all human
beingsFrom this natural knowledge have originated all the books of the more sensible philosophers, such as Aesop, Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, and Cato. It is a good idea to set these
books before uneducated and unruly individuals, that their wicked impulses may in some measure
be counteracted through this training. But really, if you inquire about peace of conscience and a sure
hope of eternal life, they are like the raven, which flies back and forth around the ark and finds no
peace outside, but does not seek it inside the ark either. It is as Paul says about the Jews (Rom. 9:31):
By following the righteousness of the Law Israel did not attain righteousness. The reason is that
the Law is like the raven: it is the ministry of death and sin, or it makes hypocrites. Now let anyone
who wants to do so enlarge on this allegory and investigate the peculiar features of this bird. It is an
impure animal, black and gloomy in color, with a hard beak and an unpleasant and doleful voice. It
scents carrion from any distance, and for this reason men shudder at its voice as though it were a sure
sign of an impending funeral. It feeds on carrion and likes places that are horrible because they are
used for public executions. Even though we do not apply all these features individually to the Law,
yet who is not aware that they fit the papists, priests, and monks very well? These men were not only
richly fed as a result of the consciences that were murdered through their false doctrine; but they
also drew on carrion for their support by making use of vigils, anniversaries, holy water at graves,
and even of purgatory to provide money. In fact, their concern for the dead brought them greater
gain than their concern for the living. They are truly ravens, for they live on carrion and screech dolefully while they sit on it. These characteristics fit the papists and the ravens well; but truly the entire
ministry of the papacy, even at its best, does nothing but mangle and murder consciences. It does not
lead to true righteousness; it merely produces hypocrites, just as the Law does too (LW, 2:160).
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The Law of God is the first step towards conversion. Consequently, conversion must begin with the experience of pain and helplessness, caused by the
knowledge of sin. What is the nature of this experience? Human beings can feel
helpless in all kinds of different circumstances: because severe illness struck them,
because a beloved one died, because they were attacked or raped, because they
have attacked or raped someone, because they are poor and hungry, etc. All these
can make us feel helpless and immoral. Why would such experiences compel us
to take recourse to God? Why not rather find a job, or tackle the situation which
makes one helpless? The helplessness caused by the Law of God is of another
kind, because its objects are spiritual matters and not earthly human affairs. It
arises out of the inability to follow the law of God and sets in motion the sense of
the need for God. Only through despair can human impotence be experienced as
the failure to please the all-merciful God. This implies that God is already at work
in the believer, because without His interference one would never be able to experience ones own iniquity. Again, faith precedes the experience of helplessness.
However, the Word of God guides us in a specific way, because it consists of
commandments and promises. The commandments are the Laws of God, which
should be obeyed by all. Their aim is not so much to bring the believers to despair,
but to show them their own inability, sin and need for God. Luther explained
the role of commandments and promises and their relation to each other in the
process of conversion:
Should you ask how it happens that faith alone justifies and offers us such a treasure of great benefits without works in view of the fact that so many works, ceremonies, and laws are prescribed in the Scriptures, I answer: First of all, remember
what has been said, namely, that faith alone, without works, justifies, frees, and
saves; we shall make this clearer later on. Here we must point out that the entire
Scripture of God is divided into two parts: commandments and promises. Although
the commandments teach things that are good, the things taught are not done as
soon as they are taught, for the commandments show us what we ought to do but do
not give us the power to do it. They are intended to teach man to know himself, that
through them he may recognize his inability to do good and may despair of his
own ability. That is why they are called the Old Testament and constitute the Old
Testament. (LW, 31:348; italics mine)
Luther gave the example of You shall not covet, a commandment that no one
can truly live up to, as no one can avoid coveting. Hence, trying to fulfil this commandment, man is compelled to despair of himself and to seek help. As we fare
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with respect to one commandment, so we fare with all, for it is equally impossible
for us to keep any one of them, the Reformer emphasized. They humble us:
Now when a man has learned through the commandments to recognize his helplessness and is distressed about how he might satisfy the lawsince the law must
be fulfilled so that not a jot or tittle shall be lost, otherwise man will be condemned without hopethen, being truly humbled and reduced to nothing in his
own eyes, he finds in himself nothing whereby he may be justified and saved. Here the
second part of Scripture comes to our aid, namely, the promises of God which
declare the glory of God, saying, If you wish to fulfil the law and not covet, as
the law demands, come, believe in Christ in whom grace, righteousness, peace,
liberty, and all things are promised you. If you believe, you shall have all things; if
you do not believe, you shall lack all things. That which is impossible for you to
accomplish by trying to fulfil all the works of the lawmany and useless as they
all areyou will accomplish quickly and easily through faith...Thus the promises of
God give what the commandments of God demand and fulfil what the law prescribes
so that all things may be Gods alone, both the commandments and the fulfilling of the
commandments. He alone commands, he alone fulfils. Therefore the promises of God
belong to the New Testament. Indeed, they are the New Testament. (LW, 31:348;
italics mine)
The Christian life is not all misery, since God comforts us through faith. If one
has faith, one will find peace of mind: That which is impossible for you to accomplish by trying to fulfil all the works of the lawyou will accomplish quickly
and easily through faith. God our Father has made all things depend on faith so
that whoever has faith will have everything, and whoever does not have faith will
have nothing As Harran (1983, 117-118) points out, Luther insisted that one
could not prepare for conversion through human effort: both the humbling force
of the Law and the saving promise of the Gospel are Gods work alone.
The great systematiser of Lutheran theology, Philipp Melanchthon, conceptualized the interplay between the Law of God and the power of the Gospel
in much the same way. The Law was found in the commandments of the Old
Testament. Melanchthon was at pains to emphasize that these commandments
are not just counsels but real commandments in the full sense of the word. They
are commanding. Also, they pertain to all human beings without exceptions. This
comes to the fore very clearly in his depictions of the counsels of the Catholics:
In this realm too the Sophists have erred shamefully and godlessly, for they have
made counsels from divine law. That is, they have taught that certain things are
not necessarily demanded by God, but only recommended, so that if anyone cares
to, he may obey, and they absolve the one who does not obey. For the most part,
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they derive the counsels from Matt., ch. 5: Love your enemies, do not resist evil,
avoid public lawsuits and fights, treat well those who deserve evil, forgive one
another, give to anyone who is needy even when there is no hope of repayment.
But we hold that all these things are demanded, and we number them among the
commandments (Loci 1521, 57). Melanchthon fervently opposed the idea that
human beings have the freedom to follow the law or not. Quite the opposite, it
is the duty of each believer to obey them. Bitingly, he remarked that there is only
one counsel in the Bible: that of celibacy. This is something human beings are
not obliged to follow, but can choose to.
Apart from the power of the law, there is the power of the gospel or the New
Testament. In this regard, the main difficulty that Melanchthon desired to tackle
was how a believer knows if God is working in his heart. The prime element in his
elaborations on this point resolves around getting insight into the sinful human
condition:
In the other class are those to whom the following passages apply: the law is the
power of sin, of wrath, etc. God reveals to them the law, shows them their hearts, and
terrifies and confuses them with a realization of their own sin. In a word, these are
the ones in whom God works through the law. Among hypocrites the law does
nothing, but they fashion a shadowy imitation of the law by their simulated, hypocritical righteousness. The law truly and properly works in those to whom sin is
revealed. (Loci 1521, 79; italics mine)
Sin and the realization of sin are how God opens the eyes of the believers to true
faith. This characteristic is extremely important, because it spells out the way to
initiate the process of conversion towards God. If one starts understanding human iniquity, the potential opens up to acquire the required knowledge of the law
of God. In fact, realizing sin is a sign of Gods work in the believer. It is a sign of
conversion taking place. The Law kills the judgment of reason: It [the Law] mortifies not only avarice and desire, but the root of all evils, our love of self, the judgment of reason, and whatever good our nature seems to possess. From this it will
be apparent how the moral virtues stink, and how the righteousness of the saints
is nothing but dirty, bloody rags (Loci 1521, 79; italics mine). It aims at bringing
about the awareness of sin, which replaces the initial consciousness of the law of
nature, shared by all human beings. Melanchthon continued to explain this:
To sum up, the proper work of the law is the revealing of sin, or, to put it more clearly, the bringing about of a consciousness of sin; Paul calls it the bond which stood
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against us with its legal demands (Col. 2/14)For what else is the consciousness
of sin than the judgment of the law revealing the sin in our heart? For that is what
Paul says in Col. 2;14: The bond which stood against us with its legal demands.
He means that the conscience is a bond, a bond with legal demands because through legal
demands, through the law, it stands against us. (Loci 1521, 82; italics mine)
The work of the law is to reveal sin, including external, internal, hypocrisy, unbelief, love of self, and contempt for or ignorance of Godwhich are certainly the
very roots of all human works (Loci 1521, 82).
Grace, according to Melanchthon, was another notion completely misunderstood by the scholastics: The worst of all offenders are the Thomists who have
placed the quality grace in the nature of the soul, and faith, hope, and love in the
powers of the soul. How old-womanish and stupid is the way they dispute about
the powers of the soul! (Loci 1521, 87) Melanchthon refused to accept that grace
could be understood as a quality in the nature of the human soul. The sole source
of grace is God and the power of the gospel. Just as law is the knowledge of sin, he
suggested, the gospel is the promise of grace and righteousness (see Loci 1521, 86).
Grace is nothing else, if it is to be most accurately defined, than Gods goodwill
towards us, or the will of God which has mercy on us. Therefore, the word grace
does not mean some quality in us, but rather the very will of God, or the goodwill
of God toward us (Loci 1521, 87). Gods promise of grace in Christ is the force
that saves us from the despair caused by human iniquity:
Therefore, we are justified when, put to death by the law, we are made alive again
by the word of grace promised in Christ; the gospel forgives our sins, and we cling
to Christ in faith, not doubting in the least that the righteousness of Christ is our righteousness, that the satisfaction Christ wrought is our expiation, and that the resurrection
of Christ is ours. In a word, we do not doubt at all that our sins have been forgiven
and that God now favors us and wills our good. Nothing, therefore, of our own
works, however good they may seem or be, constitutes our righteousness. But
FAITH alone in the mercy and grace of God in Jesus Christ is our RIGHTEOUSNESS. (Loci 1521, 89-90; italics mine)
Melanchthon put the same two pillars at the centre of the process of turning towards God: Law and Gospel; commandments and promises; sin and grace.
Given this interplay between commandments and promises, the process of
conversion is in all its aspects the work of God. The absolute inability of humanity
to contribute anything to conversion was perhaps nowhere stated as strongly as in
Calvins Institutes. At first sight, his emphasis on knowledge may seem to point
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in the opposite direction. However, knowledge should teach man two things, Calvin pointed out: fear and reverence, on the one hand; to seek the good and credit it
to God, on the other hand. Knowledge is the means through which man can realize that his life is wickedly corrupt unless it be disposed to his service, seeing that
his will ought for us to be the law by which we live (Inst., I, ii, 2; McNeill 1960, 42;
italics mine). Even though in Calvins view the knowledge of man is intimately
related to the knowledge of God, they can also be distinguished. The relation
between the two is not chronological, but almost paradoxical: the route towards
knowledge of God goes through the knowledge of oneself and at the same time
one cannot gain knowledge of oneself without the standard of Gods Law.
Here also, the knowledge spoken about is not doctrinal or theoretical knowledge; the basis of knowledge is the experience of helplessness and humility in front
of the greatness of God. This implies that to attain this knowledge certain stages
of experience will have to be stimulated. A human being needs guidance in order
to walk along this path. The knowledge of God that we need does not have to be
taught or studied or understood intellectually, so Calvin points out, it is a kind
of knowledge which God has given from the start to each and every human being, therefore all have inherited an idea of God: From this we conclude that it is
not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one of which each of us is
master from his mothers womb and which nature itself permits no one to forget,
although many strive with every nerve to this end (Inst., I, iii, 3; McNeill 1960,
46; see also Inst., I, iii, 2; McNeill 1960, 44-45). The idea of God and His law cannot be wiped out of the human mind, even though some incessantly try to do so.
Even though the seed of religion cannot be destroyed completely, all of humanity
cannot but corrupt it (Inst., I, iv, 1-2), as Calvins section goes: This knowledge is
either smothered or corrupted, Partly by ignorance, partly by malice. However,
if all knowledge of God is degenerated, humanity cannot know the standard of His
law. According to Calvin, we indeed lack the natural ability to attain pure and
clear knowledge of God. To alter our condition, all reliance on human laws, additions, prescriptions, vows and works has to be stopped. People should also not
follow human reason to speculate about the characteristics of God. People should
have faith in the grace of God to be converted and have a will which is under the
guidance of God:
Because of the bondage of sin by which the will is held bound, it cannot move
toward good, much less apply itself thereto; for a movement of this sort is the beginning of conversion to God, which in Scripture is ascribed to Gods graceNonethe-
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less the will remains, with the most eager inclination disposed and hastening to
sin. For man, when he gave himself over to his necessity, was not deprived of will,
but of soundness of will. Not inappropriately Bernard teaches that to will is in us
all: but to will good is gain; to will evil, loss. Therefore, simply to will is of man; to
will ill, of a corrupted nature; to will well, of grace. (Inst., II, iii, 5; McNeill 1960,
294-295; italics mine)
Left to our own human abilities, we cannot but will evil and corrupt whatever
good God has given us. Therefore, from the start of this process of gaining knowledge, God must be at work to make us will good. This is the power of the grace of
God. This implies that, if one attains the true knowledge of humanity, it is thanks
to the interference of God. Without this godly interference man will not go far
in attaining knowledge, neither of himself, nor of God. Calvin formulated human
corruption and limitations poignantly, when he said that simply to will is the part
of man, to will ill the part of corrupt nature, to will well the part of grace (Inst., II,
iii, 5-14; McNeill 1960, 294-309). Fascinatingly, human thought and all human
capacities are nothing but obstacles to conversion.
Faith
Essential for the believer is to put his trust entirely in God and not to doubt the
promise of grace in Christ. Faith is not opinion. As Melanchthon put it, obviously faith is not that opinion concerning beliefs or divine history which hypocrites
have conceived without the Holy Spirit. Nature does not assent to the Word of God,
and moreover is not moved by it (Loci 1521, 91). Faith is entirely different from
opinion or belief. It is related to trust, belief and goodwill: Accordingly, faith
is nothing else than trust in the divine mercy promised in Christ, and it makes no difference with what sign it has been promised. This trust in the goodwill or mercy
of God first calms our hearts and then inflames us to give thanks to God for his
mercy so that we keep the law gladly and willingly (Loci 1521, 92). As he emphasized elsewhere: You now have the way in which Scripture uses the word faith;
it means to trust in the gracious mercy of God without any respect to our works, whether
they be good or bad. For we all receive of the fullness of Christ. Those who so trust
now really assent to every word of God, both to the threats and the promises of divine history. Scholastic faith is nothing but a dead opinion (Loci 1521, 93). Or in
other words: In a word, he who has Christ has all things and can do all things, for in
him are righteousness, peace, life, and salvation. And you see that in this way the
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divine promises harmonize. For they are simply individual marks and testimonies
of Gods goodwill toward us, which he commends and brings home to us at one
time with a work, at another time with a gift (Loci 1521, 103-104; italics mine).
In this way, Melanchthon explained the notion of justification by faith alone:
Why is it that justification is attributed to faith alone? I answer that since we are
justified by the mercy of God alone, and faith is clearly the recognition of that mercy by
whatever promise you apprehend it, justification is attributed to faith alone. Let those
who marvel that justification is attributed to faith alone marvel also that justification is attributed only to the mercy of God, and not rather to human merits. For
to trust in divine mercy is to have no confidence in any of our own works. (Loci
This notion of faith leads to a particular understanding of morality. Acts and deeds
in this world, whether good or bad, convey nothing about the core of the human
being. In fact, morality does not lie in the deeds a person performs, but only in
the absence or presence of faith. The question is not whether someone performs
good or bad actions, but whether a person is good or bad. In fact, before justification, all human acts are necessarily doomed, however noble they may seem. As
Melanchthon explained, an accursed treeeach and every human beingcan
only produce accursed fruits:
All those of the accursed tree are accursed fruits. Although they are examples of the
finest virtues, comparable to the righteousness of Paul before his conversion, yet
they are nothing but deceit and treachery because they have their source in an
unclean heart. Uncleanness of heart consists of the lack of knowledge of God,
not fearing God, not trusting God, and not seeking after God, as we have shown
above. (Loci 1521, 105; italics mine)
Before God has converted it, the heart is unclean and can only bring about unclean deeds; a clean heart brings about good deeds. External human deeds in the
world, however, can give us no clue which one of the two is the case. Human beings cannot judge other peoples acts as they do not have the criteriaonly God
has themto distinguish a clean from an unclean heart. This is crucial for the
understanding of morality. Good deeds in this world do exist, but they are solely
the result of the workings of the Spirit in the believer. They are signs of Gods
presence, as Melanchthon said: Now, we must also consider that works as fruits
of the spirit are marks, testimonies, and signs of his presence (Loci 1521, 109).
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As Christians, our deeds should reveal the Spirit working in us. The demands are
very high:
Let godliness accompany steadfastness, so that we bear adversaries calmly, not
only before men, but also before God, giving thanks to him who mortifies us. We
should not be indignant at the will of God and groan against it as the Israelites
did who perished in the desert. Let godliness bring about brotherly affection. This
means that we should do good to the very ones who persecute us, that we may
attract our enemies by our good deeds. Finally, all this should originate in a sincere
heart in order that we may love all men equally and candidly. You have here the sum
and substance of the whole Christian life, faith with its fruits. Nor is there any reason
why we should divide the types and forms of virtues into moral and theological as
the philosophers and Scholastics do. Nor need we distinguish between the gifts
and fruits in the way Aquinas and his followers foolishly did. Faith is in a class by
itself. It is a sense of the mercy of God which is the source, the life, and the director of all
good works. (Loci 1521, 110; italics mine)
Central in the Christian life are faith and the resulting deeds. Faith is a class apart
and only God its source. Thus, God is also the source of all good deeds; human
beings can only bring forth corrupt deeds.
Another aspect of faith, Melanchthon explained, is its personal dimension.
Faith is not only the belief that God does all these things, but also that he does
them for me. The personal realization of the saving power of the law and the gospel
is crucial. Conversion contains this individual moment. Melanchthon touched
upon this issue by posing the question: Can a human being know if he has faith in
his heart or not? Here he emphasized the significance of the personal realization
of Gods grace: It will not be useless to give some suggestions on a matter which
I see is being debated everywhere, namely, how a man may know whether he is
in the grace of God and whether it can be known that faith dwells in our hearts
(Loci 1521, 112-113). According to Melanchthon, a conscience completely left to
itself would always sink into despair. Therefore, those who really have faith should
know that the grace of God is with them. Put differently, if you really believe that
Gods will is also His will for you, you will know that your God is kind:
First, as far as the divine will is concerned, faith is nothing else than a sure and
constant trust in Gods goodwill toward us. The will of God is known but it is known
from the promise of the gospel, by faith. For you do not attribute true glory to God if you
do not believe that God wills as he has given witness in the gospel. Those who believe
the Word of God, and who judge the will of God from his Word, and not from
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our merits, know that they are in the grace of God, that is, that they have a kind
God. (Loci 1521, 113)
We must be certain about grace and Gods goodwill toward us (Loci 1521, 114).
Once one realizes that Gods will is also His will for oneself, one is leading a
Christian life. Here, the importance of a personal realization becomes central. A
Christian life does not rest in the abstract belief that God saves human beings,
but in the personal acceptance of divine grace in ones personal life; God is graceful to me: With experience as its teacher, a Christian mind will easily learn that
Christianity is nothing else than a life that is certain of the mercy of God (Loci
1521, 114). Personal experience stands central here. The process of conversion is
all about a change of experience, which can only be attained with the help of God.
Again, Melanchthon stresses that, through human reason, we cannot discern between the godly and the godless by external events as human reason thinks (Loci
1521, 116).
According to Calvin also, faith is crucial to start conversion, but faith does
not come alone, it goes hand in hand with repentance. True repentance needs
true faith and vice versa. But, Calvin warns us: Yet, when we refer the origin of
repentance to faith we do not imagine some space of time during which it brings
it to birth; but we mean to show that a man cannot apply himself seriously to
repentance without knowing himself to belong to God. But no one is truly persuaded that he belongs to God unless he has first recognized Gods grace (Inst.,
III, iii, 2; McNeill 1960, 594). This looks suspiciously like a loop: repentance does
not generate faith; Gods grace makes it possible to recognize God as the sole saviour and thus incites true repentance. To Calvin, the idea of a few days of repentance was ridiculous. But lacking any semblance of reason is the madness of those
who, that they may begin from repentance, prescribe to their new converts certain
days during which they must practice penance, and when these at length are over,
admit them into communion of the grace of the gospel (ibid.). At his time, some
groupsnotably the Anabaptists and the Jesuitsso Calvin recounted, were content if their converts dedicated a few days to repentance to obtain the grace of
God. In fierce opposition to such practices Calvin emphasized that repentance is
a life-long process:
this restoration does not take place in one moment or one day or one year; but
through continual and sometimes even slow advances God wipes out in his elect
the corruptions of the flesh, cleanses them of guilt, consecrates them to himself as
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temples renewing all their minds to true purity that they may practice repentance
throughout their lives and know that this warfare will end only at deaththe
closer any man comes to the likeness of God, the more the image of God shines
in him. In order that believers may reach this goal, God assigns to them a race
of repentance, which they are to run throughout their lives. (Inst., III, iii, 9; McNeill
1960, 601-602; italics mine)
Faith and repentance reinforce each other and together they help us to understand
what conversion is:
Indeed, I am aware of the fact that the whole of conversion to God is understood
under the term repentance, and faith is not the least part of conversion; but in
what sense this is so will very rapidly appear when its force and nature are explained. The Hebrew word for repentance is derived from conversion or return;
the Greek word, from change of mind or of intention. And the thing itself corresponds closely to the etymology of both words. The meaning is that, departing
from ourselves, we turn to God, and having taken off our former mind, we put on a
new. On this account, in my judgment, repentance can thus be well defined: it is
the true turning of our life to God, a turning that arises from a pure and earnest fear
of him; and it consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man, and in the
vivification of the Spirit. (Inst., 3, III, 5; McNeill 1960, 597; italics mine)
Conversion is the mortification of the old man by turning to God and hence
taking up a new mind. Conversion is a vivification of the Spirit. This happens
through different phases and elements: departing from ourselves; turning to God;
taking off a former mind; taking up a new mind. Calvin seemed to use the terms
conversion and repentance almost interchangeably. He explained this notion of
turning further in a section of the Institutions titled Repentance as turning to
God. Here, we find the core of Calvins understanding of conversion: First, when
we call it a turning of life to God, we require a transformation, not only in
outward works, but in the soul itself. Only when it puts off its old nature does it
bring forth the fruits of works in harmony with its renewal. The prophet, wishing
to express this change, bids whom he calls to repentance to get themselves a new
heart (Inst., III, iii, 6; McNeill 1960, 598).
Fear of God is crucial in the development of repentance and conversion.
Calvin identified this dimension as a necessary component for it prompts people
to realize their corruption and to repent. This fear of God spoken about is the fear
for the divine judgement of humanity. According to Calvin, humanity needs the
constant threat in order to work constantly:
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repentance proceeds from an earnest fear of God. For, before the mind of the
sinner inclines to repentance, it must be aroused by thinking upon divine judgement. When this thought is deeply and thoroughly fixed in mindthat God
will someday mount his judgment seat to demand a reckoning of all works and
deedsit will not permit the miserable man to rest nor to breathe freely even
for a moment without stirring him continually to reflect upon another mode of
life whereby he may be able to stand firm in that judgment...For if we were not
sharply pricked, the slothfulness of our flesh could not be correctedThere is,
besides, an obstinacy that must be beaten down as if with hammers. Therefore, the
depravity of our nature compels God to use severity in threatening us. For it would be
vain for him gently to allure those who are asleep. (Inst., III, iii, 7; McNeill 1960,
599; italics mine)
There is the constant hazard of drowning for human beings. Heiko Oberman
(1991, 134) summarizes this aspect of Calvins theology beautifully:
Calvin was at once driven by the ever present awareness (meditatio!) of the threat
of drowning in the abyss of death, devil, and hell, and drawn by a deep seated trust
in the promise of Gods saving intervention. To him applies not the expression
come hell or high water; the diabolical abyss is hell and high water. Yet the mercy
of God subdues and swallows the power of the Beast, so forcefully formulated in
his outcry: Abyssus tuae misericordiae hanc peccati mei abyssum absorbeat
May the abyss of my sin be drowned into the abyss of Your mercy.
These twin moments of drowning in the abyss of sin and being drawn to the saving promise of God were related to the twin forces of the Law and the Gospel. As
Calvin understood it, conversion implies that living according to the law of God
dovetails with a negation of the human nature:
For when they recall man from evil, they demand the destruction of the whole
flesh, which is full of evil and of perversity. It is a very hard and difficult thing to
put off ourselves and to depart from our inborn disposition. Nor can we think of
the flesh as completely destroyed unless we have whipped out whatever we have
from ourselves. But since all emotions of the flesh are hostility against God [cf.
Rom.8:7], the first step toward obeying his law is to deny our own nature. (Inst., III,
iii, 8; McNeill 1960, 600; italics mine)
Of course, Calvin noted, humanity faces tremendous difficulties in surmounting

our natural dispositions. In this sense he sees the process as a mortification of the
flesh followed by a vivification of the Spirit. A certain kind of force is needed to
bring this about: For from mortification we infer that we are not conformed to
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the fear of God and do not learn the rudiments of piety, unless we are violently
slain by the sword of the Spirit and brought to nought. As if God had declared
that for us to be reckoned among his children our common nature must die!
(ibid.). The process of conversion therefore involves a struggle against human nature and human will. Crucial for the success of this struggle is the rebirth of man
in Christ: If we share in his resurrection, through it we are raised up into the
newness of life to correspond with the righteousness of God. Therefore, in a word,
I interpret repentance as regeneration, whose sole end is to restore in us the image
of God that has been disfigured and all but obliterated through Adams transgression (Inst., III, iii, 9; McNeill 1960, 601).
Christ and the Spirit
To progress spiritually, humanity needs additional help from God. That help is
offered via different routes, namely, Scripture, the Holy Spirit and Christ. The
Holy Spirit, Calvin explained, is the how Christ binds humans to him. We have
to internalize Christ, since he had to become ours and to dwell within usfor,
as I have said, all that he possesses is nothing to us until we grow into one body
with him. It is true that we obtain this by faith (Inst., III, i, 1; McNeill 1960, 537).
As long as Christ remains outside, we cannot benefit from His saving grace. The
Holy Spirit produces a deep and intimate union between the believer and Christ,
pivotal to conversion towards God.
How can a believer attain this? Simply accepting Christ as the saviour is
insufficient. Humans need to feel united with Christ and grow one with him. As
Calvin pointed out, until our minds become intent upon the Spirit, Christ, so to
speak, lies idle because we coldly contemplate him as outside ourselves indeed,
far from us...This union alone ensures that, as far as we are concerned, he has not
unprofitably come with the name of SaviorBut he united himself to us by the
Spirit alone. By the grace and power of the same Spirit we are made his members,
to keep us under himself and in turn to possess him (Inst., III, i, 3; McNeill 1960,
541). Formulated differently, conversion requires inward change. God and Christ
are no longer objects that humanity can coldly contemplate. On the contrary, we
can now grow in faith. Calvin recounted how this change occurred:
First, God lays down for us through the law what we should do; if we then fail in
any part of it, that dreadful sentence of eternal death which it pronounces will rest
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upon us. Secondly, it is not only hard, but above our strength and beyond all our
abilities, to fulfill the law to the letter; thus, if we look to ourselves only, and ponder what condition we deserve, no trace of good hope will remain; but cast away
by God, we shall lie under eternal death. Thirdly, it has been explained that there
is but one means of liberation that can rescue us from such miserable calamity: the
appearance of Christ the Redeemer, through whose hand the Heavenly Father,
pitying us out of his infinite goodness and mercy, willed to help us; if, indeed, with
firm faith we embrace this mercy and rest in it with steadfast hope. (Inst., III, ii,
1; McNeill 1960, 542-543)
In other words, faith in Christ is a matter of life and death. Opposing the idea
of implicit faith, Calvin stated that faith rests firmly on knowledge of God and
of the law and the will of God. Only trust in the merciful God, through Christ,
can arouse true faith: faith which is based on knowledge of Gods will. As Calvin
explains:
Bedecking the grossest ignorance with this term [implicit faith], they ruinously
delude poor, miserable folk. Furthermore, to state truly and frankly the real fact
of the matter, this fiction not only buries but utterly destroys true faith. Is this
what believing meansto understand nothing, provided only that you submit
your feeling obediently to the church? Faith rests not on ignorance, but on knowledge. And this is, indeed, knowledge not only of God but of the divine will...We do
not obtain salvation either because we are prepared to embrace as true whatever
the church has prescribed, or because we turn over to it the task of inquiring and
knowing. But we do so when we know that God is our merciful Father, because of reconciliation effected through Christand that Christ has been given to us as righteousness,
sanctification, and life. By this knowledge, I say, not by submission of our feeling,
do we obtain entry into the Kingdom of Heaven. (Inst., III, ii, 2; McNeill 1960,
544-545; italics mine)
Faith and knowledge are intimately connected here. However, the knowledge
Calvin referred to is not a theoretical or speculative knowledge which man can
reach through his intellect. It is an experiential knowledge giving the insight that
God has reconciled us to Him through Christ. This kind of knowledge and faith
are based on the divine revelation of the truth: faith is a knowledge of Gods will
towards us, perceived from his Word. Its foundation is a preconceived conviction
of gods truth. Moreover: As for its certainty, so long as your mind is at war with
itself, the Word will be of doubtful and weak authority, or rather of none. And it
is not even enough to belief that God is trustworthywho can neither deceive
nor lieunless you hold to be beyond doubt that whatever proceeds from him is
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sacred and inviolable truth (Inst., III, ii, 6; McNeill 1960, 549). To put it crudely:
to be able to have faith (and to start conversion), humanity already has to believe
in the true God. To the twenty-first-century reader, this may look like a vicious
circle: How can one attain faith? By having firm belief (faith) in God and his
promises. The
real believer does not doubt the will and the promises of God. Conversion is the process in which all these elements fall together: turning to God,
living according to the will of God, believing in God, having trust in God. From
a theological point of view, there is no problem in the apparent circularity: since
God is the source of all these things, all can be realized at once in the moment of
the infusion of divine grace. But from the perspective of human reason, the issue
is more complicated. The different moments of acceptance of a belief and making
it into a lived experience fall apart. Calvin recognizes this problem (Inst., III, ii,
18; McNeill 1960, 564):
the godly heart feels in itself a division because it is partly imbued with sweetness from its recognition of the divine goodness, partly grieves in bitterness from
an awareness of its calamity; partly rests upon the promise of the gospel, partly
trembles at the evidence of its own iniquity; partly rejoices at the expectation of
life, partly shudders at death. This variation arises from imperfection of faith, since
in the course of the present life it never goes so well with us that we are wholly cured of
the disease of unbelief and entirely filled and possessed by faith. Hence arise those conflicts; when unbelief, which reposes in the remains of the flesh, rises up to attack
the faith that has been inwardly conceived. (Italics mine)
In this life on earth the human state is always liable to the disease of unbelief. This
is the reason why conversion to God necessarily consists of struggle. This brings
us to another element central to Calvins view of conversion, namely, the role of
Christ as intermediary. Christ can help human beings to overcome this situation
of constant struggle:
For God would have remained hidden afar off if Christs splendor had not beamed
upon us. For this purpose the Father laid up with his only-begotten Son all that he
had to reveal himself in Christ so that Christ, by communicating his Fathers benefits,
might express the true image of his glory [cf. Heb. 1:3]. It has been said that we must
be drawn by the Spirit to be aroused to seek Christ; so, in turn, we must be warned
that the invisible Father is to be sought solely in this image. (Inst., 3, II, 1; McNeill
Without Christ, God would remain hidden for man. But Christ communicates
knowledge of God to humanity and humanity must seek the image of Christ.
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Revealing in this passage is how, in Christ, two crucial elements of the process of turning towards God coincide: the aim on which humanity has to focus
(God) and the route humanity should follow to reach that aim ( Jesus Christ).
Calvin illustrated this with the words of Augustine: Augustine has finely spoken
of this matter: in discussing the goal of faith, he teaches that we must know our
destination and the way to it. Then, immediately after, he infers that the way that
is most fortified against all errors is he who was both God and men: namely, as God he
is the destination to which we move; as man, the path by which we go. Both are found
in Christ alone (ibid.; italics mine). This appears peculiar: Christ enables man to
progress towards God, he is the route to follow and, at the same time, Christ is
the ideal to reach.10 In other words, the route to the ideal and the ideal seem to
fall together. This implies that the process of turning towards God (or the process
of conversion) and the end of being turned to God (or being converted) coincide.
The problem is that humanity has to fulfill the ideal from the beginning of the
route. To formulate it a bit paradoxically, humanity already needs to be converted
in order to be able to go through the process of conversion.
This has another consequence also: the ideal is not something to gradually fulfill, but rather the standard to measure mans shortcomings. As we know the ideal is Christ, man cannot
but experience immense failure. Man cannot but fail to realize the union between
himself and Christ. The only solution is the intervention of God uniting the two.
He does this through the Holy Spirit and faith. This has implication for bringing
people into the fold of this religion, for converting them into Christians: the ideal
is not something to look up to and progress towards, but it functions as a continuous
source of failure.
Humanity does not possess the power to live like Christ but needs the support of the Spirit to do so. Only the Spirit can provide the necessary power to
start the process of conversion, but this requires a special kind of attitude in man:
man has to open up to the Spirit and be ready to see it whenever it shows itself.
Calvin again:
I say, therefore, that they sin against the Holy Spirit who, with evil intention, resist Gods truth, although by its brightness they are so touched that they cannot claim
ignorance. Such resistance alone constitutes this sin...But they whose consciences,
though convinced that what they repudiate and impugn is the Word of God, yet
cease not to impugn it these are said to blaspheme against the Spirit, since they
Harran (1983, 120) notes the same paradox in Luthers theology, where Christ is both exemplum
and sacramentum: As sacramentum He suffered and died in order to free man from sin. As exemplum
He acts as guide for the Christian in tuning away from sin and toward God.
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strive against the illumination that is the work of the Holy Spirit. (Inst., III, iii, 22;
McNeill 1960, 617-618; italics mine)
If the Spirit illuminates humanity, we should not resist. If we resists, this is blasphemy. It is blasphemous because it reveals the human pretention to be able to
resist God. This teaches us more about the attitude a human being should have
in conversion: he should be open and receiving, and let God do his work in us.
Resisting this work is resisting God. Conversion is God working in humanity,
whether he likes it or not. It is not up to us to take or leave conversion. Calvin explained that the human will cannot choose whether to obey or resist conversion,
Gods activity does not produce a possibility that we can exhaust, but an actuality to
which we cannot add (Inst., II, iii, 10; McNeill 1960, 303):
He does not move the will in such a manner as has been taught and believed for
many agesthat it is afterward in our choice either to obey or resist the motion
but by disposing it efficaciously. Therefore one must deny that oft-repeated statement of Chrysostom: Whom he draws he draws willing. By this he signifies
that the Lord is only extending his hand to await whether we will be pleased to
receive his aid. We admit that mans condition while he still remained upright was
such that he could incline to either side. But inasmuch as he has made clear by his
example how miserable free will is unless God both wills and is able to work in
us, what will happen to us if he imparts his grace to us in this small measure? But
we ourselves obscure it and weaken it by our unthankfulness. For the apostle does
not teach that the grace of a good will is bestowed upon us if we accept it, but that
He wills to work in us. This means nothing else than that the Lord by his Spirit directs,
bends, and governs, our heart and reigns in it as in his own possession. (italics mine)
Conversion happens efficaciously. Calvin feels the need to stress that man does
not decide whether or not God can draw him towards Him. Conversion is all
about God working in man, guiding, turning and governing the human heart.
God reigns over the human heart as his own possession.
The Role of the Conscience
So far we have neglected an important agent in the process of conversion, namely, the conscience. Luther talked about the testimony of our consciencethe
testimony which the Spirit of God gives to our spirit and about the testimony of
the conscience which is the testimony which our conscience receives. The conscience is like a module within us that belongs to the spiritual sphere and is under
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the guidance of Gods Law. We know from the Reformers critique of medieval
society and religion that they were convinced that human beings could not impact
upon the spiritual domain. If no human thing can influence the spiritual, does
this entail that the conscience (as the Reformers understand and describe it) is
not human?
What is the conscience? Let us begin with Luthers famous reference to his
conscience at the Diet of Worms on April 18, 1521. According to a biographer,
Luther said: My conscience is captive to the Word of Godthus I cannot or will
not recant, for going against conscience is neither safe nor salutary. I can do no
other, here I stand, God help me. Amen (Oberman 1989, 203). This notion of the
captive conscience shows the intimate link between God and the conscience.
When we look at different uses of Luther of the word conscience, we acquire some idea of what the conscience is related to.11 Let us briefly sum up some
of its properties: conscience seems to be within a human being and can be heard
by a human being; it is impossible for the conscience to betray itself; it can convict one of sins and of lies; one can be accused by ones conscience; human beings
can also sin against the conscience; in ones conscience one can feel that one is
guilty; God can have a hold on the conscience; God can comfort the conscience;
the Law of God can gain control in the conscience; God can be heard and felt in
the conscience; the heathen has no knowledge of the conscience; a conscience can
condemn Satan; we can harden ourselves against our conscience; a conscience can
be evil; it can also make one free and relaxed about things; it can experience Gods
wrath; it can know whether we are doing something, because it has been commanded by God; it can be frightenedtruly frightenedfor example by the Law
of God or by the sight of its sins; the conscience is roused by the sting of the Law;
when a conscience is convicted by the Law of God, human beings are terrified and
live in fear and terror; a conscience can despair and adopt illicit defenses and remedies; the Law frightens the conscience, it cannot make it sure or strengthen it;
the conscience makes man experience how he cannot live up to the law and how
man incessantly does the opposite of what man ought to do; consciences can be
murdered, for example by the papacy and the monasteries; consciences can be tortured, also by popes for example; spiritual evils worry and torture the conscience;
a conscience can be polluted when it is violated.
See Luthers sermon on the Three Kinds of Good Life for the Instruction of Consciences (1521), Lectures on Genesis (1535-1536), Lectures on Galatians (1535), Freedom of a Christian (1520).
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When we consider these properties of the conscience, it becomes clear that

