Krishna Menon

KRISHNA MENON
SELECTED SPEECHES BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS -

IV
DECOLONISATION, PEACE AND THE

UNITED NATIONS
Edited by
E. S. REDDY
A. K. DAMODARAN
Issued under the auspices of

KRISHNA MENON NATIONAL MEMORIAL COMMITTEE
In association with
SANCHAR PUBLISHING HOUSE
NEW DELHI
1997
INTRODUCTION
Krishna Menon’s association with the United Nations as India’s major
representative was continuous for about ten years, from 1952 to 1962. Earlier he
was High Commissioner in London and after 1962 his official association with
the Government ended. Very much earlier, at the first session of the General
Assembly in 1946, he took some part. The core of his achievement was, however,
during the 1950s, when he was the best known spokesman not only of India but
also the newly independent countries and of the few Afro-Asian countries who
were members of the World Organisation.
This fourth and final volume of Krishna Menon’s speeches in the General
Assembly and the Security Council consists mostly of India’s reactions to major
world developments in a decade of significant transformation in the global
community both at the macro and the micro levels. The earlier volumes, it will be
recalled, dealt with (1) India’s official foreign policy statements in the United
Nations at the beginning of each session; (2) India’s arguments on the Kashmir
question; and (3) India’s views on disarmament. This volume deals with a variety
of subjects primarily connected with the post-colonial phase. It is not an entirely
representative collection because there were many subjects on which important
speeches were made by other members of the delegation. Of Krishna Menon’s
own speeches, only a small selection was possible. But they do provide the
substance and flavour of that first famous period of the United Nations when half
of the world became free and in Africa there were some agonising moments
before the moment of fulfilment. Not all these features are, however, purely
reactive in content. On some important world issues India took major initiatives
and contributed a little towards the resolution of very difficult problems in that
first frigid period of the ideological confrontation. It would be useful in these
preliminary remarks to make a quick survey of these major issues on which
Krishna Menon spoke.
The Indian contribution towards the tragic process of the colonial war in Algeria
was primarily one of moderation and persuasion. Krishna Menon’s speeches show
understanding of the French problem and try to take full advantage of the change
in situation since De Gaulle came to power in 1958. There was, of course, never
any question regarding the ultimate aim or about the total sovereignty of the
Algerian people. The favourite argument of France and Portugal against
decolonisation was based upon the notion that these overseas colonies were parts
of the metropolitan country and any change in their status would be an
interference in the domestic jurisdiction. This was also the position of Portugal
about its colonies. Krishna Menon never accepts this argument. He notices that
the De Gaulle Constitution made an important change from the earlier model. It
was a constitution not of the French people but of people in general. This was the
basis of Menon’s argument on behalf of the Algerians: “In all colonies
sovereignty remains vested in the people.” In an ironical reference to the imperial
position he says that “the worst freedom would be freedom from facts.” This
speech was made in 1958 and freedom finally came to the North African nation in
1961. For about ten years India had a patient dialogue with France on many
subjects, agreeing to disagree on disarmament and decolonisation.
The discussion on Cyprus mainly centred on the colonial power, Britain, and the
two neighbouring States, Greece and Turkey, engaging themselves in a diplomatic
dialogue in which the people of Cyprus were absent. Krishna Menon gives
primary importance to the Cypriot people and their national identity. Partition was
out of the question. Unfortunately, however, long after these discussions took
place and Cyprus became independent, there was again division in the island due
to the unresolved nature of the ethnic problem. Cyprus remains a supreme
example of both the success and the failure of the United Nations. Since 1974,
physical conflicts have been reduced to the minimum but the de facto partition
remains. One of the most interesting aspects of these speeches is the manner in
which many fond hopes were later realised but sometimes frustrated during the
coming three decades.
An aspect of Menon’s speeches on colonialism is the inevitable context in which

he goes back to the Indian experience. In making a general exposition on the
declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples he makes a
powerful statement about nationalism being the cause, the soul of empire and,
also, the mainspring of the resistance to it. The specific characteristics of the
Indian national movement are always brought to the attention of the world
audience in their relevance to contemporary issues. He makes important
formulations on non-violence as the only possible method of social and political
mobilisation for colonial people. He is severely critical of terrorism and violence
in the Indian national movement. “There is no shortcut”, he says, “to freedom.”
One of the more attractive facets of Krishna Menon’s specific brand of
progressive nationalism is the manner in which he was influenced by Gandhi.
This quality he shares with Nehru. This is, however, not so well known.
Other colonial problems discussed in these speeches are the future of South West
Africa and the resolution of the problem about West Irian. The discussions on
Namibia are of primary interest today as examples of Menon's careful preparation
of his brief on difficult subjects. The problem created by the changeover from the
League of Nations to the United Nations in the Mandated Territories is discussed
with scrupulous care with regard to international law. It also provides examples of
Menon, the diplomat, being generous in his compliments to General Smuts, the
South African statesman. There is very little personal rancour here in spite of the
wide political differences. “South Africans and we are probably the most patient
people in the world in regard to negotiations,” he says in an obvious reference to
Gandhi’s prolonged interaction with the South African Government and with
Marshal Smuts personally.
The importance of the small States in the future world set-up is something which
occupies Menon’s attention all the time. No area is too small to be a State,
according to Menon. Iceland is already there and there will be many like it. At the
same time he is extremely clear about the limitations of self-determination in a
part of a larger State. “There cannot be self-determination with regard to territory
that is already sovereign. If that were so, many countries - and I shall not mention
them - around this table would suffer disintegration today.” These are basic
formulations in which India’s own vital national interest is never far from
Menon’s mind.
The speeches on the Chinese representation in the United Nations are important
formulations of the well-known Nehru policy. Throughout the 1950s India was
consistently arguing for the Chinese presence in the United Nations. Towards the
end of the 1950s came the problems about Tibet and the border. Menon does not
gloss over these realities but refuses to be persuaded to give up the earlier policy
of supporting Chinese membership of the U.N.
Three major world problems are also discussed in these speeches - the Congo,
Suez, and Hungary. Both on the Congo question and on Suez, India had a great
deal to contribute and Menon’s speeches indicate this. The Suez interventions are
of particular interest because they synchronise with Menon’s successful
diplomacy outside the United Nations in London and elsewhere. Looking back
with the advantage of new perceptions after almost forty years, the interesting
thing is the moderation with which Menon put forward the anti-colonial position
without leaving behind any permanent hostility. Both Britain and France were
criticised but in a gentle tone. The Hungary episode produced some well-known
embarrassments. There is, however, no attempt to fudge the issue. Menon makes
it clear that the very first resolution criticising the Soviet military action contained
some objectionable formulations which made it impossible for India to vote for
the resolution. Abstention was the only possible option. However, in all the
speeches there is no self-censorship in criticising the military occupation of a
sovereign member of the United Nations by other member States. Menon quotes
Nehru again on this subject: “We are not neutral where human freedom is
concerned.” Another important aspect of India’s diplomatic initiatives on this
problem has to be noted. It is always a multi-nation initiative along with Burma,
Indonesia and Ceylon. It was group diplomacy at its most effective. Nothing very
much was achieved. It was a major world issue in which a new middle power had
very little of substance to contribute, but on basic issues of sovereignty and
freedom, the Indian position was articulated again and again with no special
concern for the sensitivities in Moscow. “The position that a great uprising of a
people, whether bad or good elements enter into it, whether it takes some ugly
turn or not, can ever be suppressed by force of arms, that, in our view, is
fallacious. What is more, our people have been very much moved lately by the
kind of resistance without arms that is arising in Hungary, because it strikes a
chord of remembrance in our own hearts when a great and powerful Empire
refused to listen to the voice of reason, because our people said: ‘No.’”
India’s participation in the Korean episode is well known. The speeches in this
volume deal only with the later developments, particularly the problems
concerning the repatriation of prisoners. India’s attitude towards China is brought
out in all its understanding and friendliness on many occasions. India was a
natural mediator in Asian problems like Indo-China and Korea. In a significant
phrase reminding us of Nehru’s speech in the Asian Relations Conference in
1947, Menon sees India as situated “between two continents.”
There are some interesting nuances in the 1957 speech on the peaceful
coexistence of States. The formulation of the Panch Sheel principle is seen as a
parallel development. Menon is quite detached about the question whether the
India-China formulation was original or creative. It was just an inevitable
development in the post-colonial situation which traced its roots to the colonial
period. In fact, Menon traces the various formulations on non-interference and
equality in relations between nations to the United States’ pronouncement on 26
November 1941, just two weeks before Pearl Harbor. The only addition because
of the cold war on external interventions in the domestic affairs of States is the
inclusion of the ideological concept in addition to the familiar economic and
political areas. Menon points out that this was the formulation first made in the
statement after Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to Moscow in 1955.
Towards the end of Menon’s association with the United Nations, the India-China
border problem came to the fore. There are some important speeches in this
volume on the Tibetan question after Dalai Lama’s arrival in India in 1959. He
goes into the history of the Sino-Tibetan relationship and makes careful
distinctions between the ideas of “effective” suzerainty and “conditional”
suzerainty. He makes it clear to the world audience that in spite of the Tibetan
irritation and the violation of India’s borders by China, there would be no
difference to the position which obtained under the 1954 Agreement on Tibet.
There is always the sad wistful hope that the Dalai Lama would be finally
able to return to the country.
There is one other facet of the speeches which Menon made towards the very end
of his association with the U.N. in the early 1960s. As Minister of Defence he was
associated very much in the Goa developments. In fact, there are two speeches
here made only a few weeks before the liberation of Goa which carefully
articulate India’s position. Menon makes it abundantly clear that India had not
given up the use of force as far as the problem of colonialism was concerned. On
13 November 1961 he talks generally about the use of force in international
relations when necessary alluding to Kashmir, the China frontier problem and to
Goa. One week later in the general statement on the independence of colonial
countries, Menon specifically mentions Goa and Portugal again and clearly
refuses to abjure the use of force.
There are several other important speeches in this compilation which bring out
India’s policy on several matters like the membership of the United Nations, the
problems faced by American officials in the U.N. Secretariat in the period of
McCarthyism and the economic development of underdeveloped countries. We
get here the earliest foreshadowings of the North-South divide. The peaceful uses
of atomic energy are discussed along with the establishment of the IAEA and the
crucial role played by India as a country and Dr. Bhabha personally in that major
episode in the mid-1950s. Connected with these subjects is the problem of the
dangers of radiation as a consequence of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This
is different from the other major question of the consequences of atmospheric
nuclear tests discussed in the volume on Disarmament.
It was, on the whole, a long and fruitful association. The participation by Menon
in almost all the important debates in the U.N. for ten years is significant. It is a
matter of interesting historical detail that the earliest speech, perhaps, made by
Menon in the U.N. was on the status of post-war Spain in the world body on 12
December 1946. It is a good speech full of nostalgic pride about his and his peer
group’s excitement about the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s. On 21
September 1962, after sixteen years, he made a brief intervention - also included
in this volume - welcoming the successful resolution of the dispute between the
Netherlands and Indonesia on the West Irian problem.
This fourth volume in the project initiated by Mr. E.S. Reddy and carried out by
the Krishna Menon Memorial Society, completes the present series. Outside this
enterprise, also initiated by Mr. Reddy, is the volume of the Indian diplomat’s
speeches in the U.N. on South Africa. Perhaps, there are one or two more volumes
to be prepared in the future consisting of Menon’s interventions in the Indian
Parliament. It is on the whole a remarkable corpus which perpetuates the memory
of two men and a nation in an important transitional epoch in post-war history.
A.K. Damodaran
New Delhi
1 August 1996
CONTENTS1
PART I
COLONIALISM
[Note: Statements marked with an asterisk are summaries of statements from the
United Nations official records.]
ALGERIA
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 4, 1957
Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, December

13, 1958
CYPRUS
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 24, 1954
*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, February 22, 1957
Second statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, February 22,
1957
Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, December

2, 1958
DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO

COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, December 13, 1960
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, November 20, 1961
PORTUGUESE COLONIES
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, November 13, 1961
1
The statements marked with an asterisk are summaries in official records of the United Nations.
SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)
*Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, November 12,

1953
*Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, December 19,

1956
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, October 13, 1958
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, October 23, 1959
TOGOLAND UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
WEST IRIAN
*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 29, 1954
*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, February 27, 1957
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 26, 1957
PART II
POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS2
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
2
The statements of Mr. Menon on people of Indian origin in South Africa, and apartheid in South
Africa, are published in a separate volume.
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, October 3, 1960
THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, April 5, 1961
AGGRESSION AGAINST EGYPT BY FRANCE, THE UNITED

KINGDOM AND ISRAEL IN 1956
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, February 2, 1957
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, March 1, 1957
THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY
KOREA
*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 1, 1952
Statement in the Plenary meeting of the General Assembly, December 21, 1952
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, August 28, 1953
*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 7, 1954

*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, January 7, 1957
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 15, 1957
PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF STATES
FRANCO SPAIN
TIBET
PART III
OTHER MATTERS
ATOMIC ENERGY
(A) INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN DEVELOPING THE

PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 25, 1955
(B) EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION
*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 31, 1955
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
*Statement in the Second Committee of the General Assembly, November 6,

1959
UNITED NATIONS
(A) AMENDMENT OF CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
(B) PERSONNEL POLICY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(C) TRIBUTE TO DAG HAMMARSKJOLD
(D) WELCOME TO NEW MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1. Malaya
2. Guinea
3. Thirteen African States and Cyprus
4. Senegal and Mali
5. Nigeria

INTRODUCTION
Krishna Menon’s association with the United Nations as India’s major
representative was continuous for about ten years, from 1952 to 1962. Earlier he
was High Commissioner in London and after 1962 his official association with
the Government ended. Very much earlier, during the San Francisco Conference
of the United Nations, he took some part. The, core of his achievement was,
however, during the 1950s, when he was the best known spokesman not only of
India but also the newly independent countries and of the few Afro-Asian
countries who were members of the World Organisation.
This fourth and final volume of Krishna Menon’s speeches in the General
Assembly or in the Security Council consists mostly of India’s reactions to major
world developments in a decade of significant transformation in the global
community both at the macro and the micro levels. The earlier volumes, it will be
recalled, dealt with (1) India’s official foreign policy statements in the United
Nations at the beginning of each session; (2) India’s arguments on the Kashmir
question; and (3) India’s views on disarmament. This volume deals with a variety
of subjects primarily connected with the post-colonial phase. It is not an entirely
representative collection because there were many subjects on which important
speeches were made by other members of the delegation. Of Krishna Menon’s
own speeches, only a small selection was possible. But they do provide the
substance and flavour of that first famous period of the United Nations when half
of the world became free in Africa and there were some agonising moments
before the moment of fulfilment. Not all these features are, however, purely
reactive in content. On some important world issues India took major initiatives
and contributed a little towards the resolution of very difficult problems in that
first frigid period of the ideological confrontation. It would be useful in these
preliminary remarks to make a quick survey of these major issues on which
Krishna Menon spoke.
The Indian contribution towards the tragic process of the colonial war in Algeria
was primarily one of moderation and persuasion. Krishna Menon’s speeches show
understanding of the French problem and try to take full advantage of the change
in situation since De Gaulle came to power in 1958. There was, of course, never
any question regarding the ultimate aim or about the total sovereignty of the
Algerian people. The favourite argument of France and Portugal against
decolonisation was based upon the notion that these overseas colonies were parts
of the metropolitan country and any change in their status would be an
interference in the domestic jurisdiction. This was also the position of Portugal
about its colonies. Krishna Menon never accepts this argument. He notices that
the De Gaulle Constitution made an important change from the earlier model It
was a constitution not of the French people but of people in general. This was the
basis of Menon’s argument on behalf of the Algerians: “In all colonies
sovereignty remains vested in the people”. In an ironical reference to the imperial
position he says that “the worst freedom would be freedom from facts”. This
speech was made in 1958 and freedom finally came to the North African nation in
1961. For about ten years India had a patient dialogue with France on many
subjects, agreeing to disagree on disarmament and decolonisation.
The discussion on Cyprus mainly centred on the colonial power, Britain, and the
two neighbouring States, Greece and Turkey, engaging themselves in a diplomatic
dialogue in which the people of Cyprus were absent. Krishna Menon gives
primary importance to the Cypriot people and their national identity. Partition was
out of the question. Unfortunately, however, long after these discussions took
place and Cyprus became independent, there was again division in the Island due
to the unresolved nature of the ethnic problem Cyprus remains a supreme example
of both the success and the failure of the United Nations. Since 1974, physical
conflicts have been reduced to the minimum but the de facto partition remains.
One of the most interesting aspects of these speeches is the manner in which
many fond hopes were later realised but sometimes frustrated during the coming
three decades.
An aspect of Menon’s speeches on colonialism is the inevitable context in which

he goes back to the Indian experience. In making a general exposition on the
declaration of the granting of independence to colonial peoples he makes a
powerful statement about nationalism being the cause, the soul of empire and,
also, the mainspring of the resistance to it. The specific characteristics of the
Indian national movement are always brought to the attention of the world
audience in their relevance to contemporary issues. He makes important
formulations on non-violence as the only possible method of social and political
mobilisation for colonial people. He is severely critical of terrorism and violence
in the Indian national movement. “There is no shortcut”, he says, “to freedom”.
One of the more attractive facets of Krishna Menon’s specific brand of
progressive nationalism is the manner in which he was influenced by Gandhi.
This quality he shares with Nehru. This is, however, not so well known.
Other colonial problems discussed in these speeches are the future of South West
Africa and the resolution of the problem about West Irian. The discussions on
Namibia are of primary interest today as examples of Menon's careful preparation
of his brief on difficult subjects. The problem created by the changeover from the
League of Nations to the United Nations in the Mandated Territories is discussed
with scrupulous care with regard to international law. It also provides examples of
Menon, the diplomat, being generous in his compliments to General Smuts, the
South African statesman. There is very little personal rancour here in spite of the
wide political differences. “South Africans and we are probably the most patient
people in the world in regard to negotiations,” he says in an obvious reference to
Gandhi’s prolonged interaction with the South African Government and with
Marshal Smuts personally.
The importance of the small State in the future world set-up is something which
occupies Menon’s attention all the time. No area is too small to be a State,
according to Menon. Iceland is already there and there will be many like it. At the
same time he is extremely clear about the limitations of self-determination in a
part of a larger State. “There cannot be self-determination with regard to territory
that is already sovereign. If that were so, many countries - and I shall not mention
them - around this table would suffer disintegration today.” These are basic
formulations in which India’s own vital national interest is never far from
Menon’s mind.
The speeches on the Chinese representation in the United Nations are important
formulations of the well-known Nehru policy. Throughout the 1950s India was
consistently arguing for the Chinese presence in the United Nations. Towards the
end of the 1950s came the problems about Tibet and the border. Menon does not
gloss over these realities but refuses to be persuaded to give up the earlier policy
of supporting Chinese membership of the U.N.
Three major world problems are also discussed in these speeches - the Congo,
Suez, and Hungary. Both on the Congo question and on Suez, India had a great
deal to contribute and Menon’s speeches indicate this. The Suez interventions are
of particular interest because they synchronise with Menon’s successful
diplomacy outside the United Nations in London and elsewhere. Looking back
with the advantages of new perceptions after almost forty years, the interesting
thing is the moderation with which Menon put forward the anti-colonial position
without leaving behind any permanent hostility. Both Britain and France were
criticised but in a gentle tone. The Hungary episode produced some well-known
embarrassments. There is, however, no attempt to fudge the issue. Menon makes
it clear that the very first resolution criticising the Soviet military action contained
some objectionable formulations which made it impossible for India to vote for
the resolution. Abstention was the only possible option. However, in all the
speeches there is no self-censorship in criticising the military occupation of a
sovereign member of the United Nations by other member States. Menon quotes
Nehru again on this subject: “We are not neutral where human freedom is
concerned”. Another important aspect of India’s diplomatic initiatives on this
problem has to be noted. It is always a multi-nation initiative along with Burma,
Indonesia and Ceylon. It was group diplomacy at its most effective. Nothing very
much was achieved. It was a major world issue in which a new middle power had
very little of substance to contribute, but on basic issues of sovereignty and
freedom, the Indian position was articulated again and again with no special
concern for the sensitivities in Moscow. “The position that a great uprising of a
people, whether bad or good elements enter into it, whether it takes some ugly
turn or not, can ever be suppressed by force of arms, that, in our view, is
fallacious. What is more, our people have been very much moved lately by the
kind of resistance without arms that is arising in Hungary, because it strikes a
chord of remembrance in our own hearts when a great and powerful Empire
refused to listen to the voice of reason, because our people said: ‘No’.”
India’s participation in the Korean episode is well known. The speeches in this
volume deal only with the later developments, particularly the problems
concerning the repatriation of prisoners. India’s attitude towards China is brought
out in all its understanding and friendliness on many occasions. India was a
natural mediator in Asian problems like Indo-China and Korea. In a significant
phrase reminding us of Nehru’s speech in the Asian Relations Conference in
1947, Menon sees India as situated “between two continents”.
There are some interesting nuances in the 1957 speech on the peaceful
coexistence of States. The formulation of the Panch Sheel principle is seen as a
parallel development. Menon is quite detached about the question whether the
India-China formulation was original or creative. It was just an inevitable
development in the post-colonial situation which traced its roots to the colonial
period. In fact, Menon traces the various formulations on non-interference and
equality in relations between nations to the United States’ pronouncement on 26
November 1941, just two weeks before Pearl Harbor. The only addition because
of the cold war on external interventions in the domestic affairs of States is the
inclusion of the ideological concept in addition to the familiar economic and
political areas. Menon points out that this was the formulation first made in the
statement after Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to Moscow in 1955.
Towards the end of Menon’s association with the United Nations. the India-China
border problem came to the fore. There are some important speeches in this
volume on the Tibetan question after Dalai Lama’s arrival in India in 1959. He
goes into the history of the Sino-Tibetan relationship and makes careful
distinctions between the ideas of “effective” suzerainty and “conditional”
suzerainty. He makes it clear to the world audience that in spite of the Tibetan
irritation and the violation of India’s borders by China, there would be no
difference to the position which obtained under the 1954 Agreement on Tibet.
There is always the sad wistful hope that the Dalai Lama would be finally
able to return to the country.
There is one other facet of the speeches which Menon made towards the very end
of his association with the U.N. in the early 1960s. As Minister of Defence he was
associated very much in the Goa developments. In fact, there are two speeches
here made only a few weeks before the liberation of Goa which carefully
articulate India’s position. Menon makes it abundantly clear that India had not
given up the use of force as far as the problem of colonialism was concerned. On
13 November 1961 he talks generally about the use of force in international
relations when necessary alluding to Kashmir, the China Frontier problem and to
Goa. One week later in the general statement on the independence of colonial
countries, Menon specifically mentions Goa and Portugal again and clearly
refuses to abjure the use of force.
There are several other important speeches in this compilation which bring out
India’s policy on several matters like the membership of the United Nations, the
problems faced by American officials in the U.N. Secretariat in the period of
McCarthyism and the economic development of underdeveloped countries. We
get here the earliest foreshadowings of the North-South divide. The peaceful uses
of atomic energy are discussed along with the establishment of the IAEA and the
crucial role played by India as a country and Dr. Bhabha personally in that major
episode in the mid-1950s. Connected with these subjects is the problem of the
dangers of radiation as a consequence of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This
is different from the other major question of the consequences of atmospheric
nuclear tests discussed in the volume on Disarmament.
It was, on the whole, a long and fruitful association. The participation by Menon
in almost all the important debates in the U.N. for ten years is significant. It is a
matter of interesting historical detail that the earliest speech, perhaps, made by
Menon in the U.N. was on the status of post-war Spain in the World Body on 12
December 1946. It is a good speech full of nostalgic pride about his and his peer
group’s excitement about the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s. On 21
September 1962, after sixteen years, he made a brief intervention - also included
in this volume - welcoming the successful resolution of the dispute between the
Netherlands and Indonesia on the West Irian problem.
This fourth volume in the project initiated by Mr. E.S. Reddy and carried out by
the Krishna Menon Memorial Society, completes the present series. Outside this
enterprise, also initiated by Mr. Reddy, is the volume of the Indian diplomat’s
speeches in the U.N. on South Africa. Perhaps, there are one or two more volumes
to be prepared in the future consisting of Menon’s interventions in the Indian
Parliament. It is on the whole a remarkable corpus which perpetuates the memory
of two men and a nation in an important transitional epoch in post-war history.
A.K. Damodaran
New Delhi
1 August 1996
PART I
COLONIALISM
ALGERIA
[An armed struggle for independence was launched in Algeria in 1954 under the
leadership of the National Liberation Front (FLN). France resorted to extensive
repression and military action, with nearly half a million troops in the territory.
The colonial war resulted in enormous casualties.
The question of Algeria was included in the agenda of the General Assembly in
1955 at the request of Asian and Arab States. France boycotted the discussion,
claiming that Algeria was an integral part of France and the matter was within
the domestic jurisdiction of France under Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United
Nations. Discussion in the General Assembly was adjourned without a resolution.
As the situation deteriorated, Asian-Arab States requested the Security Council in

June 1956 to consider the situation. Following objections by France, the Council
decided by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions, not to include the matter in its agenda.
Later that year, the question of Algeria was again included in the agenda of the
General Assembly at the request of Asian-Arab States. On February 15, 1957, the
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution - 1012 (XI) - merely expressing "the
hope that, in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution will
be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the
United Nations Charter."
As this led to no negotiations and as violence increased, the Assembly considered

the matter again at its next session at the end of 1957. The following is the
statement by Mr. Menon during the debate on the item.
After discussion, the Assembly adopted a very moderate resolution - 1184(XII)

expressing the wish that pourparlers and other appropriate means would be
utilised with a view to a solution in conformity with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations Charter.]
...We are considering this matter now for the third time. Last year the Assembly
passed a unanimous resolution. It would not be right to regard that resolution as
not making a recommendation. The phraseology of the Assembly is always such
that it cannot give a mandate to any country, but the nations assembled here
expressed the hope that there would be a peaceful solution. This hope has
unfortunately not been fructified, and in this part of North Africa war still rages,
3
Source: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, December 1957
and both the French people and the Algerian people continue to suffer. It is
impossible to estimate the figures or the extent of the casualties or debts and other
hardships arising from the war. One sometimes sees phenomenal figures. But
whatever these may be, there is little doubt that this war has dragged on too long
for the conscience of the world to remain unconcerned about it...
My Government has considered the statements made by the Foreign Minister of

France. I do not propose at present to go into details about it. We stand
foursquare on the principle of national independence. We regard independence as
territorial. We do not regard national independence as limited by the bounds of
race, religion or creed. If we were to say that each racial group should have its
own national independence, then in a country like this, the United States of
America, there would be very many national States. It would not be quite
practicable; it would be running all over the country.
The main reason for my intervention in this debate is to express the hope that
between now and the time of the resolution stage it will be possible for us to come
to a unanimous decision as we did last year, which I must frankly confess will not
solve the Algerian question at this Assembly; nobody expects it to do so. But at
any rate it would not aggravate the situation. It would lead to the furtherance of
negotiations. It is essential, if we are to do that, that there must be a certain
amount of give and take. There can be no give on the side of the people who
want independence and as far as the principle of national independence is
concerned. But there can be and there will be the desire to achieve that by
methods of discussion, or whatever word is used for it...
I am purposely refraining from entering into details, except to make it quite clear
that our people and Government will at no time make any compromises in regard
to the independence of colonial peoples. And neither any definition of the Charter
nor any legal interpretations can argue people into dependence. We also think, in
the background of our experience, that once that independence is gained, co-
operation between former rulers and former colonials, on a basis of equality and
mutual respect, is possible. But it is possible only if that co-operation comes by
free will from both sides. Co-operation that is compelled still spells domination.
We have a great deal of trust in the wisdom of France and also in the good sense
of the peoples of Algeria and their friends to hope that given a little time, even in
regard to the Assembly solution, shall we say by tomorrow, it may be possible for
us to work out an Assembly solution which would enable the discussions between
the French Government and those who can deliver the goods in Algeria to
continue.
I stated on behalf of my Government last year that Algeria means the whole of
Algeria, and we cannot escape the issue of Algerian nationalism, the rights that
arise from that, the aspirations that are there, by evading it by various phrases. It
would be impossible to think, as regards Algeria - as, I am sorry to say, appears in
the speeches of the Foreign Minister of France - that certain solutions may lead to
the partition of Algeria. When a country is partitioned, those who belong to the
country will try to unite it, unless it is a partition by agreement, as happened in
our case.
We do not try to undo the partition. But in other places partitions have come in
other ways. Thirty and 40 years have left the aftermath of it. Therefore, it is the
hope of my delegation that if at this stage it were possible for the Assembly to
come to a decision that there should be a recommendation for the continuation of
discussions, with a view to finding a solution - and such solutions, naturally, in
the modern world would have to be in the context of democratic conditions - that
would be the best way out...
We reserve our position in regard to the various matters, which we are entitled
under the rules of procedure to take up at the resolution stage and we express the
hope that the private talks that are going on and have been going on intensively
for the last forty-eight hours outside this room, between various parties, will result
in the continuation of discussions without it being vitiated by insistences that are
not necessary at present. All negotiations, all discussions are for a solution. What
should go into that solution is to be decided at the discussions. If we start arguing
the items that should go into that solution in this particular problem and at this
stage, I am afraid we shall get nowhere...
Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly,

December 13, 19584
[The question of Algeria was again considered by the General Assembly in 1958
as there was no progress in implementation of resolution 1184 (XVII). France,
which participated in the discussions at the two previous sessions of the Assembly
again boycotted the discussion in 1958.
Mr. Menon spoke in support of a draft resolution, sponsored by 17 Asian-African

States, under which the General Assembly would recognise the right of the
Algerian people to independence, and urge negotiations between the two parties
concerned to reach a solution in conformity with the United Nations Charter. The
draft was not adopted by the Assembly as it received one vote short of the
required two-thirds majority.]
My delegation, at the outset, considers it necessary to refer to the special

circumstances in which this debate takes place, and expresses its extreme regret at
the absence of the delegation of France...
4
This is not a matter between the Algerian people and France, for the situation
between the Algerian national movement and France is a matter which affects the
Assembly. That is to say, the item has been inscribed, France has taken part in
this discussion, and we are constantly told that the movement in France towards
colonial problems, and particularly in regard to Algeria, is a progressive one. Yet
we are not favoured with the participation of the one Government which can bring
this war to an end.
We say this not by way of protest, not by way of condemnation, not by way of
sitting in judgement, but as an expression of our sadness that we will not have this
participation. It would be bad enough if it were one of the eighty-one States
members of the United Nations without any particular qualifications; but here we
have one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, charged, more
than others, with world security and the maintenance of international peace, not
being able, or not willing, to assist us in these discussions...
This is all the more regrettable since there is a new Republic in France, the Fifth
Republic. With regard to this particular problem, the head of the Fifth Republic
said to the world, in October of this year, after the Assembly met: "What must be
achieved is the basic transformation of this country" - meaning Algeria; he did not
say "this colony"; "country" means that there are nationals who belong to that
country, a place which is the homeland of the people - "so brave, so alive, but also
so full of difficulties and suffering. This means that all Algeria must have a share
in modern civilisation, and it must be brought to them in terms of well-being and
dignity." If he had simply said "well-being," one could have understood that it
was a paternal government of a colonial country. But General de Gaulle’s
proclamation stands. It means that the personality of Algeria, its position as a
country, was recognised as late as October; and he pledges to the world that that
country, so far as he is concerned, must live in terms of dignity. What is more
essential to the dignity of a people than freedom? How can a country live in
terms of dignity and modern civilisation, even if we give it education, even if we
give it food, and build roads - all dictators build roads, you know - and supply all
the creature comforts, but without freedom?
Therefore, we must, still hope that this declaration of French policy, which was
circulated to us all on 3 October, stands true and will be respected. Our regret is
all the greater that the French Government is not participating in this debate; since
the Assembly is drawing to a close, it would be an idle wish that we might correct
this situation. But in view of the moderation of the debates that have taken place
in this chamber - and those who have participated are mainly countries whose
views on colonial rule and the liberation of peoples are well-known; but, in spite
of that, the appeal has been for negotiation between the metropolitan Power and
the people; there is no strong resolution before us, there have been no speeches of
wild condemnation - we hope that the voice of so many nations, even though the
colonial Powers have not taken a substantial part in the debate, will be heard in
France, particularly by the Head of State, and that he will interpret that as an
overwhelming part of world opinion.
A corollary to that is the statement of the leader of the nationalist movement in

Algeria. I hope my friends who have sponsored the draft resolution will not think
I am fighting shy of the words "Provisional Government of the Algerian
Republic",5 but I want to place this particular aspect of my observations in a
context which does not create difficulties for those who have not recognised this
government. The head of this Government said, in September of this year: "The
presence of Frenchmen and Europeans in Algeria does not pose an insoluble
problem. It is certain that Algeria, freed of colonialists" - that is, the colonial
Power - "will have neither first nor second-class citizens. The Algerian Republic
will make no distinction due to race or religion among those who wish to remain
Algerians. Fundamental guarantees will be given to all citizens so that they may
participate in the total life of the nation. All legitimate interests will be
respected." This was the statement made by the head of this Provisional
Government who, at any rate, at the minimum, should be considered as the head
of the effective nationalist movement of Algeria.
He goes on to say: "The efforts of this Government" - he is speaking for his

Government - "will be to find a peaceful solution through negotiation; and there
will be a response, but this will not be a response to a request for unconditional
surrender." It is not for my Government to endorse the second part of the
statement, which refers to France; but we can accept the first part, certainly, that
the efforts of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic will be
devoted to finding a peaceful solution.
The head of a movement that is engaged in armed resistance in order to establish

the freedom of his country comes forward with an offer that he is prepared to find
a peaceful solution. We consider the response to it should be adequate and of a
reciprocal character.
THIS MATTER HAS BEEN BEFORE US NOW FOR THREE YEARS. We

have had before us the questions of other territories of North Africa of different
types. We had before us, for many years, the question of the country of the last
speaker, Tunisia; and we can remember the speeches made at that time, by France
and its allies, to the effect that the Tunisians were Frenchmen and, therefore, the
decision must rest with France. Now, history has decided otherwise. Tunisia,
today, is an independent State in common with Morocco; the Protectorate which
administered French sovereignty over that territory has been withdrawn, so that
the sovereignty inherent in its people has blossomed into a Republic.
What is the position with regard to Algeria? There are a great many countries
represented here which are influenced in this matter by juridical considerations,
5
The Provisional Government was established on September 26, 1958.
perhaps with the apprehension that there may be some interference in the affairs
of a sovereign nation, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council
of the United Nations. The position with regard to Algeria is as follows. Algeria
was surrendered by the Turks when it was part of the Ottoman Empire. The
French proclaimed Algeria as an integral part of France. That was an act of
conquest; and conquest, particularly in modern times, confers the reciprocal right
of rebellion. Conquest is an act of force majeure. It is not a juridical act: it is a
political act; and every conquest confers the right of rebellion. It is written into
the American Declaration of Independence, and into the declarations of
independence of many countries, including my own, that where people are
governed against their will they have the right to rid themselves of that rule.
In 1834, France proclaimed Algeria as an integral part of France. But if this

fact had remained alone, this problem would have a different complexion.
However, immediately France proclaimed Algeria as an integral part of France,
and the rule of the Ottoman Empire was terminated, not by the people but by
France; the peoples of Algeria rebelled against it as early as 1847. So we are
dealing not with an ephemeral, a temporary or a passing phase of the resistance of
a people. The peoples of Algeria have been fighting the thraldom of an empire
for nearly 100 years; and the French conquest of Algeria met with resistance
under the national leader of that day, Abd-El-Kader. He surrendered. That
surrender again, was surrender to physical force; and it carries with it, as its
corollary, the right to resist when you are able to wake up.
Then there was quiescence for a period. But in our own time, after the conclusion
of the First World War, North Africans in Paris started a movement, moderate in
its character, which proclaimed the right of the Algerian peoples to freedom.
Then came the years of the Second World War, and the Algerian nationalists
presented to the Allies stationed in Algeria a manifesto demanding sovereignty;
and there was no greater supporter, not in exact terms but in sentiment, of this
movement than the present leader of the French nation, General de Gaulle. It was
the first time he proclaimed, on behalf of the Free French Government of the day,
that it was proper and appropriate that the Algerians - whom the French call the
"Moslem Algerians" - had the right to citizenship without renouncing their status.
This is the background in which we are functioning. We have on the one hand the
proclamation of French policy which has recognised Algeria as a country - and
what is more, two years ago the Foreign Minister of France told this Assembly
that the French Government recognised the personality of Algeria. What is a
personality if it is not a personality, that is to say, it has the right to express its
person? So if there is any suggestion today that this matter must be decided in
metropolitan France, that the Algerian people have no right to their independence,
then there is a regression from the position already communicated to the General
Assembly...
THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT WHICH IS THE MAIN RESISTANCE and
the arm of the Algerian people, today is at war with the French Government - and
I say this deliberately for reasons which I hope will soon become clear - because
when there are more than half a million modern troops in that country you can no
longer call it a civil commotion. When the forces of the French Republic on land,
air and sea are being utilised among a people which is comparatively unarmed -
but still armed, which makes it a war - I think it is necessary for us to mention the
fact in this debate that, apart from all political questions, we should appeal to the
Government of France and to the leaders of the Algerian people, to apply very
strictly to this struggle the terms of the Geneva Convention. That is, irrespective
of the recognition of the Algerian Republic, according to the Convention of which
France is a signatory, these people are entitled to be treated as belligerents, with
all the consequences that follow from it. Neither party - more particularly the
Government of France that is a signatory to the Convention - would have the right
to treat these prisoners except under strict conformity with this Convention,
providing for their housing - not to put them in common jails - providing for
rights of internment, for medical attention, for repatriation to neutral nations in
regard to these belligerents; so that when a situation like the arrest of persons who
are travelling under Moroccan hospitality and therefore at least in effect under the
Moroccan flag, comes under hostile action, it is a violation of this Convention.
It is the view of my Government that irrespective of all political settlements that

have been made, humanity requires that the status of belligerency should be
recognised and therefore the prisoners - and those others who come under hostile
action on either side - are entitled to all the amenities, all the consideration and all
the laws of humanity that are embodied in this Convention, of which France is a
signatory.
The Government of India has never resigned its position in regard to

independence of the Algerian people. We have at times allowed the words
personality, entity, and so on, to be used in order to facilitate negotiations.
Equally, we have never departed from the view that peaceful solutions are more
likely to be permanent, more likely to be effective.
Within the last two years, there have been other parts of the French Empire -
whether they be protectorates or colonies - which have emerged into
independence. Only yesterday we welcomed one of these territories as a Member
State of the United Nations.6 I think members of this Committee, when
discussing this matter, could put aside the large number of details that have been
introduced into the discussion and just consider whether, if it is possible for
Guinea, with a population of two million, the territories of Indo-China which,
after waging sanguinary war with France won a military victory and therefore
were able to establish their independence, for the other territories of the
Federation of French West Africa and of Equatorial Africa, for the territories
under trusteeship, for all these territories to emerge into independence, the
6
The Republic of Guinea became a member of the United Nations on October 12, 1958.
Algerian people alone are to be kept in a state of helotry.
And what is their sin? The main argument which has been used in regard to
Algeria is that out of ten million people one-and-a-half million people are
Europeans or of European descent. Are we to understand that because a colonial
people, either by the laws of hospitality or by the laws of conquest and of
surrender, have permitted or acquired the occupation of some part of its territory
by some other people, it is therefore to be denied liberty for ever? That is to say,
the representatives of people who belong more to modern civilisation, and
particularly of France, which is wedded to the ideas of liberty, who have become
residents of this land - should they, therefore, deny to others liberty? And should
they refuse to accept citizenship in this vast territory and come under the
government under democratic considerations? I say this because it is the view of
the Government of India that an independent Algeria, as stated by Mr. Abbas,7
should and would extend the whole of that freedom without distinction as to race
or religion. Therefore the colons, the residents, those others who come into
Algeria would be Algerian nationals.
The position in the past has been, under the French constitution, that only
Frenchmen could be citizens. Now I have no desire to make comparative studies
of these two constitutions - the constitutions of the Fifth and Fourth Republics -
but it is interesting to note, whatever its purposes may have been, that the
constitution of the Fifth Republic refers to this fact: national sovereignty belongs
to the people. The previous constitution said: national sovereignty belongs to the
French people. The French have been accustomed to calling everybody in the
French Empire a Frenchman. May I say here, with great appreciation, that
although the British ruled us for three hundred years one way or another, and for
ninety years more as an imperial Power, they never called us Englishmen - they
spared us that, and we parted in friendship. But they have been called
Frenchmen, and under the previous constitution sovereignty belonged to the
French people, under the present constitution sovereignty belongs to the people.
And if you put that side by side with the recognition of Algerian personality, with
the statement of de Gaulle that Algeria is a country - and he speaks about its great
people - I submit that under the terms of the present constitution of France itself
the sovereignty of Algeria rests in the Algerian people.
The matter having come before the Assembly, it passed resolutions year after
year. Each of these resolutions is singularly free from any words expressing
condemnation or any kind of phraseology which would create embarrassment to
the French Government... in each case the United Nations either noted or offered
the good offices of high personalities. In the first instance it called upon the
Secretary-General to offer his good offices and find a solution through
appropriate means - it did not even prescribe the means, but spoke of finding a
democratic and just solution through appropriate means - in conformity with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7
Ferhat Abbas, head of the Provisional Government of Algeria
This Assembly has now been informed that in fact it has not taken place, nor were
the good offices of the United Nations used in order to bring this sanguinary war
to an end. And today the situation is that there are half a million troops, with all
the weapons of war by land, sea and air, entailing the expenditure of $ 3 million a
day. We might well sit down here and contemplate that this billion dollars a year,
if it had gone into the paternal estate of France for the betterment of its people
during the last fifty years, would have improved the situation. There is always
money to be found for war and suppression, but little for other purposes.
The Government of France expends $ 3 million a day in order to wage war

against 10 million people, or the majority of the people of Algeria, and while I
have no desire to introduce other matters, since France remains in military
alliance with a large number of powerful countries, it must at least be expected
that it is able to release considerable instruments of war of its own for the
purposes of this colonial war. The same thing happened in Indo-China, but there,
after many years, the more effective opponents of rule gained a military victory.
Are we to wait for the time when the same situation exists in Algeria when this
conflict has had its repercussions upon neighbouring lands? There is a difference
between the situation in Southeast Asia and that in North Africa.
Algeria is surrounded by territories which are charged with a spirit of nascent

nationalism and territories that are allied in kinship, by race and other features,
with the people who are under suppression. As stated in the draft resolution
before us, the continuance of this situation can lead to a breach of international
peace. The Assembly must take into account the fact that this is a large-scale war,
waged by one of the most powerful nations of the world - one of the great Powers,
one of the Powers responsible for international peace and security more than the
seventy-seven others under the Charter of the United Nations, a Power which, by
its historic and traditional practice, is wedded to the conceptions of liberty,
fraternity and equality which from the constitution of the eighteenth century have
been transferred into every single constitution afterwards, including the
constitution of the Fifth Republic.
THEREFORE, WE COME HERE AGAIN THIS YEAR TO CONSIDER THIS

SUBJECT with the same appeal - the appeal that there shall be negotiations in
order to bring the war to an end and establish the independence of the Algerian
people. We have now come to a stage in the debate when there is a draft
resolution before the Assembly and my delegation will support this draft
resolution. We will support it not with a reservation but with qualifications and
explanations...
The draft resolution does not ask anyone to recognise the Provisional Government
of the Republic. It says: "the willingness of the Provisional Government of the
Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations with the Government of France," and
"Urges negotiations between" them. We do not urge negotiations between them
in order that they may be recognised as a Government but in order to find "a
solution in conformity with the Charter." Therefore, I would say this draft
resolution, like all resolutions, can be differently worded or better worded, but
this one, as it stands, does not offer any insurmountable difficulties in the mind of
any country which, like ours, has not recognised the Provisional Government or
the Algerian Republic. It is a resolution which, for the most part, recalls previous
decisions of the General Assembly; it recognises "the right of the Algerian people
to independence" which is inherent or expressed in the Charter; it expresses
concern at the great slaughter that is going on in Algeria of a comparatively
unarmed people. One newspaper wrote that one cannon-burst can kill fifty
Algerians, while an Algerian sniper might or might not get a Frenchman.
Then, in the preambular paragraph, the draft resolution says "the present situation
in Algeria constitutes a threat to international peace and security". We can well
remember situations, which are less grave than this, inviting the attention of the
Assembly and the Assembly taking strong, effective and prompt action, and
countries which are allied to others by military alliances, by traditional friendship,
by kinship of religion, race, civilisation and everything else, taking the position
that the aggressor must withdraw.
If I may say so, whatever may be the juridical position in this matter, the position
of France in Algeria today is not that of a colonial Power trying to restore order,
but of a sovereign country committing aggression upon a land that is free, because
in all colonies the sovereignty remains vested in the people and when they choose
to assert it they become independent. So that as far as the people are concerned,
Algeria is an independent country whose independence is being violated by the
force of French arms and therefore the position of France in Algeria is that of a
country waging war, committing aggression upon a people.
The operative part of this draft resolution does not ask for condemnation of the
French Government; it does not ask for anything more than negotiation. It asks
for negotiations between these two parties because negotiations, if they are
serious, must be between those who are able to deliver the goods. It has been part
of the argument against negotiations to ask: "With whom will we negotiate?"
Without disrespect to anyone, that is a common argument from a colonial Power.
Here, however, it is now possible to negotiate with a party that is in effective
hostility with the French Government and if it is strong enough to wage war and
resist and to carry on for three years against such powerful odds, then it must be
assumed that it is possible to enter into effective negotiations and come to a
settlement, at least leading to the cessation of hostilities to which I feel that,
irrespective of political views, every State member of this Assembly would look
forward.
OUR OWN POSITION IN THIS MATTER HAS BEEN STATED FULLY by

the Prime Minister of India. He said very recently, I believe after the Assembly
began:
"The French Government have often said they did not know whom to deal
with. I think it may well be said that at present what is called the
Provisional Government of Algeria represents all the elements in Algerian
nationalism, moderate and extremist."
In fact, the head of this Government was recognised by France as a very

moderate leader, living in France most of the time, and I believe he was a
member of the French Chamber.
"And therefore it should be easy to deal with them as representing

Algerian nationalism. I would hope, therefore, that the French
Government - General de Gaulle - will deal with these people, because it
is obvious that there is no other way of settling the Algerian problem
except in recognising Algerian freedom."
Our Prime Minister has equally stated that the question of the immediate
recognition of the Provisional Government in Algeria raises other problems. The
real test in our minds has been how we can help in this matter and not merely
make a gesture without helping. This comes from a Government that has not
recognised the Republic of Algeria but at the same time regards its emergence and
the position of the leaders of the Algerian movement as providing an answer to
the oft-repeated argument, "With whom are we to negotiate?" There are two
parties; one, the holders, according to French law, of juridical power, armed with
all the modern weapons, waging the war in Algeria for three years, with more
than half of the army committed and the greater part if not the whole of the
Foreign Legion, and no doubt having, even if not for that purpose, the indirect
assistance that must come to a Power in military alliances from the vast resources
that lie behind in reserve. On the other hand are people who, in spite of all their
suffering, have not surrendered in three years. And, what is more, Mr. Abbas tells
General de Gaulle, "When we offer to negotiate, we do not do so in terms of
surrender."
We say, therefore, that a situation has now arisen in which, if there was any
genuine desire for peace and for creating a situation in North Africa which would
not lead to further international complications, which would not endanger in any
sense relations such as they are between the independent countries of North
Africa, notably the ones recently freed from French rule and the rest of them, it
would be the policy of wisdom and humanity and of common sense to try to bring
about negotiations. If the French Government has to negotiate in any other way,
that negotiation would be something depending entirely on their will in picking
and choosing the people with whom they would talk. If you pick and choose the
people you are talking to, in a sense you are talking to yourself, and it is not
common sense to talk to oneself if you are sane. Political sanity requires,
therefore, that they should speak to their opponents.
We are told that there should be a cessation of hostilities before that. Now, as the
cessation of hostilities itself requires negotiation, it is also enjoined therefore on
the French Government to enter into negotiations - as I said, the French
Government only - because the offer of negotiations on the other side, the
willingness to negotiate, has already come; and such negotiations have to take
place in conditions where results will follow and, in view of certain events that
have occurred recently, would have to take place in conditions where both parties
feel a sense of security. They obviously could not take place on the battlefields of
Algeria; perhaps, equally, they cannot take place where French authority alone
remains, in view of present circumstances.
I should like to state here that when the question of Indo-China came up four
years ago, the same problem arose: Who are we to negotiate with? And,
ultimately, we had the situation where negotiations took place between those
parties which were factually in a position to negotiate...
There is no escape from these facts; the worst freedom we could ever ask for
would be freedom from facts. These facts are before us. And, in this massacre -
that is what it really comes to - and with all hardships it is inflicting on the French
people and on the Algerian people, with all the feelings of the whole world,
notably in Asia and Africa, with its consequences of alienating the sympathies of
new nations that have come into existence - taking all that into consideration, this
Assembly should make a unanimous appeal to the French Government to
negotiate. We should also convey to it that we express our regret, not by
resolutions, and we should convey to them that they should take account of the
fact that we all regret their representatives' absence from this Assembly,
particularly because France is not only a member of this Assembly but one of the
five great countries on which the structure of the United Nations rests.
My Government therefore hopes this will be done. As I said, every resolution can
be improved by every delegation, and each delegation, I think, would be justified
in thinking they could draft it better - but, here, what we are providing is not a
constitution for Algeria, it is not even going into the details of negotiation. We
have to look at the orientation of this resolution, and that orientation is the
recognition of Algerian independence, that orientation is a request to recognise
that a party who can deliver the goods is willing; and, therefore, there must be a
response, and all this under the umbrella of the Charter.
That being the general orientation of this draft resolution, and containing no
words of condemnation to a country which is friendly to all the other eighty
countries represented here, and with whom we as a Government and a people
have very close and harmonious relations - and as far as we had any problems of
this kind to solve, they are for the most part solved by friendly negotiation, and
only the juridical sovereignty of French possessions in India remains to be
terminated; and it was without any feelings of animosity that we approached this.
We think, therefore, that there should be no hesitation in the minds of people like
ourselves who may have difficulty with regard to the juridical aspect of this
question. No issue of the recognition of any particular Government of Algeria
arises, no issue as to the particular method of negotiation arises, no issue of
judging the rights and wrongs of this question, apart from the whole issue of
colonialism, arises.
We have here, in our submission, a draft resolution of a character calculated and

certainly designed to promote the purposes of peace rather than of conflict.
MAY I SAY, THEREFORE, BEFORE LEAVING THIS SUBJECT, that the

great mistake for any country, particularly the great Powers, is to think that years
of war, whether four or 400, will ever suppress a people’s desire for freedom.
The whole of Asia, and now Africa, is replete with examples where the power of
a strong arm has never been able to suppress a people...
My delegation therefore lends its support to this draft resolution, without

reservation, but with the qualifications I have mentioned. Our relations with
France are of the most harmonious character. We have the highest respect for the
way they have dealt with some of their colonial areas and we look forward to the
prospective and almost immediate liberation of another part of the former French
colonial empire which is now under trusteeship, we look forward to the extension
of and to be able to feel that the concept of freedom in the newly proclaimed
Republics of the Ivory Coast and Dahomey is as real as it is in Guinea, so that the
arena of freedom will be extended to Africa.
Algeria is a black spot; the oil of the Sahara - if there is any there - or even the
sands of the Sahara, or whatever wealth there may be, will not be prejudiced by
the liberation of these people because no wealth will ever come out of any
territory without the application of human labour, and that has to come from the
peoples of Africa because they alone can inhabit that area. Therefore, the
interests of France, the interests of those people, the interests of ending
bloodshed, and the implementation of the purposes of the Charter - all that
requires that there should be a turning of this tide and, in accordance with the
hopes which were aroused in recent times, that there should be negotiation... We
look forward to this draft serving this purpose; and not only the resolution but the
debate in this Assembly. The Assembly has addressed itself to this problem with
great moderation. We appeal to a people who have great generosity in many
ways - and what is more, in whom the memory of oppression, the memory of
occupation, the torture of their own people, the taking away of their lands and the
jack-boot on their own soil, is recent, and who could be more conscious of the
feelings that a people must have when their homeland is under foreign
occupation.
With these words, I have presented the views of my Government on the whole of
this question, and my delegation will support this resolution.
CYPRUS
[The question of Cyprus was first brought before the United Nations in 1954 by
Greece which wished to secure the union of Cyprus with Greece. Mr. Menon
opposed the inclusion of the item in the agenda on the formulation presented by
Greece, and was almost alone in stressing that Cyprus was a colonial territory
entitled to self-government and independence.
The question was discussed for several years, as Britain, Greece and Turkey press
their conflicting claims and views. The Indian position, pressed persistently,
gained increasing support.
Cyprus attained independence in 1960 and was admitted to the United Nations.]
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 24,

19548
[Mr. Menon made this statement to explain why India would not vote for the
inclusion of the item in the agenda in the formulation presented by Greece. The
item was placed in the agenda, however, by 30 votes to 19, with 11 abstentions.]
My delegation normally does not seek to explain its vote because the vote itself is
an explanation of one’s attitude. However, in this particular matter, we are
obliged to do so in order that there should be no misunderstanding of our position.
My Government and my country stand for the independence of nations. The
arguments we have heard here have nothing to do with the Cyprian nation and
nationhood. This is a question of Greece, on the one hand, and the United
Kingdom, on the other, wanting possession of these islands. I have read this item
as tabled by the Greek delegation: "Application, under the auspices of the United
Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the
case of the population of the Island of Cyprus." There is no talk here about the
people of Cyprus; there is no argument about the nationhood of Cyprus as such.
The position of our Government is that we would support and we desire the
establishment of self-government and independence according to the wishes of
the people wherever possible - and we hope it will be possible everywhere - by
peaceful methods of conciliation and negotiation for their freedom. If freedom
and self-government were the issue, we would support the inscription of this item,
but we cannot support the inscription of an item where the issue is as I have
stated.
8
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages 59-
60
There are three claimants. There is the United Kingdom, and Greece, and now
Turkey. Very soon it may become a free-for-all!
We therefore regard this island as the homeland of its peoples, entitled to

nationhood and independence. I disagree with my very good friend and
colleague, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd,9 who spoke of it as "a strategic necessity." It is the
homeland of the Cyprian nation.
We regard nationhood as territorial; it makes no difference to us whether, in a

particular territory, people are of one ethnic group or another. Therefore, the
territory of Cyprus is regarded by us as the homeland of a people entitled to the
recognition of their nationhood. We hope that those who are responsible for their
affairs will advance them in the near future on the road to full self-government
and independence as speedily as possible, so that they will become entitled to
derive the benefits of what is stated in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter and
also in the Preamble.
...I have heard it said by both sides that it is not possible for a small island like
Cyprus to have independence and nationhood. I should like to quote some
examples. There are several republics in Central America with populations of
very nearly three-quarters of a million people; these republics have neighbours
who are powerful. If there is a case of fear of neighbours, they should be afraid of
theirs. Although independent, their populations are not larger than that of Cyprus.
There is also the notable example of the great little country of Iceland, with a
population of 145,000 people. It is totally independent and, what is more, it had
democratic and parliamentary institutions before the United Kingdom. Thus, we
consider that the smallness of a country is not an argument against its
independence.
The real issue, therefore, should be the nationhood and independence of Cyprus
and their establishment, and not the transfer of the territory from one country to
another. We are not able to subscribe to the argument with regard to strategic
considerations...
In these circumstances, my delegation proclaims without equivocation that it

stands for the independence of peoples, the establishment of national
independence and the basing of their associations with others, as are ours, upon
free will and co-operation. We equally oppose the idea that this territory -
because some people went to live there at one time or another, or because it is
strategically valuable, or because it is valuable in other ways - is a matter of barter
and exchange between those who have it and those who wish to have it.
For these reasons we shall not be able to support the inscription of this item as
proposed.
9
Representative of the United Kingdom
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, February 22, 195710
[The question of Cyprus was discussed by the General Assembly in February

1957 in the context of increased tension in the island and in relations between
Britain and Greece and Greece and Turkey.
India submitted a draft resolution by which the Assembly would express the
earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found in
accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, and
the hope that negotiations would be resumed and continued to that end. It was
adopted on February 26, 1957, as resolution 1013 (XI) by 57 votes to 0, with one
abstention.]
(Summary)
Mr. Krishna Menon reiterated the position stated by his Government in the past,
namely that the problem was largely one of Cypriot nationality, and that India was
concerned with the independence of Cyprus in conditions maintaining the
national, territorial integrity of that country and enabling it to co-operate freely
with its present rulers if it so desired. The Government of India understood that to
be the general basis of British policy. As had been the case in the past, of course,
the element of time played a very important part. Quoting from the statement he
had made at the ninth session of the General Assembly, he declared that India
regarded Cyprus as the homeland of its peoples, entitled to nationhood and
independence. That opinion appeared to have made great progress both in the
United Kingdom and in Greece since the question had first come to the General
Assembly.
There were at least two Member States with populations smaller than that of
Cyprus, and there were nearly eight with a population of just over 1 million.
Consequently there was no reason at all why Cyprus, with its own traditions and
speaking its own language, could not be independent. To argue such a question
on the basis of history, although history had its value, was scarcely a profitable
approach, since to do so would open similar considerations in the case of other
ex-colonial countries. At one time or another the great majority of member States
had been occupied by some other State. India yielded to no one in its respect for
freedom. But the land of Cyprus, with its people, traditions, economic life, and
with the kind of feeling that had developed, could not be disregarded on the basis
of the fact that an occupation or an accession had been recognised by one State or
another.
Turning to the question of competence, Mr. Menon observed that the matter could
not be regarded as purely a domestic question since the United Kingdom
10
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, First Committee, pages
267-68
Government itself had engaged in discussions on Cyprus with Greece and Turkey.
However, it was indeed a domestic question in the sense that any practical
conferment of independence and self-government on the people of Cyprus
depended, in present constitutional circumstances, upon the sovereign will of the
United Kingdom Parliament. It was fortunate that the United Kingdom
Government, and even more the overwhelming majority of the people of the
United Kingdom, favoured freedom for the Cypriots.
India did not favour - and consequently in previous years had not supported the
inclusion of the item in the agenda - self-determination if that were taken to mean
the loss of the personality and the territorial integrity of Cyprus by inclusion in
another land. He hoped he was right in saying that things had advanced and that
the position at present was not one involving the annexation of Cyprus to one
territory or another. When the time came, it would be necessary, and to the
advantage of the parties concerned, that there should be assurances by the parties
regarding that territorial integrity. It would be a great pity if, as a result of the
controversy, the newer fashion were followed and, instead of territories being
divided and ruled, they were divided and left. Such a fate would be most
unfortunate for Cyprus, with its diverse population not only of Greeks and Turks,
but also of Armenians and Arabs.
Recent history did not support the Turkish representative’s claim that Cyprus was
part of the mainland of Turkey. Distance was scarcely the only criterion, and in
any case Cyprus was closer to Syria.
There had been recriminations about violence on the one hand and incitement to
violence on the other. There had been a great deal of that sort of trouble in the
world, for example in Malaya for the past ten or fifteen years, where the use of
force had not been able to settle the problem of the desire of the inhabitants for
independence. The use of force had not succeeded either in parts of Asia or of
Europe, and it was not likely to succeed anywhere else.
His Government had no sympathy whatsoever with the intrusion of religion into
political agitation. National independence and the affiliation of countries one to
another should not be based merely upon kinship of religion or race, although that
might be one factor.
India understood the interest of Greece in the problem of Cyprus, since that
interest corresponded to the Indian one in the question of the people of Indian
origin in the Union of South Africa. He believed that the only way for minorities
and majorities in a territory to enjoy self-government was to be able to live
together, and he did not think that the representative of Turkey had said anything
which denied that conception.
HIS DELEGATION WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE A SETTLEMENT WHICH

DID NOT take into account all the relevant interests. Indeed, any such
"settlement" would not really be a settlement. He therefore submitted a draft
resolution A/C.1/L.172, which was based on the premise that the Committee was
in no position to decide on a settlement, although it could deal with general
political principles and could, on the basis of the Charter, try to harmonise
conflicting interests.
In connection with that draft resolution, he observed that it was not possible to
continue negotiations anywhere in the context of a campaign of hatred. An
atmosphere of peace was required and would be forthcoming if negotiations were
resumed by all parties concerned. Freedom of expression was also necessary, for
without it there could be no negotiations...
It was unnecessary to go into the question whether Article 2, paragraph 7 applied.

But the General Assembly was always competent to express its earnest desire, and
that was what his delegation’s draft resolution would have it do. That draft
referred to a peaceful, democratic and just solution, which meant that minorities,
human rights, freedom of expression and the other principles of the Charter could
not be ignored. What the Assembly had to do was to encourage, and to give an
impetus to, the whole process of negotiations. So far as India was aware, the
United Kingdom had never been unwilling to resume negotiations, nor had the
other parties which were involved in one way or another. Although the Cypriot
people and nation were not present at the Committee, he believed that it should be
possible to find a solution whereby self-government and independence would
enable the establishment of friendly relations with all the countries concerned.
The Indian delegation could not concede that the reforms proposed by the United
Kingdom amounted to self-government. It did not believe that there could be
self-government when internal order was somebody else’s business. It could
never concede that the homeland of a people was a strategic point for somebody
else. It was doubtful whether the strategic considerations that had applied in
previous times were still appropriate.
The Indian draft resolution did not urge or call upon anyone to do anything
because there was no desire to infringe in any way on susceptibilities. The great
value of the United Nations was often conditioned by the use of its functions in
the context that obtained...
Second Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly on February

22, 195711
(Summary)
11
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, First Committee, page 276
Mr. Krishna Menon said he was gratified at the virtually unanimous approval of
the draft resolution submitted by his delegation and expressed his appreciation of
the magnanimity of the sponsors of the other draft resolutions in not pressing
them to a vote. It was important, however, to remember that the draft resolution
adopted did not solve the issue of Cyprus. To think otherwise would be to
indulge in political romanticism. What the draft resolution had done was to open
the way to speedier, peaceful and just settlement of the question.
In the view of his Government, the discussion of the question of Cyprus at the
General Assembly had brought to the British mind the existence of a Cypriot
nationality. He had confidence that the present leaders of the United Kingdom
Government would follow the wisdom of British statesmen who spoke of
conciliation when confronted with similar problems in the past. He had no doubt
that the vast volume of public opinion in the United Kingdom, combined with the
wisdom of the Greek Government, which had moved away from the idea that self-
determination signified the union of Cyprus with Greece, would promote a
solution.
He stressed that his Government had sought to project the position of the Cypriot
people, and he wanted to say categorically that India recognised a Cypriot nation,
irrespective of any question of language. He hoped that through conciliation the
latent sovereignty of the people of Cyprus would become a reality, and that soon
an independent Cyprus would take its place in the United Nations.
His delegation had submitted the draft resolution because it had sensed that
behind all the discussions there was a desire to find a solution through
negotiations based on national freedom.
The only justifiable interest other parties might have had in the question of
Cyprus was that motivated by the desire for the welfare and independence of the
people of Cyprus. Any other motivation would be contrary to the Charter, which
proclaimed the right of national independence. The Cypriots had been a nation all
through their history and a nation did not cease to be a nation because it was
conquered. England itself had once been conquered. In conclusion, he said that
the draft resolution placed the responsibility for finding a solution to the problem
of Cyprus on the United Kingdom Government and on the people of Cyprus.
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 12,

195712
[On February 26, 1957, the General adopted resolution 1013 (XI) calling for
negotiations for a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the
12
purposes and principles of the United Nations, but it did not lead to any progress
toward a solution.
At the next session of the Assembly later in 1957, India held extensive
consultations in the hope of agreement on a draft resolution which would
command wide support in the Assembly; but the efforts were not successful. The
Assembly was unable to adopt any resolution on this matter.]
My delegation has abstained from participating in the debate and in the voting on
this question because, after the laborious efforts made by ourselves and by various
other delegations, it became clear that any decision taken here at the present time
which did not command the overwhelming majority support of the United
Nations, not necessarily unanimity, was not likely to fulfil the purposes of the
Charter...
The Government of India is neither unconcerned nor insensitive to this matter,

and I am asked to state its position. Our position is the same as was stated last
year: that this is a colonial question. We stand four square by the independence of
the Cypriot people and their right to be a sovereign State entitled to membership
of the United Nations.
Cyprus has a long though chequered history, and going back 2,000 or 3,000 years
this country, which has remained an entity, has been ruled by the Egyptians, by
the Persians, by the Romans and the Byzantians, and afterwards it passed to the
dictators, was conquered by the King of England and passed on to Knights
Templars because he could not administer it, and then it was passed on to the
Republics of Genoa and Venice, and finally came under Turkish rule for 300
years. Turkish interests were such that in 1878 it passed on that administration to
Britain. Then came the First World War, in which Turkey was on the side of the
Central Powers, and Britain annexed Cyprus.
I will come at a later stage to our view with regard to the interests of other parties.
It has been argued that this is not a straightforward colonial question. I would not
like to be cynical and say that colonial questions are never straightforward
because colonialism is not straightforward. But there are no colonial questions
which do not have complications. Cyprus is part, under the British constitution
and the Proclamation of 1951, of Her Majesty’s other realms, the realms beyond
the seas. The legal sovereignty of Cyprus rests in the United Kingdom. The
political sovereignty of Cyprus rests in the Cypriot people. And when the legal
sovereignty, which was obtained by annexation, is removed, then the Cypriot
people - irrespective of their nationality, whether they were of Greek ancestry,
Byzantine ancestry, Armenian ancestry or Turkish ancestry - will be members of
what would be the Cypriot State when they become an independent nation...
My delegation stated here on the last occasion that we do not consider that this
land and its people should be the subject of a controversy as to who should have
them, the British, the Greeks or the Turks. I think it is time that the Cypriot
people, after all these years of subjection, came into their own nationhood.
Therefore, we stand fully by their independence. We hope that the United
Kingdom, in the pursuit of its liberal policy which has now become part of the
general thinking of the British people, will find its way in the speediest possible
time to resolve this question in a manner which is not now before the Assembly,
namely, by enabling the people of Cyprus through peaceful means, as we would
like to see it, to attain and to maintain their independence and for their country to
take its place around this table as an independent nation...
It is necessary for us, however, to deal with what is called the tripartite claim. I
hope that neither my colleague from Greece nor my colleague from Turkey will
take exception to this, because it is my duty to state our position.
Reference has been made to the Treaty of Lausanne. The reliance is that there is
some equilibrium established by the Treaty of Lausanne which confers upon
Turkey certain rights. I looked through this Treaty. I found that article 16 states:
"Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or

respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the
present Treaty."
This is not only with regard to Cyprus, but with regard to everything else. But
when it comes more specifically to Cyprus, article 20 states:
"Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the

British Government on 5 November 1914."
It is not even as though Turkey ceded it. The act had already taken place and
Turkey, by the solemn Treaty of which she was one of the high contracting
parties, agreed to the annexation, recognised the sovereignty of His Britannic
Majesty, as he was then, and Cyprus became part of the British Empire.
We go from there to article 21, which concluded this chapter. Article 21 states:
"Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on 5 November, 1914,

will acquire British nationality."
So it is not only as though the territory was taken. Nobody was interested in
keeping them Turkish. They acquired British nationality and so forth. Then it
goes on to say that if any Turkish national still remained a Turk, he had to go back
to Turkey. We will not go into how many went to Turkey. That is a different
question. But they could not remain in Cyprus. If they did, they became under
the law British subjects and they became Cypriots. So much as far as that is
concerned.
In the same way, in order to maintain our objective position, it is necessary for me
to state that the parties to this Treaty are the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan,
Greece and Romania. Consequently Greece also, by these texts, became a party
to the annexation and the establishment of this separate entity...
Our position is that the main parties in this matter are the peoples of Cyprus who
are entitled to their freedom and the British Government which at present holds
possession and authority over this island.
Finally, I am asked by the Government of India to state that while we were a

sizeable part of the British Empire, the mightiest we have known in modern times,
our independence was established by means which denounced acts of violence on
either side. We therefore do not subscribe to methods which go beyond the
necessities of the ordinary maintenance of law and order or which exercise force
in any way over subject peoples or to methods of terrorism which will never
establish the independence of a people. For 50 years in our own country there
were groups of people who thought that there was a short cut to freedom. There
is no short cut except in the organisation of the masses behind the idea of national
independence...
Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly,

December 2, 195813
[The question of Cyprus was again brought before the thirteenth session of the
General Assembly in 1958 by Greece. Six draft resolutions were submitted during
consideration of the matter in the First Committee.
India, together with nine other countries, proposed a draft resolution to ask the
United Kingdom to continue negotiations with the aim of promoting self-
government for Cyprus and preserving its integrity. The draft was, however, not
pressed to the vote as efforts to formulate a generally acceptable text failed.
When the matter went before the Plenary, a Mexican draft - expressing
confidence that continued efforts would be made by the parties to reach a
peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the United Nations
Charter - was adopted as resolution 1287 (XIII).]
...This subject has been before us for four years. Indeed, it has been on the
political horizon for forty or fifty years or more. I have no desire to go into the
chronological history of this position, but it is relevant for us to remind ourselves
13
of the progress that we have made or, even more, of the different context in which
this question has come here.
An item on Cyprus was put down by the Greek delegation in 1954. At that time,
its inscription was opposed by the United Kingdom. The voting on it was very
close and my delegation abstained, I believe, on this matter. At any rate, we did
not support the inscription of the item, to the consternation of the ex-colonial
countries...
In 1955, a new factor had emerged. In the statements made by us and the others
in 1954, we were talking about two parties, not the Cypriots and the British,
except as far as my delegation and some others were concerned, but the British
and the Greeks. By 1955, three parties had emerged - the British, the Greeks and
the Turks. Even then, the Cypriot people had not emerged.
Our position in regard to this problem is exactly the same. It is not that we are
inflexible in this matter, but in terms of the Charter of the United Nations, in
terms of the position of people who have neither political, economic nor social
freedoms, their liberation comes first. We will be the first to agree publicly and
privately that there is much in the record of the United Kingdom in either
assisting or in yielding to the demands of self-government by subject peoples. In
our own country, there have been periods of conflict and co-operation. There
have been periods of negotiation. There have also been periods when the ruling
authority has said, "we shall not talk to the rebels."...
We have therefore today the progress of this resolution from 1954 to 1956, and
the session held in 1957, when the United Kingdom agreed to the inscription of
this item. And if my memory is right I remember my distinguished friend
Commander Noble14 telling this house at that time that this problem is not a
straightforward colonial question. I am not one to play on words, but I would like
to ask this Committee which colonial question is a straightforward question.
Colonialism is not straightforward. We agree it is not straightforward colonial
problem in that sense also. But there are factors involved in it.
But the next part of Commander Noble’s statement is even more significant. He
said it is not a straightforward colonial problem because the Greeks had
introduced the question of enosis15. That is why it is not straightforward colonial.
But it has become international.
I think - out of respect for historical facts - that there are at least three
distinguished statesmen, one of them living, two of them no longer with us, who
have a high place in the galaxy of British Prime Ministers - Mr. Gladstone, to start
with; Lloyd George afterwards; and Mr. Winston Churchill, who was Under-
Secretary of State for Colonies in 1907 - who, without the Greeks exerting any
14
Allan Noble, representative of the United Kingdom
15
Union with Greece
pressure, spoke about this island being united to Greece. Now, we are not
advocates of this union; we are against it. Our position is that Cyprus belongs to
the Cypriot people, and it is their independence as members of the civilised world
that will contribute to the strength of the United Nations and will fulfil the
purposes of the Charter.
I state these facts to say that union with Greece was part of British policy for a
very long time until the nationalist movement developed in Cyprus in 1941. Then
always, as elsewhere, come reasons for lack of unity...
WE REGARD ENOSIS AS HAVING BEDEVILLED THIS POSITION and

having postponed the day of Cypriot liberation, having postponed the day of
Cypriot nationalism, which is what is being fought against by everybody - and to
fight nationalism is to try to reverse the process of history. But it was not a Greek
creation alone; Greece - the Greece of Venizelos, pre-Venizelos Greece or post-
Venizelos Greece - was only part of this. But that was a part of British policy.
Now, therefore, when we look at that we ought to consider whether there was any
time in Cypriot history any question of its being more than one entity. There was
no time. There is no necessity for us to go far into the past, but from the time of
the Phoenicians and the Assyrians to the time of Anthony and Cleopatra and
afterwards, and to the time of the Crusaders and the Knights Templar and the
Kings of Jerusalem, Cyprus has been one and entire.
Now let us come to more modern, more recent history, the history of the Ottoman
Empire - which, incidentally, appears to seek reincarnation. Turkey was suzerain
over Cyprus for 300 years. Did Turkey at that time divide Cyprus in two in order
to protect the Turkish minority against the Greek majority?
And then, though it was part of the Ottoman Empire, somewhere around the end
of the nineteenth century the British were called in, not as an act of cession of
Cyprus but in order to protect the integrity of Cyprus - and I am not going into
any other details of against whom or what...
Therefore it was Cyprus - not the Turks, not the Greeks, not the various other
communities - that was handed over. It was this island with an external boundary,
with an entity of its own, which was taken over.
From then on there was a period of twenty or thirty years, I believe, where Cyprus
was governed by the executive acts of the Crown under Orders-in-Council, that is
to say, there was no question of treating this as anything but a private estate. That
is the position of territories under Orders-in-Council, as Malta was under the
Knights Templar in days gone by.
Then came the period of Letters Patent when again under executive orders their
position was given some legal status in the way of a charter - and I refer my
colleagues of the United Kingdom to the Letters Patent of 1914, 1925, and even
as late as 1931 - where it is definitely laid down that Cyprus is a Crown Colony...
Its integrity was constitutionally, politically, factually and every other way, one.
Therefore the constitutional position of Cyprus in relation to the British Empire is
that of a Crown Colony, not two colonies.
Again, I have not the time to go into the various attempts at constitutional reform
made in this territory. In each of those the attempt has been to set up some sort of
representative institutions for the whole of the colony. The representative of the
Crown for this was the Governor of Cyprus. There was no Governor for the
Turks and no Governor for the Greeks separately; the Governor was Governor
nationwide. There was one common head representing the Crown of the United
Kingdom in Cyprus.
So unless we go back to the Assyrians or the time of the Phoenicians or the early
days of the Roman empire, or to the days of conquest in the Middle Ages, or even
afterwards when Cyprus was handed over to Italy at some time, we always find
there was no question of dividing it. We would be the first to say that there are
fissiparous factors today, and we cannot just wish them away. But are we to
judge this question merely from what has happened in the last four years or the
last five years or ten years, and ignore the history of 3,000 years?...
I say there is no period in the history of Cyprus when there have been two entities
in the island. There have been no two Crowns, no two authorities. The trouble
came not because there were changes in the body social of Cyprus. There is no
part of Cyprus, from all one can study in available figures and literature, mostly
supplied by the British Government, which is but an exclusive Turkish colony or
an exclusive Greek colony. These populations run into one another. Some
27,000 Turks live in the urban areas, but the bulk of them are in the rural areas of
Cyprus where, out of a rural population of 65,000, 29,999 live in 108 villages
with all-Turkish population; 12,000 live in 38 villages, slightly outnumbering the
Greeks; 24,000 live in 150 villages where they constitute a small minority...
So that there is no place where we can draw a line and say, "This is Turks. This is
Greeks." Now, if that is so in regard to the general area of Cyprus in its rural
communities, the position becomes even more difficult when we take the urban
areas where in the great cities and in the suburbs there are both these populations
in appreciable numbers.
Certainly, we have to take into account small minorities. The Turks and the
Greeks are not the only racial or ethnical groups in Cyprus; there are Armenians,
there are Arabs and, from a religious point of view, there are various sects. Then
we are told that there are geographical considerations, and someone has said that
if an island is only a few miles from the coast of a large country and if, on that
island, there are inhabitants belonging to the large country, then that country must
have something to do with it. I hope that the representative of Ceylon was not
here when that statement was made because I am sure that it would produce
unnecessary feelings in his mind. I want to assure him that that is a theory which
should not have any foundation; that is to say, just because a big country is near a
small country, there is no reason why they cannot live peaceably...
I want to say here that I wish to dissociate myself from all the extreme statements
that have been made with regard to the nature of rule in Cyprus. All colonial rule
must be, to a certain extent, repressive because, after all, it is the rule of a people
by another people, the ruled people having no voice in the government, and all
colonial governments have to rely mainly on sanctions. But I do not subscribe to
the theory that there is neither economic, social, nor other progress. A great many
things have happened in Cyprus, good and bad, as in other places, but if the
people of Cyprus were ruling themselves they would make mistakes - big
mistakes - but those would be their own mistakes; and self-government initially is
the facility to be able to make mistakes and to be able to correct them.
THE JOINING OF CYPRUS WITH GREECE IS NOT self-government or

independence of Cyprus; and, while no one may be dogmatic about it, there is
plenty of evidence from reports of recent times and old times that the Cypriot
population have got characteristics of their own. Is it not interesting that even the
protagonists of the Turks or the Greeks, when they talk here, say "the Turkish
Cypriot," "the Greek Cypriot"? Therefore, they are still Cypriots - one might say
"the Christian Cypriot" or "the Moslem Cypriot" in the same way.
An Englishman who visited Cyprus and wrote about it in 1879 refers to this fact:
"Except in name, they are neither Turks nor Greeks" - I hope that the
Cypriots will not be offended - "neither are they an amalgam of these two
races. From Latakia to Cyrenia, from Paphos to Famagusta, you will seek
in vain for any sample of these types. In neither face nor figure, in neither
speech nor genius, have the Cypriots any resemblance to either Turk or
Greek. Who, then, are these Cypriots? Do they stand apart, one of those
underived stocks which spring from the soil and have no history
elsewhere? The Cypriots are an amalgamated race, rustics who till the
soil, citizens who occupy towns and ports, men of a sunburned skin but of
an excellent physical type. Yet, they are neither Turk nor Greek except in
dress or creed. Who and what are they? One fact is clear: they are of
Aryan, not semitic stock."
That is of those times. Now we have more modern evidence by a Member of

Parliament, who today is not a member of the government but who went to
Cyprus as Governor, former Commander Fletcher, now Lord Winster. He said:
"In my time, racial animosities simply did not exist: the two races lived
and worked side by side in every department of the administration, in the
forests, in the health service; the children of the two races played together;
racial animosity was unknown. A new and such an ugly development has
been the rapid and shocking deterioration in racial relations."
Then he goes on to deal with the plan, which I shall deal with later on.
Today, in the armed services, in industry - I do not say the industry of the owning
side because this must be, to a large extent, imported capital - there are labour
organisations and trade unions composed of Greeks and Turks. The largest of
them is the Cypriot Federation of Labour, which has the largest membership, a
mixed membership of Turks and Greeks almost in proportion to the population.
Then there are exclusively Turkish unions which are very small. Therefore, in
these labour organisations, in co-operative societies, which the British
Government has promoted with some success in the area, the Cypriots, Greeks
and everyone else remain as common citizens of this place.
This takes us to the position of Turkey, both juridically and politically, in regard
to Cyprus. While we are not military allies of the Turks, we are part of Asia. The
Turkish Government was represented at the Bandung Conference and supported
colonial liberation. It is a country with which we have many ties, whose past
history differs from ours, but which, I hope, may provide in the future
opportunities of treading a common path in many directions.
The Turks were in Cyprus as Cyprus was in the possession of the Ottoman
Empire, and, as I said, they handed it over to the British for looking after. When
Turkey had Cyprus - and I say this without any disrespect to modern Turkey - it
was not in a position to offer protection. But that is past history. But in 1914,
after the declaration of the First World War, the United Kingdom rightly found
that it could not administer Cyprus on behalf of an enemy Power.
Since Turkey had joined the Central Powers and Cyprus was still held in some
sort of stewardship by the United Kingdom, a new situation arose. Then began
the straightforward colonial era, when the United Kingdom, annexed Cyprus.
Under British rule, Cyprus prospered very much more than under Turkish rule.
The deforested areas became more afforested. But certain political actions took
place at that time. One was Turkey’s abdication, under the Treaty of Lausanne, of
all rights to Cyprus. The second was even more important. The United Kingdom
said that if the people of Turkish origin in Cyprus wanted to be Turks they must
take Turkish nationality and leave Cyprus; that if they remained in Cyprus they
would have United Kingdom nationality. So far as I know, at the present time all
Cypriots - whether Greeks or Turks - have British passports; they have United
Kingdom nationality; they have all the advantages of Commonwealth and Empire
citizenship. There is, therefore, no question of Turkey’s having left any vestige of
sovereignty behind.
WE AS A GOVERNMENT ACCEPT THE POSITION that the United Kingdom
is sovereign in Cyprus, in the sense that it has legal sovereignty. The United
Kingdom has the power to give commands; it has the administrative responsibility
for the Island. That is why, from 1954 onwards, we have been saying that this is a
matter between the people and the Government: it is a colonial question.
But if the United Kingdom Government has legal sovereignty, the fact is that in
all colonial countries the sovereignty really lies in the people. It is latent
sovereignty, which becomes active when the colonial Power is removed or partly
recedes. It is the transfer of this sovereign power from the ruling country to the
people, to whom it really belongs, which represents the establishment of freedom.
This may take place in gradual stages; it may take place suddenly; it may take
place by revolution or by peaceful negotiation.
We therefore recognise that the power to do good is in the hands of the United
Kingdom Government. The responsibility of bringing the Cypriot people to the
fullness of their nationhood through the enjoyment of statehood is also a British
responsibility and a British function, in the sense that the United Nations Charter
enjoins upon all the members of the Organisation to bring non-self-governing
communities to self-government or independence, according to the local
conditions. This sovereignty cannot be shared with anyone. It can be transferred,
or it can become lower in the administrative Power as it becomes higher in the
people.
The United Kingdom representative has told this Committee something which has
a double significance. On the one hand, it shows the United Kingdom’s anxiety
to find a solution to this problem. It shows that the United Kingdom is flexible in
this matter. But flexibility by itself may not always be the correct solution. It all
depends on the direction and the purpose of the flexibility. The United Kingdom
has said that it is willing to share sovereignty, that it is willing to enter into a
partnership. But that sovereignty is to be shared, on the one hand, with the past
rulers of Cyprus, the successors to the Ottoman Empire, and, on the other hand,
with a country which, owing to racial ties, has held the position in the past -
apparently this is not the Greek position today, from what has been said in this
Committee - that this territory should be amalgamated with its own, that there
should be an Anschluss of this territory with its own.
It would seem that if there is any willingness to surrender or share this

sovereignty, it should be surrendered to or shared with the people to whom it
legitimately belongs. Even if it is argued that the sovereignty would be shared
not only with Turkey and Greece, but also with the Cypriot people, it is legitimate
to ask whether bringing in these two sovereign nations, far more powerful than
Cyprus is or will be, would not in itself make the independence of Cyprus still-
born. That is to say, it is legitimate to ask this question: If, as a result of the
present plan or any other plan, Cyprus were to become more independent, if its
self-government were fully promoted and, afterwards, it became entitled to
membership of the United Nations, would not other people, other countries, with
greater military and economic and other powers, have been introduced into the
government of Cyprus?
The United Kingdom representative has said that the two basic principles of
British policy are: first, the elimination of violence, the restoration of a peaceful
atmosphere; and, secondly, partnership.
On the first of those propositions, my delegation not only is in complete

agreement, but will be ardent advocates. No settlement in Cyprus can be
achieved unless there is a cessation of violence from all sides - irregular as well as
regular violence. There are 37,000 British troops on Cyprus. It is not without
significance that in this little island of 400,000-odd people, there are - according
to statistics submitted by the United Kingdom Government to the Committee on
Non-Self Governing Territories - 46,000 cases of crime, and the majority of these
crimes are in regard to offences against law and order and not in regard to moral
turpitude. In other words, because of the present political situation there are
crimes involving ten per cent of the population of Cyprus. That means that the
situation is not peaceful, and we agree that everything should be done to bring
about peaceful conditions.
From our own experience, we know this: Even when a struggle for national
liberation is conducted on the basis of peace, if an act of violence takes place,
either because of lack of discipline or because of an inability to stand up to undue
provocation, it is not the party with the upper hand that suffers: it is the fellow
who is struggling for freedom. From our own experience, we know that every
time a railway coach was burned, or a policeman was hit, or a greater tragedy
took place, it pushed back the force of our national movement for a certain period.
For the greatest strength that a subdued people has is the strength to be able to say
no to the conqueror, rather than to use the conqueror’s own weapons.
I want the representatives of the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece to believe
that the draft resolution which we and some other members of the Committee
have submitted is put forward with a desire to see that negotiations emerge and
that peaceful conditions are restored. We want conditions to prevail in which the
governing authorities will do everything they can to halt the assertion of authority
by force alone. On the other hand, we want conditions to prevail in which the
population and their leaders, the national movement that is struggling for liberty,
will recognise that, while violence may be provoked and even be justified in some
cases from an individual point of view, it does not as a national policy pay
dividends or advance the cause of freedom.
We know both from our own experience and as a common-sense proposition, and
from humanitarian considerations, that violence does not pay and does not always
strike the persons whom it is intended to strike. It brings opprobrium on all
parties concerned. Here we are one with the United Kingdom policy. We hope,
and we have no doubt in view of the state of public opinion in the United
Kingdom and the general policy of the United Kingdom Government, that an
attempt will be made to slow down the progress of violence.
WE NOW TURN TO THE OTHER ASPECT: PARTNERSHIP. I have already

said that, from the statements made here, it appears that the United Kingdom
Government is willing to have a partnership with Greece and Turkey. Before I
examine that problem, I should like to say something of which I would ask the
United Kingdom representative to take serious note. Speaking before this
Committee, the United Kingdom representative said - and this affects us very
seriously:
"This idea of partnership is one of which the British people have good
reason to be proud."
We do not take exception to that.
"Partnership has proved its worth in the development of the

Commonwealth as a great association of free and independent nations. It
is an idea which accords well with that belief in co-operation and mutual
respect which is the hallmark of a civilised and liberal diplomacy."
Now, if those sentences stood alone and were not brought into the Cyprus debate,
where a colonial issue is involved and where two sovereign countries are being
imported from outside, we would take no exception to them. We are an
independent member of the Commonwealth, having an equal position of
sovereignty with the United Kingdom. We are a sister State; we are not a
subordinate State. There is nothing in our relationship which involves a
partnership with anyone outside. That is to say, our partnership in the
Commonwealth does not impose upon us any partnership with anyone else, any
military alliance, or anything of that character.
I submit that this parallel that is drawn is something that rather complicates us and
makes difficulties with regard to our own public opinion. Partnership in the
Commonwealth is a partnership of sister States who are enjoying independence,
and this partnership arises from our free will. And here, while I have no desire to
introduce extraneous matter, the matter ceases to be extraneous when it is a matter
that is introduced by somebody else. In 1949, India, which has been a self-
governing dominion under the Statute of Westminster and its developments
afterwards, decided under her constitution to be an independent republic, with the
sovereignty derived from its people. But, for historic reasons, for sentimental
reasons, and partly in the hope that the union of free territories, without any bonds
from one to the other, would serve, to the small extent that it could, as an example
of co-operation in the world, in common with the other eight partners, it decided
to come to a new agreement. At that time there was no pressure on the
Government of India. There was no initiative from the Government of the United
Kingdom or any of the older Commonwealth countries, and we said, and it was
communicated, that we were going to become a republic. At the same time India
had declared and affirmed its desire to continue its full membership in the
Commonwealth of Nations with its acceptance of the King as a symbol of that
free association of these independent member nations and, as such, the head of the
Commonwealth.
The last paragraph of this communiqué16 says:
"Accordingly, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,

South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare that they remain
united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations freely
co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress." (Text of the
Communiqué, London, April 28, 1949)
That is what we are trying to do: freely co-operating in the pursuit of liberty and
peace...
The representative of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, speaks of the
arrangements as an experiment in ‘partnership.’ He has spoken in eloquent and
moving terms of the virtues of partnership, and we agree with all his general
remarks on this theme. We agree with him particularly when he says:
"Partnership has proved its worth in the development of the

Commonwealth as a great association of free and independent nations."
That is perfectly true, and entirely to the credit of the United Kingdom and its
partners in the Commonwealth. But it is not what is involved here. There is no
question in this partnership of freedom or independence, let alone nationhood, for
Cyprus.
I raise this point for two reasons: we do not want our people or the people in the
world - as is common knowledge, very few people except the members of the
Commonwealth understand what the Commonwealth is or what the relation is -
and therefore we do not want any confusion or any doubts thrown upon the free
character of this association. We regard it as entirely inappropriate to describe a
proposed sharing of imperial power between Greece and Turkey and the United
Kingdom as analogous to the Commonwealth of Nations. In fact, it is totally the
opposite.
What would happen in this case? These two sovereign countries, who have
economic power, who have their own legislatures, their own sovereign
authorities, their own constitutions, would be brought into the Government of the
16
Communiqué issued by the Commonwealth in London, April 28, 1949
colony in one way or another and, it is said, for international reasons.
The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in 1957, said that it has
become an international problem on account of the great demand for enosis. As
the Committee well knows, my delegation has always stood four-square on the
question of nationhood for Cyprus; and in spite of the fact that opposition
members of the Greek Parliament or anywhere else will deny it, the fact still
remains that the Cypriot people are Cypriots. They are a nation. They seek
statehood. They seek the facility to develop themselves, to develop their own
resources, to play their part in the community of the world, which is all being
retarded by the violence, by the diversion of energies in the struggle... We do not
regard this partnership between three possible potential imperial Powers if they
take part in it - and I hope neither Greece nor Turkey will take exception to it -
because the relation of Britain to Cyprus is that of the empire to subject peoples,
and the Cypriot people’s relation to Britain is that of people seeking liberation
under a liberal imperial system...
So that this idea of partnership, while it is a very nice word, in our opinion does
not fit in with the situation. What really is proposed is that the partnership should
be one that helps to thwart the growth of nationalism, and to prevent and come in
the way of the flowering of national aspirations into full nationhood.
IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION TO DISCUSS THE BRITISH PLAN for

Cyprus, because we do not believe that in the General Assembly it is possible to
evolve a plan for self-government or a constitution, nor is it its function. We
think it is the function of the Cypriot people in co-operation with the British
Government or vice versa, but that co-operation is essential. Therefore, it was not
our intention to discuss the British plan at all, but the representative of the United
Kingdom has taken us into confidence, and the published papers on it have been
brought into the debate, and, therefore, we have, to a certain extent, to deal with
it.
In this plan, if it comes into operation, it could not come into operation without
two things. First of all, the Turks and the Greeks must elect people, must co-
operate with the idea of an assembly, a legislature, and if they do not do that, then
the plan drops like a ton of lead. Then, when you take the upper echelon, the
Governor has got a council, that is the supreme body; and in that he is to be
assisted, in some form, not by the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus, but by the
Turkish and Greek Governments, which are foreign Governments at the present
time. The Turkish and Greek Governments are to share the power of the Crown.
There again, unless these two independent nations desire to be partners in this
venture, that part also does not come in.
While the plan may be one of partnership, there is no evidence that this
partnership was previously negotiated or that the parties had agreed to it. And if
it is proposed that any plan or solution is to be made without the consent of the
people who are to be partners, then in so far as they are concerned, it could be a
plan which is put to them as "take it or leave it" without seeking their consent.
Sometimes people are put on committees without being asked to join them, and
the very fact that people are elected to them does not mean that a partnership has
been consented to.
That is not the only feature. According to the representative of the United
Kingdom, in the course of events, this plan is to come gradually into being. That
sounds very good. But if you introduce the two communal legislatures and
afterwards expect the Governor to co-ordinate them, then you have already
crystallised these divisions. In fact, as Lord Winster has said somewhere in a
debate on this, this is not partnership but segregation. He said, "In all that I did, I
aimed at integration." This plan seems to aim at segregation, and there are
references to other places, where segregation takes place, which are irrelevant to
the purpose of our debate.
Referring to this - and this is the principal speech on behalf of the opposition in
the House of Lords - Lord Winster said:
"What is proposed may, I fear, bring Athens and Ankara into the affairs of
Cyprus. I want a united Cyprus to run its own affairs.
"My Lords, how far is this ‘communal autonomy’ to run? To what lengths
will it go? Are we to find two fire brigades in a town, one Turkish and
one Greek, and the Greek fire brigade not going to a Turkish fire and the
Turkish fire brigade staying at home when there is a Greek fire?...
"All these things mean that the island will be administered not as a unit
from within but by men who will be looking East and West across the sea
for their instructions and guidance...
"From my own experience in Cyprus, I feel certain that the chances of the
acceptance of this plan will be greatly enhanced if the future procedure is
clearly laid down. I feel sure that those concerned will want to know what
is to happen at the end of these seven years..."
We have another statement from one who usually does not come in the way of
something being tried out, and that is the veteran Prime Minister of England, Lord
Attlee, who had a great deal to do with the emergence of India as an independent
country. He said:
"...I would say only this one word of warning: it is rather a dangerous
precedent to have governments from outside brought in because of their
co-religionist or may be their nationalist influences. There are many
places in the world which are inhabited by natives of different countries,
and if they were all to ponder about it they might ask for a finger in the
pie, and it would be extremely awkward."
Then there is a reference to India which I will not read out.
Therefore, this plan would really introduce a kind of tripartite imperialism into
Cyprus. And if either the Turks or the Greeks, or we as a United Nations, cared
for the freedom of the Cypriot people, we would regard that as a retrograde step.
Therefore, we suggest that this is not partnership. It has been argued - and we
accept in all good faith the sincere professions of the British Government - that
they do not aim at partition. It is not a question of what we aim at as policy, but
when we build institutions which are bound to compartmentalise ambition, which
are bound to compartmentalise social objectives, then you get a divided nation. It
is possible to divide any nation that is united by the creation of separate interests,
with the best of motives in the world.
In Cypriot politics there always is an element of religious leadership because of

the position of the national movement. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to
quote here what the Archbishop of Canterbury has to say about this. Incidentally,
he is also not entirely a religious person only, because he is a member of the
House of Lords, a member of Parliament. He said:
"...I believe that partition in Cyprus would be the sign of final and total
failure to find a solution: it would be a counsel of despair."
Then we have a former Colonial Under-Secretary, Lord Lloyd, who said:
"...Partition is never a very satisfactory solution, politically or

economically. It is particularly unsatisfactory in a small island like
Cyprus, which is only just viable even as things stand at present. Partition
of Cyprus would present much greater problems than the partition of
Ireland. In Ireland, there was the homogeneous Protestant community in
the north, whereas in Cyprus the Turkish community is spread out evenly
over the whole island; so that in the event of partition, transfer of
population would be inevitable."
We have some disastrous experiences of transfer of populations - "transfer" is a

euphemistic word - of the exodus of populations, millions of them, as a result of
the disastrous policies pursued in the past which resulted in partition. I am free to
say that partition may become inevitable in certain circumstances, but it would be
wise statesmanship not to lay the foundations of the edifice which can only be
sustained on the basis of partition. Therefore, we make no apologies for saying
that my country and my Government, for such influence as it may have, as part of
its duties, would unequivocally say that any plan which leads to the dissection of
this island, any plan that thwarts the national growth of these peoples, is a plan
that is retrograde. It is not likely to lead to peaceful settlements but to unpeaceful
ones, for essentially this requires the co-operation of the Greek and Turkish
communities so-called.
If one can get the Greek and the Turkish communities to agree to remain in this
way, equally they could agree to come together. If it is based upon agreement,
why can that agreement not be used for other purposes?
REFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE TO THE RADCLIFFE REPORT17

References has been made to the Radcliffe Report and the representative of the
United Kingdom has said that this report or this proposal was a good one, that it
should have been accepted; the Greeks are sorry that they did not encourage
acceptance of it. All these are facts or opinions which do not affect the factual
findings of that distinguished jurist. One may not agree with the political
conclusions of a judge or of a distinguished lawyer, but one can always place a
great deal of reliance on his analysis of facts. This is what Radcliffe said in his
report:
"The people of Cyprus, I have reminded myself, are an adult people

enjoying long cultural traditions and an established educational system,
fully capable of furnishing qualified administrators, lawyers, doctors, and
men of business. It is a curiosity of their history that their political
development has remained comparatively immature. It is owed, I think, to
a people so placed that, when they are invited to assume political
responsibility, the offer should be generous in the sense that, within the
field offered, no qualification or restriction should be imposed that is not
honestly required by the conditions of the problem."
My delegation has purposely refrained from entering the strategic arguments that
have been brought into this question. It makes no difference to us whether the
Greeks and the Turks and the British and everybody else agreed with regard to
strategy or otherwise, but we would say that the primary consideration in this
matter is what Mr. Noble has said: the welfare and the interest of the people of
Cyprus. They are the principal factors in this matter, and in the British tradition
particularly as it has developed within the last ten or fifteen years, and according
to the Charter of the United Nations as set out in Article 73, these non-self-
governing countries are maintained in trust - not legally but morally maintained in
trust - and the great day of fulfilment is when they take it over.
According to the Radcliffe Report as regards Cyprus today:
"...Not all education is special to its own community...There are mixed

villages shared by Greek and Turk. Many Turks speak Greek as well as
Turkish, and the English language is a potential instrument of common
17
In 1957, at the request of the United Kingdom Government, Lord Radcliffe prepared a draft
constitution for Cyprus. It did not find acceptance.
understanding."
Then again, he goes on to say:
"I am conscious that I do not know enough about the problem. Their
representatives have worked together in the past in the service of the
Government, in municipal administration, in the activities of co-operative
societies and of district improvement boards...
"There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities

and, apart from other objections, federation of communities which does
not involve also federation of territories seems to me a very difficult
constitutional form..."
It is analogous to a theocratic state which is out of date in a modern civilisation.