the conscience is crucial to the process of conversion, because it appears to be the
link where the divine and the human meet. A conscience, according to Luther,
exists within a human being and can be heard by a human being, but it is not
governed by the earthly man. It is impossible for the conscience to betray itself:
the conscience knows. Therefore it is in the conscience that a human being can
feel that he is guilty. Similarly, a joyful conscience is related to a confident heart,
to having knowledge of Christ and to having the gifts of the Holy Spirit (LW,
26:439). In other words, it is related to being converted.
The conscience is the faculty that incessantly points out the chasm between
the acts of sinful human beings on earth and how we ought to act and live, namely
in accordance with the will and law of God. Before the fall, human beings would
not have been in need of a conscience, because they lived in perfect harmony: they
lived in complete accord with the will of God. There was no chasm. After the fall,
humanity became sinful and acquired an innate faculty constantly revealing the
iniquity of our acts on earth: the conscience. The precondition for the existence of
this faculty is the innateness of the law of God. The presence of the law of God in
the human mind enables the workings of the conscience.
One can only understand the meaning of god-fearing, if one understands
the role of the conscience in the process of conversion. Being God-fearing has the
positive connotation of being a true believer, but why would a true believer have
to be afraid of God? Following the Protestant understanding of the Christian
religion and its process of conversion, it is impossible for a true believer not to be
god-fearing. Why not? A conscience roused and alive cannot but tremble in fear.
This is the only apt attitude. The law of God rouses the conscience, in the sense
that it points out the gap between sinful life on earth and a life according to the
law of God. Therefore, humanity can only react in two ways: try to escape, ignore,
or harden oneself against the conscience; or listen to the conscience and tremble
before the sight of ones sins. Taking the first route, man pollutes and harms his
conscience more than he can imagine. His conscience becomes evil and turns
away from God. Through the second route, we become god-fearing; we realize
how sinful, debased and polluted we are. This is intolerable and painful. But only
this route allows us to start seeing the comfort God offers in his promises, the
Gospel. Consequently, the individual conscience became a crucial player in the
process of conversion during the Reformation.
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The conscience is also where the struggle with the flesh takes place. Schtz
Zell, for instance, prayed to God to ask for strength against the temptations of
the flesh. She requested God to not let us relax into a false, wicked, hypocritical
conscience by which we persuade ourselves that we have forgiven our debtors and
that we wish them well and so we only cloak our hearts and consciences with a
false show when there is actually nothing there (ibid., 169). Temptation is related
to the false and wicked conscience that misleads the believer. The battle against
such temptations is always ongoing and humanity needs God to be able to make
it: O dear Father, help us! In the lament and afflictions of our conscience let us
not become exhausted in battle and fall away like Judas and with him bear forever
the gnawing undying worm. But with Peter and Mary Magdalene let us weep for
our sins, come to repentance, and achieve much love and so be received by You
through Jesus Christ, comforted and strengthened, our faith increased and our
unbelief helped (ibid., 170). All this makes the human need for the help of God
abundantly clear and proceeding towards the end of her analysis of Our Father,
Zell formulated another plea for conversion in which all that is needed from God
comes together:
O righteous Father, also help us to be strengthened and made sure by You, to
break through the afflictions of this flesh and be able to enter through the narrow
gate. Grant us Your Spirit of knowledge and strength, that we may not deny You
[in this temptation of the enemytrans.] because of the sin that sticks in our
flesh with evil desires and unceasingly stirs it upTherefore the flesh struggles
against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh and its evil fruits. So there is a
great conflict and struggle in us: we have the will but we do not have the ability to
fulfil it, yet both of these are Yours. O holy Father, grant us help that in his affliction we may not be servants of sin but may overcome sin and be free children of
Your grace through Jesus ChristHowever, as long as there is this great struggle
in us and we are weak and fleshy, strengthen us, dear Father. Grant us weapons
to fight against such afflictions and sins so that we may put on Your yoke against
the cunning assault of the devil and our fleshBy that, dear Father, through Your
help we may not deny You in the afflictions and temptations of this world, even
though poverty, sickness, insult, exile, prison, torment, and death comes upon us.
O God, we could not pass through these dangers if we were abandoned and if You
did not bring us out of them; therefore help us and grant that we may from the
heart entrust ourselves to You and set ourselves willingly to obey You through the
crucified Jesus. (ibid., 170; italics mine)
Melanchthon discussed the relation between Law and conscience. According to

him: Law is a judgment by which the good is commanded and the bad forbidden
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(Loci 1521, 49). He first spoke of the law of nature and then of the Law of God.
Referring to Paul in Rom 2:15, he stated that God has engraved the law of nature
in the hearts of all people; this takes the form of the conscience:
He comes to the conclusion that there is in the Gentiles a conscience which either
defends or accuses their acts, and therefore it is law. For what is conscience but a judgment of our deeds which is derived from some law or common rule? The law of
nature, therefore, is a common judgment to which all men give the same consent.
This law which God has engraved on the mind of each is suitable for the shaping of morals. For just as there are certain common principles in the theoretical branches of
learning, in mathematics, for instanceso there are certain common axioms and
a priori principles in the realm of morals; these constitute the ground rules for all
human activityThese rules for human activity are rightly called laws of nature.
(Loci 1521, 50; italics mine)
Here also, the conscience is crucial in the process one goes through to find God.
The conscience judges the acts of the human being. Primarily, it falls back on the
law of nature that God has written in each and every mind. But the more the
conscience is formed and developed, the better it will be able to judge the deeds
of the individual. It can be better formed if it knows the law of God as revealed
in the commandments and the promises. The revelation of sin has as its aim to
awaken the believer, to confound our conscience, make us tremble, terrify us,
briefly, to condemn us (Loci 1521, 82). As such, the conscience is not just Gods
voice speaking in the heart of each believer. It is something much more specific:
it is a bond with legal demands. The bond is between God and the human beings;
the law consists of legal demands to be fulfilled by humanity. In the incapacity of
meeting these challenges, they reveal to humans their sinful nature.
But Melanchthon went further: a mere consciousness of sin would drive
the believers to despair. Again, God is necessary to save and reveal the healing
power of the gospel. Therefore, after the conscience is terrified in this manner, it
would be driven into despair were it not that it is lifted up and encouraged by the
promise of the grace and mercy of God, commonly called the gospel. Therefore,
if the afflicted conscience believes the promise of grace in Christ, it is resuscitated and quickened by faith (ibid., 84). First, the law demands the impossible
and the conscienceis assailed from all directions; then dread and confusion
trouble the conscience so that no other remedy is possible unless God raises the
conscience again (ibid., 85). We should better not think that we can resolve this
situation on our own: Some seek consolidation by their own strength, efforts,
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works, and acts of appeasementthese do not accomplish any more than Adam
accomplished with his fig leaves (Loci 1521, 85).
This is one more approximation of conversion: the conscience is pivotal in
guiding the believer, it is the place where the gap between a life according to the
will of God and human nature is felt.
All Believers are Free
From Luther onwards, conversion became the process that all human beings, in
all walks of life, should undergo. As he emphasized, Christ must teach a repentance, I say, which can be done in every walk of life, a repentance which the king in
purple robes, the priest in his purity, and the princes in their dignity can do just as
well as the monk in his rituals and the mendicant in his povertyFor the teaching
of Christ must apply to all men, that is, to men in every walk of life (LW, 31:84).
Since the process of conversion cannot be related to human works, but simply to
leading a life that pleases God, it applies to all Christians. Humanity can only put
faith in God: for the law, for the promises, for salvation. This is Christian liberty:
humanity is not burdened by human works or laws, but only needs God for righteousness and salvation.
It is clear, then, that a Christian has all that he needs in faith and needs no works
to justify him; and if he has no need of works, he has no need of the law; and if he
has no need of the law, surely he is free from the law. It is true that the law is not
laid down for the just [I Tim. 1:9]. This is that Christian liberty, our faith, which
does not induce us to live in idleness or wickedness but makes the law and works
unnecessary for any mans righteousness and salvation. (LW, 31:349)
Given this Christian liberty, we are priests forever, because Christ has made it
possible for us, provided we believe in him, to be not only his brethren, co-heirs,
and fellow-kings, but also his fellow-priests (LW, 31:355). Because of his faith in
Christ, each believer becomes a priest in the face of God. As all comes from God,
each believer possesses equal access to grace. Thus, each believer is responsible
for his own conversion: he cannot count on the intermediating role of priests or
monks. Each believer, though he cannot fruitfully contribute to his conversion, is
responsible for his own conversion. This insight makes Luther speak about the
universal priesthood of believers. In a way, each believer is now a priest who has
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the capacities to represent himself before God, pray for others and teach the Word
of God.
You will ask, If all who are in the church are priests, how do these whom we now
call priests differ from laymen? I answer: Injustice is done to those words priest,
cleric, spiritual, ecclesiastic, when they are transferred from all Christians to those
few who are now by a mischievous usage called ecclesiastics. Holy Scripture makes
no distinction between them, although it gives the name ministers, servants,
stewards to those who are now proudly called popes, bishops, and lords and
who should according to the ministry of the Word serve others and teach them
the faith of Christ and the freedom of believers. Although we are all equally priests,
we cannot all publicly minister and teach. We ought not do so even if we could. (LW,
Christians cannot be divided into laymen and priests: all are equal, all are priests.
They cannot be separated on the basis of the ministry of the Word: some groups
are not closer to God because they are ecclesiastics. In fact, all Christians should
spread the word, though not all ought to take up the task of ministers of the word.
But all Christians, householders, labourers or magistrates, should equally live up
to the law of God and become holy. To live a holy life, there is no need for Rome,
the Roman ceremonies and laws. Running a household is a sufficient environment
to receive faith.
According to Luther, God provided the human world with three religious
institutions: priesthood, marriage and the civil government. In Confession Concerning Christs Supper (1528), he elaborated on the family as a setting where parents and children can cultivate a life in accordance with the will and the law of
God. The parents should teach their children to live according to the will of God:
Again, all fathers and mothers who regulate their household wisely and bring
up their children to the service of God are engaged in pure holiness, in a holy
work and a holy order. Similarly, when children and servants show obedience to
their elders and masters, here too is pure holiness, and whoever is thus engaged
is a living saint on earth (LW, 37:364). Here, the monasticization of daily life
was expressed very explicitly. Luther compared the household to a monastery: it
aims at the service of God, engages in pure holiness, does holy work and is a holy
order.12 The attitude of obedience is described as one of pure holiness and this aim
is characterized as living the life of a saint on earth.
12
On the notion of Family life in the Reformation, see Ozment 1983.
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The freedom of the Christian in this world is a concern for Calvin too. The
danger is simple and double: mistaken strictness and mistaken laxity (Inst., III, x,
1; McNeill 1960, 719). The Christian should remember that earthly things should
be used with a clear conscience, whether for necessity or for delight. If we must
simply pass through this world, there is no doubt we ought to use its good things
in so far as they help rather than hinder our course (Inst., III, x, 1; McNeill 1960,
719-720 ). In these matters man is free, but, as this issue is a slippery one with
slopes on both sides into error, Calvin advises to plant our feet where we may
safely stand. He stresses that consciences ought not and cannot be bound here to
definite legal formulas, but inasmuch as Scripture gives general rules for lawful
use, we ought surely to limit our use in accordance with them (ibid.). Since all
that is good comes from God anyway, we only need to follow a minimal guideline
here on earth, even though the freedom of believers in external matters is not
to be restricted to a fixed formula, yet it is surely subject to this law: to indulge
oneself as little as possible; but, on the contrary, with unflagging effort of mind to
insist upon cutting off all show of superfluous wealth, not to mention licentiousness, and diligently to guard against turning helps into hindrances (Inst., III, x,
4; McNeill 1960, 722-723). The rule of moderation is crucial in this life on earth.
Man should also not desire things he does not have: The second rule will be: they
who have narrow and slender resources should know how to go without things
patiently, lest they be troubled by an immoderate desire for them (Inst., III, x, 5;
McNeill 1960, 723).
For Melanchthon also, a certain disposition of the believer is crucial to the
process of conversion, namely, freedom. This is a condition in order to be able to
reach the desired experience:
Finally, Christianity is freedom, because those who do not have the Spirit of
Christ cannot in any way perform the law; they are rather subject to the curse of
the law. Those who have been renewed by the Spirit of Christ now conform voluntarily even without the law to what the law used to command. The law is the will
of God; the Holy Spirit is nothing else than the living will of God and its being in
action (agitatio). Therefore, when we have been regenerated by the Spirit of God, who
is the living will of God, we now will spontaneously that very thing which the law used
to demand. (Loci 1521, 123; italics mine)
Melanchthon clarified the link between conversion and freedom. Freedom is

freely living according to the will and the Law of God. The believer does not have
to struggle anymore to live according to the Will of God. If one does not have
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faith, one will constantly struggle to live up to Gods Will and feel enslaved by the
law. Freedom occurs where the will of the believer has surrendered itself to the will
of God. Thus, the believer is free from the law because he lives according to the
will and the law of God freely and happily. This is the core of Christian freedom
and also the core of conversion: spontaneously living according to the Will of
God without needing the enslavement of the law: Therefore, freedom does not
consist in this, that we do not observe the law, but that we will and desire spontaneously and from the heart what the law demands. This no one could never do
before (Loci 1521, 123). This Christian freedom frees the believer from all kinds
of external observances (Loci 1521, 125). These external matters have no influence
whatsoever. The believer is free to follow them, as long as he does not believe that
they are necessary or helpful for salvation:
Therefore, let what we have said stand, that juridical or ceremonial laws have not
been so abrogated that one sins if he acts according to any one of them. But because Christianity is a kind of freedom, it is in our power to use this or that or
leave it alone, just as it is in our power to eat or drink. As for the rest, I should like
Christians to use that kind of juridical code which Moses laid down and many of
the ceremonial laws as well. (Loci 1521, 126)
But this freedom of the Christian also pertains to moral matters: Moreover, this
freedom in the moral sphere is as necessary to know as it is hard to comprehend;
it cannot be understood except by spiritual men (Loci 1521, 126). The freedom is
a freedom in which the believer spontaneously follows the Law of God. Therefore,
he is free from following the Law. This relieves him of the pressure and despair
associated with the usability to follow the Law. Realizing this freedom then is
promoting true religion. To summarize, we are free through faith from the entire
law, but this same faith, that very Spirit of Christ which we have received, puts to
death the remnants of sin in our flesh. It does so not because the law demands it,
but because the Spirit is such by nature that it cannot but mortify the flesh (Loci
1521, 130).
Conversion of Society
This notion of inner conversion for all believers has important implications towards the conversion of society as a whole. From the start of the Reformation
these came to the fore: if all believers have to go through conversion this should
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be made practically feasible in all societies. This is expressed very clearly in the
work of Zwingli and Bucer. We will focus on the second one to make our point.
Martin Bucer was one of the Reformers whose practical thought would have a
significant impact on the Reformation around Europe. Originally from Strasbourg but being exiled to England in 1549, he worked on a major treatise that
was to be dedicated to the King and that described the role of temporal rulers
in the expansion of the Reformation. Based on decades of theological reflection
and practical experience in the tasks of the Reformation, De Regno Christi (1550)
would become a very influential work. Bucer proposed a new kind of diffusion of
Christianity that involved the whole of human life and society. That is to say, the
Reformation of religion would not be restricted to the Reformation of the church
and worship, but related to all of everyday life. In this way, this work was one of the
most complete expressions of the dynamic of the monasticization of daily life that
propelled the Reformation.
As Pauck (1969, 156) points out, Bucer went far beyond Luther in his
insistence that not only the church as an institution but the whole of human life,
individual and social, must be ordered according to the will of God as revealed
in the Bible. He regarded the Reformation as a movement through which the
Christianization of all human life was to be accomplished. The Bible was for him
the source and pattern of all legislation required to this end. De Regno Christi
described a programme of reform and conversion of society.
Bucer posed the question what the similarities and differences are between
the Kingdom of Christ and the Kingdoms of the world. Both share the aim
of establishing and promoting the means of making their citizens devout and
righteous who rightly acknowledge and worship their God and who are truly
helpful towards their neighbors in all their actions (DRC 1550, 180). However,
the difference is that the kings of this world, though they can do this preparatory
work, cannot purge the hearts of men of their innate impiety and unrighteousness nor...endow them with true piety and righteousness (ibid.). Though they can
prepare the people for the reception of the Word of God, only Christ has impact
on the emergence of the fruits of piety and righteousness, for it is he himself
alone who regenerates his subjects, and leads those dead in their sins to a life of
righteousness (ibid.).
Bucer pointed out a second difference. Both should tolerate the wicked while
they lie hidden among the good; but when they have done their impious misdeeds
openly, and will not change their ways when corrected, it is proper to remove them
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from the commonwealth (ibid.: 181). Still, the methods used by both to bring
this about are very different. By Gods command, the worldly administration will
use beatings, whippings, prison, exile and various forms of execution, while in
the Kingdom of Heaven and of Christ, those who have wandered from the way
of salvation, if they are curable, are led back to it with the chains of repentance,
under the impulse of only the word and the Spirit (ibid.). The two Kingdoms are
both directed at the conversion of the people, but they administer this task in different ways. Crucial is the following: even though only God can bring about the
necessary leap of faith, still the worldly kings should engage in preparatory work
so as to create the conditions of conversion. Central to this task is disseminating the
knowledge of God. Bucer explained why: only the knowledge of God can awaken
faith, which is the precondition for all other good things. It teaches us that we are
in desperate condition when we are born into this world, uncultured and uncivilized, so that we deserve to be compared with lions, bears, leopards, wolves, and
the most harmful serpents (ibid., 196); that if we are reborn in Christ and have
become true citizens of his Kingdom, we ought to burn with such charity and
eagerness to deserve well of others that no one would tolerate the discomfiture of
anyone else but every individual would try, each according to all his capacity, to
contribute as much as possible to the salvation and well-being of his neighbor
(ibid.); and that this humanity and love of the citizens of the Kingdom of Christ
spring from faith and only from the knowledge of God (ibid.). No human being,
Bucer stressed, could enter the Kingdom of Christ and continue to live up to its
demands unless by the inspiration and renewal of the Spirit. He elaborated on
this through a powerful analogy:
Before we are inspired and renewed, we are like some horrid desert, producing
nothing but thorns and brambles, i.e., works that are burdensome to ourselves and
to others. But when our King, after the sending of his gospel, also pours out upon
us his Holy Spirit from heaven, we who were before like a sterile thing or a cactus
of the desert, now like a cultivated, fertile field bring forth plentifully the fruits of
all good works, with such an abundance that we resemble fruitful trees and crops
of a field, so densely patched that this field might seem a forest. (ibid., 197)
The contrast between the world and the kingdom of Christ is that between uncultured and uncivilized, on the one hand, and cultivated, fertile and plentiful,
on the other. Without Gods work of conversion in humanity, good works are
impossible; we can only produce evil and noxious works (ibid., 199); once the
divine work takes place, the inspired and renewed soul brings forth the fruits
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of all good works. Bucer explained the process as one of gradually surrendering
entirely to living according to the law of God. This is the only road to every
temporal and spiritual happiness.
It is to the Kingdom of Christ that people need to convert. This Kingdom
has eight vital qualities. Crucial are the preachers. They are athletes in the Kingdom of Christ, anointed and strengthened for that combat with the holy anointing of this Spirit (ibid., 205). Another quality is that in this reign only those who
have a contrite heart, i.e., regret their sins with true repentance, receive the gospel
of salvation (ibid., 206). The true citizens of the Kingdom of Christ should act in
a certain way, plainly manifest that they are trees of righteousness and plantings
of the Lord, planted to show forth his glory, so that all may see this clearly and
proclaim accordingly (ibid., 206). The people should see the good works of these
citizens. Another significant quality is that the citizens of the Kingdom of Christ
are all likewise true priests of God, i.e., by the confession of their lips and of their
whole life they announce his virtues, who has called them from darkness into his
marvellous light (ibid.). This does not mean that all should preach. In fact, different people have different roles to play, for in the Church of Christ, men ought to
be so ordered and distributed that those who are better at spiritual things should
not be much occupied with temporal things, and those who are less instructed in
and inclined toward spiritual matters proper to the Kingdom of Christ should be
of service to them in the provision of the necessities of life (ibid., 207).
Bucer also expanded on one of the central concerns of the Reformation (see
previous chapter): that of nominal versus real Christians. He reinterpreted the
history of the church according to this distinction. The visible Church has rarely
had the great happiness and glory which the prophets foretold, but it must be
remembered that these promises were made not to the nominal but to the real
people of Christ; they never have become so numerous as to cease to be a little
flock in comparison with the rest of mankind (ibid., 209). The real people of
Christ have always been few and far between. The story of the church is that of the
corruption of religion. As men will always sin, the church shall never be short of
heretics and false brethren and worldly men. However, the sixteenth century
was the most difficult period for the church, according to Bucer: faith is weakened
and the popes and priests corrupt the teachings of the gospel and misguide the
flock of believers with their ceremonies. All of this is expressed in the following
passage from De Regno Christi:
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[The Church] was oppressed for so many centuries in the service of Antichrists, as
can be seen in so many kingdoms of Europe today. For since the Lord preserved
in these churches some echo of his gospel and Holy Baptism with the invocation
of his name, it cannot be doubted that he had and still has many citizens in his
Kingdom among them, although these are involved in very many grave errors
and labor under the weakness of faith. For the Antichrists, the pseudobishops
and clergy, following their head, the supreme Roman Antichrist, first horribly
corrupted the teachings of the gospel with numerous harmful comments about
the merits of the saints and those proper to each, and about the saving power of
their ceremonies, things which are obviously impious and which they also conduct
impiously. Furthermore, they present all this to the people of Christ in an alien
tongue, and forbid the reading of the Holy Scripture. Finally, they completely
overturn the sacraments and the discipline of Christ and do everything in their
power to prevent them from ever being restored. (ibid., 209-10).
Bucer shared the objections of the other Reformers to practices such as the veneration of saints, the belief in the efficacy of ceremonies and the inaccessibility
of Scripture. He also proposed solutions to remedy the corruption of the church.
These proposals are directed at the conversion of all believers. More than other reformers, Bucer gave a special role to the kings here: they should introduce certain
norms that must guide the believers in their conversion. They should contribute to
transforming their citizens into citizens of the Kingdom of Christ.
In his analysis of the contemporary German situation, one of the first things
Bucer proposed was that the ministers should demand a confession of faith and
of obedience to Christ. He also encouraged the idea of setting up consistories,
by pointing out how persistent sinners should be pressurized to do penance by
the elders of the Church elected for this task. Later, he described this penance
in detail and there we see the crucial role the community of believers has in this
process, such as frequenting the religious ceremonies of the congregation and
helping their neighbours with good deeds (ibid., 242-247). If they are unwilling
to do penance, they should be regarded as heathens and publicans (ibid., 212).
Bucer warned for the attitude of laxity that some inferred from the teaching of
Christian liberty: many have rejected the tyranny of the popes and priests and
were happy to hear that salvation does not come by good works. But they never
seriously considered what was explained to them about the nature and the power
of true faith in Christ, and how necessary it is to be prolific in good works. In response, Bucer called for more discipline on the part of the Christians. He desired
the real acceptance of the Kingdom of Christ and a Christian discipline, which
is publicly constituted (ibid., 213).
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Bucer emphasized the importance of the ministrys focus on discipline of

life and manners. Each individual Christian should strengthen and advance his
neighbours and urge them to progress in the life of God (ibid., 240). Bucer
considered it important that the believers react persistently against weak believers too. One gets the impression that those who lack perseverance in conversion
are considered dangerous to the rest of the community; if any fall into error of
doctrine or some vice of life or manners, whoever can should with utmost zeal recall such persons from all false doctrine and depraved activity, both for the purity
of Christian doctrine and the sedulous conformity of all life to the will of God
(ibid., 240). Another significant aspect of how true faith and the Kingdom of
Christ should be present on earth is the principle that there where its fruits, i.e.,
the works of all piety and righteousness are not manifest, the Kingdom of Christ
does not exist. And when this sterility of good works publicly prevails in some
nation, the Lord transfers his Kingdom, i.e., the administration of mans salvation
through pure doctrine and his salutary discipline, to another one (ibid., 220).
Identifying specific places where the corruption of religion had occurred,
Bucer thereby also identified the groups and institutions in need of reform. For
instance, he pointed out that the schools of higher learning were vexed by the
plague of the Antichrist and by wicked monks and false canons (ibid., 274). It
is part of the Kings task to help remedy this situation and bring about the necessary changes. The king must zealously sanction and restore among his subjects
the laws that Almighty God established concerning the care and preservation
of Christs religion (ibid., 280). Bucer paid a great deal of attention to the kind
of laws that the king must uphold. The first law holds that children must be
catechized and educated before God; other laws must guarantee the sanctification of holy days, the sanctification of the Churches, and the restoration of
the ministries of the Church. Through this last law, the king should transform
the ministry: as the religion of Christ is corrupted among the previous leaders of
the Church, it certainly will be your Royal Majestys duty to establish and carry
through with greater resources a complete reformation of the episcopal order and
office, i.e., a restoration to that form which the Holy Spirit in his Scriptures has
left clearly described for us (ibid., 286).
The next two laws pertain to claiming ecclesiastical goods for the Lord and
their pious use and poor relief. This law on poor relief is telling, because Bucer
here intended to show how human nature continuously rebels against God and
how laws, like the one he proposes on poor relief, should help in countering this.
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In this sense, the laws are not so much routes towards a more ethical society, but
primarily have a theological goal: helping people to organize a life in accordance
with the will and the law of God. In such a life they must also be able to fight
against idleness, Bucer said, and the context of giving to the poor lends itself to
this struggle. All should give money to a common fund so that arrogance is countered. Bucer describes this very clearly:
[S]ince from our nature, depraved and always rebellious against God, we continually compromise the instructions and precepts of God, and accordingly to our desires and misdirected judgements, are always eager to follow paths and ways other
than what God has prescribed, however holy the care of the poor is, there will be
some who will refuse to put their alms for the poor into a common fund, and say
that they prefer to provide for the poor by their personal generosity if it seems
good to them to do so. Their arrogance will have to be countered both by Your
Majestys law and through the discipline of the Church; by a law which imposes
a double offering to the Lords fund, if anyone is caught giving anything privately
to the needy; by the discipline of the Church, so that if anyone puts nothing into
the Lords fund, he should be admonished of his duty from the Word of God by
the ministers of the churches, and if he should resolutely despise this admonition,
he should be held a heathen and a publican. For although it must be left to the
judgement of every individual how much he wishes to offer to Christ the Lord
for the use of his little ones, nevertheless no one in the Church can be allowed,
against the express precepts of God, to come empty-handed into the sight of the
Lordfor he would completely spurn the instruction of the Holy Spirit concerning the care for the poorindeed, rather, through his private almsgiving he would
overturn it. (DRC 1550, 311-312)
The seventh law on marriage gives rise to long additions on how to celebrate
nuptials, on divorce, on remarriage, second marriage, etc. These proposals are not
primarily ethical in nature but must be understood in terms of the aim of establishing the Kingdom of Christ. His proposals are directed towards living in
accordance with the will of God. In Bucer, as one scholar points out, both marriage and divorce become means and even redemptive means that preserve people
from eternal death (Selderhuis 1999, 354). In his work, we see the manifestation
of a tension typical to the process of conversion in the Protestant Reformation:
Characteristic for Bucers theology of marriage is that he struggles to give shape
to the rule of Christ and to use the Bible as his code of laws and at the same time
allow roomin the administration of those lawsfor the anthropological fact
that humans are controlled by self-seeking and passion (Selderhuis 1999, 355).
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The eighth law concerns the civil education of youth and the suppression
of idleness. Bucer pleaded for the establishment of many schools for boys and
girls. Too often the youth are busy taking pleasure in early matters like dress, food,
drinking, etc. Yet, the children of all, especially also of the poor, should be educated by the elders of the community. Bucer encouraged the function of paidonomoi,
directors of youth education, who can see to the education of these boys and
girls and guide them according to their capacities. Since the process of conversion
had to shape every walk of life and each occupation had become a potential vocation, the education of all became very important. In this context, Bucer elaborated
on the restoration of certain crafts and on the honest pursuit of profit and on the
reform of the business of marketing. He was very much concerned also that the
right people perform the right tasks.
Public decency was also part of his endeavour: Public decency furthermore
demands that public inns and hospices be entrusted to the particular care only of
men who have been recognized to be endowed with piety, chastity, and decency,
so that they may take an interest not only in the physical well-being of the guests
but also in the holiness and integrity of life and morals (DRC 1550, 345). Lazy
men should be excluded from such places. The ninth law is about controlling
luxury and harmful expenses. Since these are the greatest pitfall for healthy industry, the king should arrange for his people a law against the pests of human
life in order to prohibit, as unworthy of those who profess piety, all luxury, pomp,
and excess in housing, clothing, ornamentation of the body, food and drink, and
all things contributing more to the delight of the flesh than to the virtue of spirit
and the true utility of the commonwealth (ibid., 354).
As a tenth point, Bucer indicated the need for revision and elaboration of
civil laws. This introduced a new domain, where kings and princes need to interfere in a different way. After they have installed all the previous laws, it becomes
necessary to make the citizens obligations clearer to them:
When Your Majesty has supported and strengthened wholesome industry for his
people in the manner indicated, so that from childhood everyone will be educated
and assigned to a definitive task and function in life useful to the commonwealth,
and everyone will be urged to do his duty perseveringly, efficiently, and energetically; and when he has also driven out and suppresses all intemperance, weakness,
and luxury, the next thing to do will be to clarify and strengthen those laws by
which communication of obligations and exchange of goods are regulated among
men. (DRC 1550, 357)
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The laws of the country must be reformed and reformulated in another language
so that they become intelligible for all and also easily remembered and observed
(see ibid., 357-361). Bucer also elaborated on the system of criminal law that
was needed to help reform temporal kingdoms to the model of the Kingdom of
Christ.
This body of laws reveals an elaborate system of bringing a range of issues
under the law of God. Unlike Reformers before him, Bucer was no longer concerned only with the process of regeneration and conversion of the individual
believer, but rather with the circumstances that must be created in a society to
allow and encourage people to go through this process of conversion. Not only
must all individuals go through conversion, the kings also need to work on creating the condition of conversion in the countries that they rule. At the same time a
society needs the proposed laws to hold people in check who are sinning against
God. Attention must be given foremost to education and correction of sinful humanity, but if these fail (and they will) one must turn to punishment. In Bucers
unambiguous words:
For the nature of all men is so corrupt from birth and has such a propensity for
crimes and wickedness that it has to be called away and deterred from vices, and
invited and forced to virtues, not only by teaching and exhortation, admonition
and reprimand, which are accomplished by words, but also by the learning and
correction that accompany force and authority and the imposition of punishments. Remedies of this kind are so efficacious and salutary for mankind against
its inborn ills that Plato rightly judged it the proper role of the art of true rhetoric
to require the accusation before a magistrate even of oneself if one had committed
some offense, and also of close friends and relatives if they had been in any way
delinquent, and to seek punishments prescribed by law as a necessary medicine of
primary importance. (ibid., 383-384)
To conclude this section, a crucial approximation of conversion in the Protestant

Reformation is that all believers have to go through conversion. All are in the
same position concerning their sinful nature and their need for God to alter this
situation, therefore the requirements of this process of change hold for all whatever the way of life he or she is in. Additionally, societies as a whole were in need
of reform to make this possible: they must create the conditions in which all their
subjects could go through inner conversion.
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A Moment and a Process

Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the process of conversion is its progression
over time. We already noted in the theology of Thomas Aquinas that turning to
God is both instantaneous and continuous, because it happens all at once through
Gods infusion of grace, but also comes in different steps, because of the limitations of the human understanding. This property is also present in the Protestant
understanding of conversion. In the moment of the divine infusion of grace, all is
suddenly present: seeing sin, ending sin, hating sin, forgiveness of sin, the new life,
turning to God, living according to the will of God, the change of heart, living a
life of repentance, turning away from evil, etc. All of these coincide logically in the
very moment God infuses grace in the heart of the believer. However, simultaneously Luther states that even those who are living in grace must struggle against
sin and evil within. The change of conversion is not a single event. Conversion
remains a life-long process of struggle. Luther said many times that it should involve ones whole life (LW, 31:84). But, if the spiritual transformation is realized
the moment God infuses grace into the believer, why should those living in grace
still struggle? While regeneration by God is realized instantaneously, we still have
to go through regeneration throughout our lives on earth. Conversion is instantaneous and continuous at the same time.
This is also reflected in Luthers understanding of baptism. In one of his
seminal works, The Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), he tackled the question of baptism:
Baptism, then, signifies two thingsdeath and resurrection, that is, full and complete justification. When the minister immerses the child in the water it signifies
death, and when he draws it forth again it signifies lifeThis death and resurrection we call the new creation, regeneration, and spiritual birth. This should not be
understood only allegorically as the death of sin and the life of grace, as many
understand it, but as actual death and resurrection. For baptism is not a false sign.
Neither does sin completely die, nor grace completely rise, until the sinful body
that we carry about in this life is destroyed, as the Apostle says in the same passage
[Rom. 6:67]. For as long as we are in the flesh, the desires of the flesh stir and
are stirred. For this reason, as soon as we begin to believe, we also begin to die to this
world and live to God in the life to come; so that faith is truly a death and a resurrection,
that is, it is that spiritual baptism into which we are submerged and from which we rise.
(LW, 36:67; italics mine)
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However, the problem remains that humanity cannot escape its fundamentally
sinful and corrupt nature during this earthly life. In other words, in baptism, sin is
not completely rooted out and grace has not completely taken over. This cannot be
the case as man, as long as he is in his body, remains under the spell of sin. Here,
one of the core problems of conversion comes to the fore: as long as man is clustered to his sinful carnal life on earth, conversion cannot be completely fulfilled.
That is to say, the transition to the spiritual domain is inevitably hindered by the
bodily nature of man.
Though Calvin considered the mortification of the flesh is crucial to attain
freedom, he also warned his readers that no human being could completely escape
human nature. In other words, however one tries, sin will always be part of human life. Therefore, this struggle should be understood as an ongoing exercise. The
exercise, Calvin explained, lay in the fact that men can learn their own weaknesses
better. But temptation will never leave man, at least not during his life on earth.
Hence, the need to stay constantly alert, for there remains in a regenerate man a
smoldering cinder of evil, from which desires continually leap forth to allure and
spur him to commit sin (Inst., III, iii, 10; McNeill 1960, 602). Calvin also gave
attention to both elements of the process of conversion, the momentous and the
gradual, without creating a contradiction between the two. Both elements are part
of the dynamic of turning towards God. The aim of the process of repentance
or regeneration is to guide man towards a new life. By the grace of God, man is
reborn:
The object of regeneration, as we have said, is to manifest in the life of believers a
harmony and agreement between Gods righteousness and their obedienceThe
law of God contains in itself that newness by which his image can be restored in us. But
because our slowness needs many goads and helps it will be profitable to assemble
from various passages of the Scriptures a pattern for the conduct of life in order
that those who heartily repent may not err in their zeal (Inst., III, vi, 1; McNeill
1960, 684; italics mine).
Even being given this new life by God is insufficient for man to have that new life;
man is slow and needs much additional help. Christ and the Word of God play
crucial guiding roles in this process. Scripture is crucial in revealing Christ to man,
because it not only enjoins us to refer our life to God, its author, to whom it is
bound, but also after it has taught that we have degenerated from the true origin
and condition of our creation, it also adds that Christ, through whom we return
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into favor with God, has been set before us as an example, whose pattern we ought
to express in our life (Inst., III, vi, 3; McNeill 1960, 686; italics mine).
The life we ought to live is revealed to us instantaneously in Christ, but
humans can never fully acquire the ability to live this life. Yet, even though impossible, this life in accord with the will and the law of God should be the aim of
every believer:
I do not insist that the moral life of a Christian man breathe nothing but the very
gospel, yet this ought to be desired, and we must strive toward it. But I do not so
strictly demand evangelical perfection that I would not acknowledge as a Christian one who has not yet attained it. For thus all would be excluded from the church,
since no one is found who is not far removed from it, while many have advanced
a little toward it whom it would nevertheless be unjust to cast away. (Inst., III, vi,
5; McNeill 1960, 688)
Also those seeking to attain this are Christians. Otherwise all would be excluded
from the church. Even though humanity cannot live according to the will of God,
we must continuously try to do so, because we are not our own: Conversely, we
are Gods: let us therefore live for him and die for him. We are Gods: let his wisdom and will therefore rule all our actions. We are Gods: let all the parts of our
life accordingly strive toward him as our only lawful goal (Inst., III, vii, 1; McNeill
1960, 690). Man advances rightly by the discipline of the cross when he realizes
that this life, judged in itself, is troubled, turbulent, unhappy in countless ways,
and in no respect clearly happy; that all those things which are judged to be its
goods are uncertain, fleeting, vain, and vitiated by many intermingled evils (Inst.,
III, ix, 1; McNeill 1960, 713). Nothing but struggle will we find in this life. Therefore, we must believe, so Calvin asserts, that the mind is never seriously aroused to
desire and ponder the life to come unless it be previously imbued with contempt
for the present life (ibid.). This contempt for the present life goes together with
true conversion to God. All attention should be given to the divine and to the future life with God. But there is a flipside to this: even though human life on earth
deserves nothing but contempt, this does not mean that this life holds nothing
good. Such reasoning would be equivalent to despising God: in this life on earth,
He shows himself to be the Father. So, even though this earthly life holds nothing praiseworthy in itself, for the true believer it might still become something of
value, accordingly as one gets to know the infinite goodness of God.
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8.2. Conclusion: Post Tenebras Lux

As social scientists, our aim is to capture the development of the Reformations
process of conversion in human beings and societies. While we analyze theological writings, the aim is not to comment on theology, but rather to trace how the
theology of conversion shaped and structured the fabric of human experience. Let
us recapitulate the basic properties that the Reformers attributed to the process
of conversion.
First of all, it concerns a spiritual change, a transformation and purification of
the spiritual nature of humanity, but never of the inherently sinful flesh. Second,
conversion can start only with the help of God. By human effort alone, we cannot
attain anything worthwhile spiritually. It is the faith gifted by God and His Word
that instigate the process of conversion. Third, conversion is the mechanism that
restores the sight of the sinner and makes man see the world differently: man can now
begin to see the inherent sinfulness of ones nature and deplore this state of affairs.
Conversion is seeing sin, hating sin and trying to end sin. Fourth, this transformation of experience occurs through the twofold role that Scripture plays, namely,
the conversion of the Law and the conversion of the Gospel. The first is characterized
by terror, pain, agony, deficiency and failing; the second by peace, joy, fulfillment
and delight in Gods goodness. Fifth, conscience is pivotal in guiding the believer,
because this faculty makes him aware of the chasm between a life lived according
to the will of God and the life that gives in to human nature. Sixth, all believers
have to go through conversion and enjoy the Christian freedom that is its result.
We all share the same position with regard to our sinful nature and our need for
God to alter this situation. Therefore, the process of conversion should be possible
in all walks of life and no ones freedom of conscience should be burdened by the
fabricated laws and ceremonies of a human clergy. Seventh, conversion never comes
to completion in this life on earth. As long as a man is clenched to his carnal body,
conversion cannot be completely fulfilled. That is to say, the transition to the spiritual domain is inevitably hindered by the bodily nature of man. Finally, conversion
is both instantaneous and continuous. It is instantaneous from the perspective of
God, because conversion is immediately completed through the infusion of divine
grace. However, it is a continuous struggle for humanity, because the battle against
our corrupt human nature is never-ending.
As the above approximations teach us, conversion is not of this world; it is concerned with the spiritual world which is under the authority of God. The creation
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of a true believer happens through inducing the believer in this spiritual realm.
Conversion has to build a bridge between the material and the spiritual. Simply
believing theological dogmas is not enough to accomplish this. One also needs to
have a different kind of experience in which one sees sin and experiences the saving power of God versus the sinning. But how can a human being alter his or her
experience of the world? One possible explanation is theological in nature: God
brings about this change.
Theologically, one of the difficulties one faces in understanding conversion
to God is that it is instantaneous and continuous at the same time. The ideal and
the road towards the ideal converge in the process of conversion. For human beings, this is impossible to conceive, because we live in a world of spatiotemporal
distinctions. The converging of the ideal and the route towards it supersedes our
human intellectual abilities. This is the case, because it implies that one already
has to be Christian before one can join the route towards becoming Christian.
Our spatiotemporal understanding does not allow us to grasp this. We can only
understand conversion as instantaneous and continuous by pulling the two properties apart: either one first has instantaneous conversion and later develops this
by a process of continuous conversion or the other way around. But this misunderstands one of the most fundamental characteristics of the process: it is both
at the same time. This is a fundamental theological problem. But how could we
explain the process of conversion without taking recourse to theology and divine
revelation?
There has to be a learning process that teaches human beings how to make
the necessary transition from the worldly to the spiritual realm. How could
this transition be taught and learned? How can people be taught to experience sin
and helplessness and to surrender to God as the saviour? At least two of the approximations can be identified as being crucial to teaching this process: conscience
and the law of God. We shall approach these two as learning entities of the process
of conversion. These entities set in motion and sustain processes of learning. The
word of God consists of the commandments and the promises. Both are referred
to as the law of God; the first is the law of bondage; the second the law of love, of
peace and of freedom. By trying to live up to the commandments and necessarily
failing all the time, the process of conversion has started. The conscience is the faculty in the believer, which guides him in his experiences of failing to live up to the
law of God. It makes the experience of helplessness, sinfulness and worthlessness
possible; also it guides one to experience the grace of God through the promises
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of God in the New Testament. In such a way both work hand in hand towards the
alteration of the experience of the believer.
Put differently, the formation of the conscience and the knowledge of the
law of God are crucial conditions for the process of inner conversion to develop.
In order to allow the learning entities to function as such, certain conditions
have to be met. Theologically, one claims that the conscience and the law of God
can enable us to undergo conversion, only on the instigation of God. Human
beings cannot contribute anything. Maximally, they can create the conditions of
conversion by familiarising others with the Word of God and removing the obstacles of conversion. If human beings have not been in touch with the Word of
God and if they do not know the commandments and the promises of God, they
cannot undergo the process of conversion. Similarly the learning entities cannot
function if they are not allowed or able to follow the law of God.
Therefore, two other conditions become pivotal in this account. The freedom
of conscience and the separation of the spiritual and temporal realms are the conditions necessary to realize the conditions of conversion in society. The first has to
ensure that all believers can follow their conscience, the second that all believers
are not hindered in living according to the law of God. So, these two freedoms
are needed in order to safeguard the spiritual nature of human beings against the
ever corrupting impact of the worldly realm. If those two conditions are not met,
the conscience and the law of God cannot function as learning entities. If there is no
freedom of conscience, but only bondage of the conscience by human traditions,
then the conscience can never start looking for God. If the law of God cannot be
followed, because human authority and legislation interfere in the spiritual realm,
then the process of following Gods commandments and promises can never take
root. Hence, the message of Christian spiritual freedom was central to the Protestant Reformation, wherever it took root.
The central place of conversion in Reformation theology has become clear
in this chapter. But the importance of conversion cannot be overlooked: it is a
motor for change, both individual change and change of institutions in a society.
The Reformers argued that the only option for the believers is to turn their hearts
to God. The belief that human works can change anything in our spiritual nature
is superstitious and it is the greatest obstacle to conversion. Each believer needs a
new life, a rebirth in the spirit. This is the only possible beginning of regeneration
by God. The aim is freedom: a life where the believer freely lives in accordance
with the Will of God. True religion can be spread, but it has to be spread in a com-
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pletely different way, according to the Reformers. It has to be spread by God, in

and through each and every individual believer.
Christian believers and secular rulers can play a role, but only in so far as
they create the conditions that allow others to undergo conversion. The major
task here is to remove the obstacle of false religionall doctrines, ceremonies and
institutions that create the illusion in the believer that human works could ever
contribute to spiritual conversion and salvation.
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Creating the Conditions of Conversion:

Secular Education, False Religion and
Reform in British India
Before the nineteenth century, there had already been many encounters between
European travellers, merchants and missionaries and the Indian population.1

However, the kind of massive missionary and educational project that started under the impulse of missionaries such as Claudius Buchanan, William Carey and
the Serampore mission and colonial officials such as John Muir and James Robert
Ballantyne was unprecedented. Religious conversion became a central issue in
this context, but not in any straightforward or explicit way. During the nineteenth
century, more and more Europeans engaged themselves in the project of educating the natives. This general ambition took different forms and followed different
tracks depending upon whether the educator was a missionary, colonial official or
orientalist. But whichever track one followed, all these men (and a few women)
shared the ambition or rather the compulsion to change the native population for the
bettermorally, spiritually and materially.
Besides this ambition, they also shared a particular description of the problem they faced. It was the common conviction of these Europeans that the first
step in the process of educating the natives consisted of imparting them with a
A lot of scholarly work has been done on the missionary and educational project of Catholics
and Protestants from the sixteenth until the end of the eighteenth century. Especially the Jesuits in
seventeenth century India, in particular Francis Xavier, Roberto di Nobili and the Malabar Rites
Controversy, have been the focus of many studies, see especially the studies of Zupanov (1994, 1996,
1999, 2005). Much literature is also available on the work of Danish missions and the discussions of
Bartholomaus Ziegenbalg (and Heinrich Pltshau) with the Malabarians, know as the Malabarische
Korrespondenz, see Hudson (2000), Singh (1999). Very informative is the article by Grafe (1972).
For the general background of early mission in India, see a volume edited by Frykenberg (2003).
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clear insight into the corruption of Hindu society and cultivating the desire in
them to bring about societal change. Thus the colonial and missionary educators
also shared the belief in a causal link between the religion of the natives and this
necessity to change. The change could be brought about by secular education,
which purported to demonstrate the ills (dirtiness, poverty, illiteracy) and injustices (inequality, the caste system) of Indian society in a quasi-objective way. For
most of these educators, conversion to Christianity was considered the ultimate
aim of this process of change and, hence, the solution to a range of problems faced
by the people of India.
Many scholars have studied this relation between the colonial state in India,
Christian mission and the educational project or civilizing mission. In one of his
articles, historian Ian Copland (2006) provides an insightful sketch of the scholarly interpretations. While the classical view used to stress the mutually supportive nature between flag and cross,2 recent scholarship offers other ideas. However,
Copland argues, the challenge of identifying the true nature of the relationship
remains. In the case of India, the picture of church and state at loggerheads does
not work. He shows how the East India Company and the missionary societies...
developed a fruitful and at times even intimate relationship, based in part on their
shared faith, and in part on their common interest in providing Western education
to the countrys elite (Copland 2006, 1030). This attitude was new. Previously the
Companys goals of maximizing profit had dominated its approach to India. The
idea that Britain owed something to India and that it was indeed possible to
improve the wretched situation of this race grew gradually only in the 19th century. Copland described this aptly in another article: Over the following decades
[after 1813], however, this pragmatic, laissez-faire approach to India was slowly
replaced by a more radical and interventionist one, underpinned by the mounting
Copland refers to Christopher Bayly as an exponent of this position. Historians such as Brian
Stanley and Andrew Porter, by contrast, have cast doubt on this relation and asserted that it is
difficult to establish a plausible connection between the oversees missionary enterprise and the
ambitions of the state. Copland formulates the question for historians in the following way: So:
two movements, largely synchronous, and, at least in the eyes of contemporaries, allied. But what
was the nature of their connection? Did the missionary societies help to drive imperial expansion, or
did they merely take advantage of it better to pursue their ultimate goal of saving souls? That is the
issue which continues to exercise the minds of historians (Copland 2006, 1027). The consensus of
the 1950s and 1960s was that Christian evangelism encouraged empire building and reinforced its
impact (Copland 2006, 1028). But the pendulum has swung significantly, so Copland argues, and
by today [t]he old argument that evangelism consciously served the purposes of empire has been
replaced by one that holds that relations between church and state on the frontier were characteristically temporary, grudging, [and] self-interested and that the two were as likely to undermine each
other as they were to provide mutual support (Copland 2006, 1029).
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Creating the Conditions of Conversion
327
conviction among reform-minded sections of the British middle class that their
country owed India, and had therefore a moral duty to act to ameliorate the lowly
condition of its cowed, ignorant people (Copland 2007, 641). Which dynamics
were behind this large-scale project of education and reform? If we believe that
Western Christian culture played a crucial role, what precisely then is this role?
What were the limits within which the missionaries and colonial officials functioned and how did the Indian nation respond to these limits and proposals?
We shall focus on the nineteenth-century exchanges of ideas between Christian missionaries, colonial officers and orientalists, on the one hand, and Hindu
pundits, on the other hand. While there is a lot of historical and contemporary
material available documenting the stances of the Europeans, the academic study
of the Hindu responses to Western-Christian challenges is not equally elaborate.
Many primary sources have been lost or are not easily available (Conlon 1992,
24-25; Young 1981, 13-14). Of great interest is the pioneering work carried out
by Richard Fox Young. His Resistant Hinduism: Sanskrit Sources on Anti-Christian
Apologetics in Early Nineteenth-Century India (1981) is an invaluable source in the
study of Hindu-Christian debate in the nineteenth century.3
We shall sketch the encounter between European Christians and Hindus
in terms of three central points. (1) First, the dominant European descriptions
of Hindu society and religion were set against the Protestant-Christian background that we discussed in the previous two chapters. The Reformation theology of conversion and the corruption of religion structured these descriptions. (2)
Second, there was an apparent lack of interest on the part of the Hindus to have
any sustained debate with the Europeans on religious matters. This was not caused
by the fact that the pundits refused to debate these matters. Hindu indifference
and incomprehension, we will argue, were caused by the conceptual criteria of the
debate and its conceptions of Hinduism and religion. (3) However, some Hindus
did debate with the Christians on the latters terms and even established reform
movements that tried to model Hinduism on the Christian prototype. Ever more
Indians appeared to adopt the normative framework against which Europeans
measured the value of Indian society and its traditions. In the three sections of
this chapter, we will show how these points constituted crucial moments in the
See also his related work: Young (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2005, 2006). On the Buddhist apologetic
sources in Sri Lanka, see Young and Somaratna (1996) and Young and Jebanesan (1995). Also of
great interest in this context is the work that South Asia specialist Dennis Hudson produced: Hudson (1972, 1992, 1995). See also Conlon (1992).
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colonial educational project and its aim of creating the conditions of conversion
in Indian society.
9.1. Will the True Heathen Please Stand Up?

During the Protestant Reformation, Europeans accepted the description of medieval society and religion as idolatrous and corrupt as a quasi-objective factual
description. In reality, it concerned a Protestant theological description. The main
concern of the Reformers was to make the flock of believers perceive the corruption within themselves, their religion and their society. This was an essential moment in the process of conversion. Debates on true and false religion continued
on similar terms in the next centuries and gave shape to descriptions of idolatry in
the non-European world. An interesting example is Francis Xavier, who described
the religions of India in order to reveal the nature of true idolatry and show how
different it is from Roman-Catholic Christianity. In this way, Catholics intended
to render powerless the Protestant allegations that the Church had degenerated
into heathenism. Consider this description of the Brahmins, which Xavier gave in
a letter to the Society at Rome in 1543:
We have in these parts a class of man among the pagans who are called Brahmins.
They keep up the worship of the gods, the superstitious rites of religion, frequenting the temples and taking care of the idols. They are as perverse and wicked as
can anywhere be found, and I always apply to them the words of holy David, from
an unholy race and a wicked and crafty man deliver me, O Lord. They are liars and
cheats to the very backbone. Their whole study is, how to deceive most cunningly
the simplicity and ignorance of the people. They give out publicly that the gods
command certain offering to be made to their temples, which offering are simply
the things that the Brahmins themselves wish for, for their own maintenance and
that of their wives, children, and servants. Thus they make the poor folk believe
that the images of their gods eat and drink, dine and sup like men, and some devout persons are found who really offer to the idol twice a day, before dinner and
supper, a certain sum of money. The Brahmins eat sumptuous meals to the sound
of drums, and make the ignorant believe that the gods are banqueting. When they
are in need of any supplies, and even before, they give out to the people that the
gods are angry because the things they have asked for have not been sent, and that
if the people do not take care, the gods will punish them by slaughter, disease, and
the assaults of the devils. And the poor ignorant creatures, with the fear of the
gods before them, obey them implicitly. (Coleridge 1874, 157-158)
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This assessment of the heathen Brahmins sounds familiar. It is modelled on

the anticlerical notions within Christianity, which would remain central in Protestant-Catholic debates for centuries to come. The descriptions of idolatry in
India fed the European debates on idolatry and vice versa. In other words, the way
Europe described India was determined by the central issues and debates within
European Christendom at the time.4
The same theological background provided the foundations for the dominant
conception of Hinduism in nineteenth-century British India. These conceptual
foundations were independent of the explicit beliefs of the authors in question.
The fanatic missionary and the rationalist philosopher agreed on the basic nature
of Hindu religion. Mutatis mutandis, they provided the same type of description.
Historians of early nineteenth-century British India often distinguish between
anglicists and orientalists: the former were deeply critical of Indian religion and
culture and intended to replace it wholesale with European civilization; the latter were more appreciative of the Indian traditions and intended to educate the
natives in their own civilization.5 However, as Willem Derde and Raf Gelders
(2003) have demonstrated, these two parties converged in the core principles of
their conception of Hindu religion: they agreed that the Brahmins were corrupt
priests who had misled the lay believers by fabricating an elaborate system of
doctrines and rites, while keeping the original revelation in the Sanskrit texts to
themselves (cf. De Roover and Balagangadhara 2009).
This section will illustrate this British conception of Hindu religion and
show how it was framed within the Protestant theology of conversion and the
corruption of religion. To do so, we will compare two texts by extremely influential early nineteenth-century authors: the evangelical Christian Charles Grant
(1746-1823) and the utilitarian philosopher-historian James Mill (1773-1836).
Grant was one of the many Scots who had enjoyed great success in the service of
the East India Company. At first, he took pleasure in the luxuries that came with
his growing personal fortune and position on the Companys board of trade, but
after losing two children he underwent a conversion experience. He became one
For a historical elaboration of the descriptions and the spread and popularity of these descriptions in the intellectual circles in Europe, I can refer the readers to the research of Raf Gelders.
His project on the genealogy of colonial discourse traces the 19th century colonial ways of dealing
with Indian culture, society and religion, back to the Protestant debates. See especially his article in
CSSH, Gelders (2009) and his, as yet, unpublished PhD dissertation: Ascetics and Crafty Priests:
Orientalism and the European Representations of India.
5
For a good introduction in the debate is Zastoupil and Moir (1999), a volume which also collects
the most relevant primary sources of this debate. See also Nurullah and Naik (1964).
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of the chief champions of promoting missionary activity in British India. In 1792,

he wrote the tract Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of
Great Britain, particularly with respect to Morals; and of the means of improving it,
which argued that Christian missionary work did not conflict with the commercial interests of the Company (as had been traditionally assumed), but that it in
fact provided the only means for India to advance socially and morally. In 1802,
he was elected Member of Parliament and, in 1813, he defended this position in
the House of Commons. Grant later became chairman of the Company. His tract
would be republished several times as one of the central documents in debates on
its charter. Unlike Grant, his fellow Scotsman James Mill never travelled to India.
A supporter of anticlericalism,6 Mill was also deeply influenced by the philosophy
of Jeremy Bentham. Both strands played a role in shaping the work that would
give him fame and professional success, his History of British India (1817), which
became one of the basic texts in the training of Company officials and all British
students of India.
Egotism, Despotism and False Religion
In his Observations, Grant devoted an entire chapter to the morality of the Hindus, where he concluded that they lacked all morality: In Bengal, a man of real
veracity and integrity is a great phenomenon; one conscientious in the whole of his
conduct, it is to be feared, is an unknown character (Grant 1792, 21). Whenever
the distribution of justice had been committed to the natives in India, it had become a traffic in venality (ibid.). The Hindu distinguishes himself above all in his
absolute egotism:
Selfishness, in a word, unrestrained by principle, operates universally; and money,
the grand instrument of selfish gratifications, may be called the supreme idol of
the Hindoos. Deprived for the most part of political power, and destitute of boldness of spirit, but formed for business, artful, frugal, and persevering, they are
absorbed in schemes for the gratification of avariceThe tendency of that abandoned selfishness is to set every mans hand against every man, either in projects,
or in acts of open force. From violence, however, fear interposes to restrain them.
The people of the lower provinces in particular, with an exception of the military
caste, are as dastardly as they are unprincipled. They seek their ends by mean artiBefore starting work on his History of British India, Mill had published a translation of Charles de
Villers An Essay on the Spirit and Influence of the Reformation of Luther (1805), known for its diatribes
against the vices and abuses of the papacy.
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fices, low cunning, intrigue, falsehood, servility, and hypocritical obsequiousness.