He then goes on to say:
"I do not think that it will be advantageous to embroil the Governor in the
internal controversies of the self-governing side..."
Therefore, whichever way we look at it, whether we look at viability, whether we

look at harmony - whether we look at what the representative of Morocco spoke
about a while ago, that Cyprus, instead of being a point of conflict, a point of
trouble between Turkey and Greece, would become a place where, on account of
their spiritual, racial and other interests, they would find a field of co-operation -
this would go completely against that.
I would also like to pose a question. Let us assume for a moment, for argument’s
sake - and only for argument - that Cyprus was so partitioned, either obviously
partitioned, by putting a political saw across, or where institutions were created
with each community, as was said by Lord Winster, looking across the seas for
support, what would be the position? The conflicts, the measuring of strength
between the two communities, would not depend either on the numerical position
inside the island, or on the economic position, or the strength of fist, but would
directly involve Greece and Turkey. The two parts, A and B, would, each one, be
the beachhead for the country with which that community is said to be affiliated.
So instead of promoting peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, as it is called,

instead of seeing what we have been constantly told are friends and allies working
together, it would not be a bone of contention because it is already there. But it
would harden the positions, it would lay the very sure foundations of a conflict
where Greece and Turkey would stand ranged on the island of Cyprus ostensibly
protecting their protégés, but with all the other troubles, whether it be Macedonia
or Thrace or anything else, added to it.
From the international point of view to which Mr. Noble has made repeated
references, this solution, which is not what is sought by the United Kingdom
Government, though they say they do not rule it out now, is not a solution which
will lead to peace and harmony or to the fulfilment of the purposes of the United
Nations. We recognise that after many years of colonial rule, after there has been
violence and bloodshed, after there has been repression, after there has been all
those factors that take place when there is a conflict of a ruling power and a
nationalist movement, it may not be easy to build a bridge from one State to the
other. That perhaps would take time or perhaps would take a degree of
gradualism. But that does not mean that the objectives can be changed.
We in the United Nations, apart from our own national positions, must be
governed by the principles of the Charter, and those principles accord to the
peoples in non-self-governing territories the capacity to become self-governing.
My delegation has consistently declined to give its support to resolutions, whether

they came from the Greeks or from any one else, to self-determination, so-called,
in regard to Cyprus. It is not because we do not subscribe to the principles of the
Charter, but there can only be self-determination when we have determined what
the "self" is. Self-determination must follow self-government as the very
justification of keeping anybody under colonial rule is that they are not fit to rule.
If they are not fit to rule, how can they make decisions about ruling? Therefore,
self-determination, as the Right Honourable Aneurin Bevan18 pointed out in the
House of Commons the other day, must always follow self-government. Self
must determine itself, and also we cannot use this idea of self-determination to
thwart national ambitions and national fulfilment in various ways.
With regard to dealing with colonial questions, the Empire, in the past under
conditions rather different and in modern times, has followed different policies. It
is commonly said that on the continent of Africa there is the Lugard tradition, that
there is some other tradition between the West and the East. It is commonly said
that if we are going to get anywhere we should rather follow the direction pointed
out by Lord Durham rather than Lord North. In Cyprus in this particular matter,
this kind of thing would have to be imposed upon the people because there is no
evidence that the people have either consented or that they have been consulted.
It has been stated in these debates that flexibility would call for a conference
between the Greeks and the Turks and the British as being so-called "concerned"
Powers - it is easy to concern oneself in other people’s affairs - plus two other
NATO countries which are not concerned. Then it goes on to say that the
representatives of the Cypriot parties may also attend. They sit on the doorstep.
The people who are most concerned sit on the doorstep attending, while the other
people participate.
In all this, it is well to remind ourselves of the only resolution that stands valid
today of the United Nations, resolution 1013 of the eleventh General Assembly.
This resolution states in its operative part:
18
A leader of the Labour Party and member of British Parliament
"Expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution
will be found in accord with... the Charter of the United Nations."
Can it be said that in two years there has been a more peaceful approach to this
problem? Certainly there has been no democratic approach to this problem.
My delegation is not competent to say what is a just solution because that must be
proved by events... Consent is of the essence of the democratic process, and
there has been no evidence of consent...
WE DO NOT SAY THAT THERE ARE NO DIFFICULTIES. We do not say

that more difficulties have not been created in the last two years or that they have
not come into being. But it is always a dangerous precedent in these matters to
sow the wind because the whirlwind is the result. If separatist tendencies are
either glorified or welcomed, then those separatist tendencies will become
themselves the obstacles to progress.
What I have said may perhaps give the impression that one only looks at one side
of the picture. There has been progress in the sense that the overwhelming
opinion in the United Kingdom is in favour of a peaceful and democratic
settlement in Cyprus which will enable it to take its place in the comity of nations.
There is no doubt that whatever may be the defects of the plan itself, the plan is an
attempt, with which we do not agree perhaps, to find a solution which involves
sacrifice of authority by the United Kingdom Government.
The very fact that the United Kingdom is having it discussed here is also a change
of attitude in the sense of either seeking the co-operation of the United Nations or
not wanting to conceal any facts in this matter. All these are items of progress. I
believe that the statement made by British authorities that they would have
conversations with various leaders of the Cypriot movement is also a step
forward. But it is not a step forward to have five independent nations
participating in a conference at which the main people concerned may not attend.
The decision must come about by co-operation and by peaceful negotiation with
the Cypriot people, who are the main parties and to whom power must be handed
over.
The representative of the United Kingdom said in 1957 that the main difficulty in
this matter was enosis; that is to say, the fear that freedom would mean the loss of
liberty to the island in another way. In his statement, Mr. Averoff Tossizza, the
representative of Greece, said:
"Greece has never fostered expansionist designs on Cyprus. It does not set
its ambitions on the level of territorial expansion, which, in our time, is an
outmoded political concept of domination. What Greece has always
desired has been the liberation of the Cypriot" - I do not subscribe to all
these words - "from the chains of an assertive colonialism which they have
for so long been struggling to break."
The significance of this passage is that whatever may have been the position in
the past, today both the Cypriot national leaders as well as the Greeks look
forward to the development of self-government and independence, of statehood
and nationhood. I am not prepared to say that this was the policy in the past. But
we have been told that it was the policy of enosis which stood in the way. We
welcome the development of this national consciousness in Cyprus. I feel sure
that as a result of our deliberations here, if the United Nations were to give some
sense of faith and some sense of feeling of a desire to go forward, peaceful
negotiations will lead somewhere, to the flowering of the fullness of nationhood
at the appropriate time in Cyprus; that would be the strongest factor in attenuating
the process of violence. Then it would be possible for us to appeal to the Cypriot
people and the world would look to the Cypriot people to take the gun out of
politics. The world would equally look to the United Kingdom to follow a policy
of pacification, whereby violence would not ensue. The path of progress,
therefore, would lie in seeking, in the terms of the United Nations Charter, the
promotion of self-government without in any way jeopardising the integrity of
Cyprus.
For 3,000 years this island has remained one and entire. There has been no
Turkish Cyprus, there has been no Greek Cyprus, there has been no Assyrian
Cyprus. Whether the Greeks accept it or not, whether the Turks accept it or not, it
has a distinct personality. And some of us are not unfamiliar with Cypriots or
with their life or their speech or their looks. Therefore, if nationality is not
something that springs from the beginning of time, it is a social process and that
process can be either obstructed or forwarded.
The path of peace, the objectives of the Charter, and the solution of this problem,
either now or in the far future, depend upon the acceptance of these ideas and
seeking for ways of peaceful settlement...
DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, December 13,
196019
[In 1960, the General Assembly considered an item entitled "Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" at the request of
the USSR which presented a draft for the declaration. Asian-African countries
welcomed the Soviet initiative and formulated their own draft which was
sponsored by 43 countries.
On December 14, 1960, the Assembly adopted the Asian-African draft by 89 votes
to none, with 9 abstentions. By this Declaration - resolution 1514 (XV) - the
Assembly solemnly proclaimed "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations."
The following is the statement by Mr. Menon during the discussion of this item.]
We are now coming very near to the end of a great debate which has taken several
days of the working time of this Assembly, over fifty speaking hours, and in
which some seventy speakers have participated. It is easy to say that words do
not have a real effect, but the very fact that the Assembly, in the seriousness of its
business has devoted its time to this item, and that a number of nations have
participated in the debate - both those who have been here for a long time and
those others who have joined, on whom the impact of the subject which we are
discussing is more recent than on some of the others - is eloquent in itself. It
should not be forgotten, however, that some of the more powerful nations of
today who are here have also gone through the phase of being under colonial rule,
and it is much to their credit and the advantage of the world as a whole that they
still have memories of it and of their effort to throw it off, and are aware of its
impact upon the history of the world.
The subject comes before us this time, thanks to the initiative of the Soviet Union,
in the shape of an item on the agenda; but it is by no means a new matter to the
United Nations, being written into the Charter. I will not read those words and
clauses, which are so familiar to everyone. Not only is it written into the Charter,
but a Chapter of the Charter deals with this problem of Non-Self-Governing
Territories, though perhaps in 1960 not as adequately in the present circumstances
of the world, as may have appeared in 1945.
Again that reminds us that even the Charter, good as it is, is not like the proverbial
law of the Medes and the Persians, unalterable, but has to be vivified, has to be
19
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
1238-45
made more useful, by being responsive to the developing conditions of the world.
Colonialism, as it is called, the expansion of countries outside their borders,

usually into far-off lands, resulting either in conquest or occupation, and what is
called government from a distance - that is what it used to be called in the
nineteenth century - is no new phenomenon, so far as we are concerned. I do not
want to go into all the ancient history of this. It goes back perhaps to the early
stages of the pre-Christian era, when Alexander the Great embarked upon his
expeditions right to the frontiers of our own country, where he won his battle, but
from where he returned without establishing an empire there. And then we had
the whole period of the development of Europe, where they were concerned with
their own internal troubles, European nations either coalescing with each other or
throwing the yoke of one on the other, so that the present colonial lands of Asia
and Africa did not attract their attention for a long time except in connection with
trade.
Now we come to the more important period of today. I say this because we
should not think that suddenly, with the industrial civilisation, a new idea
developed in the mind of man, because then we are likely to think that we should
not have to guard against these evils in the future. So in more recent times there
has been expansion. This expansion took place partly as a result of exploration,
partly in an attempt to gain riches, partly in order to provide for migration, and for
dozens of causes - through the merchant; the explorer; the promoter of
enterprises; the missionary; the political leaders of some countries; the advancing
might of armies; more and more in recent years, particularly since the industrial
revolution, the engineer; and also sometimes the very nationalistic, patriotic
expansionist who saw in the conquest of other territories the glory of his own. All
this is depicted by - I will not call it the newer surge of nationalism.
I WANT TO SAY A WORD ABOUT THIS CONCEPTION OF

NATIONALISM, because it is at once the cause, the soul of empire and the
mainspring of the resistance to it. After all, colonialism, as we understand it, is
the attempt to expand power from one’s own territory into another area. Europe
particularly, having gone through the phase somewhere about the sixteenth
century, or perhaps a little earlier, of having evolved into nations from small tribal
States, found in that unification the possibility of greater unity. Now, as then, it
was often coloured by idealism: either it could be talked about in the shape of
pan-Christian ideas or the spreading of some universal doctrines, or the spread of
the gospel, or whatever it may be. In fact, you will find that in the expansion of
all these areas the source of authority has come from charters or other instruments
granted to explorers which give the sovereign power of life and death over non-
Christian peoples. It appears in the clauses of the charter of the East India
Company in regard to India, in which Queen Elizabeth gave these merchants, who
were private citizens in her kingdom at that time, sovereign rights of life and
death over non-Christian people. That is how her empire began. But it is a great
mistake to think that one motive or another can explain this.
And so we go through various phases where people explore everywhere in search

of wealth and do not find it, or as in the case of Columbus, they stumble by
mistake upon another land of vast riches, and so on. Skipping over this period
from the early times of the explorers, or the Phoenician period, we hear of the
discoveries that gave America its name by the Italian explorer, as it is said - I do
not vouch for this. Afterwards there came the expansion to the four great
territories of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the American continent, resulting in
what today - or yesterday, I should say - what yesterday was the situation, where a
small number of people in each of these metropolitan countries ruled a very
considerable number of people in other areas. But fortunately this phenomenon,
with the exception of one or two countries, or one or two combinations, is on the
way out.
If I may submit without being misunderstood, one of the most potent hindrances,
one of the greatest impediments in the way of progress, is not to recognise that
progress is being made, because if we do not recognise that progress is being
made, we are likely to apply the same remedies, have the same reactions to the
changed conditions as to the previous conditions and thereby get all our
orientation and our policies misrepresented, misunderstood and misapplied.
Similarly, if we do not recognise that progress is being made, it is very likely that
those who have been pressured into progress either by the agitations of colonial
peoples or by liberal sentiments in their own countries will be encouraged to fall
back and say to their own peoples, "We told you so." Therefore, we have to
recognise that some progress has been made.
IN MODERN TIMES, SINCE THE FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE, the

European peoples, not knowing how to preserve their meat, had to resort to
spices, and it was about that time that they learned the art of cooking properly. At
the time when Constantinople went out of the Christian ambit as such, the sea
routes became open and then all the European population, led by the Portuguese
and the Spaniards, followed by the Dutch and the French, and the English last,
came into all these areas. They spread out into the new world in America, they
spread out into Asia, and later on, in some cases they spread out into Africa.
At first this exploration was carried out by people with a real desire to travel to
these lands, the great sea dogs of the time, people who just wanted to explore for
the sake of exploration. But these exploration enterprises remind us of some of
our modern sports tournaments; that is to say, some person who wants to establish
himself in a very big way in some sport and wants to play in tournaments abroad
gets promoted by the manufacturer of some commodity used in that sport. In the
same way, behind the explorer gathered those interests who could gain by his
explorations; thus economic interests got tied up with the pioneering spirit. But
again, we must not forget that the great urge was nationalism, that it was the birth
of nationalism in the European nation States, pride in a flag, rivalry with other
nations, the fear that other nations may establish themselves in areas to the
disadvantage of themselves, that pushed people forward time after time.
First we have the phase - and when we speak about phases we have to look for
clear-cut, sharp lines of division - first we have the phase of the empires of
settlement. Those empires of settlement may have arisen either as a result of a
deliberate policy of sending people out or because - I will not mention names - in
some cases of great imperial countries they used these far-away places to deport
personalities whose liberal ideas were not acceptable at home; therefore the
convict settlements as they were called at that time, were composed of miscreants
and anti-social people, as we would call them now. But they were probably the
pioneers of revolutions, those who rebelled against the old order at home, so they
were sent abroad to the colonies of settlement. In those areas the indigenous
populations by and large became extinct and the settlements became practically
patches of the old country in a new area. They were the colonies of settlement
which are now full-fledged nations, and they have in various ways contributed
both to progress and to regress in regard to this colonial system.
Then we come to the period from the beginning of the third phase, from the
nineteenth century onward, when, as a result of the second industrial revolution
and the growth of technology, and through mercantile expansion, the search for
markets and raw materials began. Machines produced large quantities of goods.
Sweated labour was available in the home country for some time. However, that
source did not last because the people who were drawn from the rural part of the
countryside into the towns in countries like the United Kingdom, for example,
saw the attractions of industry and a way to live better, and so they began to put
pressure on those who owned the machines because they wanted higher wages.
However, there was overseas a source of this underpaid labour and there was no
particular difficulty in obtaining labourers. Most of these territories were not
democratic. Public opinion of course always exists but agreements were reached
with individual rulers which were to the advantage of the colonising nations.
So we have a period where raw materials were produced by sweat-shop labour

and where there were vast markets of underpaid people whose purchasing power
was small but who made up for it by their numbers. Thus you have an empire
which, it is generally argued, is an empire of profit. That was so in the old days,
because it is most unlikely that most of these colonising expeditions would have
taken place if there had been no profit involved and thus no incentive.
THEN CAME THE BREAK WITH IMPERIALISM, IN WHICH THERE HAVE

BEEN MANY PIONEERS from distant times up to more modern times. The first
break with imperialism was when some of the colonies revolted and in other cases
the colonies - as I said, they were colonies of settlement - began to organise
themselves into communities and as a result of the breakaway of others, some
concession had to be made to them. I will not go into great detail about this or
into the controversies that prevailed in the home countries. The most outstanding
instance of this is the breakaway of the thirteen American colonies which was
achieved under conditions which are well known in history by this time. This
however had an effect - I suppose I may be wrong - on the expansion of the
United States in later times because right through history you will find that the
consolidation of that territory as it is today was by and large not achieved by the
process of conquest but by methods which today perhaps we would decry but
which at that time were regarded as progressive, namely, the purchase of
territories. Thus we have the purchase of Florida, of Alaska, Louisiana or Rhode
Island, which is very different from the way the colonial frontiers expanded in the
case of other imperial territories.
In more modern times the most outstanding instance of the abdication of

colonialism was soon after the 1917 revolution in Russia when the imperial
possessions of the Czar were dispossessed by the Russians themselves. I will not
go into the details of it, and this is no reference to modern history, it is only a
historical survey of a situation. However, by that time other events had taken
place.
IN MORE MODERN TIMES THE RULE OF COLONIAL PEOPLE HAS BEEN

of one race over another and thus, apart from the economic factor, the racial
element was important and gave rise to a racial doctrine, which now persists in
South Africa and other places: "There are some people who are born to rule and
some others to be ruled, and it is not possible to train people of certain racial
origins to practise self-government." As against that, there was both in the
metropolitan countries and in the countries so ruled a revolt against it. So there
was some opposition to the racial doctrine, which however was responsible for
the growth of slavery. But with the abolition of slavery on the one hand and the
progress of liberal doctrines in the home country on the other, the situation
changed.
However, the most outstanding instance in the context of our thinking was the
blow to this racial superiority which was struck - though it seems far-fetched
today - when in 1905 the Japanese defeated the Russians in the Russo-Japanese
War. In those days we did not think of economic, ideological and other questions
as we do today. But the whole of Asia saw this as the defeat of a European
empire by a small, short-statured Asiatic people. I am not going into the question
of the relevance of this struggle or the title to Port Arthur or anything of that kind.
I am only dealing with the psychological aspect.
All through that period when we were but children, this idea - which may have
been a very half-cooked idea - that there was no longer a superiority of race
spread.
THEN IT WAS FURTHER DEVELOPED IN THE PERIOD OF THE FIRST
WORLD WAR. I am not for a moment suggesting that wars are to be prepared
for or that they should take place in order that colonies should be liberated. But at
the time of the First World War a great part of the world - I would not like to say
how much, but the greater part of the world - was under colonial domination or
something of that kind. Here I should like to say that a colony is a colony
whatever it may be called. The British system, with which I am more familiar, has
many types of colonies, such as Crown colonies, which in the beginning were the
private property of the Crown, dependencies - India was called a dependency, not
a colony - protectorates, and protected States. There are places like Malta which
thirty years ago was called a British ship. Then there are other areas, but from an
economic, social or political point of view all these are really part of the colonial
empire.
So in modern times we have the great colonial Powers, the United Kingdom,
France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. It is interesting that it is the most
powerful of these empires that have given way first; this has been due to a large
number of circumstances, and world organisations played their part in this - and I
mention the International Labour Organisation in Geneva in this connection. This
was one of the survivors of the League of Nations which even survived the
outbreak of the Second World War. With the impact of the International Labour
Organisation it became difficult for countries that respected conventions to
maintain the standards of labour in dependent countries, and impossible for them
to do so formally.
Secondly, there was the spread of movements devoted to the emancipation and
elevation of the working classes. This also made it difficult for the continuation
of this process; so that in some instances, not all of them, you will find that
empires have ceased to pay. Although empires have ceased to pay, this does not
mean that some people did not make considerable profits on account of political
power or that some countries did not do so. However, what is usually forgotten is
that the great military arm of the Powers, the item that goes under the
consolidated account with regard to obligations undertaken for these purposes,
also comes under the cost of empire. So while it is quite true that it could be said
that such and such a country spent so much on a territory, and that its balance of
trade is favourable or unfavourable, that presents only one part of the picture. But
at any rate there is very little doubt that this was one of the considerations.
THEN LATER, WHEN THE WORLD BEGAN TO BE DIVIDED UP...

between the great Powers, yet another category of empire was introduced, or
came into existence, that usually called "spheres of influence." So when France
and Germany and Great Britain claimed various spheres of influence in various
places, those territories, while sovereign, still did not have independence.
Now, there are cousins, descendants, of this today. As I said, there were
"vacuums" being filled in the way of ambassadors in some countries who are not
viceroys there, but who sometimes function as such. There is also the attempted
penetration or conquest of the mind, as it is called - or conquest of the body, it
may be. These things still resurrect themselves in various forms.
Now, why do I say all these things? Because, looking at the figures, we would
find a vast liquidation process - I will give you the figures in a moment - a vast
liquidation process where we are told that these great, enormous empires are now
shrunken... But as to independence of the former colonies, we have to see whether
the real substance is there, and if it is there, whether it is likely to last. In that
connection one would like to say that while we debate here day after day - and
seventy speakers have taken part in the discussion - there is an air of unreality
about the whole business, considering what happened in Algeria only two days
ago; when there are countries today like France and Portugal that claim the people
of these places are nationals of the metropolitan countries. As I have repeatedly
said to this Assembly the British did not insult us by calling us Englishmen; the
Portuguese and the French do the equivalent of that.
The war that has been raging in Algeria for seven or eight years could not be
called a Moslem revolt, an Arab revolt or a revolt of anybody else: it is really a
war of colonial independence, of the same type that occurred in this country, of
the same type that has occurred in China. This has not occurred in our country
because we achieved our independence by other methods, though you could also
call it a war in some other form if you like. It is the resistance of the people
against the force of arms, against the armed might of great empires.
THAT BRINGS US TO THE CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL OTHER

PROBLEMS concerned with world politics, and I want to spend the little time I
have, not in the description either of the balance-sheet of empire in terms of
pounds and pence or dollars and cents, or of the costs of this, that or the other. I
think we must be realistic; we must realise that empires can flourish only in one
way, and that is by imperialist methods. That is to say, when you want to
suppress somebody, you will suppress them. So we have to take this in our stride
and see how the modern world is likely to assist in the survival or the liquidation
of imperialism.
On the one hand, after the period of the first World War, with the break-up of the
Ottoman Empire the greater part of Western Asia began to achieve its freedom
irrespective of whatever internal progress in democracy might have been made.
The Ottoman Empire, defeated in the war, in the old days would have had its
territories annexed; but with the revolution in Czarist Russia, one of the great
Allies in the war was removed from the context of the empire. With the
emergence of the United States as one of the great Allies, having one of the
strongest voices in the making of the peace treaties, its President brought up that
conception once more before the world, but it was called "the sacred trust" - I am
not talking about trusteeship at the moment. But there were no other peoples in
the world that professed this. This brought in what, in the future, would emerge
as a new theory of sovereignty, that is, sovereignty thrust on the people but not
conferred upon them. What the empire does is just to oppress them; it remains
latent and legal. And then the empire is lifted and the sovereign people come into
their own. This really should be the modern theory of sovereignty instead of the
command of a sovereign, anyway in the modern period.
So first of all there was this conception that there would be no annexations of
territory, and though the discussions at Versailles and Geneva did not produce the
results that were required, there was a break with imperialism; and so you find a
third phase, where the attempt is made - at least in words - to expand or transform
empires into what may be called "brotherhoods."
This is all the positive side of it. But at the same time there is the other side of the
picture. There is Algeria; there is South Africa, where there is a situation of
another type - I am not referring to the Union itself - where a Trust Territory has
been misappropriated by the administering Power and treated as part of an
empire; there is the situation in the Portuguese territories, where alone in the
world today forced labour bordering on slavery prevails; there is, again, the
attempt by France by force of arms to subjugate a people who are as capable of
and as much entitled to freedom as any community sitting here, and who have
demonstrated to the world that their sacrifices and capacities, in spite of their
limitations, could be as great as their aspiration for independence.
BUT IN THIS MATTER WE MUST NOT FORGET - and this is where, perhaps,
there should be some soul-searching on the part of the people concerned - that the
great military alliances of the world are an aid to these empires. It so happens that
these great colonial Powers like France and Portugal depend on these alliances.
Let us take Portugal as an example. Portugal is a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO), and this organisation definitely states that these
alliances are not only in regard to the metropolitan countries but in regard to the
whole of the sovereign areas. Now, it is quite difficult for a country like the
United States, which has no colonies except for the territories in the Pacific area
which could be considered in this broad category - it is quite difficult for them to
say that they will make an alliance, but minus these territories. Whether or not
there is going to be any such alliance, that would be a matter which I would not
wish to go into. But it becomes an alliance with an empire. It is as though a free
man were making a friendly agreement with a slave-master in regard to both his
own free possessions and the master’s possessions.
So these great military alliances, whether in the North or in Europe or elsewhere,

become part of an agreement with colonialists of the worst type. It is not only in
theory that this is bad - and here, now, there may be reservations on this; we
believe that the resources of metropolitan France and Portugal for the oppression
of the colonies, their moral power to maintain them, the size of the opposition that
the revolting people have to face, are all affected by this factor. Portugal has
proclaimed before that its presence in NATO attracts the friendship of its oldest
ally, the United Kingdom. One of the oldest treaties in existence is that between
the United Kingdom and Portugal.
Although the United Kingdom has made great strides in advancing independence
- sometimes tardily, sometimes under pressure, sometimes under various
circumstances as in the case of our own country, or, as in the case of the United
States, by revolt followed by agreement - there still remain vast possessions. And
these vast possessions have to become free countries.
CERTAIN PROBLEMS HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AT THIS STAGE.

First, what is to happen to small areas of 50,000, 100,000 or 200,000 people who
are as conscious of nationalism as any large country? To say to them that they are
only a small speck of land somewhere and that they cannot be independent would
neither fit into the Charter nor satisfy their desire for liberty in their own lands.
That is one of the problems that both the United Nations and the metropolitan
countries have to face. And I would like to submit that any attempt either to
disregard their desire for national independence on the one hand, or to tell them
they will be free in their master’s home on the other hand, would not in the long
run meet the bill.
The Assembly will remember the recent example of Cyprus. Cyprus,

incidentally, brought modern Greece into the context of anti-colonialism -- and I
hope it remains there. We found one of those great European countries, a NATO
ally, standing up ultimately for colonial independence; but when they first came
here, the idea was to divert attention from the agitation in the colony by
presenting it either as a defence problem or a security problem for some people,
or making the Cypriots a bargain for a cut-up among two or three people.
My own Government took the view that there was no question of this being
anything but a colonial matter. Cyprus, by law and by circumstances, by
economic factors, political factors, sociological factors, was a colony and nothing
but a colony and, therefore, had to be treated as a colonial country entitled to full
independence, and although it took a great deal of struggle in the United Nations -
perhaps not always with the assistance of everybody concerned - Cyprus
ultimately attained its independence, though on that basis it has been vitiated by
circumstances. What I want to point out is that in the attempt to argue against the
people who want freedom, often extraneous circumstances are introduced, which
may perhaps provide some help for some time, but ultimately the people claim
their own; and all that is left behind is a great deal of ill will and newer problems,
newer complications which, if subject peoples do not take enough care, will
become what will be called a joint imperialism.
I think it is right to say that a mandate, or a trusteeship, certainly represents the
idea of the sacred trust and of divesting the old country of its colonial territories,
but if the United Nations does not stick to the principles of the Charter and its
spirit and intent, then it is likely to become a joint domination of a helpless people
by a more powerful people. This is always in the minds of the colonial peoples.
NEXT, I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY, BEFORE I COME TO SPECIFIC

PROBLEMS, that sometime in 1939 the colonial territories of the great Powers
were the following: the United Kingdom alone had about 13 million square miles;
France had a huge empire of about 4 million square miles, eighty times that of
Belgium; the Netherlands had its own colonies. All that is now dispersed, but still
there are in this world somewhere about 75 million people who are under colonial
rule. Out of the 75 million people, some 20 million belong to the British
hegemony and are on the path towards self-government. Therefore, there actually
remain some 50 million people still to be liberated; and when we think that out of
this 50 million, 14,871,195 belong to the empire of Portugal, we have the
situation that the Portuguese are the biggest imperial power in the world. And it
would be no answer to say that these people are not colonials, that they are
Portuguese citizens, as I think has been argued here. So the greater part of these
50 million people are the 14 to 15 million in the Portuguese empire and the 11 to
12 million in Algeria. Thus, between France and Portugal are divided the largest
colonial possessions - not the most scattered, but the largest colonial possessions.
In regard to their position in Africa, certain new problems are faced. Unless
colonialism is totally liquidated on the African continent, it is more prone to
become the scene of contending ambitions, either real or suspected, which will
place the fortunes and development of the African people in serious jeopardy.
Therefore, the total withdrawal of the empire from these territories is necessary
and, as in the case of peace and war, there is no half way house in this: either you
have an empire or you do not have an empire. And this is why we do not believe
that it would be possible to progress from stage to stage at this period of world
evolution.
THERE IS NO COUNTRY IN THE WORLD THAT IS NOT CAPABLE of

governing itself. We have all had the experience of being asked, just before our
imperial rulers left us: "Who will command your armies? Who will command
your air force and your fleet? Who will administer? Who will run the finance
ministry?", and so on. None of us found very serious difficulties with it any more
than other countries, and I believe that these problems are common to
independent countries as well. But then we are told that there are countries in
Asia, such as Pakistan, India and Ceylon, which have ancient civilisations and,
therefore, have had long periods of the rule of law, and so on, but it is our
submission that civilisation is not a peculiar monopoly of any part of the world.
All we mean by making this distinction is that those of us who speak about it
probably do not understand other people’s civilisations; so we must abandon this
distinction also and go straight to the position that this world must really be free
in that sense. There should be no territory under foreign rule, no country whose
territory can be used by someone else for purposes that have no relation to the
benefit or the advantage of the people who inhabit it. That is why, particularly in
this present time of vast military alliances, when the old system of strategic
points, lifelines of empire, etc., is being transformed into the position of holding
the strategic areas for purposes which are not strictly germane to the progress of
the country, we must present our opposition.
As a result of this debate, whatever may have been the nature of the facts
presented, the attention of the world which we represent is largely focussed upon
this question. We have also the situation that the resources of the world are
attracting greater attention than ever before; and in this question of world
development, every item of liberation, the more people we bring into the area of
dynamic freedom, then the more people there are for constructive endeavour.
Let us take the case of Africa: the vast untold resources of the world are in Africa.
This is not a counsel for other people to go and exploit them. In an area of
somewhere about 11 million square miles with a population of about 222 million,
98 per cent of all the diamonds in the world, 94 per cent of all the columbite, 84
per cent of the copper, 55 per cent of the gold, 45 per cent of the radium, 33 per
cent of the manganese, and so on, are in this continent; and these are required not
necessarily for the purpose of building armaments, but in order that the world may
move to higher standards of civilisation. Therefore, even from the point of view
of making available the resources of the world, and making those resources
available without the cost of blood and pressure - which is what a colonial war
means - it would be to our advantage to introduce this gospel to implement the
United Nations Charter in its reality. The Charter says this in what may be called
more or less embryonic language, but it should be made a reality in that we must
now address ourselves to the total liberation of these territories.
It is not a question of setting targets and dates. The only limitation of time on this
should be the time required for transfer. And if one may say so, those people with
a responsibility should not be permitted to take the attitude of the gauntlet with a
gift in it: that is, to say as in the case of the Congo, "There is freedom" - and then
to come back the other way because there had been no preparation for it. I think
that the Belgian Congo as it was formerly is the most distressing instance of an
empire of modern times. After seventy or eighty years of colonial rule nothing
has been left in the political, administrative or other organisations, and what is
more, after the withdrawal of the empire the former ruler comes back. That is one
thing we have to guard against.
The second thing is that no Trust Territory should be given independence merely
on the intimation of the Administering Authority that it is ready for independence,
without our being shown that it is so, and without the United Nations taking care
that the transfer of power will be carried out in such a way as to make re-entry
impossible. In the Fourth Committee soon we shall be discussing the problem of
Ruanda-Urundi, and my Government takes a serious view of this question. I
informed the Security Council only two days ago that, to the best of our
knowledge, there were two concentrations in Ruanda for the purpose of
operations against the Congo. But over and above that, we have now been told
that Ruanda-Urundi is fit for independence and, therefore, an election is to take
place in a short time. I do not want to discuss the details here because it will
come up in the Fourth Committee, but while we yield to no one in the passion to
limit the period of transition, we do not want to see that used in such a way that
independence becomes "independence"- that is, things change only to remain the
same or become worse.
Thirdly, I would like to say that we of the colonial areas who have been liberated
have to take to heart the lessons of the empires of the past, and the fate of the
peoples who are still not liberated. Therefore the Assembly, and particularly
those nations who have different views from ours on colonial questions, should
bear with us when we feel moved, when we seem to concern ourselves with
something that is not our own territory. The place of every liberated country - I
am not speaking of the others - is with the struggle of the colonial peoples. It is
the determined policy of the Government of India that while we shall not
participate in external military or other movements, while we shall not promote
trouble in any areas, while we believe that no revolutions can be exported, our
sympathies and our solidarity are with those who struggle for independence. It is
part and parcel of a country’s attainment of national independence that it does not
run away from the whole campaign for human freedom, for the freedom of
colonial peoples.
Again, it is necessary that people like ourselves who have been liberated from
colonial empires should see to it that our place in world politics is a functional
position leading to progress rather than to regression. That is to say, our
independent positions should not be used by us or by others in order to further
aggressive causes or to fasten tutelage upon other people. It would be the greatest
tragedy if some of our liberated countries found themselves aligned against the
campaigns of independence or the liberation of other peoples. That independence
is not real even though it may have all the forms and the trappings of
independence. The reality of independence must come from the people
themselves. And that reality is really not only political but also economic.
We, ourselves, do not object - in fact, it is a good thing - if there are fraternities
formed either among the liberated territories or with their former rulers on the
basis of freedom. But this should not be merely another name for empire -
whether you call it a commonwealth or co-operation, whatever it is - that would
not meet the situation. Those of us who are liberated have to make use of our
liberation. We should not be subject peoples under another name.
It is in the sense of the advancement of our territories in economic terms - more
food, more shelter, more sanitation, more education and more use of liberation -
that is the implementation of independence.
WE CONSTANTLY SAY IN INDIA THAT ON AUGUST 15, 1947, what

happened was not independence but the removal of the main obstacle to
independence, namely foreign rule; independence had still to be attained. When
people have adequate food, adequate shelter, adequate sanitation, adequate
dignity, the capacity to exercise them - that is independence.
No country should, under any circumstances, be drawn willy-nilly into any kind
of alliance, any kind of alignment which promotes either war or the domination of
that country. Far be it from me to say that sovereign territories which are
independent cannot make their own policies. But we have the right to hope that
people who have seen the consequences of the worst wars in history - the great
wars have been imperialist wars, whatever form they may take - should contribute
their might, their ideals, their moral authority, in order to extend the areas of
peace.
That is why you will find, in spite of the great conflicts in the world, that colonial
territories tend more and more to move into the position, even if they are formally
members of an alliance, of asking to be left alone. And I think the most
outstanding instance of this is the United States of America which for 150 years
wanted to keep free from foreign entanglements and wanted to be left alone for its
own economic development.
So it behooves those who are powerful people, who have other interests, not
necessarily of a selfish character, but who see things in another way, to leave
these territories alone to develop for themselves. The cause of world peace would
be assisted by the contribution that liberated peoples can make with the
enthusiasm which they bring, and by the evidence they give to the world that
human efforts and human co-operation can lead to advancement.
It should not be forgotten that in the last few years, apart from all alliances, apart
from all Charter provisions and so on, the conditions in the liberated territories,
which have an economic impact upon other countries, have led to the process of
co-operation. There is no country in the world today which either has refused to
receive or does not receive or does not give assistance in one form or another.
Therefore, willy-nilly, a form of world co-operation develops. But for all this, it
is necessary that there should be no reservations in this matter: no giving with one
hand and taking away with the other. That is why a young country like ours
stands very strongly against any imperialist Power making agreements before
independence in regard to either political, territorial or other rights. That is to say,
if these areas which are in tutelage before they become free agree, as the price of
freedom, to the establishment of bases or to enter into trade agreements or
military agreements, they have not gained real freedom.
The liberty that the liberated territories get is conditioned by the burdens which
they cannot carry. And I think the great countries of the world must take the risk
that in conditions of freedom, peoples would act sensibly, would act in the line of
progress and not otherwise; and immediate advantages should not take precedence
over these distant ideals.
IT IS ONE OF THE GREAT PHENOMENA OF THE WORLD that while some

forty or fifty years ago may be 1,200 million or 1,600 million people were under
one form of subjection or another and - if we exclude China which, though
colonial in an economic and social sense, was not so in a literal sense - nearly
1,000 million people were under colonial rule. As I said, only some 75 million
people are left, but they are scattered all over the world. They form a cancer on
the body politic of the world. So long as there is any place in the world which is
not liberated, so long as the people struggle for liberation, no attempt to give
colonial rule other names, no show of force, no military alliances or anything of
that kind, would succeed.
We have made progress on this subject at the present session. That progress has
resulted not only from the fact that we have debated these matters here, but from
the fact that the United Nations has asked Portugal to supply information.
Portugal is the last stronghold of colonialism, and that stronghold has not fallen
but it is very badly beleaguered. Spain has agreed to accept the provisions of the
Charter; Portugal has not agreed, and therefore stands today isolated. If this last
stronghold falls, we shall have made another advance.
But we must not forget that the real objective is to abolish from this world any
kind of rule by one nation or people of another nation or people, particularly if it
is based on racial discrimination and similar considerations. After all, a people’s
own economic interests are more important to it than the economic interests of
someone else.
THERE ARE VARIOUS DRAFTS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY ON THIS

SUBJECT. The first, the draft declaration in document A/4502, has been
submitted by the Soviet Union. We have read that text, and we find nothing in it
to which we can object. That is to say, we are in favour of national States
achieving their freedom in accordance with the freely expressed will and desire of
their peoples; we are against extraterritoriality of any form; and we are in favour
of the implementation of the principles of the Charter.
The second, the draft resolution in document A/L.323 and Add. 1-6, is sponsored
by my delegation, among others. It is quite true that the draft resolution could
have been shorter; perhaps there is a certain amount of repetition. On the whole,
however, it represents what I have been trying to submit to the Assembly. There
is no attempt at recrimination, no attempt to place responsibility on anyone but the
United Nations as a whole.
I would conclude by saying that the emergence of so many countries into freedom
is one of the great assets of the United Nations. While we may not always say
this in so many words - and it is not applicable to every country - we have to pay
a tribute to those countries which, whatever their past, have in more recent times
made progress. We must recognise that progress is being made, but it is not being
made fast enough. And the fact that progress is being made is no argument for
our stopping our efforts. In the next year or two we should see the liquidation of
all these dependent and colonial territories. All these places - whether they be
small, like the Island of Malta, or large, like Algeria - should emerge into
complete statehood and become members of this Organisation, unless they
themselves choose something else. We would be the last people to say that
because a State is independent it should not seek its fraternity. In fact, that is our
hope and it is the purpose of the present debate.
I hope that the drafts before the Assembly on the liquidation of colonialism will
gain unanimous approval. It will be recalled that when the decision was taken to
discuss this item my delegation said that we did not very much care where it was
discussed so long as it was discussed. It was unanimously decided to discuss it in
plenary meetings of the Assembly. That result was brought about by the
arguments presented here and it is an index of our capacity to persuade each other
and of the desire on all sides of this Assembly that colonial territories should be a
thing of the past, that this world should become really free and that the process of
peace and world co-operation should thus be facilitated.
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, November 20,

196120
[Mr. Menon made this speech during the discussion of the item on the
implementation of the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples.
India co-sponsored a draft resolution to set up a Special Committee to examine

the application of the Declaration, and to make suggestions and
recommendations. It was adopted on November 27, 1961, as resolution 1654
(XVI).]
20
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
712-15
...We no longer regard the termination of colonialism as a matter of agitation or
demand by the ex-colonial countries or the present colonial countries. It has now
become a matter for the United Nations, because they adopted resolution 1514
(XV) practically unanimously and, what is more, called upon countries governing
dependent territories to terminate their rule. So, it is no longer a question of
yielding to agitation on one side or even of going into the merits of the problem.
We have taken a decision on this. All that is required is, for those people who are
still in possession of power - whatever the legalities or modalities may be - to
surrender, and we shall thereby be able to save the time of the Assembly, and to
prevent new Congos from developing, or new Angolas or new Algerias, and still
better, see the end of the old Algerias, the old Congos and the old Angolas.
Now we have before us an item concerning implementation of this General

Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The resolution - considering the gravity of the
subject - is, except for its preamble, brief, and it points out that the subjection of
any people to alien subjugation or domination constitutes a denial of human
rights. But there is nothing in the resolution which is not already to be found in
the Charter. The difficulty in human affairs in the world is not that there are not
enough laws, ethical codes and so on, but that people do not obey them.
At the same time, it would be wrong for us to think that great advances have not
been made. Ex-colonials seem to monopolise the Chair of this meeting, whether it
be in the person of the President or of the Vice-President who now occupies the
chair. We heard from this rostrum only a few years ago - five, six, seven years
ago - demands for countries` independence, and today not only have they become
independent States, but their representatives preside over the destinies of this
Organisation. These are matters which we may sometimes forget, but if all
member States remembered them, they would see the enormity of their offence in
continuing colonial rule; because once the incubus of empire is removed, there is
released into the world not only the liberty of those people but also their vast
energies, the removal of their frustrations and the extension of the area of liberty
in this world as well.
In regard to resolution 1514 (XV), we have now passed from the stage of
demands, justifications, or even of complaints, to the point of implementing it.
Our purpose is now to carry out the decisions of the Assembly - and when I say
"our purpose" I mean not only colonials and ex-colonials, but the entire Assembly
must now be involved in the more practical task of dismantling the empires so
that the territories will be returned to their respective peoples, under conditions in
which their freedom can be enlarged and implemented. Thus will be corrected
some of the imbalances that exist, since this world cannot exist half free and half
slave, even as countries cannot do so...
WE UNFORTUNATELY ANTICIPATE THE FACT that, in spite of unanimous
decisions of the Assembly, there are countries - and fortunately very few of them
- which do not co-operate with the Assembly in the implementation of its
resolutions. For years this Assembly has been unable to obtain the co-operation of
the party directly concerned in respect of resolutions adopted on racial
discrimination and therefore, even as early as 1954 or 1955, we set up committee
where inquiries were undertaken in other parts of the world.
All members of the Assembly know that in the Fourth Committee, for the last two
years, we have been struggling hard in order to persuade the Government of
Portugal to perform its duties under the Charter; and for a long time even those
we thought would know better had been under the impression that the submission
of information on colonial territories was an act of grace. It is nothing of the
kind; it is an obligation laid down by the Charter on colonial countries that they
must submit information, with certain limitations, in regard to their dependent
territories. This is now accepted, and I am glad to think that, only a few hours
ago, in the Fourth Committee, another resolution on the subject of Non-Self-
Governing Territories, also of a character intended to further the process of
decolonisation, was adopted, calling upon metropolitan countries to take steps to
help the emergence of adequate indigenous civil servants and technical personnel
in dependent territories effectively to implement Assembly resolutions.
That particular point, although it has not yet come before the Assembly, is a
matter of great importance, especially when we look at it in the context of the
Congo. There is no greater condemnation of colonialism than what is taking
place in the Congo - and I am not thinking so much of the return of the Belgians
or the mercenaries or about Tshombe, or anything of that kind. The very fact that
a metropolitan country, after years of rule, leaves a territory in such a state of
anarchy that, after its withdrawal, civil war and outside intervention follow,
provides the worst picture of colonial rule that has come before this Assembly...
I REPEATEDLY SAID HERE THAT WE ALWAYS RECOGNISE and pay

tribute where we can for progress made. While the British Empire still has
something like thirty or forty colonial areas and some 30 or 40 million people
under its rule, this vast Empire on which it was said the sun never set, and which
stretched over the seven seas and covered all these continents, in that place the
process of unwinding has taken place. We ourselves take some pride in thinking
that we encouraged this process of unwinding. But still there are these territories -
though some of them, like Tanganyika, are on the verge of independence and I
hope that the territories of British East Africa will soon join us as independent
countries. I would like to express the hope that there will be no attempt made to
take away with one hand what is given with the other, because any attempt to
dilute the degree of national independence that is given will kick back in a very
bad way because the responsibility, in the sense of the exercise of power, will
have moved away with the metropolitan country and at the same time it will not
have become planted in the colonial people themselves.
So there is this vast territory of the former British Empire still left, and in some
cases like that of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, we are waiting with
bated breath to see what is happening, because at the beginning of this century,
under the impact of nineteenth century liberalism, the British Empire conferred
what was called independence upon a minority of people in that land of the Union
of South Africa, which is about 200 years behind modern civilisation in these
matters, with the result that a small minority was given "independence" to oppress
the others.
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, geographically, politically,

emotionally, and "morally" is contiguous to the Union. In the three territories of
Swaziland, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, which have geographical troubles, and in
the territory of South West Africa - which ought to be a Trust Territory - there are
special problems. If they merely follow independence, without following the
content of it, we shall again condemn millions and millions of people to a
domination and a racialism of a small minority. This is why my country keeps
vigilance over this matter. We have no desire to retard the progress of Rhodesia,
or Rhodesia and Nyasaland together. We have no desire to pronounce on the
merits or otherwise of federation or non-federation. But we are concerned to see
that the African and Asian populations and others who do not belong to the ruling
race as such, do not become the helots of an empire and do not have the same
kind of democracy that the Greeks had 2,000 years ago, when the fortunes and the
liberty of 300 people depended upon the suppression of 30,000. Therefore, while
we shall keep vigilance over that, we shall not thereby subscribe to the
perpetuation of empire. The United Kingdom has a responsibility to itself in this
matter, and to its partners in the Commonwealth, to the good example it has set in
the last few years by speeding up the process of liberation that in the name of
liberation more people shall not be condemned to racial helotry.
WE GO ON FROM THERE TO THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE of the twentieth

century empire, the empire of Portugal. This comparatively small country in
Europe had - I believe I am right about my figures - somewhere about 1.3 million
square miles of territory under its domination in Africa and in Asia and more
people live there than in Portugal itself.
Now here is probably not merely a perpetuation of colonialism but an attempt on

the one hand to mislead the Assembly by saying this is part of Portugal. I would
like you to examine this not merely from the point of view of verbal terminology.
But when a country says that another’s territory is its own, then it not only does
not take the position of the other metropolitan countries - shall we say Britain, for
example, which always said "we own this territory, we hope some day they will
be free" - that some day may be 500 years hence - but in the case of Portugal it
means that not only for today but for all time they deny independence to the
colonial peoples by saying, "You are not colonial peoples."
That is their way of doing it: they say, "You are not colonial peoples, you are part
of Portugal." But if they are part of Portugal then they ought to have the civic
rights and all the equalities that go with that status.
So here is a member of the United Nations that not only for today, not only for
tomorrow, but for all time, will deny the homeland of a people to the people to
whom it really belongs. And does any one think, when the mighty British Empire
thought it both politic, part of wisdom, part of common sense and part of decency,
to abdicate her power in her great Indian empire, does anyone think that the small
territory in India which Portugal regards as Portugal is going to remain in
subjection? Does he think that our desire not to foment warlike actions anywhere,
nor to take direct action, nor to create more difficulties in the world than there are,
is going to endure for long? Because peoples will not remain suppressed.
The other day, speaking in the Fourth Committee, because the representative of
Portugal had challenged some statements made by our Prime Minister, I had
occasion to reiterate that we as a State have not abjured the use of force. There are
large numbers of people in India who are pacifists, who will not use force.
Gandhi’s teachings are against force. But as a State we maintain an army, a navy
and an air force, and I hope a competent one. Therefore we have not abjured the
use of force. We have signed the Charter, and are willing to place at the disposal
of the United Nations the armed forces of our country. And therefore if aggression
continues forever, if our people are subjected to being shot in cold blood, if there
is no civil liberty and if the peace and security of our land on the one hand and of
the world as a whole is being endangered by the continuance of conflicts on our
territory, no one has the right - not under the Charter of the United Nations - and
there is no law of morality, no law of political ethics, no law of international
behaviour, to prevent a sovereign land like ours seeking to complete the liberation
of our entire country.
To us, as is often said in India, Goa is part of unfinished business. That is to say,
there were three colonial Powers on our territory, one was Britain, the largest of
all. We have dealt with that Power, and that is all that really matters. Then came
France, which had seven enclaves in our country, and by patient negotiations we
brought about a state where at any rate the de facto transfer of these territories,
small as they are, has taken place and I do not think the de jure transfer can be
very long in coming.
We have for long tried to negotiate, maintained our missions in Lisbon, negotiated
with these people. We have done so even when they went to the International
Court of Justice on some grounds which were not tenable, when they wanted to
claim the right of way on our sovereign territory in order to suppress their
colonials. We have always observed the Charter and the law of nations.
What I said the other day in the Fourth Committee remains the policy of my
Government. We shall not use force if we can avoid it. But when a time comes
and aggression continues in such a way, when thousands and thousands of people
are subjected to this situation, when our public opinion can no longer brook
having their own brothers slaughtered, when the territory becomes also an arena
of international intrigue, then, as a sovereign country, we retain our right to take
whatever action we please, subject to the law of nations. That is all we said and
that remains the position.
But having said that much, even to describe the context, we do not rush in these
matters, because we believe that the use of force, whatever may be the
justification, always has other consequences. But it is not possible for a sovereign
nation, adequately conditioned for its defences and for the maintenance of dignity
and sovereignty, to keep quiet for long. This is in no sense the language of
violence. It is not by the way of a notice to Portugal or anything in that character.
But our people are impatient and our Government has been engaged in the last so
many years in restraining that impatience, and we cannot for long suppress an
impatience which is based upon legitimate grounds and upon the desire to be free.
Now that covers some of the territories in Asia.
IN AFRICA, THERE ARE ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, and other

territories where today cruelty of a character which was not known in imperial
times, for hundreds of years, is being practised. There are people who have been
victims of the crime of murder, persons in large numbers driven away from their
homes, together with their families. There are large numbers of refugees. A type
of repression is practised that not only is not consistent with the Charter but also
is not consistent with the conduct expected of members of the United Nations.
We have not brought this up previously in any forum except to draw the attention
of other member States - and of public opinion - to it, and I hope public opinion
will take note of it, as public opinion will be the most effective solvent for all the
world’s evils, for it has today moved to a position where the country concerned
has no friends in the maintenance of its empire. We are one of those people who
desire to remain friendly with that country; our people have been associated with
Portuguese civilisation, although through the channel of conquest, for three or
four hundred years. There are people who speak the language; as in the case of
Pondicherry, it is not our desire, in the context of the independence or the
liberation of these areas, to wipe out what has been historically built up.
But, at the same time, the imperialism of Portugal is one of those things that
makes a mockery of resolution 1514 (XV). Here is a comparatively small
country. It is quite true - it has powerful allies. And again, without any offence to
any one, any of the great Powers, we should like to say that the armed alliance of
colonial countries with others causes us concern, because that might - as in the
case of Algeria, where, we are told, nearly half of the French air force and a
considerable part of France’s navy are deployed in the suppression of the
Algerian people - cannot last for long. Many countries in the world have now
recognised the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Many others
do not. It is only an exercise of discretion and patience. It will not be long before
France will have to recognise that there are no two ways, today, in 1961, of
dealing with colonial territories. Either one remains there and faces the
consequences, or one leaves and conforms to the principles of the Charter.
Consider, therefore, the French empire in Africa where, among other things,
there has been the use of territories and that neighbourhood for the purpose of
experiments with nuclear weapons, much against the desires and without the
consent of the African peoples.
So these are the unfinished parts of the colonial business...

PORTUGUESE COLONIES
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, November 13,
196121
[Portugal, which became a member of the United Nations in 1955, maintained

that its colonies were "overseas provinces" and refused to send information on
conditions in these territories to the United Nations as required by the United
Nations Charter. On December 15, 1960, the General Assembly, in resolution
1542 (XV) asked Portugal to transmit information, but it refused to comply.
The matter was discussed by the Assembly in 1961. On November 1961, India
introduced a draft resolution, on behalf of 36 countries, and it was adopted on 19
December as resolution 1699 (XVI). Under its terms, the Assembly condemned
the continuance of non-compliance by Portugal; established a Special Committee
to examine all available information on the territories; and requested member
States to deny Portugal any assistance which it may use for the suppression of
peoples in those territories.]
... there is hardly any need for further speeches on this subject except for the fact
that fundamental issues in regard to the competence of the Assembly’s resolution
of last year concerning Portuguese colonies and the current discussion of this
subject have been raised. The trend of affairs in the world, the trend of discussion
in this Committee coming even from present and former metropolitan countries,
with the exception, perhaps of one or two, make it very clear that any argument
for the purposes of persuasion is unnecessary. But at the same time Portugal
having raised the question that we, on the one hand are practising some kind of
discrimination, or on the other interpreting the law by a process of tortuous
construction, there are certain things that have to be said for the record.
First of all, I want to say, Madam Chairman, we did not deal with this question of
information or the basis on which information is to be given just this year or last
year. In fact, the Assembly addressed itself to this matter long before Portugal
became a member of the United Nations. Even at that time, most countries here
were ex-colonial countries, and they endeavoured to the best of their ability,
mainly for the sake of the United Nations so that it should become a universal
Organisation, to offer their assistance in the process of decolonisation even
though there were factors that prevented that mission. So no discrimination
charges can be laid at our door...
Article 73 is an obligation. It does not say to colonial Powers: do as you like.

"Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of
21
Source: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, November 1961
self-government," it says, "recognise the principle that the interests of the
inhabitants of these territories are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the
obligations to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and
security established by the present Charter, the wellbeing of the inhabitants of
these territories and to this end...to transmit regularly information..."
Secondly, even without this categorical statement, if a country by its becoming a

member of the United Nations accepts as a sacred trust the obligation to promote
the wellbeing of the inhabitants or recognises that the interests of the inhabitants
are paramount, it thereby accepts accountability, and the accountability in this
case is to the United Nations. Therefore, there is no question whatsoever that
Article 73, especially as read with Article 74 on the one hand and Article 10 on
the other, exempts any country from the obligations so undertaken.
THE NEXT ARGUMENT THAT IS ADVANCED BY PORTUGAL and her

friends is that this is a matter of interpretation. Interpretation became necessary
not because any of the other countries had refused to restrict or rather to define
the nature of information that may come and the factors involved in this...
The decision of the United Nations is not a matter of interpretation. It has come
after very careful consideration. The factors to determine the Non-Self-
Governing status of a territory and the obligation to transmit information
appended to resolution 748 were formulated in the 8th Assembly. Last year, the
Committee of Six countries - and these six countries included three who have in
one form or another close relations with Portugal, and two of them definitely are
metropolitan countries, even if you exclude the United States from that
classification - again gave very careful thought to this whole matter. This
Committee formulated 12 principles which were carefully scrutinised by the last
Assembly.
Now then, if you look at the formulation of these principles in the annex to
resolution 1541 of the 15th Assembly, what does it say?
"The authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in mind that Chapter XI
should be applicable to the territories which were then known to be of the colonial
type" - then meaning at the founding of the United Nations, not when Portugal
came in. Therefore, this principle is applicable to all territories which were then
known to be of the colonial type...
Principle 4 states: Prima facie "there is an obligation" - there is no ambiguity in

these words - "to transmit information in respect of a territory which is
geographically separate". Now not even this definition of Africa being Portugal
or Goa being Portugal or Sao Tome being Portugal can change the facts of
geography. These territories happen to be in other continents; and it is Portugal’s
obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically
separate "and distinct ethnically, and/or culturally from the country which is
administering it". I do not think that this principle 4, as formulated by the
Assembly after very careful consideration by the Committee of Six and careful
discussion in this Committee, permits any ambiguity whatsoever. So, any idea
that we are making obligatory what was permissive was dependent upon what one
party might wish or say that is not correct.
Then the next point made by the metropolitan country of Portugal is that these
territories of 800,000 square miles or whatever it is, with 10 million or 12 million
people, they are Portugal, that they are a part of the metropolitan territory and,
therefore, are not colonies. A territory of this kind ceases to be a colony in three
ways: either it emerges as an independent sovereign State, which none of them
has done, or it votes for free association with the metropolitan country, which it
cannot do because the people are not free, or it must be integrated with or into an
independent State - I am prepared to concede that Portugal is an independent State
for this purpose and my Government does not want to go into the question of the
form of her internal government: that’s largely her business and the business of
the Portuguese people, and if that has international consequences those we can
consider in another context. But the integration of the independent States means
that there must be similarity to begin with. Integration, which can be regarded as
the attainment of self-government is well set out in another place in these
principles. There must be some degree of similarity: there must be complete
equality of people of the erstwhile non-self-governing territories and the erstwhile
colonial Power - neither is erstwhile in this case - both territories should have
equal status and so on and so forth...
Let us look at, for example, Africa. In Portuguese Africa there are probably
10,000 people, some say 30,000, but any way a small number of people who
come under the class of assimilados. All the others are people of a different class
of citizenship, if you can call it citizenship. In fact, their state is that of bondsmen
who have no freedom in the normal sense and cannot be regarded as having this
equal status. That is the present situation, but that does not stand alone. We can
look back in history. How did these territories become associated with Portugal?
SHE IS THE EARLIEST OF THE MODERN COLONIAL COUNTRIES, having

colonised, conquered Angola in 1498, having imposed slavery on what is now the
Congo in 1492, having conquered Mozambique in 1507 - the oldest of the
colonial empires, and she has no colonies of settlement. There is no case of
Portuguese empire in history where people have gone to a virgin country and
occupied, made it their homeland. They are the acquisitions of conquest and
afterwards of exchanging barter with fellow colonialists of that type. That is to
say, the boundaries of Portugal’s colonies have been settled with the French and
with the English and various other people of the same feather and of the same
flock at that time. They all have classic characteristics of a colony of conquest.
In these places themselves there were often warlike actions, and their biggest
expansion came in, as elsewhere in Europe, on the fall of Constantinople when
they moved eastward in search of spices, the European nations having learned the
art of cooking. And, they went in search of spices all over the world, first in the
East and later in Africa, and they captured the spice trade throughout after the fall
of Constantinople at the end of the Crusading period. The route to India was
discovered by Vasco de Gama in 1498, and he tried to establish an empire in that
part of the world of which only the small territories of Goa and other areas now
remain, having been beaten in the struggle for colonialism by rival Powers, first
by the French and then by the British.
Now, to control the spice trade the most valuable was the Indian archipelago,
which afterwards became Indonesia. Albuquerque, the ablest of the Portuguese
commanders, came to the conclusion that the Portuguese needed a permanent fleet
in the Indian Ocean. That does not look as though it was part of a free society.
For this they required and secured a naval base with adequate facilities for
furnishing and refitting ships, if there were sailors to replace the losses caused by
climate and disease, which were the allies of the colonial people in the past. They
needed naval fortresses commanding the clearing houses of the Indian Ocean. All
the characteristic features of a colonial empire were there. Goa was selected by
Albuquerque as a base in 1509 when he became Governor-General in succession
to Almeida. Goa, at the end of the 15th century was under the control of the
Muslim rulers of Bijapur. Being an island, it was vulnerable to attack by sea. In
February 1510 it was attacked by Albuquerque, and in November of that year it
was finally subdued and fortified... It is a colony of conquest.
Then we come to the territory, if you like, of Mozambique. In Mozambique from

1498 to 1891, though I won’t go through the whole history of this, following the
visit of Diaz, there were attacks, battles, conquest and the erection of forts. There
was ultimately the loss of Mombasa to the British, the separation of Mozambique
from the other part of the empire, Goa, and further occupation of further territory.
In 1886 came the German-Portuguese treaty, in 1891 the treaty with the United
Kingdom to adjust boundaries and to consolidate conquered empires. They are all
classic instances of colonial expansion of that period. The history of the territory
now known as Portuguese Guinea offers another illustration of this process.
Really, all of these are sheer examples of conquest and there is - while you cannot
unconquer except by the granting of independence, there is no factor in history
which shows that there was anything in the nature of settlement, or developing a
virgin country, or anything of that kind.
Now we come to Angola. From 1559, when Diaz landed in Angola and founded
an empire near what is now Luanda, the process of penetration and conquest went
on for 40 or more years. European colonists were sent to Angola in 1597, that is
30 or 40 years after the first conquest. Then too there is a history of wars, with
the Dutch and others who followed, and the boundaries of Angola were settled
partly with the Belgians who were already in the Congo, with France in 1886,
with Germany in 1886, and the United Kingdom in 1891.
So, any arguments that these are non-colonial territories, and by some freak of
geography or whatever it may be, they are extensions of the metropolitan area,
does not hold good. Therefore, Article 74 and the factors established by the
eighth Assembly, and later by the fifteenth Assembly as a result of the
deliberations of the Committee of Six, including the three principles that I have
read out, are applicable; and Articles 73 and 74 are as binding upon any member
of the United Nations as any other part of the Charter.
My delegation submits, also, that the oft-repeated argument of Article 2 (7) of the
Charter does not really require any refutation, because the Charter stands as a
whole. Article 2 (7) was written in with the knowledge that articles 73 and 74
were there. Article 2 (7) was written in with the knowledge that Chapter V, VI
and VII of the Charter were there. One document has got to be taken all
together...
Therefore, so far as the Assembly is concerned, so far as the Charter is concerned,

so far as the law of the United Nations is concerned, so far as the practice that
obtains here is concerned, there is no argument, there is no justification
whatsoever in pleading that resolution 1541 does not apply, that what we are
trying to do is to use the mass voting power, if you like, of the anti-colonialists
and others, of all people who believe in the principles of the Charter in regard to
this matter to discriminate against Portugal. As I said last year, the argument is
that everybody, except Portugal, is out of step!
Furthermore, even if it were a matter of interpretation, my delegation would

submit that interpretation is law. All law is made up of statute, principles and
natural law, and judicial interpretation. From the time of the Romans onward,
whose law the Portuguese respect I presume, even Pretorian time, there has been
judicial interpretation. Law, under the same statute, is today different from what
it might have been 200 years ago. They interpreted it in the context of social
circumstance.
PORTUGAL WAS NOT FORCED INTO THE UNITED NATIONS. She made
an application to become a member... She came here with eyes open, with all the
customs and the practice and the law that it takes, and therefore when she came
into this house she knew how it was constructed and what are the forms of
behaviour in this family...
I would agree with some of those who spoke before that either the acceptance of a
resolution or even the membership of the Organisation does not mean that you
accept every detail or accept every comma and full stop. The membership of the
United Nations does mean the acceptance of the Charter and its basic principles
and its articles. There cannot be any justification for saying at any time that either
Article 73 or 74 is a matter of voluntary acceptance, and the proof of it is that out
of the large number of members of the United Nations there is only one country
that refuses to submit information. Furthermore, Madam Chairman, may I ask
whether this refusal to submit information, which I hope will be a short-lived
affair because there will soon be no colonies to submit information about, is it
really to the benefit of anybody?...
We should also note the fact that a country like the United Kingdom, which has
from the very beginning submitted information, this year voluntarily came
forward before the Assembly and agreed to submit political information which
she declined for so long. And while I have no desire to be ungracious about it,
there is no doubt that practical men as they are, they realised that it is more useful
from their point of view, apart from anything else, to submit rather than to
withhold information...
So, while the trend of development is towards submitting more and more
information, how can a country come forward and say that, first of all, the Charter
is wrong, your interpretation is wrong, the Committee of Six is wrong, the
Assembly is wrong, how can that be regarded as tenable?
It is not the purpose of my delegation at this stage to go into the detailed

comments that we may have to make or castigations we may have to make in
regard to the administration of Angola, or the terror that prevails in these areas,
except to point out that in Angola or in Goa, or whatever it may be, when terror
prevails, all the more reason why we should know, all the more reason why
Portugal itself should be concerned to either correct what she regards as mis-
statements or exaggerations or put the thing in its proper perspective...
THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION HAS BEEN CRITICISED. Naturally, we are a

community of 103 nations with different backgrounds, speaking different
languages - which in itself tend to cast resolutions in different modes, and we are
likely to look at them in different ways. But, as Sir Hugh Foot22 said a little while
ago, we have to either subscribe to something or not subscribe to something in a
matter of this kind, not by looking at every comma and every full stop... We hope
that this will be the last time that a resolution of this kind is passed; that the
Government of Portugal will be willing to come forward, obtain and place before
this Assembly what information it has - and the information it has would not be
very much, because it is not given to the colonial empires of this kind. There is so
much indirect rule...
Now, I am not anticipating what this report will be, if it comes. But what I have
stated, I stated deliberately, because the time has come, Madam Chairman, for the
United Nations to accept the position that United Nations resolutions having been
ignored, having been treated contemptuously by the Power concerned, in spite of
the obligation that she has undertaken under the Charter, in spite of the fact that
22
Representative of the United Kingdom
she had expressed repeatedly, it is for us to perform our duty, and that duty
cannot be of a character where we force the doors of these colonies open, even if
we could. That is not the practice of the United Nations. We are entitled to
obtain information, to try together in the proper way by asking those whom we
may expect to be in possession of the information. If they will not provide that,
then it is necessary that the Assembly find other means to keep itself informed. I
think the draft resolution contemplates that situation where without violence to
the Charter, without violence to the sovereignty of nations, it is necessary that we
should possess ourselves of these facts, so that the liquidation of colonialism may
be speeded up, that some light or reason and truth will be turned upon this large
iniquitous area of the world where prevails the state of affairs which is at least
500 years out of date. The conditions that obtain in the Portuguese colonial
empire are as out of date as slavery, and share all the characteristics of slavery at
its worst period.
I would like here to quote what has been said by my colleague from the United
States:
"All members of the United Nations have a responsibility to advance the

principles laid down in the Charter and specifically those of Articles 73
and 74. Member States are also committed to seek solutions through
peaceful means as called for in the Charter, and a number of relevant
resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 1542. In the current
debate the over-riding consideration" - and I subscribe to this - "must be
the welfare of the people of the territories under Portuguese
administration." - That is laid down in Article 73. That is what they
accepted when they came in - "It would serve no useful purpose for the
Government of Portugal to be led to believe that Portugal was singled out
by the United Nations for destructive criticism; on the contrary, it should
be given reasons to believe that all member States are genuinely interested
in helping to create conditions which would lead to self-determination."
That last part is important in view of the non-co-operation of Portugal. The only
way that we can give reason to believe that member States are genuinely
interested is to try by genuine methods, by bona fide methods, to obtain
information ourselves; and, therefore, we must look to those, who expressed this
view, to give us their support.
It has also been argued that my delegation had suggested that there was some
legality in the Portuguese position. I referred to it, last year, as legal fiction. It is
quite true that perhaps, out of misplaced generosity, I referred to the Portuguese
position as a legal fiction. I am quite prepared to withdraw the word "legal". It is
just a fiction and nothing else. I said that out of courtesy - the legal fiction of
making colonial territories, the conquered territories of Africa and Asia part of
Portugal by an amendment to their own constitution...
References have also been made by the various speakers, and I believe it appears
in the draft resolution also, about the kind of action that should be taken by
member States in regard to the Portugal with respect to her non-co-operation with
the United Nations. I would like to submit the view of my country that this is not
a vindictive act of any kind. The distinguished representative of the United
Kingdom said: "We agree with the object of paragraph regarding support and
assistance. We have certain obligations in the military field towards Portugal as a
fellow member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which are, of course,
binding upon us...” etc. I am glad to see the first part which says that the United
Kingdom agrees that certain action short of sanctions may be taken to express the
disapproval of other countries in regard to Portuguese policy about a vast number
of human beings. But we are not able to subscribe to the idea that a military
alliance can be utilised by a country - directly, indirectly, either obviously overtly
or covertly - for the purpose of expanding or maintaining colonial power. If we
agree to that, our position in regard to France and her actions in Algeria, all these
things would stand challenged, whatever our views may be with regard to military
alliances - that is a thing by itself, and we are not commenting on that. If it is
found that the military assistance given as a result of an alliance strengthens the
recipient country in its colonial grip, then, whether you like it or not, the military
alliance becomes an ally of colonialism. How can you escape that fact? It is no
use saying, the assistance is given for a different purpose. I have repeatedly said
in various committees: The gun that will fire only in one direction has not been
made: much depends upon who is behind it.
So, if Portugal receives economic assistance, technical assistance, weapons or

strategic weapons as a result of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and if it
strengthens her colonial grip, then the people who give her assistance bear moral
responsibility, if not political responsibility...
Over and above all of this, they have to take into account that the United Nations
is not a mausoleum; it is a dynamic Organisation which must reflect with all
instrumentations the great dynamic forces that play in the world. And it is too late
in the day now, especially after what has happened in the continent of Africa
lately, for anyone to say that there are certain parts of the world which can be
shielded off from the effect of the forces of liberty and of the desire of human
beings and of nations to be free of external authority...
That brings me to my last observation which I had not intended to make until I
saw the Portuguese speeches of the last few days. Reference has been made by
the distinguished delegate from Portugal - not the Foreign Minister whose
presence we are trying to welcome here - references have been made to some
observation made by my Prime Minister regarding the use of force in regard to
Goa, which they call Portuguese India. I am glad to hear they call it India, even if
Portuguese. Now all we have to do is to get Portugal out: Then it becomes India.
Now my country has at no time - may be it will, I hope, in the future - has at no
time abjured the use of force in international relations, because the world,
unfortunately, is so constituted. A few days after our independence the armies of
India, ill-prepared as they were, went out into battle in order to repel the first
aggressor. There are others who today seek to occupy territory, and if necessary
we shall use force against them today. Today there are the armed forces of India
at the service of the United Nations in the Congo and in other areas. If it is good
enough for us to use force at the behest of the United Nations, and if necessary,
against the violation of our territory, then if Portugal thinks that colonialism is
going to endure forever, and if the example of Nagar Haveli and other enclaves in
eastern India has been lost upon the Portuguese empire, irrespective of
Governments, no public opinion is going to sit back, with the armed might of a
country whatever that be, to see part of it crushed under colonial rule forever.
And we make no apology for saying that, while we have no intention of taking
warlike action against a member of the United Nations, if circumstances should
be of a character, if aggression should be re-perpetrated, we have not abjured the
use of force. But we shall not do what Portugal is doing in Goa, namely, shooting
innocent people in cold blood.
SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, November 12,

195323
[From the inception of the United Nations, India played an active role in
opposing and preventing the annexation by South Africa of the territory of South
West Africa, administered by it under a Mandate of the League of Nations.
The General Assembly repeatedly requested South Africa to place the territory
under the United Nations Trusteeship System as administering Powers of other
mandated territories had done.
At the request of the Assembly, the International Court of Justice delivered an

Advisory Opinion on July 11, 1950, that South Africa continued to have
international obligations under the Mandate and that Chapter XII of the Charter
provided a means by which the territory may be brought under the Trusteeship
System. While the Union was not under a legal obligation to place the territory
under the Trusteeship System, the Court added, it alone did not have the
competence to modify the international status of the territory.
The Union of South Africa, however, rejected the appeals of the United Nations
and any supervision of its administration by the United Nations. It offered to
assume responsibility only to France, the United Kingdom and the United States,
representing the Principal Allied and Associated Powers during the First World
War.
In this speech, Mr. Menon dealt in detail with the international obligations of the
Union Government with respect to South West Africa.]
(Summary)
The establishment of the Mandates System gave concrete expression to the ideal
of the international community, of which President Wilson had been one of the
staunchest champions; that ideal required that certain territories should no longer
be regarded as the spoils of war and treated accordingly, but should be
administered with regard for the interests of their inhabitants. That new concept
raised the question of where the sovereignty over such territories lay. To
disregard that question was to place the matter in a false perspective from the very
23
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Fourth Committee, pages
310-12
outset. There could be no doubt about the answer: wherever there was a people or
a nation, sovereignty was vested in them. It so happened that certain peoples
were not yet capable of exercising that sovereignty, which in such cases was
reserved. That was true of South West Africa; in its case, it was the Government
of the Union of South Africa which exercised sovereignty, doing so, however,
under conditions which had been explicitly laid down, and any authority it
enjoyed was by delegation.
The stand the Union of South Africa was at present taking was the one Field
Marshal Smuts had taken in the League of Nations before the establishment of the
mandate; as the Committee was aware, he had later taken a different view. The
League of Nations had not admitted the arguments Field Marshal Smuts had used
in favour of incorporating South West Africa in the territory of the Union; it had
not accepted the Union of South Africa's proposal, but had established a Mandate
for South West Africa which contained important reservations.
Analysing the nature of the relationship which the Mandate had established
between the Union of South Africa and South West Africa, Mr. Menon said that
the Mandates System, of which the Trusteeship System was a logical
development, had conferred upon the Mandatory Power the role of trustee over
the territory it administered. The concept of trusteeship had already been present
in the minds of those who had introduced the Mandates System, as was indicated
by the expressions they had used to describe what that system was intended to be.
He quoted a statement by Mr. Lloyd George in that connection. The role of
trustee had been well defined by Sir Arnold MacNair, a member of the
International Court of Justice, in his separate opinion.24 Three fundamental
principles were brought out by his analysis - the trustee was not in the position of
the normal complete owner, who could do what he liked with his own, because he
was precluded from administering the property of his ward for his own personal
benefit; secondly, the trustee was under some kind of legal obligation, based on
confidence and conscience, to carry out the mission confided to him for the
benefit of some other person or for some public purpose; thirdly, any attempt by
such a person to absorb the property entrusted to him into his own patrimony
would be illegal and would be prevented by the law.
In a memorandum called The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion,

reproduced in Hunter Miller's book, The Drafting of the Covenant (Vol. II, pages
23-60), Field Marshal Smuts had expressed a similar view, namely, that the
authority, control or administration of dependent territories should be vested in
the League of Nations, but that, as joint international administration had been
found wanting wherever it had been tried, it would be preferable for the League of
Nations to delegate those powers to a mandatory State, instead of exercising them
itself. Hence, the relationship of the Union of South Africa towards South West
Africa was purely that of a trustee to whom powers had been delegated and upon
whom an obligation based on confidence and conscience had been imposed,
24
See International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, page 146
which would not come to an end until South West Africa had attained full self-
government.
That obligation did not rest upon a contractual agreement; if that had been the
case, the contracting parties - the League of Nations, the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, and the Union of South Africa - could have made whatever
modifications they wished in the status of the territory by joint agreement. It was
a question of natural law, in virtue of which it was the duty of the Union of South
Africa to guide the people of South West Africa towards the highest level of
human development. It was precisely for that reason that, under the terms of the
Mandate, the status of the territory could not be modified without the consent of
its inhabitants. For the same reason, the rights of those inhabitants, which were
similarly derived from natural law, had not lapsed with the dissolution of the
League of Nations. Moreover, it was not primarily rights that the trustee had, but
obligations; his rights are limited to those essential for the discharge of his
obligations towards his ward. Since the rights of South West Africa persisted, it
could not be claimed that the corresponding obligations of the Union of South
Africa had been extinguished with the demise of the League of Nations.
Having demonstrated the legal impossibility of the disappearance of the

international obligations undertaken by the Union of South Africa, Mr Menon
pointed out that the South African Government had, moreover, solemnly
proclaimed its intention of continuing to carry out in South West Africa the sacred
trust of civilisation conferred upon it by the League of Nations Mandate. Field
Marshal Smuts in the League of Nations and the South African delegation in the
United Nations had stated that the Union would continue to discharge its
obligations under the Mandate until some new provision was made governing the
future status of the territory. Thus the Union had recognised that its obligations
remained valid and had accepted them.
The disappearance of the League of Nations had had only one effect: it had made
it necessary to revise the methods by which those obligations were to be carried
out. The Court's opinion concerned those methods of implementation rather than
the principle of the existence of obligations. The South African Government
rejected that opinion in its entirety and justified its rejection by pointing out that
the Court's opinions had no binding force, which was, of course, true.
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that those opinions had great moral force
and that, moreover, the League of Nations had expressly transferred to the
International Court of Justice the power of compulsory jurisdiction which article 7
of the Mandate conferred upon the Permanent Court of International Justice. If,
therefore, the Government of the Union of South Africa did not accept the Court's
opinion, it was to be feared that it did not recognise the Court's power of
compulsory jurisdiction. Yet the Court was part of the United Nations, to which
the League of Nations had transferred the powers formerly exercised by its
Permanent Mandates Commission with respect to mandated territories.
By its resolution of April 18, 1946,25 which had been adopted without objection
on the part of the South African representative, the League of Nations had taken
note of the intention of the mandatory Powers to continue to administer the
mandated territories in accordance with the obligations set forth in the various
Mandates until new arrangements had been entered into between the United
Nations and the various mandatory Powers. The resolution added that the
principles stated in Chapter XII of the Charter corresponded to those contained in
Article 22 of the League Covenant. The League had referred to the United
Nations - and to the United Nations alone - as the party with which the mandatory
Powers were to conclude new agreements. Moreover, at that time, the drafting of
the Charter had been sufficiently advanced for the League to have a very clear
idea regarding the Trusteeship System. The resolution was therefore a perfectly
valid act of succession, from the legal point of view, for its text specifically
designated the organ which was to inherit the functions of the League of Nations,
and it had been adopted in full knowledge of the facts.
The International Court of Justice had considered that the Charter did not impose
on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation to place South West Africa under
the Trusteeship System provided in Chapter XII. That statement, however, should
not be interpreted outside its context, for the Court had also declared that the
Trusteeship System provided the best means for a mandatory Power to continue to
carry out the sacred trust of civilisation referred to in Article 22 of the Covenant.
Consequently, there was on the one hand an obligation to administer a mandated
territory in the best interests of the population, and on the other, the only
genuinely effective means of carrying out that obligation; the inevitable
conclusion was that the territory of South West Africa should be placed under the
Trusteeship System established by the United Nations. Article 10 of the Charter
was couched in rather general terms, which accounted for its vagueness, but
nevertheless it unquestionably empowered the United Nations to protect the
peoples who were still dependent.
The South African representative had said that the Indian delegation had accused
the Union of having annexed the territory of South West Africa. That accusation
was justified: the Union was actually administering South West Africa as if the
territory had been incorporated into the Union, although that de facto situation
had never been officially recognised in any legislative text. In that connection,
there was a flagrant contradiction in the assertions of the South African
Government, for it claimed on the one hand that the League of Nations Mandate
authorised it to consider South West Africa as an integral part of the Union, and
on the other, that the constitutional measures it had adopted respecting the
territory were wholly legitimate and in no way amounted to annexation.
It was true that article 2 of the Mandate provided that the mandatory Power would
have full power of administration and legislation over South West Africa, but the
exercise of powers did not per se constitute the sovereignty of a State. Moreover,
25
See League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 194, page 58
the Union's rights with regard to South West Africa were further restricted by
article 3 of the Mandate, which prohibited slave trade, forced labour, traffic in
arms and ammunition, and the sale of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the
indigenous population; by article 4, which prohibited the military training of the
indigenous population or the establishment of military or naval bases or
fortifications; by article 6, which imposed on the Union the obligation of
transmitting reports on the territory; and lastly, by article 7, which stated that the
consent of the Council of the League of Nations was required for any
modification of the status of the territory. That being so, it was clear that there
was no question of the South African Government's sovereignty with respect to
South West Africa, but simply trusteeship. In addition, the Mandate explicitly
recognised two distinct entities: the Union of South Africa and the territory of
South West Africa. That was further proof that integration was not provided in
the Mandate.
It was not only in the letter that the Mandate precluded any notion of
incorporating South West Africa in the Union; that idea was also incompatible
with the spirit in which the League of Nations had established the Mandates
System. The League of Nations had rejected Field Marshal Smuts' proposal to
treat the territory of South West Africa as though it were an integral part of the
Union. President Wilson had said that the objective of the Mandates System was
to guarantee dependent territories against any future annexation, and, in addition,
to promote the advancement of the under-developed peoples of those territories so
as to enable them to decide their own future. President Wilson had added that it
was the special duty of the League of Nations to protect the people of South West
Africa from exploitation and abuse, owing to the bad administration to which the
territory had been subjected under Germany.
Although the Mandate implicitly and explicitly precluded any idea of annexation
of South West Africa to the Union, the South African Government had
nevertheless conferred South African citizenship on the (European) inhabitants of
the territory and had granted them representation in the South African Parliament.
Those two facts proved that, in fact, South West Africa had become the fifth
province of the Union. The Indian delegation would have no objection if the
Union had incorporated the territory in response to the freely and clearly
expressed will of its inhabitants. Similarly, it would be pleased to know that the
territory of South West Africa had its own legislative body if that were a sign of
its independence.
The general policy of the Union of South Africa towards South West Africa
appeared to be based on the accepted fact that the territory had simply been
incorporated. The South African Minister of Economic Affairs had stated
recently that the Union should pursue its policy without regard to any disapproval
it might arouse in the world. Such statements, which were not perhaps quite so
ruthless in their context, nonetheless fully justified misgivings concerning the
future of South West Africa.
The people of South West Africa had made some progress in education as
compared with the situation in 1917, but that was true of all peoples throughout
the world; the important thing was whether the number of illiterates had been
reduced substantially and whether the development of education in the territory
had enabled the inhabitants to reach the level of the peoples of other countries.
If it was true, as the South African Government claimed, that the tribal chiefs and
the chiefs of the tribal councils of South West Africa were entirely free, it was
difficult to understand why they had not been authorised to appear before the
Committee or why they had recently been barred from going to the United
Kingdom, although their visit was to have been for purely religious reasons. It
would appear that the local administration of the territory was not truly
democratic...
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, December 19,

195626
[On June 1, 1956, the International Court delivered an Advisory Opinion,

following a request by the General Assembly in 1955, on the admissibility of
hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa. The Court held,
by a majority opinion, that the granting of hearings would be consistent with its
Opinion of July 11, 1950, provided that the Assembly was satisfied that the
hearings were necessary to maintain effective international supervision of the
administration of South West Africa.
The South African Government reiterated its view that the Mandate had lapsed
with the demise of the League of Nations and that the Union had no other
international commitments in regard to the territory.
On the proposal of India, the General Assembly requested its Committee on South
West Africa to study legal action open to United Nations organs or governments
to ensure the fulfilment by the South Africa of its obligations under the Mandate.]
(Summary)
Mr. Krishna Menon (India) recalled that the territory of South West Africa had
been placed under the administration of the Union of South Africa in accordance
with the provisions of the Mandates System. Although the Mandates as operative
instruments in the form in which they had originally been framed had ceased to
have effective existence when the League of Nations had been dissolved, the
obligations which the Union of South Africa, as the mandatory Power, had
26
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, pages
145-47
assumed towards the international community were still valid. The Union
Government seemed to regard itself as a residuary legateee of the League of
Nations. His delegation opposed that view, because it was obvious that the
United Nations, in its corporate capacity, had inherited the position of the League.
That view formed part of the advisory opinion of the International Court.
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations conferred certain rights and
obligations, and was based on the conception that the tutelage of the so-called
backward peoples was entrusted to the so-called advanced nations. That
constituted a sacred trust which could not be dissolved by conferring all the
obligations upon the trustee. The sacred character of the Mandate was
imperishable, for if it was perishable, the entire foundation of the United Nations
would disappear.
The Mandates System had represented an advance over colonialism in that it had
been based on the concept of the sovereignty of peoples. Earlier ideas of
sovereignty had given way to the modern concept that the rights rested in the
people, and to the extent they were dominated, the sovereignty was latent in them.
In the case in point, sovereignty rested with the people of South West Africa; it
had not been conferred upon the mandatory Power. The purpose of self-
government was to make the latent sovereignty potent and that was the function
and the purpose of the Mandates System.
Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which had established
the Mandates System, the well-being and the development of the peoples of the
mandated territory constituted a sacred trust of civilisation. Article 22 likewise
made it clear that the primary obligation upon the mandatory Power was that of
accountability. Every function and every authority exercised by the mandatory
Power on the people of the mandated territory was subject to the supervisory
jurisdiction of the international community. That accountability could not be
destroyed because sovereignty rested in somebody else.
The question at issue was what procedure would best enable the mandatory Power
to fulfil that obligation of accountability. The other mandatory Powers had settled
the issue by voluntarily contracting Trusteeship Agreements with the United
Nations. There could of course be no compulsion by the United Nations, but the
Charter must be read as a whole, and Article 80 should not be interpreted as
giving grounds for delay in placing mandated territories under trusteeship. The
founders of the United Nations had provided only the trusteeship machinery and
while it was arguable that procedurally there was no obligation to use it, the
obligation of accountability still remained. His delegation did not suggest that the
Trusteeship System was the only conceivable system whereby the issue could be
resolved. Had the United Nations Charter provided for an alternate one, that
alternate should also have provided for accountability to the United Nations.
The Union Government had claimed that, with the demise of the League of
Nations, its obligations to the international community with regard to the
administration of the territory had terminated. By having integrated the territory
into the Union, it was seeking to deny that the obligation of accountability was
still incumbent upon it or that a separate sovereignty was vested in the people.
The Union Government itself, however, had not always held that position. By its
acceptance of the resolution adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on April
18, 1946, it had recognised that upon the termination of the League's existence the
latter's functions with regard to mandated territories had been bequeathed to the
United Nations. That resolution had specifically referred to Article 22 of the
Covenant and had noted that the principles embodied therein were the basis of
Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter. It had likewise noted the League's
intention that the Powers administering territories under the Mandates System
should continue to administer them in such a way as to promote the well-being
and development of their peoples in accordance with the obligations in the
Mandates until other arrangements were made between the United Nations and
the mandatory Powers. There was thus an instrument in the United Nations
capable of enabling South Africa to carry out its obligations. The meaning of that
resolution was that, pending a trusteeship arrangement for the territory, the Union
of South Africa was bound to honour its obligations under the Mandate.
That view had been accepted by the Union Government and expression had been
given to it in the United Nations by representatives of the Union Government in
1946 and later. The Union's responsibilities under the Mandate had been regarded
as necessarily unalienable. Furthermore, in a letter dated July 23, 1947 (A/334),
the South African delegation had referred to a resolution of the Union Parliament
stating that the Government intended to render reports to the United Nations on its
administration of South West Africa, and had recognised that the Government had
no alternative but to retain the status quo in the territory. Thus, on its own
admission, the Union Government was still under an obligation to render an
account of its administration of the territory to the United Nations.
However, in a letter dated March 25, 1954, from the permanent representative of
the Union of South Africa to the United Nations, addressed to the Chairman of the
Committee on South West Africa (A/2666, annex I, section c), the Union
Government had gone back on its earlier position, maintaining that since the
demise of the League of Nations it was under no obligation to submit reports or
petitions to any international bodies. In that letter it had stated that it was
prepared to enter into an arrangement with the three remaining Allied and
Associated Powers. Since, however, international law regarded the Allied and
Associated Powers as having been merged in the League when they signed the
Covenant, any reference to them was anachronistic. Presumably all the
signatories to the Covenant had thus undertaken the rights and obligations that the
former Allied and Associated Powers had had in that regard.
The question of South West Africa was particularly important because it
constituted a test case which challenged the whole concept of human rights and of
the independence of peoples. The inhabitants of the territory had lost their
identity and had been absorbed into the territory of a neighbouring nation, which
had not even granted them equality with its own citizens but had placed them
under the jurisdiction of its own Native Affairs administration. Under the very
eyes of the United Nations, a member State, defying the principles of the
Mandates System, had set out to create an empire. The United Nations would be
abdicating its responsibility if it allowed such a precedent to be established.
The fact that the United Nations had not succeeded in persuading the Union
Government to place the territory of South West Africa under the Trusteeship
System did not mean that its efforts on behalf of that territory had been a total
failure. Many formerly subject countries had similarly endured frustrations and
setbacks before finally winning their struggle for independence. In the present
case world opinion had been mobilised and the facts of the situation had been
clarified. The United Nations should now try to determine what legal remedies
were open to it. Article 7 of the Mandate had made it clear that no unilateral
decision to change the status of the territory could be taken. That would mean
that in the present case the consent of the United Nations on the one hand and of
the Union Government on the other would have to be obtained before a change in
the status of the territory could be effected. Furthermore, article 7 of the Mandate
had provided that should any dispute arise between the Mandatory and another
member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or application of
the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it could not be settled by
negotiation, should be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
The Mandate had imposed a compulsory obligation to accept the jurisdiction of
the Court. Since the International Court of Justice was the successor to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice should
deliver a judgement in the matter rather than confining itself to issuing an
advisory opinion...
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, October 13,

195827
[On October 25, 1957, the General Assembly appointed a Good Offices
Committee to discuss with the Government of the Union of South Africa a basis
for an agreement which would continue to accord an international status to the
territory of South West Africa. The Committee was composed of the United States,
the United Kingdom and Brazil. Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clarke of the United
Kingdom was Chairman.
27 Source: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, October 1958

In discussions with this Committee, the Union Government rejected any
supervision by the United Nations of its administration of South West Africa.
Instead, it was prepared to enter into an agreement with the three remaining
Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the First World War - France, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Good Offices Committee
submitted this proposal to the General Assembly without expressing an opinion.
The Union Government also suggested that partition of the territory merited
consideration, with the northern portion being administered under a trusteeship
agreement with the United Nations and the rest of the territory being annexed to
the Union. The Good Offices Committee reported that some form of partition of
the territory might provide a basis for an agreement and recommended that the
General Assembly should indicate its willingness to consider partition so that the
Union Government could investigate the practicability of partition and submit
proposals to the United Nations.
The following is the statement by Mr. Menon strongly opposing the

recommendations of the Good Offices Committee. The Assembly rejected the
recommendations by a large majority.]
...Mr. Chairman, may I have your permission to express our gratitude to the three
members of the (Good Offices) Committee, to Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clarke,
Chairman, who comes to us with a vast wealth of experience as a colonial
administrator in the good liberal tradition, who has made a great contribution
towards the termination of trusteeship in Togoland and who, along with those
who went before him, established in that part of Africa the colonial tradition
which has led the indigenous people to independence and is continuing to do so. I
would also like to say that Senor da Cunha of Brazil comes to us with a vast
wealth of experience as a veteran diplomat of international relations. The third
member of this Committee, Mr. Walmsley, represents a country which has always
said that it cannot live half-slave and half-free, a country which is putting up a
gallant fight against the problems of discrimination and is wedded to the ideals of
self-government of peoples. Therefore, it is all the more regrettable for us that we
have to join issue not only on one particular part of its recommendations but the
whole of this report lock, stock and barrel...
THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE UNITED NATIONS COMES FROM THE

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA in denying the one point on which there could be
no doubt in the mind of anyone who has signed the Charter, and on which the
World Court, in spite of dissenting views, was unanimous: the international status
of this territory. Now, the South African Government wants to say that this
territory has only an "international character." I submit, Sir, that every territory,
including the Emerald Island of Ireland, has international character because the
aeroplanes of international airlines go through Shannon. When radioactivity goes
on around the world in an indiscriminating way, probably every country will be
infected; that also in a way lends international character to every country or
territory. But what is peculiar to these mandated territories is that they have got a
"status" which is different from "character," and the differences between status
and the position established by contractual obligations are well defined in text-
books of international law, and these differences are clear to any person, who has
even an elementary knowledge of them.
Therefore, when the Government of the Union of South Africa put out that this
territory does not possess international status, it is denying its entity, its
personality; in fact it is denying its parentage. The status of South West Africa
derives from its parentage, going back to the days, to take a short-term view of
history, of the League of Nations where the first obvious technical abandonment
of colonialism was undertaken - thanks largely to President Wilson’s fifth point -
and a kind of trusteeship - by whatever name it is called; they called it "Sacred
Trust", and we call it "Trusteeship" - was established. And, here, I would like to
hark back to the World Court’s advisory opinion on this matter, in which no
dissenting judge, and no dissenting opinion had ever questioned the international
status of this territory. I promise a few minutes later to come back to this and
examine what is the content of this international status. I should first like to turn
to the concluding remarks of this report of the Good Offices Committee.
In paragraph 2 of these remarks,28 Mr. Chairman, the Good Offices Committee

gives us in some sense a jolt of hope and says that the Good Offices Committee
would have felt able to recommend to the General Assembly that certain
arrangements should be accepted for inclusion in an agreement to which the
United Nations would constitute second party. Practically the whole of this report
contradicts that because South Africa will not agree to the United Nations being
the second party. We shall be able to understand the unacceptability, the fallacy
of this position only when we examine the content of status. Therefore the second
paragraph, apart from this mention of the United Nations constituting a second
party, is really a proposal of some sort of "horse-trading," whereby a small part of
this territory will be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations in a
strategic or other context, of a limited character, of a limited place, so that the rest
of the territory may lapse into colonialism. Mr. Chairman, let us make no mistake
about it: when we speak about annexation, about absorption, about integration,
what we are really doing is not adopting one device in preference to another: what
we are doing is abandoning the whole conception of the mandates, abandoning
the whole conception of trusteeship, and going back to predatory colonialism.
And neither in Asia, nor in Africa, nor even in more enlightened continents today,
would there be people that could be pushed back into slavery once again.
In paragraph 3 this hope is completely belied. It is a false hope. It is stated that
28 In summary of the report of the Good Offices Committee, A/3900

the Union Government is not prepared to accept the United Nations as a second
party to such an agreement, nor to undertake any obligations towards the United
Nations. That comes from a member State of the United Nations and, what is
more, from a State which produced one of the draftsmen of the Charter itself, and,
earlier in the mandate period of thirty years ago, put out the philosophy of the
Mandates system in a little pamphlet called, "The League of Nations", in a more
practical form than any of us could describe.
Though afterwards he might have contradicted it, General Smuts had himself said
that the "mandatory State should look upon its position as a great trust and
honour, not as an office of profit or a position of private advantage for its
nationals." This is what was said by General Smuts, and not by the delegate of
India. General Smuts adds further:
"And in the case of any flagrant and prolonged abuse of this trust the
population concerned should be able to appeal for redress to the League,
who should in a proper case assert its authority to the full, even to the
extent of removing the mandate, and entrusting it to some other State, if
necessary. No pegging out of claims should be allowed under the guise of
the Mandate."
Now what we have before us is almost a verbal contradiction of this position

taken up by South Africa sometime ago. On page 22 of its report Sir Charles
Arden-Clarke's Committee points out that their own approach precluded any
agency other than the United Nations being the second party to the agreement,
and it did not, therefore, consider itself in a position to express an opinion on this
proposal. Well, if that is the position I am rather at a loss to find out what the
opinion of the Committee is in this matter. On the one hand it says that its terms
of reference precluded any arrangement to which the United Nations is not a
second party. Now that is quite true. Such an arrangement is precluded not only
by the terms of reference but by the whole concept of the United Nations - loyalty
to the Charter. And yet, when we read the earlier part of the report, we find that
proposals had been put forward by the Good Offices Committee for the
examination of information to be submitted by the Union Government which
would set up machinery of various kinds - the new Mandates Commission or
whatever it may be called - in direct contravention of the machinery already set up
by the United Nations, such as the Committee on South West Africa.
In paragraph 5 of the concluding remarks it is stated that if the General Assembly

should indicate that it would be willing to consider as a possible alternative basis
for agreement the partitioning of the Territory, part of it to be placed under
Trusteeship and the reminder to be annexed to the Union of South Africa, the
Union Government would be prepared to carry out, by its own means, an
investigation as to the practicability of such partitioning, and if that Government
finds it practicable, it will submit to the United Nations proposals for partition.
Now what does it all mean? It really means that the United Nations should come
forward and sanctify annexation. Now if the General Assembly were to consider
annexation, I submit, Mr. Chairman, that it would be acting ultra vires, because at
its first session, the General Assembly, after considering a similar proposition,
had already rejected annexation. The United Nations has not rescinded that
resolution by a two-thirds majority. How can it, then, go back upon its own
decisions?
As regards annexation - and it makes no difference whether part of the territory or

all of it is to be annexed - it means that the territory held in sacred trust is to be
pushed back to become a colonial empire in a country whose racial laws are
nauseating in the extreme, apart from their being harsh on the people concerned.
So much for one part of this proposal for partitioning the territory. As for the
other part of partitioning, Mr. Chairman, I must say, I am quite sure that the
authors of this report, probably, had not looked at it from this point of view; and I
do hope I do not exaggerate when I say that the second part of this proposal is a
demand - a request to the Assembly to internationalise apartheid, not merely in
the Union of South Africa but in what is now an international territory. There will
be set up two territories; one for the whites and the other for the non-whites; and
in this way apartheid will be internationalised. That is the proposition. I am
afraid - and I am sure I am not being optimistic - this matter will gain no vote in
this Assembly except that of the Union of South Africa, and since she is absent it
will be unanimously rejected.
Of course the Union is quite willing to carry out an investigation, and who
wouldn’t in those circumstances? Therefore, I join with the delegate of Haiti in
saying that my Government will not in any way lend any support to any proposals
for the partitioning of this territory, not because the territory may not be
partitioned as a trust territory - it is conceivable that in the future a Trusteeship
Agreement instead of providing for administration in one unit, may provide for
administration in five units, or two units, or three units; that is not the point - but
because we could not agree to a proposal whereby a part of this territory is to go
out of what is called the "sacred trust." Even this trusteeship, contemplated for a
part of the territory, is to be of a limited character, and we regret that in paragraph
(7) the Committee expressed to the General Assembly the view that partition
might provide a basis for an agreement concerning the Territory of South West
Africa. With great respect we entirely reject this view. This will not provide the
basis of an agreement; this will be the expression of the sanctification of apartheid
by an international authority; it will take away the richest part of this territory for
colonial exploitation and for economic imperialism; it will be disregarding the
provisions of the Charter and bowing before the challenge that has been thrown
out to the United Nations. It will merely create a situation in which while we
criticise, when criticism is due, the record of administration of countries like the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Australia and the United States, who,
voluntarily placed other mandated territories under the United Nations trusteeship,
we shall be putting a premium on bad behaviour to put it mildly.
AND THEN WE ARE ASKED TO ENCOURAGE THIS PARTITION IDEA! I
think in discussing a question of this character we ought to go back to the basis on
which the whole of this position rests. The South African claim, in as far as it has
been acclaimed in opposition to the United Nations, is based upon the idea that
they had this territory mandated to them by the League of Nations. They are not
prepared to accept any greater obligations than under the Mandate. For myself -
though I think it is the wrong thing to say in this day and age when the world is
not what it was at the time of the League of Nations, when hundreds and
thousands of millions of people have come into the orbit of freedom, when all
continents have come into this Organisation, which was not the case during the
life time of the League, and from that point of view it would be an indefensible
position - I am prepared to accept the position that we do not ask the South
African Government to accept any more obligations than those under the
Mandate. But what are those obligations under the Mandate?
First of all, the essence of this Mandate system is the idea of a sacred trust. One
doesn’t have to belong to one religion or another or to any at all, in order to accept
this conception. The element of sanctity in a trust is that it is dedicated, devoted
exclusively, to a certain end, and that end in this particular case is the wellbeing
of the people, who have not yet attained self-government or independence. This
was repeatedly stated by President Wilson at that time in his speeches and
statements, and it was embodied in Article 22 of what is called the Covenant of
the League of Nations.
It is quite true that in those days, forty years ago, the advocacy of indigenous
populations assuming the rights and obligations of self-government was not easily
acceptable; but it was accepted by implication in the Covenant in so far as it said
that this applied to peoples, who had not yet attained self-government, meaning
thereby that they would attain, should attain self-government. "Sacred" also is
something entitled to reverence and respect, but more than anything else sanctity
involves inviolability of purpose, and is not to be profaned. We cannot abandon
the basic purposes of the original foundation of this sacred trust.
This sacred trust has a comparatively early history starting, as most of these
things, in the conflict between the haves and the have-nots, between liberty and
authority, in the United Kingdom. A compatriot of yours, in historical context,
Mr. Chairman, who was one of the leaders of British political thought in the
House of Commons, faced with the repression of the British in India, challenged
the Government of the day. When Mr. Fox, the then Secretary of State,
introduced the India Bill in the House of Commons in 1783, Edmund Burke had
said "all political power, which is set over men, ought to be in some way or the
other, exercised ultimately for their benefit. Every species of political dominion
and every description of commercial privilege are all, in a strict sense, a trust." It
is the very essence of a trust to be rendered accountable, and that is exactly where
South Africa has challenged us. Therefore at this stage you will, perhaps, allow
me to analyse our point of view briefly.
Whatever the content of this trust, the main essence of it is accountability,

whether under the Mandates system or under United Nations Trusteeship. It may
be that under the Mandate accountability is somewhat limited, but the point is in
whom does this accountability vest? Surely the Mandatory Power is accountable
to some one. It cannot be accountable to the population because the population is
not yet free, and is not able to guard and look after its own interests.
Secondly, the Government of South Africa is not the Government of South West
Africa. The Union Government is not the Government, much less the sovereign
authority, over South West Africa. The Union of South Africa is the
Administering Authority. It has no dominion over this territory, is not a sovereign
power of this territory, it is truly a mandatory of this territory. The League of
Nations called upon it to look after this territory. It has already been set out in so
many documents and so many text-books of law, in the advisory opinion of the
World Court itself, that the Union Government has no sovereignty over South
West Africa. No mandatory Power has any sovereignty over the mandated
territories. Sovereignty does not rest neither in the Union Government, nor even
in the United Nations or the League of Nations. Sovereignty over this territory
rests in the people of that territory alone and lies latent, and the purpose of
development of the territory is to make it actual. The latent sovereignty - some
people call it retarded or reserved sovereignty - vests in the people and the South
African Government has a right to be there only to the extent that Administration
had been conferred upon it by the League of Nations under certain conditions.
That is the second aspect of the content of the international status of the territory
of South West Africa.
The third aspect is that there is no unlimited or residuary power vesting in the
Union. The Union acts in the territory, and administers it under a definite
arrangement. Now therefore, I come to that part of it, for the South African
Government and their friends bank a great deal on that part of Mandate, which
says that the territory is to be administered as an integral part of the Union, and
the laws of the Union are applicable to the territory.
Now, Mr. Chairman, subject to certain reservations, I submit that similar

provisions exist in some Trusteeship Agreements whereby the trust territories may
be treated as integral parts for administrative purposes only. In the case of South
West Africa and the Union Government there is one factor which we may never
forget, and that is that the laws which were to be administered and which were to
be applied in this territory were the laws of the Union as they existed in 1920. It
is since then that South Africa has made laws, which make the existence of a
human being, who is not a white citizen of South Africa, very unenviable. As a
distinguished South African judge once said, they make so many laws in that
country that if an African steps out of his house he commits a crime. The laws
that are applicable to South West Africa are the laws framed by an imperialist
government in a period of liberal thinking, in the days of Wilson. None of the
laws, whether it be the Suppression of Communism Act, so called, or the White
Bill, or the Black Bill, or the Blue Bill, none of these laws is applicable to this
mandated territory. In this same way the old Common Law that is applicable to
certain British territories is the Common Law that they took from England at the
time they went away. Any developments that took place in England thereafter are
not included in it.
And, therefore, if you take this view of the status then we come to the question,
not whether South Africa would place these territories under trusteeship in the
future - and we can quite well understand why the Union, in view of the
inapplicability of these attributes today should deny the international status of the
territory - but what the obligations of the Union are in relation to the Mandate.
There is the question of accountability. First there is no accountability to the
indigenous population because they are not citizens, they are denied freedom.
There is no accountability to the international authority.
That is why, Mr. Chairman, I pointed out that the League of Nations, in this case,
any more than the United Nations, is not a super-state. The League of Nations
had no authority over this territory, except in regard to the supervision of the
Mandate. And, therefore, the argument that the League of Nations is dead is not
relevant. The League of Nations may be dead, may have passed away; but, as
Justice MacNair has pointed out, though the Mandator may not be there, the
mandatory Power is there, the Mandate is there, and the Mandate cannot be
disturbed.
NOW, THE QUESTION ARISES: WHO ARE THE PARTIES? Sir Charles
Arden-Clarke’s report speaks about the second party; it does not speak about the
third party. As far as the Mandate is concerned, there are three parties: the
League of Nations, the South African Government as the Mandatory Power, and
the principal party concerned, the people of South West Africa. They are the real
owners of this place in whom sovereignty rests. So, if it is argued that the League
of Nations having passed away the Union of South Africa becomes the residuary
legatee of the League in so far as this territory is concerned, that is a position that
cannot be accepted.
Several statements were made by South Africa itself before this Organisation, and
in the League of Nations before and at the time of its dissolution, to the effect that
the Mandatory Power was willing to continue to discharge its obligations as
heretofore. "The Union will continue to administer the territory," said Mr. Leif
Egeland, a former colleague of mine, "scrupulously in accordance with the
obligations of the Mandate, and for the advancement of moral and material
interests of its inhabitants as she has done during the past six years when meetings
of the Mandatory Commission could not be held. The disappearance of those
organs of the League concerned with the supervision of the Mandates, primarily
the Mandates Commission and the League Council, will necessarily preclude
complete compliance with the letter of the Mandate. The Union Government will,
nevertheless, regard the dissolution of the League as in no way diminishing its
obligations under the Mandate, which it will continue to discharge with the full
and proper appreciation of its responsibilities until such time as other
arrangements are agreed upon concerning the future of this territory." This is not
our statement, it is a statement of the South African Government. I do not know
this will translate into French or Spanish, Russian or Chinese, but these words -
"until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon" - have got a significance.
They presuppose the eventuation of an event which is to come. When you say
"until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon," it does not presuppose
that these arrangements will not come about; it means that they will come, but
they will take time.
There are several similar statements made by the South African Union at various
times. But here, I shall refer to only one more of these. In 1946 a memorandum
was submitted by the South African Legation in Washington to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, which stated that the responsibility of the Union
Government as Mandatory was necessarily inalienable. In 1946 the Prime
Minister of the Union in a statement to the Fourth Committee repeated this
declaration. On July 23, 1947, in support of a resolution of the Union
Parliament, the following declaration was made: "...the Government should
continue to render reports to the Organisation, as it has done hitherto, under the
Mandate. In the circumstances, the Union Government has no alternative but to
maintain the status quo and to continue to administer the Territory in the spirit of
the existing statute." It is, therefore, obvious that all that time, while the Union
Government did not enter into a Trusteeship Agreement in respect of South West
Africa, the matter was pending. There was no question of denying the Union's
obligation of accountability.
From there, from this rather legalistic, if you like, or the more political-scientific
content of the status of the territory, we may come to one or two matters, which
are important to the people of South West Africa.
IT IS THE ESSENCE OF A TRUST TERRITORY OR MANDATED AREA that

it is not to be exploited to the economic advantage of the mandatory Power. Any
such exploitation would be totally contrary to justice. If you look at this
document that we have here before us, (S/3900) and look at the objections of the
Union to placing this Territory under Trusteeship, then it will become clear that
the reasons why these people cannot be free or be placed on the road to freedom,
the reason why the sacred trust has been violated are: First, that South West
Africa is essential to the security of the Union. Now, as I pointed out, the essence
of the trust is that the purposes, not of the trustee, but of the territory placed under
trust come first. Secondly, the interests of the Union of South Africa and South
West Africa are inextricably bound with each other.
Mr. Chairman, I would say that that is not an unusual phenomenon. There are
many trust territories in East Africa, for example, whose interests are bound with
one another. There are many common arrangements between Tanganyika and
certain other East African territories. No one can take objection to these
arrangements. It may be their economies are complementary. It may be that the
development of one helps the development of other and so on. But it cannot be
said that because there is a relationship of a close character between two persons
therefore one person cannot be free. Togetherness in this case lies in one person
having his hand on the other fellow’s throat. That is the very close proximity of
which we hear, and a very convenient one! That is the inextricable nature of this
relationship!
The third reason is that South West Africa by itself could not be economically
viable. Now that is a very classic description of an imperialist Power’s attitude.
An economy is not viable because under conditions of exploitation its resources
will not be developed. It is not viable in the existing terms of trade so long as the
people of a territory continue to be reduced to hewers of wood and drawers of
water.
Then the fourth reason is that the South African people - and I do not in any way
minimise the burdens they carry - have borne financial responsibilities for the
territory's administration. First of all, it is difficult to make a balance-sheet of
what the imperial Powers take out of a place and what they put into it. But South
Africa would not be the first mandatory Power before us; she is not the only
Administering Authority before us which has accepted responsibilities. We may
turn around and ask, for example, the distinguished delegate of the United
Kingdom or of Belgium to what extent they have borne financial responsibilities,
shall we say, in Tanganyika or some other place? Therefore, these are
arguments, which not only have no substance in them, but contradict the whole
conception of the sacred trust, and, what is more, they are cast in the conception
of an exploiting imperialism.
Then we are told that there are two types of people here and the Bantu inhabitants
have in the past indicated their satisfaction with an agreement involving
annexation of the territory to the Union. It reminds one of the sorrowful tales of
the days of slavery, when it was always said that slavery could not be abolished
because the slaves did not want to be free. I ask, Mr. Chairman, how it is possible
that the Bantu inhabitant is competent to express an opinion about the status of the
territory if that status means alliance with South Africa, but is not competent to
govern himself and express opinion in other ways. If he is competent to express
his opinion, then he must be competent to govern himself; no question of
annexation, no question of trusteeship arises. That is the position.
THEN THE QUESTION IS: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS HAVING PASSED

AWAY, if there was an authority in the League whether that authority should rest
in the United Nations or not. There are two aspects I wish to consider. First of
all, Sir, it is not a question merely of what agreement there was between the
League and any other country in the world. Those who subscribe to the Charter
have an obligation, and have a relationship with the rest of the world. The
relationship with regard to the world problems will superviene any agreements
that might have been reached in the past.
The Charter, in that sense, I cannot say eclipses, but comes above all these things;
but over and above that, there is a sufficiently outstanding authority for us to rely
upon; and that is the fact that succession in regard to world affairs today rests in
the United Nations. Now, on this question, again, there are so many observations
and so much analysis of the position in the Advisory Opinion of the World Court
that it is unnecessary to argue about it at length. There can only be one world
organisation, if it is to be a world organisation. Otherwise it is only a half-world
organisation. When an international organisation like the League of Nations -
says one of these advisory opinions - disappears, another one is created, without
indication as to whether the latter replaces the former. If the first organisation has
created an institution, such as the Mandate having for its purpose the same sacred
trust of civilisation as the Trusteeship created by the second organisation, then the
latter must be considered as succeeding the former, ipso facto. Therefore the
successor to the League is the United Nations, whatever may be the legal
quibbles. But if South Africa wants to argue that she is prepared to go on with the
arrangements under the Mandate, there may be a case for working that out. It is
up to the United Nations to set up its own Mandates Commission, to receive
reports on the territory, and to supervise the work in the same way that the League
may have done. I can see a case in that way; but I cannot see a case, particularly
with any authority, whereby one may say: the donor of this is dead; I am the
beneficiary; I have got the beneficiary rights.
The mandate has not only been vitiated, it has been violated by non-
accountability. It is not that non-accountability is not self-evident, because South
Africa itself submitted information. Again I regret that I cannot fully agree with
the Good Offices Committee's report, which says that information should not be
sent to the United Nations. It is quite true that Article 73 is not the most
complimentary, the most appropriate but Trust or no Trust, Mandate or no
Mandate, this territory is non-self-governing, and Article 73 applies to non-self-
governing territories. It may be that it is not adequate, but then we should be the
ones to complain. When South Africa sent in the reports, sent information, it was
quite clear that the South African Government, as then constituted, felt that it was
right to send these here, and it was evidently not, then, sure of its position in every
way. Non-accountability having disappeared, the bottom has been knocked out of
the Mandate altogether. So all this argument is futile in as far as the doctrine of
non-accountability is not accepted. The idea that these peoples ought to progress
towards self-government - their independence is latent - should fructify the
administration.
Though the League resolution (of April 18, 1946) says that at the termination of
the League's existence, the functions of the League with regard to the Mandated
territories would come to an end, it goes on to note that Chapters XI, XII, XIII of
the Charter embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 (of
the League Covenant). It goes on further to take note of the expressions of
intention of the members of the League, which included the Union of South
Africa, to continue to administer the territories mandated to them for the well-
being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the
obligations contained in the Mandates until other arrangements are agreed upon.
Therefore, the question of there being nobody to step into the shoes of the League
of Nations does not exist.
I COME NOW TO THE ALMOST FANTASTIC SUGGESTION, IF I MAY

USE THE WORD WITHOUT OFFENCE, in regard to an agreement with the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Who are the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers? The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are the USA,
the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and then other Powers constituting
with the Principal Powers mentioned above are the Allied and Associated Powers.
I say, first, that even if there was to be an agreement of the kind suggested, if this
were to hold any water at all, especially in this day and age, you could not
separate the Principal Allied and Associated Powers from the Allied and
Associated Powers as a whole, and these latter include Belgium, China, Ecuador,
Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil and all of us who sit here - or most of us.
But for the purposes of this argument I need not go so far. One of the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers is His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of
India. Now, my distinguished colleague, the representative of the United
Kingdom will notice that this was the title of His Majesty prior to 1932. Those
were the days when the King of the United Kingdom was sovereign of the
territory of South Africa and of India. If you read the list of signatories of the
Versailles Treaty, you will find that the United Kingdom was represented by five
delegations: the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union
of South Africa - so she is herself one of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, and what the Union Government is asking is that she concludes a treaty
with herself - Britain and New Zealand; and also India, represented by the Rt.
Hon. Edwin Montagu and His Highness the Maharajah of Bikaner. If there are
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, we are part of, and successor to, these
Allied and Associated Powers. Therefore there can be no question of resurrecting
this ghost of the Principal Allied Powers, the remnant of a predatory imperialism,
in order to beat the purposes of the trusteeship system.
IF I GO BACK, THE CONCEPTION OF THE SACRED TRUST and of the

discharge of this trust, which is not an invention of the modern age, and does not
come from what may be called an extreme doctrine, comes from the arch-priest of
British Conservatism, Edmund Burke, when he impeached the government of the
day for maladministration. The charges were the assumption of autocratic
powers, breaches of trusteeship - breach of trusteeship now is worse than in the
days when there were no trusteeship agreements - and injustices to the people
under its charge in India. Burke ended his historic speech of February 15, 1788 -
and we do not seem to have moved very much further with South African
relations; we seem to have moved very much backwards - with an indictment and
impeachment of Warren Hastings, who is alleged to have perpetrated so many bad
things in India. The impeachment was made not by him as individual but as a
leader of the House of Commons. He said:
"I impeach Warren Hastings...
"I impeach him in the name of the Commons of Great Britain in

parliament assembled... I impeach him in the name of the people of India,
I impeach him in the name of human nature itself..."
The whole of this conception stands convicted today in the name of the people of
South West Africa. It stands convicted in the name of what we call the
Declaration of Human Rights. And here we are asked to hand over these people
to a country which has practised apartheid and glorifies it, which tells the world
shamefacedly that this is the pattern you should follow in order to solve the racial
problems of the world; we are asked to hand over a territory whose people have
said here that their position is that of helots, that they are foreigners in the land
that gives them birth, whose toil makes its wealth.
I DO NOT WISH TO SUBSCRIBE TO ANY OF THE VIEWS THAT HAVE

BEEN PUT FORWARD as to how this partition line would work because I think
this whole idea is evil in its conception, it is evil in its description and evil in its
consequences. But if you look at it, you will find that the sea-board of South
West Africa, all of its territory, its great mineral wealth - they are all going to be
annexed. There are some 50,000 non-indigenous people in South West Africa
and a considerably large number of others. No one has suggested that this
territory should be distributed proportionately. I am not saying I would have you
agree to that, but no one has suggested that. What is suggested is a kind of
equality; one chicken, one horse. Therefore, in considering this question we are
taking into account the fate of these people; and not only the fate of these people
- I hope that the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom will bear with me -
but if anything should happen to this territory by some adverse wantonness or by
some extra-constitutional action to bring it under the Union, what happens to
those innocent people of Bechuanaland, whom the protection of the British Crown
has kept away from obvious and extreme apartheid, who enjoy comparatively
human conditions, and the territory of South Africa should spread into these areas,
and industrialisation drag from these other areas peoples who will come under this
inhuman tyranny. Therefore, the whole of this report of the Good Offices
Committee is ultra vires in the sense that no committee appointed by this
Organisation can conceivably have the right even to entertain propositions that are
a violation of the Charter. And I submit the basis of this consideration is a
violation of the Charter; it is disregard of the United Nations.
IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO GO INTO VERY MANY LEGAL ASPECTS

OF THIS CASE. My colleagues will deal with other aspects of the question of
South West Africa. Mr. Chairman, it is sufficient for the day to say that there is
no reason at all why these territories should not be placed under Trusteeship. The
strongest argument one sometimes hears in various circles is that the World
Court’s advisory opinion has said, or rather a majority opinion has said, that there
is no legal obligation on the part of South Africa to place this territory under
trusteeship. It would be wrong, if I may say so, to quote three summarising
paragraphs of this minute without reading the whole of the judgement. What does
it say in regard to question B? - that the provisions of Chapter XII of the United
Nations Charter do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation to
place the territory under the trusteeship system. I submit, Mr. Chairman, a legal
obligation in the sense of the interpretation of legal texts - perhaps not. But
certainly there is placed upon the Union of South Africa a Charter obligation. I
am not referring to a moral obligation, but a Charter obligation. The Charter
placed the obligation. Now in this matter a great play is made of the use of the
word "may" in the relevant article of the Charter. There again I have not the
advantage of reading other translations of this article. I turn to Article 75 of the
which reads: "shall establish under its authority a trusteeship system for the
administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by
subsequent individual agreements."
These territories are, hereafter, referred to as Trust Territories. I submit Mr.