To superiors they appear full of reverence, of humble and willing submission, and
readiness to do everything that may be required of him; and as long as they discern something either to expect or to fear, they are wonderfully patient of slights,
neglects and injuries. But under all this apparent passiveness and meanness of
temper, they are immovably persisting in their secret views. (ibid.)
In addition, the Hindus were characterized by shocking cruelty, want of benevolence, absence of affection and rational enjoyment in marriage, widespread promiscuity and the general corruption of manners. This moral character, or rather
the absence thereof, was to be explained in terms of the despotism entrenched in
Hindu society. At the core of this system of despotism lay the absolute power attributed to certain classes of society:
Despotism is not only the principle of the government of Hindostan, but an original, fundamental, and irreversible principle in the very frame of society. The law,
not contenting itself with enjoining passive obedience to the magistrate or sovereign, and with having a due regard to the inequalities in condition, and subordination in rank, which arise from the constitution of the world, and are plainly agreeable to the will of the great Creator, rests entirely on the following fundamental
position:that certain classes or races of the society are in their elementary principles, in the matter from which they were formed, absolutely of a higher nature,
of a superior order in the scale of being, to other classes. It is, in the opinion of
the Hindoos, an awful and momentous truth, a truth maintained in full vigour to
this day, a truth placed in the front of their code, that the Brahmins were formed
from the mouth of Brimha, the Kheterees from his arm, the Vyse (or Bice) from
his thigh, and the Sooders from his foot. Hence it is a necessary consequence, that
this primeval and essential distinction is no more mutable or defeasible, than it
is possible for one of the brute creation to advance itself to the rank of man. And
such is the division of the Hindoos into four great tribes or castesthe priests,
the soldiers, the husbandmen or traders, and the servile class, whose sole assigned
duty is to serve the other three. (ibid., 34-35)
Grant was extremely critical of this system that assigned fixed positions in society
to different classes or races. He considered the evils flowing from any such system
obvious and infinite: the frame of society can suffer no change; the highest orders
pervert the use of power, become weak, arrogant and oppressive; while the lowest rank is doomed to perpetual abasement and unlimited subjection and has no
relief against the most oppressive and insulting tyranny, no hope of ever escaping
from its sufferings. If the genius of a Newton should arise in that class, it could
have no room to expand, nor if it had, could all its excellence deliver its possessor
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from the obligation of administering to the most ignorant and vicious of the
Brahmins. The system discourages all liberal exertions. It consigns the lowest
orders to ignorance and should they ever emerge from this low and confined state,
the Brahmins (by an ordinance of the Vedes, which through their imposture have
the credit of proceeding from a divine origin, and of containing all valuable science) have forbidden them, on pain of death to read the sacred books (ibid., 35).
Interestingly, up to this point in Grants argument, one could mistake it for
a set of secular, liberal and rational objections to the caste hierarchy. Only his jibe
towards the Brahmins fabrication of a divine origin for the Vedas betrays the
conceptual framework behind his reasoning. In the next step, however, the deeply
theological nature of this background framework took centre stage. Referring to
the purported code of Hindu law,7 Grant argued as follows:
Nothing is more plain, than that this whole fabric is the work of a crafty and
imperious priesthood, who feigned a divine revelation and appointment, to invest
their own order, in perpetuity, with the most absolute empire over the civil state
of the Hindoos, as well as over their minds. It is true, that they assigned the reins
of political government to another order, the Kheterees; but they still maintained
in full exercise the indefeasible superiority of their own rank, they prescribed the
rules of administration, they were the privileged advisers of the Magistrate, (as the
sovereign, or ruler, is termed in the code,) they rendered themselves necessary to
the man invested with that dignity, in his personal, as well as official capacity
(ibid., 35)
To demonstrate how the singular species of despotism here described, pervades

the legal system of the Hindoos, Grant then reproduced various passages from
the code (ibid., 36). According to him, these passages showed how the immorality of Hindu society had its origin in the code of Hindu law, which prescribed all
kinds of immoralities:
It cannot certainly have escaped attention, that the immorality, the injustice, and
the cruelty of the code, are by no means confined to the instances which have
been adduced under these heads, respectively, but appear in glaring colours in
the numerous regulations which have been quoted, in reference to that wide and
important subject, the distinctions in favour of the superior tribes. Actions are
indeed often estimated, not according to their intrinsic good or evil, but according
to the relation they have to casteImmoralities of every description are tolerated
on easy terms to one part of the society, and some of the most atrocious kinds are
Grants reference to the code concerns Nathaniel Brassey Halheds Code of Gentoo Laws, or Ordinations of the Pundits (1776).
7
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permitted without reprehension, that is to say, have all the encouragement which
a legal sanction can give themOf the effects produced upon a feeble, ignorant,
superstitious people, by such a departure from the genuine principles of equity,
truth, honesty, purity, benevolence, peaceableness, and good order, in a word, by
such a standard of morals as these laws, professing the authority of a divine appointment, establish, it cannot be difficult to judge. It is a maxim so plain as not
to be mentioned without apology, that a corrupt rule must produce a practice still
more corrupt, since no higher point of perfection being aimed at, and a progressive degeneration common to all establishments, the spirit and manners of the
people, if seasonable reforms are not interposed, will in time become generally
vicious. (ibid., 45-46)
Once it had become clear that the code of Hindu law was the chief cause behind
the degeneration of Hindu society into immorality and of the Hindu people into
unmitigated selfishness and greed, Grant turned to the other causes that explained
the absence of moral character among the heathens of India. These causes lay in
that part of their complex system which is purely Religious (ibid., 46). Here the
first error was to be found in their faith in ceremonial and pecuniary atonements
for the expiation of the guilt of sin:
[T]he Hindoos are taught to have recourse to various ceremonial works and observances, and confidently to depend on these for absolution: real contrition and
amendment, hatred of evil, and a respect to the holiness of the divine nature, do
not appear to enter into their consideration of this subject. The whole is reduced
to certain external performances; and in the Vedes, there are long enumerations
of sins, that is to say, of offences against morality, and every species of offenses
which men can commit, with the particular expiation prescribed for each. In general, these expiations consist in pilgrimages, in living and dying in places reputed
holy, in ablutions, in penances, in the celebration of festivals, in fasts, in largesses
to Brahmins, in sacrifices and offerings to idols, in anointing the body with the
excrements of a cow, and in other expedients of a similar nature. (ibid., 47-48)
Grant also denounced the works of supererogation, in which the Hindus (much
like the Roman-Catholics) believed according to him. They thought that one
could procure distinguished eminence in the heavenly world by performing such
works. This was perhaps the most profligate part of Hindu superstition: The hideous painful distortions to which the Joguis subject themselves, till life is wasted
away, would be perfectly incredible if they were not so abundantly attested, and
yet seen, by many who visit those countries. They afford new proofs of what the
human mind can invent, and the body endure, in the way of torture under the
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influence of superstition (ibid., 48). To Grant it seemed obvious that Indians

had developed the same theology of remission of sins and spiritual merit as the
papists in Europe:
In short, the modes of expiating guilt, and of acquiring merit, are endless among
this people. To accomplish this end, is the business of all their vast train of ceremonies, services and external performances; it is the very thing that has upheld
the fabric of Hindoo superstition, and has perpetuated the credulity of the multitude, and the impostures of their priests: even the Bhagvad, the purest production
of Hindoo theology, proceeds upon the same principles for the remission of sin
Upon the whole then it appears, that the Hindoos pursue methods of obtaining
pardon of sin without regard to the disposition of the mind, or the conduct of
life on their own principles. They may go on committing wilful offences every
day, and as regularly wiping them off, and die at last pure and in peace, and pass
through the water of the Ganges to happiness in a new state. For the violations
of conscience, which though smothered is not extinct; for the disregard of truth,
of justice, and of mercy, their system has enabled them, without making any the
slightest compensation to men, to give satisfaction to their gods. To them they pay
a certain quit-rent, or acknowledgement, for liberty to do whatever their inclination and ability may prompt them to, as far as their fellow creatures are concerned.
Can we hesitate to say what must be the effect of such principles on their character? Among such people, crimes must prevail. (ibid., 48-49)
To this Grant added that doctrines like the transmigration of souls served to
weaken the sense of moral obligation among the Hindus. So did the character
of the whole multitude of Hindu deities. The worship and ceremonies practiced
by the Hindus also vitiated and stupefied their minds. By trying to represent the
divine nature materially, their system of idolatry infinitely degraded the divine.
This immorality and idolatry were connected to the erroneous doctrines of the
Hindus: Between depraved opinions entertained of the Divine Being, and depraved practice, there is a necessary and inseparable connection. Those opinions
originate from corruption, and he who makes a god for himself will certainly
contrive to receive from him an indulgence for his corrupt propensities (ibid., 51).
The Hindu system of superstition was most dangerous, because it was omnipresent in everyday existence: The spirit of superstition extends among the Hindoos
to every hour, and every business of life (ibid., 52).
Grants entire mode of reasoning about the Hindoo religion and its caste
hierarchy reflected the theology that we met in the previous two chapters. In this
Reformation theology, true religion entailed a personal and spiritual conversion to
God, which was prevented by human iniquity and the corrupted form of religion
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it everywhere produced. Spiritual freedom entailed that one should be free from
the burdens of human law in religion and that one should have the space to find
ones own place in Gods plan. Under this scheme, it was very important that all
occupations allowed one to progress in religion; each occupation was a potential
vocation, so to speak. In India, Grant saw a system of despotism and false religion
much like the Roman-Catholic Church as the Reformers had imagined it. The
Brahmin priests had fabricated this system of rules and rites in order to subordinate the laity and fix a hierarchy of four orders. Consequently, the lower orders
lived under a tyranny that prevented them from liberal exertions and never allowed them to change their place in society through personal growth.
Priests, Ceremonies and Human Works
In his History of British India, James Mill reproduced the same description of Hindu society, couching it in scarcely more secular terms. The Brahmins remained the
evil priests holding society in their grips, misguiding the flock of believers through
their laws and ceremonies. Mill suggested that the four castes exemplified a crude
stage in the progress of human societies. Primarily, he characterized the Brahmins
in terms of their separation of themselves from the rest of the Hindu people.
More than any other priesthood in the world they had claimed divine origins and
authority over the people:
Knowledge, and refined conceptions of the Divine nature, are altogether incompatible with the supposition that the Deity makes favourites of a particular class
of mankind, or is more pleased with those who perform a ceremonial service to
himself, than with those who discharge with fidelity the various and difficult duties of life. It is only in rude and ignorant times that men are so overwhelmed
with the power of superstition as to pay unbounded veneration and obedience to
those who artfully clothe themselves with the terrors of religion. The Brahmens
among the Hindus have acquired and maintained an authority more exalted, more
commanding, and extensive than the priests have been able to engross among any
other portion of mankind. As great a distance as there is between the Brahmen
and the Divinity, so great a distance is there between the Brahmen and the rest of
his species. According to the sacred books of the Hindus, the Brahmen proceeded
from the mouth of the Creator, which is the seat of wisdomtherefore is the
Brahman infinitely superior in wit and dignity to all other human beings. The
Brahmen is declared to be the Lord of all the classes. (Mill 1817, 111-112)
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Mill aimed to describe the Brahmanical privilege in more detail by pointing out
its pervading influence on Hindu society. He not only mentioned that they are the
Lords of all classes, but also argued that their power over society lay in their command of the rituals: As the greater part of life among the Hindus is engrossed by
the performance of an infinite and burdensome ritual, which extends to almost
every hour of the day, and every function of nature and society, the Brahmens,
who are the sole judges and directors in these complicated and endless duties, are
rendered the uncontrollable masters of human life (Mill 1817, 112-113).
Mill added a detailed explanation of how the Brahmins enriched themselves:
the religion of the Hindus is so designed that all kinds of gifts to these priests are
central. He pondered upon the question how all operations in society could be so
influenced by religion: Beside the causes which usually give superstition a powerful sway in ignorant and credulous ages, the order of priests obtained a greater
authority in India than in any other region of the globe; and this again they employed with astonishing success in multiplying and corroborating the ideas on
which their power and consequence depended (Mill Vol I, book II, chapter VI;
1817, 198). The priests and the deity determine everything: the promulgation of
the law, the classification of the people, the establishment of the government. Religious observances affect every stage of life, every hour of the day. Without much
ado Mill identified the same culprits again and again: the Brahmins. In much
detail, he described the stupid flattery of many gods and the incoherence between
one opinion and another in Hindu religion. This brought Mill to identifying an
even deeper incoherence, one between the theoretical and the practical system of
Hindu religion: It is a strong instance of the common incoherence of thought
that while so many persons of eminence loudly contend for the correctness
of the speculative, there is a universal agreement respecting the meanness, the
absurdity, the folly, of the endless, childish, degrading, and pernicious ceremonies,
in which the practical part of the Hindu religion consists (Mill Vol I, book II,
chapter VI; 1817, 245). He warned his readers that he was able only to present a
minuscule sample of this, as volumes would hardly suffice to depict at large the
ritual of the Hindus, which is more tedious, minute, and burthensome; and engrossed a greater portion of human life, than any ritual which has been found to
fetter and oppress any other portion of the human race (ibid.). Ceremonies and
rituals bind and oppress the Hindu people.
To understand Mills language we again need to turn to the Christian background against which these ideas were formulated. Mill concluded his description
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of marriage ceremonies with this intimation to his readers: If the ceremonies

for marriage are thus multiplied, trivial, and tiresome, those allotted to funerals
are in point of number still more exorbitant and oppressive. He concluded that
wretched ceremonies constitute almost the entire practical part of Hinduism:
The precepts which are lavished upon its ceremonies bury, in their exorbitant
mass, the pittance bestowed upon all other duties taken together. On all occasions
ceremonies meet the attention as the pre-eminent duties of the Hindu. The holiest
man is always he, by whom the ceremonies of his religion are most strictly performed. Never among any other people did the ceremonial part of religion prevail
over the moral to a greater, probably to an equal extent. (ibid, 264)
Thus, rites and ceremonies are made to prevail over morality, Mill stressed. Interesting to note here is the link proposed by Mill between the practical part of
religion, which should be focused on morality, but which is obfuscated by the
burden of oppressive ceremonies. He went on to give a description of different
kinds of ascetic and meditational techniques focusing on the cruel sacrifice and
penitence to which such high value is described by Hindus. He remarked: Such
are the acts, by which, according to the Hindu religion, the favour of the Almighty
Power is chiefly to be gained; such are the ideas respecting purity and merit, which
it is calculated to inspire (ibid., 276). Mill gave all these illustrations to drive
home one crucial point. It is not the fact that the Hindus do not know the ordinary precepts of morality. They do:
If we search a little further, we shall discover that nations do not differ so much
from one another in regard to a knowledge of morality, and of its obligations, the
rules of morality having been taught among nations in a manner remarkably similar, as in the various degrees of steadiness, or the contrary, with which they assign
the preference to moral above other acts. Among rude nations it has almost always
been found, that religion has served to degrade morality, by advancing to the place
of greatest honour, those external performances, or those mental exercises, which
more immediately regarded the deity; and with which, of course, he was supposed
to be more particularly delighted. On no occasion, indeed, has religion obliterated
the impressions of morality, of which the rules are the fundamental laws of human
society: It has every where met with the highest applause; and nowhere has it been
celebrated in more pompous strains, than in places where the most contemptible, or the most abominable rites have most effectually been allowed to usurp
its honours. It is not so much, therefore, by the mere words in which morality is
mentioned, that we are to judge of the mental imperfections of different nations,
as by the place which it clearly holds in the established scale of meritorious acts.
(ibid., 277-278)
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This is the reason why the Hindu religion is corrupt: external performances believed to delight the deities take the place of truly meritorious acts.
Mills critique makes perfect sense against the background of the relation
between human works and divine grace as it is conceptualized in the Reformation
theology of conversion. Truly good and moral acts can only spring from people
whose soul has been transformed by God. Rites and ceremonies divert the attention of humanity away from the pursuit of true spiritual conversion. As such the
Hindu believers are misguided: even though they have received basic knowledge
of morality, their religion is so corrupt that it conceals this. This is how human
traditions oppress the human spirit. Even though certain texts praise moral duties,
yet in the entire system of rules concerning duty, the degree of stress which is
laid upon moral acts, may, as in the case of the Hindus, bear no comparison to the
importance which is attached to useless or pernicious ceremonies (278). This did
not shock Mill, as it is by no means unnatural for the religion of a rude people to
unite opposite qualities, to preach the most harsh austerities, and at the same time
to encourage the loosest morality (279). To illustrate the depravity of the moral
character of Hindu religion, Mill like Grant also referred to the immoral qualities of the deities. Their shared focus on the harsh austerities of the Hindus is
particularly noteworthy: both pointed out that Hindus think penance in its most
extreme forms will save the believer or bring him closer to God. Thus the practices of many Indian traditions are described against the background framework
in which God and human beings have a specific individual spiritual relation to
which human beings with their human powers have nothing to contribute.
As was the case in Grants work, Mill attributed a great deal of importance to
what he viewed as the Hindu system of sacred law. The main problem, so Mill began his expos on this topic, is that the Hindus never succeeded at distinguishing
between different kinds of authorities. Some things should be under the authority
of the Magistrate; others under the authority of God in the individual conscience.
Another familiar theme from post-Reformation Europe surfaced here:
One preliminary observation is, that amid the imperfections adhering to the
state of law among a rude and ignorant people, they preserve not their maxims
of justice, and their rules of judicial procedure, distinct from other subjectsThe
doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and practices of education; the
institutions, duties, and customs of domestic life; the maxims of private morality,
and even of domestic economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation: all form essential parts of the Hindu codes of law, and are treated in the same
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style, and laid down with the same authority, as the rules for the distribution of
justice. (ibid., 133)
The problem with this state of affairs is plain: The tendency of this rude conjunction of dissimilar subjectsis to confound the important distinction between
those obligations which it is the duty of the magistrate to enforce, and those
which ought to be left to the suggestions of self-interest, and the sanctions of morality, over the greater part of human life, and to leave man no liberty even in their
private and ordinary transactions (ibid., 133). This problem too is a familiar one:
the problem of authority and the two spheres. There is a sphere of liberty in which
the individual believer needs to be left alone to obey his conscience and pursue the
salvation of his soul and a sphere where each ought always to obey the magistrate
or sovereign. Mixing up these two spheres had become one of the basic injustices
in heathen societies, according to the Reformations conception of humanity. It lay
at the root of the despotism of the Hindus also, so Grant and Mill agreed.
The theological background framework also reveals itself in the fixation on
the link between caste and occupation that we find in these nineteenth-century
European descriptions of India. The caste system, according to Mill, is mainly
characterized by its division of labour. This is sanctioned and continued by the
Hindu law and its priestly interpreters, he asserted, and thus is a barrier that
prevents all progress (ibid., 108). The degradation of Hindu society and religion
is due to the despotism sanctioned by religion and priestcraft, Mill said in the
concluding remarks of his section on the Hindus:
We have already seen in reviewing the Hindu form of government, that despotism, in one of its simplest and least artificial shapes, was established in Hindustan, and confirmed by laws of Divine authority. We have seen likewise, that by the
division of the people into castes, and the prejudices which the detestable views of
the Brahmens raised to separate them, a more degrading and pernicious system of
subordination was established among the Hindus, or at any rate the vices of that
system were carried to a more destructive height, than among any other people.
And we have seen that by a system of priestcraft, built upon the most enormous,
irrational, and tormenting superstition, that ever harassed and degraded any portion of mankind, their minds were enchained more intolerable than their bodies;
in short that, despotism and priestcraft taken together, the Hindus, in mind and
body, were the most enslaved portion of the human race. (ibid., 451-452)
A particular understanding of superstition undergirds this view of Indian society and religion: priests misguide the masses of believers. With their fabricated
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system of false religion, they actively hinder the growth of true faith, and, hence,
of true morality and happiness, because they enslave the minds of the people.
They do this by creating the illusion that humans can pursue their own salvation
through good works, penitence, ceremonies, gifts to the priests, obeying the sacred
law, procuring indulgences, etc.
Ignorance and the Obstacles of Conversion
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the caste system and the
excessive authority of the Brahmins would be identified as the chief obstacles
to conversion to Christianity in India. In an essay on this problem, one author
argued that the caste system affords one of the most formidable obstacles to the
propagation of the Gospel amongst the Hindus, since it forms an essential part of
their religious system (Fiske 1849, 74). By this time, the claims of Grant and Mill
about the authority of the Brahmins had already become clichs: Connected with
the system of which we have just spoken, is the excessive veneration which the
lower classes of the Hindus entertain for the Brahmans, their implicit obedience
to the dictates, and their superstitious dread of the displeasure and malediction
of that order. The Brahmans have acquired and maintained an authority, perhaps
more extensive, than the priests have been able to engross among any other portion of mankind (ibid., 78).
The only thing that could allow the Brahmins to maintain this excessive
authority over the minds of the Hindus, so the Europeans thought, was the deep
ignorance of the average Indian. The only way to dissolve the tyranny of the Brahmanical caste system, then, would consist of education that lifted the natives from
the darkness of ignorance. This conclusion inspired some of the British missionaries and officials to advocate setting up a central institution or college in Calcutta.
One of the statements to this effect reproduced the following words of the Reverend Alexander Duff:
But why is it that the people of India have submitted to long to the cruel, antisocial, tyrannical dominion of caste?and why have they contentedly wallowed
to long in the mire of the countless abominations of Idolatry?The same cause
supplies the true reason of both:and that reason is ignorancethe grossest imaginable ignorance. Now, that which dispels ignorance is sound knowledge. Let us then
confer the inestimable benefit of diffusive knowledge, and, ere long, we shall behold the rapid downfall of Idolatry and Caste. The cause that supplies venom and
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power to theses terrible scourges of India, is one and the same, --and the same cause
will inevitably demolish them. For the same light of sound useful and religious
knowledge which exposes the utter folly and irrationality of the one, will equally
expose the gross partiality and injustice of that artificial system which has been
framed to uphold it. In other words, Idolatry will be abhorred, and must disappear: the iniquitous despotism of caste will be felt, scorned, and trampled under
foot, with an indignation that cannot be lessened by the reflection, that, over ages
and generation innumerable, it hath already swayed undisturbed, the sceptre of a
ruthless domination, that ground men down to the condition of irrationals, and
strove to keep them there with the rigor of an irresistible necessity. (Anon. 1831,
24)
In the eyes of missionaries, then, the Hindu caste system had become the chief
obstacle to the diffusion of true religion and what sustained it was the state of
absolute ignorance in which the Brahmins kept the laity. The duty of the British was clear. They had to educate the natives so that the Brahmanical system of
idolatry would crumble: The path of duty is, therefore, clear and open before us:
let us devote our strength directly to the dissemination of true knowledge, literary,
scientific, and sacred, and we shall soon witness the stronghold of error beginning
to totter, and, of themselves, crumbling into ruins (ibid.).
In the many dialogues between Hindus and Christians that were published
to educate the natives about true religion, the same depiction of Hinduism and
the caste system as a variant of medieval European religion and society often
recurred. Ignorance of the laity and the corruption of the clerics were among the
main themes. In one of these dialogues, for instance, a son who had converted to
Christianity told his father the following: But without examination nothing is
to be regarded as true. Our people merely believe what the Brahmans say. No one
can read the whole of the Hindu Shastras because they are written in the Sanskrit
languageIf ones whole life be spent in searching into all the Shastras, when are
we to arrive at the truth and secure the salvation of our souls? (Padmanji 1870,
49-50).
Six decades later, in the year 1914, British colonial sources still pointed out
to the readers that the unifying factor of Hinduism was blind veneration of the
Brahmins. In A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province (1914), this was described as the degeneration of Hinduism into
sacerdotalism: Hinduism early degenerated from a religion into sacerdotalism,
and would, in its present form, be far better described as Brahmanism than by
any other single word; and it is this abject subjection to and veneration for the
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Brahman which forms the connecting link that runs through and binds together
the diverse forms of worship and belief of which I have spoken (Ibbetson in
H.A. Rose 1914, 116-7). Brahmanism is described as the degeneration of a purer
form of religion. The culprits for this degeneration remain the Brahmins. In The
Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India, one more element is added to
the nexus: not only is the caste system linked to Hinduism, but both are also connected to a system of rigidly fixed occupations. Casteregulates the whole of a
Hindus life, his social position and, usually, his occupation. It is the only tribunal
which punishes religious and social offences, and when a man is out of caste he
has, for so long as this condition continues, no place in Hinduism (Russell and
Lal 1916, 193).
Briefly, the British experience of Indian religion and society was very much
structured by the theological framework that emerged from the Protestant-Catholic debates during the centuries of Reformation. A fixed range of topics remained
omnipresent in the descriptions of India: the Brahmins as the corrupting priests
and their use of ceremonies and laws to enslave the spirit and conscience of Hindu
believers; caste as the inherently unjust structure that poses a barrier to any spiritual and material progress; the inherent hierarchy and inequality embedded in
Hindu society and the rigid fixation of occupations; the self-evident connection
between false religion and immorality in society.
All these elements indeed become self-evident, but only when taking the
European-Christian background into account: these are the obstacles that prevent people from becoming truly spiritual and real believers. As the basic elements
of false religion, these are taken to actively hinder the creation of the conditions
in which true spiritual conversion could begin to occur: a duplicitous priesthood;
belief in ceremonies, works, and sacraments; enslavement of the conscience; tyranny in the temporal world. What is needed is a particular kind of liberty and
even more so a new experience of ones own society and religion. This is what the
European Protestants aimed to realize in India. They hoped to make the Hindus
see their society and religion in a different way. In this sense, the descriptions of
the degeneration of Hindu religion and society that we find in Grant and Mill
provided the first step in the process of creating the conditions of conversion. In
this first step, the Hindu traditions were rendered into false rivals to Christianity.
Under this descriptive framework, false Hindu religion could not but prevent the
growth of spirituality and moralityit thwarted the expansion of true religion.
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9.2. Khrishtadharma for the Christians

The Reformation theology of conversion did not allow mere humans to bind other humans to their own understanding of religion, since God alone had authority
in the realm of religion. This posed limitations on missionary activity. However,
one was still free to create the social and cognitive conditions that would allow
the soul of the natives to undergo spiritual conversion by God. The second step
in this process of creating the conditions of conversion was to have the Hindus
themselves realize that they were followers of false religion. They should become
aware of the corrupt state of their religion and society, by accepting that the European descriptions of Hinduism and the caste system were accurate depictions
of their state of affairs.
When a number of European Christians entered into a dialogue with the
Hindu natives concerning these matters, they faced an unexpected obstacle. They
encountered unwillingness on the part of the Hindus to enter into any sustained debate. The historical material makes it clear that the Europeans determined the
conditions within which the debate should be conducted: they decided on the
topics; how one was allowed to argue; which arguments were considered relevant
and valid; etc. In brief, the debates should concern the truth and falsity of the
respective religious doctrines of Christianity and Hinduism. The Hindu pundits
were forced to comply with this thematic choice.
We propose that there was a significant link between the unwillingness of
Hindus to enter the debate, on the one hand, and the debating terms set by the
British, on the other hand. The British engaged in this exercise basically to prove
the superiority of Christian religion. Most Hindus were not impressed and found
this claim of religious superiority rather ridiculous. Remarkably, they also refused
to claim universal validity or superiority for Hinduism. Engaging in the debate,
the options for Hindu participants were very limited: showing that the Hindu
religion could meet the criteria set by the Christians or accepting the superiority
of Christianity. The criteria came down to the following:
(1) The debate had to revolve around the religious doctrines and laws of the
respective religions as found in their scriptures and law books. The Europeans assumed that these propositions were understood by the Hindus as the law of God
revealed by Him, the Creator of the universe.
(2) The discussion involved arguments that ought to establish the truth or
falsity of particular doctrines or the validity of sacred laws.
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(3) These arguments were to be grounded in historical and other factual

(geographical, linguistic, mathematical, common-sense) evidence. In other words,
the truth or falsity of religious doctrines should be backed by scientific, factual
or empirical evidence.
(4) If the evidence and arguments indeed succeeded at supporting the truth
of the doctrines in question, the superiority of the religion had been established.
(5) This superiority entailed the universal truth, validity and applicability of
the religion in question. Any rational human being now had to accept this religion
as the true one and the only hope for salvation.
Let us now illustrate how these five criteria were
operationalised
in the actual encounters between European Christians and native Hindus in India.
Why Debate Doctrines?
In a crucial text, William Smith, a missionary working in Benares and other parts
of North India in the first half of the nineteenth century, recounted the conversion
experience of the Brahmin Dwij (1850). It actually concerned the story of Nilakantha Goreh (Young 1981, 102). Smith intended to reveal to his English readers
the nature of the objections against Christianity that were raised by the Brahmins
in India. He emphasized that these Brahmins are not really interested in articulating the kind of questions about religion that gripped Europeans. Debates about
the doctrines of the Hindu and Christian religions are not at all appealing to them,
he cautioned his readers:
It is worth of notice, and may be useful to young Missionaries, at least, to know
that Dwijs doubts with regard to Hinduism did not originate so much from its
doctrines as from its facts. With respect to its doctrines, especially those referring
to Divine nature, the soul, sin, &c., the Pandits, and the Shasters too, allow, from
the acknowledged difficulty with which these subjects are surrounded, so much
latitude, that a man may entertain any opinion, so that he keeps up outward appearances, without giving offence. Matters of this kind, as with the Greeks, are,
to use a phrase current elsewhere, open questions. Hence Dwij, in the first place,
regarded the doctrines of Christianity as matters of secondary consideration; they
might, no doubt, be good and right for them, the Christians; for it might, and no
doubt has, as the Hindus often acknowledge, pleased God, among the innumerable manifestations he has made of himself, to reveal himself to the Christians
in the manner the Bible represents him to have done, and as he has done to the
Musulmans through Mahomed. No Hindu will quarrel with you on this point;
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and, like many in Christian Europe, who deem themselves much wiser, he terms
those bigots who do. (Smith 1850, 100-101)
Consequently, it was no sinecure to instigate any such Hindu-Christian debate.