Chairman, that this ‘may’ is merely an expression of simple futurity. And when it
comes it will be so placed, this is not the intention. The reason for this is that the
territories that come under trusteeship are not contemplated to be only those that
were mandated, but others as well. And that is the reason for this `may', because
in other cases - in cases of territories not under mandate - it must be purely a
voluntary choice, because they are not under any kind of trusteeship.
If a kind of sacred trust prevails in the world, and the people who are one of the
parties to the sacred trust are member States and the other party, the people over
whom the trusteeship is exercised, are the humanity of the world covered by the
Charter, covered by the Declaration of Human Rights, covered by international
law, covered by ordinary decency, then I think that the trusteeship organ which
has lapsed or is reincarnated in this form becomes a legitimate recipient. What is
more, the trusteeship system provides for agreements of different characters; and I
submit, Mr. Chairman, whatever strong views one may hold, we would be the last
people to object if South Africa came here to conclude a trusteeship agreement of
a character different from those existing in regard to Tanganyika or Western
Samoa, or New Guinea or Marshall Islands. She is entitled to do so. But, I
submit, she has a Charter obligation to enter into a trusteeship agreement, and this
second paragraph of question B in the majority opinion (of the International Court
of Justice) should not be extracted from the context of the opinion. For, in other
parts of the same opinion, on page 144 (Question C) for example, it is stated that
"the Union of South Africa, acting alone, has not the competence to modify the
international status of the territory of South West Africa." So, in this very opinion
of the World Court, which has by a majority of 8 to 6, said that there is no legal
obligation to place the territory under trusteeship, it is also said that changes of
status must be with the permission of the United Nations.
Now you may well say, nobody is changing the status. I prefer to leave alone at
the moment the characterisation of the Union Government’s position as conceding
international "character" - not status - to the territory, but that is not the issue.
I SUBMITTED TO YOU, SIR, THE CONCEPTION OF MY GOVERNMENT

as to the content of the status, and, therefore, further submit that this modification
has already taken place. Modification has taken place, or would take place if
there were no accountability. The South African Government finds itself in the
position in which the former kind of accountability is not taking place. And since
it may not, acting alone, change the territory's status, then it must resort to other
methods of accountability; and if it must resort to other methods of accountability,
then it must come before the United Nations. Therefore, while paragraph 2 of this
page (page 144 of the opinion of the International Court of Justice) is correct in a
very limited way, the Charter obligation turns up because the Union may not
change the status of the territory. And if she does not continue to be accountable,
then she changes the status and thereby she violates the mandate and she violates
the principles of the Charter. On the other hand if she wants not to change the
status, but at least maintain status quo, then she has to accept accountability, and
accountability can only be to those who are here today in the world. In order to
maintain the status quo, the Union has got to accept some form of accountability
and, therefore, to make use of this Organisation for that purpose in one form or
another.
There could be no objection - I am not expressing an opinion of my Government -

there will be no objection to the argument, to looking at this proposition if the
Union Government came and said: we do not like these new-fangled ideas of your
trusteeship agreements, which are bilateral agreements, contracts entered into; we
are prepared that the United Nations should step into the shoes of the League of
Nations and accept the mandate of South Africa as it stands, and merely alter the
words "League of Nations" into "United Nations"; and it will be up to the United
Nations to set up its own Mandates Commission.
But the plans which are aired in this report - I do not want to be unfair, nor do I
want to overstate the case of Sir Arden-Clarke - would provide for the setting up
of a South West Africa Council, and then having a Mandates Commission
selected for South West Africa. The South West Africa Council would have three
permanent members - and those three permanent members have a particular
character. Thus administering or ruling Powers would select the Mandates
Commission. Therefore the tribunal before whom this question will go, who will
be investigating reports and informations concerning the administration of the
territory, will be hand-picked by a body consisting of three permanent members
from among the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and on the other,
two others elected not by the General Assembly, but by these three. Apart from
the jarring note produced in all democratic conceptions, this method whereby on
the one hand will be put three people, who have no basis in this matter at the
present time, to select two other; and then these five to select a sub-committee
called the Mandates Commission would imply a degree of indirect representation,
which even 200 years ago would have been considered rather autocratic.
So far as this particular report is concerned, we deeply regret that nothing fruitful
has come out of it. We regret that even such a person as Sir Arden Clarke, and his
colleagues, approaching the South African Government has not been able to get
any further than the statements of the Union Government made in this country
and in this Organisation. To the extent they got further is the blatant, unqualified
request for the amputation of this territory and the surrender of it for colonial
greed. That is to say, we are invited to be parties to colonial degradation; we are
invited to be parties to the internationalising of this infamous doctrine of
apartheid. We are asked to sanctify the violation, the profaning of the sacred
trust, which has been placed in their hands. We are asked to disregard all the
statements made by President Wilson and by General Smuts, Article 22 of the
Covenant, and the Covenant of the League of Nations itself. We are, what is
more, asked to forswear our own existence, to disregard ourselves as a world
organisation which has made provisions for the looking after of these populations
that are not yet mature for self-government.
FROM THE POINT OF WHAT MAY BE CALLED THE SOCIAL OR MORE

MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF LIFE, we have had the evidence not only of the
people who have come before us as petitioners, but of various documents
submitted to us, that though 38 years have elapsed since this territory was placed
under Mandate, these conditions have deteriorated. And do not let us forget that a
mandatory is placed over these mandated areas because the mandatory is superior
in civilisation. It so happens that the people of South West Africa are the
champions of freedom; they are undergoing sacrifices, they have to face the
music, they take the risks of rebellion, they take the risks of protest. Are they the
more advanced people or the people who deny them their freedom? The South
West Africans are receiving into their community people of a different
complexion, people of a different race. They work for these people, but the
position cannot be reversed. So, let us ask ourselves as people who have pledged
faith to the principles of the Charter: where does the incidence of civilisation, so-
called, lie? - with the people who take those risks in order to obtain freedom, or
with the people who use power and influence in order to suppress freedom?
We are told that there is no slavery in South West Africa, but those of you who
care could read the report of the International Labour Organisation on Forced
Labour. It says that there is forced labour in the Union of South Africa and there
is forced labour in the territory of South West Africa. The Mandates, either by
implication or otherwise, did not permit special privileges for any member of the
League of Nations. The trusteeship agreements also do not admit of any such
privileges. But the report of the International Labour Organisation to which I
referred, Sir, reveals a different picture.
The whole basis of the Union’s argument is that everything must necessarily be
yoked to the interests of the Union of South Africa. My Government, my
country, the people of our country wish prosperity to South Africa, and we
believe that prosperity, power and strength will be increased by the liberation of
these large numbers of people, by the exploitation of the wealth of this land in the
interest of the people as a whole, by the removal of this pernicious doctrine which
divides man from man and creates a class of chosen people to rule over others.
Only a few years ago the world went to the cataclysm of war to overthrow that
doctrine.
THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERING THIS REPORT, MR. CHAIRMAN, I once

again say: we are not merely considering just an item on the agenda - each item
being as important - we are here considering the whole question of human rights,
the question of freedom, the question of going back in our tracks on the liberation
from colonial system, which the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles produced in
the mandates system and which ultimately became advanced in the trusteeship
system. We are also considering whether one country, one member State, can
come here and say: you are not doing enough for us; we will resurrect the Allied
and Associated Powers. Are we going to create a parallel organisation, when
there is already so much division, so much difficulty even in our own
Organisation? The universality of this Organisation is challenged. Then the
sanctity of the Charter is challenged. We are called upon to internationalise - I
repeat this again, to internationalise - this infamous doctrine of apartheid. My
Government will therefore, in no way, subscribe to any of these proposals.
As to the approach to be made in this matter, there is only one way. The time will
come when the spirit of man will free itself in the continent of Africa. Whether
he be black, white, blue, yellow, brown or of any other colour, he will establish
the freedom on the basis of which humanity can progress. We are the
representatives of free governments. We should not in any way subscribe to turn
the clock back, and put people in the conditions of slavery. This is not a market;
this is not a slave-market, where a government can come and say: you give us
three-quarters of this territory, and we shall not look for the other one. This is, if I
may say so, the most objectionable form of bargaining.
I WANT TO CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE

SUFFICIENT to analyse this problem. My Government will be prepared to take
into account the fact that South Africa may want to stick to the letter of the law
and say: the Mandate - and no farther. Yes, why not the Mandate? There is
enough in the Mandate. It may not be as explicit, as well-worded. And yet there
is enough in the Mandate to carry out the principle of accountability; there is
enough in the Mandate to enable close examination of the administration of the
territory; there is enough in the Mandate for the fresh winds of world publicity to
go into reactionary methods and inhuman ways of treating people. Machinery
should be set up so that the United Nations side is concerned, that is our business.
That is to say, the Mandate - the texture of the Mandate - ought to be transferred
to the United Nations (and the words "United Nations" should be substituted
wherever the word "League" appears), and then it would be for the United
Nations, without disregard for the obligations in relation to South Africa, under
the terms of the Covenant and of the Charter, to produce the machinery which
will take care of the doctrine of accountability, and of the progressing of this
people in conditions of freedom.
For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we submit that the Assembly as a whole,
unanimously, both in this committee and in the plenary session, should refuse to
countenance this report, and demand from the South African Government, appeal
to them to take into account the wails, the appeals and the cries that come from
the suppressed peoples of South West Africa. And who today would use the
words against freedom, that are used in a memorandum of the South African
Government? Only this morning, at the Trusteeship Council, we had the pleasure
of hearing the distinguished delegate of France who told us of a great event, of the
march of progress taking place in Togoland. The Prime Minister of the new
Togoland is the man who was petitioning before us a year ago. So, the petitioner
of today is the administrator of tomorrow. Changes can take place, even in South
West Africa. For the last thirty years, the changes have been in one direction, but,
of course, the bottom will be touched some day and there will be a change,
because the spirit of men cannot be crushed, whether he be African or of some
other continent. And there are large number of people in Africa, not merely
indigenous populations, people who helped to build the economy of the country,
people who come from your country, Sir, and from other countries, from liberal
traditions, and who are as opposed to this system as any others. The duty of the
United Nations, of world public opinion, is to lend support to these great moral
forces that exist in the world in order that the freedom of man may grow from
more to more.
Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, October 23,
195929
(When the General Assembly resumed consideration of the question of South West
Africa in 1959, it had before it a report by the Good Offices Committee that its
discussions with the South African Government had not succeeded in finding a
basis for an agreement. The Committee on South West Africa had submitted an
extensive report on conditions in the territory, expressing grave concern at recent
developments.
The representative of the Union of South Africa reiterated that his Government
would not accept any authority of the United Nations in respect of South West
Africa.
After discussion, the Assembly adopted six resolutions. In resolution 1360 (XIV)
of November 17, 1959, it invited the Union Government to enter into negotiations
with a view to placing the territory under the International Trusteeship System. It
also requested the Union Government to formulate proposals to enable the
territory to be administered in accordance with the principles and purposes of the
Mandate, with the supervisory functions being exercised by the United Nations.)
... We start this year’s debate on the basis of the report of the Good Offices
Committee we reappointed at the thirteenth session. The Chairman of that
Committee commands the respect of the Trusteeship Committee. He commands
the respect of the rest of the Assembly. He has a great record in standing up for
human rights, for the liberties of people, and his country stands also as an
example of democratic institutions and of the insistence upon carrying out the
principles of the Charter. The findings of the report of the Committee now before
us are regrettably, failure. It says: "The Committee regrets to inform the
Assembly that it has not succeeded in finding a basis for an agreement under its
terms of reference." Now this is a very carefully worded sentence. It says "it has
not succeeded," which is a little different from saying, "it has failed." In other
words, that is to say, that it can make a further effort.
Secondly, it says, "an agreement under its terms of reference." That might mean
that it is an invitation to us to examine these terms of reference, if necessary.
Now, the Good Offices Committee could probably have been of a greater potency
if some of the other member States, who perhaps would not take exactly the same
view as most members on this Trusteeship Committee, had found it possible to
share our views in this matter. That may well be the position, let us hope, this
year or next year or the year after.
29 Source: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, October 1959

Now, coming to the basic positions: the Union view is - and we must not miss this
fact - the Union still speaks in terms of a ‘new look’ or ‘new approach’ that is said
to have been created by statements made in 1957. However cynical some people
might be, I think it will be unwise to throw this out of the window. When the
Union Government says that its attitude is in conformity with the spirit of the new
approach and the resolution which was agreed to by a large majority in 1957 we
may profoundly disagree with the Union’s interpretation, but we do not disagree
with the fact that in recognising the new approach there may be subconsciously
this desire that there should be a new approach. Therefore, whatever little support
there is in this difficulty we have to catch up and persuade the Union
Government, particularly through States who are nearer to it than we
unfortunately are; we should try and make some progress.
We may not be led away either by the feelings that may be aroused in us by the
very authentic, from our point of view very authentic, and moving stories we
heard - not stories in any fictional sense - moving descriptions we heard from the
petitioners who appeared before us, by the information we have from the
documents before us, such as the reports of the Good Offices Committee and the
Committee on South West Africa or the provocative observations of the
distinguished chairman of the Union delegation. These are incidents in the
resolving of a problem which is so complex, which is rooted in the desires of
strong people to maintain their strength and the weak to break the power of
repression. That has been the history of all nations in the world; and if all of us
were to carry with us only the remembrance of the wounds and the scars that
struggle has left upon them, it will not be necessary for us to move to a peaceful
world.
NOW THE UNFORTUNATE PART OF THIS IS that while the Union

Government has reminded the Committee that it has reiterated its willingness to
reach an agreement, the agreement it wants to enter into is with what it calls the
surviving Allied and Associated Powers. It is difficult to know who the Allied
and Associated Powers are. In the strict terms of international law, India would
be one of the Allied and Associated Powers, because partly we are signatories to
these agreements or treaties signed at that time on behalf of the British Crown.
The five Dominions of that time were part of the Allied and Associated Powers.
The United States is one of the Allied and Associated Powers; and, no doubt,
therefore, the States associated with her, such as Puerto Rico perhaps, and others,
may also come in under similar interpretation. France is an Allied and Associated
Power and, therefore, Guinea would be able to take its place in the same way as
we do, as one of the Allied and Associated Powers. So, if I may say so with great
respect, the South African Government would be in no better position if it
summons the Allied and Associated Powers, because there will be a large number
of members of this family, who at that time were not regarded as legitimate but
are now legitimate; and, therefore, today the Union would be in no better position
vis-a-vis the Allied and Associated Powers than it would be vis-a-vis the United
Nations. On the other hand, I feel sure that the country of Field Marshall Smuts
and the Government that succeeded his Government would not want to plead
before us that in 1959 they want to resurrect the ghost of the League of Nations -
the League of Nations that foundered in its incapacity to meet the rapacity of the
war elements in the world; they would not want to resurrect that! Nor would they
want to go back from their own point of view into the commitments of Allied and
Associated Powers.
We, on our part, would be very happy if the South African Government would
hold to commitments made in Geneva at the time of the negotiations in regard to
the Mandates and no one could have made more radical, more fundamental, more
far-reaching statements - statements which cut into the position today held by the
Union, than the distinguished former Prime Minister of South Africa...
The other condition the Union makes, in order to find a settlement, is to partition
South West Africa. Now partition has now become a well-known imperial
device. In the old days the Empire ruled territories by dividing their populations.
From times of the Roman Empire, empires have followed the principle: divide
and rule. Now in the post-war years the fashion seems to be: divide and leave.
They divided our country and left it; they divided our people and left them. So it
is divide and leave. So now division seems to be the position. Now, I would like
the Assembly, however, to look at this problem of partition from another point of
view. Partition is only one aspect of it; the proposal is not to partition in order to
create two independent units of South West Africa. Partition is another name for
annexation. Partition means cut the country up, take all the good part and
amalgamate it with the Union and leave the remainder, if you want, to experiment
with trusteeship. Those are some of the aspects of this problem of partition.
So partition should not be viewed merely as partition. After all, there is no

objection to partition as such, there being other things to compensate for it. There
are many nations sitting around here today, which a hundred years ago were parts
of much larger units, whether they be Austro-Hungarian Empire, or any other
empire, not to speak of the British Empire. As I said, there is no objection to
partition if it were intended to take off the parts which have become matured in
order that they may express themselves or rule themselves better. But partition is
only the other name for annexation. Now the motive, the purpose, the political
purpose, and indeed there is no secret about it, is to integrate and take over the
richer part of South West Africa which contains all the diamonds.
I think poor people like ourselves must pray, must wish that there were no
minerals under the earth in our country, for they attract civilisation. The minerals
of a country give that country its name, but they are exploited by, they belong to,
somebody else. That is the experience of our colleagues in Ghana. So, this
partition means the amalgamation of the richer part of Africa with all its great
mineral wealth and with the most salubrious climate - there is one way of finding
in Africa where the climate is agreeable: that would be where the white
populations live. I remember distinctly the debate that went on about East Africa
when the first Labour Government took office in England. The then Colonial
Secretary, who had come under attack at that time, had said that the high lands
were for the whites and the low lands for the others - he did not use the expression
"the others," he said something else which I do not wish to repeat. So the high
lands are for the white. There it is. So the high lands, the most salubrious places
of occupation in the great riches of South West Africa, will be amalgamated with
the Union.
There is another aspect which we should look at. Supposing the United Nations
by an act of unwisdom agreed to partition, or supposing by force majeure
something was inflicted, then what happens? In South West Africa develops an
empire, the empire is extended to this territory on the one hand of which there is
the Union of South Africa which proclaims the doctrine that its survival is only
possible, as in the case of Sparta, by the liberty of 300 out of 300,000. On the
other side of it stands the Portuguese dominion of Angola; and on the top of it
stands Bechuanaland, in a very tender spot and a very tender position at the mercy
of the great forces of these two States. A little above is the Central African
Federation, which is taking very good lessons from the Union and following the
example, indeed as a pupil should. And there lies to the east coast the territory of
Nyasaland, about which out of courtesy and tenderness to our colleagues of the
United Kingdom I say very little...
HERE I WOULD LIKE TO LOOK A LITTLE BACK at the history. The Union
of South Africa was the only country in the inter-war years which disregarded the
principles of the Mandate, Japan following soon after in regard to the Pacific
Islands. The Union of South Africa conferred union citizenship on the people of
South West Africa in 1923. She had no business to do so, because it was not her
territory. At that time the people protested, and the Mandates Commission had a
great deal to say about that action of the Union. So, this idea of annexation has
always been in their minds.
I do not speak of annexation in the sense of bare naked conquest. They (the
Union) profoundly believe, probably, that the best interest of civilisation is served
by the doctrine of apartheid, by the kind of government they have; after all we
have heard the petitioners saying that there are some good hospitals. Therefore
they probably think that under the system of partition there will be some good
hospitals even though for a few people only. The point is that these ideas of
annexation have always been with them, and you may remember, Mr. Chairman,
that in 1946 in London and afterwards here the Union Government, before the
Trusteeship Committee, said that they were going to submit proposals to the
United Nations for the annexation, or rather for what is called making this
territory as integral part of the Union. The integral part clause appears in several
Trusteeship Agreements concluded by the United Kingdom and by France, but
with very good qualifications. It reads to the effect that a certain territory "shall be
administered as though it were an integral part etc." "As though it were integral
part," in English, means that it is not an integral part. But in the case of South
Africa the Union wants to reverse this.
I do not say this just to give the history and take up your time, but it is necessary
to understand how deep-seated are their views and where they lead to, and,
therefore, it is not sufficient to deal with them merely on the surface. The South
African Union has always looked upon the mandated territory, apart from the
statements of General Smuts and other more liberal element in South Africa as
part of colonial conquest. Their attitude reminds me of a Japanese representative
of Naga regime, who at one time is reported to have said, when it was pointed out
that the fortification of the South Sea Islands was against the Mandate - I do not
vouch for the statement: Mandates - What! President Wilson would not allow us
to call anything by its proper name in 1921, and therefore we call them Mandates.
And that might have been the Union’s view also.
My position is confirmed by all that we have heard, by the information we do not

get, and by the implications of the small information that came from the expert of
the Union delegation, who very kindly spoke to us. All these point to the fact that
the picture in South West Africa today is that of a colonial empire. This picture
exists in 1959 and not in 1919...
FROM THE GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE WE GO ON to the South West

Africa Committee30...
For four decades the administration of South West Africa has been conducted by
the Union under the mandates system, whose guiding principle is that the well-
being and development of the territory’s inhabitants form a sacred trust of
civilisation. And what has the Committee on South West Africa to say? Its report
tells us that the Union of South Africa has failed and continues to fail to carry out
the obligations it undertook to promote to the utmost the material and the moral
well-being and the progress of the inhabitants of the territory. "The Committee,"
the report continues, "has become increasingly disturbed at the trend of the
administration in recent years, and at the apparent intention of the mandatory
Power to continue to administer the territory in a manner contrary to the
Mandate," - here I would like to interpolate that the South African Government
has publicly proclaimed that it has no desire to go against the Mandate - "the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, and the resolutions of the
General Assembly."
30 The Committee on South West Africa was established by the General Assembly in 1953 to
continue negotiations with South Africa - conducted earlier by an ad hoc committee - and to
examine available information and petitions on South West Africa.
I ask you, Mr. Chairman, is it possible for any member State of the United
Nations to go against more injunctions than this catalogue that has been recorded
by the Committee on South West Africa. Therefore this again we point out to the
Union, not in the sense of what the distinguished foreign minister once before
called the pillorying of the Union but in order that it be known to their people who
in their limited democracy, profess to a democratic way of life and where public
opinion matters, even though only among a small part of the population.
I have an interesting anecdote about this, Mr. Chairman. In 1921, the League of
Nations was discussing the populations of the world. Each country was asked to
give its population figure. The distinguished delegate of the Union at that time
said that it was one and a half million. The delegate of India said that he thought
there were some Africans there too. "Oh, 8 million; you mean the Africans."
But in the context of their own limited democracy, there is a parliamentary

opposition, there are free churches; there is freedom of worship and, what is more,
there is increasing industrialisation. No country in the world, be it the Union of
South Africa or any other country, will be able to resist the impact, the powerful
force of industrial labour in the days to come. I say this with no desire to interfere
in the internal affairs of South Africa.
The Union has another inhibition. On the one hand it says that it intends to
negotiate with the United Nations, but on the other it is unwilling to come to an
agreement with the United Nations, as the second party. Now, this is rather a
strange insistence for the sake of prestige or for the sake of saving face. My
country, so far as possible, does not hold to this doctrine of what is called saving
the face. Very often people in saving faces, lose their heads. In this case, when
the Good Offices Committee says that the negotiations must be with the United
Nations as a party, it is basing itself on one of the three doctrines on which the
advisory opinion of the Court has given common conclusions, both in respect of
the majority judgement, and also the various minority judgements. Therefore,
negotiation with the United Nations as a party is agreed upon by everyone almost
on all sides except by the Union, and, therefore, we readily hope that the member
States who are closer in their emotional and political relations to them, would be
able to persuade the Union of the rather invidious position that will arise if the
Union of South Africa, which must claim for itself a great contribution in the
formulation of the Charter, including its racial provisions, would want to
disregard the United Nations. Even today, South Africa has admitted that this
territory has international status. Are they now going to say that status has not to
be negotiated with this world body, of which the Union is a member, and in
regard to which there are no rivals at present in the world?...
ARISING FROM THIS DEBATE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THERE ARE FOUR OR

FIVE MAIN THINGS which we have to consider. Among them are the
statements made by the petitioners; and here I am sure neither my Asian or
African colleagues nor the petitioners themselves nor anyone else who holds a
radical view on this question, will think that I am in any way guilty of derogation
of the petitioners’ case before us. It may be granted for argument’s sake that a
petitioner, a person who makes a representation, is probably likely to present one
side of the case more than the other; that is the worst that can be said. But what
has been said by the petitioners - not one of them, not only the 8 or 9 who came
here but also in the large numbers of other written petitions that we have
examined - even if 10 percent of all that was said were true, if 10 percent of that
represented the facts, then I think a case of maladministration prevailing in the
territory contrary to the provision of Mandate has been established. Therefore, it
is not necessary for us, in my opinion, to examine every word or every syllable of
the petitions. It should suffice generally to take the broad outline of the
presentation.
It is an important fact that tribal chiefs and others who are in suppression in South
West Africa still have great faith in this Organisation and still want to send
petitions to it. It is also important to remember that those men who have come
before us, particularly of non-African origin, have taken very considerable risks in
obtaining information, not newspaper stories for any publicity for themselves.
They have come before us in a serious way; they have taken very considerable
risks to make, shall we say, a little split in this curtain - I do not say what
particular colour this curtain is - on South West Africa. They have done a service
to their own country and to the United Nations as a whole by bringing about what
is sought to be achieved in the Charter as freedom of information. I would like to
say on behalf of my delegation that we owe a debt of gratitude to these men, who
at a great risk to themselves and with great restraint have presented the case of
South West Africa before us. Their statements along with other material form the
natural basis of our judgement.
Another set of factors, which we have to examine, is the juridical position, rights
and obligations in the context of this particular problem. And yet another factor is
which I purposely put in another category, the Charter provisions, which are of
more than juridical importance because they lie at the root of the foundations of
the United Nations and involve great moral and ethical issues. I cannot say that
juridical issues are often divorced from moral issues but they are not coterminus.
Mr. Chairman, besides all this there are three proposals before the Assembly.
One comes from our neighbouring country of Nepal, another from Mexico and
the third from Iran. These I propose to refer to at a later stage.
AT THIS TIME, THOUGH IT IS A VERY OLD, HARDY PROPOSITION, it is

well for us to go very briefly into the background of this problem. South West
Africa, like many other countries, came into the pale of the modern civilisation in
the context of imperial conquest. There was a time when the British Empire did
not want to have any part or lot of it. There were several occasions when
missionaries and traders asked for protection but the Government of the 19th
century England said that it did not want to get involved in these matters.
Fortunately that was the time of little Englanders; they expanded afterwards and
now they are not so little. At any rate, at that time Britain did not go and conquer
this place. By the middle of the nineteenth century the German connection with
this territory had been established in an unofficial way and, as it happened in
those years, the local chieftains - I do not suppose they consulted their populations
- made agreements with them and gave them hospitality. This was not the first
time that things happened in that way. I have read in history of an incident in my
own home town, where I was born, where the emissary of a great country visited
in 1498, landed on that coast and visited the ruler of that time, who showered him
with presents and honours and the result was that he took away 1200 inhabitants
to his home country and we never heard of them afterwards. Anyway the
Portuguese entered this territory and the other parts of Africa which they now
have as parts of their colonial empire...
In 1883 a merchant of Bremen obtained from the Hottentot chief, Joseph

Frederick of Bethany a cession of land, later known as Luderitz Bay. Bismarck,
still unconverted to a colonial policy - he was still a school boy in the imperial
business - caused the British Government to be informed beforehand - they called
Britain the elder brother - of the protectorate in words that were almost an
invitation to Great Britain to assume sovereignty over the territory. This
opportunity, like the previous one, was allowed to slip away and in April 1884
Bismarck took the initiative and assured Luderitz and his establishments of
German protection. The protection is a funny word, Mr. Chairman. You know,
under the Treaty of South East Asian Treaty Organisation, your country and mine
are under protection even though we did not ask for it! Below the 28th parallel,
or whatever it is, protection is just like the sun which rises and sets without our
knowing it.
To continue with the historical account belated attempts by the British and Cape
Governments - i.e., the South African Government of the time - to retrieve the
situation were unavailing. In the latter part of the 19th century however the
Empire had come into existence; by 1857 India had passed under the Crown and
the Empire as such had taken shape. But belated attempts by the British and Cape
Governments to retrieve the situation in southern Africa were unavailing, and in
due course protection over German traders developed into full-fledged German
annexation of the whole territory...
The first German representative sent to this territory - he does not bear a good
name in the present context - was His Excellency Goering. He was succeeded by
Kurt von Francois - that was also not a good name, the first part I mean. He
transferred the capital from somewhere to somewhere. It was there that the first
German farmers settled in 1892. And unlike most of us these farmers were very
industrious people. In 1893 there was trouble with Hendrik Witbooi, and the
Hottentot chiefs. I suppose he did not like this man going into his farm. I believe
it happens in the Middle West over here that people going into the farm are not
liked. The Germans attacked this man’s village and 150 of his subjects, including
women and children, were killed. It could be argued of course that these subjects
had no human rights and therefore somebody was trying to impose inhuman rights
upon them. The Germans attacked this village and 150 of his subjects were
killed. Then Francois was succeeded by Theodor Leutwein, who tried to treat the
native population with consideration. You will find in the history of all empires it
is always firmness plus the reverse, and the process goes on. It is the pendulum in
all foreign rule. It is part of a policy, but when it goes too far the democracy at
home starts biting.
So Theodore Leutwein found much cause for dissatisfaction and it required only a
spark to set the country ablaze. The Bondelswaartz Hottentots rose in 1903. This
rising was suppressed, but early in 1904 the Hereros revolted and killed a number
of German settlers, but not the British or the Boers. The rebellion was quickly
quelled but in the "cleaning up"- it is called "mopping up" now-a-days - in the
mopping up operations the Hereros were ferociously harried by General Trotha -
this man’s successor - and were then reduced from a tribe of 80,000 people to
15,000 starving refugees, many of whom found sanctuary in Bechuanaland, which
was British territory and where liberal traditions prevailed and these people could
move in there.
That, Mr. Chairman, is the background in which this territory starts its career in
the modern world. When we talk about sovereignty, we must recognise the fact
that power was established not by legitimate rights but by conquest, which was
recognised in those days. Then came the period of the Great War - the First
World War - and German expansionism encountered the opposition, or rather the
firmness of the British Empire and its associates, and was defeated. But in years
that followed came another trouble - another invitation to civilisation! In the
years that followed these troubles, the depopulation resulting from the methods
used in suppressing the rebellion caused a labour shortage. The only thing that
did not happen here was that the British Government not ruling this place, no
Indian immigrants were sent like in South Africa... Labour shortage hampered
the development of the territory. The discovery of diamonds in 1908 led to the
considerable increase in European population which rose to nearly 15,000 by
1913.
On August 6, 1914, that is two days after the declaration of the First World War,
the Government of the Union undertook to assume all obligations resting upon the
British regular garrison in South Africa... South Africa then sent a military
expedition of its own to German South Africa. I must say in fairness and in
historical context this replacement of regular British garrison and the sending of
the military expedition was part of the operations of the First World War against
the enemy, Germany, and not against these people. Soon after the preliminary
occupation of Luderitz Bay, the Boer rebellion interrupted these operations - that
is to say the Boer business had not come quite to a conclusion by that time. But
later the campaign against the Germans developed rapidly and successfully. In
January 1915 South African forces advanced into the country... after a campaign
of swift movement in semi-desert and waterless country forced the surrender of
the Germans on July 9, 1915. This is the war story.
Then came the end of the empire when the former territories of Germany and
Turkey, which normally would have been the booty of war, came under the
system of international tutelage. Thanks to the initiative of the American
President, who had entered the war with the promise of no annexations and no
reparations, annexations did not take place and these territories, after a great deal
of haggling and bargaining between victorious Powers, came under the System of
Mandates. South West Africa became a "C" mandate, being regarded then as an
undeveloped region - God knows why - because these people had been under
civilisation for at least six or seven hundred years before with their own tribal
systems and with their own ways of rule; they were civilised enough for the
German missionaries on the one hand and the traders afterwards on the other to
conclude treaties with them to acquire land! But they were not civilised enough
to be placed under "B" or "A" mandate! At any rate, South West Africa went
under "C" mandate and that "C" mandate went to His Britannic Majesty and His
Brittanic Majesty made the Union responsible for its administration...
The purpose of this historical account, which I have given as briefly as I can, is to
point out, Mr. Chairman, that on the one hand the occupation originally was
forcible, but at the same time not forcible against the population; I want to be very
accurate about this - not against the population but only against the Germans. The
whole operation was in order to beat the enemy and having beaten him the booty
of war went to the community of nations as "sacred trust" and that "sacred trust"
was transferred to the Union and, therefore, the Union’s title is only the Mandate.
If the Union were today to say that they are not bound by the obligations of the
Mandate, then the Union cannot take the benefits. If she must have the smooth,
she must have the rough; if she must have the rough, she must have the smooth.
If there are no obligations under the Mandate, there are no rights under the
Mandate either. Now if we take the Mandate away, what is left? In that case
South West Africa must come before the United Nations in the same way as
Algeria has come before the United Nations for the liberation of the suppressed
people. But we do not see this as a colonial possession. In the interest of
historical accuracy, in the interest of the people of this State, and out of deference
to the Union, therefore, it is a Mandated Territory, and if it is argued that the
Union has no obligations under the Mandate, then the whole basis of the Mandate
disappears: you cannot have it half and half...
ARTICLE 22 OF THE COVENANT SAYS: "To those colonies and territories

which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of
the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not
yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development
of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant." That is Article
22 of the League Covenant. It says further - "The best method of giving practical
effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to
advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing
to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on
behalf of the League." If sovereignty rests in the Union there would be no
"behalf." "Behalf" means some sort of agency, some sort of wardenship. And
therefore sovereignty does not exist there. Here I would like to say that in the
opinion of my delegation the Union of South Africa is an advanced nation -
advanced nation in terms of economic position, or political power, or civilisation,
as we generally understand it, or education etc. We not only admit that, we base
our position on this that she is an advanced nation capable of this administration.
We do not contest its geographical position and we also think that she is best able
to undertake this responsibility. But that responsibility has to be exercised in
terms of the Mandate, which alone confers this privilege upon them.
If this were not sufficient - this is in the Covenant - General Smuts, who was
responsible for this, has himself gone into this question of the Mandate. He says:
"The Mandatory State should look upon its position as of a great trust and
honour, not as an office of profit or a position of private advantage for it or
its nationals. And in case of any flagrant and prolonged abuse of this trust
the populations concerned should be able to appeal for redress to the
League, who should in a proper case assert its authority to the full, even to
the extent of removing the mandate, and entrusting it to somebody else, if
necessary."
NOW WE COME TO THE PRESENT POSITION. While I do not wish the

Committee to be taken again into the petitioner’s case and what not, I do believe it
my duty just to refer to certain matters. These acts of administration are not
individual actions. My delegation does not take the view that there are in South
Africa large numbers of administrators who, like those in the Hitler regime which
had professional sadists, went to inflict cruelty. We are only talking in terms of
criticism or offering our comments on a system, not upon individuals. The South
Africans we come across, we have met, are people for whom we have highest
respect, but they are as well victims of the system as those whom they victimise.
The South West Africa Committee says:
"The Committee has shown in earlier reports that although the

administration of the territory has previously been characterised by
separate treatment of the different racial components of the population, the
adaptation of this situation to the policy of apartheid, the concept of racial
segregation and the separate development of the races as a permanent
feature of the structure of society has been intensified since the transfer of
Native administration from the territorial authorities to the Government of
the Union of South Africa in 1955."
I think it is necessary to point out that we need not go far. There is the Declaration
of Human Rights to which South Africa is a party where it says that people must
be governed by the will of those who are being governed and so on. There is no
representation of those large populations, for whose welfare the Union is
responsible, in the South West African legislature, or in the Union’s Parliament.
The territory is represented, I believe, by six persons in the Lower House and four
in the Upper House of the Union Parliament and none of them belongs to the
indigenous population nor has the indigenous population any vote. Therefore,
there is no question even of a limited franchise. All non-Europeans in the
territory are prohibited by law from voting in the territorial elections. They are
also prohibited from being candidates for elections since membership in both the
Union Parliament and the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa is restricted
by law to Europeans... Therefore there is no question that this is nothing except
what is comparable to a democracy of the Greek of Spartan days where 300
people had all the rights and 300,000 did not. Then that is one part of apartheid.
The other is the system of Pass Laws which prevail in this territory. Pass Laws
are not just identification cards like those carried by citizens of the United States
or any other country. I remember reading a judgement of a distinguished South
African judge, Justice Bloomfield, who said: "We (South Africans) have passed
so many laws in our country so that when an African gets out of his house, he
commits a crime. He makes statutory offences." Now here are some of these
Pass Laws! Any policeman may at any time call upon an African who has
attained the age of sixteen years to produce his reference book. If a reference
book has been issued to him but he fails to produce it because it is not in his
possession at the time, he commits a criminal offence and is liable to a fine not
exceeding ten pounds or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one month. It
is not so much the enormity of the punishment but the fact people should have to
live in this kind of terror and should have to identify themselves, on demand, in
the way under penal sanctions. Pass Laws are applicable only to one section of
the population. In other countries we carry identifications equally applicable to
everybody. There are practices in other countries which we do not approve of. I
myself do not want my thumb impression taken by policemen but it is a normal
thing of this country. That is, where it is the law they do it.
Another example of discriminatory legislation: Whenever the Governor-General,

in his unfettered discretion deems it fit to issue the necessary proclamation, an
African who has been required by an order of Court to leave a certain area must
do so, and no Court of Law may grant an interdict preventing such removal, nor
may appeal or review proceedings stay or suspend such removal, even when it has
been established beyond all doubt that the order of the Court was intended for
some other persons and was served upon him in error. You cannot even argue
mistaken identity and the person in regard to whom the mistake is made has to
pay the penalty! I could read on in this way quite a lot but there is not the time to
do so.
Now supposing, for instance, it were argued, as it may be arguable, that things are
not so bad; they could be worse as we were told so many times. But we still - as a
government, as a people - still hold to the view that even good government is no
substitute for people’s liberty. It is far better for people to have their own bad
government than somebody else’s good government.
NOW WE COME TO THE JURIDICAL POSITION under the Covenant of the

League under Article 22, much of which I have read out...
There are, Sir, two main sets of documentation coming from the International
Court - one belongs to 1950 and the other to later periods - and I must place the
whole facts before you. There are parts of this judgement which probably will
appear contradictory to one another...
Three questions were referred to the World Court:
1. Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international

obligations under the Mandate for South West Africa and, if so, what are
those obligations?
2. Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applicable and, if so,
in what manner, to the territory of South West Africa?
3. Has the Union of South Africa the competence to modify the

international status of the territory of South West Africa, or, in the event
of a negative reply, where does competence rest to determine and modify
the international status of the territory?
And the answers to these questions were - 1. "The South African Union continues
to have the international obligations stated in Article 22" and then this answer
proceeds to set out what those obligations are in regard to the Mandate and in
regard to Chapter XII of the Charter. On the first question, the answer was
reached by 12 votes to 2. I do not want to read the names of the judges, that will
not be proper. By 12 votes to 2, the Court is of the opinion that "the Union of
South Africa continues to have international obligations stated in Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate for South West Africa, as
well as the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that territory,
the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United Nations, to which the
annual reports and the petitions are to be submitted, and the reference to the
Permanent Court of International Justice to be replaced by a reference to the
International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate and
Article 37 of the Statute of the Court." That is to say, that by a majority of 12 to
2, the International Court advises the United Nations that under Article 22 of the
Covenant the obligations remain with South Africa to transmit information and
petitions received from inhabitants, and that supervisory functions are to be
exercised by the United Nations and also that any member of this Organisation,
who was a member of the League of Nations, under Article 37 of the Statute of
the Court and Article 7 of the Mandate, can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court.
On question 2, i.e., are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applicable,
and, if so, in what manner, the answer is unanimously in the affirmative and the
Court has added: "The provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter are applicable to
the territory of South West Africa in the sense that they provide a means by which
the territory may be brought under the Trusteeship System."
Now I haven’t the time to place it together with other statements that have been
made, but what the Union has said is that the Mandate in that way cannot function
because the League has demised. But for want of time I could have placed before
you several statements in which South Africa has herself come here and said that
they are prepared to honour these obligations. They were parties to the creation
of the Trusteeship System, and General Smuts himself said that the Trusteeship
System was even superior to the Mandate. These are his words:
"The Trusteeship System is not only a substitute for the Mandate but even
superior to the Mandate and takes these things over."
The International Court has also said that the Charter provides an alternative. If
the League has lapsed - it cannot be said that there is nobody whom one may pay
one’s taxes or who else will receive them. While it may be technically true that
the United Nations cannot compel - it cannot compel anybody - to place territories
under trusteeship, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy and the United
States, they all placed their former mandated areas under the trusteeship system,
of their own free will. The same request was made to South Africa times without
number and it was the understanding in 1946 - I remember the discussions at that
time31 - that there would be no difficulty in this matter. General Smuts had said
at the Conference in San Francisco which led to the establishment of the system:
"The principle of trusteeship is now applied generally. It applies to all

dependent peoples in all dependent territories. It covers all of them, and
therefore an extension has been given to the principle of very far-reaching
and important character. The application of these principles to colonies of
a large number of Powers will mean a general improvement of
administration and the setting up of quite new ideals for many of the
31 Mr. Menon was a member of the Indian delegation to the second part of the first session of the
General Assembly in 1946.
dependent peoples in those colonies."
If the Union of South Africa is not at the present moment disposed to entertain
our views, may we, in all humility, submit these documents, of probably the
greatest statesman South Africa has produced and one of the founders of the
United Nations, for their attention. General Smuts also said at the same meeting
that "if these additions for the advancement of these dependent peoples,
politically, socially, economically, are carried out, I have no doubt that the result
will be very far reaching. The result will be that as both Sections ‘A’ and ‘B’
(Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter) are applied to dependent peoples all over
the world, wherever a territory is inhabited by dependent peoples - peoples who
are not advanced to look after themselves, peoples who are still backward in
development one way or another, they will have the benefits of this new
administration."
General Smuts says that it will be for the United Nations Organisation to see that
dependent peoples get the benefits contemplated for them in the system. That is
to say that General Smuts concedes, not only concedes but argues, the case of
supervision.
In San Francisco General Smuts not only conceded, he was the advocate of the
Trusteeship System with all its implications including the supervision by the
United Nations and not by the Allied and Associated Powers or anybody else.
Again, speaking here on November 4, 1946, before this very Committee, and I
distinctly remember this, General Smuts said that the Trusteeship System
embodied in the Charter has taken the place the Mandate System occupied in the
Covenant of the League of Nations. Therefore while the Court might have doubts
whether the United Nations is successor to the League of Nations or not, the
South African Government of that time had no doubts whatsoever in that matter.
This is what its representative, General Smuts, said about this system of
trusteeship.
"It is not only the successor to the Mandate System and is in many
respects an advance and improvement upon it. The Mandate System dealt
with German and Turkish colonies after the Great War. The present
Trusteeship System has much wider scope and deals with all territories,
whether or not they were under trusteeship or voluntary agreement."
The fundamental concept of the Trust itself, as that of the Mandate, is the
advancement of the inhabitants and their progress in social, economic and
political fields and this advance is to be with due regard to the wishes of the
inhabitants of the territory. There is no record here, Sir, of any consultation of the
inhabitants of the territory in the way that is meant in that position. I would have
liked to place more documentation before you, but most of us are familiar with
these things and the only purpose of placing them here again is to remind
members of the Committee of the position as it is.
NOW ABOUT THE THREE PROPOSALS. One is the proposal of the Mexican
delegation. Naturally it is not a proposal to which we can object. But if South
Africa will agree to supervision by a body composed on the same pattern as the
Trusteeship Council, it is very difficult to understand why there should be
replacement of the Trusteeship Council, but so far as the principle of it is
concerned we do not find any objection to it except, of course, that the
Trusteeship Council is established by the Charter; and there must be some very
good reasons for its displacement. But, of course, if its composition is suitable -
and I am sure that members of this Council, if their absence from a body of that
kind will assist in any way to bring this territory under Trusteeship, I am sure in
the general interest they will be prepared to do so - we have no objection on the
merits as put in that way. But in principle it appears that if on the one hand you
have the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and the Union
(four) and on the other four elected members the purpose is merely to exclude
some countries and that may create difficulties. But in any case it is another
Trusteeship Council - Trusteeship Council "B" instead of the present Trusteeship
Council "A" and whether we have the power to create a thing like that, I do not
know.
Our friend from Nepal has suggested that we should send a fact-finding mission
to South West Africa. We have no objection to that, but if the Union is not
prepared to accept the authority of the United Nations and will not negotiate with
it, then of course that creates a difficulty regarding the fact-finding mission. But
it appears to us, and I feel sure that my colleague from Nepal will agree, that
under the Mandates System and, so far as the principle is concerned, under the
Trusteeship System and under the statements made by General Smuts over here
on a particular point, the Mandatory Power cannot bar any member of the then
League of Nations and now the United Nations from having access to these
territories. That is to say, in a Trust Territory the Administering Authority cannot
create privileges for itself which it cannot afford to other members of the United
Nations.
So, in our humble submission, it is open to any member of the United Nations,
any Government, any State member of the United Nations to send out people, not
necessarily to fact-find but to visit these areas, so that our Organisation would be
seized better of all these things. In any attempt of that kind we are not for a
moment suggesting that we should create greater difficulties with regard to South
Africa by raising other issues which are unsettled. All we are saying is that even
if a fact-finding mission cannot come about in the way Nepal has suggested, its
substance can be obtained by individual efforts on the part of member
governments - and whether it is good thing or not it is for the Committee to
consider. We may make an appeal to member governments - particularly member
governments who are more of persona grata with the Union than some of us may
be - to visit these areas so that the Committee can also feel that we are not being
influenced or coming to conclusions only on the basis of documents submitted by
the Good Offices Committee or the South West Africa Committee or by our own
predilections or by previous history or by the petitioners, but by seeing for
themselves the picture that exists. The representative of Iran made another
suggestion which, of course, also requires the consent of the Union. That again is
the position with regard to the proposal concerning the consultation of the
inhabitants.
SOON I HOPE WE WILL COME TO THE STAGE OF SUBMITTING

RESOLUTIONS in this matter. We will not take any position and we would not,
in any way, promote any activity which is intended, so to say, to pile up
opprobrium on the Union. That is not our purpose. We would like not to submit
a resolution but to make some suggestions. It will be good thing if into the
Committee on South West Africa, the Union were elected as member. She would
be there; we could ask her questions; she could assist us. The Committee can be
assisted by her presence in it, and what is more, the member from South Africa,
who will sit on the South West Africa Committee, would not be barred from
going into the territory and in that way the South West Africa Committee will
become more representative.
The second suggestion we would like to make is one that has been submitted
before; we will make a request to the South African Government once again - not
only once again but as many times as may be necessary - to assist the United
Nations in the solution of this problem and take the assurance that this is not an
attempt to frame an indictment or to allocate blame or praise, but merely a step in
the progress of the United Nations under Article 76. We hope that the Assembly
will make an appeal to member governments first on the lines I mentioned a while
ago and also to use their influence with the South African Government that this
question, which creates so much ill-feeling, takes so much time of this
Committee, and creates on the one hand anticipatory and hopeful feelings in the
peoples of South West Africa and on the other a great emotional, almost
evangelical division of this Organisation which if not justified would have certain
consequences - we hope that countries like the United Kingdom and the United
States with their great influence all over the seven seas would be able to persuade
the South African Government, I do not say to see reason but to assist, not in
order to accept any of the arguments we have stated, not in order to accept any
responsibility for misdemeanours but in order to fulfil the pledges given by
General Smuts to this Organisation.
The representative of South Africa who, for the first time, has given us details in
regard to the administration of the territory, would have the opportunity to give it
to the right channel and to the right source if he should come and sit in this
Committee on South West Africa, or equally in the Trusteeship Council. Or if
they are suggesting that South West Africa is a part of the colonial empire and the
Mandate has lapsed, then of course we, those of us who are ex-colonial people,
must go into another question, and as in the case of Algeria, demand the
independence of South West Africa.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we will be able, at this time, to pass through this Committee
a resolution that is unanimous... We have been negotiating with the Union since
1907. We have not lost patience, nor have the South Africans. South Africans
and we are probably the most patient people in the world in regard to
negotiations! What is more, to South Africa we owe a great debt of gratitude
because it nourished the Great Gandhiji in his earlier days and gave him the field -
not gave him, he found the field - for his experiments and also for the
development of the great personality that brought about the liberation of our
country and gave to the world the great gospel of establishing reconciliation and
resolving conflict through means of non-violence. So, therefore, we do not lose
hope.
And in regard to this resolution that this Committee might adopt, it is our hope
that even if the Union cannot today vote for this, at least she will use her influence
with other people not to vote against it and, what is more, refrain from voting
against it herself. So, for the first time, would have gone out of this Assembly a
resolution in which South Africa is not being ordered to do anything, in which
South Africa is probably being asked not to accept anything to which she is
opposed publicly, and, if I may say so, there is machinery provided here, which
does not hit her in the face. The South Africa Committee is not a partisan
committee; so far as my delegation is concerned we are prepared to move that the
Union be elected as a member of this Committee and I am sure all of us would
agree to that, so that there will be a committee in which she herself sits, where
some beginning can be made of the reality we hope for...
Our function here is reconciliation. This is the place where differences have to be
harmonised and it is a great opportunity not only for the United Nations, but for
some of us who may have erred on the path through our enthusiasm, and for
South Africa, most of all, for the first time in the history of the United Nations to
come forward and say that they would co-operate in establishing not something
that is new but something which their own leader - one of the founders of the
United Nations - contributed in the Charter. It would give them the opportunity to
come before us, not merely as a party that has been pressed under the force of
public opinion, but in the awareness of the 14 years of debate, being reminded of
some of its own commitments, being reminded of the history of the League of
Nations, and knowing well that it is not possible to maintain or perpetuate the
conditions that obtain in South West Africa today, also having before them the
shadows of those thousands of Hereros and Hottentots who disappeared when
Germans came in. It is all part of history, and remembering all this I hope the
Union will break in new history and refrain from voting against the resolution that
is being submitted to the Assembly.
TOGOLAND UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

195632
[Togoland, a former German colony, was brought under the mandates system
after the First World War, and transferred to the Trusteeship System after the
establishment of the United Nations, with one part under British administration
and another under French administration. Britain administered its part of
Togoland as an integral part of Gold Coast.
In 1956, in a plebiscite organised by the United Nations, the territory under

British administration voted for unification with neighbouring Gold Coast,
shortly before the accession of Gold Coast to independence as "Ghana."
Mr. Menon made the following statement in support of the adoption of the
recommendation of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly to approve
unification.]
It is a coincidence, and a happy one, that on this day, December 13, 1956, the
General Assembly is considering the final act in the culmination of one of the
purposes for which the Trusteeship System was established. It was on December
13, 1946, that the United Kingdom on the one hand and the United Nations on the
other signed a Trusteeship Agreement, and today is its tenth anniversary. No one
arranged the business of this Assembly so that it should fall on this day, but it
gives us the opportunity to recall, as one of my predecessors on this rostrum said,
that in the comparatively short period of ten years there has been a development
which is unique in the annals of the United Nations.
Today we see the end of that chapter begun by Western incursion into West
Africa, first by the arrival of the Portuguese somewhere in the middle part of the
fifteenth century. Happily for West Africa and the world, the Portuguese were
conquered by the Dutch and driven out of the place, otherwise we would probably
be told today that this part of West Africa was Portugal. Others followed, and
finally, in the early part of the seventeenth century almost at the same time as the
British established the East India Company in India - on the Gold Coast they
established one of their so-called forts, again very similar to the Indian
experience. Since that time, Africa has felt the impact of Western civilisation
through trade rivalry - and I am sorry to say that in the first instance both the trade
and the rivalry were in the matter of the slave trade.
32
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
682-86
Then we come to more modern times whereby, in 1850 or so, on the Gold Coast
the suzerainty of the British Crown was sought to be established. We are today in
this Assembly considering in terms of law the future of the Trust Territory of
Togoland under British administration, but it is important to consider this question
apart from the factor of the Gold Coast, because the whole position taken by the
United Nations rests on the fact that, once it has approved the independence and
political future of the Gold Coast, it is not just the independence of the Gold Coast
that is at stake, but it includes the emergence of the Togoland people as an
independent territory.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Germans in their policy of
expanding imperialism settled in this part of West Africa and called it Togoland. I
think it is important to remember this because Togoland was no territorial entity;
it was not even like the other territories of Africa. It was the aggregation under an
invading force of various tribal groups, the name being derived from the place
where the Germans first landed. The impact of the First World War saw the
collapse of German hegemony and under the Treaty of Paris, the German territory
was divided almost equally between France and Britain. If the pattern of previous
conquests had been followed, it would have become, both in law and in practice,
part of the British and French empires, but happily, on account of the impact of
the Wilsonian outlook on the peace treaties, the system of mandates was
established and this territory of which we are now speaking became a mandated
territory under British administration.
Successive British administrators who have been responsible not only for this
territory but for West Africa as a whole belonged to a more liberal school than the
administrators in other parts of Africa, and Togoland witnessed some progress,
although that progress was very slow. In the meantime, in the neighbouring
territory of the Gold Coast, there had been policies of abandonment and
resettlement over the last half of the nineteenth century, and it was only in 1901,
after the seventh and last Ashanti war, when the Ashantis had been conquered,
that the amalgamation took place.
I mention this to show that at no time did these West African people easily give
up their independence. But once that was established, there began a movement
for national liberation on the one hand, and on the other a movement of liberal
administration on the part of the imperial authority. At the end of the last war, the
territories under mandate were placed under the system established in the United
Nations Charter, and the British administration offered - unlike the Union of
South Africa - that its mandate should be placed under a Trusteeship Agreement.
THAT IS THE SITUATION WE HAD ON DECEMBER 13, 1946. The present

history begins on June 21, 1954, when the United Kingdom Government
informed the Assembly that the objectives of the Trusteeship System had been
substantially attained, and that it was not possible for it to administer Togoland in
the future as a Trust Territory.
It is worthwhile to recall that statement for several reasons. The first and most
historic reason is the fact that here is an imperial country to a very large extent
steeped in the attributes of empire, but also imbued with the traditions of liberal
administration, coming forward for the first time and saying: "We want to release
from tutelage these people whom we have governed as a colonial power and
afterwards as custodians."
The second reason, from the point of view of the United Nations and the
arguments and the reservations made, is even more important. The British
authorities came and told the United Nations: "We cannot administer this as a
Trust Territory." Therefore the real question that we have to ask ourselves is:
what are the alternatives? These would be, first, to make Togoland under British
administration a separate independent State; or, secondly, to hand over the trust to
somebody else and continue the tutelage, after someone who is qualified has
already said to us that there is no need to keep these people under tutelage.
We argue this because, while there are so many fine points of law and
jurisprudence to be argued, it should not be forgotten that the alternative to the
procedures we are now adopting would be to continue this territory under some
form of subjugation. Therefore, after a great deal of discussion - and I want to
interpolate here that no question has received more consideration at the hands of
the General Assembly or the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council than
the various aspects of the termination of this trusteeship - various
recommendations have been adopted culminating, so far as the Assembly is
concerned, with the adoption of its resolution 860 (IX) in which it asked the
Trusteeship Council to send out a Visiting Mission to Togoland under British
administration to take further steps in the implementation of the statement made
by the United Kingdom to the General Assembly.
The Trusteeship Council sent out a Visiting Mission charged with four particular
tasks.33 This Mission recommended that a formal consultation with the people in
the form of a plebiscite should be held in order to ascertain the true wishes of the
people as to the future of the territory and that, in taking this plebiscite, two
questions should be asked: Do the people want integration of Togoland under
British administration with an independent Gold Coast? Or do they want a
separation of Togoland under British administration from the Gold Coast and its
continuation under trusteeship pending ultimate determination by the United
Nations? These two questions are important not only for Togoland under British
administration but for the remainder of Togoland as a United Nations
responsibility, because the General Assembly then decided - in resolution 994 (X)
- that the answer must be ascertained by the free will of the people, obtained
under United Nations auspices, and no other form of ascertainment was
sufficient...
33
India was Chairman of this Visiting Mission.
The result of the plebiscite was that 58 per cent of the population voted for
integration with the Gold Coast, as it is called - and I think it is a rather
unfortunate expression - and 42 per cent against. There are many who thought
that this proportion was not sufficient to decide the future of such a Territory.
But, as we pointed out in the Fourth Committee, there have been other instances
of such plebiscites, notably the one in Newfoundland, where only 52 per cent of
the people voted for such integration.
Anyway, when we look into the figures, we find that the dissident opinion is the
result of the action of only one-seventh of the Trust Territory and one-seventeenth
of the whole of the new State as it would arise. Therefore, when assessing these
results, it is not sufficient for us to go just by the social and political implications.
In other words, if there are other views or if the reservations and the doubts in the
minds of the people continue, it should be borne in mind that all this is in relation
to one-seventh of the territory, in the south of Togoland, and the others are all in
favour.
But over and above that, soon after the plebiscite - it was not as though the
plebiscite was a snap election - there were elections in the Gold Coast. Those
elections also covered the Trust Territory, because, under the terms of the
Trusteeship Agreement, the Administering Authority is not only permitted but has
the full liberty to administer a Trust Territory as though it were an integral part of
some other adjoining territory. So the elections may also be regarded as a
reference to the people. In those elections, out of an Assembly of 104 members...
only two members representing Togoland separatism were returned. Therefore in
the present Assembly there are two members who represent the views of this one-
seventh of the territory.
In the view of my delegation, when we consider the merits of the question, the
alternatives that are possible or impossible, the real assessment of the opinion of
the country or what is essential in order to further the purposes of the Charter, the
recommendation made by the Fourth Committee - namely, that steps should now
be taken for the integration of this Territory with an independent Gold Coast - is
the only possibility.
Here it is relevant, indeed it is necessary, that the Assembly should be quite sure
that the independence of the Gold Coast is not hypothetical; and that it is not an
independence that is in any degree limited in its sovereign implications or in the
safeguards that minorities would have in this territory...
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS INFORMED THE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY that the Gold Coast will be independent on March 6,
1957. This in itself is a statement that the Assembly should heartily welcome
because, unless other circumstances intervene - which we hope will not happen -
the Gold Coast will be a Member State of the United Nations soon afterwards...
Now the United Nations is being asked, in the context of this independence, to
take the necessary steps for the relinquishment of trusteeship and for the
attainment of independence by the people of Togoland. There are two matters to
which we would refer in this connection.
The first is that there have been before us during the last seven or eight years
various representations about unification problems in the Trust Territories
themselves. The first of these came before us in the shape of the unification of
Ewe tribe in the south and, for the information of the General Assembly, I should
state that the great majority of the Ewe tribe is in the Gold Coast itself. Another
large slice is in Togoland under French administration, and the smallest part is in
the Trust Territory under British administration. Therefore, whatever arrangement
might be made for the creation of a tribal nation of the Ewes, that would be
impossible unless a slice of the Gold Coast was cut off, and that would not be
practicable. Therefore the Ewe unification problem has receded into the
background.
We have been faced with another problem, called the unification of Togoland. As
I have already stated, "Togoland" was the name given by the Germans, and the
territory has no national historical background. The national character of these
areas had to be created by modern circumstances in a continent where the tribe
has been the unit for a very long time, and in the modern age it is emerging into
national territorial groups. In the Gold Coast itself, there have been territorial
changes, and Lagos is now part of Nigeria, but we have to take the situation as it
is today. Therefore any feeling that any delegation may have that we are
preventing the unity of a people is, in our submission, erroneous.
To hold back a territory under British administration from independence in order

to wait for the time when the people under French administration had arrived at
the same position would be to penalise these people who are today not only ready
- I believe all peoples are ready - for independence, but who also have the
opportunity of asserting their independence.
The second point I want to make in this connection is that it is a mistake to look
upon this situation as though it were the integration of Togoland in another
territory. The real problem here is that the independence of the Togoland people,
who number in this territory 430,000 persons and occupy an area of 13,000 square
miles - which is land-locked, without any exit to the sea - and whose economic
future is bound up with the Gold Coast, is a practical impossibility. Therefore in
this solution which is now proposed we are in substance dealing with the
independence of the Togo people, and it is up to us to show these people a great
future...
Therefore, in recommending to the General Assembly the acceptance of this

report, I want to say once again that it gives my delegation extreme happiness to
feel that a new member State of the United Nations will soon join us and ... that
an imperial country has shown the height of its greatness by the magnanimity of
abandonment of empire. The strongest is he that will abandon force and believe in
co-operation.
WEST IRIAN
[The political status of the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) was under
dispute between the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands for several
years. Because of disagreement during the negotiations for the independence of
Indonesia, the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty of 1949, by which the
Netherlands granted independence to Indonesia, had provided that the status quo
should be maintained in the territory and that the question of its political status
should be determined within a year through negotiations between the two
countries. But the negotiations broke down and the Netherlands amended its
constitution in 1952, making the territory a part of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
At the request of Indonesia, the matter was discussed by the General Assembly in
1954, and at several subsequent annual sessions. Indonesia claimed that West
Irian belonged to Indonesia and that reunification was essential for peace in the
region. The Netherlands argued that West New Guinea was a non-self-governing
territory entitled to self-determination under the United Nations Charter.
On August 15, 1962 the two Governments reached an agreement on plans for
settling the political future of the territory, and the agreement was endorsed by
the General Assembly on September 21, 1962.]
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly,

November 29, 195434
[India fully supported Indonesia in its dispute with the Netherlands over
West New Guinea (West Irian).
On November 30, 1954, India, together with seven other countries, submitted a
draft resolution (A/C.1/L.110) to express the hope that Indonesia and the
Netherlands would pursue their endeavours to find a solution to this dispute in
conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The resolution was
not adopted, as the vote fell short of the required two-thirds majority.]
(Summary)
Mr. MENON (India) said that the issue before the Committee was not a boundary
dispute, nor was it a question of rival claims to a territory existing in a political or
historical vacuum, but simply a continuation of the question of the Indonesian
people’s right to national independence. Although to mention it might seem an
34
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, First Committee, pages 438-
40
incursion into history, the fact was that the Indonesian people had been in
conflict with its rulers, the matter had been referred to the United Nations, and a
settlement had been reached. The present problem was in reality the last chapter
of a story of negotiations in regard to which the United Nations had a
responsibility, and it must fulfil that responsibility in regard to the last chapter
too. The Indonesian Government, instead of taking the law into its own hands,
had approached the United Nations as a loyal member State; and it would be
more appropriate to express appreciation of that action than to seek to deny that
the Assembly was competent to deal with the matter. it was only fair to say that
the Netherlands, while making reservations concerning the competence of the
Assembly, had not refused to take part in the discussion.
Thus both parties had in some degree recognised that the United Nations
possessed authority and that the dispute, while not justiciable, was open to
negotiation. Admittedly, that did not necessarily mean that the Netherlands
agreed to negotiate as proposed in the Indonesian draft resolution, but at least no
hostilities had been opened nor aggression launched; the context was one in
which the United Nations could contribute to a peaceful settlement.
IN SUBSTANCE, THE PROBLEM HAD ARISEN out of a series of unilateral

actions by the Netherlands. First of all, an agreement between the two parties had
not been put into effect, and the Netherlands position appeared to be that it had
expired. Secondly, arguing that West Irian was part of the Netherlands, the
Netherlands Government had performed the unilateral act of altering its
constitution to make room for a territory which had not previously been referred
to in the constitution.
The Netherlands representative had referred to facts which he regarded as

precedents. He had maintained that his country’s jurisdiction over West Irian was
similar to that of the United Kingdom, or of India - which at the time had been
under British control - over Pakistan or Burma. But in fact, Burma, India and
Pakistan had all been part of the British dependency of India. In 1935, the British
Parliament, the sovereign constitutional authority, had created the State of Burma;
and in 1947, by the passage of the Indian Independence Act, it had made Pakistan
a separate State. Could the Netherlands representative mention any comparable
legal act by which West Irian has been separated from the former Netherlands
East Indies? The situation was rather that the constitution of West Irian as a
separate territory forming part of the Netherlands was an act ultra vires, violation
of the existing agreements.
The supporters of the Netherlands delegation had in some instances shown less
moderation than the Netherlands itself. The Committee had been asked to look at
the geographical, ethnological, historical and linguistic arguments. None of those
factors determined nationality, but, since they had been mentioned, it could be
pointed out that Bernard H.M. Vlekke, in his Nasantara; a history of the East
Indian Archipelago,35 said that the Netherlands East Indies extended from the
western point of Sumatra to the Netherlands-Australian boundary in New Guinea.
Thus, before the Round Table Conference agreements, there had been only one
sovereignty - that of the Queen of the Netherlands - and no political unit called
"West Irian"; whereas since the conclusion of those agreements there had been
two sovereignties, that of the Netherlands, and that of Indonesia, comprising the
whole of what had formerly been the Netherlands East Indies.
A country need not have historical, geographical or ethnic ties with all its
constituent parts in order to be a State. Thus, if the British Government had not
separated Aden from India in 1935, and placed it under the administration of the
Colonial Office, the sovereignty over Aden, which constitutionally had been part
of the Bombay residency, would have passed to India, despite the heterogeneity of
the ethnic, linguistic and geographical factors. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia,
the sovereignty of the Queen of the Netherlands over an entire territory 3,000
miles in extent had been transferred, and a reservation had been made only with
regard to the administration of West Irian. In effect, a distinction had been made
between a State and its government; the State had been transferred, but an element
of administration, in other words, a form of possession, had remained, without
conferring legal authority over the territory.
The Netherlands representative had contended that the word "complete," in article
1 of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, referred to the word "sovereignty"
and not to the word "Indonesia." That was true, but the question was the meaning
of "sovereignty." It must mean sovereignty not over part but over the whole of
Indonesia.
It had been contended that the General Assembly was not competent to interpret
treaties or to act as a judicial body. That was equally true, but the provisions of
the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty were merely part of the evidence in a
political dispute.
Setting aside the question of sovereignty, it was admitted in article 2 of the

Charter of Transfer that West Irian was the subject of a dispute - a dispute
recorded in a treaty for which the United Nations was responsible. The United
Nations was therefore bound to use the methods of conciliation and to induce the
parties to negotiate. Thus, from that point of view, both the parties, as loyal
members of the United Nations, had agreed - at least by implication - that the
United Nations should examine the question. Consequently, negotiations would
not be followed by conflict.
In common with Australia which, it was to be hoped, would reconsider its

arguments, approach and outlook as a whole, India was especially concerned that
external complications should not arise in that part of the world just when one
war against a colonial Power had come to an end. That was another reason why
35
Harvard University Press, 1943.
the pacific intervention of the United Nations was desirable. Furthermore, article
2(f) of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty bound the parties to resolve their
differences by peaceful means. It was true that a one-year time-limit had been
fixed, but that had merely been the expression of a hope; negotiations would have
to continue until the whole question of the transfer of sovereignty was settled.
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the United Nations had had a special
interest in that international treaty from the outset, and was therefore bound to
congratulate Indonesia on having chosen the method of pacific settlement.
With regard to article 2 of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, the only

question reserved had been that of the political status of New Guinea. If
sovereignty had been of paramount importance, that Charter would surely have
specified that the transfer of sovereignty applied only to the other territories.
Furthermore, under article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter of Transfer, Indonesia
had accepted that sovereignty on the basis of the provisions of its constitution, in
which there was no reference to the fact that West Irian was to be outside the
sovereignty of Indonesia. The legal evidence, in short, gave no support to the idea
that the transfer of sovereignty, the completion of which had been promised,
would entail any reservation with regard to West Irian.
In other words, the Netherlands, when its sovereignty over Indonesia had come to
an end, had not partitioned Indonesia, as India had been partitioned; therefore the
absorption of West Irian into the Kingdom of the Netherlands was ultra vires in
respect of the Round Table Conference agreements, and therefore
unconstitutional. Thus the only legal feature of that action was its purely
administrative aspect, just as the British Crown retained government and
administrative authority in Tanganyika without exercising sovereignty there.
Geographical, historical, ethnic and linguistic arguments had also been advanced
to prove that the people of Sumatra, for example, were remote from the people of
West Irian. But everything was relative; it could scarcely be maintained that the
Netherlands was geographically nearer to West Irian than Indonesia was.
Reference had been made to the sultanate in an endeavour to show that West Irian
had no historical connection with Indonesia. It could also have been recalled that
West Irian had been settled by people from Southern India, and that between the
thirteenth and sixteenth centuries it had formed part of the Empire of the Indies.
The salient fact, however, was that, until 1940, or thereabouts, West Irian had not
even constituted a separate residency, but had formed two districts of the
residency of the Moluccas; in other words, it had been a subdivision of a State
which was now part of Indonesia.
Ethnological arguments were probably somewhat pointless, and might well

embarrass some of the oldest nations, which would find it hard to base their
nationality on ethnic ties. But West Irian and Indonesia had much more in
common than had been admitted in the Committee. Moreover, the fact that certain
peoples in the interior of a State were less advanced than others did not mean that
they should remain isolated from the rest of the community.
LASTLY, LEAVING ASIDE THE LINGUISTIC PROBLEM, some delegations

had found it necessary to advance a strategic and political argument. It was
doubtless customary to regard certain parts of Asia as indispensable to the
communications of empires or the protection of trade routes. But strategic
considerations were no more valid as a bar to the completion of Indonesian
independence than as a reason for holding territories like Suez. Moreover, it was a
very poor argument to say that if certain territories were held by Indonesia, a loyal
member of the United Nations, to which it had submitted the present question,
that would constitute a political or strategic danger to another country. Mr. Menon
would not probe that argument any further, in view of his delegation’s very close
relations with the two or three delegations which had advanced it.
The doctrine that imperial strategy was more important than the welfare of a
population was untenable. The Netherlands, of course, had economic interests
which it would be reasonable to protect by a negotiated agreement. That,
however, was a matter for arrangement between the Indonesian and Netherlands
peoples. The United Kingdom and India had already benefited economically by
the change in their political relationship; that would be the experience of any
European empire which took note of the signs of the times and made way for a
fraternal association. That was the process which had been set in motion in
Indonesia, to the greater benefit of the peoples concerned.
The Australian representative had claimed that under another authority the
inhabitants of West Irian would lose all hope of becoming civilised. But no one
should forget the aboriginal population of Australia, which had shrunk from
300,000 or 400,000 to 50,000 or the bloody conquest of the Banda Islands, which
revealed an aspect of Netherlands colonial history that belonged to the past.
In the final analysis, the Netherlands position was based exclusively on colonial
conquest, which had followed upon the arrival of the merchants. Fortunately, new
legal concepts had reduced the dispute over colonialism from one of physical
violence to one of argument, in which each should be allowed to have his say in
full knowledge of the facts.
The Australian representative had said that the people had continued to prosper
under Netherlands rule. It was true that European pioneers, administrators,
missionaries and statesmen had suffered and struggled in Indonesia, as in the
other colonies of Asia and Africa, in the service of the indigenous populations.
But that was only one side of the picture. The fact was that in Indonesia, which
before its independence had had no university, 88,230 primary schools, 3,235
secondary schools and a total of 1,879,000 pupils, there were now seven
universities, 26,670 secondary schools and nearly 5 million pupils. It was only
when the people had the power that they progressed, and the example of
Indonesia did not substantiate the assertion that the completion of the transfer of
sovereignty initiated by the Charter of Transfer would spell a period of darkness
for West Irian.
The problem was one that could be solved only by negotiation and not by
domination; and the same was true of the aggregate economic interests of the two
countries. Netherlands investments in Indonesia itself were considerable, and it
was naturally in the interests of the Dutch that the Indonesians should turn to them
for equipment and technical assistance under friendly conditions. The United
Nations, which had a special responsibility in the matter, ought to bring about a
state of fraternity in place of conflict. The independence of Indonesia had not
come as a voluntary move; it had come under the pressure of a national
movement, and after wiser counsels had prevailed. No one could desire the
conflict to be reopened when so little remained to be done to complete the victory
of freedom.
Arguments had been advanced concerning Australian security, or that other

security to which the Philippine representative had referred, as well as the
argument that the Indonesian Government would be less friendly towards the
people of West Irian and less capable of looking after them. But such arguments
should be set aside and attention given only to the agreements, to what was
morally correct, to national freedom, and to the aspirations and the future of the
peoples themselves.
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE ASIAN

AND NON-ASIAN PEOPLES of that part of the world, it was to be regretted that
Australia had not been able to follow the policy that had led it to bring the
Indonesian question before the Security Council. The future of that part of the
world lay in collaboration and in mutual understanding, and not in the fact that
certain territories were occupied by European races for the purpose of establishing
empires, exploding bombs, or halting some real or imaginary aggression. In the
present case, given goodwill and the moral support of the General Assembly, the
two parties should be able to get together and establish some relationship on a
new basis.
It had been argued, on behalf of the Netherlands, that whatever agreement there
had been with the Republic of the United States of Indonesia had been cancelled
by the changes in the constitution of Indonesia. But the new republic had inherited
the rights and obligations of the old. In the same way, the Republic of India,
another succession State, could not repudiate the obligations previously
undertaken by the British Government. The treaty had been concluded with
Indonesia; the expression "United States of Indonesia" had been merely the name
of one of the parties, whose character could change by constitutional processes
without altering the situation.
The Indian delegation had no doubt said things which would not meet with the
Netherlands delegation’s agreement, but it appealed to the Netherlands delegation
to acknowledge that the curtain had been drawn on a great part of history. Queen
Wilhelmina herself had remarked that her people had to look to the future in a
different set of circumstances...
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, February 27, 195736
[On December 19, 1955, the General Assembly adopted resolution 915 (X),
expressing hopes for the success of the negotiations envisaged in a joint statement
issued by Indonesia and the Netherlands a few days earlier. But the negotiations
failed to result in an agreement.
The matter was again brought to the General Assembly. India, together with 12
other countries, submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.173) to ask the President of
the Assembly to appoint a good offices commission to assist in negotiations
between the two Governments in order that a just and peaceful solution might be
achieved. The draft was not adopted, as it failed to obtain the required two-thirds
majority.]
(Summary)
Mr. MENON (India) felt that the issue of competence (of the General Assembly)
persisted only in the minds of those mostly concerned about what they called the
security of their country rather than that of Indonesia or of West Irian. The
thirteen-Power draft resolution was in line with the consistent attempts, during the
discussion of the matter in the General Assembly, to find a conciliatory and
harmonious solution in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Many
references had been made to the legal status of the Charter of the Transfer of
Sovereignty, but in the view of the Indian Government, Indonesia was a sovereign
national republic by virtue of the fact that, with the assistance of the United
Nations, it had established itself as an independent country. As the representative
of Ecuador had put it, the people of Indonesia had exercised their right to self-
determination as a whole, as a unity, and not island by island.
It had been claimed that the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty had been
abrogated, but, if so, that could be true only of article 2 of that document. Article
1 was the most important part and provided that complete sovereignty over
Indonesia was unconditionally and irrevocably transferred to Indonesia. At that
36
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelth Session, First Committee, pages 311-
12
time the Netherlands Constitution had referred only to Indonesia and had made no
mention of West Irian, either as a residency or as a colony. The former colony of
the Netherlands East Indies had been one territorial whole with its own
personality and unity. It was thus fallacious to argue that there was a territorial
dispute. West Irian was part of Indonesia. It happened to be in the illegal
possession of the Netherlands, and the problem was by peaceful means to end that
illegality, which had been accentuated by the Act of the Netherlands Parliament
of September 11, 1956.
Dealing with article 2 of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty, he failed to

see how the lapse of a year could automatically confer a right upon the
Netherlands Government to absorb West Irian. Article 2 said only that the matter
must be settled by negotiation within a year and that the status quo of the
Residency of New Guinea would meanwhile be maintained. But a residency was
part of a province of the Netherlands East Indies, which had become Indonesia. If
the status quo was to be maintained, any charge of annexation could consequently
be made, if at all, against the Netherlands Government, which had severed West
Irian from Indonesia in 1956.
Regardless of the status of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty, article 1

thereof had become permanent by performance, because the Kingdom of the
Netherlands had unconditionally and irrevocably transferred complete sovereignty
over Indonesia. Unless it could be established that West Irian, like Surinam, for
example, had been a separate entity - and every available constitutional document
indicated the reverse to be true - the action taken by the Netherlands Government
in 1956 was an act of annexation, and argument about reference to a juridical
authority was beside the point. To question the legality of the origins of nations
was scarcely profitable, for no revolution was legal until after it was successful.
Citing the examples of the United States, Ireland and Canada, the independence of
each of which could be questioned on the basis of arguments derived from strict
law, he declared that the question of deciding the sovereignty of countries long
after they had been established by their own proclamation, by their own will and
determination, did not arise. Moreover, in the case of Indonesia, the United
Nations had been in existence and, with the assistance of countries such as
Australia, what might have been a bloody revolution had become more or less a
peaceful settlement. Now the last portion of that settlement remained.
The representative of Australia had expressed concern over the fate of the
Papuans. In that connection, Mr. Menon observed that it was better for colonial
empires, for new countries and for old, not to go too far back into history. All, no
doubt, had a savage past originally. However, to argue that handing over the
Papuans to the Indonesians would be a crime against humanity was as fallacious
as to argue that a nation must be an ethnic whole. Few members of the
Organisation would be nations if they had to fulfil that requirement. If the
Papuans were restored to their original homeland, namely what was now
Indonesia, they would join a family or peoples which were ethnically different,
spoke different languages, had different religions and inhabited several thousand
islands.
Indonesia, instead of taking the law into its own hands, relied on the good will of
the nations of the world and sought only that representatives of member States, to
be appointed by the President of the General Assembly, should try to find some
way of resolving the question. The Assembly could not turn a deaf ear to appeals
made by those who had rightful claims and who were entitled to consideration by
reason of the fact that they did not press those claims by force, as they would be
entitled to do under the ordinary law of nations as practised throughout history...
He regretted having to refer to arguments advanced by the representative of

Australia, a country with which India had very close relations. That
representative’s argument that Australia had a cardinal interest in the future of the
whole of the area of New Guinea was imperialistic; it meant that, because
Australia had half of that territory as a colony, it did not want the other half to
pass out of European control. Mr. Menon was prepared to admit that New Guinea
was strategically important to Australia, but it was equally so to Indonesia. If
Australia was afraid of countries in the vicinity of that territory, Indonesia also
had reason, for its own security, to think in the same way. If countries were to be
treated as key areas in the defence of another country, he wondered what would
become of their liberties.
As for the Australian representative’s reference to self-determination and to the

praise given to that principle by the representative of Indonesia, he pointed out
that the Indonesian people had not only spoken about the matter, but by their
endeavours had asserted the principle of self-determination. Freedom had not
been handed over to the Indonesian people without any effort on their part. The
people of West Irian could not be referred to as cattle to be handed over to their
own people, for it was impossible to hand over the people of a country to the
same country. Such arguments were based on the fallacy that there had been a
place called West Irian isolated from Indonesia. That had not been so in Dutch
times. No interests legitimate to Australia that were separate from the interests of
the United Nations could be recognised by the General Assembly. The Australian
argument regarding the unity of the Papuan people must be examined to see
whether it did not arise from the fact that the rest of New Guinea was an
Australian colony and that, therefore, the whole conception was something rather
different from Papuan irredentism...
THE ONLY CASE THAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED was that the rights of
the Netherlands in West Irian were solely those of conquest, which were no
longer recognised as equitable and legal. If the problem to be settled under the
Charter of Transfer had been that of sovereignty over West Irian, he asked why
that document had not stated that the question of that sovereignty would be
decided later. In fact, the text had provided that it was the problem of the
residency that would be settled later.
The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.173) did not ask for any legal decision or for the
Assembly to come to any conclusion. It simply asked that the Assembly intervene
between two member States and that the President of the Assembly appoint a
good offices commission to assist the negotiations between them. The
negotiations obviously would concern restoration to Indonesia of what rightfully
belonged to it.
There had never been any suggestion by the Netherlands that the question was
one of defence. If the Australian argument in that respect were to be accepted, not
only would the Indonesian claim to West Irian not be respected, but even the
concession expressed by the Netherlands Government that the people of that area
were to be self-governing at some time could not be implemented. If West Irian
were to become an independent country, he wondered what would become of the
questions of security, of Papuan unity and the other arguments put forward by the
Australian representative. His Government requested the total dismissal of the
concept of territories as imperial outposts of other people and was more and more
inclined to accept the position, which had been taken in regard to other questions,
that all the peoples of a country were entitled to their nationality and territorial
integrity. He hoped that the draft resolution would be given the support of the
Committee.
Speech in the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 26, 195737
[The matter was again discussed at the General Assembly in November 1957.
India, together with Indonesia and 17 other countries, submitted a draft
resolution (A/C.1/L.193) to invite both parties to pursue their attempts to find a
solution of the dispute in conformity with the principles of the United Nations
Charter. The draft was not adopted as it failed to obtain the required two-thirds
majority of votes.]
The Assembly has been debating the question of West Irian for the last three years
and now it appears on our agenda for the fourth time. As the representative of the
Netherlands pointed out, nearly 200 speakers have taken part in those debates and
the legal issues, the issues relating to the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty,
all these matters have been discussed threadbare.
So far as we are concerned, we regard this problem as merely the completion of

the independence of Indonesia. Indonesia was a colonial territory, formerly called
the Dutch East Indies; and by the efforts of the Indonesian people, assisted of
37
Source: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, November 1957
course by the circumstances that arose during the war which caused a relaxation
of the hold of imperial Powers on their Eastern territories, the political power of
Indonesia was established. And Indonesia did not establish its political power and
the right to be independent in regard to 2,999 islands or 3,001 islands; it was for
the whole of the territory over which the Netherlands had had hegemony...
It is quite understandable that in the United Nations, and particularly among the
countries of Latin America, any argument to which the word "self-determination"
can be tagged always arouses a favourable response. It almost looks as though
one’s left pocket will have self-determination in a different way from the right
pocket. There cannot be self-determination in regard to a territory that is already
sovereign. If that were so, many countries - and I shall not mention them - around
this table would suffer disintegration today; that is to say, if we are to take
sovereign powers and say that the peoples must have self-determination, the unity
of those territories may well be decided by some local squabble, by some
momentary issue, by the desires of some political adventurers, or a neighbouring
country, or anything of that kind. Therefore, the issue of self-determination as
such does not enter into this matter. The Indonesians did not win their
independence by cries of self-determination but on the basis of their right as a
nation to be free; and they established it to a very considerable extent - although
Australia and other countries came in and on their initiative the Security Council
intervened to give final shape to it - by dint of their own efforts.
If it were unfortunately true that Indonesia was still the Dutch East Indies, a
colonial territory, then they would be entitled today to demand sovereignty over
the whole territory. In our submission, the sovereignty of a country is not
justiciable...
The representative of Brazil referred to the material submitted, very accurately

and well planned - as is customary with the Dutch - to the Committee on
Information from Non-Self Governing Territories. If this information is valid in
regard to, shall we say, one year, it must be regarded as equally valid for the
previous year... On August 24, 1948, before Indonesia became free, the Dutch
Government submitted information and that information is factual; it does not
contain any political argument and it is simply in regard to what Indonesia is. It
says in the report submitted to the United Nations.
"The Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) consists of a series of island groups in

the region of the equator, extending from the mainland of Asia to
Australia. The principal groups are the Greater Sunda Islands (Java,
Madura, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes, with their adjoining smaller
islands), the lesser Sunda Islands (Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores,
Timor... and New Guinea west of 141 degrees E. longitude."
This longitude of 141 degrees E. includes West Irian; it is on the other side of
West Irian. So there was no separate West Irian territory. West Irian was a
residency, it was not even a province of the Dutch East Indies. So whether this
charter is valid today or not is immaterial - the struggle for independence of the
Indonesian people was for their homeland, which is described here by the then
rulers, at a time when this struggle was not anticipated...
It is quite true that the majority of the countries of Southeast Asia, and
particularly those which have had their problems brought before the United
Nations in the years of nascent idealism, often enter into the exploratory
discussions, often accept methods whereby the completion of that process can be
peacefully accomplished. And that is where this Charter comes in. Article 2 of
this Charter makes no reference to sovereignty; it simply talks about the political
status of New Guinea, as it was then called - now West New Guinea or West
Irian. Article 2 is bounded by article 1 which says:
"The Kingdom of the Netherlands unconditionally and irrevocably

transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia" - why did they not say
over Indonesia subject to article 2 - "to the Republic of the United States
of Indonesia..."
It will be recognised that the United States of Indonesia at that time had not in its
political arrangements completed the unification of its various parts, which is all
part of history, but that Government in its wisdom - and I repeat, in its wisdom -
though rather belated and under the pressure of liberal opinion in the Netherlands
itself, transferred to the United States of Indonesia "unconditionally and
irrevocably" complete sovereignty over Indonesia. There is no difficulty about
understanding the words "unconditionally and irrevocably transfers complete
sovereignty." No; the difficulty is over "Indonesia." Now the Dutch themselves
explained what Indonesia was. Therefore, in our opinion, what is before us today
is not all these problems but how in terms of a peaceful approach we may proceed
to resolve the situation, and that is the only purpose of the resolution that is before
the Assembly.
I note that Indonesia sponsored this draft resolution and... it does show a great
deal of generosity and a spirit of conciliation, because it says that, despite their
unquestioned sovereignty over these areas, please come and negotiate - negotiate,
probably, with regard to the political status, with regard to time, with regard to
joint arrangements, with regard, probably, to getting the Dutch to invest their
considerable surplus money in the country and so, therefore, to their mutual
advantage. All those things can be negotiated. What does the draft resolution say?
"Realising that a peaceful solution of this problem should be obtained

without further delay...
"Invites both parties to pursue their endeavours to find a solution in

conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter."
Looking over Mr. Schurmann’s statement on behalf of the Netherlands, the first
point he makes, and quite rightly, is that the Kingdom of the Netherlands has
obligations under the Charter which must be performed. We may differ as to what
the contents of those obligations are but we all agree that all of us have
obligations under the Charter, and since this resolution says "Invites both parties...
to find a solution... in conformity with the principles of the United Nations
Charter," the argument about what they are can come as the negotiations progress.
They cannot be pleaded as a bar to negotiations.
During these three years, different positions have been taken. The Indonesians, if
my memory serves me right, took up a position on the basis of the round table
conference and the Charter and so on in the beginning, and they stated it. All that
was required was that it should be known that their best endeavours had failed and
it asked the General Assembly to call on the Netherlands to complete the contract.
The position of the Netherlands, subject to correction, and as far as can be judged
from the documents and the law in this case, is that the sovereignty over West
Irian was in dispute or that the transference of sovereignty and all that goes with it
was in dispute. The Indonesians had never said, to the best of my recollection,
either in Indonesia, or here, or anywhere else, that sovereignty was in dispute. But
the position taken up by the Netherlands today is that they will not negotiate
because the Charter is abrogated, it is their sovereign territory, you are asking us
to negotiate about the sovereign territory of the Netherlands, which is not the
position because it was transferred as part of the executed contract. Therefore, I
submit that if the Assembly would be good enough to address itself to the limited
task before it, it does not call upon particularly some of the Latin American States
to pronounce themselves on these questions at the present time, but asks the
parties to negotiate.
We ourselves would not dare to tell the Indonesians, publicly at any rate, to
negotiate unless they had taken the initiative. I say, therefore, that Indonesia’s
sponsoring of the resolution is an indication of generosity which often is
misplaced in public discussion. Very often it has been our experience that any
willingness to explore a tentative proposition is pinned upon you as a commitment
afterwards and the basic fundamentals are forgotten. But here, Indonesia is
willing to negotiate, wants to negotiate, and, what is more, negotiate in
conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Well, how can that
proposition be objected to? It can only be objected to if the Netherlands
Government now goes back on the facts of the case, namely, the establishment of
Indonesian independence which is the same as the establishment of American
independence by the revolt of the thirteen colonies against the Britain of that day,
unless they go back against those facts, or unless they go back against what was
intended and what is shown in article I which is part of the executed contract, that
is, the transfer of sovereignty, and article 2 only deals with the political question -
"the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through
negotiations" and so forth. And that is what is suggested, not necessarily in terms
of the article but in terms of the resolution. And since it is bounded by the
principles of the United Nations Charter, I submit that everyone can feel reassured
that such obstacles as there may be are further away and there need be no
opposition...

196138
[In October 1961, the Netherlands Government announced that it was prepared
to terminate its sovereignty over the territory as soon as the population’s right to
self-determination was properly safeguarded. The Netherlands was prepared to
agree that its powers should, to the extent necessary, be exercised by an
international authority under the United Nations which could prepare the people
for early self-determination.
Indonesia, while reiterating that West Irian was Indonesian territory, indicated
that if the Netherlands was prepared to relinquish its sovereignty over the
territory, an agreement could be reached that would not prejudice the rights and
claims of either side.
India, along with eight other countries, moved a draft resolution (A/L.367) to
urge the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to engage in further
negotiations under the aegis of the President of the General Assembly, with a
view to finding a solution in conformity with the principles of the United Nations
Charter. Neither this draft, nor an alternative draft by 13 countries, obtained the
required two-thirds majority of votes, and the Assembly adopted no resolution.]
...West Irian is a subject on which this Assembly has a great deal of information,
because year after year we have discussed it in great detail in the First Committee.
I hope I will not be misunderstood when I say that the draft resolution [A/L.354]
submitted by the Netherlands - while we cannot accept it and the Indonesians
have not accepted it, since it goes contrary to much of history - does, at any rate,
represent a change. It means its commitment to unwind its empire. Of course I
do not suppose this applies to its Caribbean empire - but it will unwind its empire.
But, having said that, I am informed that in the last speech made on this subject
by the representative of the Netherlands, he made it very clear that nothing was
going to happen for a year. And so - while I have no desire to discuss the merits
of it, the draft resolution we have submitted [A/L.367] is of another character; it
asks for this matter to be the subject of direct negotiation. It suggests that, in
view of the history of this matter and the desire that must prevail in this Assembly
38
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth session, Plenary Meetings, pages
715-18
among all concerned that, as far as possible - if it is at all possible - the changes
must be peaceful; that further attempts should be made for bilateral negotiations,
bilateral discussions, between the two main parties concerned.
It may well be asked, what is our position with regard to the question? I would,
therefore, without entering into the merits of it and without asking the Assembly
to commit itself, try to place our reasons before the Assembly...
West Irian, so far as the Government of India is concerned, is an integral part of

Indonesia. But, in all these matters, when great changes are taking place, we
believe there is room for discussion and understanding. So, as the Netherlands
has decided, according to its draft resolution [A/L/354], to withdraw from West
Irian, then the question of to whom the territory should go should be a matter for
discussion and common agreement. I should also like to say that we cannot agree
to what has been set out in the Netherlands draft resolution, namely, that the
United Nations should appoint a commission for Netherlands New Guinea,
because this means that the question of sovereignty - at worst, or at best - is in
dispute. This particular paragraph prejudges that question. We are quite prepared
to leave this in abeyance and to allow Indonesia and the Netherlands to meet,
under the aegis of the President of the Assembly, in order to find a way whereby
this "unwinding" process can take place.
We should like to express our appreciation of the fact that the Netherlands
Government has offered to spend a considerable amount on the economic
development of this territory. But no amount of economic aid can ever be a
substitute for the freedom of people. It may be argued that the West Irianese are
entitled to self-determination; if that it so, the Assembly would have to decide
that, and whatever emerges in regard to the question of sovereignty, under the
President’s guidance, would be of some value of the Assembly. But if the
position is that every country has to come here and submit itself to that doctrine of
self-determination, then I think every village, every state and every municipality
would have to become independent territory.
The position of the Government of India is that West Irian is a colonial territory,
having been administered by the Netherlands, and whose sovereignty has been
transferred under the terms of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty. But I do
not want to argue the merits of this at the present time because our desire is not to
create any difficulties in regard to this. We firmly believe that, having regard to
what has happened in the last five or six years, and the recognition, by large
numbers of Dutch people and of Indonesian people of their own interests, another
period of direct negotiation, with such good offices as the President of the
Assembly can exercise, would lead to our finding a solution, which in the past
was not possible.
Now, some people may ask; is this not a process of evasion, are you not escaping
something? Our answer to that would be: one year ago, two years ago, no one
would have thought that the imperial country of the Netherlands would come here
and say that it was prepared to withdraw from that territory. But at the present
moment, for their going they prescribe something in regard to the future of this
Territory. The answer of the Indonesians, as far as I understand it, is this: that the
Netherlands has no right to give this territory away because it is not theirs give
away.
Now, for the purpose of this particular session, we would submit that our draft
resolution (A/L.367) might perhaps lead to a termination of the imperial rule of
the Netherlands in West Irian, thus enabling the people of West Irian to be joined
with those of Indonesia; in fact, West Irian is very much like Goa, except of
course that there are no Charters of Transfer of Sovereignty in connection with
Goa...
The operative part of the Indian draft resolution reads:
"1. Urges the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to engage

themselves in further negotiations under the aegis of the President of the
General Assembly with a view to finding a solution of this question in
conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
"2. Requests the President to facilitate bilateral negotiations envisaged in

paragraph 1 above under his auspices;
3. Requests the Government of Indonesia and the Netherlands to co-

operate..."
I submit that this is a draft resolution that seeks the way of peace rather than the
way of conflict. Neither party stands to lose anything very much, because it was
not the intention of the Netherlands Government to do anything for a year
anyway. It asked for a commission of inquiry to be set up by the United Nations,
which would have begged the whole question of sovereignty, and I cannot see -
except in the general purposes of the Charter - where the authority could be
derived, because there is no trusteeship agreement in regard to it. And then again,
today the administration is in the hands of one side, and any inquiry conducted
there would be conditioned by that situation.
For all those reasons, we have submitted in good faith this very simple draft
resolution, which merely asks that the process of bilateral talking - which has
gone on for a long time - with the Presidents kind assistance, may lead to a
different situation because we are not where we were two or three years ago.
The fact that the Netherlands Government accepted the resolution on the
liquidation of colonialism and that public opinion in that country is willing to see
the termination of authority in that area, means that one of the main difficulties is
removed. Then, with regard to the other difficulty, which is that, Netherlands
public opinion may still have views as to who is sovereign and who is not, it is
something that, under the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement, and with the
President’s assistance to these parties in understanding their respective positions,
we may be able to find some solution...
Our country has always advocated, from this rostrum, that people who have
differences face each other rather than run away from each other. We think it is
better, in the present circumstances, not to introduce other elements, and that such
mediator influence, such restraining influence or conciliatory influence as may be
necessary in the context of the argument could be supplied by the President of the
General Assembly...
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly,

September 21, 196239
[On August 15, 1962, the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands reached
an agreement - with the assistance of a mediator (Ellsworth Bunker) appointed
by the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant - on plans for
settling the political future of West Irian.
Under the Agreement, Netherlands would transfer the administration of the

territory to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, headed by an
Administrator appointed by the United Nations Secretary- General. The
Administrator would have discretion to transfer the administration of all or part
of the territory to Indonesia after May 1, 1963. The inhabitants were to exercise
their right to self-determination before the end of 1969 and decide whether to
remain with Indonesia or to sever their ties with it. A representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General would advise, assist and participate in agreements for
the act of free choice.
The General Assembly discussed the matter on September 21, 1962 and adopted a
resolution - 1752 (XVII) - co-sponsored by Indonesia and the Netherlands, to take
note of the Agreement and authorising the Secretary-General to carry out the
tasks entrusted to him under the Agreement.
The following is a statement by Mr. Menon in explanation of vote on the

resolution.]
From the procedural point of view, we are here at this moment to explain our
vote. I want to make it quite clear that, so far as we are concerned, it is not a vote
39
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings,
pages 57-58
that we are explaining, because my Government does not consider that it is for us
to decide whether this Agreement should have been signed or not signed. It is an
Agreement reached between two sovereign countries, and we have no right of
interference. We welcome it, and we welcome the Secretary-General’s role in it.
It has been registered, no doubt, with the Untied Nations and therefore we
recognise its presence. We also support paragraph 3 of the explanatory
memorandum, which authorises the Secretary-General to carry out the tasks
entrusted to him, again by agreement between the parties.
I would like to say that we come here to express our good wishes to the
Indonesian Government and people, as well as to the Netherlands Government
and people, for the termination of a situation which has not been very happy for
either side. We hope that the Agreement now reached, although it does not
complete the process by which the enforced isolation of part of Indonesia from
the rest of the mother country will be ended, can see that this process is
satisfactorily completed.
I have been asked by our immediate neighbours, Ceylon and Nepal, to speak on
their behalf in offering these congratulations.
WHATEVER WE SAY ON THIS PLATFORM IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC

SIGNIFICANCE. We want to make our position very clear in regard to the status
of West Irian. The interest of my country and its participation in this matter go
back to 1949, when the Government of India, with the co-operation of the
Government of Australia, rallied the Governments of that part of the world in
order to focus public attention on the subject status of Indonesia and its attempt to
free itself from thraldom to the Netherlands Empire. Since then, our position has
been that Indonesia is one and sovereign, and we have repeated that year after
year in this Assembly. That has no relation exclusively to either our geographical
closeness or the personal relations that obtain between the Indonesian leaders and
ourselves, but rather to our approach to the whole problem of colonies...
We are familiar with this problem in which there is a bit of unfinished business -
and you have to finish it, one way or another.
With regard to the text of this Agreement, it is as I said, an Agreement between

two Sovereign nations, and it is part of sovereignty to have the capacity to deal
with it one way or another.
However, I feel we should make certain observations on this matter. The United
Nations has assumed for itself a role in this matter - very ably sponsored in this
instance by the Acting Secretary General. We congratulate him on the success of
this effort, in so far as we have an Agreement of this kind. But the role of the
United Nations - and let there be no misunderstanding about it - is not the
conversion of this area into a trust territory. While it is true that the Secretary-
General, as one of the principal organs of the United Nations and its spokesman,
has successfully intervened here, that does not mean that the accountability to the
Assembly, in regard to what happens during the period of its stewardship or
whatever status - this ad hoc position they have adopted, and the United Nations
assumes ad hoc roles in many different places, under the previous Secretary-
General we used to have a very common feature, what was called the "presence"
of the United Nations, not provided for in the Charter - but, whatever it may be, it
does not make West Irian a trust territory.
There is no question therefore of creating independence in this area. Indonesia is

one and independent. By the enforced separation of the part through the non-
completion of the agreements reached in 1949 at The Hague, at the Round Table
Conference, this territory has remained under adverse possession and the rightful
owners - I will not say the rightful owners, but the rightful sovereign Power - for
the sake of peace and also in order that the culmination of this business may be in
a peaceful way, have come to certain arrangements which suit them, and we
congratulate them in so far as, on the one hand, the conclusion of the objectives
of the Round Table Conference at The Hague is now in sight, and, secondly that
while a certain amount of waiting may take place, it will still take place under the
auspices of the United Nations so far as the practical part of it is concerned.
We also want to say that this period of the presence of the United Nations is in no
sense a period when its authority will be exercised as a kind of super-authority in
the place. The United Nations will have very limited functions. In our view, this
period should be as short as possible. The period of 1969 that is prescribed is a
maximum, and there is no reason why it should remain a maximum. The role of
the United Nations, consistent with the Charter, would be to harmonise the
various interests as far as possible, without being a super-authority over the
sovereign authority of Indonesia...
It is entirely up to the Indonesian Government to decide how this enforced

partition and the historic conditions created thereby - all the trends of separate
personality that have developed - can be overcome. It is much to the credit of
yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, and the others concerned, that an Agreement has
been brought about. Our own Government, in this matter, has always asked for
direct negotiations between the Indonesian Government and the Netherlands
Governments.
LAST YEAR THERE CAME BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY three draft

resolutions. As regards one of the resolutions, the Government of the Netherlands,
I am happy to say, showed its wisdom in withdrawing it. That draft resolution
aimed at the creation of a United Nations commission and thereby an international
trusteeship over the sovereign territory of Indonesia. We would have resisted such
a proposal even if we were the only delegation which voted against it.
My delegation, along with a number of other governments, submitted a draft
resolution at that time which obtained a majority but it did not obtain the
necessary two-thirds majority. The purpose of it was that the Indonesian
Government and the Netherlands Government should directly negotiate, with the
good offices of the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations. To
our regret at that time, a large number of countries, forty of them, mainly
belonging to the Western group of countries, did not find it possible to support it.
But soon after the conclusion of the Assembly session, the same kind of
arrangement was made of the two countries talking to each other, with your good
offices, Mr. Secretary-General. So all’s well that ends well...
I share with the Indonesians and a host of our colleagues the hope that in spite of
the difficulty that has prevailed in the past, the relations between the Dutch and
Indonesians will now develop. It is our experience that once an empire removes
itself, there are closer relations between peoples who were hitherto apart. There
are more Englishmen in India today than when the British occupied the country.
We are no longer afraid of them and they are no longer afraid of us.
Actually the Indonesians have had a long period of tutelage under the Dutch and
their educational system and so on, and the impact of Roman-Dutch law - all
kinds of things in that way. Since their independence they have come under the
influence of other countries also. They are our close neighbours. We wish them
well, and we hope that the arguments and various theories which challenge
Indonesia’s sovereignty will now disappear, that the unity of Indonesia and the
termination of colonialism in that part of the world will become fully accepted
and achieved. Furthermore, we must hope that there will be no attempt to revive
it in one way or another.
PART II
POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
[India recognised the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of

China soon after its establishment in October 1949 and supported proposals in
the United Nations that its delegation should take the seat of China.
Until 1955, the question of representation of China was raised by the Soviet
Union, as a point of order, at the beginning of each session of the General
Assembly, to seat the representatives of the People’s Republic of China.
From 1956 to 1959, India annually proposed inclusion in the agenda of the
General Assembly of an item, "representation of China in the United
Nations." Each year, the United States was able to obtain approval of a draft
resolution by the General Committee (the steering committee of the General
Assembly) recommending that the Assembly not include the item in its
agenda and not consider the matter during that session. These draft
resolutions were then debated in plenary meetings of the General Assembly
and adopted by majority vote, though the votes in support of the Indian
position increased steadily.
India and Mr. Krishna Menon earned the hostility of the United States
administrations for persistent advocacy of the seating of the People’s Republic of
China, but India remained consistent even when relations with China were
severely strained in the late 1950s.
The People’s Republic of China was seated in 1971, several years after Krishna
Menon ceased to represent India at the United Nations.
The following are extracts from some of the speeches by Mr. Krishna Menon on
the substantive and procedural aspects of the matter.]

195640
[India moved an amendment (A/L.211) to the draft resolution recommended

by the General Committee, to reject the recommendation of the General
Committee and include the question of the representation of China in the
agenda.]
...Before I go on to address myself to the amendments which stand in the name of

my delegation (A/L.210), I should like to set out the reasons why we have
40
74-82
presented them. I have no desire to comment more than is necessary on the view
expressed in the General Committee, and now just expressed by the President, in
regard to these matters, because, whether a delegation agrees with the President or
not, we elected him President and, what is more, we elected him unanimously.
My delegation and I have great personal respect for the President and for his
integrity. But that does not preclude my saying that the view taken in regard to
the procedural position in the General Committee is one that does not accord with
the rules of procedure and the general procedures adopted in public debate. The
delegation of India requested the General Committee, as it is entitled to do, to
place this item on the agenda. It is entirely up to the General Committee to decide
not to place that item on the agenda and to make a recommendation to that effect.
The explanation which the President, out of courtesy to the Assembly, has just
made - that the draft resolution falls within rules of procedure - is, in the view of
my delegation, erroneous. We have a situation here in which the General
Committee has usurped the functions of the General Assembly and of its
Committees. The General Committee has no business to make any
recommendations on the political substance of any issue. What the General
Committee has done is to advise the Assembly as to what it should do in regard to
representation, and it has thereby committed two errors. First, it has made a
political recommendation which it is not its business to make. In our view, the
President is in error in suggesting that those recommendations pertain to
exclusion or inclusion. The governing words in rule 40 of the rules of procedure
are the words "concerning its inclusion in the agenda" or " the rejection of the
request for inclusion." All that should come forward is whether we should accept
or reject. From that point of view, paragraph 1 of the United States draft
resolution would be in order, though it would be rather unusual because it is not
necessary to have a resolution to say "no." That, however, is the pleasure of the
United States delegation. If it wants to adopt a certain circuitous procedure, then
no one can stand in the way...
My delegation wants to put on record that it is regrettable that the rules of

procedure should be stretched in such a way as to enable the General Committee
to usurp the functions of the Assembly and should be so interpreted as to forestall
a discussion here. In connection with this draft resolution, the General Committee
has not only transgressed on the functions of the Assembly but it has also trans-
gressed on the functions of the Credentials Committee.
The Credentials Committee, in regard to this question, is heavily weighted against

the admission of the People’s Republic of China. Looking at its composition and
looking at the views held by its members, some of them expressed even at this
meeting and others which are well known, if it came to a question of voting, the
Credentials Committee would certainly vote down any recommendation of this
kind. However, whether or not it would is beyond the point and is only a
political inference which we way make from the available facts. But the
Assembly has the duty, until the Credentials Committee makes its report, to
regard its opinions as sub judice and not subject to pronouncement beforehand...
I now address myself to the problem before us, namely the question of the
inclusion of this item. I want to say, by way of a preliminary observation, that
there is no question of the admission of China to the United Nations; China is a
founding member of the United Nations and has a permanent seat on the Security
Council. The question is whether China is represented.
Secondly, I shall enter the merits of this question only in so far as my Government
has come under criticism and also to the extent that arguments have been used to
persuade the Assembly to vote against the admission of the item.
BEFORE DOING THAT, HOWEVER, I DESIRE TO DRAW THE

ATTENTION of the Assembly to, and to state in no uncertain terms views of my
delegation on a statement that was issued yesterday by a member of a delegation
of a member State. My staff has brought to my attention the fact that a member of
the United States delegation has issued a statement on this subject, with regard to
the greater part of which we have no quarrel, that is to say, although we do not
agree with one word of it, we do not question the right to make it. What is more,
we think that in a few years` time all those words will have to be reversed. That,
however, is another matter. But no delegation has the right to question the
integrity of another. And he who says that the Government of India or the
delegation of India is here as the mouthpiece of anybody other than its own
Government or its own people, is guilty not only of a misstatement of fact but of
doing a disservice to the cause of international friendship.
A member of the United Nations delegation stated, it was reported this morning:
"I have been shocked that India and its delegation leader have apparently become
the floor leader for the Soviet drive to bring Communist China to the United
Nations." As for being shocked, that is a question of state of mind, and the thing
to do is to go to a doctor or to a psychiatrist about it.
Knowing the leader of the United States delegation, knowing the good relations
that have existed between the United States delegation and our delegation,
knowing the number of times that we have been in agreement - against the Soviet
Union and vice versa - and knowing the number of times that we have been in
disagreement with other delegations on various questions, I, for my part, and I am
sure my Government also, would decline to accept that the opinion is the
statement of the view of the United States Government. It is up to the United
States delegation either to own or to disown that statement.
So far as we are concerned, I think it is a very inappropriate statement to come

from a responsible member of delegation of a country in regard to another with
which it is in diplomatic and friendly relations. In difficult circumstances - and
having regard to the diverse views we hold arising from the diversity of our
historic circumstances, our political thinking and our geographical configuration -
both have striven, through their ambassadors, their ministers and their
representatives, to harmonise relations.
Our relations with the United States are friendly. Our economic, political, moral
and cultural relations are of a character of mutual respect, I think it is a great
disservice to the causes for which the United States stands that anybody should be
led away into making a statement of this kind. My delegation has no quarrel with
a United States Senator making whatever statement he wants to make, and we
could not restrain him. But when a member of a delegation makes such a
statement, it is my bounden duty to my Government to make a public protest
against it and to await the statement of the leader of the United States delegation
either here or to us at any time. I have no desire to embarrass my friend, Mr.
Henry Cabot Lodge,41 by asking for categorical statements, but I hope that he will
convey to his Government the views I have expressed here.
I COME NOW TO THE QUESTION OF ADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ITEM.

First, let me remind the Assembly that the present Government of China came
into existence legally and theoretically on October 1, 1949. On November 18,
1949, that Government applied for the acceptance of its credentials so as to take
its seat in the place that belonged to China. In 1950, my delegation submitted a
draft resolution (A/1365) to the Assembly in this connection. Every year since
and in every United Nations gathering, whether it be of the General Assembly or
of Security Council when India was a member of it, or of the specialised agencies
or of any group of the United Nations, we have consistently and persistently
maintained our attitude that the proper representation of China meant
representation by the real Government of China. Therefore, any suggestion that
we have suddenly emerged, and that someone else’s mantle has fallen upon us, is
purely a subjective state of mind.
The most cogent argument against the inclusion of this item, through rather a
surprising one, is the one which has come from the delegation of the United
Kingdom and has been supported by a large number of other delegations: that its
consideration is not timely. When has one heard of an imperial country ever
thinking that progress was timely? There is always the phrase "always too late
and too little," applied to those who are in the exercise of authority without the
consent of peoples. Therefore, the question of timeliness is one on which we
must agree to differ.
The representative of the United States told us that this problem would deeply
divide the General Assembly. I reiterate what I said in the General Committee:
the General Assembly is deeply divided on this question. What in fact the
representative of the United States means is that if this was considered, it would
be against his point of view, and therefore the division would acquire a different
41
United States Representative
colour. The Assembly is divided now because there are many of us who want this
matter considered; therefore it is not as through we are creating a division. Why
should the division be looked at from the point of view of only one side? The
division is a fact that must be recognised. But why are we afraid of division? The
best way to deal with division is to discuss it. We have to and we shall,
democratically, constitutionally and in accordance with the Charter, accept loyally
the decision that is made, and therefore we do not see any reason why it should
not be argued.
But I would like, however, to refer to the more important fact about this question
of timeliness. The one grave concern that everybody in this room must have is
the general state of tension in the world, which can at any time erupt, in any part
of the world, into war, and which would lead to world war. That does not require
my reiteration. In fact, that has been the burden of the argument that China is in
close relations with the Soviet Union, a very mighty country, and is antagonistic
to the other Power group, namely that of the United States.
This is all the more reason why then we have the powerful groups; and China
itself is a very powerful country with a considerable army and a considerable
industry and - whether you like it or not, you cannot wish these facts away - a
people, particularly in the present generation, who as we know from first-hand
knowledge are very devoted to the regime that now exists and to the
reconstruction of their country, so that we should not avoid consideration of the
issues involved.
It would be fallacious to regard these issues as untimely and not to bring them
into discussion. The situation in the Far East is such that it can erupt any day into
a condition which would be most catastrophic and regrettable. For the last two
years my Government has used such diplomatic facilities as it has, such influence
as it has, not in order to bring about the victory of one point of view or another,
but to say quite frankly that the solution of this matter depends upon the United
States talking face to face with the Chinese Government, and vice versa.
Therefore, the very existence of these tensions, the very fact that there are
considerable armies massed on the Straits of Formosa, the very fact that the
Chinese Government not only has political, but even moral and psychological,
influence in the continent of Asia, is something of very great importance. If you
had been present at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, you would have
felt this. There were twenty-nine countries represented there, of which I believe
only half at that time probably recognised the People’s Republic of China. It
would be very wrong for me to mention names, but it was interesting to see the
attitude of the other countries to the personnel, as well as to the attitude and the
presence, of the Chinese Government at that conference.
Whatever contradiction may come from one quarter or another, let it not be
forgotten that this idea of the exclusion of the real Government of the Chinese
people is a slight upon the choice of Asia, since this Government holds the
allegiance of 525 million people on that mainland, since it alone is entitled and
competent to deliver the goods under the provisions of the Charter; and that is the
vast bulk of Asian opinion, even that section of Asian opinion which is
determinedly anticommunist, if you like, which is determinedly nationalist, if you
like, and which is conservative.
If we were to say that there are countries - I will not mention this continent or that
continent - which are present here, the forms of government of which are
anathema to some of us and therefore we will not have them here, how would
those countries and those continents take that? It is our experience that even in
one continent some countries may have one form of government of which others
disapprove; but while they may disapprove of it among themselves, if anyone
form elsewhere were to come and say "Your continent has such and such a form
of government," there would be a general revolt against such mention.
Therefore, this idea of the United Nations - largely by votes and influence and
pressure that comes form one part of the world - excluding the Government of the
largest country in Asia, is I think, a crime against the Charter. There is generally
a feeling here that this is just one-way traffic, that the proper representation of
China is necessary only for China. With great respect to this Organisation, I say
that it is equally necessary and good for the United Nations.
The strength and the capacity of the United Nations to implement the purpose of
the Charter depend upon the loyalty it can command of all the peoples of the
world. They depend upon its capacity to spread its influence to every region of
the world. To place certain countries outside the confines of our discussion,
outside the impact of ideas that might come from here, is not the way to try and
build a society in terms of the Charter of the United Nations.
Therefore, instead of the consideration of this question being untimely, it is our

humble view - irrespective of the situation that exists in the Middle East,
irrespective of the tumultuous, catastrophic and regrettable situation that exists in
a great part of Central Europe, particularly in Hungary, and irrespective of the
complaints that exist in regard to them, and in fact on account of them - that this is
the time, and it is more timely than any other, to consider this question
dispassionately. Does anybody believe, when any serious issue with regard to the
Far East is being discussed, that not even its most determined opponents are not
faced with the issue of discussing it with the Chinese Government directly or
indirectly?
The representative of Colombia referred to the Conference in Geneva. Where did

he sit? Did he sit with the representative of the Formosan authorities or did he
have discussions with the representative of the Chinese Government? I ask the
Assembly to recall resolution 705 (VII), adopted by it in the spring of 1953 in
connection with this. When you have to do business, you have to do it with the
people who can deliver the goods; and the other is just an illusion.
I think the other aspect of it is that China, this great country, which has an
important place in the United Nations and which is assigned a permanent seat in
the Security Council, finds its power and position being placed in the hands of
individuals or groups that cannot speak in the name of China, whatever else they
may do...
I have no desire to go further into this matter, but I want to say, in all conscience,
because we do not hear very much about it, that the situation in the Far East is of
a character which requires the presence of China and Japan among us. Without
them it would be impossible to create a situation of stability; and let us not
overlook the fact that, while there are rules and regulations about boycotts, and
other things, these regulations are of a character which are more broken in the
observance than any other. I have been in China myself and it is surprising that,
in spite of the total trade embargo, there are large quantities of European and
American goods, including vehicles, that one seems there. Therefore, obviously,
the boycott is not working. We also know the concern of European countries
about establishing trade relations with China.
We also have the fantastic situation where the armed forces of the true Chinese
Government, as some people think, are gunning innocent shipping in the Straits of
Formosa, including British ships. We hear a great deal of the honour of the navies
of other countries and there are no protests. Various other things happen in the
same way.
I have no desire to stir up feelings, even if I could. But I want to tell the
Assembly: "However you vote, please do not take to your heart the idea that this
is an untimely situation ." We are sitting on the top of a volcano in thinking that
we can just wish things away. These are real facts of life and the General
Assembly has to recognise the facts of life.
REFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS - and I shall

not refer to names - to the quality of this Government and also to whether or not
the representatives who are here are the real representatives of the Chinese
Government... I think the best authority on this point is the Government of the
United States, and here is an extract from White Paper of the State Department in
1949:
"The fact was that the decay which our observers had detected in
Chungking early in the war had fatally sapped the powers of resistance of
the Kuomintang. Its leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis
confronting them, its troops had lost the will to fight, and its Government
had lost popular support."42
42
United States Relations with China, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series
It goes on to say:
"A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the
conclusion that the only alternative open to the United States was full-
scale intervention in behalf of a Government which had lost the
confidence of its own troops and its own people."43
In the face of that statement, which was made as a serious communication by the
State Department, I suppose, to the Executive Head of the Government at the
time, after serious inquiry, how can it be pretended that an émigré group can
command the confidence of the Chinese people - a group with an army that would
not fight, that did not fight, but just ran away because there was no popular
support? There is no one who would seriously contend that the vast masses of the
Chinese people are not loyal to their Government. What is required in
international law is that the people who inhabit a territory owe habitual obedience
to their government and that the government is able to fulfil its international
obligations. These are the conditions that enable a government to be called a
government.
I do not plead for the recognition of China by any of the countries represented
here, or even by the United Nations. I only ask members to consider this. I ask
them not to shut their eyes and adopt an ostrich attitude towards a problem that is
real. If we shut our eyes, the world does not become dark; facts do not go away...
Over and above that, there is all the development that has taken place in the last
six or seven years. When the proposal to include this question in the agenda was
brought before the General Assembly for the first time, it was defeated. So far as
I can remember, at the 77th meeting of the General Committee, eleven voted
against its consideration, and two voted for it. Two days ago, at the General
Committee’s 108th meeting, five voted for consideration of the question, and only
eight against, it, and there was one abstention. There are today 28 or 29 countries
which recognise the Government of China and a certain number of other countries
- making the number larger - which are in the process of going on to recognition
through there trade and other relations. It would not be proper for me to go into
the question of who these latter are because that would be interference in delicate
diplomatic negotiations. On the other hand, there are delegations and visitors
from all over the world, except one country, who are going into China to see
things for themselves, and their reports are available to everyone.
So far as the presence of China itself is concerned, I think that the best authority
on this matter is the present Secretary of State of the United States, whom we are
sorry not to see among us and whose health, we hope, will soon be restored. He
said in 1950:
30, Washington, D.C., 1949, p. xiv

43
Ibid., p. xv
"I have now come to believe that the United Nations will best serve the
cause of peace if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually
is, and not merely representative of the parts which we like."
This is the significant part:
"Therefore, we ought to be willing that all the nations should be members

without attempting to appraise closely those which are ‘good’ and those
which are ‘bad.’ Already that distinction is obliterated by the present
membership of the United Nations."
This is Mr. Dulles' point of view. Now he goes on to say:
"If the Communist government of China in fact proves its ability to govern
China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted
to the United Nations."44
That was a statement of the Secretary of State. Of course, it is not quite fair to
quote politicians who write things when they are out of office, but it is a
legitimate argument; I happen to agree with it.
NOW THEN, WE COME TO THIS QUESTION OF GUILT. I am not going to

deal with what the representative of Ceylon called the question of "guilt by
association." The burden of this complaint is - I do not suppose it is allegations of
repression and killing in China; probably there will have to be other occasions to
discuses that - that the United Nations, by a resolution, declared the Government
of China an aggressor and therefore, it is argued that China should not be
represented here. In the second place, it was said by the representative of
Colombia that, even today, the Chinese Government looks upon the intervention
of the United Nations Command in Korea as an act of aggression and does not
agree with the policy followed by the United Nations in that regard. Thirdly, the
representative of Colombia, with imperfect memory, quoted the positions of India
on this matter...
The point which I am making is that the attitude of the General Assembly, in
regard to ex-enemy countries and countries which are barred by previous
resolutions, in our view, was adopted rightly and is in consonance with the march
of time. Therefore, there is no longer a case for arguing about a resolution which
was passed in 1951. We have to take into account the fact that negotiations are
still going on between representatives of Governments which, publicly, as in law,
will not speak to each other. Those are the facts that have to be taken into
account; so, if anyone argues that there is a resolution of 1951 in the case of one
country, he must take into account other resolutions.
44
John Foster Dulles, War or Peace, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1950), page 190
I myself agree with the action which we have taken. I do not think we can live in
the past. I think that if people disagree with us, it is far more effective, far more
useful from one’s own point of view, to bring them into society where we can
talk. But, again, we are not now discussing representation; and my real case is
only for the admission of this item.
Now we come to the other part. First I shall deal with the representative of
Colombia’s allegations, arising from his imperfect memory, with regard to the
attitude taken by Government. My Government voted for the action taken by the
Security Council in regard to Korea. We were part of the United Nations
Commission on Korea, and we have no apologies to make. To the best of our
ability and far more than a great number of other countries, we made our
contribution in the best way we could.
I do not suppose that the Assembly will ever lay the charge at the door of the
Government of India that in the solution of the Korean problem India did not
make its contribution. We are still carrying some of its burdens. However that
may be, the representative of Colombia by implication, or even directly, points
out that we subscribed to the resolution which declared that North Korea was an
aggressor. But I am not discussing North Korea; I am discussing China. As I said
a while ago, that resolution was passed in 1950. We have taken a different
attitude in regard to similar resolutions, and I do not see why we should separate
the sheep from the goats. That is the position.
Secondly, India did not vote for the resolution that declared China an aggressor.
If ever someone tells us that we said one thing and now are saying something
different, we have no objection to that if times have changed, but in this case the
facts are not correct.
Now we come to the weakest point of the argument advanced by the

representative of Colombia. That is: where is the proof that the Chinese
Government would act according to the Charter; has it, according to the
phraseology of some people, purged its sins? Those of the delegations that were
at Bandung, those who have diplomatic relations with China, will appreciate the
depth of sincerity of the Chinese Government in its attachment to the Charter.
They would challenge the decisions of the United Nations which were taken
without consulting them, when they felt they were entitled to be consulted. You
may agree with that position or you may not. I have not heard any statement by
the Chinese Government at any time which denied its acceptance of the Charter -
the attitude that it adopted at Bandung was at all times to insist upon allegiance to
the Charter and to point out that the Conference was not something outside the
Charter. There were no greater adherents to the Charter of the United Nations in
the Conference of Asian and African Nations than the People’s Government of
China and its Prime Minister.
The other leg of this argument is that the Chinese Government still speaks about
the United Nations armies who fought in Korea, and that the armies suffered
severe hardships and casualties. I say that after the war we must think of the
casualties on both sides. Two million people perished in North Korea; another
million probably perished in South Korea; so probably three million Koreans died
in one way or another. At least, that is the report. However, if the argument is
that a government disqualifies itself because it still criticises this action and
regards the United Nations Command with belligerence, then we have a large
number of other nations seated here which every year, on every occasion, express
the same views. The Soviet delegations and others who think like them have
repeatedly said from this rostrum that they regarded the action of the United
Nations Command as one of intervention and belligerency. For that reason they
are not regarded as unsuitable to be sitting here; and I hope the time does not
come when any responsible member of the Assembly would suggest otherwise.
So this argument falls to the ground as a specious one that is trotted out in order to
support a weak case.
I think it is very wrong to speak of the Chinese Government, the Government of

large country with a civilisation that has an unbroken record of history for 4,000
or 5,000 years, as though it was an adjunct of some other Government. The
modern Government of China has properly taken more care of the traditions and
institutions in China than any previous Government. You have only to look at the
preservation of buildings, monuments, institutions, ideas, systems, thought,
medicine and so on going on in China at the present time. Apart from all that, it is
wrong politically to speak of the Chinese Government as through it were a kind of
adjunct of some other country, even though it be Soviet Union. There is no
disguising the fact - the Chinese Government would be the last to do so - that the
relations between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Union are very
friendly, even as the relations between the United States and India are friendly or
those between the United Kingdom and the United States are friendly - not
always, but most of the time. So to come here and say that the Soviet Union has
been guilty of misdeeds in Hungary and therefore this is not the proper time to
consider the question of the representation of China is to create with one’s own
hands an international body of a certain character, which other peoples are trying
to do away with. That is to say, on the one hand we are arguing against some
international organisations, an international idea which opposes certain other
ideas; and on the other hand we are trying to argue that anyone who is not with us
is against us.
Therefore, to argue that the Chinese Government is in any way to be responsible

for anything except its own acts, that its own acts reflect upon somebody else’s, is
first of all to read erroneously and, if I may say so, unintelligently the history of
China during the past thirty years from the time of Bukharin. What is more, it is
not dignified on the part of the Assembly just to ignore these facts in looking
upon this great nation and its great people, who are making a heroic effort not
only for their economic reconstruction, but in the service of the world community.
We Asian people have reason to look at China in a different way. We in India do
not subscribe to the form of government in China, the predominating party in
China, the Community Party of China. There are other political parties; I have
met their representatives, and they were all alive when I saw them. We do not
agree with that form of government, in the sense that we do not want it in our
country, but we think Chinese should be welcome to the form of government they
want.
While we are talking about misdeeds and so on, I make no adverse reflection.
You have only to look at the twenty or thirty years that preceded 1949,
particularly in the days of the decadence of the Kuomintang, when the country
was steeped in corruption, in civil war, in fratricide and in the subjugation of
everything that was decent. Today there is no corruption in China; even its worst
enemies agree to that. It is one country in the world with not the least degree of
corruption. But it is not for me here to give a testimonial to its character. We are
concerned about its international relations.
Only three days ago, the present Government of China, in friendly talks with the
former Prime Minister of Burma representing his own Government and in his own
capacity, resolved problems of frontier disputes between Burma and China which
had been outstanding for many years and which are part of the legacy of the
machinations of the Western Powers in that part of Asia when the United
Kingdom Government was in possession of Burma. A very complicated situation
had been treated, and it has been resolved to the satisfaction of both sides. In this
rather sordid world of ours at the present time, threatened by war and
revolutionary change, it is consoling, it is news of some value and of some relief,
to think that this powerful Government of China, which if it really wanted to use
force could use it against us or against Burma, perhaps successfully - the Burmese
would resist to the last man, but it would still be an unequal war - was not
"negotiating from strength" in the usual sense. It was negotiating as between
equals in accordance with the tenets of the five principles that they signed. In a
very short time, not by protracted negotiations, not by ungraceful yielding, the
two Governments came to an agreement to the satisfaction of both sides. When
Burma was severely harassed by the armies of the Kuomintang, which was
committing depredations in the territory, occupying 57,000 square miles, looting
its villages and destroying life, the Assembly intervened, and, thanks to the
intervention of the United States, gradually liquidated that aggression; but the war
was waged by people who sit here, and they were not declared aggressors. At that
time the present Government of China would have been justified within
international law in pursuing its enemies because this was a base to fight against it
in Yunnan, but it did not do so, out of consideration for the Burmese Government.
Therefore, so far as we Asian people are concerned, we have no reason to think

that these people are expansionist or belligerent or imperialistic in any way. It is
their desire to live in peace with their neighbours.
Thirdly, in the context of South-East Asia, this Chinese Government, for the first
time in Chinese history, faced up to the problem of people of Chinese origin in
other countries. It is part of Chinese custom and, I believe, of Chinese law that a
Chinese person, no matter where he goes, remains a Chinese citizen. But this
Government, realising the impact and the repercussions of these matters, came to
an agreement with the Government of Indonesia - and I believe, it finalised such
arrangements with the Government of Burma also - which proclaimed the
position that a person of Chinese birth or Chinese ancestry has to choose between
Chinese citizenship and citizenship of the country in which he is living. That
represented a significant break with tradition, and it was made in the interests of
peace and solidarity.
WE HAVE BEEN HAPPY IN OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA - and that is

not because we agree with everything the Chinese say, not because we do not
have difficulties to resolve. We have a long 3,000-mile frontier with China, and
we have no armies on that frontier. We have checkposts and the Chinese have
checkposts. I have no doubt that one of their sentries might say "You have come
to the wrong side," and one of our sentries might say the same thing to them. But
we have waged no wars, so far as we know, in the whole of our history. For
3,000 years, we have had relations with China. The only Indians who ever went
into China were emissaries of religion, culture or trade - and, in the same way, the
only Chinese who came to us were travellers and traders.
If we, who are on the frontiers of China and who would, therefore, have the most
to lose, felt that we were bringing into the community of nations a country that
would run wild or that would be likely to break the law, we would be the first to
stand up and say so. I hope that no one in the Assembly would attribute to us fear
of a great neighbour. It is not in those conditions that we live.
We think that recognition of the legitimate Government of China as that qualified

to sit - or, at any rate, the consideration of that problem - would be a great step
forward. I am no political prophet, but I venture to think that in a very short time
those who are now arguing against this will have to revise their positions, because
one cannot simply ignore a vast country, with its vast economic strength, its vast
military strength, its great potential and, what is more, the allegiance it commands
in the hearts of people who think that a grave injustice is being done.
We shall still continue to disagree with the Chinese Government when it is seated
here, as indeed we disagreed with it on many questions at Bandung, where we
ironed out our differences. That is no argument for keeping them out.
My colleague from Australia, Mr. Casey,45 made at the 579th meeting certain
observations relating to our amendments. I have no desire to prolong my
45
R. G. Casey, Minister of State for External Affairs of Australia
statement by going into that matter. All I can tell my old friend is that there is a
good Australian custom of having one law for everybody, not one for the goose
and another for gander - although I do not say who is what. Mr. Casey spoke
about the iniquity of aggression. What representative of the Australian
Government can come to this rostrum in November 1956 and condemn force
when his Government has, without qualification, supported the aggressions of the
French and British forces in Egypt? Apart from certain other considerations which
I have already put forth, it is insulting to our intelligence to have the Australian
Government come here and say that these people are guilty because they have not
renounced force.
Australia has very close and friendly relations with us and desires to make a
contribution toward peaceful settlements in the Asian world. Australia is
European - that is, its people are European by birth. But they belong to the Far
East, and I think that the sooner they fully realise that, the better it will be for all
of us. Geography is not a factor that can be ignored. I am happy to pay tribute to
the Australian Government for the way in which it is now dealing with the
situation in regard to Japan, forgetting all the cruelties and iniquities that the
Japanese army inflicted on the Australian people. The same attitude has to
prevail in regard to other peoples in that part of the world.
I deeply regret that the representative of Australia, after proclaiming support of

the aggression of the French and British forces in Egypt, came here to lay this
charge of aggression at the door of somebody else.
I THINK I HAVE COVERED THE OBSERVATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN

MADE in regard to us. There is just one other point, having to do with United
Nations resolutions - and this argument, I hope, will at least commend itself to the
Latin American representatives. They have always been sticklers for law; they
have always been the first to come forward and say that they will support the law
of the United Nations and its resolutions. I should now like to refer to resolution
369 (V), adopted at the fifth session of the General Assembly, which lays down
the rules in regard to disputed representation. This is what it says:
"The General Assembly,

...
"Considering that, in virtue of its composition, the General Assembly is

the organ of the United Nations in which consideration can best be given
to the views of all member States in matters affecting the functioning of
the Organisation as a whole,
"1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the
government entitled to represent a member State, the United Nations" -
and that is the case here - "and this question becomes the subject of
controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in
the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the
circumstances of each case;
"2. Recommends that, when any such question arises, it should be

considered by the General Assembly, or by the Interim Committee if the
General Assembly is not in session."
I shall not read the rest of the resolution; it is open to members of the Assembly to
read it if they wish.
In other words, the Assembly, having gone deeply into this problem, asks that you
should consider the matter. And all that I am asking, in so far as this item is
concerned, is that you adhere to paragraph 2 of the operative part of resolution
396 (V), which was widely supported.
There is no use disguising the fact that, if this question came up on its merits as
the Assembly is presently constituted, the vote would go against any movement to
alter the representation of China immediately. But the fact remains that the
question has to be considered. The fact remains that events are marching. How
can the important problem of disarmament be considered if we are not able to talk
to the Chinese face to face? How can we consider excluding a country which
probably has an army of 5 million, which probably is armed for its defence
against any attack by the Formosa authorities and their allies - and vice versa?
How are we going to consider the problem of atomic development, how are we
going to consider the problem of disarmament?
Apart from all that, however, I believe that there are a great many of us - if not all
of us - who are moved by humanitarian considerations. China is a country which
requires, more than any other, or at least as much as any other, technical
assistance and health assistance and everything else that is needed to reconstruct a
country that has been ravaged by war for the last thirty years. It should not be
forgotten that civil war raged in China for twenty-five years, and the men who
are presently in the Government did not come to power as a result of a coup, but
by mobilising the support of their people. The army was not only fighting its
enemy but was also reconstructing the country, establishing co-operatives,
establishing schools - a moving army of reformers in the country. But China, I
repeat, is a country ravaged by war, by need, by boycotts on the part of other
countries, a nation where diseases had to be eradicated. And the use of the
specialised agencies of the United Nations, the bringing of China into the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the inclusion of China in any consideration
of the problem of disarmament and peace are matters that are vital to us, not
merely to China. Any country in the world that is afflicted by disease or epidemic
is a danger not to itself alone, but to everyone else as well. It is not possible for
us today, in this shrunken world, to be happy by ourselves. We have to take
everybody else into consideration.
Therefore, I think this is not a matter where we should go into predilection and
prejudice. It is a matter where we ought to have the courage of our convictions,
and the courage to realise that there are enough of us here - the vast majority of
people here, if not the whole of us - who are able to maintain the provisions and
the principles of the Charter.
We have been told, the other day in the General Committee and later here, that it
is the present representative of China who is a founder of the United Nations.
This, I think, is a misreading of the Charter, and it is the kind of interpretation
which should never be made before the United Nations General Assembly. I ask
representatives to look at the first page of the Charter. What does it say? It says,
"We the peoples of the United Nations," and among the peoples of the United
Nations are the Chinese - 525 millions of them, over whom the present repre-
sentatives have no authority. So it is the peoples of the United Nations who said
this, although I am not saying that the representation can be other than by
Governments.
I ask representatives to turn to Article 3. What does it say? It says, "The original
members of the United Nations shall be the States which (have) participated in the
United Nations Conference on International Organisation..." The people who
wrote this knew what they were writing, one must assume. Why did they not say,
"The original members of the United Nations shall be the Governments" - or "the
individuals" - "that have participated in the United Nations Conference?" But they
said that they should be the States which had participated, and it is axiomatic in
political science that States do not die. Governments are transient, a fact which a
great many of us know and are apprehensive about, but States do not die. One
Government takes on from another. When there is a revolution or a coup, a great
deal has to be taken over, and the classical, the accepted and even the modern
definition of a State is a territorial community composed of people who both owe
habitual obedience to a Government and are able to perform their obligations
towards their neighbours. All these conditions China satisfies.
But it is not necessary for me to argue all this. You can argue it when the item is
before you. What I plead with you is not to shut your eyes to a problem, not to
refuse to discuss it, not to proclaim to the world that you are afraid to look the
facts in the face, not to establish the dictum that if you shut your eyes the facts
fade away. The question of China has to be discussed. We have discussed it at
great length this time, in spite of the fact that you have not wanted to discuss it.
The very fact that all these arguments have come in when we are only discussing
the inclusion of an item, the weight of delegations that has been brought in to
argue for and against it, and the very diversity of arguments that has been adduced
merely proclaim the fact that there is an inescapable fact.
There is the instance of the relations with the Soviet Union, when the Western
countries, the European countries and the American countries for a long time
refused recognition but finally had to recognise it. This - and the whole tradition
of American and British systems of law in the way of recognising countries,
which are the Governments - is the more common sense approach we should
make to this problem.
Who among us here can say that our Governments were not established by
revolution of one kind or another? The United States should be the last to argue
against a government established by force or by revolution. Otherwise its history
must be rewritten, and its traditions also must stand change. None of us is
ashamed of the fact that we have supplanted other regimes which are not suitable
for the times - though they may or may not have been good in their own day.
Therefore, I ask the Assembly to adhere to the resolution it adopted during the
first session whereby it decided to take into account the facts that exist in the
world, and not to proclaim to the world that it is afraid to face realities and that it
will not discuss a problem because it does not like the look it, for that is the
decision which the Assembly would be talking... For Heaven’s sake let us not
shut our eyes and minds to facts and let us be capable of listening to views that
are against our own.

195846
[In 1958, the General Committee again adopted a United States draft resolution
recommending that the General Assembly decide to reject the request of India to
include an item on the representation of China in the agenda, and not to consider
at the current session any proposal to seat the representatives of the People’s
Republic of China.
India, together with six other countries, moved amendments (A/L.245) to include
the item in the agenda and reject the second recommendation of the General
Committee.]
...The draft resolution recommended by the General Committee for adoption by

the General Assembly is a unique procedure which has never been applied in any
case in the history of the United Nations since the second part of the first session.
Until that time, there were no rules of procedure. Anyway, this draft resolution is
before us. I will deal with it in parts because I believe that here two different draft
resolutions have been put together as one. The first part is merely a rejection of
the request that the Government of India has made. It reads, in part, "Decides to
46
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
57-61
reject the request of India..." With great respect, I submit that this did not require
a resolution or a clause of a resolution; it only required an adverse vote! But the
draft resolution is before us, and therefore I propose to deal with it.
I say here, as I said before the General Committee, that the Committee was not
entitled to submit this part of the draft resolution because the previous resolution
of the General Assembly, resolution 396 (V), definitely laid down certain
procedures in this regard. I agree with anyone that the Assembly at one session
cannot be bound for all time by decisions taken at another session. But our rule is
that once an Assembly has adopted a resolution, that resolution has to be
rescinded if it is to be disregarded.
TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION BEST, IT WILL BE NECESSARY to go

into some of the background of the whole problem...
In October 1949, the present Government of China made application to the

Security Council in regard to representation. On November 18, 1949, the
Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, who is now the Prime Minister of the Government
of China, sent a letter to the United Nations (A/1123). No action was taken,
however. Subsequently, the Security Council was asked to consider the matter by
one of the permanent members of the Council. But it so happened that Mr.
Tsiang, who was the representative of the other side, was President. He ruled that
the document might be circulated, and no discussion took place at that time.
The matter came back to the Security Council at its 461st meeting on January 13,
1950. The draft resolution for the recognition of the new China, in sum and
substance, was rejected by six votes - Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, the United
States of America and the China represented in the Security Council - to three -
India, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia - with two abstentions which are
significant today - the United Kingdom and Norway.
The debate went on. The then Secretary-General, at the end of the next meeting
or at a subsequent time, decided to examine this proposal and he submitted a
memorandum (S/1466) to the United Nations on the principle of the
representation of States. I have no desire to go on into detail on this matter
because the document enters into the merits of the question of representation in
the United Nations.
The problem before us is whether this item shall be discussed and not who should
be represented in the United Nations. But Mr. Trygve Lie’s memorandum is a
matter of great importance because it deals not only with China or Timbuktu; it
deals with the general problem of who is entitled to represent a country.
In 1950 the Security Council was again convened. This time the President was a
representative of the Soviet Union. This time, too, he was on the other side.
After some preliminary discussion the provisional agenda circulated by the
President was discussed and on that provisional agenda was the recognition of the
representation of the Central People’s Government of China. As a result of the
procedural debate which lasted three full days, the item on Chinese representation
was removed from the agenda. But how? By a vote of five in favour of removal,
five against with Egypt alone, that time, abstaining.
I go into all these details, first of all to show how old the problem is, to show that
there has been some doubt about it for a very long time. Otherwise, it would be
quite improper for a representative to come here and to say that the credentials of
a representative should be examined. There is, however, a long history behind
this case. That is one reason. The second is that from all that I have read out to
you, each time there has been a vote on it, there has never been an overwhelming
decision either way!
Before this item came to the General Assembly for the first time in 1950, an ad
hoc committee was set up to examine what should be done in the event of two
parties claiming the same seat. That can often happen. Normally, it should be
decided by the Credentials Committee. But when political questions are involved,
the Credentials Committee - which really examines the technicalities of
representation, whether the signatures are right, whether the identities are the
same, and so on - may not be adequate. Whatever the reason, an ad hoc
Committee was appointed and on 14 December 1950 the General Assembly
adopted resolution 396 (V).
There are two or three paragraphs in the preamble of the resolution which, if
necessary, I can read out. But I do not think it is essential for the consideration of
the matter. The preamble simply refers to importance of the matters. Then come
the following two operative paragraphs:
"1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the
government entitled to represent a member State in the United Nations
and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United
Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purpose and
Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case;
"2. Recommends that, when any such question arises, it should be

considered by the General Assembly or by the Interim Committee if the
General Assembly is not in session;"
It is my submission therefore that what has happened in the last two or three years
here is ultra vires, not only of the Charter, as I shall point out later, but of this
decision of the Assembly itself. The Assembly has taken a decision and unless
we rescind that decision by proper procedures, any problem of this kind where
two parties contest the same seat and find themselves in such a position must first
of all be decided in the light of the Charter. But paragraph 2, which governs the
whole thing, states that it should be considered by the General Assembly. That is
all we are asking you to do.
In casting a vote for the position I am putting forward, no one is committing

himself to endorsement of present regime in China or any of its actions. No one
is saying that as a result of that vote, the representation should be changed. The
plain issue before us at the present time - I am not going into the merits of it - is
whether the Assembly, on an issue of this character, the gravity of which I shall
point out to the extent that is necessary later, should have the right of free
discussion. By covering up this matter, by evading an issue, do we really solve
anything? Is it not the right of the members of the Assembly, of world public
opinion and of the parties concerned on either side, that there should be open and
free discussion of this matter?...
SO FAR AS THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IS CONCERNED, its position is

very clear. It does not want to include this item simply for the sake of discussing
it. It wants this matter to be considered because it gravely concerns the peace of
the world, stability and order in the Far East, and the implementation of the
purposes and principles of the Charter. What is more, it merely takes into account
the realities of the situation. The Charter stipulates obligations, and it is only a
Government which, in the classical Austinian definition, is able to command the
habitual obedience of the citizens of the State that is able to deliver the goods. If
Charter obligations are to be carried out - and this has been pointed out many
times in disarmament debates and elsewhere - and if any decision in regard to that
vast land of 630 million people is to be implemented, it requires the consent, co-
operation and implementation of the Government that can carry it out.
Therefore, as far as the Government of India is concerned, while the issue before
the Assembly is the inclusion of an item, when that item is included we shall point
out why it is necessary to effect an alteration in the representation. It is not a
question of admitting a new member State. If that were the case, it would go first
to the Security Council. China is a member of the United Nations. China is a
founder member of the United Nations. China carries with it the obligation of a
permanent member of the United Nations responsible for world security. Those
who vote on behalf of China can veto a resolution, can hold up the proceedings of
the Security Council. They are among the five great statesmen who are
responsible for the business of this Organisation.
China is a founder member. To say that China is a founder member does not
mean that this or that government of China is a founder member. Article 3 of the
Charter stipulates that members of the United Nations are States, not
Governments, and the State of China, in our humble submission, is not
represented here. Therefore, we seek to establish a prima facie case in that way,
because the objection to discussing this matter, to which I shall briefly refer, is
that it is a controversial issue. I do not think that there are many issues before the
Assembly that are not controversial. I do not think it is right for us to avoid an
issue because it is controversial; the serious consideration of this matter is integral
to the maintenance of peace in the world. The issues will not disappear just
because we refuse to look at them.
Secondly, if, as we think, the present Government of China, its composition and
political and economic policies are not the concern of this Organisation, if that
Government is in the position of being able to command the habitual obedience of
its citizens, and if it is recognised by large numbers of people in the world, then
the question arises as to whether it is right and ethical to exclude it from the
Organisation. Here I would like to give some figures.
Of the member States of this Organisation, 29 recognise the People’s Republic of

China. The Government of the People’s Republic of China has trade relations
with at least 68 other countries. The countries which recognise that Government
have a population of 1,040 million. If one adds to that figure the population of the
People’s Republic of China itself, which today is 639 million, one arrives at a
figure of 1,679 million people out of a total world population of 2,737 million, or
a majority of the world population.
We cannot, of course, come here and argue in terms of population, because the
United Nations is based upon the conception of one State having one voice and
one vote, which we do not challenge. But in deciding theses matters one has to
refer to their impact, and to the great causes which lie behind them.
Therefore, I want to submit that in ignoring these views we are really ignoring the
views of a large majority of the population of the world. But suppose we dismiss
that argument and say that it is only a minority which takes this view - 29
countries last year, 25 countries the year before that, and a fewer number before
that. There has been an increasing number every year asking for the consideration
of this problem. I wish to ask you, Mr. President, can an Organisation such as
ours survive in prestige, survive in conformity with the principles of the Charter
or in accordance with the ideas of free discussion and the protection of minority
views, when a large group of countries - 29 of them want a question debated,
some abstain and the remainder do not want the question debated, and the issue is
not discussed? I submit that this suppression of the point of view of a very large
and significant minority is not good. No one expects a minority view to carried,
and no one expects a minority to become a majority as a result of a debate here,
but the minority does have the right to put forward its views. It is largely in the
hands of the President and of the General Assembly to see to it that these minority
views are expressed.
I am very surprised not to hear some of those member States which have long
been wedded to liberal traditions and which have long traditions of parliamentary
governments, such as the United Kingdom, come forward today and say, "Right
or wrong, let us look into this matter because a large number of member States
here have a point of view which should be heard."
The reason for not allowing this question to be discussed is said to be that talking
about it might create some difficulties. Well, that is no longer true. I believe that
there are some 22 or 25 speakers inscribed on the list already. If it is the idea of
some that we should keep the People’s Republic of China out of the United
Nations because of the resolution on the Korean War or because of its form of
government or because of the behaviour with which it has been charged, the fact
remains that it is one of the great Powers of the world with an enormous
population and with considerable economic weight. We cannot put a country of
that type out of bounds. To put China out of bounds is really to put ourselves out
of bounds.
China and India are close neighbours. We do not agree with everything which the
Chinese Government does, and I do not suppose that they agree with everything
that we do. We have a common frontier with them and it is our hope that the
common frontier will be maintained without any war. We practically have
common seas. It is our desire, and I am sure that it is the desire of our neighbours,
to maintain these peaceful relations, and it is up to the United Nations to assist us
and not to allow present tensions to continue.
I submit this item with a grave sense of responsibility. The Government of India
submitted this item in June of this year and there has been sufficient opportunity
for members to review their decision. I think it is only fair to say that we even
reviewed the question just before the Assembly was to begin, following the recent
events which have taken place. It is our very considered view that the discussion
of this problem is necessary and can do nothing but good. It will enable some
progress to be made towards the solution of difficulties that are at present
unresolved...

195847
[This statement was made in exercise of the right of reply to the debate.]
...The main objection is that discussion is not timely. Now, that is merely a
matter of opinion. Not even those who have said that discussion is not timely
have denied the urgency of this problem. I think the foremost exponent of this
view, though his speech was very brief, is Sir Pierson Dixon of the United
Kingdom, who said that the deep division of opinion on this subject in the United
Nations would embitter the Assembly’s proceedings. This might have been true
47
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
101-06
three days ago, but we have had an expression of the alignments of opinion and of
the strong feelings in this matter. Therefore a proper discussion would only assist
in bringing the subject into proper proportions and perspectives whereby the cases
on either side could be put...
I should like to say again that if the item were on the agenda it would enable those
who are so sure of the untimeliness of this matter, who have been throwing dark
and sometimes not-so-dark hints about all the implications of this problem, to air
their views much better. My friend, the representatives of the United States, said
that if he really wanted to argue the substance of the matter, there were very
persuasive arguments which would make the Assembly reject this item or reject
the whole proposition when the time came. If those arguments are so
"persuasive" - and the representative of the United States is not without influence
or without the power of voice, or the power of persuasion - why does he not come
and try to persuade? Is this not a place for persuasion? It is a place for asking
people whom you may influence and with whom you may argue to accept your
views, not to shut their minds to a problem that is so difficult, that is so full of
grave implications. It is not as if the representative of the United States thought
he had a weak case. He thinks he has a strong case, and what is more, a case
which will persuade the Assembly. I do not say in what way; he says he can
persuade. Then, why not try persuasion?...
But I think the strongest argument in favour of free speech has come from the
representative Ireland... He also recognised that this is a question of major
importance when he said "There can be no doubt that the situation in the Far East
not only affected the interests of China and Korea, but is an immediate threat to
local peace and to world peace indeed, I wonder whether refusal to discuss it in
previous years may not have contributed to the present dangerous situation in the
Far East."
I should also like to refer to some other statements made recently which are of
very great importance because they come from sources which should command
respect in this Assembly.
The Prime Minister of Norway, not so long, on 21 September, I believe, after this
problem was before the General Committee, said in an interview:
“It is an absurd situation that the world’s most heavily populated country
is not represented in the United Nations.
"It is hard to imagine that any easing of relations in the Far East can be
achieved unless a responsible solution of the question of China’s
membership of the United Nations is found."...
I do not know what commentary history will pass on this. There have been many
comic opera scenes in the march of history, but this would be perhaps one of the
biggest of them where, as I said the other day, the seat of a permanent member of
the Security Council, of one of the five stewards of the security of the world so far
as the United Nations is concerned, is occupied by individuals who do not
represent their country; and, what is more, those who represent that country are
excluded from that seat.
I have no desire to speak at length in order to controvert each argument that has
been adduced. In fact, there are no arguments to controvert. I have been in this
Assembly during most of the debate and I have looked at all the speeches. The
only real arguments that have come up are, first, that discussion would be
untimely; secondly, that it may add to tension; and, thirdly, that China has
disqualified itself by its conduct.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ASSEMBLY HAS ALSO TO LOOK at the

sentiments of people who are very near to China, those who, for the last few years
- some of them, like us, from 1949 onwards and others more recently - have
established diplomatic, trade and other relations with China. It is not right for the
Assembly to disregard those sentiments because they are the sentiments of people
who speak from first- hand experience...
To us, it is not an academic question. We are not wedded to any continental

compartmentalisms. But neighbourhood, distance, geography and cultural
affinity have impacts upon the relationship of nations - we are no exception. Our
security, our future and our capacity to develop depend very largely upon the
stability in the Far East, and we would like representatives of Europe and of
countries of the American continent at least to carry away with them the
impression that in taking the attitude they are taking they are isolating themselves
to a very considerable extent from the large continents of Asia and Africa.
Then we had an expression of views which we were asked to imagine were the
views of the United States. Here I want to say that, while it is true every country
has one vote, that we are all equal, sovereign States in this Assembly and that our
status may be equal, in political affairs equality of status does not always mean
equality of function. It would be unrealistic to ignore the economic or the
political importance or the moral power of great States. Therefore, my country has
great respect for the views of the United States and, if I may say so, even for some
of its predilections. We are prepared to understand its difficulties.
But I think it would be wrong for this Assembly to think that public opinion in the
United States is not equally exercised by this problem. We have here statements
of people who have been in important positions. Mr. Dean Acheson, the former
Secretary of State of the United States, whom history will not characterise as
being a partisan of China or a partisan of pacification, much less appeasement in
the Far East because it was during his time that great troubles began, said:
"The important fact is that always, until the present civil war, the off-shore
islands - Quemoy, Little Quemoy and Matsu - have been controlled by the
same Power which controlled the adjacent coast."
... Mr. Acheson stated further:
"These, whatever may be said of Formosa, are the coastal islands, as are
Long Island, Staten Island and Martha’s Vineyard. Their population is
minimal. The only purpose of their being held by a force hostile to the
mainland Government is to block the mainland harbour of Amoy and to
offer a threat as an invasion base."
Coming form such a source, the characterisation that the occupation of these
islands by those who now occupy them is a threat to the integrity of China must
carry some weight with this Assembly...
Then we are told that war of aggression has begun and that China is trying to
shoot its way into the United Nations. Whatever we may think of the Chinese, we
should not think that they are so foolish as to believe that you can shoot your way
into an Organisation of this kind. But here, I think, a statement by a former
Senator of the United States, Senator Lehman, is important. He said:
"One-third of the General Chiang's total military forces are now stationed
on these islands. Indeed, the very presence of this preponderant portion of
Chiang's fighting forces on Quemoy and Matsu, an open provocation to
Red China, has been cited by President Eisenhower as a justification for
our defence of the islands.
"We cannot oppose the use of force by Red China and at the same time
support the threat of force by Chiang Kai-shek.
"These islands have no strategic value except possibly for aggressive

purposes against the mainland of China."
Is this Assembly to be geared into the war intentions of a group of people who are
erroneously regarded as the representatives of China in this Assembly? That is
the issue we have to face...
SOME OF THE OBSERVATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE are likely to

give the impression that there is a terrific attack going on and that the Chinese
Government wantonly started a war in the hope that it would develop into a larger
war in which that Government might gain some strength or get other Powers
behind it. And here we have a statement by Mr. Lodge, who said, no doubt on
authority, no doubt on the basis of information which he has:
"They have fired some 300,000 rounds of high explosive shells at the
Island of Quemoy. That is in the neighbourhood of three rounds of high
explosive for every man, woman and child on the islands. This barrage
against Quemoy, which was started less than a month ago, recalls the
attempted invasion in October 1949 and the attack against Quemoy in
September 1954. In this latest barrage, 1,000 civilians have already been
killed."
Incidentally, the year 1954 is important, I shall return to it.
Mr. Lodge goes on: "We think that this is not only a further disqualification to be
added to the already long list in so far as United Nations membership is
concerned, but we think...", and so on and so forth.
Now, what are the facts? There is no evidence that this amount of warfare is
going on except in propagandist minds and in the pages of certain newspapers...
I usually do not quote Time magazine but, since this quotation comes from an
adverse source, it may have some value, because if this magazine could have said
the reverse, it would have done so. This article from Time reads.
"Peking’s ultimatum was backed up by the thunder or the heaviest

sustained artillery barrage the world has been since the Korean war."
That is not a long time; if they had said "since 1914," I could have understood it.
"Day after day, Red Chinese batteries rained 152-mm. and 122-mm.
shells on Quemoy ....It was a heavy shelling, but hardly the 122,000
rounds estimated by Nationalist headquarters in Taipei. Nationalists
reported about 700 civilian and military causalities killed and wounded."
Then, a week later, on 15 September, Time reported:
"The Quemoy we saw in the three days and nights before the Chinese
nationalist plane flew us out did not look as though it has been plastered
with 140,000 rounds of artillery. Only four shells have hit Quemoy city,
where by day life goes on as usual in narrow streets lined by two-storey
houses...
"In those parts of the island lying nearest to the communist guns, every
other house has been hit. Yet, surprisingly few have been demolished.
Officially, 6,000 houses have been damaged, 600 totally destroyed.
Civilian dead since Aug. 23 now approaches 40."
...I should like to say that what goes on in the off-shore islands is part of the
revolutionary war that has gone on far the last thirty years. There is nothing new
in this. As I say, it has been going on for a long time, even through it has been
slowed at times in the hope of negotiations...
I should like to go a little into the present situation. I would want to remind the
Assembly that this situation is in all conscience very serious. At the time of the
Korean war my Government - we claim no credit for it and have not cast
ourselves in the position of a general intelligence bureau for the world, or as
mediators - in a similar situation conveyed information to the relevant quarters
which, if it had been heeded, might perhaps have had the result of preventing the
extension of the sphere of that war.
In connection with Quemoy, reference has been made to 1954. In 1955, when
Chou En-lai came to Bandung, he proclaimed to the world, after various
conversations had taken place, that China desired to settle the problem of Taiwan
by peaceful negotiations, and he also suggested direct negotiations with the
parties concerned, by which he meant Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand, and the
United States on the other. Helpful developments took place, although they did
not go so far as they might have done. A first group of prisoners was released,
and some attempt was made to set up negotiations. Unfortunately, those
negotiations were not stepped up to the level where they could have yielded full
results. But it is interesting to note that all the time those negotiations were going
on there was quiet on Quemoy.
In the early part of this year, I believe, the Geneva conversation terminated. At
the same time the troubles in Quemoy began all over again, and somewhere in the
early part of August troubles began in the Straits. We hold no brief for the
conduct of the Chinese Government - it is a sovereign Government and does not
require our special pleading - but it is our duty, especially since that Government
is absent from this Assembly, to place before you such information as we in good
faith believe to be true: in the early part of August, intervention in the inland
waters of China began, and on 23 August, artillery responses were begun from the
Chinese mainland by the Government there. It has to be remembered that at the
beginning of this period the Formosan authorities had 30,000 persons on Quemoy.
At the present time they have 80,000 persons on Quemoy and 115,000 on all the
off-shore islands together.
Now, where does the aggression lie? Here is a vast country, with a Government
that is the proper authority, threatened on its own territory and so near its
mainland, by very nearly one-third or one-half of the army of the Nationalist
forces on Formosa and by the augmentation of those troops from 30,000 t0
115,000. I suppose that in the normal course of things a Government would take -
I do not say should take - some steps toward self-protection.
That is the genesis of the present trouble. What I would point out to the
Assembly is that the trouble did not begin because this item was coming before
the United Nations. It did not begin because there was any other particular
development in the world. All that took place was the breakdown of certain
negotiations which were going on between the Chinese themselves - the
government elements and the Kuomintang elements. After all, this is a Chinese
business. There are two Chinese parties, and this is the continuation of a great
civil war...
Therefore, when those negotiations in Geneva broke down and it appeared,

therefore, that there was no possibility of negotiated settlements, those who were
likely to benefit from war took to other methods. There was intervention in the
inland waters of China and a vast augmentation of the troops there. It would be
improper for me to read out the strength of forces in other places in the Taiwan
area. All this led to the present situation, a situation of great implications. Our
information is that at the present time it is the wisdom and the strength of the
United States that restrains the Nationalist forces from any adventurous exploits
by air on the mainland. We hope that the influence will continue. But in a
situation of this kind and, especially when one is fighting a losing battle and
fighting for a cause which has no moral backing, it is not always possible to rely
on the losing party submitting to restraint in that way. If some forces should be
let loose, then, given the fact that various sides are armed with weapons of a
diabolic character, the world would find itself in a very ominous situation. That is
why, in spite of various appeals and in spite of our hearing all the arguments
about untimeliness, we have thought it necessary to place before the United
Nations the fact that we are facing a situation which, if not handled wisely, can
lead to a catastrophe.
The position with regard to Quemoy is no different from that which arose when
the Chinese Government took the Tachen Islands some time ago. That was not
regarded as a war of aggression, but the Tachen Islands were taken. We are
firmly convinced at the present time that the position taken up at Bandung by the
Chinese Prime Minister still holds and that a peaceful settlement of this problem
is possible provided there is a peaceful approach on all sides. No other solution of
the problem is possible because after a war there would be no more problems to
settle. If the correct approach is made, it is possible to bring about a degree of
understanding on this question. And if the talks in Warsaw do not proceed on the
basis of preconditions that neither side can accept, then it is possible that there
could be understanding, and the so-called Taiwan problem and the tension in the
Taiwan Strait could be settled by negotiation, as was suggested in 1955 to the
parties concerned.
But negotiations relating to the integral territory of a country are a very different
problem. I have no desire to drag out this discussion any further. I do not know
whether it is proper for me to go into it in any greater detail, but up-to-date
information from China seems to indicate that if those parties which think that the
danger of war would benefit them are restrained, and if we accept the fact that this
is very largely a matter of two Chinese parties, it is possible for the Chinese
Government and the Formosan authorities to come to an agreement in their own
way, with regard to themselves and their own motherland, and we should leave
them to it. This does not mean that the world is not concerned about any acts of
cruelty on either side, but there are ways and means of dealing with such things
which are not beyond the political powers of men.
When Quemoy and the adjoining island of Amoy, were harassed, it was not only
Chinese shipping which suffered. In the last few years United Kingdom shipping
has been subjected to bombing by the Nationalist forces. And on 19 August, the
date on which certain military events took place in that area, Amoy was
frequently bombarded and suffered much damage, and Chinese shipping was
interfered with. China began the artillery bombardment on 23 August, with the
results that we know.
MY GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN FAVOUR of settling any problem by the use of

force, even when there is a question of legitimate rights, but we have no right to
expect that every Government will take that view. When China expresses its
peaceful intentions, it must be accepted at its word. That would be the best part of
wisdom, and I think that in the agreement to renew ambassadorial talks at Warsaw
we have an earnest of those intentions. It is up to all parties concerned to make
those ambassadorial talks as fruitful as possible and not leave it at the
ambassadorial stage.
My Government, while it has no role in this matter of mediation, has always been
at the disposal of any party, and would be prepared to use its good offices, for
what that is worth, to assist in reducing tensions. There are, of course, problems
in relation to the large forces that are now occupying Quemoy Island and the
future of those forces. I can only say that these problems are not insoluble. While
the situation continues to be grave and may well lead to a larger conflict which
may in turn degenerate into a widespread war and which might be impossible to
localise - I do not say it will be impossible, I say it might be impossible - the
situation offers every reason for hope, because the history of the past three years
has shown us that it is possible for us to obtain the Chinese Government’s
adherence to the statement made at Bandung that these problems will be settled
by peaceful negotiation.
Peaceful negotiation would be assisted if the Chinese people could think that the
General Assembly is looking at this problem rather than ignoring it. We have
brought this item before the Assembly year after year. It is not a sort of very
hardy annual; this year it is more important than any other. The speeches that
have been made here have shown the concern of many people, and I would ask
those who are wavering not to cast their vote so as to make the Chinese people
think that there is no response from our side to this attitude of peaceful
negotiation. I am not here either to plead as to whether actions are all right or all
wrong. That would be very improper for me to do. But my Government is
convinced that, if we choose the right approach, if the Assembly shows that it is
not ignoring this problem - in fact the world cannot settle down, nor any of its
problems be solved if the 639 million Chinese people are ignored - we can find a
settlement...

195948
[The procedural situation in the General Assembly in 1959 was similar to

that in 1958, except that the amendments (A/L.261) to the recommendation
of the General Committee were submitted by Nepal.]
...I should now like to refer to the fact of our repetitive appearances on this
restroom on this subject. It has now become an annual subject but it is by no
means a hardy annual in the sense that a hardy annual means that there is no
flexibility about it and nothing has changed, that it is merely a kind of habit of
ours to bring it up. That is not the position...
Reference has been made to recent incidents - and I do not want to mince my
words - these recent incidents refer to the rebellion in Tibet and the handling of it
by the Chinese Government in ways that have shaken public opinion in our
country and has also stirred people elsewhere. This is not the occasion either to
go into the constitutionality or otherwise of various issues. I want to say that
there is considerable public feeling in our land on this matter and therefore we are
not speaking without emotion or on strictly legalistic grounds.
The second is about our frontiers. Various speakers have spoken differently as to
the invasion of India, or the incursions into India or aggression on our frontiers.
We certainly appreciate the concern of people about the integrity of India. I wish
this concern had been expressed when other violations took place, when year after
year we went before the Security Council and sat there to witness ten out of the
eleven members supporting aggression. Therefore, it is not merely the concern
about aggression against India. But I shall put that on one side. Let us look at it
this way: the Government of India cannot accept the position the delegations here,
all eighty-one of you, barring us, are more concerned about the integrity of our
soil than we are. I think it is doing us a disfavour in suggesting that anyone else
could be more concerned about the integrity of our country than we are.
So far as the Chinese are concerned, we have told them in plain words that, while
we were prepared to discuss any question, however difficult it is, while we were
prepared to make adjustments and compromises and while our policy remains one
of continuing friendship and settling matters by negotiation, we shall not be
48 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Plenary Meetings,
pages 89-94
intimidated, we shall not yield our territory, and we shall not permit unilateral
action with regard to unsettled disputes. That is our position. Therefore, as far as
China is concerned, we tell them that if there are disputes, "we shall sit down and
talk like civilised people and friendly Governments and that these matters are not
to be settled unilaterally."
Thus, on the one hand the Government of India is firm in the policy of the
maintenance of its sovereignty. What is more, the 2,000 miles of our frontier - it
is our frontier, and we should be expected to know about it as much as anyone
else. If there is a strong country on the other side and it represents a menace or a
matter of concern for us, I think the Government of India must be regarded as
having sufficient sense of maturity and political judgement to know its
consequences. At the same time, we are sufficiently mature and sufficiently
devoted to the purposes of the Charter and the general orientation of the United
Nations not to create a war psychosis. We have no desire to exaggerate events
any more than to minimise them. As my Prime Minister said, it is not a question
of two mountain tops or some grazing rights or anything of that kind. When a
people feel that their country has been treaded upon, there is an emotional
uprising among the people, and therefore we shall resist. At the same time, we
shall not permit either in our country or elsewhere the situation to be used to
become one in which the peace of the world is affected. The reason, therefore, for
our bringing this item here is obviously not our self-interest.
We are asked, "In view of your disillusionment about China, then why do you
bring this item here? There again, I submit, that it is not, shall I say, a very
generous way of looking at us. We do not bring the question of China here
because China is our neighbour or because China is on friendly and diplomatic
relation with us. We asked countries like the United States, for example, or
various other countries who have hostile feelings towards China, if you like, quite
legitimately perhaps, who are unfriendly to her, who do not regard China as
trustworthy, who regard China has having committed aggression, we have asked
them in the past to let China take her place here. We have said, "This may be so,
we do not want to change your opinion of China; but you must allow her to come
here." Now, if it is sauce for them, it must be equally sauce for us!
We could not come here this year and say, "we have had a bit of trouble on our
frontier, so the whole basis of our approach to the United Nations on a particular
question has changed." If that is the attitude Governments take in this Assembly,
then this Assembly cannot hope to make progress. Therefore, I think, if anything,
we deserve a degree of appreciation from a large number of people, that even
when we ourselves have been hurt, we were willing to bring up this question of
principle in the interests of the United Nations and in the interests of world peace
and co-operation. That, Mr. President, is our position.
If we thought that we should not bring up this matter here this year, it could be
only because there was a change in our foreign policy, in its fundamentals, or
because we think principles are so elastic that they can be forgotten when one’s
own interests are concerned. That is not the position so far as we are concerned.
THIS MATTER BEING A SERIOUS ONE and with consequences not only in
the debates here but everywhere else, I should like to present as fully as possible
the point of view of my Government. It is not, as someone has suggested, that we
have put down this item on the provisional agenda before the troubles which there
have been, occurred, and that if we had had any apprehensions that they would
occur, we would not have done so. Actually, this item was submitted to this
Assembly in June, long after the troubles in Tibet took place - these recent ones,
not only the older ones of previous years. After deliberate and due considerations
we put down this item. So, there is no question of our having made a mistake in
this matter on this score...
The fact that China has behaved towards us ungenerously, unfairly, if you like,
the fact that its action, as we see it, has not been to their benefit or to ours or to
that of the world, should not alter our position. The Prime Minister of India when
speaking on this matter, when he was specifically questioned in the legislature,
said:
"Our policy in regard to the entry of China into the United Nations
remains as it was... it is not because we get angry with something that
happens in China that we change our policy. That would mean that we
have no firm policies, that we are deflected by temporary happenings in
the world."
...We have repeatedly come to this rostrum, we have repeatedly gone to

conferences and proclaimed these (five) principles as our basis and our view that
it is the world’s interest that we and other countries should practice them. The
Prime Minister said that
"...if these principles are right, we hold by them and we should hold by
them, even though nobody in the wide world is willing to adopt them.
Naturally, we have to adapt our policies to what happens in the world; we
cannot live in isolation. But a principle should be acted upon even though
somebody else has not acted upon it."
That is to say, even violations by the very other party to the original formulation
of the five principles, namely China, would not justify our going away from it
without a great deal of consideration...
That is our position in regard to this matter, and therefore the Assembly should
not be led into some wrong view of things, thinking they are acting in sympathy
with us...
I think it is necessary to declare on this rostrum that our misfortunes or whatever
may happen one way or another will not induce our Government to be drawn into
cold war attitudes or into war blocs. In maintaining our rights, our dignity and
our self-respect, in not allowing ourselves to drift into wrong and hostile attitudes
and in trying to help in removing or solving each problem as it arises, we may
help a little. That is the line we propose to take. That is the utmost we can do in
the circumstances, and in the creation of this atmosphere we have to play our part.
Then there is the general atmosphere that is sought to be created as though there is
a major war developing on our frontiers. While I have had no intention of
speaking about the territories of Bhutan or Sikkim, references were made on this
rostrum about the invasion of these areas by hostile armies, by foreign elements
and so on. Now you may say: Why do you go into this? I do not feel called upon
to speak in the defence of Chinese policy and have no intention of doing so. But
it is very much our concern that the world should know the extent of this matter
both ways, large or small.
The Maharajah Kumar of Sikkim, who is one of the most active political
personalities in that territory, spoke publicly and to the press only a few days
before I left India. There were no foreign elements who had entered the territory.
There were no concentrations on that side and the press stories were incorrect.
About Bhutan, a telegram received today says:
"Prime Minister of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji has said (in Calcutta) there has
been no intrusion into Bhutan territory by Chinese troops. Nor does he
apprehend any. Dorji was speaking to newsmen."
I say this, not in order to minimise the nature of unfriendly actions that you and
we have spoken about today and yesterday. We shall defend our territory, if and
whenever it becomes necessary, to the best of our ability. But we shall also seek
to solve the main problems in the usual way by negotiation. Negotiation does not
mean that we shall negotiate on the basis of giving up what is our sovereign
homeland but we are willing to discuss minor adjustments that are required in
what is called the MacMahon Line.
Friendship with China is something that we regard as necessary for them and for
us. The Prime Minister said on 10 September:
"...We were right in working for their friendship and, may I repeat and
say, we shall continue to work for it. Any person who has the least
responsibility for India’s future cannot allow himself to be frightened and
angered and behave in fright and anger. No country should do that, more
especially in a crisis... We have to think of the future of these two great
countries. This idea of settling things by this kind of compulsion and
force or by threats and bullying is all wrong."
On 4 September, the Prime Minister said:
"I have always thought that it is important, even essential if you like, that
these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly and, as
far as possible, co-operative relations. ...it would be a tragedy not only for
India, and possibly for China, but for Asia and the world if we develop
some kind of permanent hostility... May I say that, in spite of all that has
happened and is happening today, that it (friendship of China and India) is
still our objective, and we shall continue to work for it."
These are the observations made to the Indian Parliament, and therefore they are
well considered political statements. We shall, therefore, on the one hand, not
have a policy of appeasement, nor, on the other hand, shall we be the victim of
war psychoses of any kind. Nor do we want to exaggerate matters.
BUT ALL THIS DOES NOT CHANGE THE CHARACTER of the situation so
far as Chinese representation is concerned. One may ask: What has happened?
It is quite true there have been certain happenings which increasingly change the
position of the world. The main and ominous factor is the development of the
world in the matter of atomic weapons. While China may or may not be relevant
in this context immediately, it is well known that several Powers have the
prospect of the explosion of these weapons in different parts of the world. It is
also known that scientific advances have reached the position that most nations
can make and use these weapons. Therefore, if there is to be disarmament and
suspension or prohibition of nuclear weapons, that can be done only if the great
nations and the small nations of the world are parties to it...
Secondly, I say with all respect that it is not the gigantic size of China or its
production that makes us think it should be here. It is the fact of sovereignty; we
have as much respect for the smallest of our members, Iceland, with a populations
of some 200,000, as for China with a population of some 650 million, because
they are countries and nations, large or small, and for the peoples concerned they
are their homelands and their nationhood...
We are not saying that because China is big and mighty, it is therefore dangerous
to keep her out. What we are saying is this. If we are to have a general world
settlement, if we are to settle the affairs of the world, we cannot have a great part
of the world out of it. Here is a country which is now in diplomatic relations - not
necessarily in friendly relations - with some 34 countries of the world, carrying on
trade all around. It would be impossible to keep her out of the international
context.
Now I ask: who should be the greater loser? China is certainly a loser. It would
be idle to pretend that it is not because any country that cannot be here is a loser
thereby. But the world is also the loser. It is possible for China to reap the
rewards of relationships without having to conform to obligations. It is
impossible to think of any scheme of disarmament, let alone atomic weapons,
when a country reputed to have standing army of 5 million people and probably
another 5 or 10 million in reserve, is outside the ambit of the discussions. I would
say that it does not seem sound and reasonable, to put it very mildly. Therefore it
is the United Nations, the world as a whole, that stand to lose by the exclusion of
a country. I have said before that we cannot just wish away a people or a nation,
great or small. Just because we shut our eyes the world does not become dark.
We remain ignorant. Therefore, we have to recognise these facts as they stand...
THEN WE ARE TOLD THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SINS committed by the
concerned party which makes it wrong and impossible for us to consider this
matter. I have no doubt that sins have been committed. There are many things in
China of which we disapprove. There have been actions in regard to us which we
have protested and with regard to which we propose to remain very firm, and we
shall act appropriately and to the best of our ability. But I would suggest in the
interests of facts that there are other countries, other States, who also have
deviated, including ours, from one or the other of the principles of the Charter in
letter or spirit. There is not one of the eighty-two nations here who could stand up
and say that they have not violated, consciously or unconsciously, any of the
provisions of the Charter or against whom any allegation of such evasion could
not be laid by one or another member State if they so wished.
When the United Nations was founded, it was laid down, even before the
conclusion of the war, that those who were on the other side fighting the Allies
should also come into the United Nations at the proper time. So the founders
thought in terms not merely of having some nice people here, but of having the
world as it is. It was the basic idea of the United Nations that even those who
were engaged in the overthrow of liberty in the Second World War should, after
the conclusion of peace, the termination of hostilities and the passage of time, join
the comity of nations in order that the world may develop towards a more
peaceful and whole family.
Therefore, how can we justify keeping someone else out? It is said that, while
Governments may change or die, States do not die. China is a primary member of
the United Nations. Some of the signatories of the Charter are now members of
the Peking Government, just as some others are members of the authority in
Formosa. Secondly, if there are resolutions condemning aggression in regard to
China, there are resolutions also condemning other people, very firm ones, and
repeated not on some occasion when there was an excitement but deliberately
thought out, that it was part of the constitution that certain countries should not be
admitted. We rescinded that in effect and we disregarded those resolutions. My
country was in the forefront in trying to enlarge the membership of this
Organisation. Even now there are some countries standing outside, like Outer
Mongolia or the countries that have been divided through no fault of their own,
who are not here.
What is more, this is an Organisation, with its vast economic, social and other
national and international functions, from which a large tract of territory like the
Chinese continent cannot be excluded. Now under our decisions, not even the
specialised agencies can touch China.
Therefore, really, apart from all political theory and legal subtleties, we are
excluding the 650 million people of China from such healthy influence or from
such impacts that this Organisation can make...
...we should not create a mentality which would allow an impression to get
around that there is a large-scale war brewing in South-East Asia, that Bhutan is
invaded, Sikkim is invaded, Laos is invaded and somebody else is invaded. I say,
with equal candour, that the Chinese Government has behaved in a way, so far as
we are concerned, that is both unwise and unfair and of no profit to themselves, to
us or to the world.
So far as our territory is concerned, we are as much concerned about it as anybody

else at least, and no one can say that we shall be oblivious to whatever dangers
there are. But from there to go on and say that in the foothills of the Himalayas a
large war is waging in inaccessible regions, is fantastic. I have some
responsibilities in this matter. It is not so much for the Assembly, but for all those
who desire to know, that I say that we shall not permit unilateral action so far as
we are concerned. We may be a weaker country, we may be economically
backward, we have our own ideological approach, but we certainly have sufficient
sense of our own homeland to protect it whatever may be the sacrifices. I do not
wish to express myself in stronger terms or in bitterness. We believe that, like
any case of difficult situations, this is a trying time for us. Instead of this being
the occasion where we are inviting the United Nations to adopt a lawless attitude,
as alleged, I submit that if we had, on this occasion when the first difficulty hits
us, departed from what we have been advocating from this rostrum year after
year, we would have not deserved from the members of the United Nations either
their consideration or their respect nor could we feel that we had acted with a
sense of integrity or self-respect...
[In 1960 the question was brought before the General Assembly by the Soviet
Union. The General Committee recommended a draft resolution as in earlier
years, and Nepal moved amendments to it.]
49 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session. Plenary Meetings, pages
365-71
...The Assembly has a very healthy respect for the Charter. If anyone stands up
and says that the provisions of the Charter have been violated, we feel uneasy.
That is why those who are accustomed to the ways of the Assembly are using the
magic words of the Charter wrongly. For in this issue, irrespective of its merits,
the provisions of the Charter are not involved. The Charter says that "peace-
loving States" shall be admitted, States that are "able and willing to carry out"
their obligations. But in this case the admission has already taken place. If, under
the definition of those who oppose its proper representation, China is not a peace-
loving State, then the Formosans cannot sit here either - because they do not
represent a peace-loving State. The admission of a peace-loving State has already
taken place; it is a question only of who occupies that State’s seats here. Some
gate-crashers have come in, and we must remove them; it is really a function of
the guards here.
Thus, there is no question of throwing the Charter at us and saying that because
China is not a peace-loving State the Assembly must not admit it to membership.
Actually this situation is partly our fault. Some of us, including my own
delegation, have very often carelessly referred to this question as "the admission
of China." But the admission of China does not come into it because there could
be no United Nations without China: China was a founding member of the
United Nations and its representation on the Security Council is required for that
body to function. Therefore the argument that there are certain defects in this
State cannot apply because the State is already represented here.
If this argument stood alone, it might not be so comic. But I would ask
representatives to look at the statement on this subject made by my distinguished
friend, Mr. Wadsworth,50 who is always very reasonable, very calculated and
very deliberate in his expressions. Let us read what he said - perhaps it is a
Freudian error.
"In the Taiwan Strait Communist China has been using armed forces
intermittently since 1950 as part of its violent campaign to seize Taiwan
and the Pescadores, and thus to destroy the Republic of China."
If one reads those lines carefully, one finds that in Mr. Wadsworth's mind the
Republic of China is Taiwan and the Pescadores. In his mind the Republic of
China is not that large continent stretching from the borders of Mongolia to the
yellow sea; it is not the China of 650 million people; it is merely Taiwan and the
Pescadores - and it may well be only the Pescadores in a short time... Now that
cannot be said of one of the five great States which are permanent members of the
Security Council.
50 James J. Wadsworth, representative of the United States of America

We have always said that membership in the United Nations does not involve any
obligation on the part of States to recognise other States... So a country which
takes a reasonable, a just, a sensible view that does not make us look ridiculous in
history, that country does not thereby subscribe to the economic, political,
cultural, non-cultural or anti-cultural systems that obtain in China; it does not
subscribe to recognising them nationally; it does not thereby agree to trade with
them or anything of that kind. For example, it might even participate, as in the
Korean war, in some action which may be objected to, or may be against China.
All these things do not come into it. We are merely considering whether, in
accordance with the principles of universality, in accordance with common sense,
this Assembly can be called an Assembly of the world when it excludes one
quarter of the world’s population...
IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE DELEGATION OF INDIA to make its own

position clear... We are told that because we had controversies and conflicts with
China, in regard to our frontier, therefore we have abandoned the principles of our
foreign policy, we have abandoned considerations that are applicable to our
membership of the United Nations, and, what is more important, that we reversed
the views which were applicable at a time when this was not the case.
It is quite true that China, in disregard of neighbourly considerations, in disregard

of a very formal decency, has violated the frontiers of India. My country will take
every step that is required in order to rest such aggression and to guard the
security of our land. We make no reservations on this. We have told the world
that this is an act which is against the relations that exist between our two
countries, against our desire for peaceful and friendly neighbourliness, and, what
is more, it is against the interests of peace. But in a role of that kind, however
painful it may be to us, however much it may be a violation of the principles of
existence, it will not push us away from the fundamental things that govern us in
regard to the United Nations...
In the course of his address to the Assembly this morning, the Prime Minister of
India made the following statement:
"I do not propose to deal with many other matters here but, in view of the
controversy that is at present going on in the General Assembly, I should
like to refer briefly to the question of the proper representation of China in
the United Nations. For a number of years India has brought this issue
before the United Nations because we have felt that it is not only improper
for this great and powerful country to remain unrepresented but that this
had an urgent bearing on all world problems, and especially those of
disarmament.
"We hold that all countries must be represented in the United Nations. We
have welcomed during this session many new countries. It appears most
extraordinary that any argument should be advanced to keep out China
and to give the seat meant for China to those who certainly do not and
cannot represent China...
"It is well known that we in India have had and are having, a controversy
with the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China
about our frontiers. In spite of that controversy, we continue to feel that
proper representation of the People’s Republic of China in the United
Nations is essential; and the longer we delay it, the more harm we cause to
the United Nations and to the consideration of the major problems we
have before us. This is not a question of liking or disliking, but of doing
the right and proper thing."
That which my Prime Minister stated this morning applies to Mongolia. The
people of this country, but dint of hard work, have converted inhospitable lands
into fertile regions. The people of this great country cannot be kept out because
people do not know them or because people think they do not like them. This
approach to the United Nations is something to which my country cannot
subscribe.
SOME THIRTY-FIVE OR FORTY COUNTRY NOW RECOGNISE the

People’s Republic of China. Not all of them are friendly to it. There are States
like us who do not deviate from friendship with it in spite of provocations. On the
other hand, there are States, such as the United Kingdom, which recognise and
trade with it but will not vote for its representation here. There are still others
which have recently recognised it.
The People’s Republic of China played a very important role in the Asian-African
Conference at Bandung in 1955, and assisted in the formulation of policies which
have helped Asian and African countries achieve solidarity under the umbrella of
the United Nations Charter. These are the various considerations we ought to
have in mind when we look into this matter...
Mr. Wadsworth said...:
"The Peiping regime was imposed by military force, and in ten years..."
I have a vague recollection of a thing called the "American War of

Independence." Apart from humble countries like our own, there are not many
regimes that have not been imposed by force. I ask my friends from the
continent of South America to recollect their own history. How many of their
regimes were not imposed by force, and would they feel like men and women if
previous regimes had not been overthrown and new ones imposed by force? The
fact of a State coming into existence as a result of a popular revolution has been
known. For example, there are many in this Assembly who are the creatures of
para-revolutions - revolutions from the top. There are members of the United
Nations which have forms of government ranging from communist to other forms
of authoritarian dictatorship; there are parliamentary democracies; there are
presidential democracies; there are guided democracies, and misguided
democracies. Every one is here. So we do not look at these internal questions...
We speak on this matter, at this time of night and at this late stage of the debate,
even more forcibly because of the misconduct of China in relation to India; not
that we want to appear to take upon ourselves a kind of position of imposed
virtue, but we remember that our obligations to the United Nations are not to be
conditioned by pains which we have suffered ourselves; that is to say, our national
difficulties or international difficulties with relation to one State should not make
us undertake any approach to war or peace, which would become impossible...
THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
[Soon after the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) attained independence in July 1960, it
was faced with a serious crisis. On 12 July, Belgium sent its troops to the Congo
alleging a breakdown of law and order. The provincial authorities of Katanga,
headed by Moise Tshombe, backed by Belgian soldiers, declared secession.
At the request of the Congolese Government, the United Nations sent military
forces to the Congo to provide necessary assistance until the national security
forces were able to meet their tasks, and undertook an economic assistance
programme.
India was actively involved in the United Nations Operation in the Congo
(ONUC). It contributed the largest contingent to the United Nations Force,
numbering 4,701 infantry personnel and 1,071 supporting forces. Rajeshwar
Dayal, an Indian national, was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-
General in the Congo in September 1960. India was a member of the Advisory
Committee on the Congo and the United Nations Conciliation Commission which
visited the Congo in January-February 1961.
The United Nations operation encountered great difficulties because of internal

conflicts and anarchy in the Congo, the involvement of foreign military personnel
and mercenaries, and sharp differences among the major Powers. It soon
succeeded in securing the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the capital,
Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), and other areas, but Belgian nationals remained in
the Katanga gendarmerie and police. The Government of the Congo, led by
Patrice Lumumba, criticised the United Nations Secretary-General for not
assisting it in relation to Katanga. It sought and received some military assistance
from the Soviet Union. The Congo became a serious issue in the "cold war"
contention between the United States and the Soviet Union.
A constitutional crisis developed in September 1960, when the President, Joseph

Kasavubu, dismissed the Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba, and the latter announced
the dismissal of the President with the support of the Parliament. On 15
September, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Mobutu, announced the take
over of power by the army. Subsequently, President Kasavubu issued decrees
dissolving the Parliament, and designating a "College of Commissioners,"
installed by the military, as the government.
Pandit Nehru, in a speech to the General Assembly in October, suggested that the
United Nations should help the Parliament to meet and function so that the
Congo’s problems might be dealt with by its own people. But no effective action
was taken towards that end.
In November, after heated discussion in the General Assembly, the United States
and other Powers secured - by 53 votes to 24, with 19 abstentions - the seating in
the General Assembly of a delegation designated by President Kasavubu.
Strengthened by this decision, President Kasavubu and Colonel Mobutu, with the
help of Belgian advisers, ignored appeals for national reconciliation and
lawlessness spread in the country.
The crisis grew more serious early in December 1960 when Mr. Lumumba and
other members of Parliament were detained by the Congolese troops and
manhandled. Six governments then withdrew their troops from the United Nations
Force. The provincial authorities of the Orientale province at Stanleyville
threatened reprisals against Belgian residents unless Mr. Lumumba was released,
and proceeded to arrest some Belgian nationals.
The situation was considered by the Security Council from 7 to 13 December, but
no resolution could be adopted because of serious differences of opinion among
members and the "cold war" attitudes.
India had serious reservations on the direction of the United Nations operation in
the Congo, but did not go along with other non-aligned countries which withdrew
from the United Nations Force. During the discussion in the Security Council,
India pointed out that the withdrawal of the United Nations Force would be a
calamity. Its proper functioning required new approaches, and progress might be
achieved if governments enjoying influence with the Congolese authorities were
to use their good offices to urge an end to lawlessness, the neutralisation of the
armed forces, the release of prisoners and the convening of Parliament.
The matter was discussed in the General Assembly later in December at the
request of India and Yugoslavia. The Assembly rejected a non-aligned draft
resolution co-sponsored by India and an Anglo-American draft, opposed by India,
was not adopted for lack of a two-thirds majority. After the voting, Mr. Menon
warned that a reversal of the process of deterioration in the Congo could not take
place if the United Nations and the major Powers continued to follow a partisan
policy. "Our position is that the failure of the United Nations in the Congo and
the necessity of the mission having to be withdrawn would not be a failure of the
United Nations only, but a disaster to the Congolese people who will be steeped
in the blood of civil war."
The situation deteriorated rapidly. On January 18, 1961, Patrice Lumumba,

together with Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito, was transferred in detention from
Thysville to Elisabethville in Katanga and it became known on 13 February that
they had been killed. A few days later six political leaders imprisoned in
Leopoldville were deported to Bakwanga, South Kasai, and executed.
Mercenaries from Belgium, South Africa and Rhodesia began to arrive in
Katanga.
This turn of events had grave repercussions in the United Nations. Several
countries condemned the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold. The Soviet
Union announced that it would not recognise him nor maintain any relations with
him, and would give all support to a pro-Lumumba government established in
Stanleyville, headed by Antoine Gizenga, former Deputy Prime Minister of the
Congo.
However, recognition of the grave dangers in the Congo, the advent of a new
administration in the United States, headed by President John F. Kennedy, and
growing world public opinion had a positive effect. On February 21, 1961, the
Security Council was able to adopt a resolution providing for stronger action by
the United Nations to avert civil war, secure the withdrawal of Belgian and other
military forces and promote a peaceful settlement.
As the United Nations Force became depleted by the withdrawal of several

countries, the Secretary-General made an urgent appeal for additional troops.
India made the largest contribution by sending a brigade to the Congo early in
April.
The situation was again discussed in the resumed session of the General Assembly
in March-April 1961. India co-sponsored two draft resolutions (A/L.339 and A/L.
347) - which were adopted on 15 April as resolutions 1599 (XV) and 1601 (XVI).
The Assembly also adopted another resolution, 1600 (XV), sponsored by 17
Asian-African countries.
Under these resolutions, the Assembly again called for the withdrawal of all
Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political
advisers not under the United Nations Command; urged the release of all
political leaders under detention; urged the convening of Parliament with safe
conduct and security extended by the United Nations; and established a
Commission of four jurists to investigate the assassination of Patrice Lumumba
and his colleagues.
Forceful action by the United Nations, in accordance with the Security Council
and General Assembly resolutions, including military action by the United
Nations Force in the Katanga, in which the Indian brigade was assigned the
primary role, helped avert a disaster in the Congo and a grave threat to the
United Nations.
Three speeches made by Mr. Menon in the General Assembly in December

1960 and April 1961 are reproduced here.]
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly December 16, 196051
51
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
[During the discussion in the General Assembly of the crisis in the Congo, India,
together with seven other non-aligned countries, presented a draft resolution
(A/L.331 and Rev.1). By this text, the Assembly, conscious of the urgent
responsibility of the United Nations in view of the grave and ominous
developments and continuing deterioration in the Congo, the absence of effective
central authority and the hostile attitude and resistance of armed detachments to
the United Nations operation, would consider that the United Nations must
henceforth implement its mandate fully to prevent breach of peace and security, to
restore and maintain law and order and the inviolability of persons and to take
urgent measures to assist the Congolese people in meeting their pressing
economic needs. It would urge the immediate release of all political prisoners
under detention - more particularly the members of the Central Government and
Parliament - the convening of Parliament and measures to prevent armed units
and personnel in the Congo from interference in the political life of the country
and from obtaining support from abroad. It would draw the attention of the
Belgian Government to its grave responsibilities in disregarding the resolutions
of the United Nations and demand that all Belgian military and quasi-military
personnel, advisers and technicians be immediately withdrawn.
The United Kingdom and the United States submitted another draft resolution
(A/L.332) to call upon all States to refrain from direct or indirect assistance for
military purposes in the Congo except upon the request of the United Nations
Secretary-General; to request the Secretary-General to assist the President of the
Congo in establishing conditions in which Parliament could meet in security and
freedom from outside interference, and to continue his efforts to assist the Congo
in ensuring respect for civil and human rights for all persons within the country.
On 20 December, the Assembly rejected the draft resolution c-sponsored by India.

The Anglo-American draft was also rejected for lack of a two-thirds majority.]
We are discussing probably one of the most critical situations that has emerged in
our time, which may affect the question of order or anarchy on the continent of
Africa, the prestige of the United Nations, and what the Secretary-General himself
has described as the problem of peace and security. This afternoon we are here
more especially because the Security Council has failed the United Nations. For
days and in the late hours of the night, the Council debated these problems and the
eleven wise men were not able to produce the results that were required.
Therefore, whatever may be the niceties, the various nuances involved and the
reasons that may go into it, the world looks upon the fact that the Security Council
which is charged with the protection of peace and security in the world and to act
with great urgency - even though it was convened thanks to the initiative of the
1309-91
President, and I mince no words in the matter, at this critical situation - did not
come to a conclusion. It does not matter very much whether it was due to the
intransigence of one or the lack of courage of the other, or whether it was for this
or that reason. The fact does stand out that while war threatens the world and
while civil war threatens to tear up Africa, and while other events in south-east
Asia, on account of the intervention of the great Powers of the world, threaten to
shake the peace of the world, the Security Council has been stultified. That is
why we are here today.
...We have before us a document from the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General which says that the armed forces of the so-called Government
of the Congo - that is what we should call it hereafter because it has no legitimate
authority - led by a person who is a product of a "coup d'etat" and not of a good
type either, had challenged the authority of the United Nations and, in the words
of Mr. Dayal, committed aggression against the United Nations... I think that it is
the worst challenge, the worst humiliation, that the United Nations ever suffered,
that there should be a person in charge of armed forces with no authority from his
people or even of the head of his Government presumably, and no authority from
parliament, who dares to challenge the authority of the United Nations, sanctified
by resolutions of the Security Council and this Assembly, which is not in the
Congo for imperial occupation and, as one representative unfortunately once tried
to say, for joint imperialism. It is not there for the purpose of aggrandisement, but
rather called there by a legal government. The Secretary-General pointed to the
Security-Council decision, whatever the resolution may appear to be literally, and
said that the maintenance of law and order was implied in that resolution...
Therefore, there is this second fact, that is to say, there is the beginning of war
waged upon the United Nations. Are we to sit back here idly, we the peoples or
nations of the world, as it is stated in the Charter, and not accept this challenge?
My Government does not take the view that, as regards the Secretary-General or
whoever is responsible, the mandate given by the Security Council is not enough
to cover this event. We agree that it is not necessary to exercise a mandate to the
full in the beginning, but we believe that the resolutions adopted by the Security
Council, read with the various documents that have come in to us, and the various
statements made by the Secretary-General before us, are sufficient to cover the
entire issues that are before us, because there is a threat to peace and security.
Therefore, what is to be sought is not a new mandate but working out of the
mandate, facing the realities of the situation...
We are here for three reasons. First, we are concerned with the fact that the
prestige and position of the United Nations and its right have been challenged.
Secondly, we are as nationals concerned with the humiliations inflicted upon our
people. We did not go to the Congo to be humiliated; we are prepared to take
hardships; we are prepared to bear the burdens which are necessary, and we do
not whine about them. But we say that these national humiliations are
international humiliations. What one country suffers in the pursuance of a
mandate, in the pursuance of a request by the United Nations, is the suffering of
every other country...
The feeling in my country, in Parliament, in public opinion and in the press is so

strong about this that I have to convey it to you. I can do no better than quote a
few words which my own Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, uttered a few days ago
when the Security Council was sitting, and he, with the optimism that
characterises him, hoped that some solution would come out of the Security
Council. He said:
"It is a very dangerous situation, not only dangerous for the Congo but for
the whole of Africa; not only for the whole of Africa but for the future of
the United Nations itself, because if the United Nations cannot deal with
this situation and fails, then naturally its capacity to deal with any other
situation or similar situation will go."
Another fact should also be remembered, that recent developments there had been
a matter not only of deep concern and anxiety but, in a measure, even anger to
many peoples and many countries of Asia and Africa. If I may, I will stop there.
I now turn to my friends, to my colleagues and brothers in Africa and the Asian
countries, and I should like to remind them that this is a great humiliation; it is the
reverse of Bandung.
A number of countries have had their representatives thrown out. We do not stand
for that from any country when we have an ambassador accredited there. A
number of countries have withdrawn their contingents from the United Nations
Force and no one quite knows what other developments of this kind may take
place hereafter. There is danger not only of civil war, which is practically taking
place in a small way, but of civil war spreading, of foreign intervention on a
bigger scale because as things are in the world, if one major Power intervenes, as
indeed it has done, its opposite number or some others would want to intervene
also and claim to come in to create some kind of balancing intervention. I think
that that is a very mild statement, though it expresses a situation that calls for a
strong characterisation.
The United Nations went into the Congo in order to give technical assistance, in
order to assist in the maintenance of law and order but, more than all of this, to
expel the intruder; that is to say, the Belgian Government, which, having ruled
this country over a period of eighty years as an imperial ruler, having left it
helpless without educated or capable administering strata in its society, with no
development that could cope with this situation, gave it independence - the
gauntlet with the gift in it.
We do not regret the independence of the Congo but we regret this act of political
desertion. There can be no greater condemnation of an empire, not even its
atrocities, than that it leaves a country paralysed, emasculated and incapable of
taking care of itself. Belgium today stands in the dock of the world, not only here
but everywhere and it should well be called to account by the United Nations for
this purpose. We therefore went into the Congo also for this purpose of
expulsion, for the withdrawal of Belgian nationals. Although it is somewhat out of
order I propose to take this matter first.
The Security Council, in its resolution of July 22 1960, called upon the
Government of Belgium "to implement speedily the Security Council resolution
of 14 July 1960 on the withdrawal of their troops" and authorised the Secretary-
General "to take all necessary action to this effect"... It does not say all legal
action or legitimate action or cautious action; it says "necessary action," the action
limited to the achievement of the result. Therefore the mandate is sufficiently
wide.
This was a repetition of the resolution passed on 14 July. The resolution of

August 9, 1960 adopted by the Security Council called upon the Government of
Belgium "to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under
speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every
possible way the implementation of the Council’s resolutions."
Credit is due to the Secretary-General because he permitted, and, I believe, even

led the United Nations troops into Katanga. At least so far as I know; I do not
know anything more about it, at least it was a good gesture.
On August 20, 1960, the permanent representative of Belgium replied to the

Secretary-General, that is, one month and six days after the first resolution asking
the Belgian Government to withdraw. I have said from this rostrum in another
connection three or four years ago that it always appears aggressive troops or
invading armies or imperial forces take less time to go in than to come out! Why
it should take one month and six days for Belgians to pack up and go home I do
not know.
The Belgian Government replied as follows:
"The Belgian Government has instructed me to inform you that the Kitona
and Kamina bases will be evacuated except for experts."
Further on the reply stated:
"The number of experts required for essential services is 1,000 at the

maximum for Kamina and 500 for Kitona."
On 30 August the permanent representative of Belgium said that "the withdrawal

of Belgium troops in the Congo has been completed" - I want you to mark these
words - "with the sole exception of some members of the First Paratroop Battalion
who are in transit... Instructions have been issued to the effect that, should it be
necessary and in order to avoid any delay, they should be evacuated by air. Thus
the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo has in effect been completed."
This is a categorical assurance given by a founding Member of the United Nations
and, what is more, a country that twice in this century has been ravaged by
foreign invasion and to whose aid the rest of the world had gone.
We have that assurance from the Belgian Government. But what happened? We
do not have to take any partisan sources for the examination of this reply. This
reply from the Belgian representative was dated 30 August. On the same day, the
Secretary-General wrote to the permanent representative of Belgium as follows:
"The Secretary-General has, however, just received a report from his

representatives who arrived at Kamina today, 30 August... At that time
Belgian combat troops consisting of one 400-man battalion of
paratroopers, one 120-man company of airfield guards and one school of
aviation comprising 50 instructors and students had not yet been
evacuated...
"The Secretary-General expresses his surprise at finding that there is a

marked difference between the information received from Brussels and the
facts observed on the scene... As the evacuation has, nevertheless, not yet
been completed the Secretary-General deems it necessary to submit a
formal protest to the Belgian Government requesting that the evacuation
of Belgian troops which are still in the Congo should be effected
immediately."
Those of us who know Mr. Hammarskjold know that he does not use offensive
language but indeed very courteous language; but we would all agree that this is
strong enough as language, as a request, as a protest, but it was "necessary"
action, as events have shown.
In its reply of 4 September the Belgian Government said that the relief of Belgian
units in Katanga:
"provided inter alia for an overlapping period in which to transfer

authority and hand over the provisions, bedding and other equipment...
"(2) The relief by United Nations troops was not carried out in accordance
with the time-table laid down."
In other words, they said, "we could not go out because you did not come in." The
reply continues:
"General Geysen nevertheless confirmed that, despite this major delay on

the part of the United Nations, the Belgian troops would be withdrawn at
midnight on 30 August."
Let us recall that just before they had said that they had already withdrawn. Now
they said that they would be withdrawn by midnight. The Belgian reply
continues: "An essential number of men were left on the spot..." Then we could
have rested with some feelings that things were being done. But then we turn
over and we find that on 4 September, that is, four days afterwards, the Secretary-
General has again to write, to the Foreign Minister of Belgium this time. So it is
not as though there were any delay in communication.
The Secretary-General said:
"My representatives, who went to the base today in order to see what the
situation was, have sent me a report to the effect that the commander of
the base has so far received no instructions except an indication that he
must furnish logistic support for the United Nations effort in the Congo."
It has nothing to do with removal, it is solely "logistic support for the United
Nations efforts in the Congo." The Secretary-General continued his reply:
"Furthermore, according to the report, there are still 650 Belgians at the
base, including those at Banana. The commander himself has said that all
these men are combatants, that there are no technicians among them, and
that he himself is a para-troop. On a flight over the Banana naval base two
gunboats were observed."
So it does not look as though they were there for any peaceful purpose. On the
same day the Secretary-General pursued this with greater persistence and he said:
"According to information received by the Secretary-General, officers of

Belgian nationality are at the present time attached to Katanga forces and
other groups in armed conflict with the central Government of the
Republic of the Congo."
"...In view of the circumstances, however, the situation can be interpreted

in the sense that the Belgian Government has at least permitted persons
connected with its military services under a `technical assistance'
programme to give help to forces fighting the Government of the Congo."
In other words, here is a statement by the Secretary-General to the Belgian

authorities where he definitely charges them with assistance in insurrection. Of
course, there is no question at that time that the Government of the Congo had
even suffered any difficulties or internal problems. Here was Belgium intriguing
and using its military assistance to perform an operation which would upset the
legitimate government and the Secretary-General draws their attention to that. If
that is so, the situation is essentially different from that of private individuals who
volunteer their services, because the Belgians presumably had said beforehand - I
am interpolating this - that "we cannot do anything about them, they are private
individuals." But the Secretary-General reminds them:
"In view of customary military regulations, it may be assumed that this

transfer could not have occurred without the assent in one form or another
of the Belgian military authorities; at all events, it would be hard to
believe that officers of the Belgian Army have severed their connection
with that Army in order to enrol in provincial forces fighting in the Congo
without having obtained the approval of their military superiors and
without having thereby made certain that they could rejoin the Belgian
Army, if necessary with a loss in rank of seniority."
In other words, Mr. Hammarskjold, if I am right, rejects this contention of

Belgium and says that they are taking part in aiding and abetting insurrection,
they are present there, and he does not accept their word.
Three days later, on 9 September, the Belgians again replied:
"Under the circumstances, a small number of Belgian experts were

supplied to the ‘corps de gendarmerie’ of Katanga as technical assistance.
"It is hard to see in this technical assistance a measure contrary to

operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council’s resolution of July 22,
1960."
That is to say, they admit a small amount of this presence, but not the volume
mentioned by the Secretary-General and then seek to justify it.
The Secretary-General again writes on 8 September to the permanent

representative of Belgium:
"Confirmed reports have been received to the effect that a cargo of

weapons, marked Belgian weapons, or something similar, the weight of
which is estimated at 9 tons, was unloaded at Elisabethville airport
yesterday from a DC civil aircraft of the Sabena airlines.
"The Secretary-General wishes to draw this report to the immediate

attention of the Belgian Government in order to ascertain whether it is true
that the Belgian Government had thus sent or authorised the sending of
weapons from Belgium to the provincial authorities in Elisabethville.
Should this be the case the Secretary-General considers it necessary to
make a formal protest against the delivery which is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the Security Council resolution of 22 July."
Again, in the Second Progress Report to the United Nations, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General says:
"In the last few weeks there has been increasing evidence of the return of
Belgian nationals into many phases of public life in the Congo... there has
been a substantial incursion of those elements which appear to seek a
dominating influence in the councils of administration and to exclude or
obstruct the application of United Nations technical assistance and
influence."
So that if I may interpolate here, the present action of Mobutu in offering armed
resistance to the United Nations, which has been reported by the Special
Representative, was preceded by the Belgians themselves in offering aggression
in the technical field.
"Some Belgian nationals are believed to have been actively arming

separatist Congolese forces and, in some cases, Belgian officers have
directly led such forces, which in certain areas, have been responsible for
brutal and oppressive acts of violence."
These are not my statements, these are the statements of the Secretary-General.
"Advisers of Belgian nationality have been returning to governmental

ministries both in Leopoldville and the provinces, partially through what
seems to be an organised recruiting campaign in Belgium. The motives
and activities of a signification portion of these returning officials appear
to be clearly at variance with the principles of the General Assembly
resolution and with ONUC's52 objectives."
The answer to this rather strong protest by the Secretary-General, with facts and
figures, chapter and verse quoted, is, if I may say so, a rather offensive one from
the Belgian Government. The Secretary-General receives a communication from
the permanent mission of Belgium to the United Nations stating:
"The Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General’s Special

Representative in the Congo has greatly displeased the Belgian
Government and Belgian public opinion..." - that is something, is it not? -
"which have been shocked by tendentious judgements based upon a series
of purely subjective allegations and interpretations, ambiguous
innuendoes, unfounded insinuations and arbitrary interpretations of the
decisions and resolutions of the United Nations."
I will not read very much more... it is an insult to the United Nations...
IT IS THE POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT that no extension of the mandate

as such is necessary... I think we should therefore cite the maxim that when
52
United Nations Operation in the Congo
conditions change, rebus sic stantibus, then the pertinent things have also to
change. Mr. Hammarskjold has made a reply to this, which I shall take up in a
moment. Now, what are these changed conditions?
First of all, when the United Nations went into the Congo there was a legal
Government. We went there at the invitation of the legal government. We are still
there. There is however, no longer any legal government, and today there is no
government at all. That is one changed condition.
The second changed condition is that there has been a "coup d’etat" by a person
who at best is a Chief of Army Staff under the old Government, and therefore,
"coup d’etat" conducted by a commissioned officer in the regular post of an army
amounts to an act of treason, that is to say, that a treasonable individual is in
charge of the operative forces that are in the Congo.
The third circumstance that has changed, I state with great regret, is that nationals
of various countries - and my country has only a small share - who have gone
there, have indignities, cruelties and terrorism heaped upon them - to which I shall
refer latter. Diplomatic officials are insulted, their luggage and their papers
tampered with, things have taken place in the Congo, under the higher authorities
- it is not as though they were helpless people who aided, abetted and prompted
this; it is of a technique of opposition to the United Nations. And I think it is time
we recognised that a continual war is being waged against the United Nations by
methods that are of an extremely questionable character. For whatever he is
worth, Colonel Mobutu, in so far as the United Nations is concerned, is guilty of a
great crime.
So then I come to probably the worst of the changed conditions. The Assembly in
its wisdom, or otherwise... changed its original wise position, which was to leave
the Congo benches vacant until these matters are resolved, so that it will be
possible for the Congolese themselves to decide their affairs and to have a
delegation sent over that would speak in their name. Unfortunately, on account of
the war of words that goes on here, on account of these ideas of prestige and what
not, we have a situation where a considered decision of the General Assembly
was, in effect, upset by a procedural device that does not require a two thirds
majority. I think it will forever stand as a regrettable fact in the history of the
United Nations that an extremely wise position which would probably have acted
as a break on the bad drift of events in the Congo, was upset by a procedural
device in which a great many people participated.
So a delegation nominated by the Head of the State, Mr. Kasavubu, who has no
right to nominate them, is seated today in the Assembly. We have nothing against
this individual, an estimable gentleman with whom we have, personally, friendly
relations. But we are dealing with principles at the moment. These people do not
represent authority; they cannot deliver the goods; it is very doubtful if they can
even be adequately briefed by their own principals, and they certainly cannot
implement their promises to the United Nations. But we have a right to expect,
whether we made a right decision or wrong decision - the Assembly having, by a
majority, agreed to regard a certain group as the representatives of the
Government - we have a right to expect from it the discharge of the
responsibilities of a member State. Therefore, from that point of view, out of evil
some good may come.
These are the changed conditions that have taken place, and therefore we would
suggest that with the repeated affirmation of confidence in the Secretary-General,
the repeated expressions of opinion by the Assembly that more and more vigorous
action must be taken - all this, we would suggest, has to be implemented.
THERE IS ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE CHANGES that strikes the man in the
rural villages of India. He sees that when, in Stanleyville, large numbers of
Europeans are going to be held as hostages the Secretary-General with
commendable promptitude and with great courage turns in the United Nations
forces to prevent atrocities taking place because atrocities in one place are like
atrocities anywhere else. For ourselves, whatever may be the law in the case we
believe that similar action should be taken everywhere. We think the time is
passed when we can indulge in mere legal quibbles on these matters.
I have instructions from my Government to communicate to you the following

facts, not for purpose of special pleading, but because of the special national
concern of my country in this matter of atrocities.
On 22 November some ANC ["Armee nationale congolaise"] soldiers - the ANC

is supposed to be the National Army of the Congo - stopped a United Nations
field officer, an Indian, while he was starting his car. Another field officer, and a
captain, both Indians, came to his assistance but were overpowered by the ANC
soldiers. It should not be thought that the Indian personnel could not have
retaliated; they are not there, however, for that purpose. These two officers were
threatened with cocked rifles, struck on the face with rifle-butts and marched off
at bayonet-point. We have had no apology, either from the Congolese
Government or from the permanent representative, or whoever sits here, and we
have had no explanations. One field officer is suffering from a punctured ear-
drum as a result of the blows received. The first field officer was taken away by
the ANC, savagely beaten, thrown face down, and received repeated kicks and
rifle-butt blows from his assailants.
This is the treatment offered to officers of the Indian Army wearing the
President’s Commission. We would not sit down under this in the face of an
enemy; but we have done in the Congo. These officials have not retaliated
because, first of all, while they are combatants, they are on non-combat duty in
the Congo. And we are still waiting for some explanation from Mr.
Hammarskjold on this question.
On 28 November, troops of Colonel Mobutu seized an ambulance van belonging
to the Indian Medical Unit - a very glorious thing for soldiers to do. Even in the
worst of wars when the enemy was of the character of Hitlerite Germany, these
laws, which are sanctified by practice and by the International Red Cross and the
Geneva Conventions, have often been observed, but here is a gallant soldier trying
to seize the ambulance of a medical unit. Earlier the Congolese soldiers disarmed
two Indian military policemen escorting a Nigerian general to the airport. The
Congolese officer forcibly took away all the goods of the house of the
Commander of the Indian contingent and has now occupied the house. If this is
not plain highway robbery, I would like to know what it is.
A Bazooka gun was mounted in General Rikhye's53 garden and two armoured cars
stood nearby. The families of Mr. Dayal and Brigadier Rikhye had to spend the
night often at the United Nations headquarters, in view of Colonel Mobutu's
troops' threat to attack their homes. These are Mr. Hammarskjold's
representatives. One is his adviser, the other his Special Representative. I do not
know what would happen if the Secretary-General himself went there. On 22
November, Colonel Roy was stopped on his way to the airport by ANC troops
and deprived of his car. There must be a shortage of vehicles in this place.
Colonel Harmander Singh, the officer commanding the Indian contingent, and
Captain Jagjit Singh, his adjutant, were stopped on their way to the office and
deprived of their cars. On 3 December, Mr. Lazarus, a correspondent of the Press
Trust of India, was twice set upon by Congolese civilians and received blows.
Local gendarmerie went twice to his hotel during his absence and not for
protective purposes. But I must here say with regard to this correspondent that the
Congolese authorities thought better of it afterwards and have withdrawn all
objections against him.
These are some of the atrocities that have been committed. But my Government
has no desire to enlarge and circulate them as atrocity stories. However, if we who
are not taking any combat part in this - out of the 780 or nearly 800 people who
are there, 400 are in the field hospital; a 400-bed field hospital has gone there
from India - if our people, I repeat, who are there on practically what many call a
mission of mercy, are to be treated in this way, what is the fate of the others who
are combatants and who are there in order to check lawlessness?
THIS IS THE POSITION SO FAR AS THE CHANGED SITUATION on the

other side is concerned. The second aspect to which I referred is that there is no
effective central authority. The authority in the Congo, according to the
constitution as we see it, is the Head of State, Mr. Kasavubu, whom this
Assembly, in spite of all that has been happening, treated with the highest respect.
He addressed us as the embodiment of the sovereignty of the Congolese people.
But sovereignty as an embodiment is not adequate in order that sovereignty may
53
Brigadier Indrajit Rikhye, military adviser to the Secretary-General
function through the right and proper channels.
The Government of India, while it recognises the authority of Mr. Kasavubu as

the Head of State and expects that he will respect the constitution, does not accept
his definition of his functions. Therefore the dismissal of his Prime Minister is
unconstitutional. It is not only unconstitutional in law, but it has no validity so far
as we are concerned. His closing of Parliament is also outside his authority.
Under the constitution of the Congo, which we have carefully perused, the
President has no authority to shut down Parliament for more than one month. He
could not get rid of his Prime Minister unless there was the sanction of
Parliament; and in this case, Parliament gave its two-thirds vote in favour of the
Prime Minister and against the decision of the President, and the President, in any
opinion, quite unfactually points out that there was not a two-thirds majority - and
I take the responsibility for these words.
Parliament has been sent away. It is impossible for them to meet; numbers of
them are in prison. There were cruelties inflicted by one faction against another
and members of Parliament who have Parliamentary immunity, as we have in our
own country, are under illegal detention.
The Army, which is the semblance of authority- I would like to ask the Secretary-
General to enlighten us on this. As to this Army, if the United Nations forces are
there, what is the function of the Congolese Army? The Congolese Army can
keep to traffic regulation and aid in keeping order, if they will do it. As the
Secretary-General has pointed out, they are partly for the maintenance of law and
order. If that is so, they should join the forces maintaining law and order, since
there cannot be a situation in the country where there are two military forces, each
acting in its own way. That is the best way to lead to anarchy, as indeed it has
done.
So there is violence, anarchy, illegal rule, suspension of Parliament, imprisonment

of political people, ill-treatment of foreign nationals with indignities heaped upon
them; there is total lack of observance of all diplomatic courtesies - there has been
no response whatsoever, either from the permanent mission attached to the United
Nations or from the Congolese Government, in regard to all these matters. And
then, again, there is the opposition offered by Belgium on the one hand, and now
by Mobutu's troops on the other, to the forces of the United Nations. They have
presently challenged the United Nations and are pressing the situation. This is not
a challenge merely to our dignity, but really a challenge to the authority and
prestige of the United Nations which, if it is lost in Africa, would be one of the
great calamities of our time, and would be reflected in the rest of the world.
Then came the next thing: the Government of the Congo is now apparently in the
hands of what is called a College of Commissioners. These Commissioners are,
apparently, students or ex-students who are selected, I suppose, because they are
young people who never had authority before; they would like to exercise that
authority. It is not for us to decide whether the Congolese should have students
running their Government; that is up to them. But it is our business to see that it
is under constitutional authority, thus, in accordance with law and civilised
practice.
These young people are usually guided by their teachers who are Belgians, so in
fact it is the Belgians who are the College of Commissioners, and Mr. Dayal also
reports that in many cases they give contradictory orders and opinions and create
a great deal of trouble. I regret that the young generation in the Congo, on whom
rests the future of that country, has been dragged into party politics and made to
do the bidding of party politicians who are self-seeking.
In a recent case, with regard to the orders to occupy the base at Kitona, these
orders were given by the district commissioners. I would like to ask, Mr.
Secretary-General, how, even if these commissioners were legally appointed, a
national action of this kind is taken by local officials? The occupation of the
Kitona base, as far as I can see, was the subject of an agreement or understanding
between the United Nations and the then Congolese authorities, and even if this
College of Commissioners were legal and competent officials, even then how
does it happen that a municipal authority can deal with an international body like
the United Nations, as is now happening? That is more evidence of the anarchy
that is now going on.
We come now to the more serious situation in this matter apart from the Belgian
occupation to which I have partly referred and that is the position of Mobutu
himself. The Secretary-General has been good enough to inform the Security
Council that Colonel Mobutu would not be able to function in the way he has
been doing unless he has outside assistance. This is a fact that the Secretary-
General has put before the Security Council and it is a matter of great
significance.
On November 2, 1960, in the report of the Special Representative, it is stated:

"The coup of the ANC Chief of Staff..." - and is it right for us to deal with one
who has usurped power in this manner? - "had introduced a new factor adding to
the complexity of the situation... the eruption of the army into the political scene
constituted a new menace to peace and security..." I want to lay stress on these
words, "to peace and security", because the arguments that I am going to submit
to you in the resolution are largely based upon that, "a new menace to peace and
security." It is the United Nations position, that there is a menace to peace and
security in the Congo; this is by Belgian aggression, and Mobutu is a menace to
peace and security.
In Leopoldville, the principal centre of political activity in the Congo, a state of

terror has been introduced threatening a paralysis of life in the community. The
young men, the College of Commissioners, were invariably accompanied by
numerous Belgian advisers, as a rule drawn from among their own teachers. The
inevitable consequence was that the commissioners were more inclined to listen
to their own mentors than to listen to the United Nations consultants, who in
many ministries found a wall of opposition building up against them. Indeed,
instead of co-operating with the United Nations technical aid mission, the
commissioners actually set themselves up in opposition to it. In the latest
communication of Mr. Dayal you will find the same thing repeated.
NOW WE COME TO THE POSITION IN REGARD TO THE

CONSTITUTION. As the representative of the United States mentioned in the
Security Council, there are only two constitutional authorities - I am not agreeing
- in the Congo; one was the President and the other was Parliament. Presumably
Parliament includes the Government. He went on to say that one of them is
extinct; therefore, only the President remains. That surely is the way of all
dictatorships. Destroy all opposition and say, "I am the State." That is the
position. Therefore, the rule of Mr. Kasavubu - apart from Mr. Mobutu and the
men lower down on the ladder - is an unvarnished and unashamed dictatorship,
and here is the evidence if you want it. On the evening of September 5, 1960, the
Chief of State, in a declaration broadcast on the national radio, proclaimed in
effect that the Prime Minister had betrayed his office by provoking discord within
the Government, depriving citizens of their fundamental liberties and plunging the
country into fratricidal civil war. He therefore revoked the Government with
immediate effect and named the President of the Senate, Mr. Joseph Ileo, to form
a new Government. He asked the United Nations to assure peace and order; that is
to say, having usurped power he expected the United Nations to police his
usurpation. That is in fact what is happening!
During the same evening the Prime Minister spoke three times to the population
indicating the President was no longer Chief of State and calling upon the people
and the workers and the army to rise. That is to say, they have already got a state
of civil war.
In the face of an imminent breakdown of law and order, with a civil war already
under way in parts of the country, and with a clear threat to the United Nations
Force in their function of maintaining peace and security, the Prime Minister that
night called for a closing of all major ports to traffic of the United Nations. That
is to say, they have taken action hostile to the United Nations. They have taken
people into custody and they have threatened to use force. They have given
ultimatums to certain people in other contexts.
What we are saying is this: the situation having reached its present state, it is now
necessary for the United Nations to govern or get out.
Also during the night 5 September the Council of Ministers published a

communiqué declaring the Chief of State deprived of all his functions; so we have
a situation where one cancels the other out. I will not go into the background of
this situation, but I will come to the position of Mr. Kasavubu himself. I think
there are many here who are temperamentally and, I think, in a sense
constitutionally legitimists in their thinking, that here is a Head of State
universally recognised. Up to a point this is true. But the recognition of a
constitutional Head of State requires the observance of the constitution and here I
commend particularly to my African colleagues, Mr. Kasavubu's statement on
November 16, 1960, which stated:
"The institutions given to the Congo by the Loi fondamentale are not in
keeping with the sociological and political realities of the country."
In other words, this is a polite way of saying that the African is not fit to have
parliamentary government. For that reason the local authorities of the Republic of
the Congo wish these institutions to be modified, with due regard to the unity and
territorial integrity of the Congo and taking into account the defects of the
fundamental law and experience of the months which have passed since the
promulgation of independence.
"The problem is an institutional one. It can only be solved by the

Congolese authorities guided by the wishes of the people."
The only snag in this is neither the people nor the Congolese authorities apart
from Mr. Kasavubu and his creatures do not exist, or it may be that Mr. Kasavubu
himself is at times not so independent.
Therefore, the position is this: Mr. Kasavubu says the Loi fondamentale is not in
keeping with sociological conditions. In other words, he wants to rewrite the
constitution. What happens to the sanctity of the constitution if every President
also wants to do that? That is another way of saying, "Well, I like power; I do not
like any limitations on it, so I shall put it away."
One of the contentions which must be refuted is that the closure of Parliament was
not high-handed. Mr. Kasavubu has said that Parliament was not closed in a high-
handed way. Says he, "the chief physical difficulty preventing the assembly of
Parliament is that a state of disorder, fomented by the supporters of Mr.
Lumumba, deters members of the provinces from returning to Leopoldville." I
am quite prepared to say, for argument’s sake that Mr. Lumumba may also have
behaved in that way, but that does not mean that Parliament should not meet.
"...This difficulty will only be solved by so adapting the institutions as to

give more effective guarantees that the rights of the provinces will be
respected ...
"Parliament is certainly competent to control the executive power and, if

need be, deny it confidence. It is not within its power, however, to restore
to the Government on the demand of the Prime Minister, a prerogative of
which it has been stripped;" - if you can understand the meaning of this
sentence, well, you must be a genius - "and even if it had that power it
could only be subject to authorisation by the majority required when a new
Government appears before both Houses of Parliament. In other words, a
two-thirds majority."
Mr. Lumumba asserts that he is Prime Minister by virtue of a parliamentary

decision, which decision is attacked as illegal by Mr. Kasavubu on three counts;
that is, he questions the legality of Mr. Lumumba's position. Mr. Kasavubu
contends that it constituted an abuse of power and that it was taken by the threat
of armed force, the necessary majority of votes not having been obtained. He said
that the vote was 60 to 19. This, of course, would total 79. In the Senate it
totalled to 43.
I want to say here that it has been contended that these votes are 19 votes short of
the required majority. This, in fact, is not true, because I looked at the Congolese
constitution, and it says "two-thirds of those present and voting." And this is
more than two-thirds of those present and voting. Therefore, the boot is on the
other foot.
This is the constitutional position, although I really doubt it, because there is
nothing in this except the sheer wish on the part of Kasavubu to govern just as he
likes. I am putting it euphemistically; I do not think he has the power to do so.
THEREFORE, WE COME TO THE PROBLEM OF WHAT SHOULD BE

DONE. We have set forth our position in this matter in the draft resolution
[A/L.331] which is before you.
Firstly, we think that it is necessary in the conditions of the Congo that there
should be created a new atmosphere, by putting a brake on terrorism and by
leaving it to the United Nations to assist in the maintenance of law and order and
to prevent acts of aggression. It should prevent the threat to peace and security
and it should fulfil the mandate containing the implications to which the
Secretary-General has referred. We must then enforce it by opening the doors of
the houses of detention where these people are.
After all, there are 20,000 troops in the Congo, and if disciplined troops cannot
take effective action against irregulars, then there must be something wrong
somewhere, and I would not like to say any more. If there are 20,000 disciplined
troops under an effective command, they should not be hit in the face by the
irregulars called the Congolese Army. I do not apologise for saying this, because
this lawless rabble, these murderous units that are called the Congolese Army,
have been committing atrocities and have been heaping indignities upon
diplomatic officials. I am authorised by my Government to say that they have
never seen anything of this kind before, even in times of war. If those things can
happen, either the Belgians are running the show for the Congolese Army or the
United Nations forces are not doing their job; and I would not like to say that,
because I do not know.
Therefore, the doors of these houses of detention, wherever they are, should be
opened and these political personalities, of one persuasion or another - more
particularly, members of Parliament and Government officials and others who are
highly respected members of the community - must be released. If they are
released, there may be some trouble, but that is a part of the democratic system.
However, unless these people are released, it is not possible to take any steps
forward.
Secondly, as my Prime Minister has repeatedly said, and which I am asked to

repeat again, there is no half-way house in this matter. The Parliament of the
Congo must be convened. If it is necessary that this must be done under the
authority that exists, according to the representative of the United States, in the
President, who is the only one that is left, then the United Nations and those who
are responsible for giving him his present prestige must persuade him to
reconvene Parliament. Somehow or other he must put his signature on the calling
of Parliament; that is all there is to it.
If necessary, the United Nations must offer protective custody required. This
would not be the first time that the United Nations has called upon countries to act
in a custodial capacity. The Secretary-General well knows that even before his
time we were called upon, in very difficult circumstances, to exercise custodial
duties over people who far more effectively resisted and protested and who were
more capable of making trouble - such as in the case of Korea - and those
custodial duties were carried out, and in the whole course of our troubles only
three men lost their lives. Therefore, if the United Nations has to assert its
authority, it must do so; and the custodial duties must be exercised in such a
fashion that the members of Parliament will be able to come to the Parliament and
function freely and satisfactorily and, if necessary, add to the neutralisation of any
area.
I am quite certain that this Assembly will endorse any course of action of this
kind, which will prevent civil war and which will rescue Africa from the blood
bath that will follow. Let me be quite clear about it. All of these fine phrases will
disappear, because the greater part of this area, thanks to imperialist rule, has been
left neglected, without a system for the administration of law to assist it. I am not
talking about this, meaning thereby that the place is savage, or anything like that,
but there has been so much administrative neglect under imperial rule that if tribal
or fratricidal war should break out it would be the most sanguinary thing that ever
happened. Taking that in to account, I am quite sure that the large number of
African representatives in the Assembly, with their great influence, will urge the
Assembly, to support any action that would facilitate the meeting of the members
of Parliament, the neutralising of any area and the preventing of unauthorised
troops, such as those of Colonel Mobutu, from interfering with them. After all, if
Colonel Mobutu is the only one that is "strong," it should not be difficult for
20,000 United Nations troops to deal with him.
Thirdly, we would say that, once this Parliament has met, we should be in a better
position to say that the Congolese must decide their affairs themselves. At the
present moment it is not the Congolese; it is the Belgians and a few people in the
Congo who have emerged powerful out of a coup d’etat.
The draft resolution that is now before you, and which has been put forward by
several countries, including ours, is a humble attempt at pointing out that the
mandate contained in the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions -
and I have carefully read these backwards and forwards - is entirely adequate for
our purpose... The Secretary-General, in referring to my contention about
changed conditions, said that he somewhat agreed with this pragmatic view so far
as there was no change in principle, and turned around and asked if it is not true
that conditions had changed in these ways and is it also not true that conditions
affect the positions of personalities. I suppose the implication is, "Can we set the
same stock today in regard to the members of the previous Government who were
sanctified, as previously, by Parliament?" What does the Secretary-General
himself say? He says "changed conditions, without sacrifice of principle". In this
regard, the principle here is the constitutional authority. Therefore, I have the
good authority of the Secretary-General in feeling that these changed conditions
justify vigorous action, which action has been asked for by the Security Council
and the General Assembly time after time.
I refer the Assembly to Article 14 of the Charter, under which we are operating.
Every time I have come to this rostrum and have quoted the Charter I have always
submitted that the Charter must be conceived as one instrument. You cannot treat
it in isolation. The Charter must be treated as an entire document. Article 14
reads:
"Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may

recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation,
regardless of origin."
The words that are important here are "situation" and "regardless of origin." We
are not dealing here with an international "dispute." We are dealing with a
situation which exists in the Congo, and the Charter has been very careful to
provide for such situations. It says "regardless of origin." Therefore, it does not
matter whether it is an international war, or the war of the Belgians upon the
Congo byway of aggression, which the Secretary-General has testified to or
whether it is a war that arises from a fratricidal conflict. No matter what, it must
be deemed to impair, the "general welfare" also mentioned in the Charter. That is
the definition: "any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair
the general welfare..."
What is "general welfare”? It does not refer to welfare as between nations.
General welfare can only be construed in its natural meaning, the welfare of the
generality of the people. The Charter, at the beginning, says, "We the peoples of
the United Nations". They are the people who formulated the Charter and,
therefore, when the welfare of the people of the Congo as a whole is affected, the
provisions of the Charter come into play. The Article goes on to refer to
"situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter
setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." My delegation
submits that there has been a violation of the provisions of the Charter in regard to
its Purposes and Principles. Therefore, I would request that we again look at the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter in Chapter I, where it states: "...to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace" - and there is no question about a threat to peace, apart from the facts that
stare us in the face - "and for the suppression of acts of aggression." If the Belgian
authorities are still there in the panoply of their military power, then the
suppression of acts of such aggression is required.
Article 1 goes on to refer to "other breaches of the peace," and this Assembly
would like to know from the Secretary-General whether, if Mobutu's forces
commit an act of aggression against the United Nations, that is not a breach of the
peace.
These are the purposes of the Charter which are covered by Article 14. Therefore,
so far as my Government is concerned, we do not think there is anything in this
that requires any particular modification or about which there is need to refrain
from necessary action. On the other hand, it is necessary that we should take
action in order to deal with this position.
So that the authority of my Government may be introduced into this argument

without room for doubt, I should like to read another extract from a statement my
Prime Minister made only a few days ago:
"It just seems to me be a very extraordinary state of affairs for the United
Nations Mission. If they cannot function properly, well, they are doing
more harm than good. Now, as I said, I do not want them to go away. I
think that would be fatal but I do think that they should be made to
function properly; they should be given authority by the Security Council,
and there should be no vagueness or shilly-shallying about this question as
there has been."
He points out that he cannot understand the doubts about the legality of this
question. He went on to say:
"Looking at this matter apart from the question of our nationals being
there and even apart from the fact that much has been done by the United
Nations which has not seemed to us to be right, I think it would be a
disaster if the United Nations Mission were to be withdrawn. It would
really be defeat, a confession of defeat, and an act of despair and it would
leave the Congo to go up in flames affecting the whole of Africa and
certainly affecting international affairs very greatly and intimately.
"It is obvious that the United Nations can only remain there if they can
function properly; they cannot remain there just for some little
humanitarian work which they are doing well, and just to bolster up some
odd regime or some odd party there and to carry out their orders.
"But two or three things stand out. One is that in this welter there is not
much law and order left in the Congo. There is no real government
authority functioning except in some local areas where a bit of the army is
present. The army itself is completely undisciplined and ill-disciplined,
and does more or less what it chooses."
He goes to say that:
"... persons coming in by illegal means cannot assume a legal garb. Now,
Colonel Mobutu appointed a number of students from college as a
Commission to carry on the government of the country, and where is the
authority for this?"
There is much more I could have quoted to the General Assembly if I had the
time, but it is not necessary.
THEREFORE, IN ALL HUMILITY, I COMMEND THIS DRAFT

RESOLUTION, which I have been asked by the sponsors to present to the
Assembly. In explaining this draft resolution, I will not go through the preamble
in great detail. It is based on previous resolutions passed by the Assembly and by
the Security Council. If refers to the "grave and ominous developments and
continuing deterioration in the Congo." These are mild words. The "grave and
ominous situation" is the situation of the ominous prospect of a blood bath in
Africa, a challenge to the position of the United Nations in Africa, the possibility
of an international conflict and, what is more, a fall in the prestige of the United
Nations in the world, which would be harmful to the cause of humanity,
especially at the present time when the world must proceed to disarm if it is to
survive.
Secondly, we say that the deterioration continues, because just before this meeting
was called came - I will not call it a tragic climax yet - the position where the
United Nations forces themselves are opposed by force by Mobutu's troops. The
draft resolution goes on to say:
"Noting with grave concern the hostile attitude and resistance of armed
detachments to the operation of the United Nations in the Congo as
recently reported by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
and also the continuation of lawlessness, violence and continuing
deterioration of the economic situation in the Congo;"
This is what Mr. Hammarskjold referred to the other day, when he said there are
200 deaths every day, there is poverty and suffering, there are refugees
everywhere, and so on. But how can the economic affairs of that country be put
right when there is civil war and when those in authority are shedding blood and
exerting pressure for the purpose of promoting it and the one authority that has
been sent there for this purpose, namely, the United Nations, has desisted from
acting, up to the full, to its mandate? Therefore, the draft resolution continues to
state:
"Conscious of the inescapable and urgent responsibility of the United

Nations both in the interests of the Congo as well as in the interests of
peace and security which stand endangered and for the avoidance of grave
civil war;"
Then we go on to say what we think should be done. The operative paragraphs

state:
"1. Considers that the United Nations must henceforth implement its
mandate fully to prevent breach of peace and security, to restore and
maintain law and order and the inviolability of persons, including United
Nations and diplomatic personnel and property, in accordance with the
Charter and to take urgent measures to assist the people of the Congo in
meeting their most pressing economic needs;
"2. Urges the immediate release of all political prisoner under detention" -
no one can say the sponsors are acting in a partisan way, we say all
political prisoners - "more particularly, members of the Central
Government of the Congo and officials of Parliament and others enjoying
parliamentary immunity;
"3. Urges the immediate convening of Parliament and the taking of

necessary protective measures thereto by the United Nations, including
custodial duties;
"4. Urges that measures be undertaken forthwith to prevent armed units

and personnel in the Congo from any interference in the political life of
the country as well as from obtaining any material or other support from
abroad."
It was the Secretary-General who told us in the Security Council that the army has
entered politics. That creates a new situation. It is called an army only by
courtesy. It is an armed rabble, a lawless lot of people who are offering resistance
to the United Nations, committing pillage and arson, robbing people, stopping
their cars and heaping indignities upon them, and if I were a Congolese, I would
be heartily ashamed, whatever political party I belonged to. Therefore, we say
that these men, the so-called Congolese army, must be disarmed, Mr. Secretary-
General, and there should be no question that if you, as Secretary-General of the
United Nations, have sent out an appeal for the orderly forces of other countries to
come into the Congo, it is not right that they should be thrown into the midst of
these irregular forces. If decent people are invited to a party, people who cannot
observe the dignities of it should not be there. Therefore, we say that this so-
called Congolese army has no function in the Congo in the sense that it is not
maintaining law and order, it is not protecting the United Nations; on the other
hand, it is a promoter of lawlessness. Has not the United Nations in the past acted
against people in Stanleyville? Has it not protected Lumumba against people who
were trying to arrest him in the early days? Therefore, we say there is no better
and more proper course than to disarm this army, confine the men to barracks or
find them other occupations if they are useful individuals. There would be plenty
of technical aid work for them to do.
I submit to the Secretary-General that it is not right to let this "Congolese Army"
endanger peace and prosperity in the Congo. We cannot defend, in our national
legislatures, the idea that men bearing the President’s Commission, men of the
Indian army and women of the Indian nursing services should be exposed to the
indignities in the Congo. We are not among those who would want to withdraw
from there on slight pretexts. More than our dignity, more than our safety, more
than our pride is involved. It is the United Nations which is involved, and we are
entitled to consideration from the Secretary-General, not as an individual, but
because he is the embodiment of our authority and function in this business.
Nations cannot be invited to this undertaking and be expected to remain there,

when the ordinary decencies of civilised societies are not observed. Similarly, no
regular organised army abuses the laws of its country. It would be subject to
military law. Any Indian army personnel in the Congo which commits the
slightest breach of discipline would be severely dealt with, and I give a guarantee
of that on behalf of my Government and on behalf of myself. That has been our
position in Korea and it has been the position everywhere else. Troops have gone
out to the Congo at great sacrifice to themselves, as Mr. Hammarskjold said to
this Assembly a few months ago. It is no joy-ride, it is no picnic to go there, and,
therefore, they must not be asked to shake hands with disorder.
I say that the members of this so-called Congolese army are a mob of irregulars or
guilty of offences and crimes, who have committed havoc, who have heaped
indignities upon people. Those among them who are decent should be enlisted in
the United Nations Force. Others should be enlisted to drive trucks and do other
work, and the rest of them should be disarmed and confined to barracks. We
should like to know why those people who were at one time confined to barracks
have now been released.
You may say that this is strong language. But then, we are facing a situation in
the Congo which may set the world in flames. I think the United Nations must
wake up to this responsibility and must stand fully behind the authority of the
Secretary-General in taking strong action. The Organisation is not weak. This
Organisation was strong enough even before the new admissions took place.
Now it is even stronger because 178 million people, including the people of
Congo, are represented here. We are doing service to the Congolese people by
taking this position. We are in the Congo for their service and not in order to
inflict what one representative said was a kind of joint imperialism. We in India
know enough about the nature of imperialism; nobody can teach us anything
about the ways of imperialism.
We have come to a situation now when every Congolese, whatever might have
been his political persuasion in the past, particularly the young men, must set his
heart and mind to it and must make the sacrifice of coming forward so the law and
order, the authority of the United Nations, the cause of peace and the ideas of
liberty in their own country, might prevail by their co-operation, for the
maintenance peace and security in the world. That should be their primary
concern and not the occupation of any place of seeming glory or power.
We once again affirm that the mandate that has been given to the Secretary-
General is adequate for the purpose. Unless the United Nations Command shakes
itself up for this purpose, there will be more and more grievous situations, and no
good will come out of them. What we do not do today, with comparatively limited
resources, limited sacrifices and limited harshness and unpleasantness, will have
to be done later with much greater sacrifices, harshness and unpleasantness.
We are not a country that cries out for the use of force. We are not a country that
wants to trample upon law. We are proud of our sovereignty, as you are all well
aware. We shall guard against any intruder. But here we are not trampling down
on the sovereignty of a country; we are protecting the authority of the Charter of
the United Nations. We are seeking to support such measures as will rescue this
great land of Africa, with its tremendous resources and potentialities, where,
largely owing to the impact of the public opinion organised through the United
Nations, after ages and ages of servitude and slavery, countries have come into
emancipation. We from Asia are the people who are deeply shocked and grieved.
Those of you who come from Africa, from whatever State it might be, whatever
your past might have been, whatever your present associations are; there cannot
be one African in this Assembly who is not moved to shame and concern by the
situation that has arisen, and who would not want to throw his weight on the side
of the observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. This is
my submission.
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly December 19,
1960.54
[In this speech, Mr. Menon replied to statements by the delegates of Belgium,
Canada, Congo (Leopoldville) and the United Kingdom, and dealt with the
Anglo-American draft resolution as well as the revisions to the non-aligned
draft resolution sponsored by India. Only the last part of the statement is
reproduced here.]
The Anglo-American draft resolution has all the appearances of reasonableness.

With great respect, I would say that it is extremely well drafted. It may convey
the impression that it could accomplish something. But we shall not abstain from
the vote on the draft resolution. I am authorised in this respect to speak for all
those delegations which have co-sponsored the other draft resolution with us. We
do not take this position because the Anglo-American draft resolution is another
draft resolution, but because its purpose is different and its effect will be to
encourage the forces of civil war in the Congo, and ultimately to lead to what Mr.
Hammarskjold has characterised as a Spanish war situation.
The second preambular paragraph of the Anglo-American draft resolution begins

with the words "Noting with anxiety." Now, if one notes with anxiety one must
do something about it; otherwise it becomes a vague and escapist statement. The
paragraph reads: "Noting with anxiety the continued existence of unsettled
conditions in various parts of the Republic of the Congo..." We should like the
Assembly to take particular notice of the words "unsettled conditions in various
parts of the Republic of the Congo." Now, that is no description of what is
happening in the Congo. There is a state of anarchy, there is no authority, it is not
just a disturbance here or there. The paragraph continues: "which have involved
acts of lawlessness and of violence against persons of both Congolese and non-
Congolese nationality, including personnel of the United Nations."
That is what we have always said, and we agree with that statement. But it should
be understood that in the context of this draft resolution it looks as though the so-
called authorities of the Congo have nothing to do with the disturbances there and
the acts of lawlessness against people of Congolese and non-Congolese
nationality. Our contention, however, is that what should be noted with anxiety is
that the people who are in so-called authority in the Congo are promoting these
disturbances and acts of lawlessness and are responsible for them. According to
Mr. Dayal’s report, this aggression has been committed by the Congolese army
against the United Nations troops.
54 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
1449-65
Therefore, the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution is entirely
misleading...
We then come to the third paragraph of the preamble to the Anglo-American draft
resolution. That paragraph reads:
"Mindful of the obligations and responsibilities assumed by the United

Nations to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order for
the purpose of securing the maintenance of international peace and
security, and of safeguarding civil liberties and the political independence
and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo."
Now, I would say that that wording goes very much further towards interfering in
the internal affairs and reducing this to an international issue than anything we say
in our text. It talks about safeguarding civil liberties in the Congo. That is a very
desirable thing, but, of course, civil liberties cannot be safeguarded in a country
without interfering in that country’s internal affairs. The paragraph also talks
about "international peace and security." I have been very careful to quote Mr.
Hammarskjold strictly accurately, and he has never used the words "international
peace and security" in connection with this question; he has always said "peace
and security" - and there is a distinction.
Thus, this rather generously worded draft resolution should not mislead anyone. It
just leaves things turning in the air and does not get us anywhere.
The fourth paragraph of the preamble reads: "Recognising that the

aforementioned obligations and responsibilities are still an urgent United Nations
concern" - we all agree with that - "and that all necessary action should be
taken..." But who decides what is necessary action? And why should there be
objections when other people ask that necessary action should be taken? Is not the
release of prisoners necessary action? Is not the restoration of Parliament
necessary action? Is it not necessary action to stop having truck with a private
army? So again we have a misleading, escapist clause in this draft resolution.
We then come to the operative paragraphs. Paragraph 1 reads:
"Requests the Secretary-General to continue to discharge the mandate

entrusted to him by the United Nations in accordance with the resolutions
of the Security Council and the General Assembly referred to above..."
We entirely agree with that; it is exactly what we have said. Therefore, there can
be no objection to our draft resolution in that respect. Paragraph 1 goes on:
"and to continue to use the presence and the machinery of the United
Nations to assist the Republic of the Congo in the restoration and
maintenance of law and order throughout its territory."
I should like to make two observations in that respect. This operative paragraph
asks that the presence and the machinery of the United Nations - and this includes
the military machinery, because the bulk of the United Nations machinery in the
Congo is military - assist the Republic of the Congo. I suppose that "the Republic
of the Congo" here means the authorities of the Congo. Now, how can we help
them to restore law and order when they are the law-breakers, when they are
using illegal authority?
Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution reads:
"Further requests the Secretary-General to continue his vigorous efforts to

ensure that no foreign military or paramilitary personnel are introduced
into the Congo or are in the Congo in violation of the pertinent resolutions
of the Security Council and resolution 1474(ES-IV) of the General
Assembly."
Unless he applies the relevant provisions of the Charter, how is the Secretary-
General to prevent the entry of military or paramilitary personnel? We raised that
question in the Advisory Committee. The only way to prevent personnel from
being introduce is for States members of the United Nations not to indulge in
intervention, or for the United Nations forces to be able to control egress and
ingress to prevent people from coming in, to take over the responsibility of
issuing permits and of regulating entry into the territory. Therefore, what is asked
for in the paragraph appears to be much more than what we are asking for. The
Secretary-General is to take vigorous action particularly with regard to the
introducing of new personnel, according to this paragraph of the Anglo-American
draft resolution. But what about all those things that are already in the Congo?
What about the nine tons of Belgian weapons, Mr. Secretary-General? Is that also
included in this paragraph?
We then come to operative paragraph 3, which:
"Calls upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of
arms or other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance
for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military
assistance through the United Nations..."
Again, on the face of it this does not appear to be at all harmful. If conditions
were different, if there was an agreed position about those who are operating in
the Congo, and so forth, one could understand this provision. But, as I have
stated, at the present moment there is a large quantity of Belgian arms inside the
Congo, the Congolese authorities are maintaining an army - wherever the funds
come from - and there is all this intervention. In such conditions the mere
operation of paragraph 3 would catch the situation at a point of disadvantage to
one side inside the Congo itself. And that would lead to what has been called a
Spanish war situation - that is, the United Nations would be used to hold the ring
against those who might be training to resist aggression. We are not suggesting
that arms should come in freely and that civil war should be promoted. But, in our
opinion, the adoption of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the Anglo-American
draft resolution would be a weighted decision.
Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution:
"Requests the Secretary-General... to do everything possible to assist the

Chief of State of the Republic of the Congo in establishing conditions in
which Parliament can meet and function in security and freedom from
outside interference."
In all conscience I want to ask whether Mr. Kasavubu illegally suspended

Parliament, beyond the authority conferred by the Loi fondamentale, because
there was interference from outside? Who were the interference from outside?
Did any of the power blocs interfere? Did the Belgians interfere? Did the United
Nations interfere? There was no interference from outside at all. President
Kasavubu himself has said - I read out the passage in question the other day - that
in the existing sociological and political conditions these institutions were not
suitable and so he had changed them.
So there is no question of the Secretary-General going to the assistance of the

Congo unless, of course, he is going to undertake some ideological training and
convince Kasavubu that there is nothing peculiar in the biological or ethnological
make-up of the Africans, or the Asians, or the Swedes, or the Norwegians, which
makes them fit or unfit for these institutions. Therefore operative paragraph 4
again is totally misleading and is barking up the wrong tree.
Then we have all this about the violation of human rights in the Republic of the
Congo, which operative paragraph 5 says is "inconsistent with the purposes that
guide the United Nations action in the Congo" and goes on to say that no
measures "contrary to recognised rules of law and order will be taken... against
any person held prisoner." Now this is exactly what we have been saying; release
everybody who has been detained, but in the speech made on behalf of the
resolution itself it is said that we cannot say this about the release of prisoners
because that would be interference. The paragraph goes on to request the
Secretary-General to continue his efforts to assist the Republic of the Congo -
whatever that means - in ensuring respect and so on. If it means the whole
territory of the State, it must include even those who are at present held in prison,
who are non-political, everybody - if it means the authorities, then as I said before
it is the authorities that are not giving respect to the rules of civil and human
rights within the country.
Operative paragraph 6 is about the International Committee of the Red Cross. I

confess I am surprised at the appearance of this paragraph. I will not here repeat
the phrase that is sometimes mentioned in the United Nations lobby about "aspirin
solutions", that is, send a couple of aspirins and everyone will be happy. I am not
saying that the Committee of the International Red Cross is not good. It is an
organisation mentioned in the Geneva Conventions and should be allowed to
operate, but we have had the instance where, in the case of the prisoners in
Stanleyville, we wanted reports from the International Red Cross but when we
asked the Congolese authorities to allow the International Red Cross to visit their
prisoners, the Prime Minister included, we did not get any answer. Now how can
the supporters of the present administration and the present arrangements... say
that they express the hope that the International Committee of the Red Cross will
be allowed and so on when even in a small matter they have not been able to get
through?
Finally, there is the question of the round table conference. Here again is a word
that sounds so nice; a round table conference means a conference of persons
holding opposing views, but who is to sit round the round table? If it is a question
of the reconciliation of Mobutu and Kasavubu and any other aspirants in regard to
particular problems, it is another matter, but over and above that the round table
conference is going to be called by the President who is himself a party to the
dispute. Therefore any attempt at mediation in this matter must either be carried
on with the aid of the contending parties or by the Secretary-General. I would
therefore say that this round table conference is one in name only. It is not a
conciliation conference and to call upon the General Assembly to support the
partisan attempt of one side is gross interference not only in the internal affairs
but in the squabbles that are going on and to take sides in them.
Now that I have said that, people may say that this is a destructive approach to the
matter, but you know that you cannot build unless you first destroy, and this draft
resolution is a roadblock to progress, it will mislead the General Assembly...
NOW WE COME TO THE EIGHT-POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION

[A/L.331/Rev.1]. There are two new paragraphs in the revision and some of my
co-sponsors have asked to speak about them fully. In regard to the draft resolution
itself, we understand that it has been said that in this draft resolution we and the
other sponsors are against the Charter and that we have called for illegalities. My
delegation would like to ask our colleagues where, if they take each of these
paragraphs, they can point out a single illegality. In fact, there is no request in it
for any specific measure; that is left to the Secretary-General, and since the
Secretary-General has told us he will not do it, we can be sure there will be no
illegality.
Let us take each one of these paragraphs. The first preambular paragraph recalls
the previous resolutions, and there is nothing illegal about recalling previous
resolutions. The second preambular paragraph goes on to speak of the grave and
ominous developments and continuing deterioration in the Congo, the prevalence
of anarchic conditions and the absence of authority. All this was said by Mr.
Ormsby-Gore55 in his speech and therefore this cannot be characterised as illegal.
The third preambular paragraph notes with grave concern the hostile attitude and
resistance of armed detachments to the operation of the United Nations as recently
reported by the Special Representative. If that statement is illegal, impractical or
undesirable, then I think the report submitted by the Special Representative falls
in the same category. All these facts are lifted from United Nations documents.
Then we go on to say that we are conscious of the inescapable and urgent

responsibility of the United Nations both in the interests of the Congo as well as
in the interests of peace and security. We have not said international peace and
security. We say that peace and security are endangered and we seek to avoid
civil war. I am sure the General Assembly will not consider that there is any
illegality in referring to that.
If there is any illegality, it can only be in the operative part of the resolution and I
therefore invite the General Assembly’s attention to operative paragraph 1. The
paragraph reads: "Considers that the United Nations must henceforth implement
its mandate fully to prevent breach of peace and security..." etc. There is no need
for me to read the whole of this, but is there anything illegal in saying that the
mandate must be implemented more fully, and ultimately to the fullest extent that
may become necessary in the restoration and maintenance of law and order, the
inviolability of diplomatic personnel and so on? These are in accordance with the
Charter, how can they be illegal?
Operative paragraph 2 "urges" the immediate release, "urges" - it does not say go
and open up the jails - "of political prisoners under detention, more particularly
those enjoying parliamentary immunity." Operative paragraph 3 "urges" the
convening of Parliament. In the Secretary-General’s statement of today, and in a
statement of the United Kingdom, it has been said that all steps possible should be
taken in order to bring about the convening of Parliament. Therefore, urging the
immediate convening of Parliament and the taking of all necessary protective
measures of the United Nations, including custodial duties, is part of the purpose
under the Security Council resolution aimed at maintaining law and order. What
is more, protective measures have been undertaken in the past, in the case of the
Austrian ambulance. There are custodial duties, because they have put a
protective ring around the whole place, keeping Mr. Lumumba from being
attacked by other people. Therefore there is nothing in operative paragraph 3 that
is illegal.
Operative paragraph 4 urges that measures be taken forthwith to prevent armed

units and other personnel from interfering in the political life of country and from
obtaining support from abroad. I will challenge anybody to point out whether any
55 David Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
words in this are contrary to the resolutions of the Security Council or to the
sentiments or the interpretations of the Secretary-General himself. There is
nothing illegal in paragraph 4.
Operative paragraph 5 draws the attention of the Government of Belgium to its

grave responsibilities in regard to the resolutions of the United Nations. This, I
believe, is already Charter practice; if there is any default, attention is drawn to it,
and there is no interference in the sovereignty of Belgium. It is a paragraph which
merely draws attention to something.
Operative paragraph 6 deals with the withdrawal of Belgian military and quasi-
military personnel and refers to the repeated pledges given by the Belgian
Government itself. This also is part of our history.
Then come the two new paragraphs, which require some explanation.
Operative paragraph 7 suggests that a Standing Delegation - we will not call it an

advisory commission, because it is not certain what functions it should perform
and we do not want to confuse it with the Advisory Committee which meets here
- representing the General Assembly and appointed by it should function in full
co-operation with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in the Congo.
The Delegation should be composed of representatives considered by the General
Assembly itself as specially qualified to advise on the United Nations operations
in the Congo. This evening the Secretary-General made a statement in which he
said that the responsibility should be shared, that there must be interpretation,
there must be watchfulness, this, that and the other and it appears to me that this is
either intelligent anticipation or perhaps more. At any rate, there is nothing illegal
in the stationing of a Standing Delegation in the Congo to advise the United
Nations authorities who are interpreting a rather vague resolution.
Therefore, we submit that is a very helpful suggestion and also it points to the fact
that the sponsors of the resolution are not disregarding the United Nations. They
are stating that the work should be done within the competence of the United
Nations itself. In view of the statement made by the Secretary-General about
technical assistance and so on, operative paragraph 8:
"Recommends that all necessary economic and technical assistance should

be afforded to the Congo through the United Nations by member States
promptly so that such assistance be not used as an instrument of a channel
for continuing foreign intervention."
There are two ideas: one that we must give assistance; secondly, in the form of
assistance intervention should not take place.
The Secretary-General rightly asks: is it right for us to be asked for the

withdrawal of Belgian technical personnel when there is no one else to perform
the tasks which they should perform? My delegation has not said at any time that
technical personnel of any particular nationality should be excluded. There had
been a request, I believe, by the Government of Lumumba and by Kasavubu - an
original request made to us - that no troops belonging to the great Powers be sent,
and only non-committed nations should be sent. That was not our request. Now,
the Belgian nationals and the Belgian Government raised the question, as was
stated yesterday: Is it wrong to give assistance to these people who are in such
need of it?
I refer to Article 25 of the United Nations Charter which states: "The members of
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter". And the Security Council has
asked for this assistance in this way.
Then there is Article 49 which states: "The members of the United Nations shall
join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by
the Security Council."
The Secretary-General’s contention is that such personnel are required - and there
is no doubt that they are required... Is it not right for us to expect that these very
Belgian personnel who are personnel of a member State of the United Nations,
should be placed at the disposal of the United Nations? Why should they function
differently, especially having regard to the things that have happened? We cannot
compel them, but there are Articles 25 and 49 which place upon them the duty,
and therefore our right to ask for it. Therefore, all this assistance should be
channelled. Now, I have finished explaining the resolution.
I hope that my lack of capacity to persuade or to convey the import of what I am

saying will not minimise from the importance of this matter. We have now
reached a situation in the Congo where it definitely looks that unless we take
bold, determined and wise action, it will be the parting of the ways.
MY PRIME MINISTER, SPEAKING IN PARLIAMENT, has repeatedly stated

that the withdrawal of the United Nations from the Congo would be a great
tragedy. It would lead to civil war in the Congo, and it would disturb the
conditions in Africa. It may lead to other things. He said also that it might be a
blow to the prestige of the United Nations - not in a small way and for its capacity
to function properly.
So, everybody is agreed that the withdrawal of the United Nations from this
mission would be a highly regrettable event with great consequences. But, at the
same time, we have to look at the fact that already six countries have announced
the withdrawal of their forces; some of them have taken them already - and they
are not six small countries with small contingents; all are Asian and African
countries; all are members of the so-called uncommitted States. There are others
remaining, and while I would not like to mention them either by name, my
Government is aware of the thinking in these countries.
We stand, Mr. Secretary-General, in situation where the United Nations might be

carrying very grave responsibilities, without either the capacity for its
implementation or where their very withdrawal might be a disapproval of a trend
of policy. My own Government is committed to giving assistance at the request of
the Secretary-General in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions. I am sure
Mr. Hammarskjold will bear out the fact that to the best of our capacity we have
offered this, perhaps not liberally, but to the best of our ability and certainly
promptly. My Prime Minister has announced in Parliament that their withdrawal
would not be a matter of casual or hasty decision, but at the same time, as
becomes a democratic Prime Minister, he has told the Houses of Parliament that
in certain circumstances there would be no option for them but to withdraw.
I make the following observation, particularly for the ear of some delegations,
that the part they are pursuing in submitting to this Assembly a resolution which
would have exactly the adverse effect of what I assume they intend, should not be
taken casually. I request them therefore not to press it and vote for the resolution
which we have submitted. The present situation has arisen because the Security
Council could come to no decision. There are also some people who - not like
Indonesia which had not announced their withdrawal at that time, but had been
contemplating it - are in the same position, and whose views are not publicly
known; but I believe the Secretary-General has some idea of what is likely to
happen...
In these circumstances even though one may be accused of lack of humility, I

would submit to the authors of this draft resolution, with whom we have very
intimate relations - and, speaking for myself, whose bona fides I do not distrust -
that they take into account that the introduction of these proposals at this late
stage, which bear a superficial resemblance to what we ourselves propose, but
contain a joker in them, an element which makes them entirely unacceptable.
And if they were not different from what we have submitted, they should not have
been submitted. The resemblance is only superficial.
We have now reached the situation in the Congo where the United Nations must
function either vigorously, as stated by the draft resolution, or, as the Secretary-
General indicated, it may have to consider pulling out.
If the United Nations pulls out then the consequences have to be taken into
account. If the United Nations had not gone there civil war might have taken
place or might not have taken place. Now the position is that, after five months of
intervention, after five months of United Nations presence we have a country
deeply laden with anarchy, where those who have no legal authority function in
authority. In effect, the United Nations holds the ring for illegality. That position
is very serious and, while one expresses it emphatically, I am quite sure the
Secretary-General and responsible members of this Assembly will not take the
view that this is either a note of alarm, or in any way containing some kind of
pressure attitude, but we want to convey to you without making any more
categorical statements that we are on the brink of a situation where, either the
United Nations must face ignominy or perhaps it can retrieve itself as an
Organisation; but it will have failed in the first instance in a great purpose, which
was to enable one of the newly liberated African States to maintain its integrity
and independence and to be able to function as a full member of the United
Nations, and to live in harmony and security with its neighbour States.
This is not purely a Congolese matter, this is not an African matter; this is a world
question. It is a world question just as the Korean War is world question. There
are instances of this kind taking place all over the world. My country gets
involved in these matters because, being a nation uncommitted to the power blocs,
its services, when required, are asked for and we are glad to serve in such ways as
we can. We have now in South East Asia a similar situation, where the projection
of the cold war has already started military action, and if wise counsel does not
prevail one dare not contemplate the consequences.
We must be aware of the fact that the United Nations action leads to two
alternatives. One is that a result of the civil war situation may lead to the Congo
becoming an arena of contending ambitions. Alternatively, as the Secretary-
General has pointed out, it may become a Spanish war situation, meaning thereby
the United Nations, and the uncommitted nations are not required, so other people
might hold the ring in such a way as to freeze the arms that exist in the country
and prevent other arms from going in. Both of these alternatives are catastrophic
positions and history should not be allowed to repeat itself. The Second World
War was preceded by a similar situation in Europe and this time it is in Africa.
My Government takes an extremely serious view of it because we are not among

those who would ask the Assembly to convene, when it has already had a very
heavy agenda, when this matter has been debated time and time again. Our
position is not one of using the Congo situation either to reform the Secretariat or
to castigate this person or that person or to amend the Charter, or anything of that
kind...
Let me say once again that we submit this draft resolution, in all seriousness and I
hope that none of the recriminations that have taken place in the previous debate
or any similar considerations will prevail. I hope that those who are in agreement
with the draft resolution in principle will not find themselves disagreeing with one
word here or one word there and then abstain on this matter. This must go
through and it will be proclaimed to the world that the United Nations mission is
not going to fizzle out, will not be allowed to fizzle out. In the interests of Congo,
in the interests of Africa and in the interest of the world I submit this resolution.
[In this speech, Mr. Menon reviewed in some detail the legal basis of the
United Nations operation in the Congo and the difficulties it encountered,
and introduced a draft resolution for more vigorous action by the United
Nations.]
...it is necessary at this stage to have a look at the problem of the Congo as it faces
the Congolese people, as it faces the United Nations and also, the problems of
world peace and security...
Even at the risk of repetition, one has to go back to this issue, because the position
today is such that, unless we constantly remind ourselves of the circumstances in
which the United Nations became involved in this matter, we are likely to wonder
whether our actions are right or wrong, at whether we should go faster or slower,
or in one direction or another.
Therefore, I refer briefly to this document of July 13, 1960, when the United
Nations was requested by the then Government of the Congo - as to the
legitimacy of which Government there was no doubt whatsoever - to take action.
It was not as though the United Nations was left to decide for itself as to the type
of intervention that should take place, because the Government of the Republic at
that time requested the urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military
assistance...
The document went on to say that this military assistance was asked for by the
Congolese people, and the purpose of this request is totally justified by the
Charter. The second sentence reads:
"This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan

Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between
Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on 29 June 1960."
The document further states:
"Under the terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the
express request of the Congolese Government. No such request was ever
made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo and we therefore
regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our
country."
56 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, Part II,
pages 195-207
We may well be asked whether the United Nations or all of us exercised foresight
in not taking up this question at that time as an act of aggression under Chapter
VII of the Charter. But, then, we can deal with the situation only as it is today.
But so far as the Congolese Government was concerned - and at that time there
was no question as to who was the Government because the telegram was signed
by both Mr. Kasavubu, who is the President of the Republic, and by Mr. Patrice
Lumumba, who was Prime Minister at that time - the document goes on to say
that the cause of the trouble in the Congo is the machinations of the colonial
Government and the attempt to create movements of secession in their own
country challenging the integrity of the Congo; that is to say, it was an attack on
the Congolese people, their independence, their dignity and their integrity.
This Government said at that time that it refused to accept this as an accomplished
fact and submit to the imperialist machination of a small group of Katanga
leaders. Therefore, the request came to us, first of all, because of an act of
aggression. Then there was the fear of dismemberment of the territory and its
effect upon the sovereignty of the country. It was followed by other economic
and social factors. That is one part of it.
The other part, which is highly relevant today, is contained in a document dated
July 29, 1960, where the Secretary-General, in reporting on the implementation of
the Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, set out the agreement reached
between the Republic and the United Nations...
"The Government of the Republic of the Congo states that, in the exercise
of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the
presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will
be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military
assistance from the United Nations..."
Now, so far as the United Nations is concerned, that position has not been altered.
Neither assistance nor military intervention nor the introduction of military
personnel has taken place except in accordance with the previous request.
Therefore, we are entitled to continue to expect this good faith.
"... it likewise states that it will ensure the freedom of movement" - this is
very important at the present time - "of the Force in the interior of the
country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all
personnel associated with the activities of the Force...
"The United Nations takes note of this statement of the Government of the
Republic of the Congo and states that, with regard to the activities of the
United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the
task assigned to the Force in the aforementioned resolution."
What are these tasks? They are to obtain the withdrawal or the evacuation of the
Belgian forces, to prevent the dismemberment of the territory, and also to assist in
the non-emergence of factional disorder. Now, those three things are still being
carried out by the Force.
"... in particular the United Nations reaffirms, considering it to be in

accordance with the wishes of the Republic of the Congo, that it is
prepared to maintain the United Nations Force in the Congo until such
time as it deems the latter’s task to have been fully accomplished."
In other words, on July 14, 1960, the Republic accepted that the decision on the
termination of these was a matter for the United Nations. Therefore, there cannot
even be unilateral denunciation...
The Security Council having taken into consideration the conditions under which
the United Nations will participate in the solution of the problem of the Congo, it
came before the Security Council and neither the legality nor the admission of this
item, nor the decisions at which the Council arrived, have been challenged either
by the Assembly or by the Security Council, or by anyone elsewhere. In other
words, all the action taken thereafter is consonant with the Charter.
So on 14 July and 22 July, the Security Council passed resolutions. The effect of
those resolutions was to set out the purposes of the participation of the United
Nations in the general difficulties in the Congo which were, as I said, to obtain the
withdrawal of the Belgian aggressors, as the Congo Government would say; to
request other States to refrain from any action that would promote this trouble; to
offer to the Congolese people economic, technical and other aid; and to assist in
the maintenance of law and order and to help them maintain the integrity of the
Congo. Therefore, the position of the United Nations was consistent with the
position of the Congolese people and their Government, that their country was not
to be dismembered, their independence was not to be violated, their future was to
be decided by themselves.
It may be asked why the Government of India desires at this particular time to go
into what some may regard as ancient history. The reason is that all that happens
at the present time, whether it emanates from the President of the Republic or one
of the factional leaders who side with him, or from one of the secessionists who
do not side with any of the factions as such but generally challenge the entire
authority of the United Nations, the agreement, and the independence of the
Congo itself, is disturbing and contrary to all of these basic ideas.
There then came a time when the matter again came before the Security Council,
just before the emergency special session (of the General Assembly in September
1960). The Security Council confirmed the authority given to the Secretary-
General by its resolution of 14 July.
My Government has never concealed the fact that in their view certain things
might have been done differently or that certain organisations might have had a
different character, and so on. That is why we are here. But in our opinion, the
resolution of 9 August places upon this Organisation as a whole, and certainly
upon the Security Council as a whole, until such time as the authority given to the
Secretary-General is withdrawn, the responsibility for what has happened.
Equally, it places upon the Secretary-General, under the Article which he has
quoted, the responsibility for executing its mandate. Both the General Assembly
and the Security Council are entitled to charge the Secretary-General that the
interpretation of the authority may have been excessive or wrong, his execution of
it might have been wise or unwise, might have been weak or strong. All those
criticisms are possible in regard to an executive authority. But the originating
body, the Security Council from whom this authority emanated, has never
invalidated that authority and so far as I can see from my papers, that authority
has not been withdrawn.
We are very much concerned in this matter because, while the Secretary-General
is sometimes regarded as one individual, according to the Charter he is
nevertheless head of an organ of the United Nations... It is quite true that at times
we may differ as to whether his actions proved to be too weak or too strong, wise
or unwise, or whatever it might be, and when those actions must be considered,
remedies must be sought, and so on. But since the tasks inherent in the office of
Secretary-General in this connection are carried out by so many people, who are
under the delegation of authority, not in the sense of the abdication of the
Secretary-General, but only under such delegation for the execution of certain
matters, and since one of those who are on the spot happens to be a national of my
country and has come under unfair and gross criticism, it is necessary for us to
treat this in a very impersonal way...
We now proceed from August to September. In September of that year, the

emergency special session took place and passed resolution 1474 (ES-IV) which
is more or less the charter of action so far as the Assembly is concerned. I said at
the beginning that the United Nations participation began in order to attain certain
objectives. Therefore we are entitled, after the passage of seven or eight months,
to see what distance was travelled, how far away we are from the objectives,
whether the gap between the objectives and the conditions which prevailed at that
time has been narrowed or otherwise.
LOOKING AT THE CONGO PICTURE TODAY, we find that, first of all, the
movement for the disintegration of the Republic of the Congo, that is to say, the
attack on its sovereignty, is stronger than it has ever been. In one part of the
Congo, Mr. Tshombe, largely and mainly with the assistance of Belgian and
foreign mercenaries in personnel and resources, has challenged the existence of
that Republic. What is more, he has offered a frontal challenge to the United
Nations. Therefore, we are not faced merely with the question of whether we like
this or that person or some small legality, or something of that character. We are
faced with the basic and fundamental position that it was the common desire of
the representatives of the Republic as it was at that time when they came to us,
and on the basis of our sense of responsibility, that the integrity of the Congo
should not be violated. Today, after eight or nine months, we are faced with a
movement of secession of a considerable character and there are suitable
constitutional processes that are put forward with all the appearance of
constitutionality, except that they are not in conformity with the Loi fondamentale
of the Congo or any other published and declared legal documents which form the
structure of government and organs of that territory, which would divide it up.
That is on the first aspect, whether the gap is wider than it was before.
Second is the question of foreign intervention, with which I shall be dealing at

such length as I can in the time I have. Let us look at the position today. After
eight or nine months, the main military resistance, not only to the United Nations
but to the dignity, the unity, the future of the Congo as well, comes from foreign
intervention. In other words, the aggression complained of by Mr. Kasavubu and
the late Mr. Lumumba at that time, has become almost permanent, and in spite of
the various guarantees, assurances and hopes given to the United Nations, the core
of support given by the Belgian Empire to assist the enemies of Congolese
national independence in maintaining their selfish positions, is stronger than ever
before. Therefore, while there may have been withdrawals, there have been no
withdrawals of Belgian military power or intervention in such a way as to make a
peaceful solution of this problem possible. So then, on the second point also,
after eight months we are very far away.
Then we come to some other matters, which are of perhaps a more detailed
character, and which follow from the others. While in July of 1960, the Republic,
as a unity, was not only appealing to the United Nations but expected the United
Nations to do many things - and the United Nations acted in response to its
appeals - today we have a situation of non-co-operation with the United Nations.
The forces of the world Organisation, as represented by either its civil servants or,
in this particular case, its military arm, are incurring active hostility and
sometimes hostility of a character which, but for the restraint exercised by the
United Nations might well lead to more ugly situations. So on this third point
also we are far away.
Then we have the situation that if the United Nations is to render aid in order, at
least, to deal with the conditions of famine and economic distress in the Congo, it
should be in a position where it enjoys ingress and egress with regard to this
territory, as promised in the agreement between the United Nations and the
Congolese Government...
All that has disappeared, and we have now reached a situation in which, for
example, the seaport that gives access to Leopoldville is being denied to the
United Nations. And I want to tell my African and Asian friends, this is not a
question of violation of the sovereignty of the Congo, and it would be
misrepresentation, a misunderstanding of the facts, to think that the United
Nations is a kind of imperial Power that is trying to protect itself. Under the
agreement it is entitled to the use of these places, and if that use is denied, then
there is a breach of the agreement, and a situation in which the purposes cannot be
implemented. So, whether it be at Banana or Matadi, these are situations which
cause great distress and which would prolong the present state of affairs and
prevent the peaceful solution that otherwise might be achieved.
Over and above that, we have in Katanga, one of the richest areas of the Republic,
a state of civil war. It is often thought that it is only a question of Katanga having
an irredentist or secessionist movement, under the leadership of Tshombe. If that
were so, it would be bad enough, because, after all, there is civil war in the Congo
as a whole. But that is not the whole situation, so far as we know from all the
debates and all the material available to us; for, in addition to there being a civil
war - an irredentist, secessionist civil war - there is civil war in Katanga itself.
That is to say, there exist in various parts of the territory of Katanga, north, south,
and east and what not, fights among factions of such character that the progress of
the country and its unity are very violently threatened - and all this with the
inspiration, the active assistance, of the former colonial Power.
We come now to a more recent instance where my Government feels it has to

express itself without any fear of being open legitimately to the charge of
interference in the internal affairs of sister State; that is, the proposals put out
before the world by what is called the Tannanarive Conference.57 It would not
lie in the mouth of any one of us, nor would it be within the competence of any
one of us, to say that a member State could not change its character, its
constitution, its structure or anything of that kind. But when the purposes of the
United Nations intervention and when their participation is to maintain the
integrity of the Republic, and when the agreements have been on that basis on the
initiative of the Republic itself, then, obviously, for a section of the people to go
to some place and have a conference and make a decision unilaterally
appropriating to themselves certain parts of this territory and breaking up its
unity, is not a thing that this Organisation could accept, because the Republic was
admitted to the United Nations under entirely different conditions.
When the Republic is admitted to the United Nations under these conditions, and
when practically without exception everybody here recognises Mr. Kasavubu as
the President of the Congolese Republic, my Government accepts Mr. Kasavubu
and the Republic of the Congo. But it does not accept the functional competence
57 In March 1961, President Kasavubu convened a conference of 18 Congolese political

personalities in Tannanarive, Madagascar. The conference agreed on a confederation of sovereign
States and opposed implementation of the Security Council resolution.
of Mr. Kasavubu in many matters. It is one thing to say that a President is the
constitutional head; it is something else to say that everything he does is
constitutional. But the first is more important in this context, that Mr. Kasavubu
is the Head of the Republic and at the same time Mr. Kasavubu appears party to a
conference that wants to break up the Republic. Now, these things do not go
together.
So, when we take these five aspects, we find that today, after seven months before
the Assembly and nine months before the United Nations, the Congolese problem
presents the spectacle of the United Nations still having to assist in the prevention
of the break-up of this territory, of assisting the people of the Congo to be able to
have a form of government under constitutional liberties for themselves and to
enjoy their freedom in peace and dignity. And we have to see that the prestige and
authority which arise from the agreements so far as the United Nations is
concerned are maintained in this area.
There has been so much censorious criticism of actions of both the United
Nations and various countries, criticism coming from various quarters, that if we
were to go into all of that we would be likely again to get lost and not be able to
see the wood for the trees.
THERE HAVE BEEN TRAGIC EVENTS IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. In

the first instance, as Mr. Hammarskjold pointed out to us, the Army entered
politics; that is to say, instead of being the arm of the law, it took the law into its
own hands. Mr. Mobutu became a law unto himself, and while the President, as I
said was constitutional, he acted unconstitutionally in conferring authority upon
him. We then had a situation wherein, as the Secretary-General told us in one of
his reports, they had begun to participate in matters which were not their concern,
thereby creating a different situation. That has gone on, and during the few
months just before we met we had the tragic situation that not only had factional
forces became the determining authorities in legislatures and constitutional
assemblies, but the strong arm and not the law had become the authority.
That was succeeded by the use of political assassination as an instrument of

political settlement. All countries have passed through various vicissitudes.
Sometimes they have had civil wars, revolutions, constitutional changes. But
there is nothing that is more reprehensible as a method of political transformation
that political assassination. Political assassination is a euphemism for dastardly
murder. That is to say, when there is no public opinion behind a party, then that
party or a group of individuals, instead of organising mass forces, tries to stab its
opponent in the back. That is political assassination. With the murder of Mr.
Lumumba and his colleagues, and the murder of other people, there was
introduced into the Congo situation something that is totally inconsistent with the
purposes of the Charter or with the purposes of the United Nations.
In those circumstances, we were getting no nearer to the five objectives laid
down. The Belgian forces were not only disrupting the unity of the Congo but
even making the economic functions of the United Nations difficult, so that the
prestige and authority of the Organisation were being challenged - and not in a
small way. What I mean is that, if the United Nations fails in the Congo, it fails
in the world - and that takes us nearer and nearer to a situation of a threat to
international peace and security.
In February 1961, the General Assembly having recessed, the matter was again
brought up before the Security Council. At that time, we were confronted not only
with the shocking murders and with the threat of civil war, but with another factor
which is not often mentioned - the conditions of economic distress, As early as
December 1960, the Secretary-General informed this Assembly that each day 200
people died in the Congo because of lack of nutrition. If that was the situation
then, things are worse today. With the salaries paid to these factional armies and
the various advisers and what not - and the figures are available to us - there is not
doubt that the value of money has gone down, and therefore the distress of the
people must be greater than ever before.
Thus, the matter came up before us once again in February of this year, and the
Security Council was called upon to address itself to this problem. Here my
Government desires to make a few observations, partly to clear our position and
to inform the Assembly, and also to draw the attention of the Secretary-General. It
was our view at all times, as we reiterated in the Assembly, that the original
resolutions passed by the Security Council gave this Organisation the necessary
legal authority to take the steps which were required to attain the objectives. At
that time, there were doubts about it. But, in any case, those doubts have been
cleared by the resolution of February 21, 1961. On that date, the Security Council
adopted the resolution which reiterated the previous objectives and urged the
United Nations to:
"take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of

civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting
of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if
necessary in the last resort."
That is to say, the United Nations accepted the responsibility for using such force
as was necessary to maintain the purposes and the objectives of the agreement
reached with the Republic of the Congo. It reaffirmed the previous resolutions,
called again for the convening of the Parliament and for the reorganisation of the
armed personnel, who were undisciplined and not under proper control, and it
called upon all States to extend assistance.
I will not go into the resolution in great detail. My country is not a member of the
Security Council... Secondly, while normally it is not the business of a non-
member of the Security Council to move a resolution, we were aware of the
events of the time and in full co-operation with the three movers of the resolution
and fully appreciative of the results reached.
We are glad to know that at least some of the permanent members of the Security
Council, like the United States and the United Kingdom, approved of the
resolution. Mr. Stevenson58 said that, while he did not agree with everything, he
thought it a good resolution. He said:
"Although we have some reservations about certain aspects of the draft

resolution, which we have made known to various members, including the
sponsors, we think it is basically a good resolution..."
Basically, what does the resolution say? Basically, it reaffirms all that was said
before and says that we must put more steam into this, more force into it, and get
it implemented. We must be in business. Mr. Stevenson said that "it is basically
a good resolution and we believe it should be adopted."
The same thing was said on that occasion by Sir Patrick Dean. He asked:
"Can we not now lay aside our partisan feelings... [and] join together in
approving this draft resolution?"
Therefore, at least two of the permanent members of the Security Council, which
have a great deal of responsibility for world security, supported this resolution.
The Soviet Union did not oppose it. If the Soviet Union had objected basically to
the resolution, it had the right and duty - and, what is more, it has been the
practice of the Soviet Union in such cases - to cast its vote against the resolution.
That would have meant a veto, and then that resolution would not have passed.
Therefore, irrespective of the voting on this resolution - an abstention or two - the
fact is that this is the law of the United Nations at the present time. In this
connection, my Prime Minister has said:
"It is true that the United Nations... in existing conditions cannot go

beyond the world as it is today, and difficulties of the United Nations are
often a reflection of the difficulties caused by major conflicts and cold
war... Nevertheless, we do feel that it is the ineffectiveness of the
functioning of the United Nations there that has led to the serious situation
which we have to face in the Congo today. Because of it we felt that the
time had come for a strong lead to be given, and the Security Council did
give a certain lead. The problem then became one of implementing that
lead in that resolution."
My Government has always taken the view that resolutions, if they are passed,
must be implemented. If there are ultimatums given or time limits set or courses
58 Adlai E. Stevenson, representative of the United States

of action outlined, it is necessary that they be followed to the full.
In pursuance of that resolution, therefore, the Secretary-General made an appeal

to various Governments, including our own, to supply the resources that were
required for purposes of implementation. I propose to deal with our response to
this at a later stage. But it is our view that there can be no going back on this
resolution of February unless the United Nations is to abdicate its responsibility
and plunge the Congo into a phase of dismemberment and the loss of national
dignity and national prosperity, and create a permanent challenge to its
sovereignty.
MEANWHILE, IN THE AUGUST RESOLUTION, it had been suggested - either

expressly or implicitly - to the Advisory Committee on the Congo that some
conciliatory processes should be undertaken. As a result, a Conciliation
Commission was sent to the Congo. Members are aware that the Advisory
Committee on the Congo has had a large number of meetings. Its membership
includes countries which do not have identical views either on the details of the
Congo question or on other matters. Despite that fact the Committee appointed
the Conciliation Commission which went to the Congo and produced a report..
In paragraph 124 of its report [A/711], the Commission states that it considers
that, despite the criticisms made of the Loi fondamentale and despite the fact that
it is incomplete and ill-adapted to the needs of the Congo, it is the law of the land;
and that unless and until there has been an amendment to the Constitution and in
the absence of any other basic law in the Congo, everyone concerned should
uphold the Loi fondamentale as the basic law of the Republic.
Now, that sounds like a truism. It arises from the fact that, when he suspended
Parliament, Mr. Kasavubu overthrew the constitution and appropriated the powers
for himself. He said that parliamentary institutions were not in the sociological
pattern of Africa. That used to be said by the Europeans, but that we should say
so ourselves does not seem right. In any event, although, in my Government’s
submission, the Conciliation Commission exceeded its province in going into the
future constitutional questions, it was entirely correct in saying that the Loi
fondamentale is the basic law of the Congo, the charter of the Congo.
In paragraph 126 of its report the Commission makes the following point. No
provisional arrangements - that is to say, provisional arrangements resulting from
the murder of Mr. Lumumba, factional fighting, the flux of time, and so forth -
can be considered as legal until they are approved by Parliament in accordance
with the Loi fondamentale. Thus, the Commission comes back to the position
that, even if factual situations required certain arrangements, these arrangements
can have no validity unless Loi fondamentale is respected.
In another paragraph of its report the Commission deals with the provisions of the
United Nations resolution with regard to averting the danger of civil war. To
avert such a danger and to obviate the danger of foreign military intervention, the
Commission: "recommended and still maintains that attempts by Congolese
leaders to achieve a military solution of the present crisis must be checked
immediately." The reference to a military solution by fratricidal war - that is, one
section of the Congolese people fighting another section and, what is more,
sections of the Congolese people either collectively or individually fighting the
United Nations, of which Congo itself is a part.
In paragraph 129, the Commission unanimously asks that the armed groups in the
Congo should be reorganised and insulated from politics. That is a direct denial
of the rightness of the action taken by Mr. Kasavubu, through Mr. Mobutu, in
introducing the army into politics and transferring political power and authority to
the armed forces of the Congo. The Commission says that the armed groups in
the Congo - including Mr. Mobutu's - should be reorganised and insulated from
politics. It then goes on say that the reorganisation should be carried out by the
United Nations. The Commission states in the preceding paragraph:
"It is also of the opinion that these various armed groups, undisciplined
members of which may at any moment break loose from their command
and terrorise the population, constitute a constant threat to law and order."
As I said earlier in this statement, one of the purposes of our participation in the
Congolese problem is to assist in the maintenance of law and order.
The Commission, I repeat, considers that the reorganisation should be carried out
by the United Nations. We read:
"... it suggests that this reorganisation be carried out with the assistance
and under the guidance of the United Nations through a comprehensive
training scheme under a national defence council to be set up..."
Assistance in training of this kind was one of the earlier tasks undertaken by the
Organisation. As my Government understands it, the import of this paragraph of
the Commission’s report is that, if Congolese factions or the Congolese people as
a whole looked for partisan assistance from outside, they would be importing into
the Congo all the troubles that exist in the outside world, including the blast of the
cold war...
In paragraph 136 of its report the Commission states that nothing can
"replace, bypass or circumvent the Parliament, which alone is the

authority empowered under the Loi fondamentale to take the steps
necessary ..."
Thus despite the heterogeneous composition of the Conciliation Commission,

which, broadly speaking, represents the various views of the Asian-African
countries which set it up at the behest of the United Nations, there is an adherence
to the constitutional position.
In paragraph 139 the Commission states:
"The present crisis will not be solved unless Parliament is reconvened

without delay. The Commission realises that in the present conditions of
unrest, many members of Parliament may fear for their safety."
They have every reason to do so, because some members of Parliament were
murdered. The Commission
"feels that adequate measures should be taken by the United Nations Force
to give protection to such members of Parliament as may desire it, so as to
guarantee the exercise of the rights and immunities to which they are
entitled..."
In paragraph 140 - probably the most important part of this report - we read: "All
the Congolese leaders interviewed by the Commission" - and I must say that when
one looks at the list one notes that the Commission did not go into the question of
legitimism or otherwise; it interviewed practically everyone it could see -
"referred in forthright terms to the necessity of putting an end to foreign
interference in the internal affairs of the Congo."
So long as the Republic of the Congo is part of the United Nations, and so long as
we are participating on the basis of a voluntary agreement, on the basis of an
appeal made to us and once an agreement has been accepted it can be terminated
only by the consent of the parties - the United Nations cannot be regarded as
"foreign interference."
The "end to foreign interference" therefore means interference by other people,

either by arms or by personnel, to assist this party or that party or the other party,
to try to make havoc among a people who for years have endured colonialism,
and party as a result of their own efforts, and partly by the impact of the liberation
movements in the rest of the world and the resurgence of Africa, have shaken off
the empire.
The report continues:
"... the Commission cannot emphasise too strongly the need for the
United Nations to take urgent and effective measures for the immediate
enforcement of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions
calling upon all States to refrain from sending military assistance..."
Now, sending military assistance is bad enough, but if those people who have
been giving military assistance have been asked to go away and to allow this State
to function in the context of the freedom to which they are constitutionally
pledged, if that cannot take place, then how can we ask for anything else?
Therefore, the failure on the part of the United Nations or of the member State or
of other member States to bring this about is, in the opinion of my Government,
as repeatedly stated by my Prime Minister to our Parliament and to the United
Nations, the crux of the situation.
There will be no solution of the Congo problem unless Belgian intervention, in

the form of military personnel, military advisers, the supply of arms material - all
these things - is stopped; unless the Congo ceases to be a scene where the cold
war projects itself; where if the allies and the friends of those who are largely
responsible for these troubles do not exercise their unquestioned influence with
their friends, we cannot expect to get much peace.
We, ourselves, have very friendly relations both Belgium as a State and extremely
friendly relations with the Belgian people as a people. We have very close
economic, cultural and other relations. We have had no domination of the Belgian
empire over us. But I am sure the whole world has a feeling in regard to Belgium,
which has been the victim of aggression twice in the last half century, when its
territory was trampled upon, when, instead of being a country, it was used as a
road by the marauding armies of the German empire or of the Hitler regime.
Therefore, all our sentiments, all our moral alignments, are in that way. Therefore,
when we speak in these terms, it is not the indictment of a people or some
irresponsible statement not taking into account the facts of the case. We are,
therefore, opposing a situation where the empire which happily went out by the
front door has tried to get in by the back door and used the same methods of
dividing the people, of setting one lot of people against another.
There is only one thing an empire can decently do, and that is to end itself.
Suicide is not justifiable under our human system for individuals, suicide is
justifiable for empires. The best thing they can do is to end themselves. As a great
British statesman in the past said, the proudest day of their empire will be when it
comes to an end. So, to return to this idea of coming back by the back door, this
Commission points out:
"The deliberate violations of this injunction, open or secret, are largely

responsible for the continuing deterioration of the situation and the drift of
the country towards civil war and disintegration."
The Commission then comes to the Belgians themselves:
"The Commission deplores the continued presence in various parts of the

Republic of the Congo of large numbers of Belgian and other foreign
military and paramilitary personnel, political advisers, and mercenaries.
The Commission feels that immediate steps should be taken to remove
forthwith all such personnel not under the United Nations Command from
the territory of the Republic of the Congo."
And finally the Commission says:
"The Commission has noted with special interest the Security Council’s
resolution (S/4741) ..."
These people are on the spot. The Security Council passes a resolution from here.
And while it is quite true that even if the Commission did not approve of the
Security Council resolution, it would still remain the Security Council
resolution, it is a good thing that the Commission, which is dealing with this
difficult problem, should reinforce the resolution, "which it welcomes as a
positive contribution" to the settlement...
Then there is the reference to the murder of Mr. Lumumba and the request for an
investigation...
THEREFORE, WE COME HERE TODAY WITH A VIEW TO SUBMITTING

to the Assembly a draft resolution in regard to the withdrawal of foreign
personnel which today are not only the Belgians; it is not only a question of a
handful of Belgians. No one has any objection to a Belgian as a Belgian. It is
because they are military advisers; it is because they are the leaders and fomenters
of trouble; it is because they give direction and point to this; it is because they
make the task of the United Nations, and therefore, of peace, more difficult...
The presence of Belgian nationals, including military personnel in the Congo, has
been highlighted in the second progress report of November 2, 1960, which was
submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This report has
been so long before us that it is not necessary for me to go into great detail except
to point out that,
"... there has been increasing evidence of the return of Belgian nationals
into many phases of public life in the Congo... Some Belgian nationals are
believed to have been actively arming separatist Congolese forces, and, in
some cases, Belgian officers have directed and led such forces ... Advisers
of Belgian nationality have been returning to governmental ministries both
in Leopoldville and the provinces, partially through what seems to be an
organised recruiting campaign in Belgium."
We read in the report:
"Soon after a measure of security had been reestablished in the Congo, a

recruiting agency for the Congo was set up in Brussels and supported
Leopoldville."
"As a result of the concerned activities of the recruiting agencies, the task
of ONUC has been made more difficult."
"Belgian influence is also seen in the military field."
"In Katanga" - Katanga is today practically the Belgian empire - "Belgian

influence is omnipresent. Virtually all key civilian and security posts are either
held directly by officials of Belgian nationality or controlled by advisers to
recently appointed and often inexperienced Congolese officials. Significantly,
within the security forces, there are according to the latest available data, 114
Belgian officers and 117 Belgians of other ranks in the gendarmerie, and 58
Belgian officers in the police. These figures do not reflect any significant recent
increase, although several officials have been brought from Belgium recently to
fill specific key posts."
"In the so-called ‘Autonomous State of South Kasai’ there is also a

considerable Belgian presence."
These are the positions as of November 1960 and also as of today.
The Security Council resolution of February 21, 1961, has not been implemented
because the only way the personnel can be withdrawn is by the exercise of the
responsibility that the member State of Belgium owes to this Organisation to carry
out the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.
So far as we know - these are United Nations figures, on which I place reliance -
there are twelve Belgian officers in Leopoldville; twelve foreigners, mostly
Belgians, in Kasai; 350 Belgian officers and foreign mercenaries in Katanga. In
addition, Congolese officers to an unspecified number have been sent both into
France and Belgium for training with a view to participating in these troubles.
There are more than 100 of these officers from Katanga who are training in
Belgium and France. It is very difficult to understand how a member State, in
view of its responsibilities under the Charter, can use the operations of its military
machinery to accept from a territory that is not a State military personnel for the
promotion of trouble of this kind.
In addition to this, it is now said that nationals of the Union of South Africa and
of Rhodesia have been enlisted in the Foreign Legion. I am quite certain that my
colleagues of the African States will take this into account. These elements are
bad enough in their own countries, but if they project their apartheid policies and
their general authority and outlook in order to participate in adventures of this
kind, then the future of the Congo must be bleak indeed. If these people are not
representing their States, according to the positions of their Governments, then
what is their status? Are they stateless persons? Are they military adventurers? If
that is so, then what is the position to be taken in regard to them?
NOW WE HAVE, IN ADDITION TO THAT, the fact that there was a
Conference at Tannanarive which, if it has resulted in some kind of agreement
acceptable to all people in the Congo and been in conformity with the principles
of the Charter, would have been welcomed, irrespective of whether or not it was
under the Loi fondamentale. We have no reason to believe that it represents the
views or the interests of a large number of the Congolese people.
So long as the Republic of the Congo is a part of the United Nations, we must
examine the position of the delegation that was admitted here. We would say that
the proposed remedies, such as the convening of Parliament, the withdrawal of the
Belgian forces, the giving of greater economic and other assistance and removing
the army from politics, are the responsibility of the United Nations as a whole,
and, without in any way trying to discriminate between the great Powers and the
small Powers - and I say this in all humility - it is the particular responsibility of
those countries which, at a time when it would have been wiser to leave things as
they were, conferred upon Mr. Kasavubu and his nominees the prestige and
authority of being represented in the General Assembly. It must be assumed that
they have some influence with these authorities. My Government is completely
satisfied with the good faith of the countries that took this action, but at the same
time we believe that we have the right to ask them, having regard to the
consequences of this action and to the fact that they are closely related to these
people who are behaving in a way that is inconsistent with the United Nations
position, to use their influence, political, moral, economic and otherwise, to bring
them into line with the policies and resolutions of the United Nations.
The answers given by these authorities who have found their place in the United
Nations are something like the following. "There can therefore be no question of
imposing solutions on the authorities of the Republic..." My Government can only
decide on the possibility of co-operating in the implementation of the resolution
of 21 February subject to the reservation of the interpretation placed on the
resolution." "It is not for the United Nations to require a State to follow one
particular procedure with regard to the employment of foreign technicians... The
Congo intends to recruit the technicians it requires wherever it thinks fit." This is
the wrong way of putting it. What the United Nations has asked for is the
implementation of the agreement which the Republic of the Congo made with the
United Nations. And this letter comes from the very authority which has been
supported by some Member States here, a support which has been responsible for
the added strength of these authorities. They state: "The Security Council may not
conduct any investigation in the territory of the Republic except with the
preliminary agreement of the Government of the Republic." Apart from the
question of whether the Security Council can make such claims, this is covered by
the undertaking given by Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba, the Heads of the
Congolese Republic at that time, when they said that they would carry out these
agreements in good faith, and would allow the United Nations freedom of access
in all that it required. They state: "A decision to convene the Parliament will be
taken by the Congolese themselves."
I would like to ask myself and every member of this Assembly: when it is said, "a
decision to convene the Parliament will be taken by the Congolese themselves,"
who decided to abolish Parliament? It was not the members of the Congolese
people. The Congolese people, neither in Parliament nor in convention, decided
to deny themselves the privilege of acting as a legislature. The United Nations
has not said that it will convene Parliament. It has said that if there must be some
solution in the Congo, it is necessary that these matters should come before
Parliament. Therefore, since Mr. Kasavubu has the authority to convene
Parliament, it would be a good thing if he did so. We are requesting countries like
the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and others, who have undoubted
influence with Mr. Kasavubu, to try and help the United Nations apart from
helping Mr. Kasavubu's own country, to carry out the mission of the United
Nations and to fulfil the purposes of the Charter as applicable to this particular
problem by allowing Parliament to be convened. After all, Parliament was part of
the arrangement made between Belgium and the Congolese people at that time.
As the Commission has pointed out, it is all incorporated in the Loi fondamentale,
which is the one thing that remains.
They state: "The Government of the Republic of the Congo" - that is to say, the
Government of the Republic of the Congo, so far as we are concerned, which has
no legal basis, but is the Government with which we must deal because it is
factual - "energetically protests to all free and sovereign peoples who are States
members of the United Nations against the infringement of the sovereignty of the
Republic." We are ninety-nine nations that adopted these resolutions in August of
last year, and the Security Council which again adopted its resolution in February
of this year, and one member State says that we have violated its sovereignty and
it appeals to us against an infringement that we have committed. These are the
very people who came to us and said that one State had infringed its sovereignty
and asked us to help them.
They state that the Government of the Republic of the Congo "emphasises that the
Congolese people will never permit the implementation or attempt at
implementation of the provisions of this resolution." I would like to ask if the
Republic of the Congo, which is a member State at the present time and which,
thanks to the intervention of certain States, has a delegation seated here under the
authority of Mr. Kasavubu, is going to say to us that it will not permit the
implementation of United Nations resolutions, then is this a state of complete
hostility between one member State and the whole of the United Nations? There
has been no expression of opinion either in the Conciliation Commission or the
Advisory Committee or here that these resolutions are ultra vires or are unwise,
illegal, unjust or anything of that nature. In fact, as I said a while ago, the
Security Council, in spite of its heterogeneous character, passed this resolution.
Mr. Kasavubu says: "Reaffirms the determination of the Congolese people to
defend its sovereignty by all the means at its disposal." That is consummation
which we all hope for, but whether fratricidal war, the secession of parts of the
Republic or opposition to the rendering of assistance which they themselves have
asked for - not only military assistance but also economic - form part of legitimate
sovereignty, is question that this Organisation is entitled to inquire into on the
basis of the agreements and the Charter provisions, and not otherwise. He goes
on:
"Appeals to the whole Congolese people in their regional diversity and

with their sense of common Congolese nationality to stand ready at all
times to carry out any measures for the defence of the Congolese
sovereignty."
In the sense of the defence of nationhood, we could all express the same
sentiments, but not against the United Nations. I shall not go any further with this,
but all this is a direct challenge to the United Nations. What is more, the
President of the Congolese Republic, in the exercise of his great authority and
having the control of the radio as he has, tells the country things that are entirely
untrue:
"Our country is threatened with being placed under United Nations

trusteeship."
"Our Army will be disarmed if we are not vigilant... verbal protests are not
enough, action is required..."
That is a threat of physical war against the United Nations.
"The United Nations is betraying us..."
That is hardly the right thing to say about the United Nations after the sacrifices
that many Member States have made in order to bring about peace.
“The Government has decided to mobilise all the resources of the nation...
Faced with the threat of United Nations trusteeship. I am giving every
unit and every soldier three commands. Defend the sovereignty and
honour of the Congo, defend the honour of the Army and let every soldier
defend his weapon... Let the leopard, symbol of the Congo, show his
claws, make his mighty voice resound and leap forward towards the foe."
The foe is in Katanga. The foe is in foreign intervention. The foe is in pestilence
and famine. The foe is in the challenge that is made to the United Nations. The
foe is not in the United Nations itself.
Here we have a Head of State who has been ushered in here with the assistance -
and, I believe, the well-meant assistance - of very responsible members. We hope
that their undoubted influence, their desire to establish peace in the world and
bring about a termination of this state of affairs and their realisation that a
projection of the "cold war" into the continent of Africa would not do anybody
any good, all those things will combine in order to change this attitude on the part
of the President of the Republic.
HERE WE COME TO OUR OWN POSITION. I have said very little about
Matadi because I understand from the Secretary-General that various negotiations
are in progress whereby the use of the port of Matadi will be available to United
Nations in accordance with the agreement. So far as I understand, there has been
no question of the United Nations wishing to become an army of occupation or
anything of that character. From 5 March until 28 March the Secretary-General or
his representatives have sent various messages to Mr. Kasavubu, to Mr. Bomboko
and to other people repeatedly asking, not for the evacuation of Matadi but that
the presence of the United Nations Force in Matadi might be allowed. This is a
vital condition for the carrying out of the United Nations operation for in the
Congo, especially for the prevention of civil war and the halting of military
operations, for which the Security Council resolution of 21 February authorises
the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. It is again my firm expectation
that, if the situation in Matadi should not be redressed, the matter will, of course,
become the urgent concern of the Security Council.
I should like to submit that it is the view of my Government that if, in spite of all
the negotiations and all the goodwill that is shown by the United Nations
authorities and all the attempts at conciliation, it is not possible for this resolution
to be carried out, then the Secretary-General has the responsibility to place the
situation squarely before the Security Council and ask for further instructions,
because those of us who have troops in the region cannot be placed in a position
where their logistics are adversely affected and where their morale is affected in
such a way that any future call by the United Nations for the support of these
countries would not produce the same responses. However, in certain letters the
Congolese authorities have said that they had no objection to the presence of the
United Nations Force in Matadi, but then they go on to say that unless certain
apologies are made about the way things are done this will not be allowed. I am
anxious not to rub this in very much, because I understand from the Secretary-
General that delicate negotiations are going on, and if in any way results can be
obtained we should not like to say anything that would create a difficult situation.
BEFORE I LEAVE THIS ROSTRUM, I HAVE THE DIFFICULT TASK of

saying something with regard to the presence of Indian troops. It has been a
matter of great grief, not only to our Government but to our people, that the
dispatch of Indian troops to the Congo, while I do not think it has been
misunderstood by anybody, has been misrepresented, and misrepresented very
deliberately, both in Africa and elsewhere, by interested sections. We are happy to
think that the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, our
neighbours and other countries have communicated to us their appreciation of our
response to the call for placing armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations
for the furtherance of the purposes of the Charter; but we are unhappy to think
that, while we recognise the presence of a free press in these countries, things like
this appear in important newspapers:
"The central issue is no longer the Belgians, employed by all leaders as

technicians and advisers, but rather the United Nations representative, Mr.
Dayal of India, and now the arrival of Indian troops. It is no reassurance
that Prime Minister Nehru, in his concept of an international police force,
makes their support dependent on their being ‘utilised as we intend them
to be.’"
I want to say that this is an entire travesty of the facts. The Government of India
does not interfere with the functions, the discretion, the movements or anything of
that kind, of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. He happens to
be an Indian national, in the same way as Mr. Hammarskjold is, I believe, still a
Swedish national... The same newspaper also states the following:
"Congolese leaders have protested against the arrival of the Indian forces
on two counts."
Of course, naturally, every anarchic force will protest against the appearance of
the arm of law and order. Indian forces do not go there as Indian forces. Once
they leave our shores, once we have placed them at the disposal of the Secretary-
General, they are part of the international force of the world. Like the personnel of
the Indian Army on the very ticklish boundary line between Israel and the United
Arab Republic, they are not personnel or officers of the Indian Army when they
are functioning there. It is my responsibility to say that they have been placed at
the disposal of the United Nations to carry out the orders of the United Nations
Command. But we have naturally imposed certain conditions in the sense that we
do not wish our troops to be engaged in any conflict with member States as such
or to be used for the suppression of any popular movements or things of that
character. These are legitimate conditions which the United Nations has
accepted... The newspaper continued:
"Second, the hostility between the Congolese leaders and Rajeshwar

Dayal, the Indian who is head of the United Nations mission here, has
been transferred to the Indian troops. Leaders of the Congolese Central
Government suspect India of supporting the rival regime of Antoine
Gizenga in Stanleyville..."
My Government does not recognise any of these governments in the Congo. They
recognise Mr. Kasavubu as the elected President of the Republic. As I said, we do
not recognise the way he has functioned. We have not recognised any of these
governments. If they are popular movements our forces are not likely to be used
in their suppression. It is not only an unfactual statement; I think it is rather
malicious for people who ought to know better than to say this sort of thing. I am
happy to think that the Governments of these countries, those statesmen, my
Prime Minister and others who are interested, who are concerned, are in daily
contact.
We are entirely satisfied that this does not represent the view of the American
Government or the American people, but at the same time we are entitled to ask
the United States delegation to make it clear to the world that these are individual
opinions that must come in the conduct of what is called "the freedom of the
Press," which I suppose means freedom for the owner of the Press.
Then it goes on to say in another paper, "The dispatch here of Prime Minister
Nehru’s Indian troops" - Prime Minister Nehru has no troops. He is a Prime
Minister of a democratic country - "is an example of an action taken by the United
Nations in defiance of the publicly expressed opposition of President Kasavubu
and every one of his Ministers." No responsible expression of opinion can mean
that the United Nations must carry out the behest of one member State and not of
the Secretary Council. "The Congolese object for the simple reason that they
believe that India, being allied to left-leaning Ghana, this country’s bitter enemy,
simply is not neutral". It is very odd. Until very recently these papers accused
India of being neutral; now they say we are not neutral.
The same paper goes on to say:
"Mr. Kasavubu personally made known his Government’s objection to the

Indian forces - the Congolese call their arrival an ‘invasion’ - during a
courtesy call paid to him by Mr. Abbas.59
"It was noted that the United Nations, in tacit recognition of the explosive
situation, has been in no hurry to reveal where the Indian troops are to be
stationed."
Anybody who knows anything about army movements knows they are not
published in the newspapers.
"For the moment they are to be concentrated in a camp...
"The airlift of Indian troops, the vanguard of a veritable army of 4,700 is

doubly troublesome to the Kasavubu regime, whose protests were made in
the name of the entire confederation..."
59 Mekki Abbas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Here I want to say it is not my business, because it is not a United Nations
arrangement. This airlift has been made possible by the good offices of the
United States Government, and it is surprising, therefore, that there should be this
expression of opinion on the character of the allegedly responsible quarters.
Even more than all this are matters, small as they may seem to some of you - but
there have been reference to the Gurkha troops that are in the Congo, in terms that
are entirely uncomplimentary for the very gallant band of people who have many
war honours to their credit, who have served the cause of freedom in two wars,
even though they are a comparatively backward illiterate people coming from a
country like ours; to dub them as mercenaries from the Government of India is, I
think, a gross libel. They are citizens of our country. They are honoured men and
officers of the Indian Army, and it is up to me to repudiate this libel. So far as the
Indian troops are concerned, we have placed them at the disposal of the United
Nations, and their movements and use will be regulated by the command of the
Secretary-General, as such, under the terms of the agreement that has been
reached.
In the midst of all this comes the news of yesterday, where, whatever may be said
by any other faction, there can be no question that Mr. Tshombe of Katanga in no
way comes under any kind of definition of the principles and purposes set forth in
the Charter. He is a secessionist who wants to break up the integrity of the Congo
to the support of which the United Nations is pledged, and what is more, Mr.
Kasavubu proclaims he will defend the sovereignty of the Congo. Therefore, this
secessionist movement led by mercenaries from outside with the assistance of
large numbers of Belgian officers, cannot be permitted, in the opinion of my
Government, under the terms of the United Nations resolutions.
It is not for us to say from this rostrum what action, how and when it will be
taken. We have no desire to introduce into this any prestige line of any character,
but if any part of the Congo were to break away, even if it were permitted, and the
United Nations forces are to be carried along in this manner, then the whole
authority of the United Nations and of the Charter is called into question. It is our
submission that the way of dealing with this in the hope of avoiding violence is
the way which is highly commendable. We would not want force to be used
unless the troops are forced to do so, but no army in the world is going to sit idle
when it is being attacked by regular forces.
I submit that all those who have been endowed with authority in this matter,
irrespective of what might be said, if it is not possible to carry out the resolution
of 21 February within a responsible time - the crux of which is the withdrawal of
the Belgian forces - then this organisation should rightfully expect the matter to
come before the Security Council with categorical requests for direction, so we
know where we stand.
FOR THOSE REASONS MY COUNTRY, ALONG WITH FOURTEEN OR
FIFTEEN OTHERS, has submitted a draft resolution [A/L.339]. The operative
part of it states:
"1. Calls upon the Government of Belgian to accept its responsibilities as

a member of the United Nations and a comply fully and promptly with the
will of the Security Council and the General Assembly;
"2. Decides that all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary
personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and
mercenaries, shall be completely withdrawn and evacuated within a period
not exceeding twenty-one days, failing which necessary action should be
taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;"
My own Government did not want a long time-limit to be put on the withdrawal
because the situation has been going on for seven or eight months. The view of
our Government was to request the evacuation forthwith, but many people who
are wiser than we disagreed - and we accepted their wisdom and agreed to this
period being put down; but if the general wish of the Assembly is that the
withdrawal be forthwith, we shall be willing to accept that, it being understood
that the period may be curtailed, not extended.
The draft resolution also "calls upon all States to exert their influence and extend
their co-operation." That is to say, we are concerned, as having responded to the
call made by the United Nations, which other people also have done, and we are
glad to see that some of the other countries which have withdrawn their troops are
thinking of sending them back. We hope that without military action, by good
sense on the part of all concerned, the response of Belgium, which is one of the
founding Members of the United Nations, which as I said a while ago, twice in a
half century has seen its own mother territory torn by aggression, will come to the
rescue of all of us by the voluntary action of complete withdrawal, because any
excuse, any argument that these are not official soldiers, either by the Union of
South Africa or by Belgium or by the Rhodesian authorities - these will not satisfy
the public opinion of the world...
MY COUNTRY AND MY GOVERNMENT FEEL VERY STRONGLY that

the continuance of the trouble in the Congo will only lead to greater and greater
misery and hardship for the Congolese people.
We have no desire to intrude in any way into their affairs. with regard to the
calumny that has sometimes been uttered in various countries, and which has been
repeated by others, that the Government of India or the Indian people have an
ulterior purpose in going to Africa, it is quite true that we have a large population,
but we have lived in India for six or seven thousand years. And when we have
gone somewhere, we have gone not as colonisers but for the purpose of adding to
the labour force through our powerful people, or otherwise. Therefore, it is not
necessary for me to make any kind of confession of faith in saying that we have
no ulterior motives in this matter.
We were glad to be able to respond to the resolution adopted by the Security

Council on February 21, 1961, and moved by our sister countries - Ceylon,
Liberia and the United Arab Republic - in which certain responsibilities were
placed upon members. We think it is the equal responsibility of all members to
contribute according to their strength and capacity and their understanding of the
situation. We have no doubt that, by virtue of the support of the permanent
members of the Council for the resolution, an understanding of the policy will
lead from now on to greater efforts to obtain the withdrawal of the Belgian and
other foreign forces from this area.
There are large numbers of mercenaries there from the Union of South Africa and
neighbouring territories, such as Rhodesia, which are really anarchic forces, and
which, even when a solution is found, will be disturbing factors in Africa. In
view of the policies followed in their own countries and in relation to their
territories - for example, South West Africa - I am certain that the other African
countries are quite awake as to what is happening in this regard.
We submit these draft resolutions to the verdict of the Assembly. we have no

doubt that, while full discussion is required, unanimous support will be given to
them through the good offices of the powerful countries which are members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which countries have been responsible for
assisting Mr. Kasavubu in gaining a certain amount of prestige in his country,
and that these powerful countries, which desire peace more than anything else and
know the consequences of the threat to international peace and security
surrounding this problem, will use their wisdom and their unquestioned influence
to bring about the consummation of these draft resolutions.
AGGRESSION AGAINST EGYPT BY FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND ISRAEL IN 1956
[On October 29, 1956, the armed forces of Israel invaded Egyptian territory. The
next day, the United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum demanding that
Egypt and Israel stop warlike action and withdraw their military forces ten miles
from the Suez Canal, that is, deep inside Egyptian territory. On 31 October,
French and British aircraft began air attacks on targets in Egypt, and Egypt
blocked the Suez Canal by sinking ships in the Canal. By 5 November, Israel
occupied the whole of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza, part of Palestine under
Egyptian administration. On the same day, British and French forces landed at
the northern entrance to the Suez Canal and occupied Port Said and Port Fuad.
The Indian Government played an active role, during this crisis, in diplomatic
efforts for the termination of aggression against Egypt in 1956-57.
The United Nations Security Council began consideration of the situation on 30

October, but could not take action since Britain and France vetoed two draft
resolutions, proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, for
a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces behind the Armistice Line established by the
Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949. On a decision by the Security Council,
an emergency special session of the General Assembly was then convened on 1
November.
On 2 November, on the proposal of the United States, the Assembly adopted

resolution 997 (ES-I) calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of
forces behind the Armistice Line. Egypt accepted the resolution but Israel agreed
only to a cease-fire but not to withdrawal from Egyptian territory.
On 4 November, the Assembly adopted resolution 998 (ES-I), proposed by

Canada, requesting the Secretary-General to submit a plan for setting up an
international emergency force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.
It also adopted resolution 999 (ES-I), proposed by India and 18 other Asian-
African countries, reaffirming resolution 997 and calling on the parties to comply
with it immediately. The next day, the Assembly adopted another resolution - 1000
(ES-I) - authorising the Secretary-General to set up a United Nations Command
for the international force.]
[On November 7, 1956, the General Assembly discussed the situation created by
60
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, First Emergency Special Session, Plenary
Meetings, pages 115-19
the triple aggression, and adopted two resolutions. By resolution 1001 (ES-I),
proposed by Argentina, Ceylon and five other countries, it approved the report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force, authorised the
organisation of the Force, and established an Advisory Committee to advise the
Secretary-General. By resolution 1002 (ES-I), adopted on the proposal of India
and 18 other Asian-African countries, it called on Israel immediately to withdraw
its forces behind the Armistice Line, and called upon the United Kingdom and
France to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory.
In this speech on the two resolutions, Mr. Menon informed the Assembly that
India had agreed to participate in the emergency force on certain conditions
accepted by the Secretary-General.]
We are gathered here at this meeting of the emergency session of the General
Assembly for two purposes: (1) to consider the report of the Secretary-General in
pursuance of General Assembly resolution 998 (Es-I) [A/3302] and (2) to
consider the 19-Power draft resolution [A/3309] submitted at the 566th meeting.
Before addressing myself to these two specific topics, I want to say, on behalf of
my delegation, that at this stage when we hope we are entering into a phase where
collective responsibility and the collective will of the world are being brought to
bear on the question for beneficent ends, it is desirable to look back only to the
extent essential for the consideration of this problem. We have come to the stage
when we must look forward and apply ourselves to the various aspects of this
question. My Government desires me to state before the General Assembly -
because I have just come from India - its general reaction and attitude toward the
present difficulties.
Our country, our people and our Government, indeed our whole part of the world,
have been shocked by the developments that have taken place in relation to Egypt.
We desire to state without any superlatives that we regard the action of Israel as
an invasion of Egyptian territory, and the introduction of the forces of the United
Kingdom and France as an aggression without any qualification. We have said
this from the very beginning.
We received this news not only with a sense of shock but also with a great deal of
sadness. I say "with a great deal of sadness" for two reasons, first because of the
great physical harm that is being inflicted upon the people of Egypt, and secondly
because those engaged in a part of this aggression, namely the France-British
alliance, are countries and peoples with whom we have very close kinship. That
is particularly so in the case of the United Kingdom. It is therefore more in
sorrow than in anger that we approach this problem. During the last several
weeks of great anxiety, we have tried to exercise our influence by way of
persuasion to change the course of these developments.
I think that I should leave this aspect at this stage, stating the minimum that is
required. Later I shall point out why it is necessary to refer to it. I shall come
now to the first of the draft resolutions, namely the 19-Power draft.
THERE IS VERY LITTLE THAT ONE NEED SAY ABOUT THIS DRAFT,
except that it is very largely a reiteration of previous resolutions. It was submitted
because previous resolutions have not been complied with. However, there are
certain new factors, namely, that the call for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of
foreign forces from Egyptian soil has been partly complied with by those
countries that are now engaged in the invasion of Egypt. The United Kingdom
and France, and Egypt, effected a cease-fire, according to all reports, at 7 p.m.
(New York time) yesterday. However, there have been expressions of view in the
Assembly that the fighting was continuing. Let us assume, for our purpose, that
the cease-fire has been effected and that a beginning has been made in regard to
the observance of the General Assembly’s resolutions.
Two other factors remain, however. One concerns the statement in operative
paragraph 2 of that draft, in which Israel is once again called upon to withdraw
immediately all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the Armistice
Agreement of February 24, 1949. I think that the Assembly will appreciate the
importance, not only of reiterating this request, but of taking it very seriously and
of going along with the Secretary-General in the observations which he has just
made.
Repeated calls have been made to Israel to withdraw its invading armies from the
territory of Egypt, which are there in violation of the Armistice Agreement, in
violation of the provisions of the Charter and in violation of all known standards
of international conduct. The problems which we are subsequently going to
consider, indeed the problem of terminating the conflict and attempting to find the
beginning of a solution of the basic problems there, are only possible within the
context of this withdrawal.
This particular matter is not a question of how much or how little can be done or
of whether it can be done in one day or in two days; the withdrawal of Israel
forces to their own frontiers as established by the Armistice Agreement is
fundamental to any settlement.
I am sure that the Assembly is perturbed, as was my delegation, at the recent

official statements made by the Government of Israel, statements which have been
criticised even by the other two Powers that are now engaged in operations in
Egypt. The Prime Minister of Israel has stated that there will be no withdrawal
from the advanced positions occupied. However, there has been a communication
to the Secretary-General in regard to the cease-fire. That is one of the reasons
why this draft resolution has become necessary.
My delegation is heartened by the statement just made by the Secretary-General,
in which he expressed, I am sure, the will and the views of practically the entire
representation of this Assembly, namely, that if this request is not complied with,
then the Assembly must turn, at once, to the other provisions and remedies that
are open to it under the provisions of the Charter.
Operative paragraph 3 of the draft calls upon the United Kingdom and France
once again immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory.
Perhaps I am not quite correct about this, but there seems to be a technical
inaccuracy here, because when we first called upon the United Kingdom and
France it was in regard to the introduction of forces into the territory of Egypt. At
that time the landings had not taken place. However, the landings took place
subsequently and the territory of Egypt was occupied. Now there has been a
cease-fire, but the cease-fire is only a beginning and only a part of the request
made by the General Assembly. It must be followed by the withdrawal of all
forces.
Every practical person will realise that the word "immediately" in a political
resolution cannot be interpreted in the sense of instant action, because troops have
to be moved. What this draft resolution seeks to do is to express the view of its
sponsors that it is not possible to think in terms of these Franco-British forces
remaining on Egyptian territory contingent upon some other element. It is
necessary to state this, because the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has
repeatedly said that these forces would so remain. But the history of Egypt is one
of occupation by various invading troops throughout the past, even though they
sometimes came after stating that it was only for temporary purposes.
Operative paragraph 3, therefore, should not present any difficulties to those who
agree with the general idea that the aggressive forces must be evacuated. That is
what it calls for. Therefore, the removal of these troops must begin forthwith and
its termination must take place without delay. That is the meaning of this clause.
My delegation is not prepared to set an hour by the clock when this should be
done, but the substance of the paragraph is entirely clear.
With great respect, I should now like to make some observations in connection
with paragraph 3 which have become necessary as a result of the observations
made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France. They are entirely
free to place their own interpretations on these questions, but as far as my
delegation is concerned and as far as we understand the substance and purpose of
this draft resolution and the report before us, we do not believe that the parties
which have committed aggression can lay down the conditions under which they
are willing to withdraw. The United Nations has requested them to withdraw as
part of the termination of that aggression.
We cannot accept the position that the invading forces lay down the conditions,
ostensibly in the interest of the invaded party. If we do that, we put ourselves in
the position of justifying the invasion itself. And that is a position which my
Government is not ready to accept. We are quite prepared to appreciate that there
are practical problems involved. Therefore, any reasonable space of time that is
required for the physical removal of troops is something that one can understand.
But we cannot accept the view that the pursuit of some purposes with which we
can be in agreement or which are in conformity with the Charter necessitates
these forces remaining on Egyptian soil.
With those explanations, I would like to commend this draft resolution to the
acceptance of the Assembly and I hope that it will be possible for the United
Kingdom and France, which have expressed doubts about it, and for those who
have supported them in their positions, to accept this draft so that it can go
forward unanimously, and that at this stage, therefore, the aggression would be
terminated by common consent.
THEN I PROCEED TO THE SECOND DRAFT RESOLUTION, that submitted

by Argentina and six other countries [A/3308] and introduced by the
representative of Ceylon at the previous meeting. But before I speak about that
resolution, I would like to make a statement relative to the second report which
the Secretary-General has placed before the Assembly. I should like to join all
the speakers before me on this rostrum in paying my tribute to the hard work, the
diligence and thoroughness which has entered into the preparation of this report,
and I am sure that I am not exaggerating when I say that the Assembly and the
world owe a debt of gratitude to the Secretary-General for applying himself so
diligently to this problem.
Since we are now embarking on a very serious phase of activity on behalf of the
United Nations, and since those countries that would be contributing troops or in
other ways contributing to the maintenance of the international police force would
be taking on responsibilities, it is essential that clarification should be sought and
made and interpretations given.
I am directed by my Government to deal with this matter in that way. Two or

three days ago, when this question was discussed between the Secretary-General
and our Government, he very kindly gave us his view of the context and
conditions in which any participation of countries in the international United
Nations Force would take place. My delegation has formulated these conditions
[A/3302/Add.4/Rev. 1] and further discussed them with the Secretary-General,
and we understand that they represent the accurate set of conditions and
circumstances in which such a force would function; and we would like this to be
put into the record.
The participation of a member State would be based upon these conditions: first,
that the Emergency force would be set up in the context of the withdrawal of the
Franco-British forces from Egypt and on the basis of the call to Israel to withdraw
behind the armistice lines; secondly, that that Force would not in any sense be a
successor to the invading Franco-British forces or would in any sense take over its
functions; thirdly that it would be understood that the Force might have to
function through Egyptian territory and, therefore, that the Egyptian Government
must consent to its establishment; fourthly that the Force would be a temporary
one for the emergency. Its purpose is to separate the combatants, namely, Egypt
and Israel, with the latter withdrawing as required by the Assembly resolution.
The Force must be of a balanced composition. The agreement that we are now
making would be one in principle and we would reserve our position with regard
to actual participation until the full plan is before us.
I have been instructed by my Government to communicate to the Secretary-

General - which I have done - that the Government of India would be willing to
participate in the United Nations Force contemplated by his report in the context
of the conditions that I stated and would be willing, when the arrangements are
made final and the consent of the Assembly received, to send officers
immediately to enter into consultations with the Secretary-General in regard to the
details. Of course, when we say "immediately," we are taking into account the
fact that communications between India and this country have now been
somewhat interrupted by the damage done to the airfields in the Middle East.
The Government of India has been able to accede to the position that its
contribution would be something on the order of a battalion in strength. I am
instructed to say that transport facilities, including airlift, would have to be
provided through the United Nations, because it is not possible for us to transport
this body of troops and equipment on such short notice without outside assistance.
It will be possible to implement such agreement as we may make in a very short
period, not more than ten days from the day of agreement, although it may be
possible to send advance bodies beforehand. I have already made this
communication to the Secretary-General and it is among the papers that have been
circulated.
I want to draw the attention of the Assembly to the Secretary-General’s report

which is contained in document A/3302. My delegation is glad to note that it is
specifically stated in paragraph 4 that the authority of the United Nations
Commander would be so defined as to make him fully independent of the policies
of any one nation.
I want also like to draw the attention of the Assembly to another observation by
the Secretary-General in the report, with which my delegation is not only in
agreement but which it desires emphasised:
"It may in this context be observed that the Franco-British proposal, to

which I have already referred, may imply that the question of the
composition of the staff and contingents should be subject to agreement by
the parties involved, which it would be difficult to reconcile with the
development of the international force along the course already being
followed by the General Assembly."
The report goes on to say that this Force should be set up on an emergency basis
"to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the
terms" of the General Assembly resolution. The emphasis should be on the
words "all the terms" of the General Assembly resolution. So far we are in clear
agreement; we have no difficulties.
Now we come to paragraph 8 of the report and I should like the Assembly to
look at the last two sentences of paragraph 8. Here the difficulty is not perhaps
so much one of substance, but in a matter of this kind, in view of the not always
happy experience that my Government has had in dealing with similar problems
in Korea and in Indo-China, clarification beforehand is essential in order that
work may proceed without impediments, and also so that we may not have
difficulties with other participants. Paragraph 8 says the following:
"It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the
establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present
conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the
conflict. By the establishment of the Force, therefore, the General
Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly
and fully indicated in resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956."
I confess I am a little perplexed by this statement. I do not know quite what its
implications would be. If it means that the United Nations Force is not intended
to support the parties in the aggression or to intervene militarily, then I
understand it. But if its meaning is that the occupation forces would remain
where they are and therefore that their military balance would not be affected,
then of course it is totally contrary to its purpose. I draw attention to this
because as the statement stands it is a little perplexing.
The Secretary-General will bear with me. We have had difficulties of this kind -
I would not say without number, but quite a number - both in Indo-China and in
Korea, of a very serious character. My Government would have grave
apprehensions in undertaking military obligations which are subject to the
interpretation of foreign office lawyers of different countries afterwards.
Therefore, I think that some clarification of this paragraph would greatly relieve
our minds.
The Secretary-General has told us that this is the second and final report, but I
suppose that that is only a procedural description, because it goes on to say, in
paragraph 11: "However, the general observations which are possible should at
this stage be sufficient." Therefore, my delegation wants to be assured that there
is no finality about this report in the sense that it is a kind of army manual in
regard to these forces. There, again, it is not because we want to be punctilious,
but because we have been once bitten, twice bitten, and are three times shy at
the moment.
Again, when we come to paragraph 12, which is the most important part, I
should like, first, to observe that any interpretation which we make in regard to
the draft resolution when we record our vote ought to be bounded by paragraph
12. That is to say, we could not vote on the draft resolution and then go on to
think that we can depart from the essential features of paragraph 12 in the
Secretary-General’s report.
I believe that it is permissible to elaborate, in the sense that my delegation has

done, by reading out the context, as we understand it, which we agreed with the
Secretary-General. Therefore, when votes are cast, it should be with the definite
understanding that this draft resolution urges, in accordance with the terms of
resolution 997 (ES-I), that "all parties now involved in hostilities in the area
agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt any movement of
military forces and arms into the area." This was at the time when the landings
had not taken place in Egypt and invasion was only by way of serial
bombardment. But now we have a new situation and, therefore, the sense of that
sentence is not merely to halt the movement of military forces but to reverse the
movement of military forces and withdraw them. Therefore, I feel sure that the
Secretary-General would agree that this is the implication of this paragraph.
Paragraph 12 says further:
"These two provisions combined indicate that the functions of the United
Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter
Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order
to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian
troops."
"Non-Egyptian troops" now would mean all non-Egyptian troops since, at the
time this resolution was passed, the only non-Egyptian troops in Egypt were the
Israel troops, and, therefore, it must be meant to include the others.
We turn now to a point on which we wish to lay some emphasis. The last
sentence of paragraph 12 reads as follows:
"Its functions can, on this basis, be assumed to cover an area extending

roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines,
established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel."
It must be clearly understood that when we say "an area extending roughly from
the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines," it is only in the sense that
Egypt will permit the use of its territory by the troops in order to perform their
functions, which are to keep the Israel invading armies within their own
frontiers. It cannot in any sense at any time be construed that this Force has any
occupation function in these areas or will in any way infringe the sovereignty of
Egypt, but only that it has the right of way wherever necessary.
My Government is not only in agreement, but would stand with the Canadian
Government in the view which it has put forward in a communiqué just now
issued by the Canadian Cabinet, which is referred to in paragraph 14 as follows:
"General experience seems to indicate that it is desirable that countries
participating in the Force should provide self-contained units in order to avoid
the loss of time and efficiency." We subscribe to that, and that is why, when the
request was made to us in the report on this matter the Government of India,
although it has a very small army and has its own commitments, agreed to
furnish troops of a battalion in strength.
Finally, the Secretary-General goes on to say, in paragraph 19, that he is fully

aware of the exploratory character of this plan, which means that all the details
will have to be worked out.
My delegation will support the draft resolution that has been put forward by the
delegation of Ceylon on its own behalf and on that of six other delegations
[A/3308]. We hope that, in agreeing to the decision to set up this international
police force under the supervision of the General Assembly, the Secretary-
General will look into all the legal aspects, and if there are any legal loopholes,
will seek to close them; even in performing what we think is a useful action, it is
essential that we conform to the spirit and letter of the Charter.
THERE ARE TWO OTHER SMALL MATTERS TO WHICH I WISH TO

REFER while I am at this rostrum, and those are the two communications
addressed to the Secretary-General - one from the United Kingdom [A/3306]
and the other from France [A/3307]. I would refer particularly to the latter, point
3 of which reads as follows:
"The French Government considers it necessary, in accordance with the

suggestion made to you by Mr. Christian Pineau in his letter of 5
November, that a meeting of the Security Council should be called at the
ministerial level as soon as possible in order to work out the conditions for
a final cease-fire and a settlement of the problems of the Middle East."
I regret to say that my delegation is not able to comprehend this paragraph in

relation to what we are doing because, while no one can object to its being a
very good thing for the Council to meet at the ministerial level - it was so
contemplated in the Charter - the final condition of the cease-fire is the
operation now contemplated by the draft resolution under discussion, and if we
are going to send the question from pillar to post without knowing where the
decisions are to be made, I am afraid that the urgency of this matter will not
receive attention, and the whole of the arrangement that we are now trying to
establish will flounder. Therefore, this paragraph - while the French
Government in its wisdom is no doubt entirely free to communicate what it likes
and what it thinks is right - cannot be regarded, I think, as a provision of the
cease-fire, and the General Assembly cannot be committed in any way to the
idea that the cease-fire arrangements must await a meeting of the Security
Council for settlement. It is exactly because of the Security Council’s inability
to perform its duties on account of the French veto, that this matter has come
before the Assembly, and if it is to go back to the Security Council, then other
conditions will have to prevail. It is not in any sense to give expression to a
rivalry between these two bodies, but to take this matter as it stands today -
namely, that a country having been invaded without cause, and the security
provisions having become inoperative on account of the exercise of the veto -
other procedures have been adopted. I should like to say that, in the present
case, we have an instance of great suffering and tragedy - tragedy in the sense
not only of physical suffering and physical damage, but also of spiritual damage
that has been done to the principles of the United Nations.
As I said in the beginning, the problem before the Assembly is a matter of great
sadness for us because at least one of the parties concerned stands in extremely
close relations with us, and our country is seriously concerned as to whether it
represents a reversal of the great processes of human emancipation that have
been taking place in Asia and Africa during the last half-century, in which the
United Kingdom has made very significant contributions. It was a heartbreaking
thing for us to see that there was a reversal of this process - I do not want to call
it by familiar names - which would have meant the imposition of military power
over a weak nation and an attempt to settle disputes by the arbitrament of arms.
It has been of brief duration, and we hope that, as soon as this problem is out of
the way, the General Assembly, including those members which are now not
voting for these draft resolutions, will participate in the attempt to bind up the
wounds, both physical and otherwise, that have occurred as a result of present
developments.