We find the most successful attempt to do so in the challenge formulated by civil
servant John Muir (1810-1882) in his popular work the Matapariksha (1839).
His work aimed compare Hinduism and Christianity by showing learned Hindus
(and Christian readers, of course) the inadequacies of Hinduism and the truth of
Christianity. Muir appeared very conscious of the fact that his manner of doing
so is alien to the Indian debating partners. He understood this as a deficiency on
the side of the Indians: they do not know how to reflect about religion and have
no clue as to what counts as evidence in the debate. While the line of reasoning
adopted will seem familiar and natural to the Christian reader, it will not be so
for the learned Hindus, who are not accustomed to see such rules and principles
applied to test the credibility of traditionally-received histories, and the merits of
theological doctrines (Muir 1852-54, iv). Muir introduced this problem as follows:
Many general principles which are familiar to the European thinker, may, when
abstractly stated, be far from intelligible to a learned Hindu, whose knowledge,
however extensive and recondite, belongs to a domain of thought widely different
from the practical philosophy of the West. It is necessary, therefore, that in arguing
with such persons, the principles which we assume as the basis of the discussion
should be clearly expounded, and illustrated by examples which may make their
application clear and obvious. (ibid., iv; italics mine).
Muirs aim was to show to his readers the weakness of Hindu doctrines and the
superiority of Christianity. Working towards this aim, he followed a dialogical
model by which the opponent is slowly and patiently countered and convinced:
And it should not only be the endeavour of the Christian disputant thus to adapt
his instructions in a specific manner to the mental character and habits of those
whom he seeks to convince: he is also bound both as a matter of prudence and of
Christian charity to reconcile their good will by every means in his power. However deadly and abominable he may believe the errors, or the objects of worship,
which he is assailing, to be, he should recollect that they have been through life
objects of habitual veneration to those whom he is seeking to convert to a holier
faith. This consideration, duly weighed, will lead him to see that he must not
violently vituperate the doctrines or the deities of the Sastras, but intimate with
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caution and gentleness how unworthy they are of the reverence accorded by their
votaries. (ibid., v; italics mine)
One such opponent, Hurrochunder Turkpunchanun, published Matapariksottara or an Answer to a Sketch of the Argument for Christianity and against Hinduism
(1840) in response to Muirs text. My attention has been directed to an argument
by Mr. Muir, in favour of Christianity, and against Hinduism, in Sanscrit Metre
said this Hindu pundit in his preface:
As a Hindu, I think he has not proved, that the Christian Revelation is true, nor
that the Hindu Revelation is false. Entertaining this opinion, I have attempted
an answer in the annexed verses, I would have chosen a more popular means of
disquisition, but as the learned gentleman has courted the contest in slokas, I must
not decline the challenge.
I am aware of the inutility of discussions on this subject, and that it is impossible to prove the truth or falsity of any scheme of faith.
Revelation itself implies a miracle. The first votaries must believe in humble
reverence, the person really or falsely designating himself, as the chosen of God.
Each succeeding race of believers yields a blind and a more pious acquiescence.
A Moslim asserts that Mohumud was the Prophet of God, because he has
asserted his divine mission and his assertion is recorded in the Koran. If I must
break the silence which is most prudent at such occasions, I reply, that I admit that
Mohamed made these pretensions, but that I consider him to be an imposter or
insane,at least on this subject. I have no pious prejudice in favour of the Koran,
and reply without hesitation. The Moslim makes equally short work of the Christian and the Hindu faith.
I cannot find in Mr. Muirs Slokas any argument in favour of the truth
of Christs divine mission, which may not be used in support of the Hindu or
Moslim revelations. In a word, asserted miracles have only the force of argument,
when the mind is predisposed to a pious belief which dispenses with proof.
The inference of a God from the works of nature is open to every reasoning
being and common to all religious systems.
The truth of a revelation cannot be proved by an appeal to the beauty of its
perceptive morality, nor can it falsely be established that by imputing deformity
to its institutions. The standard of beauty and deformity is arbitrary and man with
his limited reason is not able to scan the objects of the precepts, which he believes
to have been divinely revealed.
In the annexed Slokas I have met the cavils and arguments of Mr. Muir in
a mode, which will be perhaps more convincing to the Hindu than to him. But
using his own weapon, I have put questions to him in regard to Christianity, his
satisfactory solution of which would greatly serve the cause, he advocates,-- and
shake the scepticism of those who pretend that belief should be preceded by conviction. (Turkpunchanun 1840, preface; italics mine).
347
The Matapariksottara is identified by Young (1981, 94) as an early, and in some

respects original, contribution to the defence of Hinduism. Its author, Young
points out, utilized as his apologetic tools certain strands of European criticism
against Christianity (especially European free thought and Unitarianism). He
combined dogmatism and scepticism, according to Young, who detects a contradiction between the attitude exhibited in this preface and the last sloka of this
book which reads: If only Christianity could be made clear, I vow that, along
with my colleagues, I will convert to it (ibid., 95). Young identifies two potential
explanations for this alliance of scepticism and dogmatism:
Either of two alternatives may account for this apparent alliance between dogmatism and skepticism. According to the one view, Hara. attempted, albeit ineptly,
to repudiate Muirs allegedly objective methods for verifying subjectively apprehended religious truths in order to show that skepticism is the only alternative
to dogmatism. According to the second, Hara. believed that skepticism is the
guardian of dogmatism, at least when aimed at beliefs other than ones own. The
former views skepticism as a danger to be eliminated by dogmatism; the latter sees
doubting other dogmas as a means to enhance ones own. (ibid., 95)
However, there is a third possibility to understand Hurrochunders claims. In the

preface, the latter expressed his intention not to argue in the same way as Muir
does. By saying that I am aware of the inutility of discussions on this subject,
and that it is impossible to prove the truth or falsity of any scheme of faith, he
refused the terms set by Muir. Reasoning about religion, for this Hindu, did not
concern proving the truth or falsity of religions. Perhaps the contradiction Young
identifies is not a contradiction at all. Hurrochunder did not seek an alliance of
scepticism and dogmatism, but, for the sake of argument, he temporarily accepted
Muirs terms of discussing the truth and falsity of religious doctrines, even though
he considered such discussions futile and impossible.
European Expectations, Indian Indifference
In a series of lectures on the encounters between Hinduism and Christianity,
Young sketches the cultural milieu of Benares in the mid-nineteenth century. He
considers the missionaries from a variety of associations active in the city, cruising its ghats, chowks, and bazaars, talking up the Gospel andmore often than
notgetting in the way (Young 2002, case 2). They proclaimed in the cadences
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of a Sanskrit couplet for a show of sophistication that fools who afflict themselves with the pains of asceticism, who worship idols (murti) of clay, metal, and
wood, cannot attain supreme peace (param shantim) (ibid.). When this was how
the missionaries presented Christianity, Young remarks, it perhaps comes as no
surprise, as Halbfass observed, that there was no sign of active theoretical interest
in it from the learned communities of Benares, or that representatives of Sanskritic Hinduism, the pandits, were cool toward it and made no attempt to respond to
the foreign challenge, to enter into a dialogue.
To account for this lack of interest, we can turn to another pundits response
to the orientalist James Robert Ballantyne. In Ballantynes The Bible for the Pandits
(1860), one Vitthal Shastri pointed out that missionaries8 mistake our silence.
When a reply which we think nonsense, or not applicable, is offered to us, we
think that to retire silently and civilly from such useless discussion is more meritorious than to continue it. But our silence is not a sign of our admission of defeat
which the Missionaries think to be so (Ballantyne 1860, xli). Shastri went on to
explain: We are not averse to hearing reasons on the side of a religion which our
masters hold, and we think that there will be an interest, on the attempts being
fulfilled,which you undertake,to show us, by a Sanskrit Commentary, that
Christianity is not so unreasonable as it appears to be when preached without reasons (Ibid., xli-xlii; italics mine). This learned Hindu seemed to highlight a short
circuit in the debate between the missionaries and the pundits. He stressed that
when they are silent, the pundits do not express disinterest in the reasons of the
other religion. The silence expressed the Hindus experience that certain statements concerning religion were simply nonsensical or not applicable.
Hindu Indians and Christian Europeans had very different horizons of expectation where it concerned how to speak about religion. Muir explained to
his European readers how the pundits fail to reason about religion; the pundits
considered the Christian way of debating nonsensical or not applicable. What to
the Hindus was the problem with the Christian way of debating? To answer this
question, we should have a closer look at the grounds on which missionaries and
colonial officials rejected the arguments of the Hindus. For the Europeans, the
debate needs to conform to a range of issues: for instance, the divine authority of
the Hindu Scriptures, the Sastras, was supposed to be central. Evidence is asked,
by the Europeans, for the alleged divine authority of the Vedas and Sastras. The
The Sanskrit original reads khrishtadharmapracaropajivin, lit. and archly, people who depend for
their livelihoods on the propagation of Christianity (Young 2002, case 2).
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Hindu response to this challengeamong other arguments, they propose that

the Vedas sprung from the mouth of Brahma and that they have been transmitted through the oral testimony of the Muniswas rejected by the Europeans as
untrustworthy. In other words, once the debate had taken off, the next step for the
Europeans was to show how the arguments of the Hindus were invalid. Time and
again, they pointed out that the Hindus rely on tradition to argue their case; time
and again, they insisted that this is insufficient as evidence for the divine authority
of the Hindu scriptures.
Take for instance John Wilson, a missionary at the service of the General
Assembly of the Church of Scotland Missionary Society. Wilson is famous for
his An Exposure of the Hindu Religion (1832), a reply to the tract The Verification of
the Hindu Religion by Mora Bhatta Dandekara. This tract reports several evenings
of actual conversation and heated debate between the two (see also OHanlon
2002, 65; Copland 2007, 649). Wilson was of the opinion that the Hindus and
the Parsis had not studied (their) religion well and that they were far removed
from true learning. When Mora Bhatta claimed that Indians are certain that by
religion they will be saved and that [a]ll men, having, according to their inclinations, made minute inquiry, practice the observances of religion (Wilson 1832,
9), Wilson countered this by saying: The generality of mankind, in this country
in particular, make little or no inquiry on the subject [religion], and ask nothing
about the evidence of religion. They regulate their practice according to the faith
which they repose on the words of their parents, and the doctrines of their priests
(ibid., 30). The problem, according to Wilson, was that the natives never asked
for evidence and simply accepted the words of parents and priests. Wilson was
convinced of the fact that the spread of true learning and evidence (not only religious but also true science) will prove to be the death of the local religions. While
Mora Bhatta acknowledged that the new scientific knowledge would benefit the
Indians, Wilson argued that the discoveries of science, and the revelations of the
Puranas are completely opposed to one another (ibid., 31). He gave examples by
contrasting scientific facts to the stories of the Puranas.9 Therefore, true learning
is doing much to overturn the Hindu religion (ibid., 32).
Wilson gives the following illustration of his point (1832, 31-32): Let a few examples be taken
into consideration. The earth, which is globular, is described in the Puranas as possessed of the shape
of a lotus, and as nearly level. From science, it is learned that the earth is suspended in space according to the will of God; but it is described in some Puranas as resting on the back of a tortoise, and
in others as resting on the serpent Ananta. Its circumference is measured by about 12,434 kroshas;
but its diameter according to the Puranas [p. 32] extends to 500,000,000 yojanas. The earth is about
47,000,000 kroshas distant from the sun, and it is said in the Puranas to be merely 100,000 yojanas
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Mora Bhattas long exposition on idolatry could not impress Wilson. Mora
Bhatta asserted that not a single Hindu esteems an image to be God (ibid., 10).
These images have another function, he explained, related to worship, practices of
acquiring peace of mind, removal of ignorance, etc. (ibid., 10-14). The practical
function of the images in helping the people to focus on God was central according to him. Besides, Mora Bhatta remarked, image-worship is a practice common
to humanity in many religions. Christians too do not escape from this as God is
also represented under various forms differing greatly from each other. Take for
instance the Holy Spirit, Mora Bhatta points out, who is now a pigeon, then fire
(ibid., 15). Or take the Son, Jesus Christ, we find that he is sometimes in the form
of word, and sometimes, again he assumed a mortal body, composed, like ours,
of the five elements [earth, water, fire, air, and ether] (ibid.). Mora Bhatta asked
himself, if these three Divinities occasion no bewilderment of mind, but establish the creature in the worship of the one God, how can the worship of Rama,
Krishna, and other gods, occasion an ever-growing bewilderment to us? Wilson
did not buy this defence and tackled the Bhattas exposition on idolatry by countering the idea that Brahma is the Supreme God worshiped by the Christians:
that could not be the case, because Brahma is used to refer to other objects than
God (wind, mind, food, servant) (ibid., 33). Wilson argued this case on the basis
of Sanskrit texts and provided the audience with a range of citations in Sanskrit
and English translation to counter Mora Bhattas arguments (ibid., 73-99). In his
private diary he expressed his pity towards his Indian debating partners: I found
none among them able to make even a plausible defence of their own religion
(cited in Copland 2007, 649).
Evidence for Divine Revelation
The Hindu pundits arguments were rejected by the Christians using elaborate
critiques of the Hindu texts for this end (e.g. Muir 1852-54; Murdoch 1902,
73-77; Morris 1843, 12; Mullens 1856, 53; Mundy 1827, 10-11; Padmanji 1870;
Ballantyne 1859). But this way of arguing was then met with incomprehension
and ridicule from the side of the Hindu pundits (for instance, Muir 1852, 53, 55).
distant. The earth is only about 120,000 kroshas distant from the moon, and yet it is described in the
Puranas as 200,000 yojanas distant. It is impossible to enumerate the contradictions of this kind, and
the absurd fictions contained in the Puranas about the egg of Brahma and other matters of a like
nature. The Veda even contain blunders as great as those alluded to,as, for instance, it says that rain
comes from the moon. Verily in the word of God no such errors could ever occur.
351
Hence, the question emerged what would count as evidence for the divine origin
of scriptures. Take, for instance, the Anglican theologianlater to be converted
to Roman-CatholicismJ. B. Morris An Essay towards the Conversion of Learned
and Philosophical Hindus (1843). This essay revolved around an imaginary dialogue between Laurence and a Brahmin named Radhakant. The Brahmin raises
the following question: Would you, then, have me give up as false, the idea that
any truth is revealed immediately from Brahma, and yet assert for yourself that
the law of Moses, for instance, came by immediate revelation? (Morris 1843, 10)
Laurences answer to this question contains the crucial thought that
as I had been informed that the Vedas were of too ancient a date for us to know
anything certain about the mode in which they were given to the sage Vyasa; and
as, moreover, I am told that Vyasa, however divinely guided in the work, was yet
but the compiler and arranger of existing revelations, and the Vedas themselves
appeal to the ancients before them, it seemed, that as we had no certain knowledge
as to the mode of their formation, we must argue from what we know, as Gotama
allows we may, to what we do not know. (ibid., 12)
Two themes came to determine the standard by which to measure the divine
origin and authority of texts: (1) the superhuman nature of the promulgator of
the scriptures in question and (2) the true and good content which should be
worthy of God (Muir 1846, 8-10; Muir 1852, 71; Mundy 1827, 3). In concreto,
this implied that the fallibility of the Hindu texts was supposed to be proven by
pointing out the human origin of the Sastras and the morally depraved character
of the Hindu gods.
The criterion of the human origin of the Shastras and the promulgators of
the Shastras was tackled by many. Muir, for instance, said the following:
The first proof requisite for establishing the divinity of a Sstra, is that its
promulgator should be able to perform such wonderful works as are beyond
human power, and possible only by divine assistance. This supernatural power
is of two kinds: first, that of performing wonderful acts, such as curing the sick
by a word, raising the dead, &c.; second, the display of miraculous knowledge,
i.e. foretelling events; such as the minute description of something which is to
occur ten or a hundred years after. (Muir 1846, 8)
The main part of Muirs Matapariksha is designed as a dialogue between Vedavidwan (who has knowledge of the Vedas and Shastras) and Satyarthi (the truth-
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seeker from a western county). The first question posed by Satyarthi to Vedavidwan concerns the divine authority of the principal Shastras:
Satyarthi saysDeclare how the authority of the principal Sastras current in India is established
Vedavidwan saysThe Vedas and all the other Sastras issued from the
mouth of Brahma; this is plainly asserted in those treasuries of knowledge, the
PuranasHow, friend, can a particle of doubt be reasonably entertained as to the
authority of those Sastras which God himself created?
Satyarthi saysIntelligent persons do not esteem the evidence of the
plaintiff and defendant in their own cause to be trust-worthy, without some other
proof. So too, great pandit, some other proof besides their own dictum is required
to establish the authority of sacred books. By what proofs derived from reason do
the adherents of the Vedas and other Sastras set aside the doubts raised by the
Buddhists and other who deny their authority?
Vedavidwan saysThe Veda, always reputed eternal, is current to the present day; no human author of it is remembered in the worldWherefore, reasoning from the non-existence of any human origin, the wise concur in receiving it as
eternal and spoken by Brahma
[Vedavidwan] So too the other Sastras, being obtained by Munis from
the mouth of Brahma, were delivered to their disciples in succession. Thus the
whole collection of the Sastras, traditionally received, has always been acknowledged to have issued from the mouth of Brahma, and to be divine. Therefore the
divinity and authority of all the Sastras is established, being ascertained by oral
testimony. (Muir 1852, 2-4)
The Hindu participant in the dialogue uses two arguments to establish the divine
authority of certain texts: (1) they sprung from Brahma and (2) this knowledge
has been transmitted by oral testimony through the Munis. In response Satyarthi
points out that wise men cannot trust tradition just like that:
SatyarthiBut learned men should not, without examination, trust to tradition,
for there is a likelihood of there being both truth and falsehood in it. It is a matter
of knowledge to all, that many fictitious stories, received by tradition, are current
in the worldHence, O Pandit, it is to be considered whether the report current
in this country, that the Veda is of superhuman authority, and derived from the
inspiration of Brahma, is true or false.
VedavidwanI entirely trust to the tradition that is reported in India, on
this subject from early times till now; if you think differently, state (your opinion).
(ibid., 4-5)
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What we see in the above is the typical argument from tradition with which
Hindus often responded to the challenges posed by the Christians regarding the
truth of their religion and the divinity of their scriptures.10 However, the dialogue
is so designed that the reader gets the feeling that none of Satyarthis questions
are answered. Muir used various devices to create this impression. First of all, he
used the existence of the caste system and its emergence only in later texts of the
Vedas as an argument against the divine authority of the scriptures. The fact that
the caste system was not present in the oldest text, but that it was included in the
later phases shows that the Brahmin priests created it. This is in turn establishes
the human origin of at least part of the Vedas. The argument goes as follows (Muir
1852, 10-16). The original Aryyas did not know of caste divisions. The stories
about caste in the Puranas contradict the older texts and they come from a later
age. Hence, caste grew gradually by the effort of the priests:
By this I mean that the writers of the Puranas had a partiality for the religious
systems of this country. Hence whatever text is found anywhere in the Puranas
contradictory of those religious systems, will be worthy of credit. Thus it is inferred
that the distinction of caste, though not at first existing among the Aryyas, grew
up gradually by the efforts of the priests. Because the class of men who are occupied with the service of the gods and with science, everywhere acquires power and
honour. Hence, the superiority of the priests, viz. of the offerers of sacrifices and
praises, began to be believed by those who followed different occupations. Afterwards, the Brahmans, being themselves the guardians of the Scriptures, magnified
their own dignity, according to their pleasure. (ibid., 14)
We now see the larger framework within which the role of the Brahmins and
the nature of the caste system were challenged: this revolved around the question
of the authority of the scriptures. Muirs point was to prove that the sacred texts
of the Hindus are not divinely sanctioned by proving that caste is not a divinely
inspired dogma, but a later addition by the priests. He also used other arguments
indicating that the Shastras are not divinely inspired. Satyarthi goes further by explaining that the Vedic hymns are the oldest ones and goes deeper in the different
When George Smith, the Bishop of Victoria, visited the South Indian missions in 1853, he reported about some of the Hindu objections to the message of the gospel. The first objection was:
We cannot abandon the religion of our forefathers as false (George Smith 1854, 44-5). This argument from tradition appears to have been widespread in India. When Reverend Septimus Hobbs
visited certain hill tribes, he hoped they would be easier to convert than the Hindus trapped in the
well-organised Brahmanical system. When he began to teach them about Christ, they responded as
follows: No, no, we dont want to learn; we dont understand; our fathers-in-law did not learn, and
our father-in-laws fathers-in-laws did not learn; and we wont learn (Church Missionary Intelligencer
1853, 84).
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kind of Sanskrit that is used. He concludes that all these Vedic hymns are of a human origin: In my opinion all the Vedic hymns are of human origin, their divine
derivation is not established by reason. The authors of the hymns propitiated with
sacrifices, and celebrated by praises of their own composition, the hereditary gods
whom they worshipped (ibid., 17). The Vedic hymns were composed at a time
when divine knowledge was already much corrupted and the people believed in
many deities. According to Muir what happened was that natural events (winds,
fire, storm) were declared sentient (animated) and worshiped as gods. Because
the gods are not real, the hymns cannot be of divine origin. Through the mouth of
Satyarthi, he argued as follows: As these gods are all imaginary and not real, so
those hymns which celebrate them are of human origin. The author of the index
to the Veda tells the names of all the persons called by the name of rishis, who
composed the hymns (ibid., 18-19). Because they were transmitted from generation to generation people falsely believed them to be divine:
When these hymns, having been long handed down by tradition were become old,
the people began very greatly to revere them. Whatever object anywhere on earth
grows ancient, is generally regarded by men with wonder and reverence. Wherefore the discerning should not be surprised that people then declared the Vedic
hymns to be divine. People began to hold also the divine origin of the ancient
priests who composed the hymns. (ibid., 20).
The Munis came up with yet another system of thought and this posed a real
challenge, according to Muir: the different systems contradict each other and this
implies that some might be true and others must be false. How then can the Shastras give authority to all systems? If two systems contradict each other, how can
both be correct? This is the puzzle Muir put before his audience, as he concluded
that the correctness of both is not conceivable and therefore the Shastras are all
fallible and human:
The authority of Kapila being thus proved from the Sastras, his authority and
that of Vyasa must both be equal. Between the systems whch [sic] these two
authoritative munis promulgated there is a great contrariety, (as) I said. But the
correctness of both these systems between which such a contrariety is apparent,
is not conceivable, O Pandit. But it must without doubt be admitted that one of
these two, the Vedanta and the Sankhya, is contrary to truth. Hence the Sastra
in which the complete authoritativeness of both is declared is altogether fallible
and of human origin. And thus the authority of the Sastra of this country being
refuted, learned and acute men should not believe in it. (ibid., 24-5)
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Naturally, such a stance presupposes that only one truth exists in these matters.
On this basis, Muir kept arguing that the Hindu scriptures cannot be of divine
origin, because they hold so many different creeds (the Puranas and the Upanishads): Hence it is understood that they did not spring from one divine source,
but were gradually composed by a number of persons. Mutual contrariety is not
conceivable from the parts of a Sastra which is derived from the inspiration of
the omniscient God (ibid., 25). Additionally, he also stressed that there are many
mistakes and falsehoods in the text, due to the flawed memory of those who
transmitted them. He concluded his argument against the divine origin of the
Shastras as follows:
A recapitulation of the proofs above, by which the human origin of the Sastras of
India is understood, will now be given. Men know by nature that there is a God,
and from beholding the world which he has created, his greatness is understood.
When the first man, the father of mankind, was created, he knew God aright, although of limited understanding. But after he fell by transgressing the command
of God, the knowledge of God gradually decreased among his descendants. And
at the time when the people of the Aryya race came to India, they did not possess
the pure and perfect knowledge of God. Hence when they began to compose the
Vedic hymns, they erroneously celebrated the praises of Agni, Indra, and other
gods undeserving of worship. And afterwards imagining various other gods different from Indra and the rest, they worshipped them along with goddesses. And it
appears from a consideration of the Sastras that in respect of these gods a change
of doctrine has slowly arisen. There appears to be a mutual contradiction between
the authors of the Sastras as to which of that set of Gods is the supreme. A mutual contrariety is also perceived between the Vedanta and other Sastras, which
those persons called munis who were solicitous to know the truth, composed.
And in the whole circle of the Vedas, Vedangas, Puranas, and other Sastras there
are nowhere (to be) seen any contents unattainable by the human understanding.
And from the lapse of time the real history of the ancient authors of the Sastras
has been lost and cannot be ascertained. Hence there is no strong proof whatever
to show that the Sastras composed by them were declared by Brahma, this and
the like I have said. If you wish to make any reply to this I shall now attentively
hear it all. (ibid., 42-43)
In the ensuing pages of the Matapariksha the dialogue between the Veda-specialist and Satyarthi goes further, but the specialists arguments never surpass the
argument from tradition. Muir presented him as someone unable to come up
with any other and stronger argument than this: From my youth till now I have
greatly honoured my countrys Sastras which were uttered by great rishis. In them
the path of righteousness trodden by wise men of old is pointed out; and the true
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means of final emancipation is there perfectly determinedHow can I believe in

the human origin of those Sastras by whose knowledge-imparting words I have
been instructed till now (Muir 1852, 55)? The argument from tradition is then
crushed by the Christian debating partner.11
(2) The other criterion was that the Shastras must be in accordance with the
holy attributes of God: their content has to be righteous and pure, tending to
increase virtue, diminish vice (Muir 1846, 10). This brings us to the obsession of
many Europeans involved in this debate concerning the Hindu deities indulgence
in sexual and other excesses. How could texts full of such extravagances and depraved behaviour ever be of divine origin? George Mundy pointed out the many
vices of the Hindu gods in his Christianity and Hindooism contrasted (1827), again
in the context of an argument to prove that the Shastras are not of divine origin.12 The Hindoos themselves, Mundy asserts, allow these debtas, whom they
call the representatives of the Deity, to have been exceedingly wicked; and the
Shasters, which record their histories, state them to have been addicted to every
vice which can disgrace human nature (Mundy 1827, 12). In a footnote, Mundy
elaborates further on these vices:
In the history of these gods, we are informed, that Brahma was inflamed by lust
towards his own daughter; and it was only through the intervention of the Shokon
and other Rishees, that he was prevented from committing the most unnatural crime. Indro and Chondro eloped, and lived in adultery with their Gooroos
wives. Christno carried on an illicit intercourse with an endless number of milkmaids, stole their clothes whilst bathing, and wantonly amused himself by jesting
with their nakedness. And the story of Sheeb, from which the worship of Linga
originates, is of so horrid and monstrous a nature, that it is an insult to common
decency to repeat it. (ibid., 12)
Mundy further connects these vices of the gods to the kind of worship instituted
in the Hindu religion. According to him, this form of worship too illustrates that
the Bible is true and the Shasters false, since their religious worship is connected
For decades to come, British pamphlets would repeat all of Muirs arguments to try and convince
the Hindus that their religion could not possibly be divine revelation, while Christianity was.
Remarkably, these pamphlets felt the need to first teach the Hindus about the content of the Vedas.
For instance, the writer of missionary manuals J. L. D. Murdoch in his Vedic Hinduism and the Arya
Samaj: An Appeal to Educated Hindus (1902) first aimed to give educated Hindus a clear idea of the
Vedas, the most ancient and sacred books of their religion (Murdoch 1902, iii) and then imparted
them with all the reasons why the Vedas cannot be accepted as a divine revelation (ibid., 73).
12
John Wilson praised this book as an excellent work in his An Exposure of the Hindu Religion
(86).
11
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with profane songs, obscene ceremonies, indecent dancing, and various other immoral and unnatural practices, which tend to pollute the mind, elicit impure desires, and open the door to every kind of licentiousness (ibid., 14).
In his Exposure of the Hindu religion (1832), Wilson provides his reader with
a range of similar stories about the Hindu gods, of which he says that the accounts which are contained in the Hindu Shastras respecting the qualities and
character of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, are no less absurd than the description
of their origin and rank. The problem lies in the fact that these three imaginary
gods are depicted as foolish, weak, mean, proud, envious, and disputatious. More, they fight with one another like evil men, and ravenous beasts. They
resort to the spread of atheism, and other evil expedients, in order to support their
thrones. They abandon shame, and exhibit themselves as lascivious adulterers,as
deceivers, liars, thieves, and drunkards. Few sins in short can be mentioned, which
they have not committed (Wilson 1832, 39).
Wilson made an interesting side remark about the similarity between the
Ancient Greek and Roman mythology and that of the Hindus. According to him,
the moral character of the gods in both cultures is exactly the same. He cited a
description by Cicero to strengthen this point.13 He then proceeded to illustrate
his point with the help of a range of stories about the Indian godsespecially
Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. Recounting the stories in a vivid and detailed manner
(ibid., 40-47), he directed his attentionand that of his readersmore and more
to the individual characters of the gods and concluded that the character of the
three gods, considered as individuals is no less unfavourable than that which is
exhibited by the preceding accounts (ibid., 41). This too, he announced, will be
illustrated by some stories contained in the Hindus Shastras, but he warns his
reader: Nothing but a feeling of shame prevents me to be more particular (ibid.).
After this narration Wilson addressed his readers:
In a footnote Wilson (1832, 39-40) takes up a citation from Ciceros De Natura Deorum Lib.I.:
Nec enim multo absurdiora sunt ea, quae poetarum vocibus fusa, ipsa suavitate nocuerunt, qui et
ira inflammatos, & libidine furentes, induxerunt Deos: feceruntque ut eorum bella, pugnas, praelia,
vulnera videremus: odia praeterea, disaidia, discordias, ortus, interitus, querelas, lamentationes, effusas in omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria, vincula, cum humano genere concubitus, moralesque
ex immortali procreatos. This passage from De Natura Deorum I.42. and in translation it goes as
follows: For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have
been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by
anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and
wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarels, their births and deaths, their complaints andlamentations, the utter and unbridled license of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their
unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immoral parent (Cicero I.42;
1933, 43 and 45).
13
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Who can peruse the preceding narratives without shame? They are all extracted
from the books reckoned sacred by the Hindus; but when rightly considered they
form infallible and uncontrovertible [sic] proofs that these books did not come
from God. This remark holds true whether it be alleged by the Brahmans that they
are statements of real occurrences, or whether it be alleged that they are merely
allegorical descriptions. The theory of Mora Bhatta Dandekara concerning the
exhibition of God by Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva reflects the greatest dishonour
on the Supreme Being. I shall afterwards shew that his attempts to excuse their
sins are altogether futile. God will most certainly neither take such incarnations as
these, nor tolerate his representation by such forms. They are completely opposed
to one another, and can have no connexion with the Supreme God. (ibid., 47-48)
Wilson concluded that these stories not only lack constructive moral lessons, but
are in every respect unworthy of being characterized as divine revelations (ibid.,
50-51). Mora Bhattas attempts to give an explanation of the role of the gods, the
stories about the gods and the character of the gods are ridiculed. Systematically,
Wilson tackled Mora Bhattas claims. For instance, Bhatta apologizes for the
sins of the Hindu gods, by remarking that they were attended, in some instances,
with good to those who were connected with them (ibid., 55). In one particular
case, for instance, Mora Bhatta questions whether it is apt to speak of adultery.
Wilson is baffled by the possibility alone of Mora Bhattas suggestion. Consider
this dialogue, first Mora Bhatta, then Wilsons reaction:
From Parasharas adulterous connexion with the fishermans daughter there sprung
a son, [Vyasa] whose praise is in all the world, who accomplished the great work of
collecting the Vedas and Shastras. Such a son could never have been produced in
a marriage connexion, however, distinguished by excellence and purity. Why then
should it be once said that there should be any adultery in this case? This reasoning is so utterly absurd, and the principles of morality on which it is founded are
so loose, that were it not commonly used by Hindus, I should not even have alluded to it. Who will say that sin ceases to be sin, because the sinner has the power
of shewing favour to those who are sinned against? An injury does not cease to be
intrinsically an injury because the person offended may afterwards be rewarded on
account of his having suffered it. Emancipation bestowed by adulterers upon adulterous women for their adultery, and upon thieves for their thefts! Adultery is better than marriage for the production of sons of talent, and ceases to be sinful when
engages in for this object! How debased, false, and injurious must be the books in
which this is stated! Let these principles be generally approved, and acted upon,
and there will be nothing but violence, impurity and destruction,the injury of
intelligent creatures throughout the world, and the dishonour, and blasphemy of
the Divine Being. I call upon every Hindu possessed of the smallest portion of intellect, and moral feeling, to mark, and forsake the horrible doctrines of their teachers, and
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sacred books,doctrines which the Gurus are not ashamed not only to declare in private,
but to publish as ornaments of their religion. (ibid., 55-56; italics mine)
The above strategy is symptomatic of Wilsons style of arguing: each of Mora

Bhattas explanations is illustrated by a few quotes from his tract and then succeeded by an argumentation trying to discredit his capacity for rational and logical thought. Time and again, Wilson used phrases like the absurd reasoning to
which I have here alluded is often resorted to even by the most intelligent Brahmans or in reply to this foolish assertion (ibid., 52); the reasoning of the Bhatta
is on these accounts completely a failureThough it agrees with some statements
in the Hindu Shastras, it is directly contrary to some other (ibid., 59).
In great detail Wilson explained the difference between the incarnation of
Jesus Christ and the reported incarnations of Rama, Krishna, and others in reference to their object; in regard to their conduct; in regard to the application of
their benefits and finally in regard to the evidence on which their stories rest
(ibid., 64-73). Eventually, this overview of the differences had him conclude that
in the accounts of Rama and Krishna there are only direct and palpable contradictions, inconsistencies, overwhelming abominations, and exaggerations.
Instead of being led to acknowledge that these accounts are sanctioned, and exhibited, by heaven, we plainly perceive that there is nothing of that air of credibility about them, which can entitle them to the smallest respect as human historical
compositions (ibid., 71). These stories stem from the extravagant fancies of the
Hindu poets and containfew moral lessons of the slightest utility, but, on the
contrary, much which is calculated to disgust every mind which has the slightest
regard to moral purity; and they are, in every respect, unworthy of being ranked as
divine revelations (ibid., 72).
After his conversion to Christianity, Nilakantha Goreh followed much the
same route. He emphasized that connecting the supreme God to the immoral acts
of, say, a Krishna is no more than blasphemy:
The fact, however, is that all the learned men and philosophers among the Hindoos believe all things that are taught in the Vedas, Smritis, and Puranas. Take for
instance the first verse of Bhasha-parichchheda, the text book of Muktavali, and see
what description is given there of God. Salutation to that Krishna, whose appearance is like a new cloud, the stealer of the clothes of the young gopis, who is the seed of the
tree of the universe. Think of the monstrous combination of a sublime truth with
the filthiest blasphemy. (Goreh 1867, 5)
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To show and prove that the true God of the Christians is not the same as the gods
spoken of in the Hindu texts, the immoral characteristics of Hindu gods are
brought to the fore. Even if these also speak of the one true God, his characteristics are entirely different than those of the God of the Bible. Therefore, the vices
of Hindu gods were also invoked to doubt the divine origin of the Hindu sacred
texts (ibid., 5-7 and Goreh 1881, 1-2).
Besides these two themes, the Christian challengers made the case that the
texts of the Shastras do not survive even the most basic textual and historical criticism. For instance, it is shown that certain texts are older than others, that human
regulations or disputes are incorporated in the so-called divine texts, that they
abound with inconsistencies, that certain groups have created the Vedic hymns.
The ultimate conclusion is simple: there is only one Shastra that meets all the
criteria set by the European Christians: the Shastra promulgated by Jesus Christ.
As Muir put it: The Sastra of which Jesus Christ was formerly the promulgator
is distinguished by both the proofs I mentioned. In it no matter unworthy of God
is (to be) seen; but all its contents are promotive of virtue. Jesus Christ who promulgated that Sastra on earth was possessed of superhuman power, (and) himself
God (Muir 1852-54, 72).
The Facts of Religion
The next step in the dialogue often consisted of a thorough explanation of the
Christian religion.14 In his reflections on The Results of Missionary Labour in India
(1856), the Reverend Joseph Mullens later noted that this was the obvious principle that the missionaries preaching should follow:
Now that the contentious spirit of their hearers has been silenced, they need to be
instructed. Now that they have learned so much of the follies of Hinduism, they
need to be told more fully the truths of the Gospel. If they doubt about their false
gods, how earnestly should they be pointed to the only true Saviour. Has not the
time come in many localities, when missionaries should endeavour to direct their
hearers more thoroughly and more constantly to the Lamb of God, that taketh
away the sins of the world? They have long required to have their eyes opened to
the follies of idolatry, the character of their gods, and the inconsistencies of their
Shastras. The circumstances of the case compelled missionaries to point out these
evils at length, and to hold discussions with their hearers concerning them. Now
This is what Muir does in his second book of the Matapariksha (1854), for instance. See also
Wilson (1832) and (1834).
14
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let them lift the Cross higher; let them preach Jesus, the only Physician, the only
refuge for a dying world: and let them live him more fully; believing that the
deepest piety is, in every church, both the means and the guarantee of the widest
usefulness (Mullens 1856, 53).
Important to note is the stress that the authors of the dialogues began to put on
proving that the facts in the Bible really happened and that these facts are in accordance with the findings of the sciences. Jesus Christ was a historical figure and many
eye-witness accounts of his miracles exist; the same goes for the Martyrs.15 Also,
the doctrines of Christianity are true because there is continuity in the teachings:
later generations put forward the same ideas, which proves that they are true.
The Hindu pundits, however, were not at all impressed by such arguments.
Hence, most were rather uninterested to continue the debate. Even where they
did respond to the Christian call, they couldnt hide their sense of uselessness
and incomprehension towards the way in which the Christians wanted to debate.
The pundits who took up the challenge did so in several ways. They did not, and
could not, fall back on one interpretation of their tradition, since this was nonexistent. They did not consider this a problem, but it was very frustrating for the
Christians who wanted to know the doctrines of Hinduism in order to be able to
attack them. While frustrating, it could also be used as an argument that these
contradictory interpretations are a clear indication of the erroneous nature of their
doctrines.16 The Hindu pundits did share one aspect: namely, their rejection of,
and incomprehension towards, the Christian claim of being the only true religion
and that this truth should be universally accepted. The pundits found such an idea
of one universal religion surprising, to put it mildly, and refused to take the same
course in their defence of Hinduism. This is how Mora Bhatta expressed this in
his debate with Wilson:
See for instance Muir (1854, 23): The following is the substance of the argument which I have
stated in proof of the authority of the books relating to the history of Jesus. When a short time had
elapsed after the ascension of Jesus, the detail of his acts was written in books by certain persons
who knew them well. And the Christians of that period who were acquainted with their masters
history, regarding those books as worthy of credit, read them constantly. Further, the learned men
who at that time were hostile to the religion of Jesus, could not refute the narrative contained in
those books. Considering these and other facts regarding the collection of Christian scriptures, I
judge that the history contained in it is true.
16
This is illustrated for instance by Wilson who discredits one of the claims of Mora Bhatta by recounting that another pundits rather supported Wilsons interpretation than Mora Bhattas (Wilson
1832, 58); or by recounting the internal discord among the pundits about one certain passage during
one of the public debates. See also the appendix on the contradictory character of the Puranas.
15
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We do not seek to overturn the doctrines held by any one; for, as God has consulted
the convenience of all people on the face of the earth with respect to food and clothing, so,
for the inhabitants of different places, has he laid down different doctrines with a view
to their salvation. As long, therefore, as the inhabitants of India observe the ordinances prescribed to them in the sacred books here prevalent, they obtain the favour of God; and, on the other hand, the people here whom embrace the religion
of foreigners only depart farther from God. Of this we have experimental proof.
Several years ago the people in one or two districts in Konkan embraced a foreign
religion. Observe, then, what they gained by their new religion. Formerly, when
common Hindus, they did not eat animals: when they had changed their religion,
they began to eat them. Formerly they were not accustomed to drink at all: at the
period referred to they threw away all shame, and commenced open drinking to
intoxication and madness. Formerly they had some respect for others: they have
now become as rude and disrespectful as possible. But why should we multiply
examples of what is reprehensible among them?...Such are the excellent qualities
by which these men of this country are distinguished, and of which they became
possessed in changing their religion; and it would seem that only those, who wish
all these qualities to become their own would attend to the objections of foreigners attached to another religion, or think of embracing that religion themselves.
(Wilson 1832, 25-26; italics mine)
The core idea remains popular. Gandhi would repeat it time and again one century later: different peoples and different groups have different religions. Why
would one leave behind the tradition to which one belongs? As it is colourfully
illustrated by Mora Bhatta, such changes have dubious and objectionable consequences. Different peoples have different traditions and, hence, there is no need
for conversion to the religion of another group. He used a metaphor to make his
point even clearer:
A certain Christian Priest makes the following remarks: God is the Father of
all mankind, and no Father gives opposite laws for the government of his children.
God has given one Law; and therefore there is but one true religion, and one true
written rule of religion; in the same manner as there is but one Sun for this earth.
For this earth indeed, there is but one Sun; but in the Universe are there not many
Suns? How can the light of one Sun reach those fixed stars which are at an inconceivable distance from it? That they shine by their own light mist be allowed on all
hands. If a man has two sons, the one wise and the other foolish, will he give them rules
according to their respective abilities, or will he give the same rules to both? Although
he should prescribe to them different ways according to their talents, yet his intention is
one, and that isto make both wise. The same is true of God in his dealings with men.
(Wilson 1832, 26; italics mine)
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For Hindu pundits, the self-evident stance is to accept that different human groups
have different traditions. The idea of one true tradition for humankind came across
as utter stupidity, judging from the reactions of these pundits. Wilson responded
to these suggestions in the most extraordinary way (See Wilson 1832, part three).
According to him these ideas are, though popular at his time, not Hindu in origin.
Hence, he ponders upon their coming into being and comes up with this: I can
give no other account of their origin, than the supposition of the consciousness
of the superiority of Christianity; and a prevalent fear that this system may be
embraced (Wilson 1832, 100). Wilson tried to counter Mora Bhattas argument
that different religions are good for different people by providing a detailed explanation of what religion, revelation and God are and how it follows from this
that no two religions can be true at the same time, especially not Hinduism and
Christianity. His elaborate argument would lead us too far (ibid., 100-105, and
part four), but a short sketch cannot be omitted here. After explaining the basic
tenets of Gods revelation, the law of God and the nature of human beings, he illustrated how the different religions prevalent in the earth are in general directly
opposed to one another in their essential principles (ibid., 101). While some exalt
God, others dishonour God; some are monotheistic, others polytheistic; some
say God is destitute of qualities, other attribute him excellence; some teach that
God never can sin, other that he has sinned etc. (ibid., 101-102). The idea that the
respective religions are true to those practicing them was impossible according
to Wilson: Those opinions which are directly contradictory to one another, it must be
admitted, cannot proceed from the God of truth. The declaration that they are alike veritable
involves the charge of falsehood, and inconsistency, against the divine being. This is especially
the case when one looks at Christianity and Hinduism:
These remarks apply with the greatest force to the Christian and Hindu religions,
which...must be perceived to be as opposed to one another as light to darkness.
Both cannot be true in any circumstances; and the Bhatta, who makes an allegation
to the contrary, instead of attempting to prove his opinion, has only given an illustration, taken from food and clothes...an illustration is not an argument...and...
the one which...he has given is entirely unsuitable. Religion is infinitely more
important than food and clothes. (ibid., 103; italics mine)
Truth is crucial; two religions cannot be true at the same time. Later in the nineteenth century, Badaridatta would claim that it is difficult for the Hindu pundits
to take the claim that Jesus is the saviour of humankind and Christianity the sole
true religion seriously. In his lecture Christianity Destroyed (1880), he stated that:
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Brothers, I am bold to say in all sincerity, and with great plainness that I can in no
way believe that Jesus Christ, the great object of reliance in the Christian religion,
is God, and is a mediator between God and us, that He spontaneously gave up
His life to destroy our sins, and for our final happiness, and that without believing in and worshipping Him, we cannot attain to nearness to God and salvation.
These things are not merely opposed to our judgement and our logic or reason;
but by means of arguments drawn from Christian books, I can in a subtle manner
effectually show them to be absurd. (Badaridatta 1880, 7)
Interestingly, this author did not intend to argue that the teachings of Jesus are
wrong, but rather to show that Jesus is not the saviour of humanity and that his
message is not the universal truth for humanity. In his narrative Old Daniel (1877),
Thomas Hodson also pointed out that changing to the religion of another people
is considered by the Indian as absurdity:
When they went [the missionary and his assistant] the first time to any village the
people stood in the attitude of attention, but what they hear was so new, that more
of wonder than intelligence was manifested by all. After a few visits, when information had increased a little, there was still a manifest disinclination to accept the
truth. Because, for a Hindu to be told that in order to salvation he must forsake the idols
which his forefathers have worshipped for hundreds of years, and adopt the creed laid
down in the Shastras of another nation, is to him the height of absurdity. And it very
frequently happened that at the conclusion of a sermon the Missionary would
hear some one say, Very good, all very true; your religion is good for you, and ours is
good for us. (Hodson 1877, 49-50; italics mine)
As we saw before, Hindus did not consider religious doctrines as a source of rivalry.
The Christians and their traditions were met as simply another tradition, one
that was good for the Europeans (e.g. Fiske 1849, 128). The Indians had their
own traditions. Equally they did not see why a debate about religion would have
to revolve around doctrines and truth claims. Initially, this mismatch of concepts
and attitudes caused incomprehension and later irritation. However, in the long
run more and more Hindu thinkers attempted to prove the validity of the Hindu
religion along the same lines.17
That the Christian claim to universal truth was a thorn in the eyes of many
a Hindu pundit is also one of the conclusions of Richard Fox Young. From our
perspective, his conclusion becomes very interesting:
I cannot conclusively argue the origin of this adaptation, but there seems to be a significant link
between the spread of English secular education (especially the sciences, history and literature) and
understanding/accepting the evidences of Christianity.
17
365
It is clear at this juncture that the MP [Matapark] Controversy pandits did

not propound one single and consistent scheme of Dharma or agree in assessing Christianitys salvific potential. The only common factors were their unanimous rejection of Muirs contention that only the khadharma has an authentic
claim to universality (smnyat), and their reluctance to make counterclaims to
this same effect on behalf of Hinduism. One may even say that they were more
concerned about emphasizing the limitations and particularities of all religions,
including their own, than about proving the falsehood of any vis--vis the Vedas.
Discrepancies between Christianity and Hinduism were unreconciled because
they viewed biblical doctrines as fundamentally antagonistic to rti and what is
more important here because they understood them to be purposeful, in one way
or another, for a specific class of people. If, then, religions have any common basis,
it is, according to their schemes of Dharma, an identity of purpose rather than
content. Due to basic differences in mankind, there is plurality instead of singularity of religion. Each Dharma corresponds to a particular kind of person, who may
suffer from lack of competent instructors (MP) [Mataparkik], or who may
be acquiring merit in order to become a Hindu (MPO) [Mataparkottara], or
who may be destined, on account of transgressions, to a succession of hells (TV)
[stratattvaviniraya]. In each case the religion yields a result commensurate
with the characteristics of a particular class of individuals. The universal quality in
religions is that they all lead somewhere, and the quality that distinguished them
permanently and ultimately from each other is their suitability for the people who
are born into, believe in, and observe them. (Young 1981, 161)
This implies that, even though the Hindus were willing to engage in the debate,
they did not accept the attitude and perspective that transformed Hinduism and
Christianity into rivals along doctrinal lines and bearers of predicates of truth and
falsity. In other words, the Hindus did not (or could not) adopt the ProtestantChristian description of their traditions as false religion, because it appeared inaccessible and unintelligible to them. In this sense, the first step of creating the
conditions of conversion in India had failed; the British would have to look for
other avenues to prepare the mind and spirit of the natives for the truth of Christian religion.
9.3. The earth is either, or is not, an immense plain resting on

the head of a serpent
By mid-nineteenth century, missionary scholars had identified the peculiar problem they faced in the endeavour of converting the Hindus to Christianity:
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The point which seems to require in the present case, to be peculiarly established,
is thisthat if the religion of Christ be true the Hindu religion cannot be so. The
Hindus assert that a divine person has become incarnate, for the benefit of mankind, at successive times. When, therefore, they are told that our Saviour became
incarnate for the sins of men, they are not solicitous for a proof of this fact; for
the addition of another incarnation to those which their religion has taught them,
produces no shock upon their faith. (Fiske 1849, 82)
While Hindus were certainly capable of logical reasoning, they were not as keen
as Europeans to apply the rules of logic to the field of religion or traditional
stories and practices. Given what we already know about the phenomenon of
tradition and how it differs from religion, this does not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, it would become another central obstacle to conversion that vexed British
missionaries and colonial educators. The European mind had to invent routes to
overcome this obstacle. The obvious route appeared to lie in educating the natives
in the proper methods of reasoning and rules of evidence. As Fiske explained in
this remarks on the effect of education on the agenda of conversion:
In closing these few remarks upon the effect of Education, we are reminded that
there is prevalent, amongst the Hindus, a mental defect, which Education, properly directed, might do much to remove. We allude to the slight impression which
is made upon the mind of the Hindu by an argument drawn from History. The
learned Hindu asserts that the Vedas are of Divine origin; his proof of that assertion is, human Tradition. He does not perceive the necessity of supporting such
an assertion by Historical Evidence, with the value of which he is unacquainted.
If then a power of appreciating such Evidence, as a Test of positive or objective
Truth, shall be implanted, by Education, in the mind of the Hindu, doubtless,
great progress will be made in preparing him, in the first place to question, and at
length to reject, the authority of his religious books; since, in that case, he will not
fail to perceive that, whilst a clear chain of Historical Evidence can be adduced in
support of the genuineness and authenticity of the Christian Scriptures, there is
no such historical proof to be found that the Vedas contain the message of God
to men. (ibid., 126)
The nineteenth century is the century of the rise of English secular education
in India. More and more, colonial rule turned into an educational project. After the debate between anglicists and orientalists in the first part of the century,
the issue about the goal of the British educational efforts in India was more or
less settled: to teach the Indians the riches of European civilization (the English
language, history, the sciences etc.). This project was supposed to overthrow the
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wrong knowledge present in India and to initiate the same intellectual renaissance as the rediscovery of Greek and Latin had done to early modern Europe.18
Oriental traditions of learning were now marginalized and the gravitational point
of the educational project shifted to the western sciences.
However, this did not put an end to all debates on education in India. While
the relation between oriental and western learning had been settled, another debate continued throughout the century, namely, that concerning the relation between religious and secular education and the neutrality of government education. Some of the main questions were: What should be the place of religious
education in the many missionary schools in India? What should be the role of
religious education in the schools run by the Government? What would be the
correct relationship between religious and secular education in the case of British
India? Should religious education not be replaced wholesale by secular education?
A peculiar dynamic seemed to be at work here: even though religious and secular
education were believed to be each others opposites prima facie, a closer look reveals that in India they appeared to be working towards the same goal.19
How could this be the case? It was deeply believed by Englishmenmissionaries and colonial officialsthat teaching the truth of the sciences would
As Thomas Babington Macaulay put it (1835, 166-173): The question before us is simply whether [,] when it is in our power to teach this language [English], we shall teach languages in which, by
universal confession, there are no books on any subject which deserve to be compared to our own,
whether, when we can teach European science, we shall teach systems which, by universal confession, wherever they differ from those of Europe differ for the worse, and whether, when we can
patronize sound Philosophy and true history, we shall countenance, at the public expense[,] medical
doctrines which would disgrace an English farrier, astronomy which would move laughter in girls at
an English boarding school, history abounding with knights thirty feet high and reigns thirty thousand years long, and geography made of seas of treacle and seas of butterHad our ancestors acted
as the Committee of Public Instruction has hitherto acted[,--]had they neglected the language of
Thucydides and Plato, and the language of Cicero and Tacitushad they confined their attention
to the old dialects of our own island, had they printed nothing and taught nothing at the universities but chronicles in Anglo Saxon and romances in Norman French, --would England ever have
been what she now is [?] What Greek and Latin were to the contemporaries of More and Ascham,
our tongue is to the people of India. The literature of England is now more valuable than that of
classical antiquity. I doubt whether the Sanscrit literature be as valuable as that of our Saxon and
Norman progenitors. In some departmentsin history for example, I am certain that it is much less
so. This thought is reprinted in Trevelyan (1838, 43) and in Cameron (1853, 71) The whole Minute
was taken up in this book after the author stated that Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Macaulay
decided in favour of the English language; and the natives of India owe them everlasting gratitude
for the decision (Cameron 1853, 64).
19
See these primary sources on the place of religious education in the educational efforts of the British in India: Anon. (1862), Badley (1884), Barton (1874?), Bryce (1836), Dnyanodaya (1852), Duff
(1841), Mookerjee (1871), Murdoch (1872, 1881, 1900), Narayan Bhai (1852), Nuge (1846).
18
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generate in the Indian subjects the correct attitude towards knowledge and truth.
Therefore, the missionaries and other proponents of the dissemination of Christianity in India supported secular education, since they considered this to be a
necessary step towards opening up the minds of the Indian subjects to the truth of
Christian religion. In his stimulating work Subject Lessons: The Western Education
of Colonial India (2007), Sanjay Seth points out that the nineteenth-century debates on education had reached consensus on the expectation that, along with the
diffusion of scientific knowledge, Christianity would spread in India. Along with
imparting useful knowledge, secular education would improve the moral character
of the natives and, if all went well, they would convert to Christianity.
The historic controversies which had marked the advance of secular knowledges
in the Christian West were never played out in colonial India. Missionaries and
government officials alike shared the belief that modern science was a solvent of
Indian religious beliefs, which in their view mingled a false theology with fantastical and nonsensical explanations of the world and its functioning. Inasmuch as
western learning undermined native understandings of how the world worked,
it could not but also call into question their faith in their religion. Those who
has played a leading role in the decision of 1835 to limit government patronage to western education, including Thomas Macaulay and Charles Trevelyan,
had insisted that government-provided education must not allow any religious
instruction and must not be associated with any attempts at conversion. Nonetheless, they and many others anticipated that this education would be conductive to the
Christianization of India. (Seth 2007, 49)
The Facts of False Religion

Consider the following problem. In the previous section, the missionaries had
come to the conclusion that the interest of Hindus in Christianity did not generally originate from the Christian doctrines. In fact as long as proselytization
centred upon teaching and receiving the doctrines of Christianity, the missionary
project met with failure. William Smith explained that such matters, concerning
soul, sin, divine nature, were viewed by the Hindus as open questions. Hence,
they did not quarrel concerning such points and saw those who do as bigots.
Smith took the issue one step further by saying that Dwijs doubts with regards to
Hinduism did not originate so much from its doctrines as from its facts (Smith
1850, 100; italics mine). What does this mean? Smith explained that by facts he
meant the geographical and astronomical facts that Hinduism proposed. What
369
made Dwij see his own tradition in a different lightmore precisely as wrong and
corruptedwas not the truth of the religious doctrines of another religion, but a
range of facts about the world as they were described in the western sciences:
Here there was something tangible, on which he saw two correct opinions could
not be entertained. The earth is either, or is not, an immense plain resting on the
head of a serpent; or, according to others, on the back of a tortoise. It either has,
or has not, the seven circular seas of, respectively, saltwater, sugar, cane-juice, wine,
milk, &c. Mount Sumerai more than 600,000 miles high, either is, or is not in
the earths centre, around which the sun, which is stated to be as near again to
the earth as the moon, rises and sets. The decision of these and such like questions, Dwij saw, not upon opinion, which might always be doubted, but upon
the simple exercise of our senses; and the certainty of the decision made by the
English regarding them could not be shaken; and, consequently, the statements of
the Purans must be fables. But when he saw his confidence had been misplaced in
one part of Hinduism, he naturally and of necessity began to feel it might be so in
other parts too. (Smith 1850, 101-102)
Apparently, the fact that the Europeans had firm answers to a range of scientific
questions is what made Hindus doubt the truth of the claims in the Puranas and,
by consequence, the Hindu religion at large. At least, this is how the European
colonials saw the matter. This seemed to give them new ideas as to the entry point
for the message of Christianity into the minds of the Indian subjects. We would
like to argue that this turned out to be some sort of golden key to the minds of the
Indians, for which Christian missionaries had been searching for ages. Somehow
the connection between the sciences and the Christian religion opened up new
avenues to the colonial project for changing the Indian mind and creating the
conditions for its conversion.
The orientalist James Robert Ballantyne (1813-1864), for many years the
principal of the Government College of Benares, was known for his respect for
the best in Hindu thought. But this did not change his educational goals, as can
be learnt from his Christianity Contrasted with Hindu Philosophy (1859). He proposed an intimate link between the dissemination of knowledge in India and the
propagation of Christianity: the time of the unenlightened spirit of proselytism
is gone, so he asserts, rude attacks to false religion are unadvisable (Ballantyne
1859, viii). Europeans need to put their hope for the propagation of Christianity
in the dissemination of knowledge. Pondering upon the goals of the British educational efforts in India, Ballantyne described the process in the following way:
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Shall our absolutely ultimate end, then, be the production of a first-rate engineer, or of a valuable revenue officer, or of an accomplished native magistrate?
With this I am not prepared to be satisfied. My proposed end is the making of each
educated Hindu a Christian,on principle and conviction. This end, as I propose
here to indicate, implies every thing that the amplest course of education can
comprise. Let us trace the assertion backwards,as thus. That a Hindu should on
principle and conviction, embrace a religion which, like Christianity, bases its claims on
historical evidence, presupposes not merely an acquaintance with historical assertions,
but a cultivation of the critical faculty, so as that the force of the historical evidence may
be intelligently felt. The immediate preparation for a critically intelligent study of
history, is the study of Physical Geography. A history, all of whose assertions are
found consistent with the multifarious information supplied by Physical Geography, must be felt to present very different claims on our respect from those of
a Purana, with its nowhere-discoverable oceans of treacle, cane-juice, and butter-milk. But to apprehend with full intelligence what is presented of Physical
Geography, a knowledge of Zoology, Botany, and Geology are required. The full
appreciation of these, again, presupposes Chemistry, in all its extensive bearings
on Meteorology, climate, &c. The study of Chemistry must be preceded by that of
Physics. Physics demands an anterior acquaintance with the sciences of Number
and Magnitude,sciences which present the most elementary exemplification of
applied Logic. Such is the rapid enumeration of the great steps in the intellectual
course. How the moral course combines with this, we shall see, when, returning
on our steps synthetically, we enquire what apparatus of educational materials the
course above indicated will require. (Ballantyne 1860, v-vi; italics mine)
Embracing Christianity presupposes an acquaintance with historical assertions

and a cultivation of the critical faculty, Ballantyne said, and this in turn requires
knowledge of a range of sciences. In the previous section we saw how the Europeans identified certain difficulties in debating religion with the Hindu pundits,
in terms of the latters inability to reason on this issue in a historically sound and
logically correct way. Ballantyne was one of the orientalists involved in this debate with the Hindu pundits and he now appeared to link this predicament with
his educational efforts. In order to make such debates about religious truth possible and productive, the natives needed to be taught how to discuss such matters,
weigh the evidence, test the consistency of ones views. In other words, the British
began to see this as a matter of teaching the Indians not only how to discuss, but
also how to perceive, experience and reflect upon their own traditions.
Others also attributed to secular education the capacity to improve the natives morally and spiritually. For one, Muirs debates with the Hindu pundits
had significant impact on the colonial educational project. As Peter van der Veer
(2001, 23) remarks, we must not forget that John Muir was not simply a philoso-
371
pher posing intellectual questions but was a high-ranking colonial official whose
views greatly impacted educational issues. The illustrious Scottish missionary
Alexander Duff also wrote about this connection in his India and India Missions
(1839). Talking about secular knowledge and its importance in the education of
the Indian youth, he described an incident which he introduces as the simple
incident which opened up to our own mind, the first practical glimpse of the real
importance of the engine which knowledge had placed in our hands for the thorough demolition of the most ancient system of error now on the face of the earth
(Duff 1839, 580). More, according to Duff this incident is the finest practical
illustration of true knowledge becoming the handmaid of true religion, which the
history of the world can supply (ibid.). Before actually recounting the incident,
Duff warned his readers that some have underestimated this incident as simple
and futile. These commentators were wrong, he said, because it was the starting
point and occasional cause of a series of events that terminated in extremely important results (ibid., 581). Duff considered the discovery of this entry point to
the Indian mind comparable in significance to Newtons discovery of the laws of
gravitation, which had after all also been prompted by the trivial incident of the
apple. The event he wished to recount also set in motion an unprecedented dynamic in which western knowledge gained access to another culture. The incident
had started with a discussion on rain in the lessons in one of the junior classes:
In the course of ordinary interrogation, the question was put, What is rain? It was
replied, Water from the sky. Has it been produced by the sky itself ? No. How
then has it been formed? Oh, said one, with the smartness and self-possession
so characteristic of Hindu youth, Do you not know that yourself ? I think I do,
said the master; by my present object is to find out whether you know it. Well,
remarks another, with an air of manifest satisfaction, Ill tell you. It comes from
the trunk of Indras elephant. Indeed, I said, that is a new theory of the origin of
rain, which I did not know before; and I should now like to be informed on what
evidence it is founded. All I can say about it, responded he, is, that my Guru (or
religious teacher), told me so. But your Guru must have some reason for telling
you so. Did he ever see the elephant himself ? Oh no, how could he? The elephant
is wrapped up in the cloud, as in a covering; and no one can, therefore, see it with
his own eyes. How then came the Guru to know that the elephant was there at
all? To be sure, said he, because the Shastra says so. Now I understand the
matter: You have asserted that the rain comes from the trunk of Indras elephant,
simply because the Guru has told you that this is the account contained in the
Shastra? Certainly; for, though I never have seen it with my own eyes, yet I believe it is there; because the Guru has told me that the Shastra says so; and what
the Shastra says must be true. (Duff 1839, 581-582)
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Not contradicting the story of the Shastra directly, Duff continued in his sketch of
the incident, they had told the boys that the theory of the guru was very different
from the one which the Scottish guru had taught their teachers. They asked the
pupils whether they wished to hear that story and they did. In fact, Duff wrote,
nothing would have delighted them more:
Their attention was then directed to a very simple phenomenon. It was asked, In
boiling your rice what is observed to rise from the vessel? Smoke and vapour.
When a dry lid is held for some time over it, what effect is produced? It gets wet.
What makes it wet? The smoke and the vapour. True; and when it gets very, very
wet, does all the vapour continue to stick to it? No; it falls off in drops. Very
good. What then would you say of the vapour itself, that it is dry or wet? Wet,
sure enough. And whence can the wet vapour proceed? It can only be from the
water in the vessel. Is the vapour a different kind of substance from the water?
No. Why think you so? Because when it gathers on the lid we see it turn into
water again. So you conclude that the vapour is just a part of the water in the vessel? Yes. What then drives it off from the rest, and makes it fly into the air? It is
its nature to do so. Think a moment; when you hold a cup of water in your hand,
do you see vapour arising from it? No. What then makes the difference between
the drinking water in your cup, and the water that boils the rice? The one is cold
and the other warm. What makes it warm? The fire. So then it is from the water
warmed by the fire that you see the vapour ascent, and not from the cold? Yes.
What must you infer from this? That it is the fire which in making the water
warm, makes it go into vapour. Very right. The attention was next directed to the
application of all this. The pupils were referred to a very familiar phenomenon in
Bengal...(ibid., 582-583)
Next the teachers told the students how the atmospheric process takes place,
concluding by telling them that such is the simple theory of the origin of rain,
which we once learnt from our Guru in Scotland (ibid., 583). The students were
impressed, exclaiming how natural!, how like the truth!, surely it is true!, but
then one of the boys pointed out a problem:
Instantly, however, one of the boys,as of suddenly recovering his recollection,
and finding that he had committed himself, and gone too far,began to manifest
some tokens of alarm at the unwelcome discovery: Ah! said he, with a peculiar
earnestness of tone and manner, Ah; what have I been thinking? If your account
be the true one, what becomes of our Shastra?what becomes of our Shastra? If your
account be true, then must our Shastra be false. Our Shastra must either be from God,
or God must have written lies. But that is impossible; the Shastra is true, Brahma is
true;so your Gurus account must be false:and yet it looks so like the truth! (ibid.,
584; italics in the original)
373
What is the importance of this incident and Duff s account? The point is not
only the immediate link between secular education in the colonial project in India
and the ultimate religious goals of this secular education. After sketching this
incident, Duff insisted that here we see the commencement or the first germs
of a mental struggle which would terminate for some in the entire overthrow of
Hinduism. The significance lies here: Up to that moment, the very notion that it
was possible for any thing in the holy Shastras to be false, had not been conceived
as the creation of even a fitful dream (ibid., 584). Of primordial importance to
Duff is this momentary hesitation that took place and that there was now the
sudden injection of a doubt, where all doubt was believed to be impossible; there was the
sudden starting of suspicion, where suspicion was believed to be an insult to the
memory of an immortal ancestryan impious contempt of the authority of the
gods (ibid., 585; italics mine). The point is that secular education was capable of
doing something that had cost the greatest exertions from missionaries and other
Christians in the past: making the Indians think along their lines and having
them debate along their terms.
Some of the Bengali participants in the missionary project had come to the
same conclusion. One of Duff s early converts and a later priest and leader of the
Indian Christian community, K. M. Banerjea (1813-1881) began to argue with
great vigour for the dissemination of the history and science of Europe in the
Bengali language, for this would teach the Hindu mind to distinguish between
history and mythology, fact and fiction, true and false science. Thus, the Hindu
mind would be enabled to progress in the realm of religion and morality. Banerjea
dedicated his Encyclopaedia Bengalensis (1846) to the Governor-General of Bengal with the following words:
This idea of transferring the History and Science of Europe to the Bengalee
language had for years been present in my mind. Having from my early days
been animated by a desire of labouring to promote the moral improvement of
my countrymenan aspiration invigorated and sanctified afterwards by Christian principleI observed with peculiar interest the gradual development of the
Hindu mind, and the tincture it received from the religious and social institutions
to which it was subjected in our Bengalee community. I marked and bewailed the
obstacles which ignorance of history and facts interposed, and which, by retarding
the progress of the popular intellect in the true direction, perpetuated its thraldom
under a yoke more galling than what had roused the indignant eloquence of a
Wilberforce or a Clarkson. A blind and indiscriminate veneration for antiquity
obstructed the introduction of any doctrine or sentiment that could not appeal for
authority to the dictum of some canonized Rishi or Saint. History and Mythology,
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facts and fiction, were all involved in the same category. This painful observation
led directly to the conclusion, that anything which could gradually disabuse the
minds of the people at largeanything which could teach them to discriminate
between authentic and fabulous history, between true and false Scienceanything which could persuade them that what was physically and scientifically false
could not in any sense be true, must (humanly speaking;--for who could restrain
or set limits to the operations of the Divine Spirit?) prove an inestimable blessing
to the countrymust surely, though slowly, remove the rubbish of ignorance and
prejudice, and open the door for the ingress of truths and principles still higher
and more pre-eminently sacred. (Banerjea 1846, xi-xii)
In these passages, we note the origin of the European obsession with the lack of
historical consciousness so often attributed to the Hindus in colonial and orientalist sources. The confusion between true historiography and story-telling was
one of the great frustrations of the Christian mission to India. The creation of a
proper historical consciousness among the Hindus was viewed as one of the preconditions of conversion to Christianity. It would engender in the Hindu mind
the mode of reasoning that provided one of the foundations of Christian religion:
historical inquiry had to produce the evidence required to establish the facts of
true religion.
In his introductory remarks on the study of history, Banerjea (1846, 33)
remarked about the Puranas that the narratives they contain cannot be received
for facts, nor can their authority be sustained as historical guides. He continued
to argue that these narratives consisted of a mixture of truth and fiction. Any
dignified human mind was always seeking the truth about the past and, hence,
the genuine study of history would have to be imported into India: And as to our
own country, who is so destitute of dignified sentiment as not to desire a knowledge of past events?Compounded as the ancient annals of India are of truth and
falsehood, who would not still wish to separate and preserve, as far as possible, the
gold of authentic History from the dross of tales and fictions? (ibid., 39). In this
period of secular education, we see the development of a tendency that lives on in
India to this day, namely, to view the traditional stories in the Puranas and other
textual and oral traditions as imperfect and allegorical representations of the past
(Balagangadhara 2010). The teaching of the methods of historiography in India
was considered a significant step in having the Hindus adopt the modes of reasoning of European Christianity.
375
Secular Education and Hindu Reform