195661
[The General Assembly resumed consideration of the situation at its eleventh

regular session which opened on 12 November. France, the United Kingdom
and Israel announced only token withdrawals of forces and set conditions for
further withdrawals.
61
302-06
On 24 November, twenty Asian-African countries proposed a draft resolution
(A/3385/Rev.1) to note with regret that British, French and Israeli forces had
not been fully withdrawn and to reiterate the call to the three countries to
comply forthwith with the resolutions of 2 and 7 November.]
I am sure that I express the view, not only of my delegation, but of the entire
Assembly, when I say that the Foreign Minister of Belgium is held in high
respect in this Assembly, not only as a former President of the Assembly in its
formative stages, but also as the representative of a country which, twice in our
lifetime, has been the victim of unprovoked aggression...
But I have the duty of looking at this amendment as it stands and as it relates not
merely to the narrow purposes of the draft resolution that stands in our name,
jointly with others, but to the purpose that this entire Assembly has in view,
namely, that of preventing a conflagration in the Middle East and restoring to
Egypt its sovereign rights, which have been violated by the naked aggression of
the British-French alliance in disregard of the Charter - the Charter has been
disregarded in the same way as treaties were disregarded by the violation of the
neutrality of Belgium in days gone by - and also of bringing about a situation
where other problems, as was indicated by the representative of the United
States this morning, are capable of solution.
If there is any doubt about this, one has only to look at the revised text of the
draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan and nineteen others of us. It was not
without difficulty, it was not without a great deal of conflict within ourselves,
that we agreed to rewrite paragraph 1 of the operative part. We did that largely
to meet the wishes of a large number of delegations of Latin America and
Europe which, we thought, would not want us to say anything that could come
into conflict with what they regard as a tone of moderation. I do not for one
moment admit that the original text was anything but a reiteration of the facts as
they are and a calling for compliance with the mandate of this Assembly...
NOW I COME TO THE TEXT OF THIS AMENDMENT, to which we offer

the most unqualified opposition because its purpose is not to improve the draft
resolution but to defeat its purpose by what was well known to European
countries in the war, an outflanking movement. While our political experience
is limited and our capacity for probing into these things may be meagre, we are
able to see this.
If this amendment is adopted - I am sure that it will not be - and incorporated in

the draft resolution, then the draft resolution will become a mockery of its old
form. It reverses its purpose, and the only alternative then left to us is either to
withdraw the whole of the draft resolution or, if the Assembly will not permit its
withdrawal, to vote against it. And if we have to vote against it, then the
passage of the other draft resolutions becomes difficult because, unless there is a
withdrawal of troops, or at least an urging of the withdrawal of troops, it is not
right to consider other questions.
The representative of Belgium tells us that the draft resolution submitted by my

country and others does not take into account the position of the United Nations
Emergency Force. I admit that that would be so if this document stood alone;
but we are considering this afternoon both this document and the six-Power draft
resolution [A/3386]. Not only have we addressed ourselves to this question of
the United Nations Emergency Force, but the six-Power draft resolution, which
is in two parts - one is entirely and fundamentally concerned with the Force, and
states : "Notes with approval the contents of the aide-memoire on the basis for
the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency force in Egypt,
as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General" - has taken into account the
whole report of the Secretary-General, which includes all the discussions that
have gone on between him, the Egyptian Government, and various others
concerned; in fact, the whole gamut of the subject.
It is not necessary that the relevant subject should be all in one paper; it is all
part of one position, and therefore I want to tell the Assembly that if there is any
suspicion, any fear or feeling in the mind of the mover of this amendment that
we are forgetting the United Nations Emergency Force, and that there is no
reference to that in this draft resolution, that may be textually correct, but it is
not in substance correct. In substance, the position is rather the reverse.
Then we are told that it must be an expression agreeable to both parties. I ask
the representative of Belgium in all conscience whether it is right today to ask
for an expression agreeable to both parties unless one of the parties concerned,
namely, those who have troops in the invaded country, come here and declare
their determination, not to make amends - that will come later - but to vacate the
aggression without qualifications. I wish, through the President, to ask both the
representatives of the United Kingdom and France whether there is one
statement they have made, whether they have expressed one sentiment in this
Assembly, in which they have said, "We will vacate." Every promise, every
declaration they have made is contingent upon something. My country and my
Government refuse to acknowledge the right of the aggressor to lay down
conditions for vacating.
It gives me no pleasure - on the contrary, it gives us much pain - to take up this

position in regard to the United Kingdom, but they leave us no option. Time
after time the Foreign Ministers have come forward and said, "we will move out
when you do this and when you do that." That is not the language of a person
who has committed the crime of aggression upon a people that had given no
provocation in this respect.
Therefore we cannot accept this position that there must be an expression

agreeable to both parties. There is only one way of getting an expression
agreeable to both parties: that is for the United Kingdom, France and Israel to
agree to this draft resolution - then they will have proclaimed that they have
reversed the course they have taken in defying the Charter.
ONLY TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AGO, the representative of the United

Kingdom, standing on this platform, told the United Nations that it had
neglected its duty - and these are two out of the four functioning permanent
members of the Security Council. They told us that we had neglected our duty,
that we had failed to protect the rights of the world, and therefore it was given to
one nation to police a country. I do not see any provision in the Charter
indicating that it is given to one nation to use armed might in the defence of any
principles that are embodied in the Charter.
The Charter makes provision for defence in case of attack. Egypt had that right.
Neither the United Kingdom nor France had the right to use arms against Egypt,
because they were not attacked. There is nothing in the Charter, there is nothing
in any moral principles or international law and practice which places upon any
country, however, great, however, mighty, however steeped in the traditions of
domination by force, the justification today for walking into another country and
saying, "we shall make you keep the law." That is the function of the
international community, and there is no right to appropriate this for oneself.
That is the height of national egoism.
Mr. Spaak, for whom I have great personal respect, asks us to mediate to help
solve these problems. I plead, with humility, that that injunction does not apply
to my nation or my Government. We have given a great deal of thought to these
things. In the last several months, a great deal of our effort has gone into
pleading, into requesting, into using our good offices, into doing everything we
could with the parties concerned in view of our connections and in view of the
many common bonds of friendship that hold us together. Nothing that has
happened in Egypt will wipe away the relations which exist between us and the
United Kingdom; that is to be treated separately. Therefore, we have meditated
on these questions, we have given thought to these questions. Governments like
mine and others, even this morning, have gone through, as I say, a great deal of
mental conflict in trying to agree to a form of words that the great majority of
this Assembly can without hesitancy accept.
I am prepared to understand that one delegation or group of delegations would

be more exercised by one question than by another. It is only natural that this
should be so, and we have taken that into consideration. In history, our parts of
the world, the parts of the world inhabited by non-European countries, have
been the happy hunting ground for other peoples, both for economic exploitation
and for military conquests. Therefore it has almost become part of the racial
memory of men to regard these aggressions as though they were less sinful, less
criminal, less against the Charter of the United Nations, than any other. But we
are prepared as practical persons to take these things into account. It is quite
natural for people to feel more aggrieved, more hurt, more moved by troubles,
by invasions, by transgressions of one kind of another, nearer to themselves,
than when they are far off. But the resolutions of the United Nations stand; its
demands stand.
THEN WE ARE TOLD BOTH BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL

AND BY THE OTHERS that this draft resolution does not correspond to the
facts. The one possible argument, the argument that on the face of it has some
value, that the mover of this amendment put before the Assembly, was that since
this draft resolution had been placed before the Assembly, there had been
communications by the Government of Israel.
Secondly, the representative of Israel said that what had been said here - that
according to communications received by the Secretary-General no Israel forces
had been withdrawn - was not accurate. I must confess that there is something
in the way of a hair-splitting correctness in it, but I would ask you to read the
text. When you read the text, what do you find? You find that the Secretary-
General asks the Israelis to withdraw. The communication from the
Government of Israel does not say that they have withdrawn. Therefore, is it a
wrong interference to say in substance that no Israel forces have been
withdrawn? Are we to understand that the Government of Israel would hide its
light under a bushel and say, "We have withdrawn but we do not want to tell
you?" After all, we are all men of average intelligence. It is not understandable
at all to me how an argument of this kind can be brought forward, but we shall
leave it at that...
...we have here a document which, I believe, came into our hands at about 3 p.m.
and one which came in a little before that. What do they say? They say:
"The question has been asked whether these withdrawals" - that is,
withdrawals of Israel forces - "include any substantial movements of Israel
forces out of Egyptian territory back to the Israel side of the Egypt-Israel
frontier." [A/3389].
Those are not the questions asked by the Secretary-General, and I make bold to
say that without referring to the text, because the Secretary-General has to go by
the decisions of the Assembly. The Assembly asked for a withdrawal behind the
armistice lines. I challenge anybody to point out any statement by the
Government of Israel, either written or oral, to the Assembly, that any Israel
troops have been withdrawn behind the armistice lines. Assuming that this is
correct - and I am prepared to assume that it is - there is a distinction between
withdrawal from Egyptian territory and withdrawal behind the armistice lines,
and it is a distinction of very great political importance, especially in view of
what is going on in the Gaza Strip at the moment.
Therefore, to say that this puts the wording of our draft resolution out of court is
not to understand the facts of the situation. We said, "No Israel forces have been
withdrawn behind the armistice lines." I would ask the Assembly whether any
representative has heard anyone speak on behalf of Israel and say that forces
have been withdrawn behind the armistice lines. If that is so, as far as we are
concerned, we are prepared to alter that sentence, but I have not heard any
statement of that kind. We regard the withdrawal behind the armistice lines as a
vital matter.
Therefore there is nothing in these criticisms, and the operative paragraph as

amended and included in the revised text is a moderate and considered statement
of the situation.
WE WERE HAPPY TO HAVE THE SUPPORT of the representative of the

United States this morning, although he said he did not regard this draft
resolution as necessary. I am quite prepared to concede that it may not be
necessary if withdrawals are taking place; and we are equally entitled to our
different anticipations of how much encouragement - I do not want to use the
word "prodding" - is required.
But then I read the text of the French reply and of the British reply. What does
the British reply say? Mr. Lloyd came here and told us that his Government was
withdrawing one battalion - and, as always, I take his word for it. But I now ask
the Assembly to look at annex III to the Secretary-General’s report on
compliance with the Assembly’s resolution [A/3384]. In paragraph 1, Mr.
Lloyd says: "No significant withdrawal has yet taken place."
It might be said that that was the decision to withdraw the battalion. But I read
in paragraph 4: "Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government, as an
indication of its intentions, has decided to withdraw at once an infantry battalion
from Port Said."
That was written on 21 November. Presumably the decision was taken on the
20th. Today is the 24th - and it is announced this afternoon that one battalion
has been withdrawn. Some people may not agree with me when I say that, but I
am thankful for small mercies. But the fact remains that this Assembly has been
in session, the Secretary-General has been urging withdrawal, we have been
talking about withdrawal - and is there anyone here who does not say that that
has been a factor in promoting this withdrawal?
The letter of 21 November from Mr. Lloyd to the Secretary-General said that
there had been no substantial withdrawal - and that was written in the context of
the decision to withdraw one battalion. Therefore the United Kingdom
Government admits that the withdrawal of one battalion is not a substantial
withdrawal. It is quite logical: they say that there has been no substantial
withdrawal, that they propose to withdraw one battalion - and now they have
withdrawn it, so even that withdrawal is not a substantial withdrawal.
There is another aspect that disturbs us. In his second communication

[A/3389/Add.1], the representative of Israel says that two infantry brigades have
been withdrawn. The French reply to the Secretary-General [A/3384, annex 1] -
it is in language that requires a great deal of consideration - reads:
"Approximately one-third of the French forces which were deployed on 7
November has been withdrawn." Withdrawn to where? Withdrawn from the
place of deployment. Are they still on Egyptian territory? Are they on the open
seas? Are they on French territory? That is not indicated in this document.
But, over and above that, when the French Government tells us that one-third
has been withdrawn, when the Israel Government tells us that two brigades have
been withdrawn, and when the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom tells us
that one battalion has been withdrawn, the only sensible way of looking at it is
to ask: what proportion do these withdrawals bear to the total of the forces on
Egyptian soil? We have not been let in on that secret; we do not know the size
of the forces in those places. Unless we know the proportion these withdrawals
bear to the total size of the forces, these documents lose their value as evidence
of substantial withdrawals.
My delegation therefore has no option - regretting as it does any opposition on

the part of the representative of Belgium - but to request and plead with this
Assembly that it reject the Belgian amendment. The amendment does not
perform the purpose for which the representative of Belgium drafted it - in order
to produce an agreed text which might be a step towards the further solution of
the problem. It does not represent the facts as they are today, because the
original resolutions were for immediate withdrawal. I was one of those who
stood up here [567th meeting] and said that "immediate" could not mean
"instantaneous." But I must confess that by "immediate" I did not mean a lapse
of three weeks. That is not immediate; that represents a process of
procrastination. And, with the simplicity of my mind, I have not been able to
understand why it takes longer for an army to come out than it takes for it to go
in.
I WANT TO STATE CATEGORICALLY, HERE AND NOW, that I desire the

Secretary-General, on behalf of my Government, to be reminded of the
statement made by my delegation when agreeing to participation in the
Emergency Force, to which I shall refer when the main debate comes - the
statement as to the conditions and the context in which these forces were being
formed and used. We said that in no circumstances should we agree at any time
to take over from the invading forces. That would be to justify aggression. We
are not prepared at any time, even by an act of acquiescence, to condone the
invasion of Egypt. Therefore the invading countries, France and the United
Kingdom, have no right to tell us: "We will decide, when your forces come in,
whether they are big enough and whether they can take over."
Not only are they challenging the position of these forces of the United Nations;
they are taking upon themselves decisions that rest with the Assembly. It is up
to the Assembly to decide what forces should be sent and what forces should not
be sent, and under what conditions. What right has anybody else to say, "We
shall decide whether you can do the job we have been doing?" I hope we do not
do the job they have been doing.
In no circumstances, then, will my Government subscribe to that proposition,

and I want the Secretary-General to make that clear beyond any doubt - because
that would be a breach of faith with my Parliament, with my Government.
Indian troops were on Egyptian soil in past years as part of an invading army. It
is a memory we want to forget. If they are to go there again, they must go as a
peace force, and in no sense must they be associated with invasion...
This is a good time to say that my delegation and those associated with us, and
even others whose names do not appear on this draft resolution, came to the
rostrum this morning and asked that these draft resolutions be put to the vote
today, not because we wanted to stifle discussion - it is not to our interest to
stifle discussions, because it is not we that have anything to hide - but because
we wanted the Secretary-General to be able to use the weekend for the purposes
mentioned in the other two draft resolutions, and we wanted to give the United
Kingdom and France the opportunity to come here after the weekend recess and
to be able to say that they had made greater progress, so that further resolutions
of this kind would not be necessary and this would be a forgotten phase. It was
for those reasons that we came here this morning and asked that these draft
resolutions be passed, so that the Secretary-General and his staff could get on
with their work and so that the Egyptian people would find some release from
the tensions caused by an occupying army.
There are representatives of many countries in this room who have recollections
- past, present, remote - of the presence of occupying armies in their countries.
We should like to see an early evacuation of the Egyptian ports and the transfer
of administration to the Egyptian people. It is galling to think that a member of
the United Nations should have a part of its country administered by a foreign
Power. That is what we have in mind when people ask us to take things slowly.
There are the qualifications that the United Kingdom makes: that it is its
intention - only its intention, not what it is doing - as quickly as possible to take
certain action in regard to part of its force, and immediately to consider what
next can be done, and so on. There are so many qualifications here that we do
not know whether this really means withdrawal. I have no doubt at all that the
United Kingdom Government, by its declaration that it intends to withdraw,
means to withdraw. But it is fenced about with very many conditions - and
those are not conditions which are either agreed to by the United Nations or can
be agreed to under the terms of the Charter.
The Charter does not give the power to the United Nations to create a United
Nations army to occupy anybody else’s country or to take over the powers of
administration. The Charter does give the United Nations the power to
constitute an army to drive out the aggressor. But that step has not been taken,
and I am glad it has not been taken because of the extent of the area of conflict.
THEREFORE THE QUESTION BEFORE US IS whether the amendment

should be rejected, and our delegation is already committed; and the President
announced to the Assembly the motion that I made that these two draft
resolutions be now put to the vote and the general debate on the Egyptian
question continued afterwards. There are many other problems to be
considered. We have problems to bring up and propose to do so, and on them
major draft resolutions can be submitted. I therefore request that this
amendment be rejected.
There is one further point I wish to make. An attempt is being made to have the
vote, either on the main draft resolution or any part of the amendment, by parts.
We shall invoke our rights under rule 91 of the rules of procedure to resist this.
I want to save the time of the Assembly and tell you what is on our minds.
Before I leave the rostrum, I want to point out just this once that the Belgian
amendment is a request to replace paragraph 1 and 2 of the operative part of our
draft resolution [A/3385/Rev.1], and I ask the representatives to look at
paragraph 2:
"Reiterates its call to France, Israel and the United Kingdom to comply
forthwith with its resolutions of 2 and 7 November 1956."
If that paragraph is taken away, it is an admission that we no longer are willing

to press the position that we decided upon in past meetings of the Assembly.
That is clear both from the form in which the amendment is cast, and from the
way the functions of the United Nations forces would be built in as a condition
and contingency in the draft resolution. The amendment says: "Notes that
according to the information received..." The only information we recognise is
information communicated to the Secretary-General, which says that Israel has
withdrawn part of its troops, implying thereby that it has been withdrawn
according to the resolution, which is not the fact. Also, the amendment merely
asks for expediting; and if "immediate" means three weeks, how much will
"expedite" mean? Therefore that is not enough.
I may be asked: What is the use of passing a strong resolution? I am in entire
agreement with not using unnecessarily strong words. That is why our revised
version of this morning is cast in the mildest, most polite language you could
think of. There is nothing but the expression of regret. Sorrow is a good virtue
when there is inequity of one kind or another. Anger is probably bad. That is
why we have expressed not anger but regret.
I commend this draft resolution to the Assembly, and request you reject the
amendment.

195662
[Mr. Menon made a general statement on the aggression against Egypt, on the
procrastination of the aggressors, and on the role of the United Nations
Emergency Force.]
The Assembly will recall that, as a result of the fact that Egypt’s action in
nationalising the Suez Canal was challenged, conferences were held in London;
negotiations took place; and, finally, the Governments of the United Kingdom and
France brought the problem before the Security Council. Some time in October,
agreements were reached on the basis for discussion. It was understood at that
time by the world that the parties concerned were to talk directly to each other,
using the good offices of the Secretary-General, and were to explore further the
question of resolving the differences between Egypt and the two Western
countries.
It should be realised by this time that, though the problem had vast international
implications in the sense that the Suez Canal, within Egyptian sovereignty and a
part of Egyptian territory, is a waterway of international importance and of great
economic importance to the world, both the western and the eastern hemispheres,
the Secretary-General, so far as my Government is aware, had suggested
provisionally that on 29 October those discussions should continue informally -
because they would have no other status - between the representatives of the
United Kingdom and France and the representative of Egypt, with his assistance,
and that they should be held in Geneva.
That is a significant date, because it was on 29 October that Israel attacked Egypt.
I ask the General Assembly to put this in its proper context. Here was a whole set
of arrangements which had intervened in the armed preparations by the Anglo-
French alliance, which we were told were merely precautionary, and my
62 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
327-34
Government accepted that statement and has no desire at the present moment to
go into it. The Security Council had addressed itself to the question, and had
found a basis for conversation, and 29 October was the date suggested. My
Government was informed by the Government of Egypt that it was willing to
participate in those conversations. The world anticipated that the discussions
would take place on 29 October, until the Anglo-French alliance announced that it
was not willing to participate. It was on that selfsame date that Israel attacked
Egypt.
Prior to that, there had been statements of a responsible character on behalf of the
Israel Government that it would not take advantage of the difficulties and the
disputes that had arisen over the Suez Canal to enforce its views or to indulge in
any activities that might be embarrassing in those circumstances. In other words,
it was not believed by anybody that advantage would be taken of the difficulties
of Egypt at that time or of the world situation arising from the controversy over
the Suez Canal...
So, on 29 October Egypt was attacked by the State of Israel. Now we are
prepared to admit that this attack cannot be taken in isolation from the context of
the history of the last ten years. All those who have been associated with the
United Nations know that time and time again the Security Council has been
called upon to intervene in skirmishes and attacks by one side or the other, and
there is a whole background or sharp differences of opinion having resulted in
armed conflict between one or other of the Arab States, or a number of them, on
one side, and Israel on the other. But any justification for the attack of 29 October
cannot be sought in this, because there was nothing extraordinary about that
situation, and I think it would be idle to pretend that Egypt would have chosen
this particular opportunity, when it was being threatened by the accumulation of
the naval, air and land forces of two great Western Powers as part of the pressures
to be exercised upon it, to launch a new attack.
Therefore, the only "justification" for this attack was that it was a preventive war,
and the whole conception of preventive war is contrary to the principles of the
Charter and the ideas of civilised existence. Preventive war is the doctrine of the
blitzkrieg, and here on 29 October was launched a surprise attack.
On 30 October, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom issued an

ultimatum to the Governments of Egypt and Israel. I should like to read out the
report on this ultimatum as it appeared in the newspapers, which I believe
sufficiently corresponds to the text:
"The United Kingdom and France have addressed urgent communications

to the Governments of Egypt and Israel calling upon both sides to stop all
warlike acts by land, sea and air forthwith, to withdraw their military
forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal; further, in order to
separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the
Canal by ships of all nations, they have asked the Egyptian Government to
agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into positions at
Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. The Governments of Egypt and Israel have
been asked to answer these communications within twelve hours..."
I should like the Assembly to look at this text. The Israel Government and the
Egyptian Government were asked to withdraw ten miles from the Canal. The
Canal is within Egyptian territory, and for the Egyptians to withdraw ten miles
within their own territory while the Israelis were permitted to go within ten
miles of the Canal would mean an open licence for the latter to come across the
Sinai peninsula to the border of the Canal. Therefore it is all very well to talk
about this as an equal ultimatum to both sides, but I submit that the phraseology
makes it quite clear it was not.
Secondly, we were told that the Egyptian Government was asked by the United
Kingdom and French Governments to agree that their forces should occupy Port
Said, Ismailia and Suez; that is to say, there was a demand made upon a
sovereign country to permit the military occupation not only of a part of its
territory, but of its key strategic positions. It should not be forgotten that so far
as the United Kingdom was concerned, only two or three years ago, after a great
deal of negotiation, the evacuation of those bases had taken place, and the
conditions for re-entry had been incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement of October 19, 1954.
Therefore this ultimatum was a violation of the principles of the Charter and of
international practice, an aggression against a sovereign nation and a threat to
violate its territory. Also, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, it was a
violation of a specific agreement. Therefore any idea that this was permissible
or could be justified in any way because notice had been given falls to the
ground.
On 31 October, only two days later, the Anglo-French forces started bombing
Egypt. We were told that the bombing was on military targets, and in this
context I will refer later this afternoon to the speech of the Foreign Minister of
France, without going into the question whether anyone has a right to bomb
someone else’s military targets except when they are attacked or in a state of
war. I understand that it is the position of the Anglo-French alliance that they
are not in a state of war with Egypt but are performing military operations. That
is a fine distinction, except when large numbers of people die, when the
distinction does not seem to have any meaning.
In this bombing of military targets, large numbers of Egyptian civilians,

including women and children, perished. People were wounded. What is more,
Arab quarters at Port Said were burned out. A great deal of destruction and
suffering was inflected upon the Egyptian people. The whole world has been
against the bombing of civilian populations, and the fact that notice was given to
people to quit their own homes does not make that act any more humane.
On 5 November, the Anglo-French forces landed. In the meantime, the General

Assembly had met and, on 2 November, had called upon those who had invaded
Egyptian territory to withdraw within their own boundaries - that is, Israel - and
upon the others not to import any arms or armed forces or to add to their military
strength in that area.
Therefore the action taken by the Anglo-French side after the adoption of that
resolution [997 (ES-II)] was a flouting of the resolutions of this Assembly.
Instead of ceasing their action immediately the United Kingdom and France
tried by landing and military operations to gain military advantages, hoping no
doubt to negotiate from that position of strength as against the military weakness
of the Egyptian side.
On 7 November, as a result of the Assembly’s efforts, a cease-fire was

established; but the foreign forces still remain on Egyptian soil.
BEFORE I PURSUE THESE EVENTS, I AM INSTRUCTED by my

Government to make our position very clear in regard to the three parties
concerned in this aggression.
I refer first to the United Kingdom. My country is in very close and harmonious
relations both with the people of the United Kingdom and with its Government.
While this action on its part, contrary to our judgement of what is right, has been
a great shock to us - we shall criticise it, we shall never agree with it and we
shall never agree not to say so - our relations with the United Kingdom still
remain harmonious, and it is our hope that as a result of the developments of the
days to come the lapses of the last few weeks will in some way be remedied. As
I have said, this has come as a great shock to our public opinion. My
Government has asked me to make this statement because, harsh as our criticism
may be, definite as our position may be in this matter of aggression, it does not
come from any feeling of hatred or vindictiveness or any desire to lower the
prestige of another country.
The second party in this matter is, of course, France. We have very good
relations with the French Government. By friendly conversations and
agreement patiently conducted over a period of seven or eight years, the French
abandoned the last vestiges of their colonial empire on our territory. It was an
action which was of service to the world, as well as to our two countries. We
have a great regard for their culture, their ideals and their institutions. We have
a considerable amount of trade with them, and the relations between their people
and ours are always friendly. Therefore anything we say in regard to the French
Government’s action is also in the same category.
I come now to the Government of Israel. The Government of India recognises
the State of Israel and the Government of Israel. We have no quarrels with them.
We desire to remain in friendly relations with them as with everybody else. We
have taken part in the consideration of the Israel-Arab questions as part of our
responsibilities in this Assembly. There is nothing in our tradition or in our
recent history which can lay at our door the charge of any racial feelings, any
anti-Semitic feelings, or indeed the disregard of the rights of a member State.
Our position in this is not the same as that of the Arab countries, and we do not
hesitate to say so, irrespective of whatever emotions are aroused. Therefore,
with respect to Israel also we have no feelings of hatred, no desire to rub things
in or anything of that character. The way we address ourselves to this matter,
therefore, is purely objective.
I NOW DESIRE TO REFER TO THE POSITION as set out by the three

countries. Mr. Lloyd, speaking on behalf of his Government told us that the
purpose of this attack was to do some sort of service to the cause of civilisation,
to the cause of peace, which would prevent the world from going up in the
flames of war. Secondly, he told us that this was a challenge which the United
Kingdom had thrown out to the United Nations. I am sorry that that should have
come from him. Thirdly, we were told that it was a protective shield between
the combatants; the shield seems to have been something which prevented one
of the combatants from defending itself.
Neither my Government, nor anyone in my delegation, would ever privately or

publicly wish or state that instead of attacking Egypt the Anglo-French forces
should have attacked Israel. We would never say that, we would never think it,
because the bombing of women and children, of protected enterprise and
industry and of economic development in any country, the infliction of harm and
cruelty in that way, particularly in a thickly populated area, is as much a crime
against humanity and as much to be deplored if it takes place on Israel’s territory
as on our own.
Therefore our argument is not, "Why do you not go and bomb them?" Our
argument is that, first of all, this was not an action to limit war. If we take, for
argument’s sake, the idea that it was so thought of, it was wrongly conceived.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have no responsibility, no
rights and indeed no defence for the position that they take up - that they have
some God-given function of policing the world. If Egypt or Israel was in danger
of being attacked, either one had the right under Article 51 of the Charter to
defend itself individually and collectively. But for this Organisation to admit
even by quiescence that any member State, however powerful - whether it be the
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom or France, the most
powerful countries in the world - may take upon itself the protection of the
world, is to go away from the whole idea of collective organisation and from the
development of some law in the world and to go back to the idea of national
enterprise for the maintenance, so-called, of peace in the world.
In all, the United Kingdom and France have visited many countries in the last
three or four centuries. In many places they have stayed in a fit of absent-
mindedness; they did in ours. They have conferred a great many benefits during
their sojourn. But their peoples have always desired the termination of that stay.
Those like ourselves have managed to arrange it in a rather friendly way and
therefore we reaped the advantage both of the subordination as well as of the
present friendship.
Therefore we deny this conception, first of all, that in fact it was a war to
prevent a greater war. We deny the right to wage the war. We state
emphatically that it was a violation of the provisions of the Charter, particularly
of Article 2, paragraph 4. I do not mention the Israel Government, because it
makes no bones about this. Of course, there are other people who are putting on
this the aura of idealism. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter definitely says:
"All Members"- there is no exemption here for the permanent members of

the Security Council or for those that have higher standards of civilisation
or have arrogated to themselves a moral right - "shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
If it is going to be argued that this action is consistent with the purposes of the
United Nations, then we turn to Article 1, where we say that among those
purposes is the maintenance of international peace. It will be a bad day when
we say that the maintenance of international peace is to be achieved by the
bombing of civilian populations and by a blitzkrieg on countries, a word and a
set of circumstances which we want to forget in our civilisation. Article 1 goes
on to say: "and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace." The words from "to take effective
collective measures" are not covered by this action. It is true that if Israel,
France and the United Kingdom act together, it is a collective measure. France
and the United Kingdom, however, have denied that they acted in collaboration
with the State of Israel.
If it is argued that the French and the British acting together are taking collective
measures, I submit that Article 1 of the Charter does not imply or contemplate
measures of that kind, but measures that are provided for in Chapter VII of the
Charter. Therefore, if the United Kingdom and France, which have a special
voice in the counsels of this Assembly as permanent members of the Security
Council, knew that Israel was going to attack on 29 October - and if that was
the reason why they did not want to go to Geneva, because they were otherwise
occupied - then their duty, in my humble submission, would have been to
convoke the Security Council and ask for such action to be taken as would arrest
the aggression that Israel was contemplating, especially since in this particular
matter the United Nations had not only created the State of Israel but had also
put in machinery, however weak or inadequate, to supervise the truce as it
existed between the two countries. So they took it out of the United Nations,
they took it out of the truce machinery and returned to the law of the nineteenth
century.
The invasion of Egypt by the United Kingdom Government stands on a par with
the attack on Alexandria in 1880 and the occupation of Egypt thereafter. This
must be clearly understood, and we keep on reiterating these things, because in
the last week, in the United Kingdom, in this country and in this Assembly and
elsewhere, there has been an attempt to describe this action as though it was
some service to the world. The moment we permit this halo to get around it, to
portray an act of aggression as an act of morality, we shall be unable to take any
corrective action.
Mr. Lloyd further told us that the action we were taking in regard to the United
Nations Emergency Force had been first conceived by the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, that the idea had been repeated in this Assembly by Sir
Pierson Dixon, and that thereafter it had been put before the Assembly by the
Foreign Minister of Canada. I must say that we are rather taken aback by this.
We had accepted, we continue to accept the actions of the Canadian
Government as taken in good faith, as measures arising from themselves, not as
part of the policies of the two aggressor countries. Mr. Lloyd’s statement treats
the Canadian proposal as though it were part and parcel of Anglo-French foreign
policy. The Canadian Government can make its own explanations and defend
itself.
So far as our Government is concerned, the proposal for setting up an

emergency force was a conception - there is nothing unusual about it - put
forward by the Foreign Minister of Canada as one of the ways to bring about a
cease-fire.
Then Mr. Lloyd went on to refer to the conditions under which the aggressors
would withdraw, a cease-fire having been affected on 7 November. On 2
November, an immediate cease-fire had been asked for [resolution 997 (ES-I)].
On 4 November, the General Assembly had asked for the withdrawal of all
non-Egyptian forces from Egyptian soil [resolution 999 (ES-I)]. The Israel
forces were to go behind the armistice lines and the United Kingdom and France
to withdraw from Egyptian territory. The Secretary-General was to report on
compliance.
Therefore to suggest in any way that the withdrawal is dependent upon the
judgement of the United Kingdom and French Governments as to the
competence of the United Nations Emergency Force, is again to seek to usurp
the powers of this Assembly. Who are these two Governments to make their
own judgements? They can no more make judgements about the action of the
Assembly by themselves than we can - and we do not claim that right.
Therefore, whether this United Nations Emergency Force is competent is a
matter for General Burns on the one hand and the Secretary-General on the
other. Constitutional responsibility for it rests in this Assembly, and my
delegation denies the right of the Governments of the United Kingdom and
France to appropriate to themselves the right to say that this Force is competent
for any one purpose or another.
But the position becomes much worse when we go into the substance of this
competence. Competence for what? Competence to perform the duties that the
Anglo-French invaders were supposed to be attempting? In other words, the
view expressed in the statement by Mr. Lloyd before this Assembly is that the
United Nations Emergency Force is a continuation of the invading forces. It is
to perform the part of putting what is called a protective shield between the
combatants, of staying there for the solution of various problems, of preventing
conflicts in the sense they understood it - and therefore hallowing the
aggression.
I hope that this Assembly will at no time lend itself to a position where by
various and devious methods it is called upon to give its blessing to invasion.
Mr. Lloyd continued: "We are, therefore, prepared to make this act of faith." I
should have thought the withdrawal was an act of penitence, not an act of faith.
I hope the word is used in the sense of their faith in the Assembly. Mr. Lloyd
also stated:
"We think that there is in this a great test for the United Nations and for
the Powers on whose continued support the United Nations ultimately
depends.
"We are, therefore, prepared to make this act of faith because we believe
that the United Nations has the will to ensure that the United Nations
Emergency Force will effectively and honourably carry out all the
functions laid down for it in the Assembly resolutions."
I entirely endorse that particular sentence, if I may. However, Mr. Lloyd

continued:
"But, should our faith prove to have been misplaced, should all this effort
and disturbance have been for nothing, should the United Nations fail to
show the necessary will-power to procure the lasting settlements required,
then indeed there will be cause for alarm and despondency."
"Alarm and despondency" where? Is it a threat to cause "alarm and

despondency" in our minds or in the minds of the humble people of Egypt? He
continued:
"That is our position with regard to this question of withdrawal: it will

take place as soon as possible, as the United Nations Force becomes
effective and competent to discharge its functions."
I submit that the competence of the United Nations Emergency Force is entirely
a matter for the United Nations. The Governments of France, the United
Kingdom and Israel will contribute in that judgement in the proportion of their
power here, namely, each as one sovereign State amongst seventy-nine nations.
That is our position.
THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF FRANCE63 in the general debate before this

Assembly told us the position of his Government. I am glad to say that he
admitted as follows:
"We have been sharply rebuked for taking the initiative in launching
military operations without having been directly attacked. While I am
prepared to concede the cogency of that criticism from a strictly formal
point of view, I would like to suggest an analogy at this point."
Mr. Pineau then quoted a statement he himself had made in a small rural
community in France. He said that Hitler’s armies should have been attacked in
1936. Well, if the comparison is right, then again I say that the place to find the
force to attack an intending aggressor, if that is the argument, was the Security
Council.
The Foreign Minister of France then went on to say:
"The most important feature of this short campaign is the vast amount of
military equipment of Soviet origin captured by the Israel army in the
Sinai desert. It is impossible to believe that this could have been utilised
by the Egyptian army alone, which everyone knew had very few
specialists and technicians."
Apparently the Egyptian army did not think so. But whatever it is, are we to be
put in a position that if we buy military equipment from anyone, it means that
the particular seller of the military equipment is part of our fighting forces or our
military allies? My country purchases a considerable amount of military
equipment from France. But, so far as I am aware, we have no military
agreements with them and we have no intention of using French forces for any
purposes of our own. This is a very dangerous proposition because,
63 Christian Pineau
unfortunately, people go around and buy arms from here, there and everywhere.
For that reason, should a political meaning be read into this?
But that is not the main purport of this statement. The French Foreign Minister
continued:
"As far as the Anglo-French action is concerned, the main concern was to
destroy the aircraft which had also been abundantly supplied by the Soviet
Union. We bombed airfields and destroyed aircraft on the ground, but we
always gave due warning so that the personnel could take shelter, which
they always very carefully did."
They always did "very carefully" in Port Said and in other places where there
are no air raid shelters, where there has been very little time to get people to
understand them. What is more, when the time comes - and I hope the
Assembly will take the right steps - it will be found that large numbers of
civilians, including women and children, have been killed, their homes
destroyed and great destruction wrought in these areas.
However, I cannot understand the logic of the argument that says that there is an
amelioration of aggression just because you want to destroy somebody else’s
aircraft. If there is going to be disarming in the world, that is to say, the
lowering of the armed strength of any country, are we to imagine that the way to
do it is for somebody to go and bomb other people’s arms? Then let us cut out
the Disarmament Commission and let each country go and bomb other people’s
arms and destroy them that way. That seems to be a kind of law of the jungle.
France has been engaged in colonial wars ever since the conclusion of the
Second World War. The long period in Indo-China was happily terminated by
the wisdom of French and other statesmanship in 1954; and when the guns were
silenced in Indo-China, for the first time in a quarter of a century there was no
war in the world. France has suffered ravage by invasion, and its people, both
inside and outside France, as we all know, fought heroically in its defence. But
ever since the conclusion of that war, but for the brief spell of the armistice in
Indo-China and the beginning of the ruthless war over North Africa, these
colonial wars have gone on. We cannot help wondering whether this enterprise
in Egypt was not a part of the same process.
We have been told that there is some distinction in the mind of the French
Foreign Minister between small nations and big nations, with regard to their
wisdom. He quite rightly tells us that the atomic bomb will destroy us all, and
that therefore we must try to disarm and give up this atomic weapon. But the
important part - and it has a bearing on the whole of this proposition - is the
attitude of a big country to a small country. Mr. Pineau went on to say the
following:
"In a few years, when atomic energy becomes less expensive, the
manufacture of atomic bombs will be easy. We may well ask in all
seriousness what will become of peace when each nation possesses the
atomic bomb and threatens to use it. The mad will then be the masters of
the world."
Why should the small countries have the monopoly of madmen? That I do not
understand.
I COME NEXT TO THE ISRAEL POSITION. So far as the General Assembly

resolutions are concerned, the Assembly has called upon Israel to withdraw its
forces behind the armistice lines. Speaking on the Belgian amendment, I said,
on behalf of my delegation, that in view of the arguments that had been raised,
we would be willing to reconsider the draft resolution [A/3385/Rev.1] if it were
pointed out to us that the Israel forces had withdrawn behind the armistice lines.
Then the representative of Israel, in his intervention, went on to say that
thousands of people from the Sinai peninsula had gone back to their homes, to
their factories and to their farms. Well, soldiers going back home is not the
withdrawal of forces behind the armistice line. But if the Secretary-General had
been informed with particulars that Israel forces had been withdrawn behind the
armistice line, my delegation would consider it the duty of the Assembly to have
recorded that fact. However, that does not appear to be the position. As I said
on November 24, if an action of that kind had been taken, the Israel Government
would not be loath to inform the Assembly about it, because it would be to its
advantage. And even in the evening of that day my delegation reiterated that if
there were such a communication before the Secretary-General, we would be
prepared to refer to it and to make our own position clear in the course of the
intervention today. We waited for it.
This afternoon, there was a communication from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General [A/3395]. I have read this document
carefully, and the wording is just the same. There is no reference to
withdrawing behind the armistice lines, merely to the withdrawal of forces from
Egypt. This communication states the following:
"In the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 24 November the

Israel representative expressed the willingness of the Israel Government to
continue to discuss with you the means of implementing its undertakings
with respect to the withdrawal of forces from Egypt."
It goes on to say that Israel is prepared to make specific proposals. The

document also says:
"On 8 November, I conveyed to you my Government’s expression of

willingness to withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory on the
conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations."
I wish to say, in order to be frank with the Assembly, that I have not seen any
document so far, coming from the Government of Israel, which categorically
informs the Secretary-General that any appreciable part of its troops has been
withdrawn. By this is meant regiments, units of the army, and not soldiers going
home for a holiday; that can take place even in the middle of a war; soldiers go
home and that cannot be regarded as withdrawal. What is more, even in this
latest Israel communication, there is a specific refusal to mention withdrawal
behind the armistice lines. This matter is of very great importance.
I ADDRESS MYSELF NOW TO THE REPORTS AND THE DRAFT

RESOLUTIONS that are before us. A while ago it was said - and I refer to our
position in regard to the general status of this debate - that the debate is
continuing and that it is open to anyone to submit draft resolutions, even
hereafter. In this connection, I should like to point out that there are still draft
resolutions before the General Assembly. There are draft resolutions concerning
the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force which have not been
taken up. They have been introduced in order to obtain Assembly authority for
the maintenance of these forces, for their expenditure and so on. Therefore, it is
not as though the business is finished.
As regards the running of this Force, so far as my Government is concerned we

have had discussions with the Secretary-General, and as members of the
Advisory Committee we have been given a certain amount of information, and
the matter will come up again for discussion when we consider the Secretary-
General’s report on this matter, which contains his revised draft resolution
[A/3383(Annex)/Rev.1].
There are three or four matters on which my Government desires to express

itself. In the first place, with regard to the United Nations Emergency Force, the
position of the Government of India was fully set out in the Assembly during the
debate on that matter when I read to the Assembly the six conditions on which
my Government would participate in the force. They have been discussed with
the Secretary-General before, and the covering letter refers to the discussion and
also to the fact that there was agreement in so far as the formulation of those
conditions was concerned. There was an acknowledgement by the Secretary-
General to the effect that the conditions attached had been fully noted and that
the offer was accepted. It is well known that both in private municipal law and
in international law, if you make an offer with conditions and that offer is
accepted, it means that the conditions are accepted. I will not tax the Assembly
by reading them out, but those six conditions are on record.
That has a bearing upon what has been said with regard to the function of the
Assembly by the representative of Canada and by others. Our understanding of
this, and of the basis on which the United Nations Force is organised, is that
there can be no violation of Egyptian sovereignty. It is the sovereign right of
every Government to admit to its territory whom it likes and to refuse to admit
those whom it does not like. It is equally the prerogative of the Assembly to
determine the composition of the Force.
Now the composition of the United Nations Force and the conditions upon
which it works, are in our view, governed by various documents. One of these
governing conditions is contained in paragraph 12 of the report of the Secretary-
General of 6 November [A/3302]. So far as we are concerned, during the
discussion of this report at the first emergency special session, my delegation
asked for certain clarifications and also put forward our interpretation of certain
points, which interpretation was accepted by the Secretary-General during the
meeting.
The statement to which I refer is as follows:
"The representative of India has raised a great number of points. On

several he has attempted an interpretation of what I intended to say, and I
think I can say that on all those points, to the extent that I could fully grasp
what the representative said, I can confirm that his interpretation of my
intention is correct."
This is followed by other statements on record, so there is no difficulty in that

regard. In addition, there is a memorandum from the Egyptian Government
which sets out conditions under which the Emergency Force may work in Egypt,
which conditions are also part of the record. There have been references to the
basing of units of the United Nations Force in Egypt, to their arrival and the area
they should occupy, to the withdrawal of Israel forces behind the armistice
demarcation line and other matters concerning the withdrawal of non-Egyptian
forces.
The question of the area occupied by the Force would be subject to agreement.
The Secretary-General declared that it was his intention to negotiate with the
Government of Egypt concerning the conditions of operation of the United
Nations Force, having regard to the agreed list and balanced composition. At
this time it would be possible to begin the transit of troops.
With regard to the length of stay of United Nations forces in Egypt, it was noted
that the forces would arrive only with Egypt’s consent, and that they could not
stay or operate unless Egypt continued to give such consent. These are all
quotations. The Secretary-General stated these conditions had been based on the
understanding of Egyptian acceptance.
Therefore, so far as my Government is concerned, the position is very clear.

There can be no question that these forces are in Egypt as occupying troops.
They are in no way to perform the functions of invading forces, and their
presence should in no way be regarded as a factor which should delay the
withdrawal of the invading troops. The withdrawal of such invading troops
must take place immediately and, of course, in this connection "immediately"
means as soon as practicable. There should be no delay awaiting the fulfilment
of some other conditions. The only governing factor should be the mechanics of
withdrawal.
NOW WE COME TO TWO OTHER PROBLEMS with regard to the Suez

Canal. First, with regard to the clearing of the Canal, I desire to state on behalf
of my Government that it is not our intention to do anything that would delay
such clearance. At the same time, we understand the actions taken by the United
Nations on behalf of the Egyptian Government as being actions taken with the
authority of the Egyptian Government. Therefore there is no question of
violation of Egypt’s sovereignty. We hope with confidence - we might even say
with trust - that these functions will be carried out expeditiously. Furthermore,
the cost involved will necessarily be the subject of discussion by this Assembly.
At the present moment my Government is not prepared to make any categorical

statement in this connection. We will be bound by the decision of the General
Assembly, in so far as it conforms with our parliamentary procedures, but at the
appropriate time my delegation will raise the question of the necessity of
vigilance in, for example, the provision of a comprehensive audit of the
expenses which must arise. We must also consider who is to cover such costs,
whether the United Nations is to indemnify aggression which, in my opinion,
would mean that it would have to under-write aggression to a certain extent. We
have already heard some of the representatives of Latin American countries who
have stated that their countries are not prepared to shoulder such responsibility,
and we must look upon this as a financial matter.
We entirely agree with the recommendation of the Secretary-General that this

consideration should not delay action. The Secretary-General is acting on the
resolution which my delegation had the honour to co-sponsor, and I want it
clearly understood by the Assembly that this is not a final resolution - it is a
resolution giving the Secretary-General authorisation and power to undertake
the necessary expenditures in order to carry out the proposals before the
Assembly. I think, as all of you who have taken the trouble to read the
documents to which this resolution refers will see, that this is merely a means of
facilitating the commencement of operations and of enabling our Secretary-
General to make the necessary investigations. That is the purpose of the
resolution, and it is our intention to encourage the withdrawal of troops so that
the clearance of the Canal can take place.
There is no doubt that the British and French equipment now in the Suez Canal
area has a very considerable mechanical contribution to make and would be
most useful in speeding up this process if the Egyptian Government were willing
to permit its use, in which case my Government would not object. However,
this is an entirely Egyptian problem, in so far as it is for the Egyptian
Government to give its consent or otherwise.
We feel, however, that the Egyptian people cannot be asked to entertain the
presence of Anglo-French personnel in the present state of affairs. We have
been somewhat heartened by the fact that there are nearly 8,000 British subjects
in Egypt and that so far there has been no violence against them, although, from
our reports, they are living under strictly limited conditions owing to the state of
public opinion. We trust that the Egyptian Government will continue to exercise
restraint, and we have confidence that it will do so, as is expected of a civilised
people. On the other hand, we cannot very well ask the Egyptian Government to
revise its views, unless it does so of its own volition, because of the use of these
invading forces, unless, perhaps, there is some sort of indemnification or
penitence. This is something that is not usually expected of people, and it may
lead to difficulties.
I understand the Secretary-General has other arrangements in hand, and we were

very happy to note that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United
Kingdom offered every co-operation. We have every reason to believe that such
co-operation would take into account these difficulties of personnel and so on.
Therefore the contributions would be of a character which do not impinge on the
circumstances which prevail at the present time.
The other draft resolution relates to the expenditure upon the Force
[A/3383(Annex)/Rev.1]. Here again the Secretary-General has made some
reports and, so far as our contribution to the Emergency Force is concerned,
these matters have been discussed by the Advisory Committee and also between
Governments, and the principles on which they are based have been approved
by the Assembly. However, the details have still to come before us for
discussion.
I hope that very soon it will be possible for the Secretary-General to advise this
Assembly of the extent of damage to property and loss of life which is involved,
and on the need for relief in Egypt. According to our information, such damage
is on a very vast scale - much larger than one would be inclined to believe from
reports so far published.
So long as these conditions remain - and it is only fair to say that these
conditions are not only those expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs of the United Kingdom to this Assembly but also those expressed by his
Government - then the withdrawal is contingent. A contingent withdrawal is not
what has been asked for by this Assembly.
Coming back again to the extent of damage and casualties, although my

Government does not readily accept these reports, because there is always an
element of exaggeration of war damage, we do feel that the time has come for
the Assembly to take some decision to ask for a report from the International
Red Cross, and also to appoint a group of representatives of selected nations to
visit the areas occupied by invading armies and to inform the public of the world
as to the exact extent of damage and the requirements for rehabilitation.
Particularly for a country that is economically backward, the margin of

resistance in these matters is very small and, while my delegation has no
intention of submitting any proposals until after we have heard the Foreign
Minister of Egypt, we would suggest that the General Assembly should not
forget, because our minds have been focused on these big military questions of
withdrawal and on the related political questions, that there is this vast
humanitarian problem. Thousands of people have been killed - the official
statement made by one of the governments concerned is that the number is very
much less, but whether it is less or more must be ascertained by the Assembly.
Whether it be in Egypt or in Hungary, my Government would not, in public or
responsible statements, be willing to accept reports that are not authorised.
Therefore we would suggest that the time has come for the Assembly to
consider receiving a report from a highly trustworthy authority - that is, the
International Red Cross - and also to consider appointing a group of its own
members to send their representatives into these areas, with the permission of
the parties concerned, to appraise themselves of the conditions.
Finally, the Government of India has sent its troops into Egypt. As I said the
last time I spoke from this rostrum, those troops have been in North Africa
before. They were part of a fighting army and, as a fighting army, they
performed their duties. This time they have gone there as a peace army. On
behalf of my Government, I stated categorically that our understanding of the
use of Egyptian territory was merely as a right of way to the border, and that the
business of this army was to separate the combatants and to keep them
separated. That is the function which the Force will perform. We are happy to
know that the various units - Canadian, Scandinavian, Yugoslav and Indian - are
all co-operating and that it is not, as the Foreign Secretary of the United
Kingdom feared, a hotch-potch.
My Government also desires to express its appreciation of the role and functions
of General Burns, the Commander, to whom our officers will give full co-
operation.
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, February 2,

195764
1069-73
[Britain and France completed the withdrawal of their forces from the Egyptian
territory on December 22, 1956. But Israel continued to procrastinate. After
repeated calls by the General Assembly, it withdrew from most of the Egyptian
territory by January 24, 1957, but set conditions for withdrawal from the Sharm
el Sheikh area which commanded the Gulf of Aqaba, and Gaza, Palestinian
territory on the Egyptian side of the Armistice Line.
In this speech, Mr. Menon explained two draft resolutions co-sponsored by

India and six other countries. The first draft again called on Israel to complete
its withdrawal without delay. The second dealt with measures, after the
withdrawal, to assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions. The
two drafts were adopted on 2 February as resolutions 1124 (XI) and 1125(XI).]
We are once again debating today a subject that came before us as a matter of
emergency three months ago. It cannot be a matter of congratulation to
ourselves or an assurance that the cause of peace is being furthered when we
realise that, three months after the first resolution was adopted, we are still
reiterating the same resolution.
After all the speeches that the Assembly has had to hear today it is not my
purpose to elaborate my observations to any greater extent than is necessary for
the purpose of two draft resolutions before the Assembly.
The resolutions that were formally passed on the various dates that are set out in
the two draft resolutions before the Assembly all had two purposes. One was
the withdrawal of the invading forces, in this particular case the Israel forces,
from Egyptian and Egyptian-controlled territory. The second was the
scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement. In different ways, these
two purposes, either together or separately, appear in the resolutions of 2, 4 and
24 November 1956, and 19 January 1957.
Only a few days ago, this Assembly passed a resolution [1123(XI)] asking for
the total withdrawal of the Israel invading forces behind the armistice
demarcation lines. It should be remembered that, from the very beginning, the
Assembly has insisted that these forces should withdraw behind the demarcation
lines provided by the Armistice Agreement of 1949.
These forces are still, in part, on the Egyptian side or the Egyptian-controlled
side of the armistice lines.
I should like further to say that the subject before this Assembly, from the
beginning of the first emergency special session till now, is not the resolving of
what has been known as the Arab-Israel question. We were faced with the issue
of invasion, the issue of aggression, and that is what we were dealing with. As
Governments engaged in the consideration of these questions, it is inevitable
that we should look at other related matters, but that would not take away from
the crucial fact that other progress may follow afterwards. That does not mean
that there is any condition attached to the withdrawal. Each one of these
resolutions asks for unconditional withdrawal.
In order that there might be no apprehension that this applies only to one
particular aggressor, I should like to recall to the Assembly what my delegation
said on 7 November last in regard to the other invading forces. We said:
"We cannot accept the position that the invading forces lay down the
conditions, ostensibly in the interest of the invaded party. If we do that,
we put ourselves in the position of justifying the invasion itself. And that
is a position which my Government is not ready to accept."
TODAY WE HAVE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BEFORE US, and these

draft resolutions deal with two separate matters. I wish to state without any
ambiguity whatsoever that we do not regard the first draft resolution [A/3517] as
conditional. Both draft resolutions deal with matters with which the Assembly is
concerned. They are both matters related to the Armistice Agreement and even
to the peace of the world.
The first relates to withdrawal, and I shall speak on that first. It recalls the
previous resolutions and it deplores "the non-compliance of Israel to complete
its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line despite the repeated
requests of the General Assembly."
The reference to complete withdrawal means the withdrawal not only of the
armed forces of Israel, but of whatever elements there may be in the invaded
area. Therefore there can be no question of an exception for civilian forces or
civilian authorities or anything of this kind. That is the meaning according to
my delegation, which is one of the sponsors, and I feel sure that no sponsor
would join issue on this: that "non-compliance to complete its withdrawal"
refers to the withdrawal of everything connected with the State of Israel behind
the armistice demarcation line.
Paragraph 2 calls for the completion of such withdrawal without further delay.
In accordance with the usual practice of these resolutions, the language of this is
mild; it does not seek to use exaggerated terms. But I think the Assembly is
entitled to feel assured that this further call for a withdrawal, coming three
months after the first resolution, means that that withdrawal must take place
forthwith, this is, that there should be no intervening period between the passing
of this draft resolution and the process of withdrawal, which can only spread
over so many hours or so many days as the case may be, as is required in
practice, as in the case of the other withdrawals from Egyptian territory, except
that, the United Nations Emergency Force being now in operation and having
gained experience from the previous withdrawals, it should be possible for this
withdrawal to be completed very much more quickly.
That is with regard to the first draft resolution. I believe that, in examining the
vote on previous resolutions, there should be very little doubt with regard to the
support that will be given to it.
I come now to the second draft resolution [A/3518]. In connection with this, I
repeat what I said before, namely that it is a separate draft resolution and that it
is not by way of a condition which should be satisfied or a price which is offered
so that the first draft resolution might be implemented. On the other hand, it is
related to the first draft resolution in the sense that nothing that is said in
resolution 1120 (XI) would have any meaning whatsoever unless what is said in
the first draft resolution is completed. To that extent, there is a one-way
relationship, but there is no two-way relationship so far as we are concerned.
The complete withdrawal of Israel behind the armistice demarcation line, as
requested in the first draft resolution, is required before the United Nations can
address itself to its general purposes, namely those of conciliation in the
maintenance of peace and the promotion of harmony.
I should like to explain the position of my delegation, as a sponsor of this second

draft resolution, so that there should be no doubt in the mind of anyone who is
casting his vote as to exactly what the draft resolution stands for.
First, there is reference to the Secretary-General’s report [A/3512], which is

before us. The Assembly will recall that, after adopting the resolution
[1123(XI)] of 19 January, we requested the Secretary-General to make an early
report and we fixed the time limit for it. We now have that report before us for
our consideration.
Having received and considered that report, the second draft resolution states
that the withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure
progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions. Now that is the expression
of one of the purposes of the United Nations. It is a statement that, once
withdrawal is completed, it will be possible for the United Nations and the
parties concerned to proceed to other things.
The paragraph should be understood in that way, which is its open and plain
meaning. All proposals that are put before organisations of this kind must be
interpreted in their plain meaning.
Paragraph 2 calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to

observe the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. I have stated
previously in connection with this question that it is legitimate for us to look at
performance. I have stated, in speaking on the first draft resolution, that
performance as related to withdrawal is still incomplete. With regard to the
scrupulous observance of the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, the
essential provision of which is that people should keep on either side of the
armistice demarcation line, there has been no compliance on the part of Israel.
Furthermore, when I last spoke on the subject I referred to violations of the
cease-fire agreement that had taken place after the acceptance of the cease-fire
resolution [997(ES-I)].
On the other side, the Secretary-General states in paragraph 22 of his report that,
in the course of the discussions which took place after the circulation of his
previous report, he was informed of the desire of the Government of Egypt "that
all raids and incursions across the armistice demarcation line, in both directions,
be brought to an end, and that United Nations auxiliary organs afford effective
assistance to that effect." The last part of that statement requires the close
attention of members.
The present draft resolution suggests that United Nations forces, should be
placed on both sides of the armistice demarcation line so that the Armistice
Agreement might be better secured and so that there might be no violation of it.
It is the position of my delegation, as a sponsor of this draft resolution, that the

Force can be placed only on both sides of the armistice demarcation line, which
is sketched for ready reference on the map at the end of the Secretary-General’s
report [A/3512]. The line goes from Rafah, on the other side of the Gaza Strip,
down to a point just below Elath, on the Gulf of Aqaba. It is not the individual
position of my Government, but the position of the draft resolution, that the
United Nations Emergency Force, after the total withdrawal of Israel, be placed
on this armistice demarcation line. That would mean the total evacuation of the
Gaza Strip and also the removal of the invading forces from that area in the
Sinai desert between the red line on the map and the Gulf of Aqaba. But there is
no suggestion, and there can be no suggestion, that foreign forces, which are
United Nations forces, can be stationed anywhere on Egyptian territory.
HERE I WANT TO GO INTO THE FACTS and into what might be called the
law of this question.
The procedures involved in this question are all governed by the resolutions
which we have adopted and which incorporate paragraph 12 of the report of the
Secretary-General [A/3302] from which the United Nations Force emerged. My
Government at that time laid down specific conditions on which we would
participate in the United Nations Force. But if we had merely laid down those
conditions, they would have had little value except as being the view of one
Government. Those conditions, however, were accepted. The Secretary-
General accepted them when we agreed to participate in that Force. My
delegation made reference to it again on November 7, 1956, when we were
engaged in the last phase of obtaining the withdrawal of the British and French
forces from Egyptian territory. We stated that it was understood that if the
Force was going to function on Egyptian territory, there must be Egyptian
consent for that process.
It has been basic to the whole functioning of UNEF that it could not set foot
anywhere on Egyptian soil except in full accordance with international law and
practice and with recognition of the sovereignty of Egyptian territory.
This is not the view of only one Government. Indeed, it is not only something
that was agreed to by resolution, but it is an international agreement between the
Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government, which is set out in an aide-
memoire [A/3375, annex], and the Secretary-General made reference to it
yesterday.
If that is not sufficient, the Secretary-General, in his latest report [A/3512], has
set out in paragraph 5 (a), (b) and (c) what must be regarded, in terms of his
draft resolution, as the governing conditions under which any recommendation,
any proposal here can be considered.
At the present moment the point to be resolved is the evacuation of the invading
forces from the Gaza Strip. It is argued sometimes that there is some doubt as to
the legal status of this territory, but there can be no doubt as to what its status
was before the invasion; and what sub-paragraph 5(a) says is that there can be
no changes in regard to that. Therefore the only solution, the only development,
the only response that can be made by the invading party is to withdraw behind
the armistice line in regard to that particular area.
There has been some reference in various speeches to the effect that the United
Nations could go all round the world conducting elections and introducing
troops and taking over the governments of sovereign States. The Charter is very
clear on this and, under the provisions of Charter VII, any proposal to introduce
troops into Egyptian territory would require the consent of the Government of
Egypt.
It is true that the United Nations Emergency Force is an organ of the United
Nations. To that extent it takes its instructions, its guidance from the United
Nations, but, as the Secretary-General has pointed out on previous occasions, it
is equally true that it has to function on sovereign territory; so that, if there is the
law on the one side, there is the law on the other side that sovereignty has to be
respected. Therefore arrangements must be made, which is what the Secretary-
General has done, with the Government of Egypt, and the Government of Egypt
has responded in good faith. Therefore, there cannot be any question of
ordering these forces to operate anywhere except in terms of Egyptian
sovereignty and with Egyptian consent. Sub-paragraph 5(c) says the United
Nations actions "must respect fully the rights of member States recognised in the
Charter." The right of a Government under the Charter is the right to maintain
its sovereignty. It must also respect international agreements - and I submit that
the Armistice Agreement is an international agreement, and therefore that its
terms must be respected.
Now, if these are the governing conditions, then it follows that what is now
proposed is merely the placing of these troops on territory that is the frontier
between Israel and the Egyptian-controlled area, which is the armistice
demarcation line. In placing them there, it is necessary that they should be
placed on both sides of that line, and their function, as the Secretary-General
points out, if all is agreed to, would be to assist the present observation corps to
carry out what Egypt has said it desires and to which it has agreed, namely, that
"all raids and incursions across the armistice line, in both directions, be brought
to an end."
With regard to the remainder of the territory which is still under Israel
occupation, the withdrawal not having been completed, the only function that
UNEF can perform in that area is of the same kind as it has been performing on
the rest of Egyptian territory, namely, that of supervising the cease-fire and the
withdrawal and the securing of that withdrawal. Therefore the entry of this
Force anywhere else at any time would be governed by the conditions under
which the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government have come to an
agreement.
I refer to the Egyptian Government because all these operations are on Egyptian
territory. It so happens that Egypt is the invaded country and not Israel. If Israel
were the invaded country, it would equally apply to it, but the facts are that
foreign forces are on Egyptian soil, and it is for the purpose of removing them
that this machinery of UNEF has been put forward.
I believe that paragraph 2 of the second draft resolution is common ground,

since it calls on both sides scrupulously to observe the Armistice Agreement.
I should now like to take each part of paragraph 3 separately.
There is reference here to the Sharm E1 Sheikh and Gaza areas. Those terms are
descriptive and are easily comprehensible if one looks at the map. There is no
authority anywhere in the agreement reached, no suggestion in this draft
resolution, that any part of Egyptian territory, whether it be the island of Tiran or
Sharm El Sheikh or any of these other places, should be occupied. My
Government has repeated time and again and has made a basic position in regard
to UNEF, that at no time can it become an occupying force in another country.
Therefore its movements, its functioning in a territory that is Egyptian, must
depend upon the agreements that have been made before. That explains the
reference to the Sharm El Sheikh and Gaza areas; that is the geographical
description of the territories that now remain under occupation.
The wording used here is "on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line."
Some representatives have raised doubts about this, and it is quite obvious that a
force which is now about 5,000 strong could not stand on a line which bears a
merely geometrical definition; it must be on either side. What is more, it is only
under conditions where this Force that is intended to be protective can occupy
both sides of the line by arrangements with both sides that it can be other than an
occupation force. If it were only on one side, then it would be placing that
country under protection and, to a certain extent, sharing the character of an
occupation force.
Then comes the next part of operative paragraph 3, which refers to the
"implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General’s
report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein." The purpose of
that paragraph is to say that all other measures must be governed by the
considerations which I have read out, considerations which govern the whole of
the procedure we are debating.
It would not be right to shy away from controversial issues; speeches have been
made here on the question of freedom of navigation and various other issues,
and this Assembly knows the number and the complexity of the issues
surrounding this problem. Here, therefore, it is necessary to draw attention to
paragraph 23 of the Secretary-General’s report [A/3512] on which we have been
asked to express our opinion. There are at least three important ideas here which
are covered by this phraseology in the draft resolution, "with due regard to the
considerations set out therein."
The first is that this matter is not directly related to the present crisis and that the
concern evinced therein is related to legal aspects of the problem, which must
be treated in its own right. In paragraph 24, the Secretary-General points out
that the legal problems in this connection are not beyond dispute, not only not
beyond dispute between the parties involved but in the minds of jurists and even
in the mind of the appropriate authority of the United Nations itself, because he
goes on to say that the International Law Commission "reserved consideration of
the question what would be the legal position of straits forming part of the
territorial sea of one or more States and constituting the sole means of access to
the port of another State." This description, says the Secretary-General, applies
to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, and he adds that a legal
controversy exists as to the extent of the right of innocent passage through these
waters.
The Secretary-General himself having said that this problem is one of long
duration, that it must be treated on its own and that there are legal problems, and
when we have the authority of the International Law Commission that that
Commission itself has not made up its mind on the matter, there can be no
question that the present draft resolution seeks to resolve the question. It must
be considered, if the parties are willing to consider it, or if other circumstances
arise. Therefore this draft resolution does not regard this problem as covered by
the present operation. The present operation is merely to move the invading
forces from the area to which reference has been made.
In paragraph 4, the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General, in

consultation with the parties concerned, to carry out the measures specified
therein and to report to the General Assembly. That is a normal request to the
Secretary-General and it again points out that the co-operation of the parties in
the implementation of the resolution is required. I have thus made it quite clear
what, in our view, and what, in the view of this draft resolution, the functions of
the United Nations Emergency Force are. And I should like to add that it is not
possible to extend or modify those functions in any way without the consent of
another party.
Paragraph 29 of the Secretary-General’s report is helpful to an understanding of

this draft resolution. It specifies that Israel troops, on their withdrawal from the
Sharm El Sheikh areas, would be followed by UNEF "in the same way as in
other parts of Sinai." That is to say, there is no difference whatever of category,
kind or quality with regard to this process. The paragraph continues:
"The duties of the Force in respect of the cease-fire and the withdrawal
will determine its movements. However, if it is recognised that there is a
need for such an arrangement, it may be agreed" - and the key word is the
word "agreed" - "that units of the Force (or special representatives in the
nature of observers) would assist in maintaining quiet in the area beyond
what follows from this general principle."
Now there is nothing new in that, because it is open to those who have the
authority for the United Nations Force on the one side, namely, the United
Nations itself, represented by the Secretary-General, and the territorial Power on
the other side, to come to any agreement they wish. The paragraph goes on to
say that "the Force should not be used so as to prejudge the solution of the
controversial questions involved" - and whatever controversies have been raging
during the last seven or eight years, the Force is not a solvent for that purpose, it
is merely an evacuating force with a temporary purpose unless, as in the case
where it is put in on the armistice line for security purposes, it has assumed
something different. Thus, it is "not to be deployed in such a way as to protect
any special position on these questions, although, at least transitionally, it may
function in support of mutual restraint in accordance with the foregoing."
To summarise therefore, I would say, first of all, there are two separate draft
resolutions. The first is not conditional on the second, but the second certainly
cannot have any value unless the first is operative. Secondly, the first draft
resolution represents an attempt by the Assembly for, I think, the fifth or sixth
time, and three months after its initial attempt, and therefore the words "without
further delay" mean "withdrawal forthwith." And when that withdrawal is
completed, then it will be possible for what is set out in the second draft
resolution to be proceeded with. Those procedures must be governed by the
principles that have been set out, which I have read, and the placement of the
Force can only be on the armistice demarcation line, and its placement in any
other area or for any period of time must be dependent upon the consent of the
territorial sovereign Power and also upon the exigencies as decided by the
United Nations Command on its side.
We believe that the Assembly should adopt these draft resolutions and convey to
the invading country that the time has passed when it is right, appropriate or in
the interests of the country itself - and the United Nations does not consider any
matter except in the interests of all member States - to delay further. It may be
that one member State is on the wrong side of a question; another member State
may not be on the wrong side; but these solutions are always intended for the
furtherance of the purposes of the Charter.
Therefore it is my submission that the implementation of the first resolution is in

the interests of all parties concerned, including the invading Power. My
Government deeply regrets that even before the draft resolution has been
considered by the Assembly there have been reports, which may not be accurate
- I hope they are not - that this will not be complied with. In the interval
between the last resolution and this one, we also have the report of a statement
by the Prime Minister of Israel with regard to the withdrawal of these troops
which also must cause us all concern. In spite of all that, the Assembly,
expressing its regret by the word "deplores," asks Israel to complete its
withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line forthwith.
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, March 1, 195765
[In this speech before returning to India, Mr. Menon elaborated on the Indian
position as regards the issues covered in General Assembly resolution 1124 (XI)
of February 2, 1957. The withdrawal of Israeli forces was completed soon after,
on 8 March.]
My delegation takes part in this debate four weeks after the adoption of resolution
1124(XI), which was placed before the General Assembly on February 2, 1957
and which called upon the invaders of Egypt, in this particular instance Israel, to
withdraw from Egypt and Egyptian-controlled territory.
1267-74
It is common knowledge that at that time it was the intention of the majority of
the members that supported this resolution that a further resolution should be
adopted setting a time limit for the withdrawal. However, at that time, in view of
the late hour, no such draft was put forward. It was generally understood that the
word "forthwith" would not mean three or four weeks.
It is true that we are all representatives of our Governments and that it makes no
difference as to which individual speaks for one Government or another.
However, I should like to make a personal explanation. I have delayed my
departure from the United States day after day for the last several days, cancelling
my passage in the hope that my country and my Government might be able to
give further assistance in finding a solution to the problem before us, thus
disposing of this item by the final withdrawal of Israel from Egypt and Egyptian-
controlled territory. That hope has not been justified.
We heard a statement from this rostrum at the 664th meeting by the representative
of Israel that a statement will be made by his delegation at the meeting this
afternoon. This is the first time that such a procedure has been adopted in the
Assembly. It is not necessary for a representative to come and say that a
statement will be made; the usual procedure is to inscribe one’s name on the list
of speakers. In that way we would be informed. It is only reasonable to say that
an announcement to the effect that a statement will be given does not further
inform our minds.
My objective in coming here is to place before the Assembly without any

ambiguity, the position of my Government on the subject matter of resolution
1124(XI) and the central issue which it covers. First of all, let me state what that
issue is. That issue is not the Israel-Arab disputes. That issue is not all the
procedures that arise from the establishment of the mandate in Palestine, or from
the resolutions of 1947, or from the Armistice Agreements of 1949, or from the
series of Security Council resolutions. That issue is one and one only: that a
member State, namely Egypt, was invaded by three countries, namely, the two
powerful empires of the United Kingdom and France, and Israel, which, in
disregard of the principles of international morality and law, invaded the territory
of Egypt. Afterwards however, the United Kingdom and France made
recompense for their action by their obedience to the resolutions of the United
Nations with far greater promise than this smaller and newer country has shown.
My country recognises Israel. It recognises Israel not only as a member of the

United Nations, but it also recognises Israel diplomatically. And we are happy to
say that it recognises us. Therefore, the issue before us is one and one only: the
question of this war, the invasion of Egypt. I do not mean for a moment to say
that any issue in this world can be totally isolated from various relationships. But
any decision that the Assembly can take can be only in regard to this matter. For
one thing, all the other questions are so complex, so far-flung and so broad that
they would require very considerable negotiation and adjustment.
As regards the liquidation of the situation created by the invasion, it appeared
more hopeful that the situation between the Arab countries and Israel would
improve and that some way might be found, not necessarily to settle the
difficulties, but to do away with some of them. But the events of the autumn
intervened. Now those events of the autumn are the total responsibility, and I
would say the primary responsibility, of Israel for having carried out the invasion,
and for having effected it conjointly with the two powerful empires in the hope of
crippling a weak country - a militarily weak country, but not a morally weak one -
in comparison to the two powerful empires.
Therefore, the operative part of resolution 1124 (XI), in which the General
Assembly "calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice
demarcation line without further delay," is what binds all of us, and it is our duty
to have this provision implemented. We in India have lived under invasion for
centuries. We have witnessed invasions, and therefore we share the feelings
which were exhibited at the previous meeting by Mr. Fawzi, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Egypt, for the first time in four months of patient discussion. It is the
duty of the Assembly, which includes India and seventy-nine other members, to
see that there should be no further delay in this matter...
I should like to think that the Government of Israel will come to the meeting this
afternoon and say that it has at long last decided to obey the mandate and the
dictate of the General Assembly. In spite of all that has happened, it is right for
us to think that a member State will, in the last analysis, obey the mandate of the
Assembly. These resolutions are very clear. It is therefore on that basis that I
proceed.
However, in view of the large number of speculations that have arisen, in view of
a certain paragraph that appeared in the Secretary-General’s report, in view of the
statements made by the French Prime Minister and the suspicions that exist in the
mind of the victim of the aggression, which are very natural ones, and in view of
our sympathies with the victim of aggression, and the fundamental position which
my Government holds that invasion should not pay, whatever it might be - that is
to say, as a result of the invasion, one cannot reach the position to which Mr.
Fawzi referred at the previous meeting, namely that instead of being the invaded
country Egypt was being accused of aggression (we have some familiarity with
this position ourselves) - a further statement might be necessary.
I SHOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO REPEAT THE POSITION of my

Government in regard to various matters connected with this question. I will take
them one by one.
One point relates to the evacuation of the Gaza strip and the functions of the
United Nations Emergency Force. I have seen references to the effect that it is
possible for the United Nations to confer greater powers upon the United Nations
Emergency Force. My Government disassociates itself from that statement. The
functions of the United Nations Emergency Force are governed by two factors
which can only work concurrently. One factor is that the Assembly has to confer
powers upon the Force or to withdraw them; in other words, the Assembly is
sovereign in the matter. The other factor has to do with the sovereign rights of
Egypt. The presence and functioning of the Force in Egypt are governed by an
agreement between the Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt [A/3375,
annex], which has been repeatedly read out here and which I shall therefore not
take the time to read again. Any extension or contraction of the powers of the
United Nations Emergency Force has to be governed by these two factors.
Secondly, we want to lay stress upon the fact, reference to which appears in the
Secretary-General’s report [A/3512], that the functions of the Force, both in the
rest of the Sinai Peninsula and presumably in regard to the Gaza strip, would be
exactly the same as in the other areas.
It is useful in this connection to recall to the Assembly what the functions of the
United Nations Emergency Force are. Its functions are the obtaining of a cease-
fire and the supervision of the withdrawal. They were restated when my country
participated in the Force and subscribed to the resolution. At no time could the
Force be an occupying army; at no time could it take over from the invader.
So far as the Government of India is concerned, it desires to make a further

statement in this connection. Our relations with the United Kingdom, in spite of
possible differences, are very close; there are bonds between us which cannot be
defined by constitutions, by resolutions, or things of that kind. It was therefore a
very painful duty for us to come here and say that the invader could not make
conditions. We can take no lesser position in regard to another invader.
Therefore, with regard to the Gaza strip, our position is that the invader must
totally evacuate, so that the conditions obtaining before the war will be restored.
The functions of the United Nations Emergency Force would be exactly the same
as they were in other parts of the area. If there are to be any additions to those
functions, they must be the result of agreements between Egypt and the Secretary-
General acting on behalf of the United Nations; such is the general basis of the
functions of the Force.
My Government has subscribed to, and, in months gone by has taken some
diplomatic initiative - it is no secret - in bringing about, the position that the Force
should also assist the Observer Corps on the armistice line between Israel and
Egypt. And it must be clear that the armistice line referred to is the boundary line
between Israel territory and Egyptian territory. There can be no question of that
Force occupying Egyptian territory only. Our proposal in the beginning was that,
for the placing of these troops, there should be equitable contributions of territory
from both sides. That is a proposition that is understood, and therefore it has not
been included in the resolution.
That is our position in regard to the Gaza strip.
WE DEEPLY REGRET THE REFERENCES TO BELLIGERENCY, to the

position of the Straits of Tiran - the legal positions that appear in the Secretary-
General’s report. The Secretary-General, as an organ of the United Nations, and
with the total freedom that he has as an independent organ, is fully entitled to say
what he wants to say. But I think we have an obligation to read the whole of this
report as one piece and not to pick out what suits one party and omit something
else.
Let me deal here with two ideas. First of all, the word "belligerency" has been
thrown about, and it is easy to arouse the sentiment, particularly among our Latin
American colleagues, that belligerency is hostile to the conception of the Charter
of the United Nations. Of course belligerency is hostile to the conception of the
Charter. So is war - although we are dealing with war. My Government desires
to state that an armistice is a condition of suspended war; it is not a condition of
peace. Resolution 1125 (XI) asks for observance of the provisions of the General
Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Egypt and Israel. I have read the
Armistice Agreement very carefully. I do not see in the Armistice Agreement of
1949 any reference to belligerency anywhere.
It is true that a basic conception of international law is that, in conditions of

armistice, hostile actions shall not be taken - and in law a hostile action is
different from an attitude of belligerency. But hostile actions or belligerency can
only be against the other party. That is to say, if Egypt were to undertake hostile
actions against Israel, or vice versa, that would be an act of belligerency. But if
Egypt were to conduct actions on the streets of Cairo of which we, according to
our conceptions of good taste, did not approve, that would not be an act of
belligerency. Therefore, when we talk about acts of belligerency, we must
consider to what territory those acts appertain.
That takes us to the question of these waters. Now, what does the Secretary-
General say? Referring to a statement by the International Law Commission in
regard to the question "what would be the legal position of straits forming part of
the territorial sea of one or more States and constituting the sole means of access
to the port of another State," he says:
"This description applies to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. A
legal controversy exists as to the extent of the right of innocent passage
through these waters." [A/3512 para 24].
That last sentence is conclusive. The moment the Secretary-General has stated -
in so doing, giving weight to that opinion - that a legal controversy exists as to
the extent of the right of innocent passage through these waters, the right of
decision is taken out of our hands altogether. The General Assembly cannot
decide a legal controversy. I am not subscribing, however, to the statement that
there is a legal controversy. All the existing evidence is on our side, that is on
the side that these waters are territorial waters. And the two countries concerned
are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Egypt. The entrance to
these waters is nine nautical miles wide, which is less than the twelve-mile limit
which is relevant in this connection. The broadest area of these waters conforms
to the twelve-mile territorial sea claimed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on
the one hand, and Egypt, on the other. If there should be a dispute between the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in regard to their respective territorial
rights, that would be a different case.
I would therefore say that this is an inland sea, and it is too late in the day for
European countries - and, if I may say so with great respect, for the Republics of
South America - to take a view on this which is totally unconnected with their
own history.
A great luminary in England, Lord Fitzmaurice, stated on February 21, 1907, in

the House of Lords the position of the United Kingdom Government that only
bays with an entrance not more than six miles wide were to be regarded as
territorial. In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, however, which was
decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 1910, the United
Kingdom repudiated that position. The United States contended for its
accuracy, but the Court refused to agree.
So far as other countries are concerned, France holds the Bay of Cancale to be
territorial, although its entrance is seventeen miles wide, and the entrance to the
Gulf of Aqaba is nine nautical miles wide. Before Newfoundland became part
of Canada, the United Kingdom held that Conception Bay was territorial, and
we have no information that Canada has changed that position. The United
Kingdom held that Conception Bay, Chaleur Bay and Miramichi Bay in Canada
were territorial, although the width between their headlands is twenty, sixteen
and fourteen miles respectively. Therefore, in each case where there is an inland
sea of this character, where the entrance is larger than in the case of the Gulf of
Aqaba, the United Kingdom and France have held it to be part of their own
territories, just as though it was land.
Hudson Bay in Canada, which embraces about 580,000 square miles with an
entrance fifty miles wide, is claimed to be a territorial bay of Canada. Norway
claims Varangerfjord as territorial, although its entrance is thirty-two miles
wide. The United States claims the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, as it does
other inlets of the same character, as territorial, although the entrance to one is
twelve miles wide and the entrance to the other ten miles wide.
The Institute of International Law has voted in favour of the principle that a gulf
or bay whose entrance is twelve miles wide or less constitutes territorial waters,
although it admits that those gulfs and bays with a wider entrance which have
been considered territorial waters for more than one hundred years also have a
territorial character. As matters stand, it is doubtful whether many gulfs and
bays are territorial. It is not only the United Kingdom, France and the United
States that are concerned in this matter; there are other European countries
whose skin will be touched if we are to have a general proposition disregarding
for this purpose the sovereign rights of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in this
connection. There are other territorial bays in Europe. There is the Zuider Zee,
which is Dutch. There is the Zalew Szececinski (formerly the Bay of Stettin) in
the Baltic and the Schelde in the North Sea. These are all territorial waters, but
an international congress may decide these questions.
Now, what is the present position on this point? In fairness to the Secretary-
General, it must be said that paragraph 28 of document A/3512, on which the
whole of this unnecessary argument has been concentrated, does not say what it
is alleged to say. This is what it says:
"As a conclusion from paragraph 24-27" - which is a discussion of the

whole of this problem - "it may be held" - he does not say it should be
held - "that, in a situation where the armistice regime is partly operative by
observance of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement concerning the
armistice lines, possible claims to rights of belligerency would be at least
so much in doubt that, having regard for the general international interest
at stake, no such claim should be exercised in the Gulf of Aqaba and the
Straits of Tiran."
Now, first of all, this statement is an expression of a hope. Secondly, with great
respect to the Secretary-General, it is based on the false conception that the
exercise of sovereign rights in a sovereign territory, in territorial waters, is an act
of belligerency. Such an exercise of sovereign rights would be no more an act
of belligerency than if it were an act on the highways of Cairo. It would be an
act of belligerency if it were committed anywhere else. Therefore, in the
submission of my Government, the statement is based on that false conception.
Over and above that, the Secretary-General quite rightly tells us that "possible
claims to rights of belligerency" are "so much in doubt." If they are so much in
doubt, how can we, by resolution, by newspaper articles, by assurances or by
anything of that kind, deal with this problem? So far as we are concerned, I
would go so far as to suggest that if it was right during the days of the Ottoman
Empire for the Khedive of Egypt to enter into an agreement with France to cut
across the Isthmus of Suez, destroy the land and make it into a sea - nobody
thought that was against international law - then it would equally be possible for
Egypt, in agreement with Saudi Arabia, to fill up the Gulf of Aqaba. I should
like to ask: what international authority could challenge that?
This does not mean that, in the interests of international peace, there is not an
obligation upon every party concerned, including my own country, to assist in
such ways as are possible to maintain good behaviour. My good friend, the
representative of the United States referred to the fact that Japanese ships - and,
I suppose, Russian ships - sail up the Hudson and, therefore, there is freedom.
But that is a freedom subject to consent. Mr. Lodge invites me to his apartment
and I go there, but that does not mean that I have the right to occupy it.
These are territorial waters, and I want to utter a note of warning - that is to say,
I do not want to warn anybody, but I want this thought to be raised in the minds
of people. Hard cases make very bad law, and there are too many inlets and
gulfs in the world. If France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway,
Germany, and certain countries in Latin America, particularly Nicaragua and E1
Salvador, will only refer to the relevant decisions of the international courts in
this matter, they will begin to realise that, especially in a continent where one
country, I will not say which, claims 200 miles of territorial sea, in the present
state of international law territoriality is merely a unilateral declaration. Some
countries give the distance on the territorial sea as three miles, others say twelve
miles, and there is the country that has said 200 miles, and nobody has objected
to it. Nobody could. Therefore, the only way to solve this problem is not by
threats or by suggestions - which, fortunately, have not come from any
responsible Government - of forcing passage through or of test cases, or
anything of that kind, which would only lead to the precipitation of the crisis in
the Middle East.
My country - and the Arab nations do not like us to say this - hopes and trusts
and looks forward to the time when, whatever the rights and the wrongs of the
Israel-Arab disputes, these problems will be resolved in some form so that the
Arab countries can turn their attention to their economic development and when
the vast quantity of money that comes from the international world for the
arming of the State of Israel will also be diverted to the development of under-
developed areas. That is our hope; but to express a hope and to work for it is not
to deny the sovereign rights of someone else, and that is our position with regard
to the Gulf of Aqaba. If it were true that passage could be forced in one place,
passage could also be forced in another place.
IT IS NECESSARY FOR ME TO REFER, with some sadness, to the

circumstances which have prevented my delegation from participating in the
debate earlier. It is common knowledge that the United States delegation has
been exercising considerable initiative and deploying its energy in vast measure
in order that the implementation of resolution 1124 (XI) of February 2, 1957,
would no longer be delayed. My Government has assisted in this process. We
are a far-off country, and a small country in terms of power, but we have, as far
as we could, with the common connection that we have with the Arab countries
and with more understanding of their position, placed ourselves at their disposal.
It is necessary for me to state this in order to state the position of my
Government. We have no knowledge whatsoever, either from the Egyptian
delegation in New York or from our mission in Cairo, that there has been any
consultation with the Egyptian Government in regard to the alleged agreement
that might have been reached between the Government of the United States, the
Government of France and the Government of Israel.
I do not even say there are such agreements, because in these matters we cannot
go by newspaper reports. Therefore, so far as we are concerned, we are not
involved in any of these matters. We are involved in finding a solution. If it so
happens that the statement that the Israel delegation is being good enough to
make this afternoon is of the same character as the statements made by the
Governments of France and the United Kingdom, and that it terminates the
situation, we would be happy. If it is not, however, then the duty of the
Assembly is to proceed to other measures; and in that, my Government will give
the United States Government every possible assistance in order to implement
its original intention which it voiced before the Security Council. I have said
this not in order to disclose any private conversation, but merely in order to
remove any suggestion that we are partners in any secret diplomacy.
This takes me, before I leave the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, to the legal
position as it stands today. There are no final decisions on this position, as has
been pointed out by the Secretary-General himself in his report [A/3512], where
he says that the International Law Commission has left this matter rather in
doubt and that it must be decided some other time. But I have read out to the
Assembly the legal authority that exists. However, in the United Nations, the
International Law Commission has taken this matter under consideration. The
Commission pointed out, in article 16 (duties of the coastal State) of its Articles
concerning the Law of the Sea, that the coastal State - or the coastal States, and
in this particular case, Egypt and Saudi Arabia - must not hamper innocent
passage through the territorial sea [A/3159].
This is the normal law; it is the normal law anywhere. It is the normal law in
any country that if a national of another country goes there, the Head of the State
offers every facility that must be expected. That is the code of international
behaviour, according to article 16 of the International Law Commission’s
Articles concerning the Law of the Sea.
But article 16 is bound by article 17, because while article 16 states the general
position, article 17 refers to the rights of protection of the coastal State. In this
condition of armistice, in the conditions that have prevailed during the last ten
years, article 17, therefore, becomes important. What does that article say? It
says the following:
"1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to
protect itself against any act prejudicial to its security or to such other of
its interests as it is authorised to protect under the present rules and other
rules of international law." [A/3159].
A further paragraph in the same article reads as follows:
"3. The coastal State may suspend temporarily in definite areas of its
territorial sea the exercise of the right of passage..."
Therefore, this right of innocent passage, so-called, actually means that, first of
all, one must prove innocence. Innocence depends upon the character of the
party claiming the passage; it depends upon the purpose of the passage, and also
upon the freight that is carried. I am sure that the Government of France will be
the first to support the idea of the right to search of freight, even though we do
not uphold particular actions taken by it. The paragraph continues:
"...if it should deem such suspension essential for the protection of the
rights referred to in paragraph 1."
That is, its security. The paragraph continues: "Should it take such action, it is
bound to give due publicity to the suspension." I do not think that anyone can
complain in this case that there has been any lack of publicity. The next
paragraph of the article reads as follows:
"4. There must be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships

through straits normally used for international navigation between two
parts of the high seas."
That particular clause does not apply to the Gulf of Aqaba because that Gulf
does not connect two high seas - unless we suggest that there is an interim
connection through the atmosphere or through the land. It is not as though the
Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea were connected by the Suez Canal in that
way; for, of course, the Suez Canal has another characteristic, that of an artificial
waterway. Therefore, that does not apply.
This is the legal opinion as it stands today. It is quite true that the International
Law Commission concludes that we must have all this properly considered
because there are many other difficulties in this question, and the Commission
has left the matter for further consideration. But, so far as the law can be stated,
that is how it stands today, and it applies to all the European countries, which
have fought many wars on this question. And what is more, if their interests
were affected, they would repudiate it, as the United Kingdom repudiated Lord
Fitzmaurice's statement before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1910, and
would moreover claim territorial rights, whether over Hudson Bay, Chesapeake
Bay, or the Bay of Cancale. This question is very important to all these
countries. Otherwise, it simply means that, in difficult and troubled times, a
country can have a Trojan horse within its territory. What would happen to the
Scandinavian countries, with their large number of enormous fjords on their
coasts? Therefore, while the immediate hard conditions may lead to their
overlooking these matters, this is the position. And my Government, therefore,
restated this position in regard to the Gulf of Aqaba.
WITH REGARD TO THE WITHDRAWAL, it is not sufficient, in the opinion

of my delegation, for a statement to be made that withdrawal will take place.
The question depends upon when the withdrawal will take place, and how
complete it will be. Also, no such withdrawal will prejudice any claims, any
questions, that the United Nations may have to raise, or any issue which the
parties may have to raise in respect of the damage done during the period
between the cease-fire and the withdrawal itself. Therefore, if, as I fondly hope,
there will be a statement this afternoon that, in view of international opinion, in
view of the opinion inside Israel itself, a decision has been made to withdraw
unconditionally from the invaded territory, that decision would have to be
implemented, and the General Assembly would have to exercise its vigilance in
regard to implementation.
It is not sufficient for us to obtain an assurance that there will be withdrawal and
then leave the matter to the United Nations Emergency Force, which has only
the right of supervision, and which has no right of forcing evacuation. We
would not want our troops to fight either Arabs or Israelis and, therefore, the
Force’s position is merely that of supervision. There must be, therefore, proper
provision for reporting to the General Assembly within a very reasonable time,
over the weekend perhaps, that withdrawal has been accomplished. I quote the
position taken by Mr. Lodge in this matter some time ago that it is easier to
withdraw now than it was when the British and French withdrew because all the
arrangements are there...
The relevant passage of the aide-memoire of the Secretary-General66 reads as

follows:
"The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General of the United

Nations have stated their understanding on the basic points for the
presence and functioning of UNEF as follows:
"1. The Government of Egypt declares that, when exercising its sovereign
rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it
will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the General Assembly
resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956.
"2. The United nations takes note of this declaration of the Government of
Egypt and declares that the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good
faith, by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned
66 A/3375, annex, setting out the agreement between the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and the Egyptian Government
resolutions; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to
correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its
willingness to maintain the UNEF until its task is completed."
Therefore, there can be no question, either in the Sharm el Sheikh area or in the
Gaza area, of any army of occupation. All that can be accomplished is complete
evacuation. If this afternoon at three o’clock, by the grace and generosity of the
Israel Government and the persistent endeavours of the Government of the
United States and its President, we are able to hear a statement that there will be
an unconditional withdrawal, I am sure that the General Assembly will be
delighted. But at the same time, in view of its experience, it would be apt to say,
like Oliver Cromwell: "Put your trust in God, my boys, and keep your powder
dry." We still would have to exercise our vigilance; we would have to see
performance in this case, and not only promises.
My Government has an interest in this matter in view of the sufferings of the

invaded country, in view of our allegiance to the Charter and, what is more, in
view of the practice that is developing in the United Nations of converting the
victim into the aggressor. Anyone who brings a complaint here and shows any
reasonableness very soon finds himself in the position of having done the
mischief himself. That has been our experience, at least in one instance, and we
do not want to see it repeated elsewhere.
I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO REFER TO THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ issued

on February 28, 1957, by the President of the United States and the Prime
Minister of France. My Government is in no position, and has no right, to say
what they should issue and what they should not issue. But we have every right
to draw attention to some matters...
Unfortunately, these agreements and the present development have taken place
in the context of a philippic delivered against nationalism, and I would like the
representative of the United States particularly to listen to the fact.
For 4,000 years our part of the world had communications with Europe. We
gave Europe the origins of its languages, its science, its medicine and everything
else. When I say "we gave Europe," I mean that in the course of history those
discoveries passed that way. When we went through the process of history,
Europe repaid us by the conquest of Alexander. Fortunately nature took its toll;
he returned a conqueror, but with an empty victory.
Since that time, Europe has developed and nationalism has been established.
Mr. Guy Mollet, Prime Minister of France, refers to exaggerated, fanatical forms
of nationalism. With great respect, I say that I could not say more. I subscribe
to the doctrine that nationalism in its exaggerated phases is an evil to the world.
But what I want to ask is this: What is more exaggerated a phase of nationalism
than the attempt of a nation to plant its flag on someone else’s country?
Imperialism is the most exaggerated form of nationalism. So I say to Mr.
Mollet: Take a bit of your own medicine; it is good French medicine.
Imperialism is the most exaggerated form of nationalism.
It does not lie in the mouth of conquering countries, whose history is replete
with tales of blood, to lecture to other people about exaggerated forms of
nationalism. For a thousand years we have lived under European domination.
For the last three hundred years we have seen domination, ever since the fall of
Constantinople, when unfortunately the East sold spices to Europe and taught its
people the art of cooking, and the Europeans first went in search of trade, and
afterwards brought their soldiers in after them; and when the fortress of
Constantinople was destroyed, the empires were established and the Portuguese
came in, and by habit the Spaniards followed the Portuguese, and then the Dutch
came in, and the French after them, and the English after the French, and then,
later, the Germans, establishing spheres of influence from the Yellow Sea to
what is now Istanbul.
We have suffered from these things, and for the first time in 4,000 years nearly
1,700 million people of the world are shaking off the shackles of racial
domination. We refuse to submit to it. We would rather die on our feet than
live on our knees. And I appeal to the representatives of the United States to
understand the sentiment of our peoples. If the United States does not, then it
casts its lot with the imperial countries whose sun has set, because where there is
not righteousness, there will be no victory.
The cause of Egypt is not the cause of Arab misbehaviour or of good behaviour.
There are many things on which we probably would have acted differently.
Egypt is a sovereign Government entitled to act in the manner it deems best.
We have no quarrels with Israel. We, unlike the Arab countries, recognise that
country. But we are not prepared to accept the statement that the future of the
world lies in the re-establishment of empire over Africa, under this cross-gain
conception which, as I said, has neither pride of ancestry nor hopes of progeny,
like the proverbial mule. It is merely a new imperial conception, a conception
based upon force, a conception based upon the erasing of the self-expression of
the peoples in that great continent.
The attempts - and I would exempt the United Kingdom from this because its
policy is the reverse of this connection - by the empires of France or Portugal or
Belgium, or any other country, to maintain their stranglehold on subject
populations would be resisted by us with our weakness; and our weakness
probably is stronger than their strength, because our weakness is based upon the
spirit and determination of peoples to be free.
Therefore, it is with very deep regret that we find that there is an identity of
thought, very vaguely expressed, in this joint communiqué issued by the Prime
Minister of France and the President of the United States. But that only is the
penumbra, the background, of the present development. What hurts us, what
creates concern in our minds, is the paragraph in the communiqué which refers
to the solution of the problems of the Middle East. I take the liberty of reading
the following:
"With reference to the Middle East, they stated their common conviction
that solutions to the problems of the area can be achieved by peaceful
means, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."
This is the first time that one of the great Powers has in a declaration omitted
any reference to the Charter of the United Nations. The United Kingdom, in
various agreements and even, I believe, in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement,
introduced the words "the Charter of the United Nations." Whether they observe
it or not is another matter. But this is the first time that there has been an
omission with regard to the Charter of the United Nations.
In the context of the violation of justice and international law by invasion by one
side, this statement by itself, to put it very mildly, is inadequate. We therefore
sense in this a return to secret diplomacy and agreements to which the United
Nations may not be a party.
But it may be that all these things will resolve themselves. My Government
fully shares the conviction and the hope that the solutions to these problems can
be reached peacefully.
That takes me to the last point. Our colleagues from Canada, with whom we
have the closest and the friendliest of relations and a great deal of similarity, and
sometimes identity of thought, have from the very beginning, it must be said in
fairness to them, taken the view that the present crisis - the war, the invasion -
should be utilised to solve what is called the Middle Eastern problem. Of
course, I do not know what the Middle Eastern problem is; there are so many
problems. At any rate, the representative of Canada’s main reference is to the
Arab-Israel problem. It is the view of my Government, as I said a while ago,
that there must be a solution to these problems sometime, somehow, but it can
only be found in co-operation and in terms of coexistence and of the recognition
of the legitimate rights of the sovereignties of people. What is more, it has to be
a gradual process. First things first, and the first thing is what the General
Assembly has already sought to accomplish by resolution, namely, to maintain
the armistice in conditions of peace by insulating the frontier and by
strengthening the Observer Corps.
To try to use the invasion, the fruit of the invasion, as a part of this book of
invasion with a chapter on settlement is incongruous. Therefore, any attempt
such as that which the Canadian Government seems to be so insistent upon,
namely, to try and build into this problem a specific solution, is to try to mix oil
and water - and they will not mix.
We have every hope that, if Israel withdraws completely and there is no further
trouble about it and if the welling of public opinion in France brings about a
great change in its present imperial positions, then it is possible that the
functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force on the armistice
demarcation line would be a pilot project which would assist in the elimination
of the suspicions and the inevitable conflicts that arise when two hostile forces
are ranged one against the other. Afterwards, that procedure may by consent be
applied to other areas. But however that may be, these are things that have to be
taken in their stride, and any attempt to try to bite off more than we can chew at
the present time and to go away from the fundamental problem that is before us
- which is not the Arab-Israel question - would not be advisable.
We have not consulted other Arab countries about this. Egypt has no right to
speak on their behalf. We are now trying to resolve a war and a war situation
where the territory of Egypt has been invaded. It would have been a different
position if, in the course of the invasion, all the other Arab countries had joined
their forces and had gone into active military alliance and opposed it.
This is not to say that the Government of India desires to stand in the way of any
progress towards a settlement, but we want to express our apprehension at the
attempts to use the weaker position of the country against which aggression has
been committed - that is to say, not morally weaker, but weaker because of the
impact of the invasion - and to use the great power of other great countries in
order to solve problems that have been subsisting for ten years and which
involve many issues. This would be impractical.
We should like to say that considerable efforts have been made during the past
few days by the Egyptian delegation and, to our knowledge, by the United States
delegation to find a way whereby the Assembly could be invited with some hope
and some reason to resolve unanimously, if it became necessary, to put a final
stop to this chapter - I would not say this chapter, but this series of chapters - of
prevarication. It is in the interests of the people of Israel that this tension should
stop. It is unthinkable that, whatever may happen in the next day, in the next ten
days or in the next ten years, the population of Israel could live in the Middle
East except in terms of friendship with the Arab countries. That is what we have
to seek to promote, and my country is dedicated to that task.
THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY
[The situation in Hungary was brought up before the United Nations Security
Council - by France, the United Kingdom and the United States - on October 27,
1956, following intervention by Soviet military forces in repression of an uprising
in the country. The Council could take no action because of a veto by the Soviet
Union, and an emergency special session of the General Assembly was convened
on 4 November to consider the matter.
On the same day, on the proposal of the United States, the General Assembly
adopted resolution 1004 (ES-II) calling upon the Soviet Union to desist
forthwith from all armed attack on the people of Hungary; and requesting
the Secretary-General to investigate the situation and report with suggestions
on methods to bring to an end the foreign intervention in Hungary.
The following speech by Mr. Menon was an explanation of India’s abstention on

the resolution.]
On November 4, the Assembly adopted resolution 1004 (ES-II) in regard to the

situation in Hungary. My delegation abstained in the voting on this resolution. I
want to say here and now that the abstention of my delegation was not due to lack
of instructions or any other difficulties. It arose from the nature of this subject
and the nature of the resolution before us. We abstained because we agreed with
some parts of it, but did not agree with others. Therefore, we are not by our
abstention proclaiming our unconcern or lack of interest in this matter.
Often, those who understand but little of the approach and the policy of my
Government and country to the affairs of nations choose to dub us a neutral. We
are not neutral where human freedom is concerned.
The situation in Hungary has been a cause of grave anxiety to our Government
and has caused much concern among our people. However, we have to recognise
the fact that that concern has to be expressed in terms such as those of paragraph 3
in this resolution, which states that the Hungarian people should have a
government which is "responsive to its national aspirations and dedicated to its
independence and well-being."
So far as my Government is concerned, the State of Hungary is a member State of

the United Nations and even with all the emotional environment that surrounds
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Official Records of General Assembly, Second Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings,
pages 44-45
the present tragic situation, we may not forget the sovereign rights of a sovereign
State in the Assembly. We may not refer to a member State as though it were
struggling for its independence. Our sympathy is with the people of any country
who have struggled to attain their national independence and desire to retain it.
The use of force and violence by governments or by people, whether inside a
country or against another country, is reprehensible and entirely contrary to the
outlook and the approach of my Government and country, and this attitude applies
equally to the affairs of its own people and to those of other nations.
We have received with interest and with hope the announcement of the Soviet
Government that it proposes to withdraw its troops from Hungary. It is the
fervent hope of my Government that this announcement will be implemented.
The draft resolution that was before the Assembly on 4 November contained
many parts which, if they had been put individually to the vote, we would have
supported. But since the draft contained a number of other matters to which we
were not able to lend our support, we abstained on it. Therefore, our position in
this matter is that we do not regard the issue of freedom as conditioned by
distance from our capital or by the race or complexion of the people involved; we
regard this issue as universal.
Here, however, in this political gathering, we are trying to find ways and means of
resolving difficulties. It is the considered view of our Government that anything
the General Assembly does must be directed to that end. It is probably well
known that, both in regard to this problem and to a problem with which we are
more familiar, the invasion of Egypt, the Government of India has during these
last anxious weeks attempted to use its power of persuasion in quarters where it
may be useful to bring about some amelioration of the present situation.
My Prime Minister only the other day, in referring to this matter, spoke of the
suppression of freedom in various places and mentioned Hungary in that
connection. That is the position of my Government...
Finally, the purpose of my explanation of vote is to make clear that we are

prepared at all times to use such influence and such energies as we have in the
promotion of human liberty. We fully support parts of this resolution, particularly
the first paragraph of the preamble, stating that "the United Nations is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members." The General
Assembly cannot in any circumstances, whether it considers the action under
discussion right or wrong, disregard the sovereign rights of members. India is
against the intervention of any government or of any outside authority in the
affairs of States from whatever quarter it may come and whatever form it may
take; whether it be subversion or obversion makes no difference.
We are equally in support of the second paragraph of the preamble, which refers
to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We are not qualified to speak upon the Peace Treaty between Hungary and the
Allied and Associated Powers at this stage.
We are fully in support of the right of the Hungarian people to choose the form of
government it desires; this is inherent in its sovereignty and in its membership of
the United Nations. It is our view that in dealing with a member State the General
Assembly cannot deal with the problem in the same way as in the case of a
colonial country, where the people have no representation.
I hope that the explanation I have made makes it quite clear where India stands on
this matter. We stand for the freedom of peoples. We are against foreign
domination in any country. We anticipate with hope and with confidence that the
Soviet Government, having announced its intention to withdraw its troops from
Hungary, will implement that declaration soon.
I am also at liberty to say that our own Government, in such ways as are open to
it, seeks to further the purposes that are inherent in the thoughts and minds of all
of us.
Finally, whatever the different views we may have in the Assembly, there is no
one here who, by his speech or by his vote, has indicated that he disregards or is
callous to any situation where violence seeks to oppress freedom or to drive a
country into a state of anarchy. The great expression of public opinion from all
sides of the Assembly will itself be a contribution to the solution of the difficult
problem before it and will help to enable the independent country of Hungary to
resolve its problems and to have ensured to it all the conditions of existence that
are envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.
[The Secretary-General formally communicated the Assembly resolution of 4

November to the Governments of Hungary and the Soviet Union. But soon after,
in Hungary, the Government headed by Imre Nagy was replaced by a
Government headed by Janos Kadar. The credentials of the Hungarian delegation
to the General Assembly were challenged and the Assembly decided to take no
decision pending further clarification.
Discussion of the situation in Hungary continued before the Secretary-General

was able to make a report on the resolution of 4 November. Cuba, Ireland, Italy,
Pakistan and Peru presented a draft resolution to call upon the Soviet Union to
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Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Emergency Special Session, Plenary
Meetings, pages 68-69
withdraw its forces from Hungary, and to declare that free elections should be
held in Hungary under the auspices of the United Nations. The United States
moved another draft resolution concerning assistance to refugees from Hungary;
India, together with Ceylon and Indonesia, submitted amendments to delete
references to political aspects in that draft.
The following speech of Mr. Menon was devoted to the two draft resolutions and
the amendments.
On 9 November, the Assembly rejected the amendments and adopted the two draft
resolutions as resolutions 1005 and 1006 (ES-II).]
The General Assembly has before it a number of draft resolutions, the

amendments to one of the draft resolutions presented by the delegations of Ceylon
and Indonesia together with my own delegation, and there is also pending the
resolution of November 4, 1956 [1004 (ES-II)]. I should like to deal with the
resolutions which are before us today in the order in which they have been
submitted.
There is first of all the five-Power resolution (A/3316) which deals in substance
with the situation in Hungary. With regard to that draft resolution, the position of
most delegations has already been stated, because that draft resolution deals with
the subject matter covered by the resolution of 4 November.
I should like to reiterate what I said from this rostrum yesterday. Having
considered the position in Hungary, the Assembly passed a resolution which
requested the Secretary-General to make certain investigations and report to it.
That resolution is still pending. We are told and the Secretary-General has
informed us that he is not in a position to make that report. It appears to me in the
normal course of things entirely an unusual proceeding to go on to other
decisions. The decision of the Assembly of 4 November is, on the face of it, a
clear indication that the Assembly wants information. The Assembly wants to
know what the Secretary-General is able to do in these matters.
It is quite true that my delegation abstained on this resolution for the reasons I set
out yesterday. But even though a delegation abstains on the vote, when a
resolution is adopted it becomes the resolution of the Assembly. In our opinion,
there is a duty cast upon the Assembly at least to conform to its own resolution
passed only a few days ago. Therefore, we think that the five-Power draft
resolution, apart from all other considerations to which I shall refer in a moment,
is misconceived. We are not able to support it, and shall vote against it.
Secondly, in making this approach to the problem, my delegation desires to

submit with respect that we are not giving sufficient thought and attention to the
resolving of the problems and the difficulties that exist in Hungary at the present
moment. There is no one here who does not appreciate that there has been
fighting, suffering and unsettlement and that there is not the stability required.
Any decisions that we adopt here must be directed to the improvement of those
conditions. Furthermore, my delegation cannot subscribe at any time to any
phraseology or proposals before the Assembly which disregard the sovereignty of
States represented here. For example, we cannot say that a sovereign member of
this Assembly, admitted after due procedures, can be called upon to submit its
elections and everything else to the United Nations without its agreement.
Therefore, any approach that we make as though this is a colonial country which
is not represented at the United Nations, is not in accordance either with the law
or the facts of the position.
With regard to the subject matter, it has disturbed our minds and caused my
Government and people a great deal of anxiety. As I said yesterday on this
rostrum, we have, as a Government, as all Governments do, the right to exert what
influence we have and make such approaches as are possible to assist in resolving
this problem and to bring about a situation where the Hungarian people will be
able to settle down to constructive tasks and enjoy their national independence.
I am to say that in the correspondence between the Prime Ministers of the Soviet
Union and India, the last part of which was communicated from New Delhi and
received here this afternoon, the Soviet Government informed us of a
determination to deal with its relationships with their neighbouring socialist States
on the principles of mutual respect of their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
friendship, co-operation and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
This appears in the declaration of the Soviet Government of 30 October, and it is
reiterated.
There is the problem of the Soviet troops. The Government of India is informed
that Soviet troops are to be withdrawn from Budapest in agreement with the
Hungarian Government as soon as order is restored. And the Russian
Government intends to start negotiations with the Hungarian Government in
regard to Soviet-Hungarian relations in conformity with this declaration.
It is entirely upto the Assembly to make its own decision with regard to these
matters. As far as our Government is concerned, we have made efforts in this
direction with a view to attaining the ends that are put forward in these
resolutions. In agreement with Yugoslavia, Poland and other countries, who are
very near to Hungary and whose problems though not identical are of a similar
character, we think that we should not do things here merely out of emotion or
other reactions or out of our political predilections, forgetting the interests of the
Hungarian people and of the Hungarian State. Therefore, any attitude which is
taken which will retard this process of the withdrawal of troops and the settling
down of the Hungarian people will be contrary to our general purposes.
For those reasons, we think that the five-Power draft resolution is not one which
we can support. We consider that it will not assist in the purposes in which the
Assembly has interested itself...
We come now to the second draft resolution (A/3319) before us, which stands in
the name of the United States of America. This draft resolution is of an entirely
different category, and I would like to say that we are in agreement with its
purposes. If I am right, the purposes of this draft resolution are humanitarian, that
is, the relief of suffering. But a purpose always gets rather distorted when
material that is relevant to other purposes is imported into it. Therefore, my
delegation while agreeing with the purposes as being in conformity with the
general approach towards relieving suffering, whatever may be the causes, has
tried to remove from the United States draft resolution such parts as make it
unacceptable to us, and to retain all the rest, even though we might not have
phrased it in that way; that is to say, if my delegation and those who co-sponsored
these amendments had to submit a draft resolution de novo, we might not have
adopted this phraseology. But we are anxious to retain as much of this draft
resolution as we can and to take away from it only those things that have no
relevance at all or may come in the way of its purposes.
It is our submission that the draft resolution as we seek to amend it meets the
purposes which the United States draft resolution has in view, without importing
into it other considerations and that it will achieve the end to which my colleague
from Indonesia has just referred, namely, to bring to this draft resolution a larger
degree and wider extent of support.
In regard to the whole question of the relief of suffering in conditions of war or

conditions of civil disturbance, I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly
to the fact that these matters have been taken into consideration by the nations of
the world and have led to the formulation of the Geneva Convention in regard to a
disturbance of this character, whether the disturbance be a civil disturbance, a
civil commotion, internal might be said - and therefore as coming within Article
2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter - or an international war. It is the
submission of my delegation that these matters of relief should be dealt with in
accordance with the Geneva Convention. If they are dealt with in accordance
with the Geneva Convention, the channelling of aid should be through
organisations of a character which do not call into question the nature of that aid
or its purposes or whether, in a packet containing medicaments, arms are going in,
or anything of that kind. Therefore, in these circumstances, the aid should go to
the International Red Cross which would decide the local organs through which
their further transmission should take place.
I am sure that the Assembly will share the feeling of my delegation that we were
glad to hear this morning from the representative of Yugoslavia that the
International Red Cross has not met with any resistance from any party
concerned, and that the International Red Cross is functioning through the
Hungarian and Yugoslav Red Cross missions. Therefore, it is the appropriate
international authority free from political or national bias which conforms to the
terms of the Geneva Convention, and is the appropriate authority to deal with this
matter.
While we have no desire to have a specific mention of this apart from what
appears in the draft resolution, half the trouble arising from political controversy
would disappear if we would separate the humanitarian aspects from our own
political objectives. That is why my delegation has moved these amendments,
and I hope that after the statement that the representative of Indonesia has made
and that I have made - and that I am sure those who speak after me will make - it
will be seen that we are in agreement with the purposes and the motives that lie
behind the United States draft resolution (A/3319). But we cannot agree with its
formulation; however, we are in agreement with the main purposes. We hope,
therefore, that these amendments will find favour with the sponsor of the draft
resolution...

195669
[The situation in Hungary was considered by the eleventh regular session of the
General Assembly soon after it opened on November 12, 1956.
The Hungarian Government rejected the General Assembly resolutions on the

situation in Hungary claiming that they were in contradiction with the United
Nations Charter. The settlement of the situation and the holding of elections, it
held, were entirely within the jurisdiction of Hungary and that the sending of
representatives of the Secretary-General to Hungary was unwarranted. It
informed the Secretary-General that it would begin negotiations with the Soviet
Union for the withdrawal of troops after law and order was restored.
On 16 November, the Secretary-General appointed a three-man group, including

Ambassador Arthur Lall of India, to investigate the situation caused by foreign
intervention in Hungary.
During the discussion in the Assembly, India, together with Ceylon and Indonesia,
presented a draft resolution urging the Hungarian Government to accede to the
request of the Secretary-General to permit observers designated by him to enter
the territory of Hungary and travel freely therein. It was adopted on November
21, 1956, as resolution 1128 (XI).]
My Government and our country have been very seriously concerned with the
69
Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, pages 166-70
developments in Hungary and the catastrophic consequences of violence in that
country. There have been statements made before this Assembly of a character
which does not correspond to the attitude of the Government of India or its people
or, indeed, of the peoples of Asia as a whole, if we are any judges of it.
It is not always possible or necessary for a government to take an identical line

with another government, even though it may have strong views on any particular
subject. I shall not this morning try to rebut the observations that have been
made, somewhat unjustifiably, for the simple reason that I am on this rostrum this
morning for the particular purpose of using our humble efforts in order to assist in
a turn in the Hungarian situation whereby it will be possible, we hope, to urge the
Government of Hungary to dispel the serious anxiety and concern and, in many
parts of the world, the revulsion of feeling that has arisen on account of the
developments there.
The approach that I make this morning is not by way of trying to controvert
statements, even when they have been made unjustifiably, in regard to ourselves.
Therefore, while our draft resolution (A/3368) itself is concerned with a very
small aspect of this problem, I would like to take a few minutes to state the
position of my delegation in this matter.
We stand, without any reservations, for the right of a people to have the form of
government they desire and to order their own affairs in their own way, without
any external pressures, from whatsoever quarter they may come. We do not
believe that the basis of any modern government, of any civilised government,
can rest on the power of arms from outside. We ourselves have had a long
experience of the capacity of people to resist that intervention, and when the
peoples of a country, irrespective of the amount of physical force that is applied
against them, are determined to say "no," those people are bound to succeed.
Therefore I want to express here the very grave anxiety that exists in our land, and
our great desire to see this business not become a part of a general situation of
hostilities between camps of countries, but to move towards a solution. We have
condemned violence in unmistakable terms. We do not believe that the
government of any country should be based upon foreign intervention or upon the
armed might of any other country. From our own point of view, the existence of
foreign forces in various countries in the world is inimical to the cause of peace
and progress.
We have not only expressed our sympathies for the grave suffering that exists in
Hungary, but our Government dispatched by air yesterday the first instalment of
supplies for relief to Hungary, although we are a people greatly in need ourselves
and the demands for the relief of suffering in Egypt, which is closer to us, are as
heavy as we can meet. This is a token expression of our desire to assist in this
matter.
We stand unqualifiedly by the sovereignty of Hungary, whose dismemberment we
would not wish in any way to assist; neither would we wish to have intervention
by any party whatsoever. Equally, we stand by the right of the Hungarian people
to shape their own destinies without outside interference. In a situation of this
kind, violence starts and it spreads all around. But no government can be
sustained by the power of a foreign army. The only governments that can be
sustained by the power of a foreign army are not governments but administrations
that are of a dependent character.
Our history is one where a powerful country, with a mighty army and a mighty
power, imposed its authority over us, and the unity and the will of our people
alone, and not our armed might, was responsible for its displacement. Therefore
we look with sympathy to the populations of Hungary who are trying to unite and,
I hope, to stand against elements of dismemberment, from whichever quarter they
may come, either from within or from without.
At the same time, the four Prime Ministers of what are known as the Colombo
countries - that is, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India - the other day issued a
statement which is a considered statement of policy. They said the following:
"They regret that Soviet forces, which had been withdrawn in accordance
with the policy laid down in a statement issued by the Government of the
Soviet Union on 30 October were reintroduced into Budapest a few days
later. The Prime Ministers" - and this is the most important part of our
statement - "consider it an inalienable right of every country to shape for
itself its own destiny free from all external pressures. They are of the
opinion that Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily,
and that the Hungarian people should be left free to decide their own
future and the form of government they will have without external
intervention from any quarter."
That is our general position. But today we are dealing with a problem in regard
to allegations that have been made in this Assembly on the one hand, and
denials on the other hand; and I want to assure you that it is not as though we sit
detached, unconcerned, by the reports on one side, and by the denials on the
other, as though we were giving a Solomon's judgement, a kind of award in this
matter. We think, first, that there is a responsibility for the Assembly to express
itself in a restrained fashion, in order to obtain a settlement. Secondly, the main
concern that we should have is to try to obtain, in terms of the decision of the
General Assembly, the introduction into Hungary of observers, and the good
offices of the Secretary-General.
On 4 November, the General Assembly adopted a resolution [1004 (ES-II)].

Since then, I have said on this rostrum that the position of my Government is
that this resolution must work itself out fully. The Secretary-General is on the
rostrum. On account of other preoccupations and his absence from the country,
we have not had the benefit of his oral communication to the General Assembly.
But my delegation has taken the trouble, if it may be called trouble, to ascertain
for ourselves what is the status of the Secretary-General's intervention in this
matter, and he is here to correct me if I am wrong.
Our understanding is that the Secretary-General's efforts are by no means

terminated. Some progress has been made as far as we can see from the
correspondence, and the attempts now must be devoted towards prising open,
towards gaining an entry, into this situation, where the light and the impact of
international opinion will have a direct bearing upon the resolving of the
situation in Hungary.
It is for these purposes that the delegations of Ceylon, Indonesia and India have
submitted the draft resolution before us...
Believing as we do that the tragic situation in Hungary, the violence that has
happened, the atrocities that have been committed, of which reports are being
received, have stirred public opinion very much in our part of the world, we
think that the binding up of these wounds can only begin if the process of
healing takes place through the good offices of observation under the direction
of the Secretary-General; so that instead of our approaching this problem merely
from the point of view of invectives, we would be able to proceed to a
constructive step.
The draft resolution that we have submitted is of a limited character. But we

believe a large volume of opinion, especially of countries which are not
involved in the great Power groupings of the world, should be thrown behind the
request, the urging, that we are making to the Hungarian Government.
I would like to say from this rostrum that I hope that the people and the
Government of Hungary, and those who are responsible for the state of affairs
there and for the conduct of government, will listen to the voice of those
countries, and not say that they will take upon themselves the grave
responsibility of not listening to the appeal, to the request, to the urging, that we
are making to them that the Secretary-General should be invited to go to
Hungary. The Hungarian Government should be met in its capital, and not
outside its country. That is our view. The office of the Secretary-General is a
Charter organ of the United Nations. He has rights; he has obligations; he has
functions; he has a status of his own. Over and above any resolutions adopted
by the Assembly, the Secretary-General carries with him, wherever he goes, the
responsibilities of fulfilling, so far as it is assigned to him in the Charter, the
implementation of its purposes.
Therefore we hope by this resolution to convey to the Government of Hungary

the voice of large numbers of people, of millions of people in Asia and other
uncommitted countries, who join with the others, without any attempt at the
present moment to introduce words of condemnation, without in any way
interfering with the process of settlement that may happen.
We should like to say that the Government of Hungary should be aware of the
fact that, whatever might have been the situation a few days ago, there is
restoration of work, restoration to normality, according to the newspaper reports,
and therefore an opportunity arises for it to revise - I should not say "revise"
because, so far as I can see from the correspondence with the Secretary-General,
there have been no categorical refusals so far - its attitude.
It is necessary, therefore, that our message should be conveyed to those who are
in a position to act; and here we say in all seriousness that they should listen to
our urging that United Nations observers appointed by the Secretary-General -
who would be acting on behalf not of any one particular country or particular
group and who, so long as he retains his office, retains the confidence not of one
section or another section of the United Nations, but of its entirety, however
much we may disagree with him on one aspect of things or the other - that such
persons should be given the facilities, according to resolution 1004 (ES-II), "to
enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein, and to report their
findings to the Secretary-General."
It is not the habit of my delegation to speak in terms of warnings, to speak in

terms of what will happen if something else does not happen, but I would be
failing in my responsibility if I did not say here - and I hope that my voice
reaches further - that the Government of Hungary will assume an extremely
heavy responsibility if it does not respond as quickly as possible to the urging, to
the request that we are making, a request which we are making not as part of a
political grouping, but as expressing the feeling that is welling up all over the
world.
We have kept ourselves under restraint, without pronouncing judgement on

events which we have not been able to observe ourselves, and in spite of
whatever newspaper criticism there may be, whatever epithets may be used, my
Government and people will not shift to a position where we are called upon to
condemn without evidence. Even though we may believe something, even if all
the facts point towards that, even if there is what a magistrate calls a prima facie
case, we have, as a sovereign government in relation to another government, the
responsibility of permitting a judgement or an inference to be made on the basis
of facts, and we are now asking in this draft resolution permission to do that,
because there is a war situation. There is the absence of the means of
communication; foreign journalists in the country are few; the channels of
information, naturally, in those conditions dry up. Serious allegations are made,
and equally sincere, or rather, equally deliberate, contradictions are made of
them.
We are not saying, therefore, that we just sit back and pass judgement in time.
That is not our tradition. Our position is that the Hungarian Government is, in
the General Assembly resolution of 4 November, requested "to permit observers
designated by the Secretary-General to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel
freely therein and to report their findings to the Secretary-General."
I want to state here and now that the Government of Hungary stands to profit by
this exercise. Let us assume, for argument's sake, that there is something to
hide. But it is not possible, with a large number of International Red Cross
workers, with the state of communications in the world today, with, on the
Government's own admission, people inside Hungary who are not in support of
the administration, however much of a minority or a majority they may be, to
seal up any country; and, therefore, to give the false or, from the Hungarian
Government's point of view, erroneous impression that there is an attempt to do
that is to work against the cause of Hungary itself.
Every statement which we have made from this rostrum has been directed not at
giving expression to some emotional state of mind, but at assisting in the
resolving of this problem, and that is the purpose of this draft resolution. We
had, perhaps naively, hoped that when a statement such as is contained in this
draft resolution was made, there would have been no difficulty, even on the part
of those who take the views that are expressed in the Cuban draft resolution, in
accepting this as a practical step towards, as I said, prising open the situation.
The present belief of my Government is that the Government of Hungary would

not disregard such a request, if it was made with the support of practically all
sections of opinion in this Assembly and, I feel sure, so far as our draft
resolution is concerned, without a single vote against it. It is my hope that no
vote will be recorded against this draft resolution, and if a resolution goes out of
this Assembly without a vote against it and with a large number of delegations
supporting it, it is our belief that the Hungarian Government, especially in view
of the lapse of time and in regard to the functions recently performed by the
Secretary-General in another connection, would take the first step of making
arrangements for the Secretary-General to visit Hungary and also to discuss with
him the question of permitting observers designated by him to enter the territory.
I want, in all humility, to ask this Assembly to understand the position of a

Government that is called upon by the Secretary-General to assist in an impartial
investigation. A few days ago, the Secretary-General asked the Government of
India whether it would assist in the investigations which he is making in his
office from such material as he may have at his disposal and, secondly, whether
we would nominate any persons to form part of the observer team to go to
Hungary.
If the Government of India were callous about this, or if its mind had been made
up, or if it did not want to assist in the solution, the easiest thing for it, with all
the burdens which it has and with its very small capacity, would have been
respectfully to decline his request. But the Government of India contributed the
assistance that was required for this investigation for which we did not require
any assent from the Government of Hungary. We have done so.
But with regard to sending observers into another territory, it is not possible to
accede, without authority from the territory, irrespective of all legal aspects, to a
request of that kind. So we told the Secretary-General that the moment the
Government of Hungary acceded to the request that had been made to it in the
resolution - asking that observers designated by the Secretary-General be
permitted to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel therein, and to report their
findings to the Secretary-General - we would be prepared to send someone
suitable for this purpose.
Now I ask the General Assembly, in all conscience, if a country is called upon to
participate in such investigations, would the Assembly not expect the
representatives and the Government of that country to express themselves with
restraint on the events that have happened? Would any serious gathering of
people expect a member of an investigating body to go out of his way to express
opinions unless they were beyond all contravention? That is to say, the
Secretary-General, I presume, asked the Government of India to contribute
assistance in this way because, in his judgement - and we respect his judgement
and are flattered by it, and probably from the previous history of India in
contacts of this kind - he thought that we would render an objective account and
assist in reaching an objective result.
Therefore we were restrained in dealing with the situation, but with one eye to
assisting in a solution. That is the purpose of this draft resolution. What we
should be most concerned about is the continuance and deterioration of this
situation, and, whether we like it or not, when forces are as they are, the best
function we can perform is to assist in a transformation by injecting into the
situation the element that is envisaged in this draft resolution.
We have stated our position fully about the use of force, about the intervention
of armed forces in the internal affairs of any country. We are not at the present
moment going into the question of foreign forces in another country resulting
from treaties or on account the system - which we do not approve - of military
pacts and alliances. That is another matter which does not come into it. But the
maintenance of a government in a country by foreign forces, the position that a
great uprising of a people, whether bad or good elements enter into it, whether it
takes some ugly turn or not, can ever be suppressed by force of arms - that, in
our view, is fallacious. What is more, our people have been very much moved
lately by the kind of resistance without arms that is arising in Hungary, because
it strikes a chord of remembrance in our own hearts, when a great and powerful
empire refused to listen to the voice of reason, because our people said "No."
No arms are powerful against a spirit of determination. That is what lies behind
this draft resolution. I want to ask once again, I want to appeal to this Assembly
to give this business an opportunity to take a turn for the better. I cannot speak
for the Hungarian Government. I cannot speak for anyone but my own
Government - and I want to assure you that I can speak for my Government.
You may not think so if you read some of the newspapers. It is no use indulging
in wishful thinking in this matter. We should get the other party concerned into
the context of dealing with this. This cannot be done by two people who are in
isolation from each other; that is the purpose of this draft resolution.
I hope that the Foreign Ministers and others who are here at this Assembly will
see the purpose of this and give this approach a chance. As I said, we have
assured ourselves that the Secretary-General by no means regards his efforts as
terminated or that the door has been closed on this matter. I understand, if my
information is correct, that conversations are going on even now between the
Secretary-General and the Hungarian representative in this General Assembly.
I hope that as a result of the appeal that we are making, the representative of
Hungary in this meeting will be able to tell us that he is willing to communicate
this resolution immediately to his Government. I think I am not committing any
act of impropriety when I say that the Government of India is using such
influence, such capacities as it has in the diplomatic field, to assist in this
process. That is the purpose that lies behind this draft resolution.
KOREA
[On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council considered
communications from the United States and the United Nations Commission on
Korea that North Korean forces had on that day invaded South Korea. It adopted
a resolution calling upon North Korea immediately to cease hostilities and
withdraw its forces.
Two days later, following non-compliance by North Korea, the Council adopted a
resolution recommending that members of the United Nations furnish necessary
assistance to South Korea to repel the armed attack. Several countries informed
the United Nations of their willingness to provide military and other assistance.
India, which voted for the two resolutions, offered non-military assistance.
India abstained on a further resolution of the Security Council on 7 July setting

up a United Nations Command under the United States, and recommending that
all member States make forces and other assistance available to it. Instead, India
undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to avert an extension of the war and to
secure a peaceful settlement.
Negotiations between the United Nations Command and the North Korean
and Chinese commanders began in July 1951 for a cease-fire and armistice.
After more than a year of negotiations, both sides reached agreement on
most provisions of a draft Armistice Agreement, but there was a deadlock on
the provisions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war.
Mr. Menon, who was sent as a member of the Indian delegation to the General
Assembly in 1952, especially to deal with the Korean problem, presented a
proposal to break the deadlock (A/C.1/734). They were approved by a large
majority in the General Assembly but were rejected by North Korea and China.
However, the armistice negotiations were resumed in April 1953 and on July 27,
1953, an Armistice Agreement was signed; it incorporated provisions which were
very similar to the Indian proposals.
The Korean Political Conference was held in Geneva in 1954 in accordance with
the Armistice Agreement, but failed to find a solution to the Korean problem. The
debates in subsequent sessions of the General Assembly led to no progress as only
South Korea was invited to participate in the discussions, and the United States
and its allies continued to insist on United Nations supervision of elections in
Korea.]

November 19, 195270
[As the Korean armistice negotiations in Panmunjom became deadlocked on the

provisions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war, India submitted a
draft resolution (A/C.1/734) containing proposals which it felt might secure an
agreement. The draft was adopted by the General Assembly on December 3,
1952, as resolution 610 (VII).
In this speech, Mr. Menon explained the terms and purposes of the Indian
proposals.]
(Summary)
...Mr. Menon pointed out that his Government approached the Korean problem
from total belief in the bona fides of both parties to reach an armistice and that
there was an anxious desire on both sides to bring the war to an end as soon as
possible. In this respect, he recalled a statement of the representative of the
United States that the purposes of the intervention in Korea had been achieved
and that all that remained was the termination of it.
At this stage his delegation did not think it was called upon to enter into a
discussion regarding the facts of the Korean question. The United Nations had,
for its part, already reached some conclusions on the facts of the matter, and a
discussion regarding them would more appropriately be conducted in bodies set
up to work out a settlement of the Korean question.
The legal aspects of the Korean question had already been rather extensively
debated in the Committee. While he appreciated that it was not possible to
discuss this question without entering into its legal aspects, it would be losing
sight of the final objective if the legality of the question alone became the centre
of discussion. His delegation would therefore try to avoid temptation to follow
the various legal arguments that had been presented, except in so far they were
relevant to the understanding of the proposals that his delegation had submitted
before the Committee and in so far as they were helpful in the reconciliation of
the points of view that might appear to be in conflict.
Similarly, Mr. Menon said, the question of principle which had been raised was a
very important question involving the ideals of people, and their determination to
work and sacrifice for it. A principle, according to him, was a comprehensive
system of relationships. To illustrate this point, Mr. Menon stated that a point of
principle was not like a geometrical point, that is, it was not without magnitude.
It was an area, where it was possible for different parties to enter and find their
abode, and for that reason it was possible to reconcile different points of view
70
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, First Committee, pages 111-
15
without sacrifice of principle. Bearing this in mind, Mr. Menon said he would
proceed to examine the draft resolution submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/734).
Mr. Menon stated that, first, he should like to acknowledge with gratitude the
sympathy, the understanding and assistance which his delegation had received in
its efforts to work out the proposals it had submitted. He, however, would like to
make it clear that the responsibility for the contents of the Indian draft resolution
rested solely on his delegation.
In the view of his delegation the negotiations were not to be conducted here in
New York or anywhere else except in Korea where the principal parties were.
Nor was it the intention of the Indian delegation that the existing machinery and
personnel on either side should not continue to carry on the negotiations and bring
them to a successful conclusion. His delegation felt, however, that it was not
enough if its resolution contained a mere restatement of any principle, even in a
modified form, or of any proposal that did not go into the method of how the
present difficulty could be resolved. It was for that reason that his delegation's
draft resolution contained several details. It was divided into two parts; the first
part contained nine clauses, followed by seventeen headings of proposals.
Mr. Menon pointed out that the Indian draft resolution in its preamble not only
referred to the report of the United Nations Command but also to "other relevant
reports." This was done to place the immediate problem in the general context of
the item on the agenda. The resolution then took into account and noted with
approval the various agreements so far reached in the negotiations in Korea and
pointed out that there was disagreement now on only one remaining issue. All the
delegations were in agreement on this point. But his delegation could go even
further than that and state, on the authority of the Chinese and the North Korean
Commanders that one issue alone prevented the conclusion of an armistice. The
draft Armistice Agreement would be signed once the question of the repatriation
of prisoners was settled. His delegation also found that there was considerable
measure of agreement in the speeches made on that question and if it were
possible to weave all these points of agreement into a pattern, the Committee
would be nearer to a solution.
Mr. Menon pointed out that article 60 of the draft Armistice Agreement 71 was a
great achievement, and for that reason the Indian draft resolution stated that the
General Assembly was anxious to expedite and facilitate the convening of the
political conference as provided in article 60. The draft resolution referred to that
article because the solution of the political problems was the main objective while
the armistice was only a step towards that end.
The next two clauses of the first part of the draft resolution were its main part and
formed the basis of his delegation's proposals. They sought to reconcile the two
71
Article 60 provided for a political conference to settle through negotiation the questions of the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.
points of view, not by a surrender of principles on either side, but by fitting them
into the general pattern of a solution.
Mr. Menon then explained that, in the last paragraph of the first part of the draft
resolution, the President of the General Assembly was requested to transmit the
proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
and to the North Korean authorities only, since the other side was the United
Nations itself, which would be informed naturally in the appropriate and usual
manner.
Dealing with the second part of the draft resolution, Mr. Menon stated that it was
termed proposals because it was meant to show the way to a solution rather than
being a solution in itself. In the opinion of his delegation, the solution must come
through discussion and negotiation by those who were on the scene in Korea, and
these proposals, which were equally applicable to both sides, were meant only to
form the basis of agreement between the two sides. Mr. Menon pointed out that
any cut and dried formula sent out from the United Nations in New York might
more likely be regarded as hindrance rather than a help.
Since difficulties had arisen owing to the divergent positions held by the two
sides, in regard to the repatriation of prisoners, his delegation's draft resolution
had suggested that a repatriation commission should be set up. This was not a
new idea, as in other wars prisoners had been exchanged through neutral or
through protecting Powers. In this respect, Mr. Menon recalled the dispute
between Bolivia and Paraguay over Chaco. At the end of that war, the prisoners
of war held by both sides were repatriated with the help of a repatriation
commission, on which other nations were represented. Similarly, the process of
returning prisoners to their homeland through the help of a body of people who
have equal access to the two sides was not a novel procedure.
To adopt such a procedure was even more appropriate in the present case, since
there were charges and counter-charges regarding the prisoners being free or not
being free, or their being concentrated at places where bombardments take place,
or their treatment in prisons. For this reason, his delegation had proposed a
commission which would enjoy the confidence of both sides or, at any rate, on
which both sides were equally represented. It had suggested therefore that the
Commission consist of the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden
and Switzerland. Two of them were nearer to one side and two were presumed to
be nearer to the other side. All four were non-combatants and not participants in
the war. Therefore, if it were possible to constitute a repatriation commission of
these four Powers, the functions as envisaged in the proposals of his delegation's
draft resolution could be carried out by them. But if for any reason any one of
these Powers was unable or unwilling to carry out this function, then it should not
lead to a deadlock or a postponement of the efforts to bring about an armistice.
For that reason, his delegation had proposed that four other Powers, two
nominated by each side, but drawn from those not participating in the fighting in
Korea and also not permanent members of the Security Council, be constituted as
a commission.
Explaining paragraph 2 of the Indian proposals Mr. Menon stated that the
question whether the Geneva Convention was ratified by one Power or not did not
matter. He pointed out that at Nuremberg trials it had been laid down and had now
become accepted that, irrespective of all conventions, matters of this kind would
be dealt with according to principles of international law. For that reason any
objection by one party or the other that it had not fully followed or ratified the
Geneva Convention of 1949, or that it was not operative until now, did not exist
in reality since it was fully established that the release and repatriation of
prisoners should take place in conformity with international law. On this point,
there was unanimity of opinion in the Committee. Moreover, the Chinese and the
North Koreans had also demanded that repatriation should take place in
accordance with the terms of international law. His delegation therefore thought
that such a provision provided a common meeting ground. That this was common
ground was also recognised by many other delegations in their speeches.
But a conflict had arisen on what was called "voluntary repatriation," "non-
forcible repatriation," and so on. Mr. Menon suggested that, instead of attaching
too much importance to the words, it would be better to consider the meaning.
His delegation was of the opinion that what was really meant was that force
should not be used against the prisoners of war. This was a basic factor in the
Geneva Convention as well as in the practice of international law. The Chinese
had repeatedly said that they were not asking for forcible repatriation. They
would appear to argue that the soldiers had become prisoners as a result of force
and that, in order to release them, it was necessary to remove the force. The other
party stated that force would have to used in order to repatriate some of the
prisoners. The practice of international law, however, specifically laid down
without any equivocation or ambiguity, that force must not be used against the
prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands. Mr. Menon
stated that, in pointing out this basic agreement on not using force in the
repatriation or detention of prisoners, he was not unmindful of the difficulties that
had arisen as different delegations had given different interpretations to this basic
practice of international law. It would be a duty entrusted to and enjoined on the
members of the repatriation commission to see that force must not be used to
prevent or effect the return of the prisoners of war to their homelands. There was
another clause in the same paragraph which stated that prisoners of war should at
all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the
Geneva Convention and the general spirit of that Convention, which again was in
accordance with the statement made by the representatives of the two parties.
Explaining paragraph 4 of the Indian proposals, Mr. Menon stated that in regard
to the release of prisoners to the repatriation commission it was essential that
agreement regarding numbers, exchange points and demilitarised zones should be
reached. He emphasised that this clause, like other clauses, applied to both sides.
Thus, the prisoners of war would come out of the control of the detaining side and
would be released to the repatriation commission. That would be the
responsibility of the detaining side and it would be done at points agreed upon.
The repatriation commission might not find it necessary to take all those prisoners
to one point. If all the four members of the commission and the two parties were
agreeable, then it might be possible to demilitarise the place where the prisoners
were being detained. His delegation’s draft resolution did not state that the
prisoners of war were to be carried to a particular point. As regards the phrase
"agreed numbers," Mr. Menon explained that it was used because there were
thousands of prisoners and they could not all be released on the same day. If
there were an agreement, there could not be any complaint. It was purely a
technical question. The commission or those who were responsible at lower
levels would be able to say that they could take care of so many prisoners on one
day and so many on the next.
As regards paragraph 5 of his delegation’s proposals,72 Mr. Menon pointed out

that the talks at Panmunjom showed no difficulty on the subject. The reference to
the letters of the Commanders of the North Korean and Chinese forces was
specifically made in order to avoid any misunderstanding. The classification of
the prisoners would again be purely a technical question. It would be checked at
the time when the prisoners were no longer in the custody of the detaining side
and when they would be under the influence of the neutral Powers.
Under paragraph 6 of the Indian proposals, the prisoners would be free to return
to their homelands forthwith and their speedy return would be facilitated by all
parties concerned. This would eliminate all question of forcible detention and
would expedite the return of the prisoners to their homelands.
Mr. Menon stated that paragraph 7 was an important paragraph in his delegation's
proposals. It had been argued by the other side that a prisoner could not express
himself while he was under imprisonment. This paragraph envisaged that once
the prisoners had been released by the detaining Power and were on their way to
their homelands, the two parties should have freedom and facilities to explain to
the prisoners depending on them, their rights and the conditions prevailing in
their homelands. One party had pointed out that since the prisoners had been
completely shut off from the world during their captivity, they had absolutely no
knowledge of what was going on on the other side. For this reason the two parties
would have facilities to explain the situation to them. This would mean that it
would be possible for the Chinese side for instance to explain to the prisoners that
there was an amnesty. They would be able to tell the prisoners that they need
have no fear of going home and there would be an opportunity to answer the
questions of the prisoners. Thus it would remove many misunderstandings that
might have arisen in the minds of the prisoners.
Paragraph 8 of the proposals enlisted the aid of Red Cross teams of both sides in
72
Concerning the classification of prisoners according to nationality and domicile
the work of the repatriation commission. The Red Cross teams could, for
instance, explain to the prisoners that they could go home and that they could not
take part in the fighting.
Paragraph 9 of the proposals would give the prisoners freedom and facilities to
make representations to the repatriation commission. Mr. Menon pointed out that
it was again a technical question. One could not have thousands and thousands of
prisoners at any time of day or night wanting to ask questions. It would all have
to be done according to arrangements prescribed for the purpose. This was the
main purpose of paragraph 9.
Paragraph 10 of the proposals was necessary inasmuch as it was impossible to

arrange for the organisation of a unit or of a camp with large numbers of people
without some discipline, some rules and order.
Paragraph 11 gave the right to the prisoners to know under what conditions they
were being repatriated. The Geneva Convention also gave this right to the
prisoners of war.
Mr. Menon then referred to the clauses in the Indian proposals regarding the
appointment of an umpire. He pointed out that when the two sides had agreed on
the basis of repatriation, then questions of interpretation would arise. This would
be a natural situation since every agreement required interpretation. Normally the
interpretation of the agreement would rest with the repatriation commission, but
in a commission in which each side nominated two members there might be an
even split and disagreement, in which event a majority decision would be
unobtainable. It was therefore proposed that an umpire in accordance with article
132 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 should be appointed and that he should
have the deciding vote. This matter was also discussed at the time of the signing
of the Geneva Convention. The appointment of an umpire by agreement between
the parties was one of the provisions written into it. It was also a normal
procedure in industrial disputes, or in disputes between nations.
His delegation felt that the best way out of an impasse would be for the two
parties to agree on the appointment of an umpire. However, if there were no
agreement, then the matter would be referred to the General Assembly. That did
not mean that the General Assembly would appoint an umpire; it only meant that
the General Assembly would consider what could be done at that stage. His
delegation, however, felt that it was very vital that the repatriation commission
should, in its first meeting and prior to an armistice agreement, appoint an umpire.
Until that umpire was appointed, the repatriation commission would not come
into being and, until the repatriation commission did come into being, the
armistice agreement could not be validated, and the armistice would not become
operative. In order to avoid a prolongation of the disagreement on the
appointment of an umpire, it was being proposed that a period of three weeks be
fixed for the appointment. The suggestion of a time limit was not to be construed
as constituting an ultimatum, but only an indication that the appointment of an
umpire, which alone enabled the repatriation commission to get moving, should
not be delayed.
Mr. Menon explained that paragraph 15 was also inserted for practical reasons.
The commission would certainly need assistance and would have to delegate its
power, not in principle or in policy but for administrative purposes, to subordinate
organs. In this way, replicas of the repatriation commission would function.
Explaining paragraph 16 of the proposals, Mr. Menon pointed out that it indicated
that a machinery of execution was already provided in the draft Armistice
Agreement; all that was needed was an agreement between the two parties on
repatriation. Thus, as soon as an agreement on this issue was reached, the draft
Armistice Agreement would become operative.
Mr. Menon stated that paragraph 17 of the proposals was linked with the sixth
paragraph of the preamble. The draft Armistice Agreement provided for the
political conference to meet at the end of ninety days; that was why this paragraph
had also limited the period to ninety days, and there was no other sanctity
attached to it. Explaining further, Mr. Menon stated that the present position was
that, according to the knowledge of the United Nations Command there was a
large number of prisoners who would not like to return to their homelands. On
the other hand, the Chinese thought that these prisoners would return if they were
free from control. There would be no problem if all prisoners were to decide to
go home after their release from the military control and when they came under
neutral supervision. If, however, there were number of people at the end of ninety
days who had still not returned to their homelands, for one reason or another, then
their case should be referred to the political conference which would have come
into existence in accordance with article 60 of the draft Armistice Agreement and
which was to deal with the whole of the Korean question. He pointed out that his
delegation did not intend to suggest any shifting of responsibility from one organ
to another, because if that were so, there would be no point having an armistice at
all. The idea was that a new body would have come into being and a reference to
it had to be made. One would hope that the repatriation commission would make
recommendations and would endeavour to get an agreement to deal with the
residue of the prisoners.
Moreover, those prisoners, who for one reason or another were not able to return
to their homelands, could not be kept in captivity for an indeterminate period.
Usually, a time limit was set within which a prisoner of war should be repatriated.
It might therefore be necessary to make some provision to that effect if there
remained such a residue. One provision could be to refer the matter to the
political conference. The political conference might give an immediate decision.
If the conference were to bring about peace quickly, then the question would
assume another aspect because in conditions of peace there would be no
prisoners. But if, in spite of the efforts of the repatriation commission, there were
still some prisoners left, their case would become the responsibility of the United
Nations. Mr. Menon added that it was apparent from the statements on both sides
that there would be prisoners who might not be wanted by one side or the other.
Under those circumstances, there would be a residue and that residue would
constitute a group of people who had to be cared for. they could not be kept in
captivity forever, and the repatriation commission would have to make
recommendations.
Mr. Menon gave the assurance that there were no strings attached to this
paragraph; it simply meant that it was necessary to have a paragraph which would
provide a time limit. There was no question of people being further screened. As
at every stage, the general principles of international law must be observed and
the prisoners released to the repatriation commission were always entitled to
humanitarian treatment...
Mr. Menon added that in submitting the draft solution his delegation was not
prescribing a solution, but was indicating the way to a solution. It was possible to
find various hypothetical situations which might make difficulties but that was a
common factor to every plan. In fact, such hypothetical situations existed in
adequate numbers in the draft Armistice Agreement itself. His delegation had
proceeded on the basis that the moment the question of repatriation of prisoners of
war was settled, the draft Armistice Agreement would begin to operate.
In conclusion, Mr. Menon appealed to the Committee that, while considering the
resolution submitted by his delegation, its members would not only analyse its
clauses, but would also analyse its effectiveness as a decision of this Assembly
with all its moral authority and in view of all the urgency that the situation in
Korea demanded.

December 1, 195273
[This statement was in reply to the debate on the Indian draft resolution
concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war.]
(Summary)
Mr. MENON (India) recalled that twelve days ago his delegation had submitted a
draft resolution as a possible solution of the Korean problem. That draft
resolution had been debated by a large number of delegations. He, however, felt
again the absence of the representatives of the People's Republic of China, as his
delegation considered that the Korean question could not be fully and
appropriately discussed without the participation of the representatives of China.
Similarly, since the Committee had permitted the representatives of the South
73
Source: Ibid., pages 173-77
Korean authorities to take part in the debate, it was necessary also to invite
representatives of North Korean authorities.
Mr. Menon stated that the discussion that had taken place on his delegation's draft
resolution had given his delegation considerable assistance in understanding the
various points of view. He was grateful to the Committee for giving priority to
the Indian draft resolution. In their efforts to find a peaceful solution of the
Korean problems, his delegation was specially indebted to two groups of people.
While the draft resolution had been submitted in the name of India, it had the
sympathy, the support and the concern of all delegations from the Asian
continent. It had also the sympathy of the great countries of the South American
continent which, although far away from Asia and not directly involved in the
Korean war, had consistently expressed their desire to be of assistance in finding a
solution of this problem. Mr. Menon pointed out that in singling out these two
groups of people he was not in any way making invidious distinctions.
Referring to the debate on the Indian draft resolution, Mr. Menon stated that it had
revealed considerable common ground not only between delegations which were
aligned one to the other, but also between delegations representing different
points of view. Such differences as existed appeared to be very largely based on
fears and doubts and possibly a lack of clarity on certain aspects of the Indian
proposal. His delegation would therefore do its best to supply these clarifications.
He reaffirmed the point of view of his delegation that, in submitting its draft
resolution concerned with proposals for a Korean armistice, it believed that a
settlement in Korea would lead to a general settlement in the Far East and to an
improvement in the entire world situation. His delegation also hoped that it
would speed the day when the representatives of the People's Republic of China
would be able to take their rightful place in the United Nations. It was in the hope
that the Indian proposals or something akin to them, might sooner or later
convince the Chinese people and their Government as offering a way out of
present difficulties that his delegation put forward the proposals, in spite of the
fact that the Indian Government had not yet succeeded in conveying to the Central
People's Government of China the purposes for which they were made.
Mr. Menon emphasised that his Government had never alleged at any time that it
was speaking for China. However, it could speak to China, and that was the great
advantage that it had. When it presented what it thought might be a possible
solution, it acted largely on the basis of its judgement and the information it
possessed. Throughout its efforts to find a solution of the Korean problem, the
Government of India kept the People's Republic of China informed, although that
was done entirely on the responsibility of the Government of India. Whatever
might be the immediate fate of the Indian draft resolution, the Government of
India would continue to keep its contact with the People's Republic of China and
would continue in its efforts towards achieving peace. His delegation had no
illusions that a settlement could be reached without the agreement of the People's
Republic of China. Therefore in submitting its draft resolution, the Indian
delegation was not laying down any terms; it was merely making proposals which
would pave the way to negotiations.
Recalling the continuous cultural, social and economic relations between India
and China during the last two or three thousand years, Mr. Menon observed that
this relation had never brought about conflict or resulted in the division of spheres
of interest or rivalries which normally characterised such relations. In the light of
its motives and in the light of its understanding of the world situation and all the
factors that concerned Asia and the world as a whole, his Government hoped that
it would succeed in presenting its proposals to the People's Republic of China.
No doubt the Chinese Government, an independent and powerful Government
enjoying the support of its people, would make its own decisions on these
proposals. Nevertheless, the Government of India, representing a people who
were placed midway in proximity of relationship to the two continents and the
two views, felt its duty to continue its efforts in dispelling doubts and in
presenting its point of view. His Government's principal audience in this respect
was to be found on the Chinese mainland.
Clarifying the Indian draft resolution, Mr. Menon stated that it provided that the
prisoners of war on either side were free to return, not in an academic but in
active sense. There would be no restraint upon them, and indeed, their return
would be facilitated. This freedom would be guaranteed to the prisoners if the
draft resolution were accepted by the Committee, and any obstruction placed on
their return after its adoption would be contrary to that decision and contrary to
international law. Furthermore, the Indian proposals would expedite the
repatriation process. There would be no further "screening" or interrogation. The
repatriation commission, as proposed in the Indian draft resolution, would in a
sense serve as caretakers of people who were on their way home and not as
gaolers. There would be no opportunity for any kind of third degree, or illegal or
undue pressure. Equally, there would be no question of people being divided into
categories of those who "want to go" and those who "do not want to go" and thus
becoming marked men.
The first step in the implementation of these proposals would be the release of all
prisoners into the custody of a body other than the detaining side. Thus, the first
act of release by the detaining side would be the first step of repatriation. In that
first step, the provisions of the Geneva Convention with regard to full repatriation
would begin to operate and would constitute the observance of international law
in its first stage.
In submitting its draft resolution, the Indian delegation endeavoured to find a way
which would meet such legitimate objections as there might be, without infringing
rights, international law or deep-seated and well held beliefs... The Indian
proposals, Mr. Menon submitted, represented a great advance towards
reconciliation and a great advance also in the full implementation of international
law. He added that one could understand the objections raised by the People's
Republic of China in view of what had been said in the past regarding the
question of voluntary repatriation and also in view of the lack of adequate
information abroad concerning the proceedings of the Committee.
Mr. Menon said that one of the main planks of the Indian draft resolution was that
the settlement must be in terms of the Geneva Convention of 1949. The Geneva
Convention now formed a part of international law and there should not be any
inroads into that Convention.
However, if some difficulties arose in the implementation, they should be solved

in a manner which would not be contrary to the Convention. This principle was
not only applicable in international law but was also part of the law of almost
every individual country. Since the United States was the country deeply
concerned in this matter, having the largest number of troops in the battle area and
being one of the principal participants in the debate, he would like to cite from
some legal decisions of United States courts which would corroborate this
position.
After the Second World War many prisoners of war of Italian and German
nationality desired to remain in the United States rather than to be repatriated.
They claimed to be American citizens on the grounds that they were born in the
United States or that their parents had been naturalised or for some other reasons.
But the United States had already decided on a policy repatriating all prisoners of
war irrespective of their desire and no exceptions were made to that policy. That
policy was also supported by the courts. Mr. Menon then cited a decision by the
Circuit Court of Appeals on June 8, 1946, which upheld the policy adopted by
American military authorities as valid and legal. Thus, as far as the United States
law was concerned, the right of repatriation was obligatory. Therefore, in
adopting the same policy with regard to Korea, the Indian delegation was
following the obligation as contained in the Geneva Convention.
Mr. Menon pointed out that it was a fact that the Geneva Convention did not deal
with the question whether, on account of the obligation of repatriation, it was
legitimate or right or obligatory on the part of one Power to use force in order to
remove the body of one person to another place. Since the Geneva Convention
did not deal with this question, it placed no obligation for forcible repatriation on
the detaining Power.
On the other hand, when the framing of the Geneva Convention was under
discussion the Austrian representative sought permission for prisoners to opt to go
to countries of their choice. This request was not supported and the main
opposition to it came from the United States and the USSR. They stated that it
was not in the interest of the State of origin that this right be conferred on the
prisoners of war. Thus the right of repatriation, the freedom to go and the lack of
right on the part of a State to detain, were laid down by the Convention.
Mr. Menon pointed out that there was no contradiction between paragraphs 2 and
3 of the Indian proposals. So far as the obligation to use force was concerned,
Article 118 of the Geneva Convention had to be read with other Articles, and it
was laid down in Article 3 that under no circumstances could violence be used
against the person of a prisoner by anyone. Under the Indian proposal, the
prisoner of war would cease to be under the custody of the detaining Power and
would pass on to the care of a neutral authority nominated by the two sides.
Comparing the Indian proposals with the proposals put forward at Panmunjom, 74
Mr. Menon pointed out that under the Indian proposals the prisoners of war could
not go back to the detaining Power. They would be released into the custody of
neutral Powers who would act for the parties in the conflict. Since they would be
under the custody of neutral Powers, who would be bound by international law,
there would be no opportunity for the former detaining Power on either side to
exercise any coercive pressure on them. There would be no more screening or
interrogation.
Mr. Menon explained that under the Indian proposals all prisoners of war without
exception must be delivered to the repatriation commission who would receive
them, not on behalf of the detaining Power but on behalf of the country of origin,
in order that repatriation might be effected. Thus, the obligation under Article
118 of the Geneva Convention was carried out in respect to all prisoners and not
with regard to any particular section of them. They would cease to have any
contacts with the former detaining Power, and even if they had any questions to
raise, they would approach the repatriation commission in that respect. Moreover,
the repatriation commission would be obliged to make sure that the prisoners
were not placed in such a way that they might be open to pressure or coercion.
The Indian proposals also would refer the remainder, if any, of the problem of
prisoners to the political conference already agreed to by the parties. Thus, there
would be no unilateral disposal of this problem.
Mr. Menon then stated that the expression which had been used in the Indian draft
resolution that force should not be used either to detain or to effect return to their
homelands meant that the detaining side should not be called upon to use force
against any unarmed prisoners to effect their return. This non-use of force was,
however, equally applicable to detention as it would be in the case of repatriating
prisoners. Since there were charges and complaints by both sides that the
prisoners of war were being subjected to torture or were being kept in places
which were subject to aerial bombardment, it was important to remember that the
non-use of force was also equally applicable to detention of prisoners.
The Indian proposals would also facilitate the return of the prisoners to their
homelands as speedily as possible. In this respect, guards who would not be
approved by the repatriation commission because of special racial, political or
74
Proposals by the United Nations Command
other objections would be removed.
As regards the mental or nervous state of prisoners of war, who, because of their
prolonged detention, are unable to decide their future, Mr. Menon pointed out that
there would be a considerable period during which the Red Cross representatives
of both sides and the representatives of the State of origin could approach the
prisoners to provide information to them in accordance with the arrangements to
be made by the repatriation commission. If the prisoners entertained any wrong
ideas as to their home conditions, certainly there would be opportunities to have
them corrected.
Finally, the Indian proposals provided that the prisoners should not remain in
captivity forever. In fact, when the prisoners were released to the repatriation
commission, they would be on their way home. In any case, it would be wrong to
characterise the control of the repatriation commission as one akin to that
exercised in a concentration camp.
However, if there were still some prisoners on either side whose return to their
homes could not be effected, then that problem would be referred to the political
conference which was provided for in the draft Armistice Agreement. It was
pointed out by some delegates that this paragraph of the Indian proposals was
based on the assumption that there would be a number of people whose return
would not be effected. While his delegation did not subscribe to such an
assumption, it was necessary and reasonable, in view of the various allegations
made, that provision must be made for such a contingency. However, this
question would arise only if there were some prisoners left whose return might
not be effected.
Referring to the main objections which had been raised in the Committee to the
Indian proposals, Mr. Menon said that one of the main objections was that his
delegation's draft resolution did not provide for a cease-fire. He, however, wished
to point out that the Indian draft resolution was a cease-fire resolution. Since the
only obstacle to an armistice in Korea was the non-settlement of the issue of the
prisoners of war, if it were solved then there would be a cease-fire within twelve
hours. Therefore, the concentration on the question of prisoners of war was
essential inasmuch as it was blocking the way to a cease-fire. Accordingly, his
delegation's proposal must be considered as a cease-fire resolution.
In this respect, Mr. Menon recalled the previous efforts to arrive at a cease-fire in
Korea. On December 13, 1950, thirteen Asian nations had requested and obtained
the setting up of a cease-fire group. That group formulated certain principles for a
cease-fire which were approved on January 13, 1951. They called for a cease-fire
to be followed by a political conference. The People's Republic of China rejected
those proposals at that time as it found it unacceptable to have a cease-fire before
political negotiations. The United Nations, however, continued in its efforts to
achieve a cease-fire. These efforts received an impetus by the initiative taken by
Mr. Jacob Malik in a statement on June 23, 1951, which was later clarified by Mr.
Gromkyo on 26 June. These resulted in the Commander of the United Nations
forces in Korea asking the North Korean and Chinese Commanders to a
conference and consequently the armistice negotiations started on 12 July. The
negotiators agreed upon an agenda and that agenda included five items, one of
which was the question of prisoners of war. Four of these items were already
settled and only the question of prisoners of war still remained to be settled.
Therefore it must be apparent that the present situation was merely the
continuation of a series of efforts to establish a cease-fire. Once the question of
the repatriation of prisoners of war was settled, there would be no further
obstruction to the achieving of a cease-fire...
As regards the question of the appointment of an umpire, an umpire was

necessary because the four Powers which had been proposed for the repatriation
commission might not always be in agreement. Since these Powers were the
nominees of the two sides, it was likely that there might be very sharp differences
on certain occasions, and his delegation did not like the idea that on account of
their differences there might be a delay in the repatriation of the prisoners. That
was why an umpire had been provided. He would be called in when the members
of the commission were equally divided. His delegation saw no other role for the
umpire under its proposals other than arbitrating in case of a deadlock. For that
reason, it would not like that the umpire be made a member of the commission
since the umpire must be agreed to by the two parties and must be available
whenever necessary. However, unless the two parties agreed to appoint a
chairman, either by rotation or otherwise, the umpire could act as chairman. Mr.
Menon also pointed out that his delegation did not mean that the umpire should be
appointed by the United Nations in case of a deadlock. His delegation had only
proposed that if in three weeks' time there was not an agreement on the
appointment of an umpire, then the matter should be referred for further action to
the United Nations as the party that had made the proposals...
Mr. Menon said that the delegation was seeking only to bring together the parties
that were divided by war and by a conflict which had devastated lands to the point
where the stability of the Asian continent was at stake. That initiative was solidly
supported by other Asian nations who felt that the war being waged in their
continent should come to an end. So long as there was the will to peace, peace
must ensue... He hoped that the Committee would pass the Indian draft resolution
without any dissenting votes. That draft resolution did not settle everything; but if
accepted in the spirit in which it had been put forward, it did endeavour to suggest
a way out of the difficulties which had thus far stood in the path of a settlement
and it might well lead to a lightening of the tremendous burden oppressing
humanity...
195275
[On December 14, 1952, there was a riot in an internment camp in Pongam;
many prisoners were killed and wounded as a result of firing by United
States and South Korean guards. The Soviet Union brought a complaint to
the General Assembly alleging murder of prisoners of war, and moved a
condemnatory draft resolution. The following is the explanation of vote by
Mr. Menon.
India abstained on the draft resolution which was rejected by the Assembly.]
The General Committee and, later, the General Assembly, in according at this late
hour its unanimous assent to the discussion of this problem on this last day of our
Assembly session, record the concern of all of us, irrespective of the views held
on this draft resolution, in regard to the general problem of Korea and of the
treatment of prisoners...
Irrespective of all the arguments pro and con, we cannot forget the fact that there
has been a grievous incident, and we have to deal with this in terms of the Geneva
Convention. If there has been one result above all others from the adoption of the
resolution on Korea,76 it is that an overwhelming majority of the Assembly, and
even those who opposed the resolution, have affirmed their allegiance to the
Convention.
The United States delegation has referred to the fact that there were no prisoners
of war in these camps.77 I am neither anxious nor able to contest this, nor am I
desirous of doing so; it is not necessary to do so. But I should like to say - and
this is by no means any condemnation since it would be very wrong to condemn
without having the facts before one - that whoever these people are, they come
under the Geneva Convention because the Geneva Convention, in article 4,
definitely lays down, in relation to the treatment of civilians, that the persons
protected by the Convention are those who at any given time in any manner
whatsoever find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
party to the conflict, or of an occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
In the last sub-paragraph of that article, it exempts people covered by other

sections of the Convention. I say this merely to point out that the concern of all of
us must be to see that the terms of Convention, as a rule of law, are observed.
75
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
519-20
76
Resolution 610 (VII) of December 3, 1952
77
The United States representative had stated that the Koreans interned in the camp were guerillas
and other Communists captured in South Korea, and not prisoners of war.
Since this matter has come before us, we appeal to those with the responsibility
and the power to see that the matter is fully investigated in order that the peoples
of the world will have confidence in our professions of support of the Geneva
Convention.
It is a sad state of affairs when, in prisoner-of-war camps or anywhere else, the

nationals of other countries who, as a result of hostilities, have come under the
responsibility, care and control of the detaining Powers, should become subject to
action which ends in killing.
This question has now come before us in this forum, and no effort should be
spared to consider whether it was necessary to use force, whether the force used
was warranted by the Geneva Convention and what further steps can be taken if,
unfortunately, this war should continue, as it is continuing, to prevent any
recurrence of this character. These occurrences, apart from the special views
which various people may hold, have the effect of weakening the faith of the
peoples of the world in the whole conception of the rule of law in regard to war
prisoners. This is the main reason why we have intervened in this debate.
Reference has been made to the resolution that was adopted by the Assembly,
which is no longer our resolution, and to its effect one way or another in regard to
the rioting. It is not my intention to enter into a debate upon its merits or what it
stands for, or to try to refute the various arguments that have been advanced.
However, I cannot let this last day of the session pass without removing from the
minds of people outside this hall an erroneous impression of what it stood for.
Reference has been made to our being a rubber stamp. It would require a very
large stamp to stamp us. Therefore, I reiterate, and I do not care very much what
contradictions may continue to follow, that the resolution was an endeavour to
obtain peace in Korea. I am sure that everyone will feel that if that effect had
been achieved now, there would have been no prisoner-of-war camps and no riots.
The ending of the war is the way to end the treatment of the prisoners of war,
whether or not the facts alleged are true.
I should like to read what my Prime Minister stated in Parliament concerning the
resolution:
"This resolution was based on certain principles which are based on the
Geneva Convention, which lays down well-established principles on the
practice of international law on the subject. While voluntary repatriation
would have been against these principles and was ruled out, it was stated
that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect
their return to their homelands and no violence to their persons or affront
to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner or for any
purpose whatsoever."
REFERENCE HAS ALSO BEEN MADE TO CHINA; it has been said that we
have submitted proposals of which it had no knowledge. I took very good care
in the course of the debate not to involve more parties than necessary, because
our one concern was not to score a point in the debate but to make some
contribution to peace. As to the Central People’s Government of the People’s
Republic of China, it was not represented at the United Nations, but we
communicated these principles to it at Peking on 2 November; we were not
acting here for fifteen or seventeen days without the knowledge of those on
whom this would have an impact. We were given to understand that the Central
People’s Government appreciated our attempt. While it made no commitment at
all, there was no disapproval indicated. It made it clear, however, that it was
entirely opposed to voluntary repatriation.
The Government of India, while greatly appreciating the wide support for the
resolution received from a very large number of States members of the United
Nations, deeply regrets that the Central People's Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Soviet Union Government have been unable to accept
the resolution. That is our position. We still hope that on reconsideration, these
governments will appreciate that the proposals contained in the resolution are
fair and just, are based essentially on the Geneva Convention and on
international law, and are not opposed in any way to the basic principles which
they themselves put forward on earlier occasions.
The resolution is not mandatory. It is an honest attempt to find a solution to a

problem which is endangering the peace of the entire world and the continuation
of which has brought the utmost ruin and misery to the people of Korea.
It was not our intention to refer to this, but the debate has brought the subject
into the discussion at this time. Even though at the present moment the
resolution stands rejected by the Central People’s Government, I believe we can
permit ourselves to think that the discussions have had the effect of focusing the
attention of the overwhelming majority of peoples and of governments of the
world on the way of peace. They are aware of the Korean problem and of the
efforts and the perseverance that must be exerted and all the work that must be
done, whatever the obstructions; and that is the purpose that we have achieved
so far. We admit that the purpose is not complete until the war in Korea is
ended, but neither invective in this Assembly nor battle in Korea will bring
about peace. Therefore, we continue to appeal; and as regards my Government
and my people, we shall struggle in this direction.
AS FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ITSELF, WE SHALL NOT VOTE

AGAINST IT for the simple reason that it refers to prisoners of war. Equally,
we cannot vote in favour of it because it refers to facts which are alleged and
which have not been investigated, as far as we are concerned. We have stated
our position fully. We believe that any allegations of this type, however sound
or however wild, must be investigated fully and thoroughly in fairness to the
people who are responsible for the conduct of these places. The confidence of
the people of the world must remain unshaken.
I should also like to take this opportunity of directing the attention of the
Assembly, of the President, and of all those concerned, to the appeal that has
been made by the Red Cross organisations for the immediate repatriation of the
sick and wounded prisoners on both sides. The appeal has been made to the
United Nations Command and to the Governments of the People’s Republic of
China and of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea that those who are
wounded should be returned immediately in accordance with Article 109 of the
Convention.
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, August 28, 195378
[Armistice negotiations in Korea were resumed on April 26, 1953, and an

Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July. It provided that prisoners of war
who did not wish to be repatriated to their home countries would be handed over
by the parties to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission - consisting of
Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia, with India as Chairman - for
disposition.
The General Assembly resumed its session on August 17, 1953, to consider the
Korean question, especially the political conference envisaged in the Armistice
Agreement for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.
By resolution 711 (VII) of August 28, 1953, the General Assembly approved the
Armistice Agreement, and decided that the participants in the Conference on the
United Nations side would include only member States which had contributed
armed forces to the United Nations Command and South Korea. It also provided
for the participation of the Soviet Union. (As a result, a subsequent proposal by
North Korea and China to invite four neutral nations - India, Indonesia, Pakistan
and Burma - was rejected by the United States as head of the United Nations
Command.]
My delegation has explained its position very fully in the Committee on the draft
resolutions that are now submitted. We regard draft resolution A of the First
Committee as containing the possibilities of bringing about the desired results
which should now flow from the armistice, given goodwill on all sides, and if its
extensive possibilities are fully explored.
This is not the time, nor would it be desirable for us, to enter into a controversy on
78 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
724-25
this, to make any elaborate explanation of our position. At the same time it is
necessary for me, on behalf of the Government of India, to make it quite clear that
our approach to the present situation is that we are in a post-armistice period, that
is, that we are marching towards peace rather than merely stopping the war or
bringing about a cessation of hostilities. In that context we consider that the
further negotiations should not rule out any possibility, provided all those
possibilities move in one direction, namely the direction of peace.
We therefore stated before the Committee that we envisaged this conference as

one that should not engage itself in previous arguments as to what is, or is not, to
be discussed, but as one that should proceed on the basis of the terms of reference
laid down in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the interpretation left
to the conference itself. As I said at that time, our own understanding of the
position of the Chinese and North Korean Governments is that they would
approach this problem in a mood of reasonableness and the desire to bring about a
peaceful settlement.
For all those reasons, with regard to all these draft resolutions, we declined to
participate. It is not because my Government or people have no views on the
matter, it is not because we have no concern, and it is not because we are
indifferent. But I suppose there are occasions when even those who stand and
wait also perform a service. We therefore did not participate in any of the voting
except on one point, and that is where draft resolution A says that the General
Assembly welcomes this conference. That is our attitude on the whole of this
matter...
Secondly, I would like to tell the representative of the United States that we share
his concern, that those men who have suffered the horror of war on both sides,
those who are disabled, those who have been away from their homes, should
return to their homes very quickly. That was our attitude in regard to the
repatriation resolution [705 (VII)]. In fact, if I may say so, we used the
expression "return to their homelands," and that is what everybody wants. But it
is not sufficient to want something; we must pave the way towards it. In the
words of a distinguished poet after the first Great War, "words without deeds
breed pestilence," and in this case it is the pestilence of separation from peoples,
the pestilence of all the post-war consequences. Therefore, in any approach that
we make, it will be in this way.
When I came to the rostrum I intended to make a longer statement. I do not feel
that I need do that because sometimes one’s conclusions may be right. I am
reminded of what an old judge is supposed to have said to a young judge: "Give
your conclusions and you will always probably be right; don’t give your
arguments, you will probably be wrong." I do not think I shall be wrong, but still
I do not want to take the risk. Our approach, therefore, is one where as little as
possible may be said and done which slams any door, which creates further
obstacles. We have a great deal of them now and it is our task to overcome them.
Given good will, I believe it will be possible, going on from the draft resolutions -
and I use the multiple - that have been before this body, to move forward to find
ways and means of bringing about a conference and the rehabilitation and
unification of Korea, which is our object.
The representative of the United States in the course of his observations before
the Committee - I am afraid I shall have to refer to this matter - made reference -
for the moment it is in the state of obiter dicta - to a possible second or third or
fourth conference. Of course, conferences can always take place; there are issues
to be solved. But we do not want to be regarded as subscribing to or for or
against any of those suggestions. What we have at the moment is a conference
that must follow from the post-armistice situation which has been provided for,
which we have been discussing. We have already said that what should be
discussed there is a matter for the conference.
It is interesting that in the history of peace conferences the situation has always
been so. In Vienna in 1815, the negotiators met for particular purposes. They
went on to discuss the status of diplomatic representatives. They went on to
discuss the navigation of rivers. In connection with the Treaty of Paris, the
negotiators discussed maritime laws and the state of private property. In 1919,
the negotiators established the International Labour Office. It is surprising, when
people get together, what they may or may not discuss. Therefore we are content
to leave this in the hands of people who, whatever the divergences of their views
may be, must be weighed down with their responsibilities and with the desire to
bring about peace...
YESTERDAY, IN THE COMMITTEE, WE CAME TO THE VOTING STAGE

on the draft resolutions, and we found that there was one large part of the globe,
confined to this continent with the exception of Canada, which had certain views
in a very large majority - the United States and the great Republics of Latin
America. We were also happy to note that, of the States which took part in the
fighting in Korea and made the sacrifices, only three or four regarded the draft
resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and its sister States of the
Commonwealth [A/L.153] as not acceptable.79 We are also beholden to our
sister States of Asia. India is not a country which makes sharp continental
divisions because it is objectives and ideas which unite people, not merely
geography. Geography is one factor, and a very important one, but it is not
everything. But we are grateful to our Asian colleagues who, with only two
exceptions, supported the draft resolution.
It is against that background that my Government has to approach the whole of

the situation, and the position is by no means one where it is possible to say that
79 Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom had submitted a draft resolution in
the First Committee recommending that India participate in the political conference. It was
adopted by 27 votes to 21, with 11 abstentions. The United States opposed the proposal.
one has reached a decision that is free from difficulty or from any objection of
any kind.
Taking everything into consideration, I think that the purposes of peace are best
reached by not forcing the draft resolution with regard to India to a division in this
Assembly. I have repeatedly stated that we are at all times willing to assist in the
cause of peace. I have cited three elements: one was the decision of this
Assembly, another the attitude of the Chinese and North Korean Governments,
and the third our own evaluation of what is or is not likely to be useful.
We have also said that we are basically in favour of a composite conference and
that, therefore, the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/L.157] was, basically, the
right approach, although we do not subscribe to its individual composition or to
the arguments produced for or against.
Against that background, therefore, I must repeat that my delegation will not in
any way try to influence the Assembly’s decision. We have done no canvassing:
we have not been candidates. As I have said, India has not "stood up" or "stood
down." All we can do is to express our views and leave it to the Assembly’s
sense of what is its duty and what it thinks is the right thing to do in these matters.
I think it is also necessary to say, in fairness to our sister States of the

Commonwealth, that they have at no time tried to exert any influence or pressure
on my Government, on my delegation or on me as an individual. The United
Kingdom, it is quite understandable, would not try to do that because it knows we
do not yield to pressure; and, what is more, the United Kingdom is not
accustomed to doing that sort of thing. Thus there has been no argument, no deal
and no trade or anything of that kind in this matter. We come here, of our own
volition, in the interests of the cause we serve and on the basis of the principles
that I have repeatedly stated before the Committee. I say, in all sincerity, that the
heat that has been injected into this debate is not the official contribution made by
the United States delegation. There is no lack of friendliness or of cordiality
between us, whatever our views may be. We have not hesitated to state our
position in regard to all this.
I hope, in these circumstances, that those who have supported us will not think
that we are running away from a battle. What we are trying to do is not to add to
the heat of any battle. That is the contribution we try in all humility to make. I do
not know how these things are done, but I hope that some way will be found
whereby the sponsors of the draft resolution on Indian participation will be able to
express themselves as to what they wish to do, and I hope also that our supporters
will accept both our gratitude and the expression of our intentions and our
motives in making this statement. We do not say that we are standing down,
because India has not been a candidate, but we think, as a member of this
Assembly and as part of the family which must make the contribution towards
peace, that the best course that can be adopted so far as concerns draft resolution
C is not to force it to a decision.80

December 7, 195481
[The Korean Political Conference, under the Armistice Agreement, met in Geneva
from April 26 to June 15, 1954, but failed to reach agreement.
The fifteen countries attending the Conference on the United Nations side
submitted a report to the General Assembly (A/2786) and presented a draft
resolution (A/C.1/L.119) to approve the report and thereby their proposals,
especially that elections in Korea should be under the supervision of the
United Nations, which were not accepted by the other side.
Mr. Menon, in his speech, warned against this approach and advocated
conciliation and negotiations as essential for a peaceful solution. India submitted
a draft resolution which called merely for taking note of the 15-Power report on
the Conference.
The General Assembly adopted the 15-Power draft on December 11, 1954, as
resolution 811 (IX). India abstained on that resolution and did not press its own
draft to a vote.
Similar resolutions were adopted in subsequent sessions of the Assembly and

there was no progress towards a peaceful settlement.]
(Summary)
Mr. Menon (India) said that on seven occasions and during five General
Assembly sessions the United Nations had been discussing the Korean problem.
The aim of the United Nations - the unification of Korea by peaceful means - had
remained unchanged throughout, in spite of pressures from outside the General
Assembly.
Among the documents before the Committee were the reports of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission (A/2641) which, regrettably, had hardly been
mentioned so far. Yet the Commission had contributed to the efforts of the United
80 At the request of the sponsors, the draft resolution on India’s participation in the political
conference was not put to the vote.
81 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, First Committee, pages 504-
06
Nations to bring about the cessation of hostilities in Korea. It was generally
recognised that the stubborn problem of the repatriation of prisoners had been
solved through the good offices of the Commission. When the Indian
representative on the Commission, as its Chairman, had asked by a
communication dated January 10, 1954, at the conclusion of the 120-day period
provided for under General Assembly resolution 610 (VII), that the Assembly
should be convened so that he could submit the Commission's report to it, the
majority of the member States had refused his request. The decision had been
unfortunate, particularly as it was known to have been taken on the initiative of
the more powerful nations, the very nations which, during the resumed seventh
session of the General Assembly in August 1953, had practically promised that a
request to reconvene the Assembly would be received favourably. His delegation
would not start a discussion of the subject so as not to raise some controversial
issues which might make both parties even more inflexible, but it reserved the
right to request the General Assembly to study the reports in question, if
necessary.
The Committee also had before it a note by the Secretary-General on the question
of the prisoners of war (A/2809). In that connection, the Indian delegation invited
particularly those States which had voted for General Assembly resolution 610
(VII) of December 3, 1952, to read paragraph XVII of the proposals appended to
that resolution; it stated that if there were any prisoners of war who had not been
repatriated and whose future had not been provided for by the political
conference, the responsibility for their care would be transferred to the United
Nations; he also drew attention to paragraphs 7 and 8 of document A/2809. The
Indian Government still had on its hands 87 or 88 prisoners of war who had not
opted or had not expressed the desire to live in India. The Fifth Committee would
in due course be asked to take appropriate financial action, and the member States
which had maintained that prisoners of war should be allowed to settle in the
country of their choice, would have to respond accordingly when approached.
The next document was the report of the United Nations Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711). He drew special attention to
the part of the report dealing with the bellicose attitude of President Syngman
Rhee. Although it was not always appropriate to quote statements made by
politicians and statesmen in the heat of the moment, the statements in question
had been reiterated on 7 December of that month in Seoul, and they were
dangerous. They were in complete contradiction with the stand taken by the
powerful nations which had a direct military alliance with the Republic of Korea
and which had been stressing the need for a peaceful settlement of the problem of
the unification of Korea. There could be no doubt that in taking decisions which
directly or indirectly gave strength to such statements, the General Assembly
would be taking a dangerous attitude.
The following document was the report of the fifteen Powers dealing with the
Korean Political Conference at Geneva (A/2786). It was merely a report on the
conference; but since it appeared from the document that the Secretary-General
had received a copy of the records of the meetings, those documents should be
regarded as being implicitly part of the record. In view of the subjective nature of
document, it was important to refer to the original records of the meetings for a
comparison of the different views.
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE COULD NOT BE SAID TO HAVE no

connection with the United Nations. In fact, it had grown out of General
Assembly resolution 711 (VII). In operative paragraph 5 of the resolution, the
General Assembly had stipulated that the United Nations should be informed if
agreement was reached and that it should be kept informed at other appropriate
times. Consequently the report in document A/2786 should be treated as an
interim report of the proceedings of the Conference. Agreement had not been
reached, but the situation should not be regarded as final, and it was for the First
Committee to seek common ground between the views of the two parties.
On May 13, 1954, Sir Anthony Eden, United Kingdom representative at the
Conference, had spoken of certain principles as essential to agreement. The first
principle was that elections should be held for the formation of an all-Korean
Government. The second that the elections should truly reflect the people's will,
taking account of the distribution of the population between North and South.
Thirdly, the elections should be based on universal suffrage, secret ballot, and
should take place as soon as possible and in conditions of genuine freedom.
Fourthly, the elections had to be internationally supervised, under the auspices of
the United Nations. The countries selected did not necessarily have to be those
which had taken part in the Korean war; there could be a panel of countries
acceptable to the Conference. Fifthly, any plan for a settlement of the Korean
question had to provide the conditions in which foreign troops could be
withdrawn in conformity with General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of 7 October
1950.
Mr. Molotov, who had represented the Soviet Union at Geneva, for his part, had
stressed the following points on 5 June: First, elections on the basis of universal
suffrage, a secret ballot and proportional representation would make it possible to
set up an all-Korean legislative body. Secondly, the Geneva Conference should
approve in principle the creation of a supervisory body to watch over those
elections throughout Korea. The composition and functions of that body and the
principles on which it should base its activities would be considered additionally.
No party had expressed a categorical wish concerning the system to be adopted in
that proportional representation, nor had any particular method of voting been
advocated. Mr. Molotov's third principle related to the question of foreign troops,
whose withdrawal he had suggested. Fourthly, all the participants of the
Conference were to agree that the all-Korean elections should be held under the
supervision of an international body.
A simple comparison of the two approaches, limited to those specific points,
showed that there was no real discrepancy between them.
The French representative at Geneva had said that Korea should be unified within
its historical frontiers as a free, independent and democratic State. He had added
that elections should be held throughout Korea to set up a single and truly
representative Government for the whole of Korea. Those elections should be
carried out in conditions of genuine freedom under international supervision.
Furthermore, the French representative had said that the settlement of the Korean
question should provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Once unification
had been achieved under proper conditions, the United Nations should be called
upon to approve the settlement reached.
At the Geneva Conference, the only suggestion at variance with the principles he
had just outlined had come from the South Korean representative. Definite
progress had, then, in his delegation's opinion, been made at Geneva, and it was
for that reason that, in one form or another, the efforts to achieve a peaceful
settlement of the Korean question in conformity with the objectives of the United
Nations should be continued.
As the United Kingdom representative had said, the commission which

supervised the elections, however composed, should be truly impartial and should
be so composed as to command the authority necessary for its decisions to be
carried out. That had also been the Canadian representative's position.
His delegation felt strongly that the United Nations should not subscribe to any
hard and fast view on international supervision. With regard to Korea, it had a
dual role to play; first, through the United Nations Command, which was
concerned with the military operations, and secondly, through the world
organisation itself.
As the Swedish representative had said, any peaceful settlement presupposed an

attempt to settle in a practical and realistic manner the problems that arose. While
in the specific case it was true that China did not recognise the authority of the
United Nations, it should not be overlooked that the United Nations did not
recognise China. That country could not be expected to feel bound by the Charter
of an Organisation that did not recognise it as a member.
The question of international supervision could, however, be settled in a manner

acceptable to all parties. It was possible to hold impartially supervised elections in
Korea on the basis of the secret ballot and proportional representation.
"Proportion" did not mean "equal proportion," and there was no reason to think
that elections in South Korea would all result in the triumph of one party.
Elections on the basis of proportional representation would therefore be likely to
make a compromise possible.
THE KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE AT GENEVA had proceeded from
General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) which, adopted by an overwhelming
majority, had ratified the Armistice Agreement. That resolution had formally
embodied the idea, which had long existed, that a peaceful settlement in Korea
should be secured by negotiation. The fifteen-Power draft resolution
(A/C.1/L.119) likewise referred to the Armistice Agreement. It was common
ground, therefore, that the Agreement was still valid, and the settlement should be
achieved by negotiation. That did not mean that the conditions essential for a
resumption of negotiation existed at the moment, but it would be unwise and
contrary to the principles of the United Nations to inject into any decision that the
Committee took approval in advance of a particular form of settlement. When,
therefore, the fifteen Powers, in their report (A/2786), took the view that the
supervision of the elections should be under the authority and auspices of the
United Nations, that could not constitute more than a view put forward by one
party, and it would not be wise to commit the First Committee to it.
The similarity of views on a large number of points that existed between the
Indian draft resolution and the fifteen-Power draft resolution was, admittedly,
encouraging. The main difference resided in the fact that the fifteen-Power draft
resolution called upon the General Assembly to approve the report on the
Conference. While it was true that such approval could not mean much so long as
the Armistice Agreement remained in force, it could not fail to add to the general
confusion. It would therefore be better to adopt his delegation's draft, under
which the Assembly would merely take note of the report.
At all events, the unification of Korea continued to be the aim. North and South
Korea complemented one another economically, and it was important to achieve
unification, although not by coercion, by ill-considered measures or by war.
History had shown that problems that seemed insoluble could ultimately be
solved in a manner acceptable to both parties. It was in that spirit that his
delegation had proposed its draft resolution, in which it felt that it had defined
what should be the United Nations position. It was the duty of the United Nations
to strive to reconcile conflicting interests. A study of the records of the Korean
Conference at Geneva supported the hope that negotiations would be resumed
which would ultimately lead to the implementation of the Armistice Agreement.
Although the General Assembly had not thought fit, in August 1953, to accept the
draft resolution submitted by Canada, Australia and New Zealand (A/L.153) that
India should be invited to send representatives to the Conference - the object of
the proposal being that countries not fully committed to either side should be
represented and act as conciliators at that Conference - his delegation had no
national pride in the matter. It merely hoped that the United States representative
would support its efforts to avoid a further deadlock...
November 21, 195582
(Summary)
Mr. Menon (India) pointed out that one member of the United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) had
declined to sign its report (A/2947), a fact which might deserve an explanation.
Referring to the basic objective of the Commission to bring about the unification
and rehabilitation of Korea, he noted that, while one part of that objective referred
to the whole of Korea, the other, rehabilitation, applied only to one part of the
country. In that connection, he suggested that the United Nations would have to
address itself to the fact that casualties and devastation had been caused in both
parts of Korea, and that the causes of hunger and famine that existed on one side
were, from the humanitarian point of view, of equal importance with those on the
other.
With regard to certain details of UNCURK's report, it appeared that the greater
part of the information contained therein - whether concerning the armistice or the
alleged violations of the armistice, or the conditions in Korea - had come from the
authorities in the Republic of Korea or from the United Nations Command.
Mr. Menon recalled that the various resolutions adopted in the past on the
question by the Security Council and later by the General Assembly had always
indicated that it was necessary to bring the two parts of Korea together. In order to
achieve that aim, the co-operation of the two sides was required. To insist that the
only way to establish unity was through acceptance of an election supervised by
the United Nations amounted to imposing a settlement by one side on the other.
The United Nations, however, was not incapable of acting impartially. It was
possible, as Sir Anthony Eden had suggested in Geneva, to find a body of member
nations which had not taken part in the war to conduct the elections or to take
other steps towards unification in an impartial way.
The United Nations had followed the road of negotiation for a long time. The
political questions in regard to Korea were specifically mentioned in the
Armistice Agreement as being capable of political settlement. Paragraph 60 of
the Armistice Agreement provided for a political conference. On August 28,
1953, when the political conference had been decided upon, the General
Assembly, after a long debate, had decided [resolution 711 (VII)] that there
should be a conference which was representative not only of the United Nations,
but of the other side as well, and of those who were not on either side. It had thus
been established that the political issues must be a matter for negotiations.
82 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session, First Committee, pages 187-
89
Mr. Menon reiterated the view of the Indian Government that the Korean Political
Conference had not been terminated. That view was based on the fact that there
had been no report to the General Assembly by the Geneva Conference in the
sense of resolution 711 (VII). There had been no communication of the
proceedings of the Conference, although there had been a report on the
Conference. In the absence of an official document from the Conference itself, it
was thus possible to draw various inferences. It seemed to the Indian delegation
that in Geneva it had been agreed that there must be impartially and
internationally supervised elections. There had been no agreement that there must
be United Nations supervision.
THE FIRST COMMITTEE WAS NOT A FORUM where the work of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission could be examined. According to paragraphs
24, 25 (g), 28, 29, and 41 of the Armistice Agreement, the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was responsible only to the Military Armistice
Commission. The NNSC had submitted no report to the United Nations. Without
an official report of that Commission, and in view of the fact that the Armistice
Agreement provided for the settling through negotiations of any violations of that
Agreement, the Indian delegation was not prepared to discuss any alleged
violations. There might have been certain violations of the Armistice Agreement;
but the Committee should not permit a great deal of passion to be introduced by
the suggestion that there had been serious violations. Had there been serious
violations, there would have been war in Korea.
In that connection, it should be recalled that the President of the Republic of

Korea, speaking at the first anniversary ceremonies of the Korean Army Training
Command at Kwangju, had called for readiness to fight for unification soon. That
attitude of the Republic of Korea was certainly not in conformity with the
Armistice Agreement or with the laborious efforts which had been made by the
United Nations from 1950 to 1952 to bring about a cessation of hostilities in
Korea.
The report of UNCURK contained the statement that, while the United Nations
Command had faithfully observed the terms of the Armistice Agreement, the
North had flagrantly violated them by a considerable military build-up,
particularly by the illegal introduction of combat aircraft. The statement had not
been supported by evidence from the NNSC. Furthermore, such an indictment
was not part of the function of UNCURK. Its task was the task of healing, not
that of making an inquest or finding fault.
The NNSC was the keystone on which the arch of the Armistice Agreement
rested at present; if it were pulled out, the whole edifice would fall down. But in
November 1954 the Provost-Marshal General of the Republic of Korea had sent a
letter to the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the Commission warning them
to leave the country peacefully within a week of the receipt of his message
(A/2947, para. 15). Those members were part of the Commission, bearing,
irrespective of the opinions of the countries or the persons, the imprimatur of the
United Nations. The members of the Commission shared a great deal of the
sanctity of the United Nations, and that state must be maintained. That official act
on the part of the Republic of Korea, which was followed by demonstrations
against the Commission, was a unilateral violation of the Armistice Agreement.
The UNCURK report quite clearly brought out the fact that the Republic of Korea
had taken an antagonistic attitude to the principle and machinery of the Armistice
Agreement and that the purpose of so doing was to tear the Armistice Agreement
to pieces. Thus, one party, which was part of the United Nations Command,
continued to pursue the policy of breaking up the armistice.
The immediate objective of the United Nations when it went into Korea had been
to repel aggression. Its main objective, however, was the establishment of peace
in Korea. In the opinion of the Government of India, the United Nations should
actively encourage contacts between the two parts of Korea. It should permit
them, and if necessary, use what influence it had, to achieve unity from the top
rather than the other way around. As a preliminary step, even before talking
about elections, it should remove the idea that the unification of Korea could
come by one side adopting the Constitution of the other, or by one side leading an
army into the other side. There could not be a unification which was absorption
of one side by the other. That applied to the North as well as to the South.
The delegation of India deeply regretted the approach that was made from an
attitude of non-reconciliation, an approach that was contrary to the efforts made
by the General Assembly in 1952 and thereafter, an approach that did not coincide
with paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and did not tally with the
fundamental objectives of the United Nations in Korea. The United Nations,
therefore, must not simply reiterate every year its resolutions. It was very
important that the United Nations and the powerful countries which had a great
influence on its policies did not convey to the peoples of Asia that perhaps it was
a good thing to leave that running sore. It was important that the message of the
United Nations should greet the vast multitudes of Asia, who had been recently
awakened to nationalism, in the context of assisting them in their actions, in their
unity and in their rehabilitation. By simply passing a resolution referring back to
the past and saying it could do no more, the United Nations would admit its
failure. That was the reason why the Indian delegation would not vote for the
draft resolution submitted by the United States (A/C.1/L.145).
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, IN THE OPINION OF THE INDIAN

DELEGATION, had elicited a great many ideas and had shown that the
similarities in the approach of the several sides were greater than the
dissimilarities. It was common ground that if there must be unity in Korea, there
must be elections on a proportional basis, and a proportional basis did not mean
equal proportions. It was common ground that those elections must be free. The
point of difference was with regard to ensuring that the elections would be
properly carried out. It would not detract from the prestige of the United Nations
if the supervision of those elections would not be formally the task of the United
Nations. Many important problems had been settled outside the organisational
framework of the United Nations, although not outside the purposes of the
Charter. Similarly, whatever machinery was set up for the supervision of
elections in Korea should be agreeable to the United Nations and in consonance
with the Charter. But the unification of Korea could not be less important than
what was alleged to be the prestige of the United Nations.
So far as the Indian delegation was concerned, it hoped that the Korean question
would be considered for the last time at the present session. The time had come
to take action between sessions of the General Assembly in order to heal that
wound in Asia. The great leaders of the people, particularly the great leaders of
the United Nations Command, must take the initiative so that all the forces and all
the channels available were utilised for that purpose. Discussions and the use of
diplomatic channels were the necessary ingredients in the matter.
Secondly, the United Nations must introduce greater flexibility into its attitude. It
must get away from the language of the ultimatum and must adopt the language of
reconciliation. Where there was conflict, it was only sharpened by threats, by
ultimatums and by adopting positions which would not help in solving the
problem. The delegation of India, therefore, pleaded for reconciliation. It
requested the delegation of the United States to try to see its way to deleting from
its draft resolution the reference to resolution 811 (IX).
The delegation of India had no objection to the greater part of the United States
draft resolution. However, the draft resolution in recalling the resolution of the
previous year, meant that United Nations supervision was a condition precedent to
the unification of Korea. India would have no objection to United Nations
supervision if it were possible to persuade both parties to accept it. Korea could
not be unified without the consent of the North and the South. The two
Governments of Korea should therefore be encouraged to come together on such
problems as they might discuss without any political or constitutional
commitments. In that way, contacts might develop. One must perhaps reconcile
oneself to the view that elections were still far off, that unification could not be
accomplished in one stage. But unification would never be accomplished if
negotiations were not allowed to develop. Peace could not be brought about by
pursuing counsels of conflict.
TURNING TO PART (C) OF THE AGENDA ITEM, relating to the problem of

ex-prisoners of the Korean war, Mr. Menon stated that consultations had been
taking place between the Government of Brazil and the Government of India with
regard to the Brazilian offer to receive those ex-prisoners who opted to live in
Brazil. He also noted the offer made by the Government of Argentina to receive
some of those ex-prisoners and expressed the thankfulness of the Government of
India to both Governments and to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the
matter. In that connection, Mr. Menon remarked that, although the Government
of India did not anticipate any difficulty, the ex-prisoners remained in India until
they were resettled. The problem must therefore be regarded as a standing
problem.
Referring to a request by the Government of the Republic of Korea that three

South Korean representatives be allowed to interview Koran ex-prisoners in India,
and ascertain from them their wishes regarding repatriation, Mr. Menon stated
that Government of India was responsible only to the two Commands, and not to
any particular Government, for the final disposition of the ex-prisoners. The
Government of India, therefore, suggested that the South Korean Government
should make its approach through the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Furthermore, under paragraph of 11 of the annex to the Armistice Agreement, the
ex-prisoners of the Korean war could either elect to go to a neutral country or ask
to be repatriated to their fatherlands. The word "fatherland" in that paragraph
meant either China or North or South Korea, according to the Command to which
those ex-prisoners belonged at the time they were taken prisoner. The
Government of India had thus turned down the request of a South Korean who
wanted to be sent to North Korea, and that of a North Korean who wanted to be
sent to South Korea.
According to the latest statement of options of October 15, 1955, there were only
2 South Koreans, 74 North Koreans, and 12 Chinese ex-prisoners in India. Of
those, 4 North Koreans and 2 Chinese had been repatriated in 1955, according to
their options and the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The ex-prisoners had
expressed their gratitude to the Government of India for the affection, generosity
and kindness which they had received in India.
Mr. Menon concluded by stating that, while India recognised neither South nor
North Korea, it desired to live in peace with both the people of the North and the
people of the South. It was its desire that, before too long, these people would
belong to one unified, independent and prosperous country.