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the debate on secular education and
the neutrality of government education continued. Some were dissatisfied with
the perfect neutrality of government schools and argued that this neutrality had
been taken too far. For instance, one official of the Bengal Civil Service wrote
the following to Lord Stanley, Member of Parliament and Secretary of State for
India:
In its own schools Government has, under the name of perfect neutrality, admitted the Shasters and Koran, whilst it has prohibited the study of the Bible.
And inasmuch as false science is intimately connected with false religion, the true
science in the Government schools has had the effect of sapping the faith of the
pupils in their own religion; and true religion not being substituted in its place,
they usually become sceptics. In fact, neutrality in education is impossible. You
cannot give the simplest lesson of geography without contradicting the Hindoo
religious books. Of our geography and science be true, the religion based upon
these books must be false. This is the inference drawn for himself by every young
man who passes through a Government College. With great force, therefore, an
intelligent Hindu observer may exclaim, Education must be carried on upon a
sounder principle, and religion must be fostered. Dont turn India from idolatry to
atheism. (Tucker 1858, 7-8)
According to this official, it was inevitable that the secular education of the British would undermine the Hindu religion and society. This was commendable, but
after destruction, there was a need for construction:
Our rule in India, notwithstanding all the manifestos of a hundred years to the
effect that we do not wish to interfere with the religion of the natives, is the
embodiment of a spirit now working counter to and undermining all the evils
of social, political, and moral life in that country. The instinctive feeling of the
irreligious and the heathen is true. The red line must advance on the moral and
religious, as well as on the political map. We cannot avoid it. Hindooism and Mahomedanism are incapable of reformation, and must fall. As well set a chair on the
sands of the sea, and order the waves to stop, as attempt to set limits to the spread
of Western Christianity. The natives feel this, and the common impression is that
in a few years the whole country will become Christian...We ought to assume a
bolder position as a professedly Christian Government. Whilst all religions are
tolerated in so far as they are not subversive of morality and the rights of others,
we should accept our position as the regenerators of India, and give every facility
for enlightening, and raising the moral and intellectual standard of, the masses of
the people. (ibid., 14-15)
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It appears to be the case that even the most dogmatic of Christians had realized
the importance of secular education to the diffusion of true religion. Now, one
began to emphasize the fact that certain sciences should be taught against the
background of Christianity. While mathematics and physics did not require infusion with the truths of theology, the human sciences could not be taught without
these. In the words of an anonymous letter to the editor of the Delhi Gazette on
Missionary, versus Government Education (1862): There are some Sciences such as
Mathematics, and Logics, and Grammar, which a heathen or an unbeliever may
teach just as well as a true Christian, but there are other and far more important
branches of study, such as History and Ethics, which the Christian teacher must
claim exclusively as his own (Anon. 1862, 9).
Both among British colonials and educated Hindus, dissatisfaction began to
grow about the lack of formation that the colonial educational system provided
in matters of moral formation and religion. There were two main concerns. First,
because of the kind of scientific and other knowledge the Indian students attained through secular education, idolatry and superstition were indeed destroyed,
but the students also began to despise their own traditions. As the educational
system offered nothing as a substitute, these educated Indians were lost, since
they became atheistic, sceptic and immoral (e.g. Barton 1874; Murdoch 1900).
According to these commentators, the problem was that the moral character of
the students remained unformed and they became irreverent of all authority and
tradition. Second, this sorry state of affairs had to be remedied by imparting religious education along with the secular education. Naturally, the different groups
involved understood different things under this heading. Missionaries pleaded
for Christian education; liberals pleaded for non-sectarian moral education about
universal truths; some were even open to letting the Hindus and Muslims teach
their own religious beliefs; Hindu reformers started their own schools where they
intended to teach a sanitised version of Hinduism that lived up to the Christian
model of a religion with rational foundations.
Remarkably, Protestant missionaries and Hindu reformers then shared the
same set of concerns. More than anything, this shows the success of the project of
secular education. Indeed, this system of education had laid the foundations for
the conversion and reform of the natives. In the course of the nineteenth century,
the Protestant-Christian way of describing Indian society, religion and its evils
had become so familiar to the educated Indians that they founded Hindu reform
movement on the basis of these descriptions. The tentative hypothesis I would like
377
to propose here is that secular education aimed to create the necessary mindset
in the Indians that was to compel them to accept the Christian evidence for the
corruption of the Hindu society and its traditions.
Along with education in the sciences, the Indians were imparted with a
series of purportedly scientific descriptions of their culture, history and society.
The claims about the corrupt and evil nature of Hinduism and the caste system
were presented simple rational and empirical facts about the world, much like
the theory of the origin of rain that Duff had taught his Indian students. The
explicit theology in these Protestant descriptions of Hinduism and caste moved
to the background so that they could be taught and learned as secular scientific
accounts of the Indian culture and society. Even though this did not necessarily
lead to conversion to Christianity, it did lead to the experience of the corruption of Hindu traditions, their superstition and their inferiority in comparison
with a rational, spiritual and true religion such as Christianity. Hence, by
the late nineteenth century, secular education had successfully created the conditions under which Hindu Reform movements could thrive. These had accepted
the Protestant-Christian assessment of Hindu traditions in terms of idolatry and
false religion as though it was a neutral and true description (Balagangadhara and
De Roover 2010; De Roover 2006). In order to do so, they first had to accept the
criteria and conditions of what counted as cogent arguments and good reasons in
the realm of reflection upon religion.
These reform movements could not emerge without a price card attached
to them. The price was the acceptance of a range of presuppositions concerning
the nature of the Indian traditions: the Indian traditions were so many different religions, namely Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, and the so-called
tribal religions; Hinduism had its own set of doctrines; its stories had to be seen as
scriptures that imparted knowledge and descriptions of the world that claimed
to be true; hence, this religion could not but be a religious rival of Christianity;
this rivalry concerned a competition between doctrines over truth; this truth is
a universal truth. In this manner, the centuries-old Christian project of warring
against ignorance and superstition regained momentum in the new garb of secular
education.
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9.4. Conclusion
Even though the nineteenth-century British colonial government desired to improve the corrupt religious and social situation, which it perceived in India, it
generally opted for an attitude of non-interference in religious matters. Missionaries and their religious education were discouraged and regarded with suspicion.
As has been argued elsewhere, this stance stemmed both from the Protestant
theology of religious freedom and from the pragmatic concern not to alienate the
native population from the colonial rulers (De Roover and Balagangadhara 2009).
The destruction of idolatry and the conversion of the people, government officials
believed, should be realized through the gradual diffusion of knowledge among
the Indians, rather than through active proselytism. Many of these officials were
genuine Protestants, convinced that theirs was the one true religion and that all
should convert to and live according to Gods will, but they nevertheless opposed
explicitly religious education by the missionaries.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the enterprise of converting and civilizing the natives had gone through several stages. First, European missionaries,
orientalists and travellers had developed a basic image of the Hindu traditions as
false religion and of the caste system that was taken to express this religious
corruption in the fundamental social structure of India. The background theology that had emerged from the Protestant Reformation allowed them to link
the conception of Hinduism to the conception of casteboth of which had
been developed by Europeans in the process of reflecting upon their experience of
India. All ills in Indian society were now to be blamed on the very foundations of
the heathen religion of Hinduism.
Next, missionaries and colonial officials tried to teach this description of
Indian culture and society to the Indians themselves as the truth about India.
They did so by developing dialogues between representatives of true religion and
followers of false religion. Apart from a handful of cases, however, the endeavour
to have the natives convert in this way led to failure. Hindus showed indifference
to these debates about the truth and falsity of religion and utter incomprehension
towards the description of their traditions as false religion. They did not perceive
any problem in regarding several religions as true at the same time. They could
not understand how factual historical evidence and logical consistency were relevant in assessing the value of traditional stories or how the facts of history could
ever prove the truth of Christianity.
379
Eventually, colonial officials and missionaries identified a precondition that

had to be fulfilled before one could ever dream of large-scale conversion of the
Hindus to Christianity: one would first have to teach them to reason according to
the rules of historical evidence and logical consistency in the field of religion. This
generated the third stage, namely, that of secular education. Teaching the sciences, history and ethics in government schools would impart the natives with the
proper modes of reasoning. Secular education was attractive to many Indians and
it was embraced by a growing group in the course of the nineteenth century. The
project of secular education finally provided the Europeans with a key to tackle
the fundamental problem of having the heathens of India undergo the process
of spiritual and moral conversion.
It concerned a typically English education centred upon teaching the products of western civilization: mathematics, physics, geography, western philosophy,
history and literature. According to the Europeans (Christians and non-Christians alike) providing this education to the Indians was crucial, because it would
enlighten them and provide them with the necessary knowledge to have a free
and well-educated life. This knowledge, it was believed, would also help the natives to overcome their state of idolatry, superstition and ignorance, because it
would allow them to see the corruption of their traditions and the immorality of
their practices. Many Europeans agreed on the fact that secular education would
result in a fundamental change in the Indian mindset: the native subject came to
despise his own traditions, looked down upon character traits considered as typically Indian, rejected the indigenous practices as immoral.
However, for Christian missionaries whose task was to bring people to the
true religion, this did not suffice. They accused the British Government of not
fulfilling its duty: it had to improve the situation of the heathens and a purely
secular education fell short of this goal. Enlightening the Indians and providing
them with scientific, historical and philosophical knowledge did not transform them
into Christians. Naturally, they appreciated the fact that secular education helped
destroy idolatry and superstition. While secular education was deemed efficient
in making the natives see the immorality of their traditions and practices, it also
failed because it created another kind of immorality in them. Secular education
destroys something without adding anything in return. It creates a void. Instead
of engaging in the full formation the Indian people, forming their consciences so
that they can live according to the will of God, secular education leaves them half-
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way, since they are still blind to true religion. Therefore, they necessarily remain in
a state of unhappiness and immorality.
Even though many different appreciations and interpretations of the impact
of secular education circulated, government officials and missionaries all agreed
on one central fact: the colonial secular education imparted the Indians with the
awareness that their traditions were immoral, superstitious, and idolatrous. How can
we make sense of this conclusion? How could a purely secular education change
the perception of educated individuals to such an extent that they saw the practices of their ancestors and fellow Indians in a completely new light? One route
is simple: accepting that indeed the Indian traditions and practices were corrupt
and immoral and that the rational light of the sciences and philosophy can help
one to overcome this state of ignorance. However, it is quite unconvincing to describe the accumulated traditions of a culture solely in terms of superstition and
immorality.
We propose another route: to understand these dynamics in the educational
debates of the nineteenth century, one needs a deeper understanding of a specific
process central to Christianity, namely, the process of conversion. The characteristics of this process, we would like to suggest, are such that they compelled British
colonials, as Protestant believers, to have both an attitude of non-interference
towards the Indian traditions and at the same time engage in a gradual process of
transformation, change and reform of the Indian people and its society. Secular
education appears to have had a result many Christians had long hoped for, but
which they could not realize through explicit preaching of the gospel or coercing
conversion. It may have created a void in the minds of the newly educated Indians, but this void also offered an opportunity. In this sense, the colonial project of
secular education aimed to create the conditions of conversion.
Chapter 10
Conclusion:
Conversion and Secularisation
in a Culture Without Religion
In this concluding chapter, I would like to spell-out the basic hypothesis that underlies the doctoral thesis and links all the chapters together. At the outset, I wish
to emphasize that this hypothesis is really what the word suggests: it is speculative
and tentative; formulated to solve problems that have arisen. It is also heuristically productive in the sense that it appears to suggest unexpected answers, each
of which has to be investigated further. This hypothesis is being formulated based
on many discussions with Prof. Balagangadhara and is very much indebted to his
writings, both published and unpublished.
One of the most intriguing aspects of his hypothesis is the double dynamic
of religion: religion spreads in the world, or universalizes itself, in two ways
(Balgangadhara 1994, see especially chapter 11). The first is the process of proselytization: here the emphasis lies on the fact that a specific religion wins converts.
People are inducted or converted into a specific religion through the process of
being born into it or through the process of conversion. The second is the process
of secularization: here the emphasis is on how a specific religion spreads in a nonreligious fashion. Secularization picks out both how a specific religion generalizes religious ideas in apparently non-religious forms and how secular institutions emerge in the social and cultural world that embody religious ideas. These
two processes (proselytization and secularization) come together in the spread of
a religion in a society. At the highest level of abstraction, this hypothesis claims
the following: what we call Western culture today is a child of Christianity.
382
Chapter 10
Two implications of Balagangadharas hypothesis are very relevant to my

research in this thesis: (a) what we call the secular world todayi.e. the world
of both ideas and institutions that we think are secularis actually a religioussecular world. That is to say, these apparently secular spheres of human existence
are not only created by a specific religion (Christianity) but they are also part of
a religious world, the one created by Christianity. The secular world of the West
lives within the religious world created by Christianity and, as such, is a secularreligious world. So, whether we look at the structure of our cities or at the nature
of our juridical institutions; whether we look at our intellectual traditions about
ethics or human rights or at a phenomenon like the Enlightenment; the claim is
that these are children of Christianity. This hypothesis is a bold conjecture in the
Popperian sense of the word: if true (or, at least till proved false), this hypothesis
has the power to change the way we look at the world and the way we have looked
at the world for centuries long.
The second implication that is of relevance to my thesis is (b) how I have
interpreted and adopted the above hypothesis for my needs. Protestant Christianity, unlike the kind of Christianity that emerged within the Pagan world of
Rome, did not confront a purely secular world. What it did confront was a secular-religious world created by Catholic Christianity. That is to say, Protestant
thinkers confronted a Catholic secular world and, in challenging this world, they
attempted to create a Protestant secular world (but within the ambit of a Catholic
world). If that is the case, the secular-religious world that Protestantism created
should be both recognizably Christian (but one that must also be acceptable to
the Catholics) and specifically Protestant. To put it succinctly: both the Catholics
and the Protestants should recognize and live in such a world, albeit for different
reasons. Catholics see the specifically Protestant as something that Catholics
themselves had always recognized and admitted to as a part of Roman-Catholic
Christendom (e.g. its anticlerical tendencies); whereas Protestants are both satisfied and dissatisfied with such a world: satisfied because this world is Protestant;
dissatisfied because it is not yet fully Protestant. While such appears to be the
case prima facie, the point is the following: depending on where one puts the
emphasis, the Protestant Reformation must appear as (a) a revolution within the
Western culture and as (b) a storm in a tea cup. Both should appear as legitimate
descriptions of the Protestant Reformation and there can be no facts of the matter that can settle the case fully one way or another. That is to say, the Protestant
Reformation is both a radical break with the Catholic world that preceded it and
Conclusion
383
a continuation of that world. In short, the Protestant Reformation brought forth

novel and original ideas and institutions, but doing so only by extending further what
was already prefigured in the Catholic world. One can also formulate this idea in a
quasi-paradoxical form as well: Protestantism broke with Catholicism only by extending Catholicism. I have attempted to develop both implications of the hypothesis
on the spread of religion in the last three chapters.
It is also of importance to note how these implications have been developed.
This has taken the form of a hypothesis about the dynamic of religious development that can also be tested for its falsity and cognitive productiveness. I have
identified the typically Protestant dynamic as one of the monasticization of daily
life. Let me spell-out this hypothesis in simple terms.1
In one sense, Protestantism broke neatly with Catholicism in so far as it
abolished some institutions considered fundamental by the latter: the monasteries
and the priesthood. The matter becomes especially intriguing when we focus on
the secular aspect of the dynamic. The suggestion is that Protestantism altered
the relation between certain religious institutions (e.g. the monasteries, the priesthood) and the secular world by secularizing these institutions. That is to say, it generalized these two institutions to encompass the secular worldthe priesthood of
all believers and the monasticization of daily lifeand, in doing so, brought forth
a new secular-religious world and altered the pre-existing relationship between
the earlier religious world and the earlier secular-religious world. The Protestant
secular world is then different from the Catholic secular world, but it is also continuous with the Catholic religious world because it generalized some of the religious institutions of that world and allowed them to enter and shape the secular
realm.
What form did this monasticization of daily life take? Or, what was the
secular form of the institution of the monastery? The answer is as simple as it is
startling and controversial: the emergence of normative ethics in the form we are familiar today. In the process of criticizing certain Catholic distinctions (such as the
differences between commands, precepts and counsels) and by arguing that
the Bible uniformly commands all Christian believers (past, present and future)
in the same way to live according to the will and the law of God; by arguing that
the distinctions between the laity, priests and monks do not reflect spiritual
and religious distinctions but merely one of office; by arguing that obedience to
I will keep this very brief as it is a report of work-in-progress. Together with the other researchers
of the research group Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, especially Prof. Balagangadhara and Dr.
Jakob De Roover, we are currently continuing our research on this issue.
1
384
Chapter 10
God does not allow any kind of exception; in all these ways, the Reformers broke
with the Catholic religion. What was the duty of priests and monks now became
the duty of all Christians without distinction. In the process of secularizing this argument, the normative ethics of today came into being.
If this is true, multiple conclusions force themselves upon us. Let me mention just a few that appear interesting:
(1) There must be recognizable continuities and discontinuities between ethics
before and after the Protestant Reformation or, in other words, between medieval
ethics and modern ethics. At first sight, this appears to be the case. In recent
decades, many authors have argued that there is continuity between Aristotelian
and Thomist virtue ethics. Some of these same authors have also revived the notion of supererogatory ethics in order to understand some ethical behavior and
acts. This virtue ethics is contrasted with the Kantian normative ethics. At the
other side of the spectrum, we find authors who not only show that virtue ethics does not add anything to our understanding of ethics and morality but also
that it is fully reducible to normative ethics. Needless to say, many argue that no
supererogatory acts exist but only imperfect duties because of which we postulate acts that go over and beyond the call of duty. There can be no moral acts,
they argue, which transcend moral duties. The first group emphasizes the break;
the second denies it by reducing virtue ethics to normative ethics. It does so
by showing that normativity is present in virtue ethics too. Though the issue is
unsettled, the hypothesis predicts its existence and claims that this debate will not
go away.
(2) In many standard text book stories about the history of ethics, Immanuel Kant is credited with the emergence of modern morality (especially with
the deontological version of ethics). The hypothesis suggests that to understand
modern philosophers like Kant and Fichte (or others) and their theories on ethics, one has to look deeper into the Protestant writings, especially the emphases
placed on the relationship between Gods Law and the difficulties in following it
for human beings. As such we can also raise a question for the history of ethics:
though Kant is very difficult to read and understand by ordinary men and women,
why did the basics of his moral philosophy nevertheless acquire such a hold on
ordinary people? The hypothesis suggests that the answer might lie in the popular
nature of the Protestant Reformation and its new take on normativity. In doing so,
it suggests that there is an interesting link (that definitely requires further explora-
Conclusion
385
tion and research) between a philosophical theory and the dominant concerns of
a culture.
(3) The same point can be made in a different way. In the standard history
books on ethics, one speaks often about the is-ought problem (or fallacy). David
Hume is credited with the discovery of this problem or fallacy. Very briefly, the
problem involves deriving an ought statement from an is statement: from the
statement that all people strive after happiness, one cannot derive the statement
that all people ought to strive after happiness or that it is (morally) good that all
people strive after happiness. Hume found that many philosophers slip from one
statement to the other. Now, the question is: why did only Hume see this problem
and not other generations before him? Of course, this question is not raised as
an issue for research because there is an implicit answer available in the common
sense: it has to do with the genius of Hume. While I do not want to downplay the
role of geniuses in history, note that a similar question, say with respect to physics,
generates interesting historical and philosophical questions for research: why did
generations before Einstein not formulate the theory of relativity? In answering
this question, the genius of Einstein does not do much explanatory work: after
all, Sir Isaac Newton was no less of a genius. In search of answers to this question, we have to talk about the theoretical preconditions of a theory like relativity,
its relationship to previous theories in physics, the nature of scientific progress and
such like. In exactly the same way, we can formulate and seek answers to questions
involving the genius of Hume. In proposing the hypothesis that normative ethics
came though the process of secularization of Protestant schemes and structures
of conversio, we can begin to explore the relationship between the emergence
of problems and solutions in ethics to the intellectual concerns of a period and a
culture.
(4) The hypothesis further allows us to transform some vague and ill-structures questions into structured ones and some ad hoc answers into issues that can
be taken up for research. I have touched on one such question in the ninth chapter.
Consider the fact that the British approached Indiaand other cultures in the
worldprimarily through a normative framework, which made the others, the
Indians, into immoral creatures. Those writers who rebelled against such an approach were not only in the minority, but also failed in defending the Indian culture in normative terms: their defense basically boiled down to the idea that the
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Indian culture, though moral once upon a time, had degenerated into what it had
become. It is not so interesting to ask why this happened. Take for instance two
popular answers: the British described the Indians in this way due to racism or
due to imperialism.2 The first is ideological (or, speaking charitably, theoretical
in the sense that it was based on some theory of racial supremacy or the other) and
the other is socio-economic (imperialism is a socio-economic relation between
nations and their economies). Which of these two answers is right? The common
sense answer is both, but this is manifestly absurd: not every form of imperialism is also a form of racism and not every form of racism is imperialist by nature.
Furthermore, it is also absurd because it transforms every British citizen of the
last four centuries into a racist and imperialist and, in effect, transforms the entire
British culture into a racist and imperialist culture. Surely, this is as unacceptable as the claim that the Indian culture is immoral by nature. Our hypothesis
restructures the question and the possible answers. The British approached other
cultures normatively because this approach towards human beings and societies
had become secularized in European societies. Therefore, even those who were not
convinced Protestants ended up embracing a normative framework that transformed Indians into immoral creatures.
This hypothesis allows of nuances, which can be tested independently: on
the one hand, the early descriptions of Indian culture (during the Middle Ages)
will not have embraced a normative view of her people and culture. On the other,
the descriptions of India after the Reformation, whether developed in RomanCatholic or in Protestant Europe, will have become fully normative. Our current
researchsee especially the outcomes of my colleague Raf Gelders doctoral research (2010)shows that both are indeed the case.
(5) This brings me to the focus of the first six chapters. If, indeed, normativity is the result of the secularization of Protestant Christianity, that means that
any culture, which is not Christian, will have great difficulty in understanding
normative claims. One of the striking things we noticed in the first six chapters is
the extent to which Indians have difficulty in interpreting the notion of conversion, which is a normative concept. Even though they use English, speak in a way
similar to Europeans and the Christians, use the same sentences and words, I have
shown that they speak differently. If we take the Christian understanding as the
original, we can then say that the Indians distort this meaning. This distortion is
striking because different Indians from different generations not only distort the
Ill-understood and popularized variants of Edward Saids Orientalism (1978) have encouraged
such an approach. This has been especially the case in the field of study called Postcolonial Studies.
2
Conclusion
387
meaning but they also do so in the same systematic way. In other words, there is
systematicity to this distortion. This distortion becomes manifest when they speak and
write in English, a European language that expresses these normative concepts.
The hypothesis predicts both: (a) that there will be a systematic distortion each
time when Indians use words from English that have a normative component in
their meaning (e.g. religious freedom, conversion, reform, secularism); (b)
and that the systematic nature of the distortion is expressive of the Indian culture
as a culture that does not know of this normativity. (This hypothesis is not limited
to India: we can also make predictions about other countries and cultures. As a
result, it is capable of research and refutation.) As a consequence, I have used
the English language sources exclusively, neglecting what some of these authors
(Gandhi, for instance) wrote in Indian languages. Through a study of how the
notion of conversion began to acquire some structural meanings, I have tried to
indicate what some elements of the Indian culture are probably like: the difference
between religion and tradition; the link between a community and its tradition;
the attitude of non-interference; the blindness to religion; etc. I consider this to
be one of the main achievements of the dissertation, but at the same time this is
only the tip of the iceberg.
(6) There is an even bolder implication lurking beneath the translation problem. On the basis of a deeper study of the systematic distortion that I have spoken
of, we could predict the meanings of some of the core words in the Indian languages. That is to say, in these debates on conversion, e.g., we observed how the
protagonists use some specific words from the Indian languages to translate in
a distorted form the meanings of English language words. Because this tendency
will be common to multiple generations of Indians, we can make the following
claim: certain words from different Indian languages will be used to translate English language words not because the former are synonyms of the latter but because
they distort the latter in the same way. In other words, when we study translations of
words across cultures, the commonly used equivalents in local languages do not
signal in the direction of synonymy of meaning but in the direction of distortion:
the systematic distortion of the meaning of chosen synonyms will tell us more about the
language and culture into which English language words are translated by the natives.
This should be put in a stronger form: we have to study how people use English in
India, in order to understand their local languages. How they distort the English
language provides us with clues about the semantics of their local languages. In
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Chapter 10
studying cultures, in other words, we would do better to focus on their distortions

in meaning rather than on looking for their synonyms to our words.
(7) Finally, I have also tried to suggest that the British not merely lived in
a culture where religion had secularized itself, but that they also extended this
dynamic as the cornerstone in proselytizing the people and culture of India.
The British introduced a secular European education in India. The fact that many
considered this as a necessary step in the mechanism of Christianizing India does
not reveal some nefarious plot or hidden agenda. Instead, it tells us that they
were using a mechanism known to them, even if its relevance in India took them
some time to figure this out.
These are only some obvious interesting implications that follow from the
hypothesis of the Protestant Reformation as a monasticization of daily life. In
some senses, one could say that I have circled around this hypothesis from many
angles and the entire thesis tries to illustrate and explicate it. It is by no means a
complete product, but I hope to have shown what is interesting about the hypothesis and how and why it could be tested empirically.
Annex 1: Anti-Conversion Legislation at a Glance

Orissa
Madhya Pradesh
Chhatishgarh
Gujarat
Himachal Pradesh
Name
Orissa Freedom of
Religion Act
Madhya Pradesh Dharma

Swatantrya Adhiniyam
(Freedom of Religion
Act)
Chhattisgarh
Dharma Swatantrya
Adhiniyam (Freedom of Religion
Act)
Gujarat Freedom
of Religion Act
Himachal Pradesh
Freedom of Religion
Bill
Status
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
Year
1967 (in effect in

1968)
1968. Amended in 2006.
The state was part

of Madhya Pradesh:
1968. Amendment
in 2006.
2003 (amended in
2006 -Act 30 of
2006-but this bill
has been dismissed
in 2008)
2006
Title
An Act to provide
for prohibition of
conversion from one
religion to another
by the use of force
or inducement or by
fraudulent means
and for matters
incidental thereto.
An Act to provide for

prohibition of conversion from one religion
to another by the use of
force or allurement or by
fraudulent means and for
matters incidental thereto.
Idem Madhya
Pradesh
An Act to provide
for freedom of religion by prohibition of conversion
from one religion
to another by
the use of force
or allurement
or by fraudulent
means and for the
matters incidental
thereto.
A bill to provide
for prohibition of
conversion from one
religion to another
by the use of force
or inducement or by
fraudulent means
and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto.
D e f i n i - (a) conversion
tions
means renouncing
one religion and
adopting another; (b)
force shall include
a show of force or a
threat for injury of
any kind including threat of divine
displeasure or social
excommunication; (c)
fraud shall include
misrepresentation or
any other fraudulent
contrivance; (d)
inducement shall
include the offer of
any gift or gratification, either in cash
or in kind and shall
also include the
grant of any benefit,
either pecuniary or
otherwise; (e) minor means a person
under eighteen years
of age.
(a) allurement means

offer of any temptation
in the form of (i) any gift
or gratification either in
cash or kind; (ii) grant
of any material benefit,
either momentary or
otherwise; (b) Conversion means renouncing
one religion and adopting
another; (c) Force shall
include a show of force
or threat of injury of any
kind including threat
of divine displeasure or
social ex-communication;
(d) fraud shall include
misrepresentation or any
other fraudulent contrivance; (e) minor means
a person under eighteen
years of age.
Idem Madhya
Pradesh but 2006
amendment to the
definition of conversion: Provided
that the return in
ancestors original
religion or his own
original religion by
any person shall
not be construed as
conversion.
(a) Allurement
means offer of any
temptation in the
form of:(i) any
gift or gratification, either in
cash or kind;(ii)
grant of any
material benefit,
either monetary
or otherwise; (b)
Convert means
to make one person to renounce
one religion and
adopt another religion; (c) Force
includes a show of
force or a threat of
injury of any kind
including a threat
of divine displeasure or social
excommunication;
(d) Fraudulent
means includes
misrepresentation or any other
fraudulent contrivance; (e) Minor
means a person
under eighteen
years of age.
(a) conversion
means renouncing
one religion and
adopting another;
(b) force shall include show of force
or threat of injury or
threat of divine displeasure or social excommunication; (c)
fraud shall include
misrepresentation or
any other fraudulent contrivance;
(d) inducement
shall include the
offer of any gift or
gratification, either
in cash or in kind or
grant of any benefit
either pecuniary or
otherwise; and (e)
minor means a person under eighteen
years of age.
Relevant
No person shall
p r o h i b i - convert or attempt
tion
to convert, either
directly or otherwise,
any person from one
religious faith to
another by the use of
force or by inducement or by any
fraudulent means nor
shall any person abet
any such conversion.
No person shall convert or

attempt to convert, either
directly or otherwise, any
person from one religious
faith to another by the use
force or by allurement or
by any fraudulent means
nor shall any person abet
any such conversion.
Idem Madhya
Pradesh
No person shall
convert or attempt to convert,
either directly or
otherwise, any
person from one
religion to another
by use of force or
by allurement or
by any fraudulent
means nor shall
any person abet
such conversion.
No person shall
convert or attempt
to convert, either
directly or otherwise,
any person from one
religion to another
by the use of force or
by inducement or by
any other fraudulent
means nor shall
any person abet any
such conversion:
Provided at any
person who has been
converted from one
religion to another,
in contravention of
the provisions of
this section, shall be
deemed not to have
been converted.
Orissa
Madhya Pradesh
Chhatishgarh
Gujarat
Himachal Pradesh
P u n i s h - Any person contrament

vening the provisions
contained in Section
3 shall, without prejudice to any civil liability, be punishable
with imprisonment
of either description
which may extend to
one year or with fine
which may extend to
five thousand rupees
or with both; Provided that in case the
offence is committed
in respect of a minor,
a woman or a person
belonging to the
Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes the
punishment shall be
imprisonment to the
extent of two years
and fine up to ten
thousand rupees.
Any person contravening

the provision contained
in section 3 shall, without
prejudice to any civil liability be punishable with
imprisonment which may
extend to one year or with
fine which may extend
to five thousand rupees
or with both; Provided
that in case the offence
is committed in respect
of a minor, a woman or
a person belonging to
the Schedules Castes or
Scheduled Tribes the
punishment shall be imprisonment to the extent
of two years and fine up
to ten thousand rupees.
Idem Madhya
Pradesh but 2006
amendment: (1)
For the words one
year the words
three years and
for the words five
thousand the words
twenty thousand
shall be substituted.
(2) In proviso for
the words two
years the words
four years and
for the words ten
thousand the words
twenty thousand
shall be substituted
Whoever contravenes the provision of Section

3 shall, without
prejudice to any
civil liability, be
punished with
imprisonment
for a term, which
may extend to
three years and
also be liable to a
fine, which may
extend to rupees
fifty thousand:
Provided that
whoever contravenes the provisions of section
3 in respect of a
minor, a woman or
a person belonging
to the Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe shall
be punished with
imprisonment for
a term which may
extend to four
years and also be
liable to a fine
which may extend
to rupees one lakh.
Any person
contravening the
provisions contained
in section 3 shall,
without prejudice to
any civil liability, be
punishable with imprisonment of either
description which
may extend to two
years or with fine
which may extend to
twenty five thousand
rupees or with both:
Provided that in case
the offence is committed in respect of
a minor, a woman or
a person belonging
to Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribes,
the punishment of
imprisonment may
extend to three years
and fine may extend
to fifty thousand
rupees.
Rules
Madhya Pradesh Freedom Idem Madhya

of Religion Rules, 1969
Pradesh
Gujarat Freedom
of Religion Rules,
2008
The Himachal
Pradesh Freedom
of Religion Rules,
2007
Orissa Freedom of
Religion Rules, 1989
Addition- Congress Party ruled

al info
state Government
See Note 1.
Congress Party led

state Government
Note 1: The dismissed amendment of 2006 of the Chhatishgarh bill held the following idea: (b) Convert means to make one person to
renounce one religion and adopt another religion; but does not include to make one person to renounce one denomination and adopt another denomination of the same religion. Explanation: For removal of doubt, it is hereby illustrated that for the purpose of this Act:(i) Jain
and Buddhist shall be construed as denominations of Hindu religion; (ii) Shia and Sunni shall be construed as denominations of Muslim
religion; and (iii) Catholic and Protestant shall be construed as denominations of Christian religion. STATEMENT OF OBJECTS
AND REASONS: Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003 defines the term convert. The said definition does not elaborate the specific mention of a particular denomination of religion. It is considered that conversion amongst the inter
denomination of the same religion should be excluded from the operation of the Act. It is, therefore, considered necessary to elaborate
and clarify the term convert to make it more specific. Accordingly, the term convert in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act is proposed
to be amended to elaborate the said term so as to clarify illustratively that Jain and Buddhist shall be construed as denominations of
Hindu religion, Shia and Sunni shall be construed as denominations of Muslim religion and Catholic and Protestant shall be construed
as denominations of Christian religion for the purpose of the Act and the provisions of the Act shall not apply to inter-denomination
conversion of the same religion.
Awaiting Implementation - 2009

Arunachal Pradesh
Rajasthan
Name
Freedom of Indigenous Faith Act

Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 1978
Rajasthan Dharma Swatantrya Bill
Status
Awaiting Implementation
Awaiting Implementation
Year
1978
2006 failed attempt/2008 successful attempt
Title
An Act to provide for prohibition of conversion from

one religious faith to any other religious faith by use
of force or inducement or by fraudulent means and for
matters connected therewith.
A Bill to provide for the prohibition of conversion from one religion to another by the use of force or allurement or by fraudulent
means and for matters incidental thereto.
Definitions
(a) government means the Government of the Union

Territory of Arunachal Pradesh.
(b) conversion means renouncing one religious faith
and adopting another religious faith, and convert
shall be construed accordingly;
(c) indigenous faith means such religions, beliefs and
practices including rites, rituals, festivals, observances,
performances, abstinence, customs as have been found
sanctioned, approved, performed by the indigenous
communities of Arunachal Pradesh from the time
these communities have been known and includes
Buddhism as prevalent among Monpas, Menbas,
Sherdukpens, Khambas, Khamtis and Singaphoos,
Vaishnavism as practised by Noctes, Akas, and
Nature worships including worships of Donyi-Polo,
as prevalent among other indigenous communities of
Arunachal Pradesh;
(d) force shall include show of force or a threat of
injury of any kind including threat ofdivine displeasure or social excommunication;
(e) fraud shall include misrepresentation or any other
fraudulent contrivance;
(f ) inducement shall include the offer of any gift
or gratification, either cash or in kind and shall also
include the grant of any benefit, either pecuniary or
otherwise.
(g) prescribed means prescribed under the rules;
(h) religious faith includes any indigenous faith.
(a) allurement means offer of any temptation in the form of: (i)
any gift or gratification, either in cash or kind; or (ii) grant of any
material benefit, either monetary or otherwise;
(b) conversion means renouncing ones own religion and adopting
another; (Explanation: Own religion means [the] religion of ones
forefathers);
(c) force includes a show of force or a threat of injury of any kind
including threat of divine displeasure or social excommunication;
(d) fraudulent means and includes misrepresentation or any other
fraudulent contrivance;
(e) Minor means a person under 18 years of age; and
(f ) unlawful means an act which is in contravention of any of the
provisions of this Act.
Relevant
prohibition
No person shall convert or attempt to convert, either

directly or otherwise, any person from one religious
faith to any other religious faith by the use of force or
by inducement or by any fraudulent means nor shall
any person abet any such conversion.
No person shall convert or attempt to convert, either directly or

otherwise, any person from one religion to another by use of force
or by allurement or fraudulent means nor shall any person abet any
such conversion. Provided that any person who has been converted
from one religion to another in contravention of the provisions of
this section, shall be deemed not to have been converted.
Punishment
Any person contravening the provisions contained in

section 3 shall, without prejudice to any civil liability,
be punishable with imprisonment to the extent of two
years and fine up to ten thousand rupees.
(1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 3 shall, without

prejudice to any other civil or criminal liability, be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one
year but which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to
fine, which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees: Provided
that in case the offence is committed in respect of a minor, a
woman or a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe punishment of imprisonment shall not be less than two years
and may extend to five years and the fine may extend to rupees fifty
thousands.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force registration of body registered under the
Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958 (Act No. 28 of 1958) of
the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 (Act No. 42 of 1959) shall
be liable to be cancelled, if it is found (a) that the funds of the body
have been used, or are being used or are contemplated to be used
for conversion; or (b) the body is involved in securing conversion.
Rules?
No.
No.
Additional
Info
Congress-ruled state Government
Repealed
Tamil Nadu
Name
Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Ordinance
Status
Repealed in 2006: The Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Act, 2002 is hereby repealed.
Year
2002
Title
An Ordinance to provide for prohibition of conversion from one religion to another by the use of force or allurement or by fraudulent means and for matters incidental thereto.
Definitions
(a) allurement means offer of any temptation in the form of (i) any gift or gratification either in cash or kind; (ii)
grant of any material benefit, either monetary or otherwise;
(b) convert means to make one person to renounce one religion and adopt another religion;
(c) force includes a show of force or a threat of injury of any kind including threat of divine displeasure or social
ex-communication;
(d) fraudulent means includes misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance;
(e) minor means a person under eighteen years of age.
Relevant prohibition
No person shall convert or attempt to convert, either directly or otherwise, any person from one religion to another
by the use of force or by allurement or by any fraudulent means nor shall any person abet any such conversion.
Punishment
Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 3 shall, without prejudice to any civil liability, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also be liable to fine which may extend to fifty
thousand rupees: Provided that whoever contravenes the provisions of section 3 in respect of a minor, a woman or a
person belonging to Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to four years and also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees.
Past
- Early laws were the Rajgarh State Conversion Act (1936) in Madhya Pradesh state, the Patna Freedom of Religion Act (1942) (in modern Bihar
state), the Sarguja State Apostasy Act (1945) in todays Chhattisgarh and the Udaipur State Anti-Conversion Act of (1946) in Rajasthan.
- 1954: presentation in the Lok Sabha of the Indian Converts (Regulation and Registration) Bill, by Jethalal Joshi. He explained it was to regulate
conversion and to provide for registration and licensing of persons aiding any person to become a convert (Kim 2002, 230). In 1955 Nehru spoke out
against it. The bill was eventually rejected.
- The Backward Communities (Religious Protection) Bill (1960).
- 1978: O.P. Tyagi The All-India Freedom of Religion Bill central government.
Potential future laws

- Karnataka: Since 2009 some reports have appeared saying that anti-conversion laws are considered in Karnataka.
- Potential new laws are under discussion (in Jharkhand and Uttarakhand), according to Jenkins 2008. For Jharkhand, see also HRF 2007.
Note 2: The information in this table is taken from different sources. Most of the relevant Acts are available on the websites of the respective state governments, like from the Tamil Nadu Government, http://www.tn.gov.in/acts-rules/ord9-2002.htm. Most of the Freedom
of Religion Bills have also been collected and made easily accessible online by the All India Christian Council, https://www.christiancouncil.in/. In collecting the information on this fact sheets I also made use of information provided in the following literature: the yearly
International Religious Freedom Reports of the US State Department, see www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/index.htm, HRF 2007, Jenkins
2008, Kim 2003, Manickam 2003, SAHRDC 2008, Economist 2008.
Glossary
Note: This glossary explains the common use of the terms in studies on South
Asia. However, in some cases our research programme compels me to add an
alternative interpretation or to complement the customary understanding. This
should make it clear that in some cases the common use of the terms in the social
sciences and humanities is not unproblematic or value-free.
Arya Samaj: famous Hindu Reform movement founded at the end of the nineteenth century by Dayanand Saraswati. Its general aim was to purify the Hindu
traditions from wrong beliefs and bring them back to the pure teachings of the
Vedas. This went hand in hand with criticism of a range of social ills. The Arya
Samaj opposed child marriage, idolatry, rituals, etc. The remarriage of widows was
promoted. It adopted a range of Western Christian descriptions and critiques of
the Hindu traditions. Generally this movement had appeal especially among the
Western educated elites in the Indian society.
Brahmins (idem Brahmans): One of the four varna groups (see jati), namely the
highest ranking. In the Western Christian descriptions of Hinduism, the Brahmins have been associated with the priesthood, but in reality they have all kinds
of professions.
Dalit/untouchables/Harijans: Names used to refer to Hindu groups and people
outside of the caste-system. Harijans, or children of God was the term used by
Gandhi to refer to these people. These groups are mainly characterized by the
social disabilities they experience in the Hindu society and untouchablity was
declared illegal by the Indian Constitution (1950). In order to correct the wrongs
towards these groups the SC/ST (Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes) Reservation system was set up. This guarantees positive discrimination in the fields of
education and positions for people belonging to these groups.
Deva/Devi: Hindu deities. The second is the female form. Often they are associated with natural powers, such as earth, wind, fire etc.
394
Glossary
Dharma: This term has been translated as religion, law, natural law, righteousness, ethics, etc. Its precise meaning remains unclear, because the term
has no semantic equivalent in western languages. In modern times, the term is
sometimes used to translate the English term religion and thus to create artificial
terminology like Hindu dharma, Bauddha dharma, Christian dharma...
Gujarati: The language of Gujarat (an Indian state in NW India) or of the Gujarati communities. Mahatma Gandhi spoke Gujarati.
Harijans: see dalits.
Hindutva: Literally this means Hindu-ness and the term generally refers to the
Hindu rightor the Hindu nationalists (originally from V.D. Savarkars Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1924)). I use Hindutva loosely to refer to the Hindu nationalist organizations and their leaders and participants as they are collected in the
Sangh Parivar, especially the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa
Hindu Parishad (VHP) and related associations such as ABVP (All-India Students Council), Bajrang Dal (part of VHP), and many more.
Hindutvavadis: Supporters of Hindutva.
Jati: This term is usually translated as caste. The Sanskrit word means form
of existence fixed by birth.Actually it refers more generically to groups within
the Indian traditions, especially to regional groups or families. According to the
Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004, s.v. jati), however, the official Hindu view gives
second place to jti as an aberration of varna. Together, the terms varna, caste and
jati, refer to the so-called Indian caste system and this cluster is generally related
to a religious justification. As our knowledge of the relations between groups and
families in India is in fact very limited today, it is difficult to know what jati and
varna refer to within the Indian traditions. Without denying the existence of
huge problems of poverty and inequality in India among certain parts of its population, the problem remains how this can be related to jati or varna. Till today the
meaning of these terms is disputed, e.g. certain jatis fight to achieve a lower caste
status in order to enjoy the benefits of the SC/ST system of reservation. It is not
clear which jatis belong to which varna.
Glossary
395
Lok Sabha: Hindi for House of the People, the lower chamber of Indias parliament. Its members are elected for five years.
Marga: This Sanskrit word means path. It refers to ways or means or techniques
to reach happiness. Generally three margas are distinguished: the way of knowledge or jnana-marga, the way of devotion or bhakti-marga, the war of action or
karma-marga.
Moksha: In many of the Asian traditions, moksha is the ulitmate spiritual goal or
enlightenment. Many different paths or means or techniques can help different
kinds of people in different walks of life to reach enlightenment. Hence, the proliferation of paths and techniques (some intellectual, some through the body, etc.)
in the Indian traditions.
NRI: Non-resident Indian. Generally this refers to the groups of Indians living
abroad, e.g. in the U.S.
Panth: Refers to panthan which means path in Sanskrit. A panth is often started
by a guru or an acharya and is later led by followers of the guru. For instance, Sikhisme is Nanak Panth, refering to its founder guru Nanak.
Parampara: This term refers to the guru-shishya tradition in the Indian traditions.
The central idea is that teachings or techniques are transmitted by a guru (teacher)
to his or her shishya (disciple). Examples are the Bhakti traditions or Advaita
Vedanta.
Puja: This is traditionally translated as worship, but ritual is more accurate.
It refers both to the daily pujas in peoples homes as to the elaborate pujas in
temples. There are millions of ways to do puja. In our current day understanding
of the Indian traditions we know very little about the nature and structure of these
practices.
Pundit/pandit: Teacher or scholar. Generally refers to knowledge of and skills in
the Sanskrit language or Hindu law, scriptures, religion, or music.
396
Glossary
Purana: Sanskrit for of ancient times. Texts and stories dealing with heroes,
myths, legends, genealogies of gods and saints, devas and devis, tales of the creation and destruction of the universe, cosmology, etc.
Sampradaya: This is closely related to the guru-parampara. Often it is translated by
tradition or religious system, it refers to a school transmitted from one teacher
to another. Samparadaya is thus a collactive of ideas, attitutes, practices, and/or
techniques which are transmitted and also refined generation after generation.
One becomes part of the samparaya by diskha (inistiation) into the parampara.
Satyagraha: Coins the freedom struggle of non-violent resistance Gandhi stands
for. It literally means truth-seeker. The term was created and invented specifically
to give this struggle a fitting name (there was a contest to find a good name).
Savarnas: Caste Hindus. Savarna Hindus or savarnas is used in Gandhis work
to refer to the Hindus with varna, that is, the Hindus who are a part of the caste
system. Most often, it is used as a reference to the higher castes of Hindu society.
Shuddhi: A ritual created by the Arya Samaj to purify people who were formerly
Hindus and bring them back into the fold of Hinduism. It is translated as reconversion to Hinduism.
Swadeshi: This means of our own country or local self-sufficiency and became
a famous term through the swadeshi movement during the Independence struggle in India. Promoting Indian-made products and boycotting British import, this
movement gained momentum at the beginning of the twentieth century (after the
Partition of Bengal). Especially the massive boycott of British Lancashire fabric
and the use of domestic fabrics all over India had great impact during the struggle
for Independence, stimulating all sorts of indigenous enterprise. Gandhi reinvigorated the swadeshi movement by seeing in it a key road to swaraj. He made khadi
(Indian hand-spun and handwoven fabric) a symbol of swadeshi and a part of the
process towards swaraj.
Swaraj: Swaraj means self-rule or Independence.
Glossary
397
Varna: The Sanskrit word varna has many possible meaning, among which colour,
selection and classification. Varna is often used to refer to the four-fold distinction
Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisha and Shudra.
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Index
A
Ahmed 29
Algu Rai Shastri 93
Ali Khan 10
Ambedkar 10, 15, 84, 124, 138, 140
Anant 15, 24
Ancient pagan traditions
as false religion 182
as tradition 178
their blindness to religion 184
Anglicists and orientalists 329
Anthony 88, 89, 93
Antichrist 228, 230, 231, 235, 241, 250,
312, 313
Anti-conversion arguments 17, 69
as non-interference 100
opposing colonialism 18
showing incomprehension 31, 68
showing resentment 87
Anti-conversion laws 9, 13, 18, 22,
103132
against force, fraud, inducements 18,
118
as targeting Christianity 116, 117, 121
conceptual confusion in 110, 111, 112
Aquinas, St. Thomas 216221
on contemplative life 219, 220
on happiness 217
on theological virtues 218, 219
Armstrong 134, 209
Arnold 33, 34, 35
Arya Samaj 10, 43, 44, 145, 149, 356
Attias 134
Augsburg Confession 234, 240, 250
B
Bainton 253
Bajpai 73, 80, 85

Balagangadhara i, 1, 3, 5, 31, 64, 74, 78,
79, 98, 125, 126, 128, 130, 148, 173,
175, 178, 184, 189, 207, 213, 214,
329, 374, 377, 378
Ballantyne 325, 348, 350, 369, 370
Ballhatchet 136, 140, 144
Banerjea 373, 374
Banerjee 136, 138
Barton 367, 380
Bayly, S. 146, 326
Bellah 134
Benedict XVI 12, 13, 14
Benko 181
Bentham 330
Berman 215
Bernier 195, 196
Bilgrami 34
Biswan 15, 16
BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) 13, 18, 24
Bloch 3, 98, 115, 148, 174
Boisson 262, 265
Brahmins 328
as priests of false religion 332, 335, 336,
339, 340380, 342380
Brahmo Samaj 149
Brass 80
Brekke 10, 154, 157
Bremer 261
Brosse 134
Bryant 134, 153
Bucer iii, 221, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313,
314, 315, 316
Buchanan 325
Buckser and Glazier 134, 153, 154
Bugge 146
Buyers 194
C
Caldwell 134
Calvin 221-224, 242, 248, 254, 258, 263269, 288-290, 293-300, 307, 318,
460
319
on ceremonies 231
on Christian freedom 307
on clergy/laity distinction 249
on his conversion experience 265
on human sinfulness 224, 248
on idolatry 243
on knowledge of God 274, 275
on monasticism 246, 250
on primitive church 248
on sensus divinitatis 224
Cameron 253, 254, 367
Campbell 193
Cardinal Dias 14
Carey 194, 325
Carvalho 18
Celsus 184, 185, 186, 187
Chadwick 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 253
Chandhoke 75
Charles V 221, 234, 241
Chatterjee, Margaret 33, 34, 65
Chatterjee, Partha 31, 73, 77, 78, 113
Chatterji 10
Chiba 78
Chiriyankandath 80
Christianity
and good works in India 14
in Gandhis thought (see Gandhi on
Christianity)
its domestication of paganism 181
its horizontal and vertical expansion
207260, 261, 262
its notion of freedom 26, 226, 232
Cicero 179, 284, 357, 367
Citron 134, 271
Claerhout 79, 143, 189
Clarke 136, 153, 154, 155
Clmentin-Ojha 11, 146
Comaroff 134
Comaroff and Comaroff 136
Comparative Science of Cultures 1, 2
Conceptual transplants 71, 72, 77, 79, 86,
Index
98, 100, 101

Conlon 327
Conn 134
Conscience
mechanism of conversion 90, 300
Constituent Assembly Debates 6, 28, 71,
86, 99, 122
Conversion (Christian theology) 207260
and freedom 305
and Gods law 266, 285
and Gods Word 282, 285
as Christian life process 207260
as Gods intervention 28, 272
as instantaneous and gradual 219, 317
as life-long 278
as new life 276
as penance 209, 264
as spiritual change 267
as turning towards God 216
different from ancient religion 213
law and gospel 281
monastic conversion and medieval
church 210
of society 308
problems of Pauline model 209, 210
Conversion (Indian debate)
and caste 139
as attack on Hindu traditions and culture 11, 17
as Christian duty 13, 29, 193, 194
as force, fraud and inducement 19, 28,
88, 89, 93, 120, 122
as inalienable human right 87, 88, 96,
100
as reconversion to Hinduism 10, 116,
121
as social disruption 45
as socio-political protest 15, 137, 146
as universal predicament 173, 204
as violence 17, 30
different meanings 92, 100, 114, 124
in the social sciences 133, 133170
Index
of minors 87, 89, 92, 93

to Buddhism 10
to Islam 10
Conversion in Sri Lanka 11
Copland 80, 326, 327, 349, 350
Copley 33, 136
Cossman 77
Cotterrell 78
Craufurd 192
D
Dalits 15, 16, 138, 158
as converts 124, 138, 142
Harijans (Gandhi) 56, 57
Dalmia 3, 115
Dandekar 175
Derde 329
De Roover 3, 31, 79, 130, 148, 189, 329,
377, 378
Devadason 107131, 108131
Devos 150
Devotio Moderna 209
Dhavan 111
Di Nobili 149
Dow 191, 192
Downs 146
DSouza 15
DSouza, Rev. Jerome 90
Dube and Dube 154, 155, 157
Duff 340380, 367380, 371380,
372380, 373380, 377380
Duffy 277
Dwij 344, 368, 369
E
East India Company 191, 197, 326, 329
Eaton 146, 161, 163
Ebner 212
Eire 231, 241, 242, 243, 244, 265
Embree 73
Engineer 158
461
Erasmus 241, 242
F
Farel 242
Fenech 154, 157
Fernandes 136, 137
Finn 134
Fiske 340380, 364380, 366380
Fitzgerald 10
Fletcher 134
Forrester 137, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146
Freedom of religion 9, 82, 83, 97
as freedom from conversion 95, 105
131, 205
as freedom to convert 15, 87, 90,
104131, 108, 204
as inalienable right 16, 91, 112
as pragmatic recognition of minority
demand 92, 99
different interpretations 4, 112
its origin in Christian liberty 91, 205
Frykenberg 3, 115, 136, 137, 164, 325
G
Gaborieau 11, 146
Gandhi iii, 6, 10, 19, 28, 33-70, 100, 105,
108, 124, 125, 126, 167, 176, 195,
199, 200, 201, 362
and Christian missionaries 36, 38, 40,
51, 52, 62
and equality of religions 43, 47, 68
and the discussion on fellowship 47
characteristics of traditions 40, 61-64
conversion and non-violence 53
conversion and satyagraha 52, 53, 64
conversion into a religion 58
conversion of a religion/tradition 38,
44, 58
equality as functional symmetry 64, 67
his support to anti-conversion laws 49,
63
Index
462
moral considerations to change ones

tradition 49
on Christianity 37, 199, 200
on self-propelling nature of religion 56,
59, 66
on shuddhi 42
on truth of religions 48, 50, 51, 67
on untouchability 54, 57, 60
prima facie inconsistencies 34
semantic and conceptual distortions in
his thought 34, 35, 36, 64
swadeshi and conversion 36, 38
why read him in English 35
Gelders 329
Gibbon 93
Gillespie 134
Giordan 134
Goertz 220
Gogerly 193
Gokhale 10, 137, 140
Golwalkar 77
Goodman 134
Gopal 77
Grafe 191, 325
Graham 29, 243
Grant 187, 253, 270, 303, 329, 330, 331,
332, 333, 334, 335, 338, 339, 340,
342
Gregorian Reform 215
Gregory VII 216
Grimm 253
Griswold 195
Guder 134
H
Hackett 134
Halbertal and Margalit 230
Halhed 332
Hardiman 11, 146, 157
Harding 136, 137, 144, 145, 146
Harnack 212
Harran 210, 211, 263, 281, 286, 299
Hawkins 134
Hefner 134
Heimsath 146
Hendrix 257, 258
Heredia 136, 137
Hindmarsh 134
Hindsley 209, 212
Hinduism
and the caste system 16, 54, 142, 143,
151, 334, 340380
as false religion 29, 191, 193, 194,
328342, 368374
as immoral 337
as non-proselytizing 18, 37, 191, 192
as religion? 115, 175
as western creation 189
Hindu-Christian dialogue 39, 328, 343
Hindu law 332, 333, 338, 339
includes Buddhism, Jainism and
Sikhism? 115, 124
Hindutva 117
as Hindu nationalism 12, 21, 44, 95
Hobbs, Rev. S. 353
Holwell 192
Hopkins 194, 195
Horton 134, 136, 159, 160, 162, 163
Houtart 137
Husain 84, 95
I
Ibbetson 342380
Idolatry 190
as human self-righteousness 241
Christian understanding of 191
following human laws in spiritual matters 225, 243
its ceremonies 336
obstruction to conversion 340
pagan misunderstanding of 186
Imperialism of categories 78
Ismail 81, 83
Iyer 34, 68
Index
Iype 14
J
Jaffrelot 10, 11
Jagat Narain Lal 94
Jahangir 9
James, William 136
Jayakumar 137
Jayalalitha 13
Jenkins 111, 136
Jha 80
John Paul II 13, 203
Jones 146
Jordens 11, 33, 34, 68
Joshi 103
Joshua Project 23
K
Kalam 10
Kamath 85
Kapur 77
Keppens 3, 31, 189
Khilnani 75
Kim 50, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106, 107, 136,
137, 164, 165, 166, 167, 203
Knott 175
Kolb 234, 235, 240, 243, 251, 252
Kooiman 137, 146
Kowalski 262
Kreider 134
Kuhn 171
L
Lamb 134, 136, 153
Lamb and Bryant 134
Lauterbach 244
Legal transplant 78
Leo X 279
Liebeschuetz 180
Lindberg 253, 254, 265
Little 214
463
Locke 38
Lord Stanley 375380
Luther 221-230, 236-237, 241-246, 253,
254, 258, 263-267, 271-273, 277286, 299-302, 305-306, 309, 317,
330
on baptism 317
on Christian freedom 226, 267, 305, 306
on clergy/laity distinction 245
on conscience 300, 301
on Gods revelation 272
on his conversion experience 263
on human additions 237
on monasticism 244, 245
on papacy 231
on priesthood 235
on primitive church 230
on Roman hierarchy 225, 226, 228
on simul iustus et peccator 280
on theology of satisfaction 230
on things indifferent 242
on true church 238
M
Macmullen 180
Madan 31, 113
Manickam 111, 137, 146
Masuzawa 189
Mathew 10
Matthews 11
Maulana Hasrat Mohani 83
McKee 238, 239, 252, 270, 271
Meenakshipuram 10, 24, 158
Melanchthon 221, 227, 234, 243, 254,
263, 274, 280, 286, 287, 288, 290,
292, 293
on Christian freedom 233, 307, 308
on conscience 303, 304
on corruption of religion 227
on human sinfulness 228, 268
on human traditions 232
on justification by faith alone 291
Index
464
on monasticism 250
on Roman hierarchy 227, 232
on scholasticism 227, 273, 274
on theology of satisfaction 233
Menon 80, 158
Mentzer 243
Mill 329, 330, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339,
340, 342
Miller 10
Minucius Felix 186
Mirabai 46
Mitra 146
Mora Bhatta Dandekara 349, 350, 358,
359, 361, 362, 363
Morris, C. 214, 215, 350
Morris, J.B. 351
Morrison 134, 209, 211, 212, 213
Mott 55, 59
Muir, E. 232
Muir, J. 197, 198, 325, 345, 346, 347, 348,
350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356,
360, 361, 365, 370
Muldoon 134, 209, 210, 258
Mullens 350, 360, 361
Mundy 350, 351, 356
Munshi 82, 83, 87
Murdoch 63, 350, 356, 367, 376
Muslim League 80, 94
Muslim personal law 83, 84
Muth 181
Mutua 206
N
Nandy 31, 72, 73, 78, 113, 114
Navayana Diksha 138
Nehru, Jawaharlal 15, 86
Neill 136
Nepal, Constitution of 203
Newman, John Henry 138
Nichols-Roy, Rev. J.J.M. 89, 90
Nilakantha Goreh 198, 344, 359
Nischan 243
Niyogi Report 103, 109, 110

Nock 134, 135, 136, 159, 160, 180, 212
O
Oddie 3, 115, 136, 137, 146, 151, 152,
159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 167, 189
OHanlon 146, 349
Oommen 33, 146
Oriental despotism 331, 339
Origen iii, 184, 185, 186, 187
Owens 11, 111, 136
Ozment 253, 254, 306
P
Padmanji 341380, 350380
Parekh 34, 171
Parel 33, 34, 35
Pauck 309
Pelagianism 228
Pennington 3, 115, 189
Perera 11
Periyar 15
Phule 15, 152
Pltshau 325
Pollmann 261, 262
Porter 326
Propagation 87
Protestant Reformation 79
against corruption of religion 221, 225
against hierarchy 229
against human additions 230, 234,
241244
against monasticism 244
against priesthood 209, 228
and the clergy/laity distinction 235
and the numero-merito problem
207260, 262
and the problem of spiritual authority
237
as Christianization 257, 258
Index
as monasticization of daily life 207-324

as universalization of conversio 220
its notion of faith 290
on Gods sovereignty 343
on human works 240, 247
on role of Christ 296
Q
Queen 10
R
Radhakrishnan, S. 202
Raghavendra 112
Rajnath Singh 13
Ramakrishna 201
Raman 140
Rambo 134, 135, 136, 162, 170
Ray 104131, 107131, 108
Reardon 253, 254
Religion
and truth predicates 174, 187, 222
conceptual confusion about 84, 85, 102,
112, 115, 156
different meanings 79
religious rivalry 173, 175
universality of 173, 174, 175, 189
Rice Christians 137
Riley 134
Rizvi 10
Robinson 136, 137, 153, 154, 155
Rule of St. Benedict 211, 214, 215
Russell and Lal 342380
S
Sangh Parivar 23
Sarkar 75, 158
Scribner 240, 262
Sears McGee 264
Secular education (in British India)
325380
and Hindu reform 375377
465
as diffusion of English science and

values 370
creates problem of scepticism, atheism
and immorality 375380
creating the conditions of conversion
365-378
Secularism
and anti-conversion legislation 109
as equality of religions 74, 107131,
112, 124
as Hindu secularism 77
as pseudo-secularism 77
as state neutrality 80, 110
conceptual confusion about 84, 85, 102,
112
Indian secularism 76, 102
liberal secularism 73, 74, 114
Secularism vs. Hindutva 6, 21, 22, 25, 28,
29, 30
as explanatory framework 21-23
conceptual problems of the framework
117
Seervai 108, 109
Serampore mission 325
Seshagiri Rao 33, 34
Seth 368
Shah 78
Shah Bano 80
Shastree 10
Shraddhananda 44
shuddhi 10, 42, 43, 44, 45, 121
Singh 13, 34, 80, 137, 325
Singh and Singh 34
Skinner 77
Smith, G. (Bishop of Victoria) 353
Smith, W. 368
Somanatha 198
Spinner-Halev 171
Srikanth 77
Srinivas 17, 18, 19
Staines 29
Index
466
Stanislaus vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

104131, 106131, 107131,
109131
Stanley, B. 13, 50, 195, 326
Stanley Jones 50, 195
Stietencron 3, 115
Stromberg 134
Sugirtharajah 3, 115
Swami Dayananda Saraswati (contemporary) 17, 203
Swarup 136
T
tabligh 42, 44, 45
Tandon 91, 92, 93, 94
Tartakov 10, 138
Tejani 75
Tellenbach 216
Tertullian 180
Tidrick 34
Tone 193
Tradition
and its antiquity 196
and religious rivalry 176, 197
and truth predicates 65, 127, 176, 180,
196
as action heuristics 66
as corruption of religion 221
its blindness to religion 195
its characteristics 125, 126
vs. religion 64, 123, 125, 127, 171, 188
Turkpunchanun, H. 346
Venkatesan 108, 111

VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) 112, 113,
158
Viswanathan 3, 115, 136, 137, 138
Vivekananda 201
Vyas 158
W
Wanegffelen 261, 262
Watson 52, 78
Webster 72, 75, 137, 145
Western cultural experience 188
as constraint on theory formation 1
Western descriptions of India and Hinduism 41, 148, 329
as reflection on cultural experience 2,
150, 342
Why I am a Hindu 39
Wiedemann 180
Wilken 180
Wilson 349, 350, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360,
361, 362, 363
Wright 10
X
Xavier, Saint Francis 325380, 328380
Y
Young 38, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51,
53, 54, 55, 198, 327, 344, 347, 348,
364, 365
Z
U
Uniform civil code 71, 81, 82, 84
V
van der Veer 134, 136, 370
Zell, K.S. 221, 238, 239, 252, 266, 269,

270, 271, 303
Ziegenbalg, B. 190, 191, 196, 197, 202,
325
Zwingli, H. 221, 242, 254, 309

Claerhout Doctoral Dissertation

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FACULTEIT LETTEREN EN WIJSBEGEERTE

Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het verkrijgen van de graad van doctor

Promotor: Prof. Dr. Balagangadhara Rao

Chapter 1: The Debate on Religious Conversion in India

1.1. Populist Preachers and Pedantic Teachers

1.2. The Secularism vs. Hindutva Framework

1.3. Clusters of Concerns

Chapter 2: Gandhi, Conversion and the Equality of Religions:

2.1. Making Sense of Gandhi

2.2. What does India need: Tradition or conversion?

2.3. Equality of Religions or Functional Symmetry?

Chapter 3: Conversion, Religious Freedom and Secularism

3.1. Conceptual Transplants

3.2. Secularism and Religious Freedom

3.3. Conversion: From Incomprehension to Irritation

3.4. Conversion and Conceptual Transplants

Chapter 4: Conversion Legislation in India:

4.1. Propagation as Transmission

4.2. Conversion and the Secular State in India

4.3. Force, Fraud, Inducement

4.4. Conclusion: Clarifying Confusion

Chapter 5: The Impossibility of

5.1. The Sciences of Conversion?

5.2. The Universal Predicament of Conversion

5.3. Conclusion: The Conceptual Limits of Change

Chapter 6: Two Worlds of Conversion

6.1. Premises of the Two Worlds

6.2. Ancient Foundations of the Two Worlds

6.3. Two Worlds between Europe and India

Chapter 7: The Protestant Reformation and

7.1. Conversion before the Reformation

7.2. Human Sin and the Corruption of Religion

7.3. The Evil Hierarchy of Popes, Priests and Monks

Chapter 8: Conversion and the Creation of True Christians

8.1. Approximations of Conversion

8.2. Conclusion: Post Tenebras Lux

Chapter 9: Creating the Conditions of Conversion: Secular Education,

9.1. Will the True Heathen Please Stand Up?

9.2. Khrishtadharma for the Christians

9.3. The earth is either, or is not, an immense plain...

Chapter 10: Conclusion

development of scientific research is difficult to pinpoint, but I am certain of one

Apology of the Augsburg Confession

Bharatiya Janata Party

The Ante-Nicene Fathers

Augsburg Confession (Confessio Augustana)

The Complete Works of Mahatma Gandhi

De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), by Cicero

Institutio Christianae Religionis, by John Calvin

Loci 1521 Loci Communes Theologici, by Philipp Melanchthon

Niyogi Committee Report

National Commission for Minorities

De Regno Christi, by Martin Bucer

Selected Writings of Martin Luther, by T.G. Tappert

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council

USCIRF United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

On this problem, see especially Balagangadhara, Bloch and De Roover (2008).

Theme of the Dissertation

dynamic of religion, conversion and secularization,3 has impacted on a completely

Structure of the Dissertation

was propelled by the universalization of the individual process of conversion. The

The Debate on Religious Conversion in India

contemporary re-conversion attempts and movements of some Hindu nationalist