January 7, 195783
(Summary)
83 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, First Committee, pages
26-27
Mr. Menon (India) dealt first with part (b) of the agenda item.84 He stated that
the expression "ex-prisoners" was purely descriptive and that his Government had
never agreed that the persons involved were ex-prisoners: they were people
brought over from Korea under conditions in which India had no other option.
Summarising his Government's report (A/3203), he noted that, out of a total of 88
prisoners, 2 had been repatriated to China and 6 to North Korea; 55 had been sent
to Brazil and 9 to Argentina in accordance with their option: 16 former prisoners
remained in India. Of these, 9 had opted for Mexico; 2 had opted for Argentina,
but had been found medically unfit; and 5 had opted for India. Five of those who
had opted for Mexico now wished to go to Argentina. He requested the
Secretary-General to pursue the discussions on the subject in order that there
might be no further delay. He had been in continuous touch with the Government
of Mexico and expressed the hope that that Government would soon take a
favourable decision.
Referring to the report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (A/2641),

he noted that it had not been discussed by the General Assembly at any time
although his Government had on many occasions suggested such a discussion.
His Government had not pressed for a discussion for fear that it might lead to a
acrimonious controversy which would not assist in resolving the Korean question.
Hence, he stated on the behalf of his Government that the report was still before
the United Nations and should be taken up at an appropriate time.
TURNING TO PART (a) OF THE KOREAN ITEM, he stated that the United
States draft resolution was not likely to achieve the desired objective. His
delegation, having failed to persuade the United States delegation to change the
draft resolution so as to enable India to support it, had decided not to move any
amendments. His delegation's reason was its anxiety that there should be as little
controversy as possible. He did not think such a resolution would make any
difference to the problem which had to be settled by a political discussion on a
realistic basis. Commenting on the draft resolution he pointed out that in operative
paragraph 2 the principle of free and general elections in Korea, which his
Government heartily supported, was limited by the particular method embodied in
the final declaration of the Geneva Conference, namely, that the elections should
be under United Nations supervision. The door would have been left more open
for achieving the objective of unification, had the paragraph concluded with the
word "objectives."
Operative paragraph 3 went further than previous resolutions in nominating

UNCURK as the authority supervising elections throughout Korea, which,
however had not been provided for. In his view such a decision was not
calculated either to promote the purposes of the United Nations or to achieve
Korean unification. To create an election commission as a by-product of a
84 "Problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean War: report of the Government of India”

resolution would be a very great mistake since it could not work and the question
of supervision would have to be decided after the political discussion. Such a step
would move the problem back to the position in 1950, when the Commission had
been appointed to supervise elections all over Korea. He recalled that the North
Koreans had at that time refused to let the Commission in. Paragraph 3 also asked
all States and authorities to assist the Commission to enter North Korea to force
their way in. The matter could be effectively achieved only by a meeting of
minds between the two sides. He drew a distinction between the principles of the
Charter, for which his Government had the highest respect, and any particular
resolution, remarking that any decision made must work in the context of the
time.
Korea had been divided in 1945 as a result of the power politics of the great
Powers. Its division into North and South Korea had not been brought about
either by the Koreans or by the United Nations, nor had it been brought about by
the war. The future of Korea lay in the coming together of North and South with
the consent of their peoples. The objective of all decisions of the United Nations
had been to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified,
independent, democratic Korea. There had been no reference to unification by
force by any party except the Republic of Korea. He then cited statements made
in 1955 by Mr. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, during a visit
to the United States in which he had called upon the American people to bring
about the unification of Korea by force.
In pursuing its fundamental objective of unifying Korea, the United Nations had
always proceeded from the assumption that two Koreas existed - not that the two
Koreas would exist forever, but that there were in fact two Koreas, which must be
brought together in the future. Yet at the previous meeting the representative of
the Republic of Korea had reiterated that the Armistice Agreement should be
abrogated. Only the very firm stand taken by the United States had prevented the
termination of the armistice ever since its conclusion. The Republic of Korea had
not signed the Armistice Agreement, although it had been one of the belligerents,
and was strictly speaking still at war with North Korea, since there was no peace
between them.
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREA had been to halt

aggression at the thirty-eighth parallel and to establish an armistice as a first step
towards unification. If the United Nations was to accomplish its task of
unification, direct negotiations between the two sides were necessary, or the
United Nations must lay down plans whereby such negotiations would be
possible. He drew the attention of the United States, in particular, to the fact that
there was no great difficulty in doing that. He quoted statements made at the
Geneva Korean Political Conference by the representatives of Belgium, France
and Canada, which referred, inter alia, to the possibility of negotiations and to
free elections in order to unify Korea, to be held under a form of international
supervision acceptable to the United Nations. His Government considered free
elections - including the secret ballot, freedom of propaganda, universal suffrage,
and sufficient time for campaigning - essential to the unification of Korea.
International supervision was important, but that did not necessarily mean United
Nations supervision, though even United Nations supervision was capable of
various forms which could be made acceptable to the other side. Supervision by a
body of nations which was acceptable to both sides and in which the veto question
would not arise was always possible. Peaceful elections required co-operation by
the machinery of administration on both sides.
An election meant election to some body. The South Korean Government

proposed election to its Parliament, but that was not the United Nations position.
Some form of constituent assembly was necessary which could create a
constitution, and that required the consent of the other side. Decision on the
question of the number of representatives from each side should be based roughly
on the population. North Korea had a small population, South Korea had a large
one. It was up to the two parties to come to some agreement. He felt that the
pressure of world public opinion would lead North Korea to accept the idea.
Then the constituent assembly would decide either to accept one of the two
constitutions or to find some other method, with the two administrations carrying
on in the interim.
With regard to the admission of Korea to the United Nations, his Government had
subscribed to the admission of new members at the tenth session on the basis that
it did not include any country in which there was a problem of division. That
applied to Germany, Vietnam and Korea.
Regarding freedom in North Korea, he pointed out that it was difficult for the
United Nations to obtain information about what was going on there. It was
equally necessary to make inquiries concerning the other side. He cited an article
by Dorothy W. Allan of the Korean Affairs Institute, Washington, printed in the
Washington Post of May 21, 1956, raising questions about certain actions of the
South Korean authorities.
He expressed the hope that the United States would encourage the idea of
informal contacts between the two sides with a view to developing and uniting
their common country. His delegation had refrained from submitting
amendments to the United States draft resolution in order to avoid wrangling.
The real problem was not a matter of formal amendments or finding words; it was
a question of the willingness of both North and South Korea to unify, recognising
the differences that at present existed between them and had to be reconciled, and
abandoning ideas of destroying the Armistice Agreement and of relying on
reinforcements in the South and on alleged stockpiling of arms in the North. The
task of seeking unification must go on because to leave Korea divided was to add
one more point of possible explosion in the world.
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly on November 15,
195785
One cannot say that either this item or the approach to it made from any side or
the debate provides any hope for the establishment of what are called United
Nations objectives, either in North or South Korea.
My delegation has no intention whatsoever of reintroducing into this debate any

further element of acrimony.
We are not discussing Korea; the Korean people do not come into this, it is a cold
war debate. This has nothing to do with Korea and it has been so for years.
Before I deal with the main political aspect of it, there are two matters which I
have to refer to so that they may be read into the record. One relates to the
remaining prisoners in India.
THERE ARE PERHAPS SOME FIVE PRISONERS WHO HAVE NOT

SETTLED DOWN IN INDIA. With regard to these we are negotiating with the
Governments of Mexico and Argentina. I have no doubt that that problem will be
resolved. That is why, unlike our procedures of previous years, we have not
introduced an item on prisoners. After all, there are only five men. But five men
can make quite a lot of difficulty. They are Korean prisoners, but we think that
direct negotiations through the usual channels, through the Governments of
Argentina and Mexico, will resolve this problem. At the same time, I think that
this Assembly owes a debt of gratitude to the Government of Brazil for taking a
certain number of these men - a small number it is true - which has reduced the
problem to a very small size. Argentina has also taken some of these prisoners.
Therefore, there is no lack of desire on the part of the countries concerned – either
Brazil, Argentina or Mexico - to assist in this not necessarily political aspect of
this problem.
I am happy to say that some Korean prisoners opted for Indian nationality subject
to any future decisions. They, according to the custom of our country, have to
work for a living and they are all engaged in engineering occupations for which
they were trained by the Indian army during the last three years while they were
there. But when I say the Indian army, I mean the non-combatant part of the
Indian army. These men are being employed in the telephone industry and in
related industries. We have made no use of them for military or para-military
purposes. From the Western point of view their emoluments, and probably even
their conditions of life, may not be as good as some of you would like, but we are
85 Source: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, November 1957

a poor country. I think they are doing better than our own people from that point
of view; I do not say from the point of view of work, so there will be no difficulty
with them...
NOW WE COME TO THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION

which is the purpose of the draft resolution86 and the debate. I request the
Committee to give its attention to paragraph 5 of this report (of the United
Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) which states:
“There has been no change in the basic prospects for realising the
fundamental objective of the United Nations in Korea, namely, to bring
about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic
government for the whole Korean peninsula." (A/3672).
Thus after six or seven years, our own Commission has to confess that the
United Nations objective has not been established. It is possible to allocate
blame and praise, but the fact does remain that even in a problem that is small
compared, shall we say, with disarmament or other things which we have been
dealing with, we have not been able to get anywhere near it.
Today we have a draft resolution before us which is a reaffirmation of the

resolution passed in 1954, which was reaffirmed in 1955 and 1956. We are
asked to reaffirm it for the fourth time, and I am afraid that this will not take us
any nearer solution...
My delegation has no desire to elaborate on this subject except to say that the
unification of Korea and the establishment of Korean nationality, if the majority
of Koreans wish it, is not only desirable but necessary from the point of view of
the stability of the Far East and as opening the way to the solution of other
questions. I have no doubt that once some of the other cold war propositions are
out of the way this proposition of Korea, which appears so tough and so
incapable of solution, will, however much to our surprise, be solved overnight...
I do not say that every country here can claim - and we cannot claim - to be
observing the Charter 100 per cent. There are many countries here whose
Governments are not based upon the will of the people. The United Nations is
founded on that basis, without reference to the internal characteristics of
governments. But it is possible to bring the North and the South Koreans
together. The country has been divided at the 38th parallel, not because the
Koreans wanted to divide it but because the Russians and the Americans wanted
to, so that it has nothing to do with the Koreans. Thus it is possible to bring
about the unification of Korea on the basis of understanding between the two
sides, on the basis of free elections, if necessary on the basis of a constituent
86 Draft resolution proposed by the United States and ten other countries
assembly, on the basis of continually working together or on the basis of a
confederation or of any kind of solution if the Koreans are left to themselves.
But in view of the position we have taken, my Government is in support of
international elections.
My colleague from Ceylon was right in saying that the United Nations has a
special responsibility in this area because the United Nations declared North
Korea as aggressor. It waged war on this account, and we supported it.
Therefore, my Government is in favour of elections under international
supervision. But I would ask at what time during the difficult days was United
Nations supervision exercised over the whole of Korea? Never. The armistice
was not brought about under United Nations supervision. The United Nations is
one of the parties, represented by the United Nations Command, represented by
the United States.
I FEEL SURE THAT THE GENIUS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, the desire
of the North Koreans to unite - all this will bring about a solution pretty soon.
But it can only be brought about if there is a recognition, which fortunately there
is, that the North Koreans are a minority taken as a whole. I do not say that all
South Koreans have the same views, but if they could elect their own parliament
- or whatever their assembly is called - and not have to rely on outside assistance
for maintaining the separation on either side, then we would get unity...
It is not possible in the present circumstances to obtain a solution - if solution is

desired by everybody concerned - of the division of Korea into North and South
except in terms of the two sides nominating their own representatives and
finding, either on the basis of the armistice agreement or on the basis of the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the third element that is necessary.
This is how the whole Korean business has proceeded. That is how the Korean
war was brought to an end. This is not in any way to disparage the position of
the United Nations. The United Nations has two functions in this matter. First,
it is one of the combatants. Second, it is the custodian of the Charter in the way
of harmonising interests.
Is it more important to unite Korea? Is it more important that that unity should
come about on a basis where even a minority, but a considerable minority, on
either side will not only acquiesce but agree? Are there any valid objections to
seeking an election of this character which can be discussed as among the
leaders of the two sides? I have no doubt that all the public statements made by
the North Koreans and for that matter, by the South Koreans will be of a
character that do not give us much hope. But the Koreans are a patriotic people.
They want to see the unification of their country. They have, as the result of a
great war, been able to liberate themselves from Japanese imperialism. They had
hopes of being a country, and I am sure that modern Japan will assist them to
rehabilitate themselves. Post-war Japan will do so - that is our expectation.
Therefore, while nothing can be done this year in view of the positions that are
held, we hope we will get to the kernel of this proposition - that is, international
elections. "International elections" does not necessarily mean only one type;
there are several types of international elections. Any of them may be effective
so long as the international element is maintained, and, so long as impartiality
and integrity are maintained. We have tried that in the Korean issue. It enabled
the war to be terminated after three years of the bloodiest slaughter on both
sides. And three million Koreans died; that is what we have to bear in mind.
Three million Koreans, whether from the north or the south, are human beings.
They were killed in the war. It is quite true that a great many nationals of other
countries were killed too, but nothing like that number. Both sides of the
country have been devastated, more particularly the north.
MY DELEGATION NATURALLY EXPRESSES ITS OWN VIEWS, but we

are not so proud as not to be able to quote other authorities on this question. The
Foreign Minister of France, in 1954, when the climate was much more torrid
than it is now, said at Geneva:
"For the moment, in the same conciliatory spirit of which it has already
given ample proof in the course of the parallel negotiations over Indo-
China, the French delegation lends its support in principle to the ideas
already expressed here by one of our Chairmen and which can be
summarised as follows: (a) Korea should be unified within its historical
frontiers, as a free, independent and democratic State; (b) for this purpose
elections should be held throughout the whole Korean territory to set up a
single and truly representative government for the whole of Korea; (c) the
elections should be carried out in conditions of genuine freedom under
international supervision;" -
The French are extremely logical and they are very, very constructive when their
colonial interests are not concerned.
"(d) the settlement of the Korean question should provide for the
withdrawal of foreign troops;" -
The twenty-one divisions, or whatever it is, on one side, and what the
representative of the Philippines referred to just now, the mounting of arms
which he alleges on the other side - you do not get free elections unless, of
course, those arms are for the purpose of the security of the country.
"(e) once unification is achieved under proper conditions, the United

Nations should be called on to give their approval to the settlement thus
reached."
Is this not a practical proposition? No one wants to elbow the United Nations
out. What the French Foreign Minister submitted in 1954 was: Let there be
elections under international supervision, and bring about unification; both
before that and after that the United Nations can be called to give its sanction
and its ratification. That appears to us the approach to Korea that is possible.
There is another aspect of this question which should not be forgotten. The
South Korean Government is not a party to the Armistice Agreement. The
Armistice Agreement was signed by the United Nations Command. Some
representatives may recall that there were repudiations of this at that time. But,
however that may be, it is not necessary to rake all that up. But, if Korean
unification is really required, then I think that, at least as a challenge, a fair
international machinery for elections, as suggested by the Foreign Minister of
France in 1954, should be offered to both sides. That is our view. We do not
think that view will gain the majority of votes in this Assembly as it is at present
constituted.
We are thankful that there is no war taking place and, unless someone provokes
it, neither the North Koreans nor the South Koreans are capable of bringing
about a war which will shake the world.
Therefore, our view is that we would have hoped that, another year having
passed, a new type of resolution would come up. We entered into no
negotiations about this matter, no discussions about it, because we thought the
time was not ripe.
THE RESOLUTION WILL, NO DOUBT, PASS. We cannot support it for the

simple reason that the solution is not in keeping with the Armistice Agreement.
The Armistice Agreement was not dictated by the United Nations Command.
The United Nations Command represents the United Nations. It is one of the
two parties - one of the fifty-fifty parties in the stability that obtains. Now, how
can it be that, when it comes to a settlement, that can be forgotten, but at the
same time the substance of it can be obtained?
There are countries which are outside the United Nations. There are countries
within the United Nations which are not deeply involved in the cold war. There
is enough in the whole negotiations after December 1952 which warrants the
belief that the United States has not only the capacity but the willingness, if it so
desires, to find a solution to this matter. But I do not think that we assist a
solution by any recrimination of any kind.
We have no comments to make on the report of UNCURK, except this one, and
that is the only part that is important: I think that, when United Nations relief
and rehabilitation can reach only half of the country, that in itself is a
commentary on the whole situation, whoever is at fault. I think that from now
on we ought to address ourselves to the proposition - and I hope that by the time
we meet next year the world may have improved and it may be possible to
establish the objectives of the United Nations, namely, the unification of Korea
within its national frontiers on a representative basis, under elections conducted
democratically and under international auspices, where there is no question of
the elections not being straight...
My delegation will therefore take no part in voting on this resolution, because

we have no desire to aggravate this situation. We think it is not a resolution that
does a lot of credit to the United Nations. That is our view...
I WISH TO REFER TO ONLY ONE OTHER MATTER. The Government of

India wishes to reserve its right to discuss the report of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission. This report has been submitted to the Secretary-
General, but it has never been discussed because it has been generally agreed
that such a discussion would involve a great deal of bitterness and acrimony.
We must not forget that there has been considerable "monkey business" on both
sides on various occasions. It has been generally agreed that a discussion of the
report would raise problems which, although they are political problems, have
no direct relation to this issue, technically speaking.
The report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission could be discussed

under the present item. We desire, however, to suspend the discussion of the
report, and have not introduced an item in this regard, as our small contribution
towards maintaining an atmosphere in which there is a lack of disharmony. For
the record, however, we must reserve our right to discuss the report at this
session, or next year, or in 20 years.
PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF STATES
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 13,

195787
[In 1957, the General Assembly included in its agenda an item entitled
"Declaration concerning the peaceful co-existence of States" at the request of the
Soviet Union which presented a draft resolution.
A draft resolution was also presented by India, Sweden and Yugoslavia. On

December 14, 1957, the General Assembly adopted this resolution by 77 votes to
0, with one abstention; the USSR did not press for a vote on its draft.
In this resolution - resolution 1236 (XII) - the General Assembly realising the
need "to develop peaceful and tolerant relations among States, in conformity with
the Charter, based on mutual respect and benefit, non-aggression, respect for
each other’s sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity and non-intervention in
one another’s internal affairs," called upon all States "to make every effort to
strengthen international peace, and to develop friendly and co-operative relations
and settle disputes by peaceful means as enjoined in the Charter of the United
Nations..."]
...While we have taken no initiative in this matter, both in the course of the
general debate in the Assembly and in the course of the debate of this item here,
reference has been made to the policy of my country and to what are now called
the five principles and to various other matters in which we are deeply and
profoundly interested.88 In fact, they form the basis of our approach to our
relations with other countries in the world and to international problems generally.
At the same time, I should like to say that the Government of India attaches no
importance either to the numeral "five" or to any particular formulations of it;
the content is more important than anything else. That we live together in this
world, either as individuals or as nations, has no particular merit because there
is no escape from this planet; so, in one form or another, so long as we are
surviving we shall be existing. That is not sufficient. It is necessary for human
beings in our civilised communities to live together in mutual tolerance, and I
would submit to this Committee that while it may not so appear now, what we
are actually discussing is merely the extension of that to the international field.
In civilised communities, individuals and groups, people of different races and
backgrounds, of different opinions and different political parties, have to find
87
From: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, December 1957, pages 240-246
88
The five principles of peaceful co-existence were originally formulated in an agreement
between India and China in 1954. They were subsequently endorsed by many governments and
international organisations.
ways of adjusting and tolerating each other, sometimes of suffering each other.
And, therefore, what we are now discussing is the extension of that democratic
principle into the field of international affairs...
I said a while ago that we did not claim any particular sanctity either for the
numeral "five" or for the label of "principles," or even for the phraseology
contained in them. Indeed, in the various statements of the Government of India
and of other countries of the East, West, North and South there have been
variations of the phraseology at the Bandung Conference. We go further and say
that neither the present generation of Indians nor our country has a prescriptive
right in this matter. I will not go so far back as the edict issued 2,500 years ago,
which is not only of historical interest but of sentimental interest to us, but we are
near enough to the Western world, and I have found in the well documented
publication, the Department of State Bulletin of the United States, that as far back
as November 26, 1941, the United States proposed adoption of a draft mutual
declaration of policy. This contains the fundamental principles upon which their
relations with each other and with other countries were to be based, and the
phraseology was practically the same as that adopted by India and others. The
principles were: the inviolability of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of
all nations; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; equality,
including the equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and reliance
upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific
settlement of controversies and for the improvement of international conditions by
peaceful methods. Those principles were formulated before the conclusion of the
war, and perhaps if this declaration had not remained in draft, the course of past
history might have been different, but that is by the way...
In the course of the debate, reference has been made to the current history of those
so-called "five principles," and so far as my country is concerned, in one form or
another they have been agreed to and subscribed to, either directly or indirectly,
by a large number of States on all continents. There are 20 to 21 countries. I
hope I have not left anyone out, in Asia, in Africa, in Europe and on the American
continent which are direct signatories of these principles. The countries in Europe
include the Federal Republic of Germany; in America, they include Chile...
So far as Western Europe is concerned, the Prime Minister of the United

Kingdom, during his visit to India, expressed himself in favour of those principles
and of our policy based upon it.
The United States Ambassador to India, speaking to us on September 27, 1955,

explained that the United States did not consider strength the ultimate answer to
world peace. He adhered to the five principles "in words and in purposes" - those
are his words. He stated that these, which India had enunciated, were but another
expression of what had already been expressed in many treaties since the last war
and in the United Nations Charter.
About the same time, in October, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, Earl Home, said:
"This brings me to the point where I believe it is possible to state with

truth that the objectives of foreign policy of the United Kingdom and India
and other Commonwealth countries are identical. Mr. Nehru has himself
named principles of living together in world society to which we have all
subscribed."
I am not trying to make this a testimony meeting. Our country claims no

prescriptive rights, no rights of originality and no monopoly with regard to these
ideas. In fact, it does not come to us either as a revelation or as something we
inherited from some unknown source. It is purely a pragmatic approach to a
problem.
In the United Nations more populous countries and less populous countries have
all expressed these opinions. Mr. Thors of Iceland, speaking at San Francisco,
on the tenth anniversary of the United Nations, said on behalf of Iceland:
"The world has two roads to choose between, and this has already been
said here and will be said over and over again. One is the road of disputes,
disagreements, discord and conflicts. This is bound, sooner or later, to
lead to war, to ruins and to the extinction of civilisation. The other road
leads to peaceful coexistence and co-operation between all nations under
the dome of the United Nations. There is practically no limit to the
prosperity and the well-being that can be given to humanity if the leaders
of our world will agree to live in peace and understanding."
...The approach of India in this matter is, as the representative of Finland said
yesterday, that we do not claim to prescribe what is good for other countries.
We simply say that this is the kind of approach we like to make, and we hope
that if it were acceptable to the others it would lead to better relations. In
pursuance of this policy we have tried to establish, and in a very considerable
measure have succeeded in establishing, close friendships with countries of
entirely different persuasions. This applies not merely to visits of cultural
delegations, and things of that kind.
For instance, in our very considerable economic development, such countries

with divergent systems as the United States, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia
and Germany have all come to our assistance, and our relations are based upon
mutual respect.
During the visit of my Prime Minister to Moscow, when a joint statement was
made, the question obviously was discussed in regard to ideologies, and I think
there is no use disguising the fact that there has been apprehension - and to a
certain extent it prevails in the non-communist world - that there may still be the
practice of imposing ideologies upon friendly nations. So the original draft of
the so-called five principles was changed in Moscow in its article 3, which
reads:
"No interference in each other’s internal affairs for any reason of an

economic, political, or ideological character."
So that by adherence to these ideas we do not in any way abandon our principles
or our approach. We are not surprised, although we may sometimes be
distressed, at the degree of heat that is introduced into the controversy.
Soon after my Prime Minister returned from Moscow, Mr. Mohammed Ali, who
was then Prime Minister of Pakistan, said in an interview in Calcutta on June 24,
1955, that the addition of this third clause - that is, the one I read out just now -
was more comprehensive and was a great improvement on previous statements,
and he agreed with it. Thus, whether it be on the European continent, in great
parts of America or in Asia, there has been, irrespective of the differences that
exist, a desire to implement the purposes of the United Nations Charter in these
more concrete terms...
We think, at this stage of the Assembly, especially in view of the developments

that have taken place, that if we could all come together - not merely to cover a
crack in granite with a piece of tissue paper, but with some desire for a common
agreement of this character - that might assist to a small extent in the further
attempts towards the lowering of tensions or in finding ways out of other
unresolved problems.
Mr. Cabot Lodge89 said this morning that declarations are not enough; that tones
are not enough; that deeds are necessary. No one would challenge that
statement. But we think that even deeds are not adequate, because if a deed is to
be understood or done in the right way by the doer himself it requires a
correctness of approach, and therefore even an approach which is called a tone
has its value.
In the attempt we are now making we are not in any way questioning the doubts
and apprehensions that exist in the minds of various countries, but we think that
if the General Assembly were to approve the declaration unanimously it would
serve to rally the forces of world opinion and the minds of people to its main
purposes - not that the Charter is not adequate, but as a constant reminder...
The resolution that will be submitted, the proposals we are discussing, the
whole of this subject, is something which, so far as our people are
concerned, has entered deep into their hearts and minds, and the support
that the Assembly gives will be a great inspiration, particularly to the
people who have recently come into freedom - undeveloped economically,
89
Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Representative to the United Nations
having great faith in the United Nations, and looking forward to a world
which will not be rent by war. But, in spite of all their differences, and
there are many ways in which we ourselves fall by the way side in regard
to these principles - we do not try to conceal that fact - but it sets a line, a
direction, and for that reason we ask for unanimous support and we hope
we will get it.
FRANCO SPAIN
[Mr. Menon made this statement in explanation of the vote of the Indian
delegation in favour of resolution 39(I) on relations with Spain,
recommending that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from
membership in international agencies associated with the United Nations,
and that all members of the United Nations immediately recall their
ambassadors from Madrid.]
The delegation of India desires that the voice of India should be heard from this
rostrum in support of this very important resolution, in which this Assembly calls
upon member States to take initial action which will enable the peoples of Spain
to participate in this Assembly.
The Government of India would have been prepared to support a resolution which
went much farther than this one, but we are anxious to add the voice of our
country and of our people, and the support of the Government of India, to the
present resolution, which is likely, we hope, to attain a fair degree, a very
considerable degree, of agreement in its present form.
We have heard, in this debate and in the debate in the Committee, the word
"intervention" mentioned time after time. Some of us, many of us, have been
associated with the issue of Spain and the struggle of the people to establish a
government there and to resist fascist aggression. We are familiar with another
word, and that is "non-intervention." We know where non-intervention led us. It
resulted in Hitler and Mussolini being able to rehearse in Spain their war on the
continent and to bring havoc to the world a few years later. So, today, we are
adding our voice to proclaim our support for this first step, however limited,
which will enable the people of Spain to liberate themselves and join the
community of nations as a respected member of the family of nations.
For that reason, we are glad to support the resolution and also to proclaim that
this issue is not one which concerns only Latin America, or America as a
whole, or Europe, but the peoples of the entire world.
TIBET
[The Federation of Malaya and Ireland raised the question of Tibet in the
General Assembly in 1959, when the Dalai Lama addressed a communication to
the Secretary-General complaining of the violation of fundamental human rights
of the Tibetans. The two countries presented a draft resolution calling for respect
for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive
cultural and religious life. On October 21, 1959, the Assembly adopted the draft
as resolution 1353 (XIV).
Mr. Menon made the following speech stating the position of India and explaining
abstention on the resolution.]
...Our approach is not only coloured, it is conditioned, by our emotional

backgrounds and connections with the territory we now call Tibet. It emerges
into history, so far as we are concerned, only in very recent times, somewhere
about the seventh century of this era. Traditionally our connections with Tibet go
back to the emergence of the earliest strains of our civilisation, which were
supposed to emerge from Central Asia, from the shores of the Tibetan lakes. But
in more recent times, when, after the Buddha had given his gospel to India, or had
lived his life in India - about ten or twelve centuries afterwards - Buddhism went
into Tibet. At that time the Tibetans were not part of any other country - that was
over 1,200 years ago - and from that time onwards there have been religious,
cultural and other relations between Tibet and India.
Then we emerge into the second half of the thirteenth century, when the new
Tibet, as we may call it, takes its place in history, with its chequered progress and
with its many vicissitudes. In the thirteenth century the Mongols conquered
Tibet. So, whatever views we may hold about present governments or
administrations of people, whether of Tibet or China, we would be going against
history if we were to say that this was the first time that violence or war or
conquest had been the fate of this part of the world. In the thirteenth century the
Mongol conquerors established themselves as emperors of China, and they
conquered Tibet. Then came a series of other events and three or four centuries
afterwards the Dalai Lama of Tibet, who was originally and basically a religious
head, became the political head of Tibet.
In 1640, after overrunning Tibet, Gusri Khan appointed the fifth Dalai Lama as
the political head of Tibet. The effective suzerainty of China over Tibet was not
90
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
517-21
even then established, but by the eighteenth century China had obtained effective
suzerainty over this territory.
Then we pass on to the period of modern imperialism. In 1871, soon after the
Franco-Prussian War, the British were apprehensive of Russian designs in Central
Asia - this may sound as if we were talking about today - and then started
interesting themselves in Tibet. In the period 1873 to 1899 they sought various
concessions in Tibet, not by negotiating with the Tibetans, but by negotiating with
the Chinese Government. In 1904, after a military campaign, they forced the
Tibetans to accept some of the agreements they had previously negotiated with
the Chinese. We pass on from that period until we come to 1907, when the
Anglo-Russian Convention was signed concerning China’s suzerainty over Tibet.
This was largely negotiated at that time by the British authorities as a safeguard
against unilateral conduct by Czarist Russia. It was not replaced in the years that
followed. In this 1907 Convention Chinese suzerainty was reiterated. Then there
followed the conference of Simla in 1914 at which the parties who signed, or
rather initialled, these treaties, were Tibet and Great Britain, and that also shows
Tibet as being under the conditional suzerainty of China.
But for the purpose of this discussion my Government is not so much concerned
with the legal niceties or even the textual implications of the Charter as such.
Therefore, it is not our intention to raise the question of whether the subject may
or may not be discussed or whether it may be barred by the doctrine of domestic
jurisdiction. We ourselves would not raise that issue, even if we were taking a
more active part in this debate. We think the Assembly has a right to discuss this
if it so decides, but discussion does not mean intervention, and we have always
held that point of view. Therefore, while we did not participate in the voting on
the admission of this item, we have no desire to raise the question of domestic
jurisdiction for that reason.
In the document before us (A/4234), there is the explanatory memorandum

explaining the request for the introduction of this item by the Governments of
Malaya and Ireland, and there is a reference in it to an appeal from the Dalai
Lama to the Secretary-General of September 9, 1959.
THE DALAI LAMA’S APPEAL DEALS WITH TWO ASPECTS OF THE

PROBLEM. One is dealt with in the first series of points one to six: this deals
with political issues. It seeks to establish the Tibetans’ status and seeks
recognition of their sovereignty as a result of our discussion. The second series
deals with the second aspect of the situation, that is with present conditions, with
human rights and atrocities and things of that character. The memorandum
submitted by the two sponsors deals only with the second series of points.
Therefore, in what the Assembly is seized of now there are no political issues, and
therefore it is unnecessary for my Government to argue this question at all. So far
as human rights are concerned, we state without any reservations whatsoever that
we do not have any standards different from what we have advocated from this
platform and in a small measure have tried to practise in our political and other
relations.
Therefore, from the point of view of the consideration of these matters while we
did not support the inscription of this item, for reasons which I shall mention in a
moment, we do not want in any way to put forward legalistic objections and to try
to build up a procedural barrier.
Consideration of this problem must, first of all, have as its central theme the
interests of the Tibetan people and of the Dalai Lama himself. So far as we are
concerned, there have been troubles in Tibet not only in the old days but in recent
times also. That is to an extent a part of the great changes that are taking place in
the world. But we would ourselves have liked to have those changes take place
more peacefully, with less cruelty, perhaps with less upset. Also, we do not
subscribe to the view that these changes are merely the overthrow of certain
feudal lords or otherwise. If these upsets have to come, they should come, so far
as possible, with the least degree of violence. But, while we may wish that, we
have no right to impose non-violence with violence. That is to say, we cannot
argue non-interference with interfering. Therefore, all we can do is to express our
point of view and, without violence to our foreign policy and without violence to
our relations with other countries, unless there is justification for it, do what we
can within our own capacities.
India inherited the British position in Tibet in 1947 - that is to say, that Tibet was
under Chinese suzerainty. In 1954, we entered into an agreement which was not
an agreement in regard to the political status of Tibet as such, but was an
agreement relating primarily to trade matters. India has a degree of trade with
Tibet, and vice versa, and one of the trade routes was protected by our own escort
forces in difficult terrain, in earlier days.
When China established itself under this new Government, we regularised these
relations. We withdrew the so-called "Mission" from Lhasa and appointed a
Consul-General who is under the jurisdiction of our Ambassador in China. The
agreement we had with Tibet in 1954 is largely concerned with those trade
matters - the introduction establishes the relation between China and ourselves.
That is the position.
THERE HAVE BEEN TROUBLES BEFORE. The matter came up here in

1950, and then it was adjourned because it was thought that a peaceful
settlement would be brought about. Then, more recently, there have been
disturbances in Tibet, for instance the revolt of the Khampas. They themselves
are not all in Tibet proper; their revolt began in China proper. They are mostly
Chinese themselves. However, the Tibetan Khampas and other Tibetans
subsequently joined them, and a very considerable revolt appears to have taken
place.
As a result, the Dalai Lama himself and some 12,000 or 13,000 of his followers
came over to India. I think it would be right for us in this connection, when
considering the concern that parties and countries and peoples have in regard to
human rights and humanitarian affairs, to point out to the Assembly that, while
we are not a Buddhist country, we alone of all countries in the world had the
responsibility, which we willingly undertook, to give asylum to the Dalai Lama,
as we had the right but not the obligation to do, and also to receive some 12,000
or 13,000 refugees.
Therefore, no feeling that we are indifferent to what happens in our neighbouring

country or to the conditions that I have mentioned can ever be held in regard to us
in this connection. We still have those refugees in our land. And, although there
have been allegations in the past by the Chinese Government - not perhaps the
Chinese Government, but certainly by Chinese quarters - that India has promoted
these troubles, or that India has been a base for this, there has been no justification
whatsoever for that sort of statement or allegation.
On the other hand, the Dalai Lama is entirely free in India to do whatever he likes.
That is evident from the fact that this item has come up here. The Government of
India does not approve, does not support, the discussion of this item in the United
Nations. But, in spite of that, we have done nothing to prevent it. Our view has
been that it is within the rights of a political refugee, to whom we have given
asylum, to exercise his own freedom, within limits, in his own way, and we have
not interfered with that at all. At the same time, we have said that we hope and
expect that there will be no undue embarrassments.
The developments in Tibet have been discussed times without number in India,
and my Prime Minister has made the position of the Government very clear. He
has said:
"On the one side there was a dynamic, rapidly moving society; on the
other, a static unchanging society, fearful of what might be done to it in
the name of reforms. The distance between the two was great and there
appeared to be hardly any meeting point. Meanwhile, changes in some
forms inevitably came to Tibet... Though physical barriers were
progressively removed, mental and emotional barriers increased...
"When the news of these unhappy developments came to India, there was
immediately a strong and widespread reaction. The Government did not
bring about this reaction. Nor was this reaction essentially political. It
was largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian
reasons, and also on a certain feeling of kinship with the Tibetan people
deprived from long-established religious and cultural contacts. It was an
instinctive reaction."
Then he went to say, referring to the general criticism that had been made on the
Chinese side about our "interference":
"We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to

maintain the friendship between India and China but at the same time we
have every sympathy for the people of Tibet and we are greatly distressed
at their hapless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China in their
wisdom will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win
them to friendly co-operation..."
This was in the early part of the trouble. Then more and more refugees began to
come in. At the beginning of this problem, various countries - it is not my
business to mention their names - intimated to us that their attitude must depend,
to a certain extent, upon India’s reactions to this business. You will find in this
Assembly that India and a large number of Asian countries have not chosen to
take an active part in promoting and supporting any movement here. That is not,
as has been suggested, because of our fear of anybody or because we are too near
China and do not want to displease her. Of course, nobody wants to displease his
neighbours. But our action in this matter, our posture in this matter is dictated by
considerations which are not of a selfish character. We recognise equally that the
action taken by Ireland and Malaya is dictated by motives which they regard as
very worthy and valid, and we respect them. But we expect other people to
understand that, if we have taken the position in this matter that we have taken, it
is not because of extraneous considerations of pressure but because we think that
the welfare of the people concerned and their future depend to some extent upon
the restraint that can be exercised.
The Prime Minister of India has said:
"Now, where a society has existed for hundreds and hundreds of years, it
may have outlasted its utility, but the fact is that uprooting it is a terribly
painful process. It can be uprooted slowly, it can be changed even with
rapidity, but with a measure of co-operation. But any kind of a forcible
uprooting of that must necessarily be painful, whether it is a good society
or a bad society. When we have to deal with such societies anywhere in
the world, which as a social group may be called primitive, it is not an
easy matter to deal with it. All these difficult things are happening. They
should have happened; they would have happened may be a little more
slowly but with a greater measure of co-operation, because such a change
can only take place effectively and with least harm to the fabric, to those
people concerned, if it is done by themselves. They may be helped by
others, may be advised by others, but it must be done by themselves."
He goes on to say that this applies to us all. He continued:

"The moment a good thing is done by bad means that good thing becomes
a bad thing. It produces different reactions..."
As a result of this there are 12,000 refugees from Tibet who have crossed into
India through the North Eastern Frontier Agency, which is Indian territory, and
about 1,600 through Bhutan, through the Himalayan territory, and a few hundreds
through Sikkim. These refugees are being cared for. But I should like to say, in
order to put the international position correctly, that we have disarmed these
refugees on the border. And where there have been any instances of arms not
being surrendered we have not allowed these refugees to come into our country.
That is international law in regard to all political asylum, to which we have
adhered.
All this is done on the basis of broad policy. I should like to quote again the
Prime Minister.
"Our broad policy was governed by three factors: (1) preservation of the
security and integrity of India; (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations
with China; and (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. That
policy we shall continue to follow, because we think that a correct policy
not only for the present but even more so for the future. It would be a
tragedy if the two great countries of Asia, India and China, which have
been peaceful neighbours for ages past, should develop feelings of
hostility against each other. We for our part will follow this policy, but we
hope that China also will do likewise and that nothing will be said or done
which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries... maintaining
our dignity, maintaining our rights, maintaining our self-respect, and yet
not allowing ourselves to drift into wrong attitudes and hostile attitudes,
and trying to help in removing or in solving such problems as they arise,
we may help a little."
This is still our hope. That is one of the reasons we do not want accentuation of
feelings or strong language to be used either way because, after all, the end to be
sought must be some settlement. These problems cannot be solved quickly. The
thing one can do in the circumstances is to create an atmosphere which may bring
this about. This is our position.
Then the question arises as to whether the presence of the Dalai Lama and his
entourage in India does not create a difference in political relationships. I have
already indicated our position in this matter, and that we stand by the agreement
of 1954. In regard to the 17-Point Agreement, to which reference has been made
by many representatives in this Assembly, it is the view of the Government that
that Agreement still stands. It is quite true that some of its provisions have been
broken but that unfortunately will be found to be the case in regard to many
international treaties. If certain conditions are broken, either party or others
concerned take whatever action is necessary or possible in regard to them.
Some time ago, on June 30, 1959, a statement was issued which suggested that
some political changes were to be established, and then the Government of India
said:
"The Government of India wants to make it clear that they do not

recognise any separate government of Tibet, and there is therefore no
question of a Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in
India."
I have stated as far as I can both sides of this proposition.
THE MATTER COMES HERE EITHER AS A POLITICAL ISSUE or as a

humanitarian issue. We could argue the legalism of it, as I said, but we do not
intend to do it. My Prime Minister informed Parliament that this matter can come
up before the United Nations only for two reasons. He said:
"One is violation of human rights and the other aggression. Now,

violation of human rights applies to those who have accepted the Charter
of the United Nations, in other words, those members of the United
Nations who have accepted the Charter. Strictly speaking, you cannot
apply the Charter to people who have not accepted the Charter, who have
not been allowed to come into the United Nations."
"Secondly, if you talk about aggression, aggression by one sovereign

independent State on another... Tibet has not been acknowledged as an
independent State for a considerable time, even long before this happened
- much less after. Therefore, it is difficult to justify aggression."
Then, regarding the legal aspects, the Prime Minister went on to say:
"Then, I come to a certain practical aspect. And that is what good will be
achieved" by discussion or resolution in the United Nations. "Suppose we
get over the legal quibbles... It may lead to a debate in the General
Assembly or the Security Council, wherever it is taken up" - this was said
in September of this year - "a debate which will be an acrimonious debate,
an angry debate, a debate which will be after the fashion of cold war.
Having had the debate, what then will the promoters of that debate and
that motion do? Nothing more. They will return home. After having
brought matters to a higher temperature, fever heat, they will go home.
They have done their duty because they can do nothing else.
"Obviously, nobody is going to send an army to Tibet or China for that

was not done in other cases. It is fantastic to think they will move in that
way in Tibet. Obviously not. So, all that will happen is an expression of
strong opinion by some, other countries denying it and the matter being
raised to the level of cold war - brought into the domain of cold war - and
probably producing reactions on the Chinese Government which are more
adverse to Tibet and the Tibetan people than even now. So, the ultimate
result is no relief to the Tibetan people but something the reverse of it."
This is our position.
Just because a matter is a matter that contains features we do not like, we do not
therefore necessarily think this is either the forum or any remedy can be brought
about here. We have no evidence in regard to some of these matters, nor is it our
business to argue the contrary. All that we should like to say is what the Prime
Minister has said in some other place that so far as aggression and refugees are
concerned, these refugees came into India sometime in March or April 1959, and
they have not returned since. There may be some exaggerations, there would be
some exaggerations, it may be otherwise. We are not prepared to vouch for it
either way.
THE PROBLEM, AS WE SEE IT AT PRESENT, IS THIS. The Dalai Lama is a

very young man - I met him myself; he kindly came to see me before I came here.
He is highly respected by his own people, at least by a great part of his own
people. There is, as I have outlined, a great degree of emotional concern in this
matter in India, and one would hope that his future, the future of his refugee
people, still lies in their own homeland. We would not push them back, we would
not be inhospitable, we would not reverse the laws of political asylum in any way.
But we would never depart from the belief that reconciliation is possible.
In this we may allow ourselves to feel somewhat encouraged in the sense that the
Dalai Lama, in spite of all the violent language used in controversy either here or
in China, is still the Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Council. If the Chinese thought that there was an end to all of these
things, I personally would have believed that they would have brought a
termination to that position. Neither I as an individual nor the Government of
India can or do wish to hold out any prospects or hopes or anything of that kind in
this matter. The fact that the Dalai Lama is still a young person with a great deal
of vitality, that he is interested in the welfare of his own people who, apart from
these 12,000 are in the trans-Himalayan region in Tibet and, what is more, the
Chinese Government may not have yet gone the whole way - all this may give us
some hope that, with the expression of opinion in the world, with the passage of
time, some reconciliation would come about and that this sorry chapter of history
would then be forgotten, and would be a past chapter.
We think that, however acute the problem, the path of reconciliation is the
constructive path. It is for those reasons that we shall not contribute to tightening
this deadlock, we shall not add to this by being parties to any acrimonious
discussion here.
There have been many arguments about whether this is a cold war debate or
otherwise, about whether the motives were one thing or another. The issue is not
whether the Irish and Malayan delegations brought this subject up here in order to
promote the cold war. To our mind, the issue certainly is not whether they were
asked by someone else to do it. The issue is, what are the consequences? These
consequences are before us in the proceedings of the last two days and in the
proceedings before the General Committee. Much has been said which can
neither be established nor refuted. Many theories have been brought forward.
Out of twenty-five speakers, I think that twelve or more different views have been
expressed on these matters. It has not thus led either to a clarification of the
position under the Charter or to the establishment of a solution to this problem.
In this problem our primary concern must be the Tibetan people, who have not
figured very much in these debates, and we therefore do not find ourselves in a
position to support the draft resolution that is before us, either as it stands as a
whole or any part of it... We have examined the draft resolution very carefully,
and we therefore take the only position we can take, that, in the interests of
reconciliation in the future, because it does not promote any constructive step at
all, the draft resolution cannot have our support. We do not see a basis for it in
the sense that if it is a question of human rights we must deal with people here
who have subscribed to the Declaration91 because the Declaration definitely states
that it is the States Parties whom it binds. Therefore, I have to state that this draft
resolution cannot have our support. We will abstain on each paragraph if it is put
to the vote in parts, and on the draft resolution as a whole.
Our abstention, however, will be in no sense - I repeat, in no sense - a lack of

concern or a lack of feeling in regard to the Tibetan people or any reflection upon
our relations with China. It merely arises from the posture and policy which I
have placed before the Assembly...
In spite of all that has happened in Tibet, in spite of all that has happened in the
corridors of this Assembly and in the debating from either side, in spite of the
type of language sometimes used and the approaches, wrong or otherwise
prejudicial to a solution, it is the hope of my people and my Government that the
plight of the Tibetan people will be resolved by the process of reconciliation and
that the incidents of the recent past will become part of past history. At the
present moment, with the other incidents that have taken place on the Indian
border, it is not possible for me to say whether this may be either proximate or
immediate, but any warming up of these issues or any exacerbation of them
cannot lead in any way to reconciliation. But at no time have we lost faith in that
sort of thing because, as I have said, outside the 12,000 people who are in India,
91
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on December 10, 1948
the vast bulk of the Tibetan people are still on Tibetan land. They live there and
they have their being there. I hope that the young Dalai Lama who has been their
leader, in whom a large number of the Tibetan people place a great faith and who
has attracted a great deal of sympathy from various parts of the world, will be able
to place his talents and services at the disposal of his people and return to them in
dignity and in peace. If any country, be it mine or anyone else’s, or if the
President, can do anything in order to minister to that reconciliation, that would
be our role as part of the United Nations.
PART III
OTHER MATTERS
A. ATOMIC ENERGY
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN DEVELOPING THE PEACEFUL

USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
[In December 1953, President Eisenhower of the United States, in an address to

the General Assembly, proposed the setting up of an international agency in order
to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy. After consultations with Australia,
Belgium, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom, the United States
requested in 1954 that the General Assembly include in its agenda an item
entitled "International co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic
energy."
On December 4, 1954, the Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution expressing

the hope that the agency would soon be established, and requesting the Secretary-
General to organise an international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic
energy.
The International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held
in Geneva from 8 to 20 August 1955, with Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, Chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission of India, as President.
During discussion at the tenth session of the General Assembly in 1955, several
resolutions were proposed on the convening of further international conferences
and on the establishment of the proposed agency. India participated actively in
the discussions and, along with other States, submitted two resolutions. After
discussion, the Assembly unanimously adopted, on December 3, 1955, resolution
912(X) covering both matters. It decided inter alia that all States members of the
United Nations and its specialised agencies would be invited to the conference to
adopt the statue of the International Atomic Energy Agency.]
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 17,

1954
(Summary)
Mr. Menon (India) stated that the reaction of his delegation to the plan presented
by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953, had been made known very soon
after that speech had been delivered. Subsequently, on May 10, 1954, the Prime
Minister of India, speaking in the Indian Parliament, had welcomed President
Eisenhower's approach to the question...
The problem of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was of great importance, and it
would create great changes in the economic and also, perhaps, political relations
of the world. It was therefore absolutely necessary that it should be considered
with objectivity and without emotion. The lack of emotion on the part of the
Indian delegation should not be construed as a lack of enthusiasm for the
proposal. While welcoming the proposal, the Prime Minister of India had already
stated that the use of atomic energy was far more important for a country like
India than it might be for other advanced countries.
The pattern of the current debate was that each delegation stated its position, its
achievements, its resources and its desire to join in the effort to evolve a scheme
for the peaceful utilisation of atomic energy. With regard to the joint draft
resolution, there was a general willingness to accept the intentions of the sponsors
and to wait to see how the details outlined in the draft resolution would be
presented in the course of the debate.
Mr. Menon stated that in India there was fortunately no resistance of a mental or
institutional character to scientific research. The notion that there was no
difference between mass and energy which, from the point of view of actual
reaction and approach, was perhaps revolutionary to the Western world, was not
so to the Oriental mind. A child in India would speak of matter and energy as the
same. Therefore the educated strata of his country were almost predisposed to
adopt that approach. Moreover, the tradition of scientific investigation in India
went back thousands of years. There had been a continuous spirit of scientific
inquiry, the origin of which was lost in the remoteness of time. The system of
writing numbers had been known to Indian civilisation many thousands of years
before.
Mr. Menon enumerated the main contributions of ancient Indian scientists in the
field of mathematics. The Indian mathematicians had also been the first to use the
letters of the alphabet to denote unknowns, which had contributed to the advance
of algebra. Mr. Menon then reviewed the contributions made by Indian scientists
in the realm of physics. He added that translations and interpretations of ancient
Indian writings in Sanskrit showed that the Indian scientists in those times had
been familiar with the concept of motion, both atomic and molecular, as
underlying the physical phenomena of sound, light and heat.
Mr. Menon then traced the progress of Indian scientific thought until the time that
India came into contact with the industrial civilisation of the West. In 1784, the
Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal had been established, which had started a
resurgence, and modern scientific methods had received an impetus in India. As a
result of that, a number of scientific institutions had been established and
considerable advance had been made in scientific research in various fields.
The emergence of an independent India in 1947 had given further impetus to the
establishment of new institutions for carrying on research in the various fields of
science. The two most important of India's institutions were the Indian Institute
of Science at Bangalore and the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research at
Bombay. The Institute at Bangalore was associated with the name of Sir
Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman, the discoverer of what was known as the Raman
ray and the Raman effect. The revolutionary discovery in 1928 of the Raman
lines had been of the greatest importance for molecular research. Beside Raman,
other Indian scientists, prominent among whom were Dr. Saha, Dr. Kothari, Dr.
Bose, Sir Kariamanikkam Srinivasa Krishnan, and Dr. Bhabha, had also made
important contributions to scientific research in the atomic field.
In 1948, the Indian Parliament had passed the Atomic Energy Act for the
development and control of atomic energy. As a result of the passage of that Act,
an Atomic Energy Commission had been established in August 1948 under the
chairmanship of Dr. Bhabha. The Commission was directly responsible to the
Prime Minister of India. The functions of the Commission included the
promotion and control of research in nuclear sciences and the survey and
development of the mineral and other resources of the country which might be of
use in the production of atomic energy. The research programme of the
Commission was being carried out at the Tata Institute and several other
institutions. Mr. Menon then quoted from a book by Mr. Gordon Dean,92 former
Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in which it was stated
that, among the nations in Asia, India had the largest and most advanced atomic
energy programme, that India had made considerable progress in recent years in
cosmic ray research, that it had the world's richest deposits of monazite, which
contained thorium, and that, under the leadership of some very able scientists,
India was making a determined effort to keep itself informed about nuclear
research developments all over the world.
The Indian Government was fully aware that no great advance could be made in
the field of atomic research by having only a few well-known scientists, and it
had therefore established a number of well-provided and well-staffed laboratories
where research could be carried on by younger scientists. Similarly, most of the
Indian universities were receiving grants from the Government or from public
institutions for the encouragement of nuclear research. As a result, there were
today in Indian universities 96,000 students being trained in scientific study and
research and 116,000 in technical projects.
Describing India's atomic energy resources, Mr. Menon stated that very big
deposits of low-grade uranium ore had already been found in various parts of the
country. In addition, there were monazite reserves estimated at over one million
tons, containing over 0.3 per cent uranium. Uranium-bearing belts had also been
discovered in eastern and central India. To stimulate the mining of uranium by
private concerns, the Atomic Energy Commission had offered to buy all stocks of
uranium ore. As a further incentive, rewards were offered for the discovery of
92
Dean, Gordon, Report on the atom; what you should know about the atomic energy program of
the United States, Knopf, New York, 1953.
new deposits, and grants-in-aid were given for mine development. The
government geologists also gave advice to private prospectors and samples of ore
brought by them were analysed free of charge. The Indian Rare Earths Ltd. was
also exploiting other material resources in that field. The Raw Material Division
of the Atomic Energy Commission was also carrying out extensive survey and
drilling operations for atomic minerals.
A plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons of monazite per annum had been set up in
1952 in southern India and another plant to process thorium and uranium to
commercial purity was also in an advanced stage of construction and would be in
operation in 1955.
The Indian Atomic Energy Commission laid great stress on the application of its
work to the population as a whole and to the development of applied science. It
had added a biological and medical research department, which was working in
close co-operation with the Indian Cancer Research Centre. The application of
atomic energy to agriculture was also in progress.
India had made considerable progress in cosmic ray research, for which its
geographical position was particularly favourable. A major development in that
field had been the establishment of a laboratory at Gulmarg, in Kashmir, 9000
feet above sea level; other research centres existed in different parts of the
country. Cosmic ray research in India had received further impetus with the
launching of a joint Indian-American programme of research, in October 1952, on
the nature and behaviour of cosmic rays in the thin air region nearly twenty miles
above the earth. The programme was sponsored by two American institutions, the
National Geographic Society and the Franklin Institute, and by the Aligarh
University of India.
Turning to the plan initiated by President Eisenhower, Mr. Menon stated that his
Government saw no reason why the development of the industrial uses of atomic
energy should not take place irrespective of the question of banning atomic
weapons. The banning of atomic weapons was an absolute necessity in itself, but
should not be confused with the other question.
Mr. Menon wished to deal next with the question of the relationship of raw
materials to industrial expansion in the modern world. He drew attention to the
fact that certain countries, like his own, possessed vast resources of raw materials,
and emphasised that those countries must not be placed in the position where they
supplied their raw materials to the industrially advanced countries, receiving in
return processed material, and even complete atomic reactors. The United
Nations should not, directly or indirectly, find itself in a situation of assisting
colonial exploitation. It must therefore be emphasised that any country which
contributed raw materials to the international pool must have the right
progressively to contribute those materials in a more processed and finished form,
and that no impediment should be put in the way of its technical and industrial
development.
On behalf of his Government, Mr. Menon declared that India had no objection to
supplying considerable quantities of uranium- or thorium-containing substances,
provided it was clearly understood that India would deliver such supplies, with
the passage of time, in a more and more finished form. The ultimate criterion
should be self-sufficiency; that criterion should be accepted as a basic principle,
although it did not in any way preclude exchange or co-operation with other
countries. The Indian delegation only wanted to make sure that in the atomic age
there should not be a repetition of the former relationship between the
manufacturing country and the country which produced raw material, the latter
remaining permanently a supplier of raw material, and no more.
Mr. Menon then declared that his country must have some assurance that the
material it supplied would not even indirectly be used for manufacturing atomic
weapons; as for the question of the direct use of such material for such purposes,
that would be covered by bilateral agreements.
Referring to the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.105),93 Mr. Menon stated that he
had the assurances of its sponsors that it was not their desire to exclude any part
of the world. As far as his country was concerned, it was in a position to make a
proper contribution to the present task from the beginning. Mr. Menon wished to
point out that India possessed natural, scientific, technical and financial resources
to develop atomic energy on its own, without any assistance from any foreign
country; at the same time, its programme would, of course, be expedited through
co-operation with other nations...
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 25, 1955
(Summary)
Mr. Menon (India) emphasised that his delegation had entered the debate with the
desire that the Committee and the Assembly should reach a unanimous decision.
That was still the fervent hope of his delegation...
Twenty-two months had been devoted to what might be called "preliminary

talks." Since the conclusion of the debate at the previous session, when the
Committee had agreed that the negotiations concerning the establishment of an
International Atomic Energy Agency should proceed, and that suggestions
thereon should be extended to the United States Government, India had sent out
some communications in order to obtain all the information possible. Subsequent
to the Indian communication of August 8, 1955, to the Secretary-General, a draft
93
The joint draft resolution was proposed by Australia, Belgium, Canada, South Africa, United
Kingdom and the United States.
statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency had been circulated.
Although in the last ten years progress in atomic development had been made,
particularly in destructive fields, nations and scientists had not forgotten its more
useful value. Besides technical advance, there had also been some progress in the
understanding of the relation between technical discoveries and social conditions.
However, no one should think that debate on the problem of the peaceful uses of
atomic energy, or the establishment of the Agency, or even the large-scale
development of such peaceful uses, constituted in themselves a solution to the
problem of preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes. The two
problems were separate, though related, and where they related, their relation was
of a rather ominous character. Although he had no desire to trespass on the field
of disarmament at the present stage, he wanted to mention that fact because he
thought it would be a great mistake to be guided by the escapist belief that
building on one side solved the problem of destruction on the other.
He stressed that, following the pattern set by previous speakers, he would

consider the item under three separate headings and deal first with the general
question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, then with the question of holding
scientific conferences, and thereafter with the question of establishing an
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Turning to the first of those questions, he emphasised that his Government did not
look upon the question of the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
fundamentally and primarily as a technical problem. It was necessary to bear in
mind that the problem had vast social and economic significance. His
delegation's approach was based on the view that the world was at the dawn of a
new era where social values, industrial techniques and social purposes faced a
great revolution. India recognised that any approach made to the problem could
not be confined within national frontiers. That was true not only in the field of
destruction, where the possession of destructive atomic weapons was of
consequence to people who were far removed from them - indeed, it was probably
more ominously of concern to those who were far away from them.
The search for energy derived from the atom had been brought to the fore by two
factors. First of all, in order to raise the standard of living, it was necessary to
consume more energy. It had been stated by the President of the International
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy94 that, at the present rate of
consumption, the available sources of energy would be used up in less than a
century. Secondly, the fact was that the people of the world had to learn from the
occurrence of a calamity the ways to turn that calamity to useful purposes. Since
the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the events that followed, an
urge had been created to find more and more methods of exploiting and
harnessing atomic energy. He wished in that connection to stress that India's
position in favour of the total prohibition of the use of atomic and other weapons
94
Dr. Homi J. Bhabha
of mass destruction remained unchanged.
In connection with the problems of the new era, it was useful to recall a few facts
in connection with the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century. Mr. Menon
mentioned in that respect the production of machine tools by the Western
centuries, such as the United Kingdom; the division of the world into two camps -
those who produced consumer goods and those who provided raw materials and a
market for those goods; changes in agriculture; the institution of forced labour and
slavery; and the discovery of new land and the sharing of the unexplored parts of
the world among the great Powers, who were the pioneers in the industrial
revolution. Those were historical facts which had a strong bearing on the attitude
that countries like India took in the approach to the present problem. Those
experiences should be remembered in order that humanity might be saved from
the consequences of the atomic revolution in so far as its evil aspects were
concerned, and might turn that revolution to more useful purposes.
In any arrangements made for the future, there must be, first of all, equity
between nation and nation as well as between the social groups inside each
country. It was necessary for the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency
to place emphasis on the protection of those who worked with atomic energy, in
view of the grave consequences involved and the ominous burden they undertook.
Turning to the development of atomic resources in India, Mr. Menon stressed that
his Government's pursuit of knowledge about atomic energy would be restricted
to its peaceful uses. In a short survey he described the political, administrative
and scientific establishments in the atomic field in India, and gave details
regarding the resources of atomic raw material, their extraction and processing,
the training of scientists, the creation of scientific laboratories, and the reactor
programme in which India was being assisted by Canada and the United States
which provided it, respectively, with an NRX reactor and heavy water. India also
co-operated in that field with Norway, Sweden and certain other countries. His
country was thus making its contribution to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It
was the policy of his Government that the facilities available in India should be
open to those other States which were willing and able to make use of them.
Speaking on the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,

held at Geneva, he stated that his Government wished to express its appreciation
for the services rendered by the Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee, and
the Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General of the Conference, as
well as the members of the Secretariat, all of whom had contributed to its success.
His country had been happy to provide the services of Mr. Bhabha as President of
the Conference. Mr. Menon also recalled the contribution made to the
Conference in various fields by young Indian scientists. Apart from all its
material achievements and the exchange of knowledge which had taken place, the
Conference had not only been a great exercise in international co-operation, but
had also furthered the great idea of an open world. In lifting the veil of secrecy
from atomic research, a new channel of international co-operation had been
opened. Another great achievement of the Conference had been the momentum it
had itself generated for the continuation of its work. The Conference had also
been characterised by a spirit of recognition and generosity; if some of that spirit
could be brought into the field of political discussion, considerable progress
would be made. Finally, another great achievement of the Conference had been
to make potent the desire for the establishment of the Agency, which his
Government supported with enthusiasm.
With regard to the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, he did
not wish to go into detail at the present stage. His Government had
communicated its views in that respect to the United States Government... the
draft resolution submitted by India and five other Governments contained some
ideas that were basic, but that did not mean that they were incompatible with
other basic ideas...
In going through a great revolution, India and countries like it did not wish to find
themselves merely hewers of wood and drawers of water. India would not be in
favour of an economy in which there were "haves" and "have-nots," which was
the foundation of international conflict and war. His country would not be a party
to any organisation that, either by implication or by its economic consequences,
would confine large areas of the world which were the producers of raw materials
and were at present backward in their economic development, to that scale of the
economic ladder. India was in favour of a scheme of international co-operation.
So long as there were under-developed countries that could not keep pace with
other countries, as their standards of living were lower, they became the weak link
in the chain of international progress.
Mr. Menon recalled the statement made by the representative of the United
Kingdom at the 758th meeting of the Committee to the effect that the United
Kingdom had, for many years, as a matter of international co-operation provided
international services in banking, insurance, and shipping, but that it was now
moving towards a new era of international atomic co-operation. Mr. Menon said
that his country favoured international co-operation in atomic matters, but that
India and countries like it were not moving into a period in which a monopoly on
shipping, banking, insurance, or atomic energy was going to be held by any
country. It was his delegation's desire to see that the circumstances which came
in the wake of the industrial revolution and some of the unhappy conditions which
followed were not repeated. That was why his delegation, in putting forward its
proposals, wished to give some guidance to the General Assembly as to the nature
of the relations which should exist between the United Nations and the Agency.
The United Nations should see that the preparatory work in that connection was
spread out in such a way that, even at the formative stage, the contributions of
different parts of the world would come into the Agency. India would like to see
the International Atomic Energy Agency established in such a way that no
country could be excluded. Mr. Menon said that what he was asking for was an
"open forum." India did not look upon compromise as a sign of weakness; at the
same time, however, it had no desire to seek unanimity when it did not mean
consensus of minds.
In conclusion, he pledged that his delegation and Government would endeavour to

assist in reaching unanimous agreement on a draft resolution which would enable
the world conference to meet and discuss a draft statute which would command
wide acceptance in the world. That conference should be a deliberative assembly.
He had no doubt that in a few days it could be announced to the world that the
nations, in spite of their differences, were prepared to venture on that great
experiment in a spirit of harmony and, if not necessarily in agreement in every
detail, with a commonness of objective in order that humanity might be the better
served.
EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION
Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 31, 1955
[In 1955, the United States proposed, for the agenda of the General Assembly, an
item entitled "Co-ordination of information relating to the effects of radiation
upon human health and safety." India proposed an item entitled "Dissemination
of information on the effects of atomic radiation and on the effects of
experimental explosions of thermonuclear bombs." The two items were
considered together.]
(Summary)
Mr. Menon (India) stated that his delegation had insisted on raising the question
of the effects of atomic radiation in its entirety, and not solely the effects of such
radiation on human beings, first, because that specific aspect of the question was
little known and, secondly, because man was conditioned by his environment.
The question of the co-ordination of information had been dealt with at the 773rd
meeting by the United States representative; in recent months, there had been
consultation between the two delegations which gave cause to hope that they
might be able, jointly, to present certain conclusions.
For its part, India considered it essential to approach the problem from the point
of view that the difference between the atomic age and the age which had
preceded it was as great as the difference between the latter age and pastoral
civilisations. India's concern in the matter was not new; on April 2, 1954, the
Prime Minister of India had asked that full publicity should be given to the known
or probable effects of atomic radiation, and had stressed the risks incurred by
those who sailed what had once been the open ocean. Then, on April 8, the
Indian Government had communicated to the Secretary-General certain proposals
for circulation to the Disarmament Commission. Finally, in July, the Indian
delegation had raised the matter again in the Trusteeship Council and had
emphasised the serious consequences of certain explosions and their effects, at a
distance of more than 175 miles, on 28 Americans and 236 inhabitants of the
Marshall Islands.
In his statement at the 700th meeting, he recalled, he had referred to a statement

by Dr. Adrian on the possible effects of atomic radiation.
At the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, the Prime Minister of India had

suggested the establishment of a chain of stations to keep a continuous watch on
radio-activity, and the Conference had endorsed that proposal.
Thus, India was approaching the problem not from the point of view of partisan
agitation, but from the point of view of making constructive contributions. It had,
for example, declared its readiness to place at the disposal of the international
community the facilities for observation which it possessed and which were by no
means negligible. The basic consideration, in that matter, was not to recognise
any political or social barrier, and even, if it proved feasible, to go so far as to
observe other planets.
Mr. Menon paid a tribute to the positions taken by Lord Russell and the late
Professor Einstein, who had called for measures to evaluate the intensity of
atomic radiation, and to the efforts made in the United States, particularly by the
National Academy of Sciences and the Federation of American Scientists. The
Federation had expressed the hope that the United Nations might participate by
setting up a monitoring service.
Scientific opinion on the problem was divided: while some felt that the effects of
atomic radiation, although harmful, could be tolerated, others considered that
beyond a certain limit there would be serious consequences.
It would be a great mistake to believe that the Indian delegation was concerned
only with the effects of nuclear explosions; the peaceful use of atomic energy also
created problems, and, while it was not being suggested, for example, that radio-
active isotopes should no longer be used, the consequences of their use in
medicine or agriculture should be investigated. Besides, the problem was not new
if the difficulties caused by X-ray therapy were considered.
The basic problem was to determine whether the effects of atomic radiation could
be inherited; if so, the whole human race would be affected. Consequently,
contamination from radiation should be prevented in the same way as steps had
been taken the world over to pasteurise milk. Already, an American scientist had
mentioned the possibility that radiation might be a cause of cancer.
In other words, all that had to be established for the present was a prima facie
case to show that radiation might have far-reaching consequences. In the days of
the industrial revolution, workers had had to be protected against certain
occupational diseases. Similarly, with the use of radio-active elements, measures
should be taken, not to halt progress, but to make provision against harmful
consequences resulting, not only from bombs, but from the medical, agricultural
or industrial use of atomic energy. It was no secret that, at the time certain
explosions had taken place, scientists themselves had admitted that they had
miscalculated the consequences. Finally, the world was in the grip of a psychosis
which caused people to believe that the mildest storm was an effect of nuclear
explosions, and that uneasiness, based as it was on ignorance, also produced
undesirable effects which should be dispelled.
The problem of atomic wastes should also be studied by any organisation to be set
up by the United Nations. Like oil wastes and smoke, atomic wastes presented
problems which should not be underestimated, as had been done in the past when
there were only a very few factory smokestacks. The proposal to create "atomic
graveyards," where wastes collected in containers would be buried, might be
acceptable in a world which had renounced war, but might prove dangerous if the
burial-grounds were ever subjected to aerial attack. As to the suggestion that the
wastes should be emptied into the ocean, it should be borne in mind that a
considerable proportion of the world's inhabitants made their living from the seas
and were entitled to expect respect for the freedom of the seas which, as the Prime
Minister of India had said, had already been imperilled by atomic experiments.
If radio-activity were communicable to another generation, there was a danger of

a chain reaction being set up. The United States representative had, it was true,
pointed out that there was already radio-activity in the human system. But there
was a limit to everything. Man was already subjected to atmospheric pressure, for
instance, but that did not mean that the pressure could be increased with impunity.
Estimates of the level at which radio-activity could influence heredity might,

understandably, differ. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that explosions
brought in their wake not only radio-active matter, but substances surface-covered
by radio-active matter. And such radio-active elements circled the earth
threatening all countries indiscriminately. Some believed that exploding the
bombs under the sea would solve the problem; but in that case the sea might also
become radio-active.
Quoting the remarks made at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy by Mr. Hermann Mueller, of the University of Indiana, on the
question of chromosome aberrations and, the more important point, mutations, he
said, with reference to the effects of the dropping of the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, that it was not merely persons actually exposed to the radiation, but
their children's children who might show induced mutations as a result. In any
case, from the standpoint, not merely of nuclear explosions, but also of the
peaceful uses of atomic energy, the question was quite as worthy of study as, say,
the problem of deforestation in India. If it were ignored, the benefits of atomic
energy would be outweighed by its disastrous genetic repercussions.
There was, admittedly, a more or less official school of thought in the United
States and the United Kingdom which held that what was now being done was not
harmful - and he, for one, was far from wishing to imply that such scientists were
influenced by political considerations. Sir John Cockcroft, for example, while not
minimising the problem, had stated before the United Kingdom Parliament that
the present effects of nuclear explosions were negligible. Other, equally
reputable, scientists, however, considered the atomic radiation to be ten times
more intense. Sir John Cockcroft, in any case, acknowledged the need for long-
term genetic studies in that connection. Finally, common sense suggested that
peoples living in flimsy houses, as in India for instance, would be more exposed
to radiation than others. According to the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, nuclear weapons tests had made the waters of the Pacific north of
the Equator ten times as radio-active as before.
In one United States publication it had been stated that, if atomic radiation
continued to increase, about a third of the children born in the United States alone
each year would carry undesirable characteristics. Radiation could not, therefore,
be alleged to constitute no danger to the individual and the species. The radiation
increase due to the present tests was capable of producing one deleterious
mutation per 50,000 conceptions, or about 78 mutated germ cells a year among
children born in the United States.
Mr. Libby, of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, had stated that the
maximum tolerance exposure for workers in the Commission's plants was 15,000
times as great as the radiation to which the rest of the population was normally
exposed, and that such concentrated radiation on a selected group would not have
any immediate repercussion. Even if that were so, the fact remained that a
problem would arise, not immediately, but in the long run.
There was, hence, every justification for bringing the problem before the
Committee. The Indian delegation had, therefore, proposed placing on the
Assembly's agenda the question of dissemination of information on the effects of
atomic radiation and on the effects of experimental explosions of thermonuclear
bombs... It was stated in the explanatory memorandum submitted by India
(A/2949/Add. 1) that the use of radio-active materials had presented to the world
a powerful new tool but that the use of those materials was attended by serious
hazards to the persons working with them. It was, therefore, essential that the
data about the biological and other effects of radiation should be studied with
scientific objectivity and thoroughness.
There was a divergence of opinion among scientists on the long-term
consequences of detonating nuclear and thermo-nuclear bombs for experimental
purposes, in particular in regard to the possible genetic effects. It was accordingly
essential to set up immediately an international unit which would collect and co-
ordinate data on the immediate and long-term consequences of atomic radiation,
as well as on the known effects of experimental explosions of hydrogen or atomic
bombs, and bring that information to the knowledge of the world.
In a word, there was a prima facie case for inquiry. For the moment it was a
question not of creating a doctrine or bolstering up a particular thesis, but simply
of seeking the truth and making it known. Whatever procedure were adopted, the
main task was to set up a body which would enable the Secretary-General to fulfil
his mission.
The evaluation of data and the conclusions must be objective and international in
character, even though the material might come from national or even private
sources. The conclusions should, furthermore, be brought to the attention of
public opinion through the medium of the General Assembly. Finally, the
principle of universality must be strictly observed in applying the conclusions.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Statement in the Second Committee of the General Assembly, November 6,

195995
(Summary)
Mr. Menon (India) said that he might depart somewhat from the agenda item -
the economic development of under-developed countries - but would endeavour
to consider it in the context of the international political situation. The present
tendency towards a relaxation of tension associated with the efforts to deal with
the basic issues of disarmament would have social and economic, as well as
political consequences.
Discussion had long centred on the economic causes and consequences of war,
but now the basic challenge confronting mankind appeared to be the balanced
expansion of the world economy. It involved not only balanced economic growth
within nations, difficult to achieve as that aim was in itself, but, even more,
balanced economic growth among nations, and would thus affect the relations
among all nations. It would therefore be a mistake to suppose that the main
problem was the economic development of under-developed countries, for the
world did not consist only of under-developed countries, and the latter could not
transform their economies solely by means of the help or charity of other
countries. Even when the under-developed countries succeeded in becoming
consumers of many manufactured goods produced by other countries, their
economic situation would still remain much the same and the same problems
would confront them with equal urgency. Consequently all countries, developed
and undeveloped alike, must deal with the world problem of balanced economic
expansion.
Fortunately it appeared that elemental forces or perhaps destiny were now urging
mankind towards closer co-operation, as the Prime Minister of India had pointed
out. The time was past when each country could attempt to fend for itself in the
economic field, when countries had been free to destroy goods in order to
maintain price levels or to prevent other countries from producing certain goods.
The spread of democracy, in other words the influence of the people and of public
opinion in every country, made it impossible for Governments to resort to such
methods. The policy of every country, whatever its economic and social system,
must now be based not on considerations of national power, but on due regard for
general prosperity and plenty.
Recent statements of world leaders had shown that they had understood that
requirement. Mr. Eisenhower had said that peoples of the world were no longer
95
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Second Committee,
pages 171-72
prepared to resign themselves to poverty, disease and oppression, that the problem
of the under-developed countries was more important to Western civilisation than
the problem of the conflict between the West and the Communist world, and that
all the more developed countries should work together in helping the less
fortunate nations. Mr. Khrushchev, for his part, had proposed a programme of
general and complete disarmament that would make it possible to devote
enormous sums of money to constructive activities and to aid for the under-
developed countries; he had stated that even a small part of the funds that the
great Powers spent on arms would make it possible to begin to change the face of
Asia, Africa and Latin America.
There was a paradoxical situation in the present world; although in one sense it
was shrinking in another it might be said to be expanding, since millions of men
who had been mere chattels were now growing into a full awareness of life and
the discovery of new resources and technological progress were enlarging the
frontiers of the world. Mankind's paramount task was now to plan for plenty,
in order to meet the needs and aspirations of the world population of 5,600
million that would be reached by the end of the century.
THE WORLD POPULATION HAD STEADILY INCREASED ever since the

beginning of the Christian era, as a result of the change in the means of
production and in patterns of trade, and neither birth control nor any other method
would halt the population expansion now taking place, which was not confined to
the under-developed countries. Far from taking a pessimistic view and believing
that man had reached the limit of what could be done to increase food production,
he considered that the advances of science and modern technology would make it
possible to prevent any food shortage. Even at the present time mankind was
producing more than it would consume. Two-thirds of the food produced was
eaten by the animal population; that included creatures that were harmful or
useless, but they could be wiped out only by international planning, as had been
demonstrated in the case of locust control. Furthermore, some countries obtained
a higher yield per acre, because they had reached a more advanced stage of
technological development.
As a result of the spread of scientific knowledge and modern techniques, mankind

would soon be able to change methods of cultivation everywhere, to make more
use of fertilisers and even of isotopes to fertilise land that was now unproductive,
to undertake the essential task of reforestation, perhaps one day to irrigate deserts,
and remove the salts from sea water, thus providing additional water resources. A
combination of technological and meteorological knowledge would make it
possible to control the weather, and to obtain beneficial rainfall when and where
required, always provided that planning was done at the international level.
From the time when man discovered that energy and matter were one, and that
every gramme of matter contained 25 million kilowatt-hours of energy, there was
no further possibility of any shortage of power, and consequently of any shortage
of food or other supplies, since once mankind had learned how to tap the energy
that lay hidden in matter, he would have access to infinitely greater world
resources than at present. Formerly States had attempted to deal with population
expansion by extending their living space through immigration and conquest; now
what was needed was more power, instead of more space. Nuclear fusion would
soon make it possible to use resources hitherto lying idle, such as the tar oil buried
deep in the soil of Canada that required underground explosions for its
exploitation. The energy in the heart of volcanoes, and in the sea, the wind and
the sun, could all the harnessed in the service of mankind. In view of all those
potentialities, it became evident that the most valuable and sorely needed of
resources was a supply of technicians; the training of technicians was the most
urgent need of the present age and one of the conditions of mankind's survival.
Consequently the advancement of technical studies should also be the subject of
serious planning throughout the world.
It was clear, however, that mankind would be unable to use all those sources of
power or to exploit all the earth's resources if the present disputes and imbalances
continued. The most serious imbalance appeared to be that resulting from the
enormous disparity between levels of living in the more advanced and the under-
developed countries. Mr. Black, the President of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, had said that the resulting tension might
become serious enough to overshadow the problem of the cold war. He had said
that the time had gone when money could be the sinews of diplomacy and the
means of winning friends and allies... The development of the under-developed
countries was an objective of vital importance in itself, and it was worth while
making unceasing efforts to achieve it regardless of the ups and downs of the
world political situation or the fluctuations of international trade.
Economic aid and trade alone would not suffice to solve the problems of the
under-developed countries and enable them to raise their levels of living; they
must also be able to industrialise. For example, it was desirable in order to meet
the needs of mankind that all countries should produce as much steel, in
proportion, as the United States of America. But it was obvious that it would be
necessary to plan the world economy so as to prevent any conflict, between the
more advanced countries and the currently less developed countries which would
eventually become industrialised, over the raw materials that all would need.
Increasing industrialisation throughout the world and automation would create
further problems, in regard, for example, to full employment and the use of
leisure, and steps should be taken now to find solutions.
But in order to ensure peace, on which the progress of mankind depended, it was
also necessary to make an immediate attack on all the causes of instability and
tension, to improve the terms of trade of the under-developed countries, to
eliminate the barriers to the international exchange of goods and ideas, to produce
with a view to general prosperity rather than in terms of existing patterns of
production and to strive to increase per caput incomes in the poorest countries.
In practice all those problems would have to be tackled one by one.
In the meantime... he proposed that the Second Committee should undertake a

study to determine how the world's resources could be utilised to free mankind
from want. Wisdom demanded that mankind should endeavour to plan for future
generations. Mankind could survive, achieve its aspirations and at last live in a
world of plenty, provided that it learned how to use the discoveries of science for
constructive purposes. It was for the Second Committee to begin to guide men's
activities towards that promising goal.
C. UNITED NATIONS
AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

195696
[In 1956, the General Assembly considered, at the request of Latin American
States and Spain, the question of amending the United Nations Charter to
increase the membership of the Security Council and other organs of the
United Nations in view of the increase in the membership of the Organisation.
They presented a draft resolution to increase the membership of the Security
Council from 11 to 13, and to allocate the eight non-permanent seats as
follows: Latin America, 2; Asia and Africa, 2; Western and Southern Europe,
2; Eastern Europe, 1; Commonwealth, 1.
In this speech, Mr. Menon commented on the proposal and suggested further
study of the matter.
No action was taken at that session of the General Assembly. Agreement on the
expansion of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council was
reached several years later. Amendments to the Charter were approved by the
General Assembly in 1963 and came into force in 1965.]
...The Security Council came into existence as a result of the decisions taken in
San Francisco in 1945 on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals; and those
proposals provided for the present five permanent members, as well as for six
others. Later, in London, there was what is called London agreement which is not
in writing with regard to the allocation of these non-permanent seats to different
geographical areas of the world...
My delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that, when
the United Nations was established, large numbers of States of the world were
less concerned with the problems with which we are faced today.
There have emerged in the world new countries and, what is more, Asia and
Africa have acquired new significance. At the time the United Nations was
founded, there were only two Asian countries which were members of it, namely,
China and the Philippines. India was also one of the members that assisted in the
founding of the United Nations, but then it was not independent at the time. It
96
716-20
was represented by the then Government of India, and its representation came
through what is called the Commonwealth group. Therefore, even taking India
into account, there were only three Asian countries. Instead of three Asian
countries, today from Asia and Africa we have here seventeen new entrants and
probably somewhere around twenty-seven countries belonging to the
unrepresented area.
Now, looking at the United Nations as a whole, we find that certain areas of the
world are totally neglected, as in the case of Africa, or very much under-
represented, as in the case of the whole area of Asia and Africa. Naturally, when
certain areas are under-represented, it means, in relation to that position, that
certain other areas are over-represented.
The considerations governing the composition of the Security Council were in the
minds of the framers of the Charter, for when this question of conferring powers
on the Security Council was discussed at San Francisco, the Assembly agreed that
the Security Council should have wide powers; and one of the reasons adduced
was that the non-permanent members were elected by the Assembly and
represented the Assembly as a whole. In other words, in the composition of the
Security Council, the six non-permanent members were assumed to represent the
remainder of the membership of the Assembly, that is, the world as the United
Nations then knew it. This of course casts upon us the responsibility of taking
into account these considerations.
It is well known that when a country is elected to the Security Council, it does not
always, and certainly not necessarily, represent the area. There are very well-
known instances where the contrary is the case. It is doubtful whether we could
totally remedy it, having regard to the sovereign character of our governments and
the necessity for every country casting its vote after consultation with or in
accordance with the wishes of its government. It is, of course, to be argued that
the governments themselves would have to take into account the position that, in
view of the intent of this article, and according to the San Francisco discussions
and the London agreement, their views should be representative not merely of
themselves but of certain groups...
MY DELEGATION WISHES TO PLACE BEFORE THE GENERAL

ASSEMBLY not all, but a number of considerations that should go into the
composition of the Security Council and its strength.
A great many references have been made to geographical representation. From

reading Article 23, it is quite plain that geographical representation is not the only
factor; but just because it is not the only factor, it cannot be dismissed as merely a
factor. It is a very important factor, since the Security Council is concerned with
international peace and security, in which geography plays such an important part,
and large parts of the world cannot be left unrepresented in this way.
The article also takes into account the contributions made by members to the
maintenance of peace and security. That contribution, in the realistic terms of the
world as it is, is not to be assessed merely by the positive contributions which
they will make, but also by how much world peace and security will be
endangered if their co-operation is not forthcoming.
It is unsafe to argue that because members of the Security Council, or certain

States, have not contributed recently - or might have done the reverse - for that
reason they have to be kept out. In that case we would have a very tragic situation
at the present time, with certain permanent members of the Security Council not
being available.
Therefore it is not merely a question whether they make a positive contribution; it

is the weight, the economic, the military, the political and geographical weight,
that comes into the position of a country in relation to the rest of the world that
has to be taken into account. We take all these considerations into account when
we invite members to make financial contributions. The financial contributions
are judged on capacity to pay, on population, on importance - all kinds of
considerations go into it. And we have the countries charged with respective
percentages of our total amount.
In this draft resolution (A/3446), it is stated that new members have come into the
Organisation and that the Security Council should be enlarged by two members.
As I said a while ago, when the Security Council was established, there were 50
members of the United Nations. Now there are 79 members. If 11 was
considered sufficient for 50 members, it appears that the addition of two certainly
is not a considerable one; it is doubtful whether it is proportionate.
When the League of Nations was founded, it had 42 members. Its strength varied
from time to time, because some new members joined and others were expelled or
left the League; but its strength varied from 42 to 58 members. And the strength
of the League Council varied from 10 to 14 members. Therefore, whether we
take the proportionate strength and compare it to the strength of the members of
this Assembly in terms of the history of the United Nations, or in terms of the
history of the League of Nations, the present Security Council is much too small
for this purpose.
It is quite true that at San Francisco, as well as at other places where there was
discussion, it was pointed out that the size of the Security Council should not be
such as to prevent the urgent dispatch of business. With very great respect, I
submit that the lack of urgency in the dispatch of business has not come about so
much from the size of the Security Council as from the general nature of political
conflict in the world and the irreconcilability of points of view, and perhaps from
certain procedural arrangements. So we should not lay too much stress upon the
relation of size to expedition. Of course, there is a point that is reached when size
becomes a very important factor.
I should like next to refer to the suggestion in the draft resolution with regard to
the new members. The implication obviously is to the new entrants, and when the
addition of two members is suggested, this draft resolution does not stand merely
by the words that are on paper. So much conversation has gone on, so much
discussion has taken place, and it is common knowledge that the idea is that there
should be one Asian member added - there is no Asian representation now; that is
to say, if Asia is regarded as strictly excluding the Middle East and restricted to
east, south-east and northern Asia. But, of course, if the Middle East was to be
included in the geographical definition of Asia, then it would become necessary to
include Eastern Europe in the definition of Europe. It would also be necessary to
include Latin America in the definition of America.
But, out of the 20 new members, 11 have come from these areas - the
unrepresented areas. Therefore, if there is an enlargement, the whole of this
enlargement has to go to that area. On this basis, the purpose of the enlargement
is to make the Security Council more representative, reflecting more the
membership of the General Assembly. And we say that the Security Council, as
at present constituted, is very ill-balanced, and that the addition of these two
members on this basis, instead of correcting that imbalance, will accentuate it.
The fact that you add one and one equally at the present time does not offset the
fact that there is already a preponderating imbalance existing, and also that the
equal seats that are being allocated represent two regions of unequal importance.
That is to say, there are more members from Asia and Africa which should be the
recipients of this.
There are other considerations also which should be taken into account. My
delegation would be the last to argue that we could have political influence in this
place, or voting power in this place, or anything else, merely or even
preponderatingly on the basis of population. That would be a very fallacious
argument, and it would vitiate the foundation of the United Nations, which is that
of sovereign equal States. But when we are considering questions of security,
when we are considering the functions of the Security Council, just as geography
cannot be brushed away, so a large weight of population cannot be brushed away.
And if we look at the world as it is, 1,304 million people lived in Asia in 1951 out
of a total world population of about 2,300 million.
Whatever amendment is brought in is not only for this year and, irrespective of all
the votes that can be rallied, no power in the world, if the United Nations is to
survive, can keep the real Government of China out of this place for a very long
time - I doubt if it can keep it out even for a short time. Therefore, for the present
purpose, let us include China as being represented - the representation is not
necessarily correct, but our views are well known in this matter. Even then, there
is one Asian country - or two, including the Middle Eastern countries,
representing 14 Member States in Asia and 10 Member States in the Middle
East...
Now, we should like to compare this with other regions. There is Africa, with a
population of 200 million, and from which there are today four members in the
United Nations. It is quite true that the Union of South Africa could possibly
come in as a member of the Security Council, through the Commonwealth group,
but I am afraid that the masses of the African population would not regard
representation of them by the Union as the representation of Africa. Add to that
what can happen in the next four or five years. There is the Federation of
Rhodesia, there is the new State of Ghana which will come about in March 1957,
there is Nigeria, there are the countries of East Africa and, irrespective of the
desires of the administrators and irrespective of the difficulties, there is Algeria.
Now all these countries would become members of the United Nations within a
very short period of time, so that there is a large and increasing number of
constituents in Africa, and their representation is nil. Egypt, which
geographically is in Africa, comes within the Middle Eastern franchise. That is
the position in Africa.
Now let us take Western Europe. Western Europe today has three seats: the
United Kingdom, France and one non-permanent seat. It is not sufficient, in fact,
it is not correct, in this context to argue that the draft resolution refers only to the
non-permanent seats. We are referring to increasing the strength of the Security
Council, and therefore the permanent and non-permanent seats come into
question. There are three seats for 161 million people: that is, one for 53,600,000
people. We would be the last people in the world to minimise the contribution
made by Western Europe to civilisation during the last 2,000 years and to material
civilisation in the last 500 years, but I think it would be very difficult for us to
adopt the argument of the nineteenth century that one European is equal to ten
others. That is not an argument that should be promoted in this Organisation.
Now, if you add one more seat to this representation, that would make four seats
for 161 million people, but let us look at it the other way, if you like. Let us
consider that the permanent seats are taken out of this calculation; then there
would be one seat for 77 million people in Western Europe as at present, or, if the
new suggestions are carried through, there would be two seats for 77 million
people in Western Europe, or 12 countries. That is to say, one seat for six
countries, which includes large and small.
I have with me a table of members elected to the Security Council, and it is of

some significance to note that it is only from Western Europe that a country has
been able to occupy a non-permanent seat twice. The Netherlands was elected
twice, Belgium was elected twice. That is to say, there are more seats there,
comparatively speaking, than people to contest them, otherwise no country would
be elected twice, where in every other part of the world the difficulty is to make it
go around once.
Therefore there is this very considerable imbalance, and any change that is made
must have for its prime consideration that this imbalance must be corrected.
While no mathematical distribution is possible, the Security Council must reflect
the conditions of the world - as it is.
Asia and Africa, politically and economically, and from the point of view of
security and peace, have become tremendously important in the last ten years,
and, as recent experience has shown, unless these areas and their views are taken
into account in our deliberations, the peace of the world will not be as secure as it
otherwise might be...
There are 319 million people, including the nearly 200 million in the Soviet
Union, for whom there are two seats provided. On the continent of America,
there are 348 million people and there are three seats, and four when Canada held
the seat of the Commonwealth. So, from the picture I have presented to you, you
will see that the representation on the Security Council is very disproportionate...
If India were, for example, to seek election through a group of Asian countries,
then we would be here, under present calculations, once in 26 years.
Furthermore, in view of the political changes taking place, in three years` time
India would be here once in 36 years. We are, of course, hopeful that the United
Nations will last much longer than that, but still for any country 26 years is quite a
long time.
Pakistan, our neighbour, with 70 million people and a very strategic position - that
country would be here under the same conditions. Now we are elected from the
Commonwealth group, we will be here once in 14 years, next year it would be
once in 16 years, and in the following period once in 24 years.
I submit that this does not represent the state of the world. It is not sufficient to
say that to go from 11 to 13 is a very considerable advance in correcting this
position. First of all, as I say, there is the question of imbalance - disproportion.
When you look, not only into the geographical conditions, but into the political
alignments, it becomes even more disproportionate, because the Security Council
does not function in the way it should function.
My delegation therefore regards this problem as one which requires very careful
consideration because, once it is amended this year, we cannot come back and
amend it next year. The amendment must, therefore, take into account all these
factors. We would not be agreeable to any amendment which provided one of the
new seats for Asia and the other for Europe, in fact providing one new seat for
Italy, Spain and Portugal together. That would not be a correct representation.
We cannot sell to our people the idea that it takes twenty other nations to make up
for one European nation, which was the theory in days gone by. It is very
difficult to sell that today and we have no desire to sell it - so that is that.
THEREFORE, TO SUM UP OUR POSITION, we think that any such
amendment should take into account geographical distribution as one of the
factors...
Secondly, we think any changes must correct the present imbalance and maintain
the proper balance of populations, not necessarily mathematically, but take this
factor into account. I want to be clear: countries with small populations are as
important to the United Nations as the very big countries, but we are in this
particular matter, where the maintenance of international peace and security is
concerned, taking into account the weight in terms of the peoples as one factor.
Thirdly, it is necessary that countries which, by and large, can be said to be able
to express the views or the sentiments of groups of countries, or through which
those sentiments can be channelled - should be represented on the Security
Council, and that is why I told you that, if a large country could sit but once in 26
years, the Security Council would be rather out of touch with its constituents.
And that is why, when an important problem arises, it shifts from the Security
Council either to diplomatic discussions outside, or to the General Assembly.
And since the General Assembly is not built for this purpose, we are having
plenty of difficulties because the General Assembly has not taken on certain
functions, for example, in regard to the Emergency Force and so on, for which it
was not equipped.
Fourthly, the existing representation, which ignores the 525 millions of China, has
to be rectified.....
Last year the Assembly appointed a committee of the whole [resolution 992 (x)]
for the amendment of the Charter. We believe that this problem is part of the
issues of the amendment of the Charter. Therefore this problem must receive
consideration either by that committee, with the request that it should receive
priority, or the Assembly should appoint some other representative group to go
into the whole of this question. Because, as I said, there is not one consideration;
there are large numbers of considerations. And a resolution that is put in this
way, so that its provisions would require the ratification of two-thirds of the
States, including the five permanent members, is subject to the danger that
nothing very much may happen.
My delegation wants to throw out this suggestion, and this suggestion is not one
for postponement. We share with everybody the view that this is not a matter to
be shelved. It is a matter to be considered; but mere consideration is not enough,
it must result in a remedy that is adequate...
PERSONNEL POLICY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
[The personnel policy of the United Nations was discussed by the General
Assembly, at the request of the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie.
Following attacks during the McCarthy era on alleged "subversives" in the

staff of the United Nations, the Secretary-General had succumbed to United
States opinion, and dismissed a number of staff members who had refused to
answer questions by the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the United States
Senate as to their membership of the Communist Party of the United States,
invoking the protection against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. He co-operated with the United States
Government in its investigation of the United Nations staff of United States
nationality and provided facilities for that purpose in the United Nations
Headquarters. This created serious concern among delegations and others that
the independence and integrity of the international civil service might be
undermined.
The Secretary-General presented to the General Assembly the opinion of a

commission of jurists he had appointed to advise him. It recommended the
dismissal of staff members who had refused to answer questions on possible
subversive activity against the "host country." Though the Secretary-General did
not accept all the recommendations of this Commission, the report heightened
concern as it gave a special position to the host country.
During the discussion of the matter in the General Assembly, thirteen Western
States moved a resolution. India, together with eleven other Asian and Arab
States, presented another resolution. The following is the speech by Mr. Menon
on the resolution sponsored by India.
On April 1, 1953, the Asian-Arab resolution was rejected by 29 votes to 21, with 8
abstentions. The Western draft was adopted.]
...I propose to deal with the draft resolution before us paragraph by paragraph,
explaining it and showing why we support it.
I feel sure that there is no need for me to argue that the second paragraph of the
preamble will be one which the General Assembly will desire to record and vote
on, namely, "Taking note of the satisfaction reported by the Secretary-General
97 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
663-66
with respect to the efficiency and integrity of the Secretariat." While it is true that
this sentiment is shared by all governments and delegations, and while it is true
that all of us would want it to be proclaimed, it is equally true that numerous
delegations, in the course of the debate, have expressed the view and this also
seems to be the general impression that has long been created in the public mind
that a considerable degree of unrest, or other bad feelings, exist in the Secretariat
of the Organisation.
I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Indian delegation and the
other delegations which sponsored this draft resolution, to state publicly that we
have the highest regard for the efficiency and integrity of the members of the
Secretariat. Were it not so, this matter would have come up from one delegation
or another long before there was a report from the Secretary-General. Indeed,
when my delegation first wrote to the President on this matter, it was with a view
to clearing up all these questions, so that this kind of atmosphere that surrounds
the men and women who work for us, who make the work of our Assembly, the
implementation of our decisions and the considerations of problems by us
possible, should not go unnoticed and that they should not be under any suspicion.
I therefore hope that those who have not subscribed to this draft resolution
hitherto will consider that this aspect of it is worth recording and proclaiming.
Then we come to the third paragraph of the preamble, concerning the "importance
of maintaining and developing an international civil service in accordance with
the purposes and provisions of the Charter." What we have perhaps in too brief
and abrupt form stated in this draft resolution is contained in the other draft
resolution (A/L/146/Rev.1)98 in its quotation from the Charter; we have no
objection to the preamble as set forth there. It is significant, however, that one of
the most important features of both these draft resolutions is this reference to the
international character of the civil service, expressed either in terms of our having
to conform to the provisions of the Charter, or as in our draft resolution. Here I
should like to say that the discussion which has taken place has clearly shown that
what we are discussing is really not some small matter that has come up, but the
question of the whole of the administrative machinery, its temper, its calibre and
the basis on which it should rest. I therefore find myself in disagreement with the
representative of Canada, who told us:
"Today our concern is not about millions but a few thousands of men and
women in the Secretariat of the United Nations."
That may be the superficial aspect of it. What we are considering are the main
principles on which the international civil service should be based.
If this is correct, then any review of the problem, which means an advance from
the position already reached in the Charter, requires a close and detailed study,
98 Draft resolution by France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and ten other
Western and Latin American countries.
as indicated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble.
This item has come before us not quite in the usual way. I do not mean to
say that it has come up in an improper way, but that it has come up for
discussion in the Assembly without going before a committee. I do not for a
moment suggest that there is anything improper, wrong or procedurally
questionable in this, but it does give rise to difficulties in the sense that neither
governments nor we ourselves in a collective way have had an opportunity to
discuss and consider, comment or formulate any proposals on the legal, the
political or the various other aspects of this problem.
If it is to be suggested that these aspects do not exist, the briefest way of my

meeting that argument would be to try and quote from the speeches that have
already been made. I would ask the representative of France to forgive me if I
start with him first not because I want to single him out. The representative of
France said:
"It is the first time that, apart from the technical discussions in the Fifth
Committee, the members of the United Nations have been called upon to
pass judgement on the work, organisation, operation, merits and
weaknesses of the Secretariat, and on the steps which should be taken to
improve it."
That does not look as though we were dealing with a small problem of a few
thousand people. Then he went on to say:
"Official optimism is now no longer in place; and it would be wrong to

ignore the serious crises through which the Secretariat has been passing
for several months."
The French representative said further:
"It is inevitable that such relations should not be easy. Obviously they
raise very delicate problems owing to the intimacy and multiplicity of the
contacts between the Secretariat and the host countries."
He said "host countries," in the plural. That goes to the root of the consideration
of this problem. He also said:
"Much energy could be used on more constructive and useful tasks than
this ghost-hunt or witch-hunt."
These are not my words. The representative of France continued:
"Many of the best members of the staff are thinking of resigning, while
others are discouraged. Unless care is taken, the stability and efficiency of
the Organisation may also be endangered."
He went on to say further:
"If, in connection with his work, a conflict arises between his obligations
as an international civil servant and his duties as a citizen, his only choice
is either to remain faithful to the Organisation or to submit his
resignation."
The representative of France went on in that fashion. I do not propose to discuss

this, but since I have quoted the delegation of France I should also like to quote
one or two other people.
The representative of the Netherlands said that the Secretary-General, in

paragraph 97 of his report, had endeavoured to define the expression "subversive
activities," but Mr. Von Balluseck wondered whether that definition was precise
enough. The same question could be raised, he said, with respect to paragraph
87. The Netherlands representative went on to say: "Furthermore, I have some
doubts whether the report gives a full picture of the position taken by the
Secretary-General." The representative of the Netherlands drew our attention to
the point that staff members should not be automatically dismissed "exclusively
on the grounds that they have used their constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination in official inquiries concerned with subversive activities and
espionage." He said he could not agree with that.
These matters have been referred to by delegation after delegation. My purpose

in quoting them is not to try to throw the burden of proof upon delegations that
do not support the draft resolution, but merely to point out that whatever
conclusions we may reach, here is a problem with so many facets that even
those who put their names on draft resolutions have not necessarily differing
points of view, but views covering a very wide field - the jurisprudence of
member States, their ideas of law, their ideas of public conduct and everything
else...
The Secretary-General has been good enough to say that no charges of any
character have been made, much less been proved, against any member of the
secretariat. I am sure we are all happy to hear that. Therefore it appears that the
problem before us is not one that can be easily disposed of without going into
the question of principle.
A considerable amount of material has been sent to us. We had the Secretary-
General's report before this debate opened. It was our general impression that it
would largely be based upon what is now called the jurists' opinion. With great
respect, I say that the jurists' opinion, so far as we are now concerned, is "out of
court" because the Secretary-General has told us that he has not accepted it, that
he has accepted only some parts of it. What we have is what the Secretary-
General has made his own, and therefore it saves us the embarrassment of
discussing from a juridical point of view the propositions of law and
jurisprudence that have been propounded in that report. Thus, that is out of the
way.
We have also been provided with volumes of evidence and records of

examinations conducted by committees sitting in this country. It is neither my
desire, nor would I consider it proper and appropriate, to go into any detail of
this or into the manner in which these hearings were conducted or anything of
that character. It has nothing to do with me, but I am entitled to say that in these
documents I find certain examples, of which I shall cite only one.
If a witness is asked whether he would be loyal to the United Nations or to his

own country and is thus put on the horns of a dilemma, then I think it is
appropriate for us to take that question into consideration and be able to instruct
our servants as to the conditions of employment and what their obligations are
and what they are not. I do not answer these questions. I simply say that
problems of this character have been raised. It is equally necessary for us to
consider whether or not it is appropriate, if a person withholds evidence in
accordance with his constitutional right... that we, as employers, should use the
economic pressure of employment in order that he may go back upon what he
regards as his right.
I find it difficult to accept the idea that fear of incrimination is the same thing as
having committed a crime. A crime must be proved beyond all reasonable
doubt, so Sir Gladwyn Jebb99 told us this morning. Now, what is reasonable
doubt? It is doubt of reasonable minds. Reasonable minds are minds that are
not inspired by passion, but by reason, according to law. What is more, it is
possible to prove a crime beyond reasonable doubt only when the examination
of witnesses is undertaken by counsel on one side and cross-examination takes
place by the other, and there are no questions from the court itself. But these
hearings are not conducted by courts...
In the very beginning, my delegation, in dealing with the principles of this

matter, said that we did not accept this view of "host" country. We are all host
countries and it is quite arguable that another country may have laws which the
majority of the people in this Assembly may not be willing to understand in the
same way.
At the same time, practical problems have arisen. The draft resolution we have
put forward does not have the implication that the representative of the United
Kingdom thought it had. I am sure that he does not think so as to its purpose,
which is not to hamstring any action that the Secretary-General might take...
99 The representative of the United Kingdom

At the same time, I am fully aware of the fact that we have to take into account
the great many misconceptions about this Organisation as a result of the kind of
publicity to which the representative of France referred in his speech, and
therefore something will have to be done. That is why we have produced this
draft resolution. My delegation and others associated with us have put forward
this draft resolution without placing any blame or responsibility. We have
simply asked for a study of this question...
Before retiring from this rostrum, I should like to say, mainly on behalf of
my own delegation because we have not had the opportunity of consulting the
co-sponsors of this draft, that a new factor has recently entered the situation: that
is, that the implementation of this resolution would fall to a new incumbent of
the office of Secretary General.100 In those circumstances, while I entirely
agree that there is no personal question involved here, the reference being solely
to the institution of Secretary-General, then, if the Assembly in its wisdom
thinks that this discussion has provided adequate guidance and that nothing
further is now required, I feel sure that those who have sponsored this draft
resolution would be prepared to give every consideration to the idea that both
these drafts should be shelved or withdrawn, or that some other draft should be
substituted, saying simply that the Assembly has considered these problems and
reaffirms the principles of the Charter...
TRIBUTE TO DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

1961101
[Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, died on

September 17, 1961, in a mysterious plane crash as he flew from Leopoldville,
now Kinshasa, to Ndola to meet Mr. Moise Tshombe in order to secure an end
to conflict in Katanga and resolve the problem of Katanga within the
framework of the unity of the Congo.]
I come to the rostrum on this sad occasion to pay a tribute on behalf of the
Government and the people of India to a great world statesman, a distinguished
Secretary-General of the United Nations and a friend of all of us...
100 On April 7, 1953, the General Assembly accepted the resignation of Trygve Lie and elected
Dag Hammarskjold as the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
101 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
13-14
We cannot, however, regard this as merely an occasion of personal loss, because
men, once they are born, know that they will die some time. This is a great
political event. It is an accident; it is a great international tragedy; if it is anything
else it will become an international crime. It is the desire of my Government and
people that there should be a complete investigation of this matter when the
occasion arises, and as soon as it is possible, so that the world will be assured that
those who travel around functioning on behalf of the United Nations shall be free
from hostile action by those from whom it is not expected.
My country is very shocked by this event, but we hope that the void that has been
left by the sudden departure of the Secretary-General will not leave us stunned in
such a way as not to perform our duties. In a sense it is a test for the United
Nations because there are no provisions laid down, but since we are here as
leaders of the nations of the world it is our duty to find a way out.
To Dag Hammarskjold himself - for his great devotion to the cause of the United
Nations and for the friendliness which he brought to bear among the nations of the
Organisation - we pay our tribute. To the people of Sweden, who have now
sacrificed the second of their great citizens to the cause of international peace,102
our hearts go out, and I am quite sure that the Assembly will want to remember
the colleagues of Dag Hammarskjold, the other servants of the United Nations,
who perished with him in the same catastrophe, and I wish to convey our
sympathy to their families on this occasion.
With regard to the Congo itself, the best tribute we can pay to the Secretary-
General is to see that the Security Council resolutions are implemented. Just half
an hour ago has come the news of a cease-fire in Katanga. That may be the
beginning, or perhaps the completion, of the implementation of the resolution of
the United Nations and a movement from struggle to peace.
For all these reasons we should do well to remember the service rendered by the
late Secretary-General in this connection, often under criticism, and it is not to be
wondered at that any person who is dynamic and who has a policy and ideas to
put forward should some time incur hostility and criticism. Neither that person
nor the critic, therefore, is to be regarded as being doomed to condemnation for all
times. That is part of the incidence of public life, as such, and Dag Hammarskjold
took it in that way. All representatives will remember that when last year, while
we were at the United Nations, there were demands for his resignation he said,
very courageously, that it was very easy to resign but much more difficult to stay
on. He said that if it was the desire of the smaller nations in the Assembly that he
should resign he would do so; but that, on the contrary, if it was not their desire
102 Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden (1895-1948), United Nations Mediator in Palestine, was
assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948.
that he should resign, he would stay.103
Mr. Hammarskjold brought the importance of the United Nations to bear in Africa
more than in any other part of the world. Perhaps those who have been here for
six or seven years will realise that until about three years ago Africa was spoken
of only in passing. It was only in 1957-1958, I believe, that in the Secretary-
General’s report, Africa was fully projected as an important part of United
Nations activities - not merely in the sense of receiving milk from UNICEF or
antibiotics from WHO, but as part of the problem of restoring the imbalance of
the world in which the present African position emerged. To Africa, more than
anything else, his later years were devoted, and to Africa we look for the
correction of these imbalances which will help to restore peace and harmony in
the world.
To the late Secretary-General, therefore, we pay our tribute, and as far as we are
concerned we should like to assure this Assembly that, to the best of our ability
and to the best of the ability of our Government and our people, we shall devote
ourselves to the fulfilment of the purposes of the Charter and the resolutions
passed by the United Nations - more particularly with regard to the Congo, to
Africa and to other matters.
WELCOME TO NEW MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
[Admission of new members to the United Nations was blocked from 1950 as
the Western countries vetoed eastern European States and the USSR
countered by vetoing all other applicants, including several Asian States.
India, and Krishna Menon in particular, tried hard to break the deadlock.
Some sixteen new members were admitted in a "package deal" in 1955 when
a compromise was reached. The following are speeches by Mr. Menon on the
admission of some of the new members since that time.]
MALAYA
Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on September 17,

1957104
103 The Soviet Union condemned Mr. Hammarskjold for the actions of the United Nations in the
Congo.
104 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Plenary Meetings, pages
8-9
With Malaya my country has very ancient and historic connections. In the third
century before Christian era, before the emissaries of the Emperor Asoka of that
time went to preach peace and co-operation in this land - long before that -
geologists have it that, by overland route on the continent that is now submerged,
trade was carried on between India and Malaya of that day. Later on, through the
Straits of Malacca we traded with China, and this connection between the two
territories was later cemented by the movement of populations. So today in this
vast land there are some 700,000 people of Indian origin who are either citizens of
or domiciled in the Federation of Malaya.
In welcoming the Federation of Malaya to membership in the United Nations, we

are happy to recall the fact that once again the United Kingdom, in the exercise of
its sovereignty and by the process of co-operation, has enabled one of its former
colonial territories to become an independent nation.
On this occasion, the names of two men, who are not present in the Assembly,
come foremost to mind. One is the present Prime Minister of the Federation of
Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, whose statesmanship and patience has
enabled both the United Kingdom and the several States that compose the
Federation, to overcome the difficulties that made the achievement of
independence a very long process extending over several years of negotiation.
The other name that comes to one’s mind is that of another statesman, a
Scotsman, the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in India, Mr. Malcolm
Macdonald, who a few years ago started what then seemed the impossible task of
welding the various communities and territories of Malaya in preparation for
independence.
It would not perhaps be inappropriate at this moment to say that, irrespective of

the different racial stocks that exist in the territory, it is possible, given the will
and the desire to co-operate, for them to be united in a form of independence
within the aegis of the Commonwealth of Nations. This may be an instance
which has lessons for all of us. We in India are happy to feel that the process that
we began as an act of faith in the United Kingdom and in ourselves and other
members of the Commonwealth eight or nine years ago, when the territories that
became independent decided, upon their own free will and with no pressure from
the older members of the Commonwealth, to remain in the fraternity - that act of
faith stands justified today. Now the tenth member of the Commonwealth has
been admitted as a Member of the United Nations at the dawn of its independence
and welcomed by the other States in the same way as its predecessors.
This is a further step in the Asian revolution and the liberation of colonial
peoples. Now two or three small pieces of territory have yet to take this course,
and we hope that the United Kingdom and others that have assisted in the process
of the liberation of Malaya will not be found wanting in the processes which will
accomplish the same thing in regard to other territories...
That chapter of history which began 171 years ago, when the British went to this
place and established a colony, and which has passed through various
vicissitudes, is now completed. We have no doubt that the attainment of
independence by the Federation of Malaya is not merely the achievement of that
country and the United Kingdom, but is also one of great credit to the world, and
its admission to the United Nations is a gain to us as it is to that country.
GUINEA
Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on December 12,

1958105
We join in congratulating the two main parties who made this event possible,
namely, the new Republic of Guinea and the Republic of France.
While countries have won freedom before, the modern age has seen imperialisms
abdicating their power and, at least in the last stage, in an atmosphere of
friendship and co-operation or at least in the acceptance of the inevitability of
freedom. We are also glad to feel that in the rise of the Republic of Guinea there
has been an expansion of the arena of freedom in West Africa, opened in recent
times by the action of the United Kingdom in welcoming what was the former
Gold Coast to the sisterhood of the nations of the Commonwealth.
We have no doubt at all that this event has had an impact on the awakening and
the fruition of the efforts of the people of West Africa, and I hope that the whole
of Africa will continue to have it in the same way.
In the case of Guinea there is one other factor which we must not lose sight of,
and that is the great national movement which has enabled Guinea to become
independent today - and the full participation in it of the great trade union
organisations - which gives us the hope or the insurance of social equity and
social progress in this new republic of Africa. We welcome this eighty-second
member, therefore, not merely as an addition to our large number, but as one
which will bring to this Assembly new ideas and which will contribute generally
to the lessening of tensions and to the richness which so-called small nations have
contributed to the work of this Organisation...
We hope that the admission of Guinea will be followed by the admission of other
countries with which it was linked until a few days ago. Since 1946, Guinea has
been a part of the French West African Federation. Only two days ago we read
that Dahomey, the Ivory Coast and other parts of that French federation had
105 Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings,
pages 571-572
become republics. We hope that the republican form of government, the content
of it, will justify their application for admission and our welcoming them here...
I believe that Guinea is the first element in the French colonial empire proper -
that is, excluding Cambodia, Laos, Tunisia and Morocco, which were
protectorates whose sovereignties were, theoretically, only mothered by the
presence of an empire on top of them. This is the first part of 4.5 million square
miles of colonial territory of the French empire in Africa which, by dint of its own
efforts and by the co-operation of the leadership of the French Government, has
been able to come into the United Nations...
My Government, which recognised the Government of the Republic of Guinea as

soon as it was born, joins with all of you not only in congratulating this new
republic, but in hoping that its admission to the United Nations will rapidly lead
to the expansion of freedom in West Africa, in the rest of Equatorial Africa - not
only in French Equatorial Africa - but in the rest of the former mandated and trust
territories such as Tanganyika, and, as a previous speaker has said, in two or three
years` time when the neighbouring territories come into the Organisation, we
would have altered the composition of this body sufficiently to make it more
representative of the world as it is.
THIRTEEN AFRICAN STATES AND CYPRUS
Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, on September 20,

1960106
... today we think of these fourteen new nations which have joined us - some of
them on the continent of Africa, others like Cyprus, populated by people who
have inherited an ancient civilisation. I think it is also right to say that, in some of
these cases, as in Somali land and Cyprus, for example, the United Nations has
taken a direct part, if I may say so, in that liberation. Not only those who have
gained liberty but also those who denied them liberty have learned the lesson of
liberty because the burden of empire is not always on those over whom the empire
rules, but on the people of the empire itself. They may also rest content in
thinking that, with the expansion of the political dimensions of humanity, they
have contributed to this vast Organisation greater and greater power towards
peace because empire and peace do not live together. The greater the inroads we
make into the negation of freedom which empire represents, the greater the hope
and the prospect of peace in this world.
My delegation would also like to recall on this occasion the great numbers of
men, women and statesmen who have contributed much both in the ruling
countries and in the ruled or oppressed countries in order to bring about this
consummation. I think it is only right that we should also remember those men
26-27
and women who made the supreme sacrifice in order that those who came after
them might become citizens of a free country.
The United Nations can congratulate itself that it is receiving into its fold millions
of human beings who, perhaps a generation ago, would not have been thought of
in this context, but who today represent in their own persons and presence here as
independent nations the triumph of the principles of the Charter. But that triumph
would have been short-lived unless the imbalances that exist in the world, largely
as the result of previous conditions, are not redressed both by the efforts of the
people who are liberated and by those who are in more privileged positions.
I conclude by saying that, even before this Assembly rises, we hope to welcome
into this fold newer elements who represent this freedom and that the whole
continent of Africa, the rest of Asia, the remnants of the colonial empires will also
see either the light of day or the curtain which keeps them away from it will be
ripped open by the force and energy of peoples. Once again, I wish to
congratulate all these new countries that have come into the United Nations...
SENEGAL AND MALI

1960107
It is with a sense of privileged duty that my delegation appears on this rostrum, on

its own behalf and also on behalf of the delegation of Pakistan to convey our
congratulations to the two young Republics - Senegal and Mali - which have now
joined us as States members of the United Nations.
We have reason to congratulate ourselves on more than one count. First of all, the
wisdom and statesmanship of the leaders of these countries have saved us from
the fear of another crisis and another seat of confusion on the African continent.
The Assembly owes them a debt of gratitude for having been able to resolve their
disputes in this way and for having given a demonstration of the implementation
of the principles of the Charter which calls upon people to resolve their disputes
by peaceful means...108
My country is very happy to feel that on this continent of Africa where in 1950
there were four independent countries - that is, if you include South Africa as an
independent country, large numbers of its people not being independent - there
are now some twenty-six independent countries, covering a population of 178
209-10
108 The Federation of Mali, encompassing Senegal and Mali, established in 1958, was granted
independence in June 1960. But Senegal and Mali separated soon and the two States applied for
membership in the United Nations.
million out of a total estimated population of 222 million. The great French
empire with its area of 4.5 million square miles has now only three-quarters of a
million square miles under its tutelage. It is our hope that with the victory of
freedom in Algeria, the greater part of that area also will come within the ambit of
freedom. The remainder of what is truly dark Africa is South West Africa - I use
the language of the present rulers - and Portugal in Africa. We have no doubt that
the vigour and the determination of the African peoples, backed by enlightened
public opinion and the conscience of humanity, will see the dismemberment of
the Portuguese empire and the liberation of the African peoples and others subject
to Portuguese colonialism...
NIGERIA
My delegation is privileged to be associated with other Commonwealth countries

and to be associated on behalf of the Government and people of India in the good
wishes expressed from this rostrum both to the people and Government of Nigeria
and the people and Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
present occasion when Nigeria has become an independent country. I have also
the great privilege of speaking on behalf of our neighbour countries of Burma and
Nepal, who asked me to do so.
We from India have special reason to feel gratified on this occasion, because the
current of political evolution which was released by the emancipation of India...
that process, though sometimes obstructed by the smaller-minded administrators,
has progressed, and today we have large numbers of these territories which were
formerly colonial countries that have become independent. Not only have they
become independent, but they have become independent on the one hand, by the
process of resistance, and, at the same time, by following that resistance along
routes that are not violent.
In Africa, this current manifested itself in the liberation of the colony of the Gold
Coast, now the great Republic of Ghana, which regained its territories that it had a
thousand years ago in the great Empire of Ghana.
Now, Nigeria, though its name and its present geographical boundaries are the
result of those pages of history which we desire to forget for the four hundred
years that preceded British settlement, and though its territorial boundaries are the
result of imperial occupation and conquest, that land and its peoples who were
then resident there came into the context of international relations in the first
millennium before the birth of Christ. From the ports of Egypt and India sailed
the ships of the Phoenician Empire into Nigeria in order to conduct trade, and so
525-26
did the Carthaginians. So from all times there have been relations...
There is at the present moment a comparatively unknown period between the

Phoenician traders and, so far as I know, the later period when the French made
an incursion into these territories, only halted by internal troubles in France itself.
I would like to draw the curtain over the period that follows, because this is not
the occasion for it. Then comes the challenge to the Portuguese monopoly, when
the Portuguese protested to King Edward IV of England because some of his men
had gone on to the coast of Guinea and they said they had a Portuguese monopoly
in this area and no one should go there. So began the conflict between empires,
which is always the hope of dependent peoples.
Then came the great liberal movements in England which were responsible - and I
say this deliberately - which were responsible for the overthrow of slavery and the
liberation of a large number of African peoples from the status they then had
either in their own homeland or in other parts of the world.
The British Empire settled Nigeria; the present boundaries began gradually to
emerge. It is a matter for congratulation to the British people and a matter of
satisfaction to the Nigerian people that, unlike some other parts of the world, their
many institutions, tribal systems, and so on, for various reasons which we need
not go into now, were left comparatively free and intact. The liberal
administration of West Africa enabled the emergence of the present Federation
with its territorial particularity and, at the same time, a great sense of unity. I
think, if the United Kingdom will forgive me, it is occasion not only to pay tribute
to the British Government and British State as such, and to the Nigerian people
but also to the large number of liberal administrators of West Africa - who are
different from the administrators in some other parts of the Empire, who
advocated the policy, though perhaps paternalistically, of the participation of the
peoples themselves...
The relations of our own country with Nigeria have been of an economic
character. It is singular that that area, like the rest of West Africa, is surprisingly
free from any trace of racial discrimination. It is a happy thing that in those
countries of the former British Empire which are now independent, and entirely
independent members of an association which we call the Commonwealth, where
all power and authority derives solely from their own people, there is no racial
discrimination in reverse. My own country would dislike to see, either on account
of past history or on account of a newer form of colonialism, the emergence in
any of these territories of a practice against a non-indigenous minority which
recalls the "apartheid" practice in the Union of South Africa. Discrimination in
one direction or another is against the principles of the Charter and all elementary
conceptions of human relationships.
Together, therefore, we welcome into this community of nations another great

African territory, its boundaries shaped perhaps by pages of history of which
everybody need not necessarily be proud - but progress always has diverse
elements in it - and they come here through progress made by their own efforts
very largely, responded to, as their leaders said in the Conference in London, by
the peoples and the Government of the metropolitan country in various degrees.
The number of the population liberated in Africa reached a total of 178 million in
the past twenty years...
Over a hundred years of peaceful administration have brought into existence a

federation - and a federation is a far more difficult political structure to work than
a unitary government - which is today functioning. In the continent of Africa the
struggle for that independence has been carried on comparatively peacefully.
What justification on earth can exist for the continued domination and
suppression of vast territories either by one country or another?
The United Nations, therefore, can point to all these territories as witness of the
success of its gospel and also as justification for the demand that it must make
upon other colonial countries.
At the end of the year perhaps others also will join until on that great continent
which has now become so significant in the history of the development of peoples
there alone will remain the empires of Portugal and of South Africa dominating
other peoples. We have not the slightest doubt that the sense of liberty and the
passion for freedom that rests in the minds of peoples, the example of the
greatness of these nations, their proximity, and the development - economic,
social and spiritual - they will make will be a force which no empire in the world
can resist. This is the hope that we must have today, and I, on behalf of my
Government and the people of India and of my colleagues of Nepal and Burma,
tender congratulations to Nigeria and to the Government of the United Kingdom,
and to the United Nations itself, for being able to welcome to our ranks a new
nation with new contributions to make.

Krishna Menon - Decolonisation Peace and The Unit

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SELECTED SPEECHES BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS -

DECOLONISATION, PEACE AND THE

Issued under the auspices of

An aspect of Menon’s speeches on colonialism is the inevitable context in which

Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 4, 1957

Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, December

Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, December

DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO

*Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, November 12,

*Statement in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, December 19,

TOGOLAND UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS2

REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, October 3, 1960

THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, April 5, 1961

AGGRESSION AGAINST EGYPT BY FRANCE, THE UNITED

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, November 7, 1956

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, February 2, 1957

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, March 1, 1957

THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, November 8, 1956

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, November 9, 1956

*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 1, 1952

*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 7, 1954

*Statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, January 7, 1957

PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF STATES

(A) INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN DEVELOPING THE

(B) EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

*Statement in the Second Committee of the General Assembly, November 6,

(A) AMENDMENT OF CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

(B) PERSONNEL POLICY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, April 1, 1953

(C) TRIBUTE TO DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

(D) WELCOME TO NEW MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

3. Thirteen African States and Cyprus

4. Senegal and Mali

Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, October 7, 1960

An aspect of Menon’s speeches on colonialism is the inevitable context in which

As the situation deteriorated, Asian-Arab States requested the Security Council in

As this led to no negotiations and as violence increased, the Assembly considered

After discussion, the Assembly adopted a very moderate resolution - 1184(XII)

My Government has considered the statements made by the Foreign Minister of

Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly,

Mr. Menon spoke in support of a draft resolution, sponsored by 17 Asian-African

My delegation, at the outset, considers it necessary to refer to the special

A corollary to that is the statement of the leader of the nationalist movement in

He goes on to say: "The efforts of this Government" - he is speaking for his

The head of a movement that is engaged in armed resistance in order to establish

THIS MATTER HAS BEEN BEFORE US NOW FOR THREE YEARS. We

In 1834, France proclaimed Algeria as an integral part of France. But if this

It is the view of my Government that irrespective of all political settlements that

The Government of India has never resigned its position in regard to

The Government of France expends $ 3 million a day in order to wage war

Algeria is surrounded by territories which are charged with a spirit of nascent

THEREFORE, WE COME HERE AGAIN THIS YEAR TO CONSIDER THIS

OUR OWN POSITION IN THIS MATTER HAS BEEN STATED FULLY by

In fact, the head of this Government was recognised by France as a very

"And therefore it should be easy to deal with them as representing

We have here, in our submission, a draft resolution of a character calculated and

MAY I SAY, THEREFORE, BEFORE LEAVING THIS SUBJECT, that the